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Sony RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0
NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR 		SAMSUNG S3FS91J / S3FS91H / S3FS91V / S3FS93I Secure Microcontroller RISC 32-bits, with SWP, Rev. 5
ANSSI-CC-2009/25
name Sony RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0 SAMSUNG S3FS91J / S3FS91H / S3FS91V / S3FS93I Secure Microcontroller RISC 32-bits, with SWP, Rev. 5
scheme NL FR
not_valid_after 24.06.2019 01.09.2019
not_valid_before 24.06.2009 15.10.2009
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/Certification_Report_NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC_2009-25fr.pdf
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/957-2-STP-E01-10.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC-cible_2009-25en.pdf
manufacturer Sony Corporation Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
manufacturer_web https://www.sony.com/ https://www.samsung.com
security_level EAL4 EAL4+, AVA_VLA.4, AVA_MSU.3, ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2
dgst b2a375e103b59ffb d841ce8fe4160d6c
heuristics/cert_id NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR ANSSI-CC-2009/25
heuristics/cert_lab [] CEA
heuristics/extracted_sars ADV_LLD.1, AVA_MSU.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ADV_FSP.2, AGD_ADM.1, ATE_IND.2, ATE_FUN.1, ADV_RCR.1, ATE_DPT.1, AVA_SOF.1, AVA_VLA.2, AGD_USR.1, ATE_COV.2, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.1 ADV_LLD.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_DVS.2, ADV_IMP.2, AGD_ADM.1, ATE_IND.2, AVA_VLA.4, ADV_RCR.1, ATE_DPT.1, AVA_SOF.1, ADV_HLD.2, AGD_USR.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_FUN.1, AVA_MSU.3, ADV_SPM.1
heuristics/extracted_versions 1.0 5, 32
heuristics/report_references/directly_referenced_by {} ANSSI-CC-2009/57
heuristics/report_references/directly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006 {}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referenced_by {} ANSSI-CC-2011/24, ANSSI-CC-2009/57, ANSSI-CC-2013/65, ANSSI-CC-2013/60, ANSSI-CC-2016/60, ANSSI-CC-2013/49, NSCIB-CC-09-26151-CR, ANSSI-CC-2019/38, ANSSI-CC-2012/06, ANSSI-CC-2012/39, ANSSI-CC-2014/81, NSCIB-CC-11-32973-CR
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0212-2004, BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006 {}
heuristics/st_references/directly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006 {}
heuristics/st_references/indirectly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006 {}
heuristics/protection_profiles {} 62c62b4b4210800e
maintenance_updates
protection_profile_links {} https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfiles/ssvgpp01.pdf
pdf_data/report_filename Certification_Report_NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR.pdf ANSSI-CC_2009-25fr.pdf
pdf_data/report_frontpage
  • FR:
  • NL:
  • FR:
    • cc_security_level: EAL 4 augmenté ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
    • cc_version: Critères Communs version 2.3 conforme à la norme ISO 15408:2005
    • cert_id: ANSSI-CC-2009/25
    • cert_item: Microcontrôleurs RISC 32-bits SAMSUNG S3FS91J / S3FS91H / S3FS91V / S3FS93I, avec SWP, Rév. 5
    • cert_item_version: Microcontrôleur : S3FS91J/ S3FS91H/ S3FS91V/ S3FS93I - Rév. 5 Librairies logicielles : Test Rom code version 1.0, RSA library version 3.9S, TRNG library version 1.0, Secure Bootloader version 1.0
    • cert_lab: CEA - LETI 17 rue des martyrs, 38054 Grenoble Cedex 9, France Tél : +33 (0)4 38 78 40 87, mél : [email protected]
    • developer: Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd San#24 Nongseo-Ri, Giheung-Eup, Yongin-City, Gyeonggi-Do, 449-711, République de Corée Commanditaire Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd San#24 Nongseo-Ri, Giheung-Eup, Yongin-City, Gyeonggi-Do, 449-711, République de Corée
    • match_rules: ['Référence du rapport de certification(.+)Nom du produit(.+)Référence/version du produit(.+)Conformité à un profil de protection(.+)Critères d’évaluation et version(.+)Niveau d’évaluation(.+)Développeur (.+)Centre d’évaluation(.+)Accords de reconnaissance applicables']
    • ref_protection_profiles: BSI-PP-0002-2001 Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0 July 2001
  • NL:
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006: 1
  • NL:
