IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
Link Link by certificate ID Link by certificate nameCSV information ?
Status | archived |
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Valid from | 16.02.2010 |
Valid until | 01.09.2019 |
Scheme | 🇩🇪 DE |
Manufacturer | Sony Corporation |
Category | ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems |
Security level | EAL4 |
Heuristics summary ?
Certificate ?
Certification report ?
Extracted keywords
Symmetric Algorithms
DESRandomness
RNGBlock cipher modes
ECB, CBCSecurity level
EAL 4, EAL 1, EAL 7, EAL1, EAL3, EAL5, EAL7, EAL2, EAL4, EAL6Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)
ACM_AUT, ACM_CAP, ACM_SCP, ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2, ADO_DEL, ADO_IGS, ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1, ADV_FSP, ADV_HLD, ADV_IMP, ADV_INT, ADV_LLD, ADV_RCR, ADV_SPM, AGD_ADM, AGD_USR, ALC_DVS, ALC_FLR, ALC_LCD, ALC_TAT, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ATE_FUN, ATE_COV, ATE_DPT, ATE_IND, AVA_CCA, AVA_MSU, AVA_SOF, AVA_VLA, AVA_VLA.2, AVA_VLA.3, AVA_VLA.4, APE_DES, APE_ENV, APE_INT, APE_OBJ, APE_REQ, APE_SRE, ASE_DES, ASE_ENV, ASE_INT, ASE_OBJ, ASE_PPC, ASE_REQ, ASE_SRE, ASE_TSSCertificates
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010, BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009, CC-0590-2009Evaluation facilities
Brightsight, TÜV InformationstechnikCertification process
out of scope, which is out of scope of the TOE, RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE, i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation, this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE, cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE, cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE, of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as, communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and, of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and, secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode, interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent, built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher, EEPROM built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher, Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4, IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential documentSide-channel analysis
JILCertification process
out of scope, which is out of scope of the TOE, RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE, i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation, this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE, cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE, cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE, of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as, communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and, of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and, secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode, interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent, built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher, EEPROM built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher, Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4, IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential documentStandards
AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 35, AIS 32, AIS 38, ISO/IEC 15408:1999, ISO/IEC 15408: 2005Technical reports
BSI 7125, BSI 7148, BSI 7149File metadata
Title | Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 |
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Subject | Common Criteria Certification |
Keywords | "Common Criteria, CC, Sony Corporation, IC chip for the reader / writerRC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4" |
Author | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der informationstechnik |
Creation date | D:20100303105054+01'00' |
Modification date | D:20100308120846+01'00' |
Pages | 34 |
Creator | Writer |
Producer | OpenOffice.org 3.1 |
Frontpage
Certificate ID | BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 |
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Certified item | IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4 |
Certification lab | BSI |
Developer | Sony Corporation |
Security target ?
Extracted keywords
Symmetric Algorithms
DES, Triple-DESRandomness
RNGBlock cipher modes
CBCSecurity level
EAL4Security Assurance Requirements (SAR)
ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2, ACM_SCP.1, ACM_CAP.3, ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_LLD.1, ADV_RCR.1, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2, AVA_MSU.2, AVA_SOF.1, AVA_VLA.2Security Functional Requirements (SFR)
FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1.1, FCS_CKM.1.1, FCS_CKM.4.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.1, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_SDI.1, FDP_UIT.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFC.1.1, FDP_IFF.1.1, FDP_IFF.1.2, FDP_IFF.1.3, FDP_IFF.1.4, FDP_IFF.1.5, FDP_IFF.1.6, FDP_ITT.1.1, FDP_SDI.1.1, FDP_UIT.1.1, FDP_UIT.1.2, FDP_UCT.1.1, FDP_ACC.1.1, FDP_ACF.1.1, FDP_ACF.1.2, FDP_ACF.1.3, FDP_ACF.1.4, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ACC, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UID.1.1, FIA_UID.1.2, FIA_UAU.2.1, FIA_AFL.1.1, FIA_AFL.1.2, FIA_ALF.1, FIA_UAU, FIA_AFL, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1.1, FMT_SMR.1.2, FMT_MSA.2.1, FMT_MTD.1.1, FMT_MSA.3.1, FMT_MSA.3.2, FMT_MSA.1.1, FMT_SMF.1.1, FMT_MSA, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_RCV.4, FPT_TST.1, FPT_FLS.1.1, FPT_TST.1.1, FPT_TST, FPT_TST.1.2, FPT_TST.1.3, FPT_PHP.3.1, FPT_ITT.1.1, FPT_RCV.4.1, FPT_SDI.1, FPT_AMT.1, FTP_ITC.1, FTP_ITC.1.1, FTP_ITC.1.2, FTP_ITC.1.3, FTP_TRP.1Evaluation facilities
TÜV InformationstechnikCertification process
out of scope, Out of scope, i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation, Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE, of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious, 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of, mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer, up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the, that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The, utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the, level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the, results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data, processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE, of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip, Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information, parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04Side-channel analysis
Physical Probing, physical probing, DPA, Malfunction, DFA, reverse engineeringCertification process
out of scope, Out of scope, i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation, Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE, of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious, 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of, mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer, up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the, that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The, utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the, level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the, results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data, processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE, of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip, Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information, parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04Standards
AIS20, AIS 20, ISO/IEC 18092, ISO/IEC 15408, CCIMB-99-031, CCIMB-99-032, CCIMB-99-033File metadata
Title | MDPU2 ST Ver1.11 |
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Subject | 英文(K.H.) |
Author | EbisawaHiroki |
Creation date | D:20050819223433+09'00' |
Modification date | D:20050819223926+09'00' |
Pages | 70 |
Creator | Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0 |
Producer | Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows) |
Heuristics ?
Extracted SARs
ATE_DPT.1, ADV_SPM.1, AVA_MSU.2, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_LCD.1, ADV_IMP.1, AVA_VLA.2, ADV_RCR.1, AGD_USR.1, ADV_HLD.2, ATE_COV.2, ADV_LLD.1, ATE_FUN.1, AGD_ADM.1, ALC_TAT.1, ATE_IND.2, ALC_DVS.1, AVA_SOF.1Similar certificates
Name | Certificate ID | |
---|---|---|
IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4 | BSI-DSZ-CC-0588-2009 | Compare |
IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4 | None | Compare |
References ?
No references are available for this certificate.
Updates ?
-
22.08.2024 The certificate data changed.
Certificate changed
The state of the certificate object was updated.
- The report property was updated, with the
{'download_ok': True, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': '04038fd20036e25dd082669d4b6ad415cd622314fd81fa5555094c9d9b5b2527', 'txt_hash': 'adc2bbf5d6fb629dda0a19467f713ad5744b3fd588b2aff1a48a9a4d20019191'}
data. - The st property was updated, with the
