BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
for
IC chip for the reader / writer
RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4
from
Sony Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
IC chip for the reader / writer
RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), Version 4
from Sony Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice
of the Certification Body for smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 February 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz, BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
7.1 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN...............................................................16
7.2 Evaluator Tests......................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................22
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408: 2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz, BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
7 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), Version 4 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-
CC-0590-2009. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009 were
re-used.
The evaluation of the product IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG),
Version 4 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 22 January 2010. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Sony Corporation
The product was developed by: Sony Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), Version 4 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Sony Corporation
Gate City Osaki, Osaki East Tec.
1-11-1 Osaki Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo
141-0032 Japan
9 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an IC chip with the product name “RC-S940” (product
code ”CXD9768GG”, produced at the Oita wafer production site8
) Version 4 that will be
embedded into a Smart Card Reader/Writer. The IC chip (refer to figure 1: Block Diagram
of TOE) consists of memories (16kBytes ROM, 128kBytes EEPROM, and 4kBytes SRAM),
data bus, security logic, peripheral devices, I/O interface, a dedicated CPU, etc. In the
ROM the program for control of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data
and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM
area communication data and other processed data are stored as temporary data. The
TOE contains some security logic (Random Number Generator, CRYPTO Engine and
Illegal Voltage/Frequency/Temperature Detection Sensors) and peripheral devices (Timer,
Interrupt Controller, Clock Gear and Reset Generator) are used for maintaining
performance and security. The IC chip provides an UART interface used for
communication with the controller (e.g. a PC connected to the Reader/Writer the TOE is
built in) and a RF CARD interface used for communication with a contactless Smart Card
(RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE).
This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and
STOP Mode are within the scope of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware,
which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation.
The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and subsequent
secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to
EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode (this
interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides
physical and logical security functionality to prevent disclosing or modification of data
stored inside the IC chip. The concrete security functions of the TOE are listed in table 1.
Figure 1: Block diagram of the RC-S940
8
Sony confirms that the RC-S940 will be produced only at the Oita wafer production site, which was part of
the evaluation.
12 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Configuration of the functional blocks of TOE is as listed below:
● CPU: TLCS-900/L1 CPU is a 16-bit CPU. It has 16MBytes of linear address space.
● SRAM: 4kB SRAM built in the IC chip.
● ROM: 16kB ROM built in the IC chip.
● ROM program stored in the ROM.
● EEPROM: 128kB (64kB x 2) EEPROM built in the IC chip.
● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM.
● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM.
● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher co-processor (Triple DES,
compatible with ECB Mode / CBC Mode), random number generation function, and
detect function (illegal voltage detect function, illegal frequency detect function, illegal
temperature detect function).
● Peripheral Equipment: Peripheral equipment contains a 16-bit timer, interrupt controller,
reset controller and clock gear.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part
2. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.1 Detection of illegal operation
SF.2 Protection to information leakage
SF.3 Physical protection
SF.4 Encryption of data
SF.5 Mutual authentication
SF.6 Protection of data passing through the interface
SF.7 Self Test
SF.8 Protection of internal data
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'basic' (SOF-basic) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
13 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions and Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2
and 3.3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The Security Target [6]
and [9] identifies only one configuration of the TOE, the IC chip for the reader / writer RC-
S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4. For details please refer to chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IC chip for the reader / writer
RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), Version 4
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Relea
se
Form of Delivery
1 HW /
FW
IC chip RC-S940 (product code
CXD9768GG produced at the Oita
wafer production site), i.e. the TOE
(including ROM program version 3,
Mask set version 3)
4 Trusted carrier and
sealed packaging
2 DOC Document RC-S940 IPL Users Manual
[10]
1.0 Electronic transfer,
PGP-encrypted
3 DOC Document RC-S940 Operation
Guideline [11]
1.1 Electronic transfer,
PGP-encrypted
4 DOC Document RC-S940 Administrator
Tools Manual [12]
2.0 Electronic transfer,
PGP-encrypted
5 DOC Shipping key and program signature N/A Electronic transfer,
PGP-encrypted
6 DOC Correspondence table:
serial no. vs. ID number IDm
N/A Electronic transfer,
PGP-encrypted
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
14 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide security functionality for a secure download of
firmware to the EEPROM and for secure communication between a controller and the
IC chip.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of the Threats are not
covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled
by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Secure communication
channel, management of external TOE data, personnel and delivery procedures. Details
can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
C P U R O M S R A M E E P R O M
S e c u r i t y L o g i c
P e r i p h e r a l
E q u i p m e n t
D a t a
- B u s
Figure 2: Block diagram of TOE
The configuration of the functional blocks of the TOE are:
● CPU: 16bit CPU with 16MBytes of linear address space.
● SRAM: 4kB SRAM built in the IC chip.
● ROM: 16kB ROM built in the IC chip.
● ROM program stored in the ROM.
● EEPROM: 128kB (64kB x 2) EEPROM built in the IC chip.
● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM.
● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM.
● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher co-processor (Triple DES), random
number generation function, and detect function (illegal voltage detect function, illegal
frequency detect function, illegal temperature detect function).
● Peripheral Equipment: Peripheral equipment contains a timer, interrupt controller, reset
controller and clock gear.
15 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developers testing effort can be summarized in the following four aspects.
TOE test configuration:
● The tests are performed with the chip RC-S940 Version 4. To be able to test all TSF in
detail for some tests special prepared chips are used.
Testing approach:
● All TSF and related sub-functions and subsystems are tested in order to assure
complete coverage of all SFR, addressing both hardware and ROM program
functionalities of the TOE. The developer combines automated test tools and manual
test procedures, as appropriate for the item under test.
Testing depth:
● The tests are performed on (sub-) function level and can be mapped to mechanisms
interfaces and subsystems.
● The developer has tested the TOE systematically at the level of TSF functionalities as
given in the functional specification.
● The developer has tested the TOE systematically at the level of the subsystems as
given in the high level design.
● The entire test set comprises 756 individual test cases.
Testing result:
● All testing strategies of the TSF passed all tests of individual tests.
● Overall the TSF have been tested systematically against the functional specification
and the high-level design.
● The developer tests demonstrate that the security functions perform as specified.
All test results are as expected and no test failed.
For re-evaluation:
The developer did not repeat any developer testing, as the TOE is unchanged.
7.2 Evaluator Tests
Independent testing according to ATE_IND:
The independent testing was partly performed in the developer’s testing environment in
Tokyo, Japan and partly at TNO (name has changed to Brightsight in the meantime) in
16 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Delft, Netherlands. During the testing at the developer’s site the same platforms and tools
as for the developer tests were used.
The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE as
described in functional specification and the high level design, and to verify the developer's
test results by sampling a representative set from the developer's tests and additionally
add independent tests.
The results of the specified and conducted independent evaluator tests confirm the TOE
functionality as described in functional specification and the high level design. The TOE
security functions were found to behave as specified.
The results of the developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator, matched
the results the developer stated in the developer test documentation.
For re-evaluation:
The evaluator did not repeat any developer testing, as the TOE is unchanged.
Penetration testing according to AVA_VLA:
The penetration testing was performed by the subcontracted hardware evaluation facility of
TNO (Brightsight). Due to the nature of this testing, specific hardware investigation and
electronic lab equipment was used. As result of the Summary Report Theoretical
Vulnerability Analysis the evaluator conducted Evaluation Body Testing.
The conducted penetration testing confirms that the TOE in the intended environment of
use does not feature any exploitable vulnerability for attackers with low attack potential.
For re-evaluation:
The evaluator did not conduct evaluation body testing, as the TOE is unchanged.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The Security Target [6]
and [9] identifies only one configuration of the TOE. The tests are performed with the chip
RC-S940, product code CXD9768GG, Version 4 (ROM ver.3, mask set ver.3). This is in
consistence to the configuration identified in the Security Target [6] and [9].
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
17 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on two sites that have moved
since the last certification.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: SOF-
basic
– SF4-1, SF4-3: Pseudo Random Number Generator part
– SF5: Mutual authentication
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20, AIS 25 and
AIS 26 (see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security Function SF4-2 (Triple DES Cipher system).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
18 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IPL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RF Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
19 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
20 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.9
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security
Target (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940
Version 4 Reader/Writer IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations-
technik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation
(confidential document)
[9] Security Target (Public Version) BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005,
RC-S940 Security Target (sanitised public document)
[10] RC-S940 IPL Users Manual Version 1.0, 4 March 2004, Sony Corporation
[11] RC-S940 Operation Guideline, Version 1.1, May 26, 2004
[12] RC-S940 Administrator Tools Manual, Version 2.0, June 21, 2005
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
21 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the
conformance result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages
listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
22 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
23 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
24 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
25 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
26 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
27 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
28 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
29 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
30 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
31 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
32 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), Version 4 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended
by advice of the Certification Body for smart card specific guidance for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 February 2010, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
● ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
● ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
● ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) FeliCa Business Division, Sony Corporation (GCO Site)
Role: Development of hardware / ROM program
Gate City Osaki West Tower, 9F, 1-11-1 Osaki Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo, 141-0032,
Japan
b) Ofuna Development Center, Toshiba Corporation (Ofuna Site)
Role: Development of hardware, design of masks
2-5-1, Kasama-cho, Sakae-ku, Yokohama-city, Kanagawa-pref., Japan
c) Oita Factory, Toshiba Corporation (Oita Site)
Role: Manufacture of wafers
3500, Matsuoka, Oita-city Oita-pref., Japan
d) Toshiba LSI Package Solutions Corporation (Kitsuki Site)
Role: Manufacture of LSI
2820-2, Minami-Kitsuki, Kitsuki-city, Oita-pref., Japan
e) Sony EMCS Kisarazu Tec (Kisarazu Site)
Role: Initialization of the LSI / Installation of the customer's information to the LSI
8-4, Shiomi Kisarazu-shi, Chiba-pref., Japan
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
33 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
34 / 34