    • NSCIB-07-09612: 1
    • NSCIB-CC-09-10991: 2
    • NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR: 16
  • FR:
    • ANSSI-CC-2009/25: 18
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-PP- 0002: 1
    • BSI-PP-0002: 2
  • BSI:
    • BSI-PP-0002-2001: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL 4: 2
    • EAL4: 1
    • EAL7: 1
  • EAL:
    • EAL 1: 1
    • EAL 3: 1
    • EAL 4: 2
    • EAL 5: 1
    • EAL 7: 1
    • EAL4: 4
    • EAL4+: 2
    • EAL5+: 1
    • EAL7: 1
  • ITSEC:
    • ITSEC E6 et: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT.1: 1
    • ACM_CAP.4: 1
    • ACM_SCP.2: 1
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL.1: 1
    • ADO_IGS.1: 1
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.2: 1
    • ADV_HLD.2: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 1
    • ADV_LLD.1: 1
    • ADV_RCR.1: 1
    • ADV_SPM.1: 1
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM.1: 1
    • AGD_USR.1: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_DPT.1: 1
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_MSU.2: 1
    • AVA_SOF.1: 1
    • AVA_VLA.2: 2
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT: 2
    • ACM_CAP: 2
    • ACM_SCP: 1
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL: 3
    • ADO_IGS: 1
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP: 1
    • ADV_HLD: 1
    • ADV_IMP: 1
    • ADV_IMP.2: 1
    • ADV_INT: 1
    • ADV_LLD: 1
    • ADV_RCR: 1
    • ADV_SPM: 1
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM: 1
    • AGD_USR: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS: 3
    • ALC_DVS.2: 1
    • ALC_FLR: 2
    • ALC_TAT: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_CCA: 1
    • AVA_MSU: 1
    • AVA_MSU.3: 1
    • AVA_SOF: 1
    • AVA_VLA: 1
    • AVA_VLA.4: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_claims
  • R:
    • R.T: 1
  • T:
    • T.M: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
  • Microsoft:
    • Microsoft: 1
  • Samsung:
    • Samsung: 15
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
  • BrightSight:
    • Brightsight: 3
  • CEA-LETI:
    • CEA - LETI: 1
  • CESTI:
    • CESTI: 4
  • KISA:
    • KISA: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • Triple-DES: 1
    • DES:
      • DES: 4
  • DES:
    • DES:
      • DES: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_scheme
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/randomness
  • TRNG:
    • TRNG: 7
pdf_data/report_keywords/cipher_mode
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • SCA:
    • physical probing: 2
    • side channels: 1
  • other:
    • JIL: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS20: 2
  • CC:
    • CCIMB-2005-08-004: 1
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 46-3: 2
  • BSI:
    • AIS 34: 2
    • AIS34: 1
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2005-08-001: 1
    • CCMB-2005-08-002: 1
    • CCMB-2005-08-003: 1
    • CCMB-2005-08-004: 1
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408:2005: 1
    • ISO/IEC 18045:2005: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process
  • OutOfScope:
    • 1.2, 9 December 2004. [ST] Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, version 1.1, May 2009. [ST-HW] Renesas AE45X1-C (HD65145X1) Version 03 Smartcard Security Target –: 1
    • 19, 2007. [ETR] Evaluation Technical Report, RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope (09-RPT-128), Version 2.0, June 23, 2009. [ETR-HW] Renesas AE45X1-C ETR-Lite, version 1.0, July 13: 1
    • 24, 2009 3 Security Target The Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope (957-2-ST- E01-10), version 1.1, May 2009 is included here by reference. Please note that for the: 1
    • Assurance Level (EAL) 4 evaluation is the RC- S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 from Sony Corporation located in Tokyo, Japan. This report pertains to the TOE which has the: 1
    • Common Criteria security evaluation of the RC- S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0. The developer of the RC- S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope is: 1
    • EAL) 4 evaluation is the RC- S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 from Sony Corporation located in Tokyo, Japan: 1
    • Evaluation Lab Brightsight BV TOE name RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0 Report title Certification Report Report reference name NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR number page: 1