{'download_ok': True, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': 'e9e1220e48d91026af3d57651c2d4aafc383d7e462d61de9efc9a0f5fddd44b4', 'txt_hash': '06f0047ce2d6262bd013e6c87868a2b41c26a9c06801a15179fafef22c05fe3c'}
data.
The PDF extraction data was updated.
- The report_metadata property was set to
{'pdf_file_size_bytes': 767988, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 34, '/CreationDate': "D:20100303105054+01'00'", '/Subject': 'Common Criteria Certification', '/Author': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der informationstechnik', '/Creator': 'Writer', '/Keywords': '"Common Criteria, CC, Sony Corporation, IC chip for the reader / writerRC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4"', '/Producer': 'OpenOffice.org 3.1', '/ModDate': "D:20100308120846+01'00'", '/Title': 'Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['http://www.bsi.bund.de/']}}
. - The st_metadata property was set to
{'pdf_file_size_bytes': 309061, 'pdf_is_encrypted': True, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 70, '/Author': 'EbisawaHiroki', '/Comments': '英文校正 by H.Hamada', '/Company': 'Sony Corporation', '/CreationDate': "D:20050819223433+09'00'", '/Creator': 'Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0', '/ModDate': "D:20050819223926+09'00'", '/Producer': 'Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)', '/Subject': '英文(K.H.)', '/Title': 'MDPU2 ST Ver1.11', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': []}}
. - The report_frontpage property was set to
{'DE': {'match_rules': ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)'], 'cert_id': 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010', 'cert_item': 'IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4', 'developer': 'Sony Corporation', 'cert_lab': 'BSI'}}
. - The report_keywords property was set to
{'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010': 18, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009': 2}, 'NL': {'CC-0590-2009': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 4': 5, 'EAL 1': 1, 'EAL 7': 1, 'EAL1': 5, 'EAL3': 4, 'EAL5': 6, 'EAL7': 4, 'EAL2': 3, 'EAL4': 4, 'EAL6': 3}}, 'cc_sar': {'ACM': {'ACM_AUT': 2, 'ACM_CAP': 2, 'ACM_SCP': 2, 'ACM_AUT.1': 1, 'ACM_CAP.4': 1, 'ACM_SCP.2': 1}, 'ADO': {'ADO_DEL': 2, 'ADO_IGS': 2, 'ADO_DEL.2': 1, 'ADO_IGS.1': 1}, 'ADV': {'ADV_FSP': 2, 'ADV_HLD': 2, 'ADV_IMP': 2, 'ADV_INT': 2, 'ADV_LLD': 2, 'ADV_RCR': 2, 'ADV_SPM': 2}, 'AGD': {'AGD_ADM': 2, 'AGD_USR': 2}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS': 2, 'ALC_FLR': 2, 'ALC_LCD': 1, 'ALC_TAT': 2, 'ALC_DVS.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_FUN': 4, 'ATE_COV': 2, 'ATE_DPT': 2, 'ATE_IND': 2}, 'AVA': {'AVA_CCA': 2, 'AVA_MSU': 2, 'AVA_SOF': 3, 'AVA_VLA': 3, 'AVA_VLA.2': 1, 'AVA_VLA.3': 1, 'AVA_VLA.4': 1}, 'APE': {'APE_DES': 1, 'APE_ENV': 1, 'APE_INT': 1, 'APE_OBJ': 1, 'APE_REQ': 1, 'APE_SRE': 1}, 'ASE': {'ASE_DES': 1, 'ASE_ENV': 1, 'ASE_INT': 1, 'ASE_OBJ': 1, 'ASE_PPC': 1, 'ASE_REQ': 1, 'ASE_SRE': 1, 'ASE_TSS': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'vendor': {}, 'eval_facility': {'BrightSight': {'Brightsight': 2}, 'TUV': {'TÜV Informationstechnik': 2}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 4}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {}, 'crypto_scheme': {}, 'crypto_protocol': {}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 1}}, 'cipher_mode': {'ECB': {'ECB': 2}, 'CBC': {'CBC': 2}}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'other': {'JIL': 3}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI 7125': 2, 'BSI 7148': 1, 'BSI 7149': 1}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'BSI': {'AIS 20': 3, 'AIS 25': 3, 'AIS 26': 3, 'AIS 35': 2, 'AIS 32': 1, 'AIS 38': 1}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408:1999': 2, 'ISO/IEC 15408: 2005': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 7, 'which is out of scope of the TOE': 2, 'RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE': 1, 'i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation': 1, 'this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE': 1, 'cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE': 1, 'cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE': 1, 'of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as': 1, 'communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and': 1, 'of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and': 1, 'secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode': 1, 'interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent': 1, 'built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher': 1, 'EEPROM built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher': 1}, 'ConfidentialDocument': {'Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4': 1, 'IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential document': 1}}}
