NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD)

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• 22.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The report property was updated, with the {'download_ok': True, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': 'bcbd5f02a44d2c18eb2a17ab9c7b79d182e95d748c50a197a11982b7579bab7a', 'txt_hash': '9d95d3b35fb7bb42096b3ba937072eb2d56dd7e76fc7cf62d9cebd975b3bcf0d'} data.
  • The st property was updated, with the {'download_ok': True, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': 'c6a70aa4dfcdd7544a016a6a35622b3d59855c88e5c3faef52a438cd914a5537', 'txt_hash': '546871ec8ed1f329a36c7d7acb03edc848e5dc66074f6cd7baf9b40e9939f93b'} data.
  • The cert property was updated, with the {'download_ok': True, 'convert_ok': True, 'extract_ok': True, 'pdf_hash': '7a4829902ecaa4e63955c2548235314f42207ce20888959c8fd6f5792b7f8c88', 'txt_hash': '1e0d0f7cd2336e838130aa128107883ca0ba5bc5dfc984230e47b96c54b1be77'} data.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 798956, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 28, '/Author': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik', '/CreationDate': "D:20180718094821+02'00'", '/Creator': 'Writer', '/Keywords': '"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2"', '/ModDate': "D:20180718103620+02'00'", '/Producer': 'LibreOffice 5.2', '/Subject': 'NXP eDoc Suite - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) V3.0', '/Title': 'Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['https://www.bsi.bund.de/', 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung', 'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS', 'https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte', 'http://www.sogisportal.eu/']}}.
  • The st_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 1987572, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 76, '/Title': 'Security Target ePasslet/ePKI-SSCD', '/Author': 'bdrisch', '/Keywords': 'SSCD, ePasslet Suite, electronic Signature', '/Creator': 'Microsoft® Word 2013', '/CreationDate': "D:20180222105849+01'00'", '/ModDate': "D:20180222105849+01'00'", '/Producer': 'Microsoft® Word 2013', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': []}}.
  • The cert_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 362826, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 1, '/Author': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik', '/CreationDate': "D:20180718094855+02'00'", '/Creator': 'Writer', '/Keywords': '"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2"', '/ModDate': "D:20180719115311+02'00'", '/Producer': 'LibreOffice 5.2', '/Subject': 'NXP eDoc Suite - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) V3.0', '/Title': 'Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': []}}.
  • The report_frontpage property was set to {'DE': {'match_rules': ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)'], 'cert_id': 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018', 'cert_item': 'NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD', 'developer': 'NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH', 'cert_lab': 'BSI', 'ref_protection_profiles': 'EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (**) Functionality: PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4. (**) The IT Product identified in this certificate fulfils PP EN 419211-2:2013 and is therefore a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3.(a)) of Regulation No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 6. Juli 2018 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR only Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report Contents A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8 5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8 6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12 3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13 5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14 6. Documentation............................................................................................................14 7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15 8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17 9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19 11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................19 13. Definitions..................................................................................................................20 14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21 C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24 D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25 5 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 ● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 ● BSI Schedule of Costs3 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 6 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045. ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 + ALC_FLR components. 7 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD), has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 April 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH. The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\'s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 July 2018 is valid until 5 July 2023 Validity can be re-newed by re-certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\'s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14 45886 Gelsenkirchen Deutschland 9 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation. The TOE is named NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation and short named ePasslet3.0/SSCD. It is intended for use as a Secure Signature Creation Device. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue TSF_Access Access Control TSF_Admin Administration TSF_Secret Secret key management TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging TSF_Auth Authentication protocols TSF_Integrity Integrity protection TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this 11 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No. Type Item / Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW+SW NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite on platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) 3.0 Two different ways of delivery of the TOE are described. Either, the customer collects the product at the NXP site itself, or the product is sent by NXP to the customer. Here, the product is delivered in parcels sealed with special tapes to detect manipulation of the tapes. 2 DOC Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on- chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization Operational Guidance [12] 3.0.12 The TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form (encrypted) according to defined mailing procedures by NXP. 3 DOC Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on- chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization Preparation Guidance [13] 3.0.13 4 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications Guidance Manual [11] 3.0.9 Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the crypto lib, the JCOP operating system and the NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. There the JCOP operating system and the applet is integrated into the ordered IC variant by masking during the chip production by the manufacturer, according to the configuration information contained in the OEF (Order Entry Form). Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in 12 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite product as the delivery process covered by the certified JCOP platform [14]. The TOE identification comprises several steps. The correctness of the IC and the existence of an additional banking applet can be checked with the custom mask ID by using GET DATA (Identify) command. The verification of the correct eDoc Suite version can be done by requesting data from the Issuer Security Domain by using GET DATA (Verify Package) command. Detailed information on the TOE identification can be found in the guidance documents for the TOE [11] [12] [13] and the platform [20]. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: ● Cryptographic Support, ● User Data Protection, ● Identification and Authentication, ● Security Management, and ● Protection of the TSF. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 6.2 of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [9]. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: • OE.SVD_Auth, • OE.CGA_QCert, • OE.SSCD_Prov_Service, • OE.HID_VAD, • OE.DTBS_Intend, • OE.DTBS_Protect, • OE.Signatory, • OE.APPLET, • OE.VERIFICATION, • OE.CODE-EVIDENCE, • OE.APPS-PROVIDE, • OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY, 13 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 • OE.KEY-CHANGE, • OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS, • OE.USE_DIAG, • OE.USE_KEYS, and • OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance documents. 5. Architectural Information The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform comprised of eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization: ● Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control. ● Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying JCOP platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library. ● Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated. ● Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events. ● Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if special APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering all applet commands. ● Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging. ● File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management by a representation of the existing elements. ● State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the authentication status of the terminal and the challenge. 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 14 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 7. IT Product Testing Developer\'s Test according to ATE_FUN The developer’s testing effort is summarised as follows: TOE configurations tested: The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product ePasslet3.0/SSCD on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS by NXP, in all variants (except the different memory configurations) in scope of the certification, including those used for the independent tests: ● J3H145CEX30, ● J3H145CAX30, and ● J3H145CGX30. Developer’s testing approach: The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach: ● Tests to cover all actions defined in [21], ● Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the document [21] and executable on the TOE, ● Access rules test as part of the requirements on TSF data, ● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design. Verdict for the activity: All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected. Evaluator Tests Independent Testing according to ATE_IND The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach, configuration, depth and results. Test Approach and Set-up: The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/SSCD application installed on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test software. Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used. The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to: ● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms), ● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution), ● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging), ● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance [12]. ● The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the following approach: 15 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 ● Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases. ● Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality. ● Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented. ● The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing. ● Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps were performed and described for nearly each test case. ● The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body. Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform evaluation (except the SHA perturbation resistance). ● Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with the certification body. Configuration: The TOE was tested in the HW variants: ● J3H145CAX30, ● J3H145CEX30, and ● J3H145CGX30. All TOE variants were used for different tests with the ROM values, see [6]. The keys and personalization data used in the test configurations were provided by the developer. Test Results: The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The test results are logged. The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the actual test results. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN Overview: The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall 16 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually successful. Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional developer tests. The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases. The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test set was devised. TOE test configurations: The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered into the personalization agent stated in the security target. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite that is part of the ROM of platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) by NXP. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in [12] and [13]. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: 17 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 ● Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, ● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, ● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, ● Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6, ● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, ● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform [20] and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (see [4], 26, 34, 36, 46). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]). As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8] ● for the', 'cc_version': 'PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the', 'cc_security_level': "Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. Since this TOE is a composite TOE it relies on its platform certifications. Please refer to [14][16][18] for details. The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be resistant against attackers with attack potential high. In the course of the evaluation the underlying platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) underwent a re-certification and the re-certified platform was chosen as basis for the current composite evaluation. All composite work units according to [4, AIS36] were reworked and the evaluation reports are valid for the re-certified platform. Further, the developer created an ST-Lite for publication. During the examination the evaluator compared the Security Target [6] with the Security Target Lite [9]. The Security Target Lite complies with the requirements of [4, AIS35]. Therefore the evaluator determines that the Security Target Lite is a correct sanitised version of the Security Target. 18 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report After completion of the evaluation report for aspect ALC the developer documents [9], [11], [12] were changed. The final version of the configuration list [10] which includes the current version of these documents was provided. The changes in the configuration list were examined and the evaluator is of the opinion that the evaluation report for aspect ALC remains valid also for the updated configuration list. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de). The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of that table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only. 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]). 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES"}}.