    • NSCIB-CC-09-10991 Certification Report Sony RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0 Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety: 1
    • The Target of Evaluation – TOE (i.e., RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope) is a dual interface integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating system. The TOE is: 1
    • and was completed on 29 May 2008. The current RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope v1.0 has been re-evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was completed: 1
    • as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria: 1
    • evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0, to be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4: 1
    • evidence, Sony Corporation as the developer of the RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 submitted an Impact Analysis Report [IAR] to the NSCIB Certification Body requesting a new: 1
    • i.e., RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope) is a dual interface integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating system: 1
    • in yellow. The form factor of the smartcard is indicated in gray. The Global Platform OS, which is out of scope of the TOE, is indicated in blue. The components of the TOE “FeliCa Operating System” constitute: 1
    • is a “delta” with respect to the evaluation of the “RC-S957 Series with contact operating system out of scope” with certification id NSCIB-07-09612. The difference between this evaluated TOE and the original: 1
    • is defined uniquely by its name and version number RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, v1.0 and can be identified by its ROM version: 0C06 and form factor: Antenna Module (IC with: 1
    • out of scope: 21
    • reader is encrypted (based on single DES). The RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope has several self-protection mechanisms, as follows: Ø Common smartcard self-protection mechanisms: 2
    • recently performed evaluation of the original RC-S957 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope, v1.0. The original RC-S957 Series was certified on June 9th 2008 under the certification: 1
    • requirements specified in Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope (957-2-ST-E01-10), version 1.1, May 2009. The Security Target does not claim conformance to any: 1
    • the evaluation, the intended environment for the RC-S957/2 Series with contact operating system out of scope, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the: 1
pdf_data/report_metadata
  • /Author: p647
  • /CreationDate: D:20090702110646+02'00'
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  • /Title: Certification Report NSCIB-CC-09-10991-CR.doc
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 253688
  • pdf_hyperlinks: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org, mailto:[email protected]
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 16
  • /CreationDate: D:20100728152007+02'00'
  • /Keywords:
  • /ModDate: D:20100728152007+02'00'
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  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 316471
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pdf_data/st_filename 957-2-STP-E01-10.pdf ANSSI-CC-cible_2009-25en.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0351-2006-MA-01: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-PP-0002: 6
  • BSI:
    • BSI-PP-0002: 20
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL4: 7
  • EAL:
    • EAL 4: 1
    • EAL4: 11
    • EAL4 augmented: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT.1: 1
    • ACM_SCP.2: 1
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL.2: 1
    • ADO_IGS.1: 1
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.2: 1
    • ADV_HLD.2: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 1
    • ADV_LLD.1: 1
    • ADV_RCR.1: 1
    • ADV_SPM.1: 6
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM.1: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_MSU.2: 1
    • AVA_SOF.1: 1
    • AVA_VLA.2: 1
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT: 2
    • ACM_AUT.1: 1
    • ACM_CAP: 2
    • ACM_CAP.4: 2
    • ACM_SCP: 2
    • ACM_SCP.2: 1