. - The st_keywords property was set to
{'cc_cert_id': {}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL4': 10}}, 'cc_sar': {'ACM': {'ACM_AUT.1': 3, 'ACM_CAP.4': 3, 'ACM_SCP.2': 3, 'ACM_SCP.1': 1, 'ACM_CAP.3': 1}, 'ADO': {'ADO_DEL.2': 3, 'ADO_IGS.1': 4}, 'ADV': {'ADV_FSP.2': 3, 'ADV_HLD.2': 5, 'ADV_IMP.1': 4, 'ADV_LLD.1': 5, 'ADV_RCR.1': 4, 'ADV_SPM.1': 6, 'ADV_FSP.1': 7, 'ADV_HLD.1': 2}, 'AGD': {'AGD_ADM.1': 7, 'AGD_USR.1': 3}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.1': 4, 'ALC_LCD.1': 3, 'ALC_TAT.1': 4}, 'ATE': {'ATE_COV.2': 3, 'ATE_DPT.1': 3, 'ATE_FUN.1': 3, 'ATE_IND.2': 3}, 'AVA': {'AVA_MSU.2': 3, 'AVA_SOF.1': 3, 'AVA_VLA.2': 3}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FCS': {'FCS_COP.1': 22, 'FCS_CKM.1': 20, 'FCS_CKM.4': 16, 'FCS_COP.1.1': 2, 'FCS_CKM.1.1': 2, 'FCS_CKM.4.1': 2}, 'FDP': {'FDP_IFC.1': 20, 'FDP_IFF.1': 15, 'FDP_ITT.1': 12, 'FDP_SDI.1': 14, 'FDP_UIT.1': 11, 'FDP_UCT.1': 11, 'FDP_ACC.1': 13, 'FDP_ACF.1': 10, 'FDP_IFC.1.1': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.1': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.2': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.3': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.4': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.5': 1, 'FDP_IFF.1.6': 1, 'FDP_ITT.1.1': 1, 'FDP_SDI.1.1': 1, 'FDP_UIT.1.1': 1, 'FDP_UIT.1.2': 1, 'FDP_UCT.1.1': 1, 'FDP_ACC.1.1': 1, 'FDP_ACF.1.1': 1, 'FDP_ACF.1.2': 1, 'FDP_ACF.1.3': 1, 'FDP_ACF.1.4': 1, 'FDP_ITC.1': 2, 'FDP_ACC': 3}, 'FIA': {'FIA_UID.1': 11, 'FIA_UAU.2': 10, 'FIA_AFL.1': 7, 'FIA_UID.1.1': 1, 'FIA_UID.1.2': 1, 'FIA_UAU.2.1': 1, 'FIA_AFL.1.1': 1, 'FIA_AFL.1.2': 2, 'FIA_ALF.1': 2, 'FIA_UAU': 1, 'FIA_AFL': 1}, 'FMT': {'FMT_SMR.1': 15, 'FMT_MTD.1': 10, 'FMT_MSA.2': 11, 'FMT_MSA.3': 12, 'FMT_MSA.1': 22, 'FMT_SMF.1': 11, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 1, 'FMT_MSA.2.1': 1, 'FMT_MTD.1.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.3.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA.3.2': 1, 'FMT_MSA.1.1': 2, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 1, 'FMT_MSA': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_FLS.1': 19, 'FPT_PHP.3': 14, 'FPT_ITT.1': 12, 'FPT_RCV.4': 20, 'FPT_TST.1': 11, 'FPT_FLS.1.1': 1, 'FPT_TST.1.1': 1, 'FPT_TST': 1, 'FPT_TST.1.2': 1, 'FPT_TST.1.3': 1, 'FPT_PHP.3.1': 1, 'FPT_ITT.1.1': 1, 'FPT_RCV.4.1': 1, 'FPT_SDI.1': 1, 'FPT_AMT.1': 3}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC.1': 22, 'FTP_ITC.1.1': 2, 'FTP_ITC.1.2': 2, 'FTP_ITC.1.3': 2, 'FTP_TRP.1': 2}}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'vendor': {}, 'eval_facility': {'TUV': {'TÜV Informationstechnik': 1}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 17}, '3DES': {'Triple-DES': 4}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {}, 'crypto_scheme': {}, 'crypto_protocol': {}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 1}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 1}}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'Physical Probing': 5, 'physical probing': 3, 'DPA': 1}, 'FI': {'Malfunction': 26, 'DFA': 1}, 'other': {'reverse engineering': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'BSI': {'AIS20': 2, 'AIS 20': 1}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 18092': 2, 'ISO/IEC 15408': 6}, 'CC': {'CCIMB-99-031': 1, 'CCIMB-99-032': 1, 'CCIMB-99-033': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 10, 'Out of scope': 1, 'i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation': 1, 'Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE': 1, 'of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious': 1, '2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of': 1, 'mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer': 1, 'up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the': 1, 'that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The': 1, 'utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the': 1, 'level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the': 1, 'results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data': 1, 'processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE': 1, 'of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip': 1, 'Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information': 1, 'parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04': 1}}}
. - The report_filename property was set to
0662a_pdf.pdf
. - The st_filename property was set to
0308b_pdf.pdf
.
The computed heuristics were updated.