  • The report_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018': 18, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1024': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016': 2}, 'NL': {'CC-98209-CR2': 1, 'NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2': 2, 'NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 5}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5': 6, 'EAL 2': 3, 'EAL 1': 1, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL5+': 2, 'EAL6': 1, 'EAL 5+': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 3}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_FSP': 1}, 'ALC': {'ALC_FLR': 3, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.5': 1, 'ALC_DEL.1': 1, 'ALC_DVS.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.2': 1, 'ALC_COMP.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 4, 'AVA_VAN': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FCS': {'FCS_RNG.1': 1}}, 'cc_claims': {'OE': {'OE.HID_VAD': 1, 'OE.APPLET': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION': 1, 'OE.CODE-EVIDENCE': 1, 'OE.APPS-PROVIDE': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY': 1, 'OE.KEY-CHANGE': 1, 'OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS': 1, 'OE.USE_DIAG': 1, 'OE.USE_KEYS': 1, 'OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC': 1}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 28, 'NXP Semiconductors': 4}}, 'eval_facility': {'BrightSight': {'Brightsight': 2}, 'TUV': {'TÜV Informationstechnik': 4, 'TÜViT': 1}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 8}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'CMAC': 2}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 1}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 2}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 1}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 2, 'SHA-384': 2, 'SHA-512': 2}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 1}, 'KEX': {'Key Exchange': 1}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 1}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 2}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 2}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 2}}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'other': {'JIL': 3}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-02102': 1, 'BSI 7148': 1}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {'JCOP': {'JCOP 3': 8}}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS180-4': 2, 'FIPS186-3': 2, 'FIPS197': 2}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#1': 1, 'PKCS1': 1}, 'BSI': {'AIS 34': 2, 'AIS 36': 2, 'AIS 20': 2, 'AIS36': 1, 'AIS35': 1, 'AIS 35': 2, 'AIS 26': 1, 'AIS 32': 1, 'AIS 46': 1, 'AIS20': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC 5639': 2}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 4, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 4, 'ISO/IEC 17065': 2}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'ConfidentialDocument': {'being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification': 1, 'providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD), cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024, Version 4, 18 June 2018, ETR Summary – ePasslet 3': 1, 'TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [8] EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device': 1, 'Revision 13240, 18 June 2018, File 2018-06- 18_conflist-JCOP3_rev13240.xlsx, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [11] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card': 1, 'Composition NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) – EAL5+, version 3.0, 04 December 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential document) [16] Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Certificate number CC-17- 67206': 1, 'Report for Composite Evaluation P6022y VB, version 1, 25 August 2016, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [20] Guidance Document for the platform: JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS User Guidance and Administration': 1, 'Functional Specification ADV_FSP. Version 3.0.4, 29 September 2017, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) 23 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 C. Excerpts from the Criteria For the meaning': 1}}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1024': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016': 1}, 'NL': {'NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2': 2, 'NSCIB-CC-15-67206-CR': 2}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 3, 'BSI-PP-0006-2002T': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5+': 3, 'EAL5': 4, 'EAL 5': 2, 'EAL4': 1, 'EAL5 augmented': 3, 'EAL4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 3, 'ADV_FSP.5': 1, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_INT.2': 1, 'ADV_TDS.3': 2, 'ADV_FSP.4': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_PRE': 1, 'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_PRE.1': 2}, 'ALC': {'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.5': 1, 'ALC_DEL.1': 1, 'ALC_DVS.