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL: 2
    • ADO_DEL.2: 2
    • ADO_IGS: 2
    • ADO_IGS.1: 3
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP: 2
    • ADV_FSP.2: 3
    • ADV_HLD: 1
    • ADV_HLD.2: 2
    • ADV_IMP: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 2
    • ADV_IMP.2: 6
    • ADV_LLD: 1
    • ADV_LLD.1: 3
    • ADV_RCR: 1
    • ADV_RCR.1: 2
    • ADV_SPM: 1
    • ADV_SPM.1: 5
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM: 2
    • AGD_ADM.1: 4
    • AGD_USR: 2
    • AGD_USR.1: 4
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS: 2
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 6
    • ALC_LCD: 2
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT: 2
    • ALC_TAT.1: 2
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_COV.2: 2
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_DPT.1: 1
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_MSU: 1
    • AVA_MSU.2: 1
    • AVA_MSU.3: 6
    • AVA_SOF: 3
    • AVA_SOF.1: 1
    • AVA_VLA: 2
    • AVA_VLA.4: 7
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM.1: 13
    • FCS_CKM.1.1: 1
    • FCS_CKM.2: 1
    • FCS_CKM.4: 9
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 1
    • FCS_COP: 18
    • FCS_COP.1: 4
    • FCS_MSA.3: 1
    • FCS_RCV.4: 2
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC.1: 12
    • FDP_ACC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1: 8
    • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_IFC.1: 2
    • FDP_ITC.1: 10
    • FDP_ITC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ITC.1.2: 1
    • FDP_ITC.1.3: 1
    • FDP_ITC.2: 3
  • FIA:
    • FIA_UAU.1: 7
    • FIA_UAU.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UAU.1.2: 1
    • FIA_UAU.3: 8
    • FIA_UAU.3.1: 1
    • FIA_UAU.3.2: 1
    • FIA_UID.1: 9
    • FIA_UID.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_MSA.1: 8
    • FMT_MSA.1.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.2: 5
    • FMT_MSA.3: 8
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 10
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1: 9
    • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
  • FPT:
    • FPT_FLS.1: 9
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 6
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_RCV.4: 7
    • FPT_RCV.4.1: 1
    • FPT_RVM.1: 10
    • FPT_RVM.1.1: 1
    • FPT_SEP: 1
    • FPT_SEP.1: 7
    • FPT_SEP.1.1: 1
    • FPT_SEP.1.2: 1
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC.1: 7
    • FTP_ITC.1.1: 1
    • FTP_ITC.1.2: 1
    • FTP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FAU:
    • FAU_GEN: 1
    • FAU_GEN.1: 1
    • FAU_SAS: 3
    • FAU_SAS.1: 8
    • FAU_SAS.1.1: 1
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM: 1
    • FCS_CKM.1: 29
    • FCS_CKM.1.1: 3
    • FCS_CKM.2: 4
    • FCS_CKM.4: 18
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
    • FCS_COP.1: 25
    • FCS_COP.1.1: 3
    • FCS_RND: 3
    • FCS_RND.1: 8
    • FCS_RND.1.1: 1
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 1
    • FDP_ACC.1: 9
    • FDP_ACC.2: 11
    • FDP_ACC.2.1: 1
    • FDP_ACC.2.2: 1
    • FDP_ACF: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1: 12
    • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_CKM.2: 1
    • FDP_IFC: 2
    • FDP_IFC.1: 20
    • FDP_IFC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1: 3
    • FDP_ITC.1: 16
    • FDP_ITC.1.1: 2
    • FDP_ITC.1.2: 2
    • FDP_ITC.1.3: 2
    • FDP_ITC.2: 1
    • FDP_ITT: 1
    • FDP_ITT.1: 17
    • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL.1.2: 1
    • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_LIM: 4
    • FMT_LIM.1: 14
    • FMT_LIM.1.1: 1
    • FMT_LIM.2: 20
    • FMT_LIM.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA: 2
    • FMT_MSA.1: 11
    • FMT_MSA.1.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.2: 23
    • FMT_MSA.2.1: 2
    • FMT_MSA.3: 12
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_SMF: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 7
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1: 9
  • FPT:
    • FPT_AMT.1: 1
    • FPT_FLS: 1
    • FPT_FLS.1: 23
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 15
    • FPT_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP: 2
    • FPT_PHP.3: 18
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_SEP: 2
    • FPT_SEP.1: 10