- The cert_lab property was set to
['BSI']
. - The cert_id property was set to
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
. - The extracted_sars property was set to
{'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_SPM', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AVA_MSU', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AVA_VLA', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_RCR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_USR', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_HLD', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_LLD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_ADM', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_IND', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DVS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AVA_SOF', 'level': 1}]}
.
- The report property was updated, with the
-
17.08.2024 The certificate data changed.
Certificate changed
The report_link was updated.
- The new value is
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0662a_pdf.pdf
.
The st_link was updated.
- The new value is
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf
.
The state of the certificate object was updated.
- The st property was updated, with the
{'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None}
data.
The PDF extraction data was updated.
- The st_metadata property was set to
None
. - The st_keywords property was set to
None
. - The st_filename property was set to
None
.
The computed heuristics were updated.
- The extracted_sars property was set to
None
.
- The new value is
-
12.08.2024 The certificate data changed.
Certificate changed
The state of the certificate object was updated.
- The report property was updated, with the
{'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None}
data.
The PDF extraction data was updated.
- The report_metadata property was set to
None
. - The report_frontpage property was set to
None
. - The report_keywords property was set to
None
. - The report_filename property was set to
None
.
The computed heuristics were updated.
- The cert_lab property was set to
None
. - The cert_id property was set to
None
.
- The report property was updated, with the
-
23.07.2024 The certificate was first processed.
New certificate
A new Common Criteria certificate with the product name IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4 was processed.
Raw data
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate",
"category": "ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems",
"cert_link": null,
"dgst": "f3abe81c51dd5651",
"heuristics": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.Heuristics",
"annotated_references": null,
"cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010",
"cert_lab": [
"BSI"
],
"cpe_matches": null,
"direct_transitive_cves": null,
"extracted_sars": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": [
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ATE_IND",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ALC_TAT",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ATE_COV",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_RCR",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "AVA_VLA",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ATE_FUN",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_FSP",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "AVA_SOF",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ALC_LCD",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "AVA_MSU",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "AGD_USR",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "AGD_ADM",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ATE_DPT",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_SPM",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_IMP",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ALC_DVS",
"level": 1
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_HLD",
"level": 2
},
{