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.2': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1, 'ATE_IND.2': 1, 'ATE_DPT.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 7}, 'ASE': {'ASE_CCL.1': 1, 'ASE_ECD.1': 1, 'ASE_INT.1': 1, 'ASE_OBJ.2': 1, 'ASE_REQ.2': 1, 'ASE_SPD.1': 1, 'ASE_TSS.1': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_ARP.1': 1, 'FAU_SAS.1': 1, 'FAU_GEN': 1}, 'FCO': {'FCO_NRO.2': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 8, 'FCS_COP': 19, 'FCS_RND.1': 10, 'FCS_CKM.1': 19, 'FCS_CKM.2': 3, 'FCS_CKM.3': 1, 'FCS_CKM.4': 14, 'FCS_COP.1': 8, 'FCS_COP.1.1': 15, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 2, 'FCS_CKM': 1, 'FCS_CKM.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM.4.1': 3}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACC.2': 3, 'FDP_ACF.1': 48, 'FDP_IFC.1': 9, 'FDP_IFF.1': 2, 'FDP_RIP.1': 13, 'FDP_ROL.1': 2, 'FDP_SDI.2': 11, 'FDP_UIT.1': 1, 'FDP_ITC.2': 7, 'FDP_ACC.1': 26, 'FDP_IFC.2': 1, 'FDP_ITC.1': 6, 'FDP_ACC': 26, 'FDP_ACF': 17, 'FDP_RIP.1.1': 2, 'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_SDI.1': 2, 'FDP_ITC': 1}, 'FIA': {'FIA_ATD.1': 1, 'FIA_UID.2': 1, 'FIA_USB.1': 1, 'FIA_UID.1': 15, 'FIA_UAU.1': 10, 'FIA_UAU.4': 1, 'FIA_AFL.1': 7, 'FIA_UID.1.1': 3, 'FIA_UID.1.2': 3, 'FIA_UAU.1.1': 4, 'FIA_UAU.1.2': 3, 'FIA_AFL.1.1': 3, 'FIA_AFL.1.2': 3}, 'FMT': {'FMT_MSA.1': 15, 'FMT_MSA.2': 8, 'FMT_MSA.3': 24, 'FMT_SMF.1': 28, 'FMT_SMR.1': 28, 'FMT_MTD.1': 7, 'FMT_MTD.3': 1, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 4, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 3, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 2, 'FMT_MOF.1': 6, 'FMT_MOF.1.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA': 13, 'FMT_MSA.2.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA.3.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA.3.2': 2, 'FMT_MSA.4': 7, 'FMT_MSA.4.1': 2, 'FMT_MTD': 13}, 'FPR': {'FPR_UNO.1': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 8, 'FPT_FLS.1': 16, 'FPT_PHP.3': 11, 'FPT_EMS.1': 11, 'FPT_TDC.1': 1, 'FPT_RCV.3': 1, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 5, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_TST.1': 14, 'FPT_FLS.1.1': 2, 'FPT_TST': 2, 'FPT_PHP.1': 6, 'FPT_PHP.1.1': 3, 'FPT_PHP.1.2': 3, 'FPT_PHP.3.1': 3, 'FPT_TST.1.1': 2, 'FPT_TST.1.2': 2, 'FPT_TST.1.3': 2}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC.1': 1, 'FTP_ITC': 3}}, 'cc_claims': {'T': {'T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA': 1, 'T.CONFID-JCS-CODE': 1, 'T.CONFID-JCS-DATA': 1, 'T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE': 2, 'T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA': 2, 'T.INTEG-JCS-CODE': 1, 'T.INTEG-JCS-DATA': 1, 'T.SID': 2, 'T.EXE-CODE': 2, 'T.NATIVE': 1, 'T.RESOURCES': 1, 'T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT': 1, 'T.COM_EXPLOIT': 1, 'T.LIFE_CYCLE': 1, 'T.OBJ-DELETION': 1, 'T.PHYSICAL': 1, 'T.OS_OPERATE': 1, 'T.RND': 1, 'T.CONFIG': 1}, 'A': {'A.APPLET': 1, 'A.VERIFICATION': 1, 'A.USE_DIAG': 1, 'A.USE_KEYS': 1, 'A.PPROCESS-SEC-IC': 3, 'A.APPS-PROVIDER': 1, 'A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY': 1, 'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'OT': {'OT.SID': 1, 'OT.FIREWALL': 1, 'OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID': 1, 'OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG': 1, 'OT.NATIVE': 1, 'OT.OPERATE': 1, 'OT.REALLOCATION': 1, 'OT.RESOURCES': 1, 'OT.ALARM': 1, 'OT.CIPHER': 1, 'OT.KEY-MNGT': 1, 'OT.PIN-MNGT': 1, 'OT.TRANSACTION': 1, 'OT.OBJ-DELETION': 1, 'OT.APPLI-AUTH': 1, 'OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS': 1, 'OT.COMM_AUTH': 1, 'OT.COMM_INTEGRITY': 1, 'OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY': 1, 'OT.EXT-MEM': 1, 'OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT': 1, 'OT.SCP': 3, 'OT.IDENTIFICATION': 1, 'OT.SEC_BOX_FW': 1, 'OT.RND': 1, 'OT.CONFIG-LIMIT': 1}, 'OE': {'OE.APPLET': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION': 1, 'OE.CODE-EVIDENCE': 1, 'OE.APPS-PROVIDER': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY': 1, 'OE.KEY-CHANGE': 1, 'OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS': 1, 'OE.USE_DIAG': 1, 'OE.USE_KEYS': 1, 'OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC': 1, 'OE.HID_VAD': 3}}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 30, 'NXP Semiconductors': 1}}, 'eval_facility': {}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 13}}, 'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 1}, '3DES': {'TripleDES': 1, '3DES': 2}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'CMAC': 2}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 4}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 7}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 2, 'SHA-256': 2, 'SHA-384': 2, 'SHA-512': 1}}, 'JH': {'JH': 1}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 