    • FPT_SEP.1.1: 1
    • FPT_SEP.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
  • FRU:
    • FRU_FLT: 1
    • FRU_FLT.1: 1
    • FRU_FLT.2: 22
    • FRU_FLT.2.1: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • A:
    • A.DLV: 1
  • O:
    • O.RND: 5
  • T:
    • T.RND: 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/vendor
  • Samsung:
    • Samsung: 9
pdf_data/st_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • Triple-DES: 6
    • DES:
      • DES: 4
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • 3DES: 44
      • TDES: 5
    • DES:
      • DES: 22
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 2
  • RNG:
    • RND: 10
    • RNG: 5
  • TRNG:
    • TRNG: 22
pdf_data/st_keywords/cipher_mode
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_engine
  • TORNADO:
    • TORNADO: 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • FI:
    • physical tampering: 2
  • SCA:
    • Side_channel: 1
    • physical probing: 6
    • side channel: 1
    • side channels: 1
  • FI:
    • DFA: 3
    • Malfunction: 24
    • malfunction: 13
    • physical tampering: 2
  • SCA:
    • DPA: 9
    • Leak-Inherent: 22
    • Physical Probing: 4
    • Physical probing: 2
    • SPA: 6
    • physical probing: 7
    • side-channel: 3
    • timing attacks: 1
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS20: 4
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 46-3: 5
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 7810: 2
    • ISO/IEC18092: 2
    • ISO/IEC7816: 2
  • BSI:
    • AIS31: 3
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 46-3: 2
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408-2005: 1
    • ISO/IEC 7816: 4
    • ISO/IEC 9796-1: 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process
  • OutOfScope:
    • Dual Interface IC Chip Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope Version: 1.1 Public Version No. 957-2-STP-E01-10 Introduction This document is the Security: 1
    • FeliCa Dual Interface IC Chip Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope Version 1.1 : June 2009 Sony Corporation FeliCa Business Division NO.957-2-STP-E01-10 ©2009 Sony: 1
    • ST identification ST Name: Security Target RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope Version: 1.1 Date: June 2009 TOE identification TOE Name: RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based: 1
    • Security Target presents the following TOE: RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope. The TOE is a dual interface integrated circuit with an antenna and an embedded smartcard operating: 1
    • TOE Description 2.1. Overview The TOE (i.e., RC-S957/2 Series with contact-based operating system out of scope) is a dual interface COT package for an integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating: 1
    • is indicated in yellow. The form factor of the smartcard is indicated in gray. The GP OS, which is out of scope of the TOE, is indicated in blue. The components of the TOE “FeliCa Operating System” constitute: 1
    • out of scope: 7
    • system out of scope Version: 1.0 Product type: Dual Interface IC Chip for smartcard Form factor: Antenna Module (IC: 1
pdf_data/st_metadata
  • /Author:
  • /CreationDate: D:20090623194607+09'00'
  • /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0.7
  • /ModDate: D:20090623194911+09'00'
  • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 7.0.5 (Windows)
  • /SourceModified: D:20090623104507
  • /Title: Microsoft Word - 957-2-STP-E01-10.doc
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 344849
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 47
  • /Author: KyungSuk YI (Bryant)
  • /CreationDate: D:20100121203853+09'00'
  • /Creator: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2
  • /Keywords: S3FS91J/S3FS91H/S3FS91V/S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller For Smart Card with SWP Common Criteria(version 2.3) EAL4+ Evaluation
  • /ModDate: D:20100121204205+09'00'
  • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 9.2.0 (Windows)
  • /Subject: Security Target Lite
  • /Title: Security Target Lite of S3FS91J/S3FS91H/S3FS91V/S3FS93I 32-bits RISC Microcontroller For Smart Card with SWP
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 717879
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 74
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