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
"family": "ADV_LLD",
"level": 1
}
]
},
"extracted_versions": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": [
"4"
]
},
"indirect_transitive_cves": null,
"related_cves": null,
"report_references": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
"directly_referenced_by": null,
"directly_referencing": null,
"indirectly_referenced_by": null,
"indirectly_referencing": null
},
"scheme_data": null,
"st_references": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
"directly_referenced_by": null,
"directly_referencing": null,
"indirectly_referenced_by": null,
"indirectly_referencing": null
},
"verified_cpe_matches": null
},
"maintenance_updates": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": []
},
"manufacturer": "Sony Corporation",
"manufacturer_web": "https://www.sony.com/",
"name": "IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4",
"not_valid_after": "2019-09-01",
"not_valid_before": "2010-02-16",
"pdf_data": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.PdfData",
"cert_filename": null,
"cert_frontpage": null,
"cert_keywords": null,
"cert_metadata": null,
"report_filename": "0662a_pdf.pdf",
"report_frontpage": {
"DE": {
"cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010",
"cert_item": "IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4",
"cert_lab": "BSI",
"developer": "Sony Corporation",
"match_rules": [
"(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)"
]
}
},
"report_keywords": {
"asymmetric_crypto": {},
"cc_cert_id": {
"DE": {
"BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009": 2,
"BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010": 18
},
"NL": {
"CC-0590-2009": 1
}
},
"cc_claims": {},
"cc_protection_profile_id": {},
"cc_sar": {
"ACM": {
"ACM_AUT": 2,
"ACM_AUT.1": 1,
"ACM_CAP": 2,
"ACM_CAP.4": 1,
"ACM_SCP": 2,
"ACM_SCP.2": 1
},
"ADO": {
"ADO_DEL": 2,
"ADO_DEL.2": 1,
"ADO_IGS": 2,
"ADO_IGS.1": 1
},
"ADV": {
"ADV_FSP": 2,
"ADV_HLD": 2,
"ADV_IMP": 2,
"ADV_INT": 2,
"ADV_LLD": 2,
"ADV_RCR": 2,
"ADV_SPM": 2
},
"AGD": {
"AGD_ADM": 2,
"AGD_USR": 2
},
"ALC": {
"ALC_DVS": 2,
"ALC_DVS.1": 1,
"ALC_FLR": 2,
"ALC_LCD": 1,
"ALC_LCD.1": 1,
"ALC_TAT": 2,
"ALC_TAT.1": 1
},
"APE": {
"APE_DES": 1,
"APE_ENV": 1,
"APE_INT": 1,
"APE_OBJ": 1,
"APE_REQ": 1,
"APE_SRE": 1
},
"ASE": {
"ASE_DES": 1,
"ASE_ENV": 1,
"ASE_INT": 1,
"ASE_OBJ": 1,
"ASE_PPC": 1,
"ASE_REQ": 1,
"ASE_SRE": 1,
"ASE_TSS": 1
},
"ATE": {
"ATE_COV": 2,
"ATE_DPT": 2,
"ATE_FUN": 4,
"ATE_IND": 2
},
"AVA": {
"AVA_CCA": 2,
"AVA_MSU": 2,
"AVA_SOF": 3,
"AVA_VLA": 3,
"AVA_VLA.2": 1,
"AVA_VLA.3": 1,
"AVA_VLA.4": 1
}
},
"cc_security_level": {
"EAL": {
"EAL 1": 1,
"EAL 4": 5,
"EAL 7": 1,
"EAL1": 5,
"EAL2": 3,
"EAL3": 4,
"EAL4": 4,
"EAL5": 6,
"EAL6": 3,
"EAL7": 4
}
},
"cc_sfr": {},
"certification_process": {
"ConfidentialDocument": {
"IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of T\u00dcV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential document": 1,
"Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4": 1
},
"OutOfScope": {
"EEPROM built in the IC chip. \u25cf A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher": 1,
"RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE": 1,
"built in the IC chip. \u25cf A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher": 1,
"communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and": 1,
"cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Firmware (out of scope of the TOE": 1,
"cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. \u25cf Firmware (out of scope of the TOE": 1,
"i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation": 1,
"interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent": 1,
"of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as": 1,
"of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and": 1,
"out of scope": 7,
"secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode": 1,
"this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE": 1,