1}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 17}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 8, 'RND': 2}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 1}, 'CCM': {'CCM': 4}}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'physical probing': 1, 'SPA': 2, 'DPA': 2, 'timing attacks': 2}, 'FI': {'physical tampering': 11, 'malfunction': 1, 'DFA': 1, 'fault injection': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {'JCOP': {'JCOP 3': 12}}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS 180-4': 2, 'FIPS46-3': 1, 'FIPS PUB 46-3': 1, 'FIPS180-4': 1, 'FIPS186-2': 1, 'FIPS197': 1, 'FIPS186-3': 1, 'FIPS PUB 186-3': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#15': 3, 'PKCS3': 1, 'PKCS#1': 1}, 'BSI': {'AIS20': 6, 'AIS31': 3, 'AIS 20': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC4493': 1, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 9796-2': 1, 'ISO/IEC 15946-1': 1, 'ISO/IEC 15946-2': 1, 'ISO/IEC 7816-4': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 7}, 'X509': {'X.509': 1}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2012-09-001': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-002': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-003': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 2, 'Out of scope': 117, ' While D.Sig provides the TOE’s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification': 1, 'chapter 7.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'managed within JCOP). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP': 1, ' No contradictions to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[bArray] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'chapter 7.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1[AID] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1[AID] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[Installer] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACC.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FCO_NRO.2[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.4[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'chapter 7.1.8 in platform ST) FAU_SAS.1[SCP] No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP': 1, 'chapter 7.1.8.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'chapter 7.1.9 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' While D.Sig provides the TOE’s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification. 1.3.2.1 TOE identification and TOE variants 2 Please note that there are': 1, 'MIFARE functionality or a banking application in ROM; please note that this functionality is out of scope of the TOE’s security functionality claimed by this security target. The correctness of the chip': 1, 'platform ST) Firewall Policy (chapter 7.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 1, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 1, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out': 1, 'internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] No correspondence Out': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 2, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 1, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision': 1, 'The requirement in this ST is equiva- lent to parts of the platform ST. FCS_CKM.2 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope': 1, '1.1[ECDHPACEKeyExchang e]. No contradictions to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[APDU] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[bArray] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL] No': 1, 'vio- lations complement JCOP mecha- nisms. No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TDC.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Aid Management (chapter 7.1.1.4': 1, 'platform ST) FIA_ATD.1[AID] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.2[AID] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1[AID] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. INSTG Security Functional': 1, 'which addresses security aspects outside the runtime. FMT_SMR.1[Installer] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[Installer] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3[Installer] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -': 3, 'manager (ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. RMIG Security Functional': 1, 'that owns the deleted objects by invoking a specific API method. FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] FPT_FLS.1 The': 1, 'verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification. FDP_UIT.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[CCM] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ITC.2[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -': 1, '19 of 76 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FPT_FLS.