"which is out of scope of the TOE": 2
}
},
"cipher_mode": {
"CBC": {
"CBC": 2
},
"ECB": {
"ECB": 2
}
},
"cplc_data": {},
"crypto_engine": {},
"crypto_library": {},
"crypto_protocol": {},
"crypto_scheme": {},
"device_model": {},
"ecc_curve": {},
"eval_facility": {
"BrightSight": {
"Brightsight": 2
},
"TUV": {
"T\u00dcV Informationstechnik": 2
}
},
"hash_function": {},
"ic_data_group": {},
"javacard_api_const": {},
"javacard_packages": {},
"javacard_version": {},
"os_name": {},
"pq_crypto": {},
"randomness": {
"RNG": {
"RNG": 1
}
},
"side_channel_analysis": {
"other": {
"JIL": 3
}
},
"standard_id": {
"BSI": {
"AIS 20": 3,
"AIS 25": 3,
"AIS 26": 3,
"AIS 32": 1,
"AIS 35": 2,
"AIS 38": 1
},
"ISO": {
"ISO/IEC 15408: 2005": 1,
"ISO/IEC 15408:1999": 2
}
},
"symmetric_crypto": {
"DES": {
"DES": {
"DES": 4
}
}
},
"technical_report_id": {
"BSI": {
"BSI 7125": 2,
"BSI 7148": 1,
"BSI 7149": 1
}
},
"tee_name": {},
"tls_cipher_suite": {},
"vendor": {},
"vulnerability": {}
},
"report_metadata": {
"/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der informationstechnik",
"/CreationDate": "D:20100303105054+01\u002700\u0027",
"/Creator": "Writer",
"/Keywords": "\"Common Criteria, CC, Sony Corporation, IC chip for the reader / writerRC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4\"",
"/ModDate": "D:20100308120846+01\u002700\u0027",
"/Producer": "OpenOffice.org 3.1",
"/Subject": "Common Criteria Certification",
"/Title": "Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010",
"pdf_file_size_bytes": 767988,
"pdf_hyperlinks": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": [
"http://www.bsi.bund.de/"
]
},
"pdf_is_encrypted": false,
"pdf_number_of_pages": 34
},
"st_filename": "0308b_pdf.pdf",
"st_frontpage": null,
"st_keywords": {
"asymmetric_crypto": {},
"cc_cert_id": {},
"cc_claims": {},
"cc_protection_profile_id": {},
"cc_sar": {
"ACM": {
"ACM_AUT.1": 3,
"ACM_CAP.3": 1,
"ACM_CAP.4": 3,
"ACM_SCP.1": 1,
"ACM_SCP.2": 3
},
"ADO": {
"ADO_DEL.2": 3,
"ADO_IGS.1": 4
},
"ADV": {
"ADV_FSP.1": 7,
"ADV_FSP.2": 3,
"ADV_HLD.1": 2,
"ADV_HLD.2": 5,
"ADV_IMP.1": 4,
"ADV_LLD.1": 5,
"ADV_RCR.1": 4,
"ADV_SPM.1": 6
},
"AGD": {
"AGD_ADM.1": 7,
"AGD_USR.1": 3
},
"ALC": {
"ALC_DVS.1": 4,
"ALC_LCD.1": 3,
"ALC_TAT.1": 4
},
"ATE": {
"ATE_COV.2": 3,
"ATE_DPT.1": 3,
"ATE_FUN.1": 3,
"ATE_IND.2": 3
},
"AVA": {
"AVA_MSU.2": 3,
"AVA_SOF.1": 3,
"AVA_VLA.2": 3
}
},
"cc_security_level": {
"EAL": {
"EAL4": 10
}
},
"cc_sfr": {
"FCS": {
"FCS_CKM.1": 20,
"FCS_CKM.1.1": 2,
"FCS_CKM.4": 16,
"FCS_CKM.4.1": 2,
"FCS_COP.1": 22,
"FCS_COP.1.1": 2
},
"FDP": {
"FDP_ACC": 3,
"FDP_ACC.1": 13,
"FDP_ACC.1.1": 1,
"FDP_ACF.1": 10,
"FDP_ACF.1.1": 1,
"FDP_ACF.1.2": 1,
"FDP_ACF.1.3": 1,
"FDP_ACF.1.4": 1,
"FDP_IFC.1": 20,
"FDP_IFC.1.1": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1": 15,
"FDP_IFF.1.1": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1.2": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1.3": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1.4": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1.5": 1,
"FDP_IFF.1.6": 1,
"FDP_ITC.1": 2,
"FDP_ITT.1": 12,
"FDP_ITT.1.1": 1,
"FDP_SDI.1": 14,
"FDP_SDI.1.1": 1,
"FDP_UCT.1": 11,
"FDP_UCT.1.1": 1,
"FDP_UIT.1": 11,
"FDP_UIT.1.1": 1,
"FDP_UIT.1.2": 1
},
"FIA": {
"FIA_AFL": 1,
"FIA_AFL.1": 7,
"FIA_AFL.1.1": 1,
"FIA_AFL.1.2": 2,
"FIA_ALF.1": 2,
"FIA_UAU": 1,
"FIA_UAU.2": 10,
"FIA_UAU.2.1": 1,
"FIA_UID.1": 11,
"FIA_UID.1.1": 1,
"FIA_UID.1.2": 1
},
"FMT": {
"FMT_MSA": 1,
"FMT_MSA.1": 22,
"FMT_MSA.1.1": 2,
"FMT_MSA.2": 11,
"FMT_MSA.2.1": 1,
"FMT_MSA.3": 12,
"FMT_MSA.3.1": 1,
"FMT_MSA.3.2": 1,
"FMT_MTD.1": 10,
"FMT_MTD.1.1": 1,
"FMT_SMF.1": 11,
"FMT_SMF.1.1": 1,
"FMT_SMR.1": 15,
"FMT_SMR.1.1": 1,
"FMT_SMR.1.2": 1
},
"FPT": {
"FPT_AMT.1": 3,
"FPT_FLS.1": 19,
"FPT_FLS.1.1": 1,
"FPT_ITT.1": 12,
"FPT_ITT.1.1": 1,
"FPT_PHP.3": 14,
"FPT_PHP.3.1": 1,
"FPT_RCV.4": 20,
"FPT_RCV.4.1": 1,
"FPT_SDI.1": 1,
"FPT_TST": 1,
"FPT_TST.1": 11,
"FPT_TST.1.1": 1,
"FPT_TST.1.2": 1,
"FPT_TST.1.3": 1
},
"FTP": {
"FTP_ITC.1": 22,
"FTP_ITC.1.1": 2,