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACC.1[SD] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SD] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SD] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FCO_NRO.2[SC] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[SC] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SC] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[SC] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.4[SC] No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. EMG Security Functional': 1, 'group includes requirements for managing the external memory. FDP_ACC.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[EXT-MEM] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[EXT-MEM] No': 1, '76 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FMT_MSA.3[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[EXT-MEM] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Further Functional Requirements': 1, '7.1.8 in platform ST) FAU_SAS.1[SCP] No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP) FCS_RNG.1 FCS_RND.1 In this ST, random numbers accord- ing to AIS20 class DRG': 1, 'Functional Requirements (chapter 7.1.8.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[SecureBox] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SecureBox] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SecureBox] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SecureBox] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Configuration Security': 1, 'Requirements (chapter 7.1.9 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FMT_SMR.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Table 4: Assessment of the': 1, 'Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks OT.SID No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE No contradiction to this ST. OT.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'OT.REALLOCATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'the plat- form leads to secrecy of SCD. No contradiction to this ST. OT.PIN-MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.TRANSACTION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. OT.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite / SSCD Security': 1, '76 Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks OT.APPLI-AUTH No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. OT.COMM_AUTH No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.COMM_INTEGRITY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.EXT-MEM No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.IC OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, OT.EMSEC_Design The': 1, 'are related. No con- tradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.RECOVERY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.SUPPORT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. OT.IDENTIFICATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SEC_BOX_FW No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'No direct correspondence. No con- tradiction to this ST. OT.CONFIG-LIMIT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. Table 5: Assessment of the platform objectives. 2.2.4 Assessment of': 1, 'T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'Platform Threat Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No': 1, 'DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.INTEG-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SID.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST': 1, 'SID.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'T.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.COM_EXPLOIT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.LIFE_CYCLE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.PHYSICAL T.Hack_Phys No contradiction to this ST. T.OS_OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RND T.SCD_Derive No direct correspondence, but secure random number': 1, 'cure internal signature key gen- eration. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFIG No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. Table 6: Threats of the platform ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -': 1}}}.
  • The cert_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5': 2, 'EAL 2': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ALC': {'ALC_FLR': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'vendor': {'NXP': {'NXP': 1, 'NXP Semiconductors': 1}}, 'eval_facility': {}, 'symmetric_crypto': {}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {}, 'crypto_scheme': {}, 'crypto_protocol': {}, 'randomness': {}, 'cipher_mode': {}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 2, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 2}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {}}.
  • The report_filename property was set to 1024a_pdf.pdf.
  • The st_filename property was set to 1024b_pdf.pdf.
  • The cert_filename property was set to 1024c_pdf.pdf.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The cert_lab property was set to ['BSI'].
  • The cert_id property was set to BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018.