"FTP_ITC.1.2": 2,
"FTP_ITC.1.3": 2,
"FTP_TRP.1": 2
}
},
"certification_process": {
"OutOfScope": {
"2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the \u201c2.1 Product Type\u201d. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of": 1,
"Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information": 1,
"Out of scope": 1,
"Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE": 1,
"i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation": 1,
"level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the": 1,
"mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer": 1,
"of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious": 1,
"of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip": 1,
"out of scope": 10,
"parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04": 1,
"processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE": 1,
"results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data": 1,
"that the following paragraphs describe the TOE\u2019s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The": 1,
"up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the": 1,
"utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the": 1
}
},
"cipher_mode": {
"CBC": {
"CBC": 1
}
},
"cplc_data": {},
"crypto_engine": {},
"crypto_library": {},
"crypto_protocol": {},
"crypto_scheme": {},
"device_model": {},
"ecc_curve": {},
"eval_facility": {
"TUV": {
"T\u00dcV Informationstechnik": 1
}
},
"hash_function": {},
"ic_data_group": {},
"javacard_api_const": {},
"javacard_packages": {},
"javacard_version": {},
"os_name": {},
"pq_crypto": {},
"randomness": {
"RNG": {
"RNG": 1
}
},
"side_channel_analysis": {
"FI": {
"DFA": 1,
"Malfunction": 26
},
"SCA": {
"DPA": 1,
"Physical Probing": 5,
"physical probing": 3
},
"other": {
"reverse engineering": 1
}
},
"standard_id": {
"BSI": {
"AIS 20": 1,
"AIS20": 2
},
"CC": {
"CCIMB-99-031": 1,
"CCIMB-99-032": 1,
"CCIMB-99-033": 1
},
"ISO": {
"ISO/IEC 15408": 6,
"ISO/IEC 18092": 2
}
},
"symmetric_crypto": {
"DES": {
"3DES": {
"Triple-DES": 4
},
"DES": {
"DES": 17
}
}
},
"technical_report_id": {},
"tee_name": {},
"tls_cipher_suite": {},
"vendor": {},
"vulnerability": {}
},
"st_metadata": {
"/Author": "EbisawaHiroki",
"/Comments": "\u82f1\u6587\u6821\u6b63 by H.Hamada",
"/Company": "Sony Corporation",
"/CreationDate": "D:20050819223433+09\u002700\u0027",
"/Creator": "Word \u7528 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0",
"/ModDate": "D:20050819223926+09\u002700\u0027",
"/Producer": "Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)",
"/Subject": "\u82f1\u6587(K.H.)",
"/Title": "MDPU2 ST Ver1.11",
"pdf_file_size_bytes": 309061,
"pdf_hyperlinks": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": []
},
"pdf_is_encrypted": true,
"pdf_number_of_pages": 70
}
},
"protection_profiles": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": []
},
"report_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0662a_pdf.pdf",
"scheme": "DE",
"security_level": {
"_type": "Set",
"elements": [
"EAL4"
]
},
"st_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf",
"state": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.InternalState",
"cert": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
"convert_garbage": false,
"convert_ok": false,
"download_ok": false,
"extract_ok": false,
"pdf_hash": null,
"txt_hash": null
},
"report": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
"convert_garbage": false,
"convert_ok": true,
"download_ok": true,
"extract_ok": true,
"pdf_hash": "04038fd20036e25dd082669d4b6ad415cd622314fd81fa5555094c9d9b5b2527",
"txt_hash": "adc2bbf5d6fb629dda0a19467f713ad5744b3fd588b2aff1a48a9a4d20019191"
},
"st": {
"_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
"convert_garbage": false,
"convert_ok": true,
"download_ok": true,
"extract_ok": true,
"pdf_hash": "e9e1220e48d91026af3d57651c2d4aafc383d7e462d61de9efc9a0f5fddd44b4",
"txt_hash": "06f0047ce2d6262bd013e6c87868a2b41c26a9c06801a15179fafef22c05fe3c"
}
},
"status": "archived"
}