  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016']}} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016']}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_CCL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_IND', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_COMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_SPD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_REQ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_INT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DVS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_ECD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_INT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_OBJ', 'level': 2}]} values added.
• 17.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The report_link was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1024a_pdf.pdf.

  The st_link was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1024b_pdf.pdf.
• 12.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The report property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.
  • The st property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.
  • The cert property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The cert_metadata property was set to None.
  • The report_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The report_keywords property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.
  • The cert_keywords property was set to None.
  • The report_filename property was set to None.
  • The st_filename property was set to None.
  • The cert_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The cert_lab property was set to None.
  • The cert_id property was set to None.
  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_CCL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_IND', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_COMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_SPD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_REQ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_INT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DVS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_ECD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_INT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_OBJ', 'level': 2}]} values discarded.
• 23.07.2024 The certificate was first processed. Show diff

  New certificate

  A new Common Criteria certificate with the product name NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) was processed.

Raw data

{
  "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate",
  "category": "Products for Digital Signatures",
  "cert_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1024c_pdf.pdf",
  "dgst": "b09a5f82a84964b0",
  "heuristics": {
    "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.Heuristics",
    "annotated_references": null,
    "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018",
    "cert_lab": [
      "BSI"
    ],
    "cpe_matches": null,
    "direct_transitive_cves": null,
    "extracted_sars": {
      "_type": "Set",
      "elements": [
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_COMP",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_CMS",
          "level": 5
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_DPT",
          "level": 3
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DEL",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_TSS",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_FUN",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_INT",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_REQ",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_CCL",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AGD_PRE",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_ECD",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DVS",
          "level": 1
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      "DE": {
        "cc_security_level": "Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. Since this TOE is a composite TOE it relies on its platform certifications. Please refer to [14][16][18] for details. The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be resistant against attackers with attack potential high. In the course of the evaluation the underlying platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) underwent a re-certification and the re-certified platform was chosen as basis for the current composite evaluation. All composite work units according to [4, AIS36] were reworked and the evaluation reports are valid for the re-certified platform. Further, the developer created an ST-Lite for publication. During the examination the evaluator compared the Security Target [6] with the Security Target Lite [9]. The Security Target Lite complies with the requirements of [4, AIS35]. Therefore the evaluator determines that the Security Target Lite is a correct sanitised version of the Security Target. 18 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report After completion of the evaluation report for aspect ALC the developer documents [9], [11], [12] were changed. The final version of the configuration list [10] which includes the current version of these documents was provided. The changes in the configuration list were examined and the evaluator is of the opinion that the evaluation report for aspect ALC remains valid also for the updated configuration list. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the \u0027Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102\u0027 (https://www.bsi.bund.de). The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column \u0027Security Level above 100 Bits\u0027 of that table with \u0027no\u0027 achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only. 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]). 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES",
        "cc_version": "PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended \u25cf for the",
        "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018",
        "cert_item": "NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD",
        "cert_lab": "BSI",
        "developer": "NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH",
        "match_rules": [
          "(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)"
        ],
        "ref_protection_profiles": "EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 (**) Functionality: PP conformant Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4. (**) The IT Product identified in this certificate fulfils PP EN 419211-2:2013 and is therefore a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3.(a)) of Regulation No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 6. Juli 2018 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR only Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report Contents A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8 5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8 6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12 3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13 5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14 6. Documentation............................................................................................................14 7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15 8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17 9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19 11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................19 13. Definitions..................................................................................................................20 14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21 C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24 D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25 5 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: \u25cf Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 \u25cf BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 \u25cf BSI Schedule of Costs3 \u25cf Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) \u25cf DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] \u25cf Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 6 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report \u25cf Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045. \u25cf BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For \"Smartcards and similar devices\" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For \"HW Devices with Security Boxes\" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 + ALC_FLR components. 7 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD), has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD), was conducted by T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 April 2018. T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH. The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that \u25cf all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, \u25cf the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\u0027s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 July 2018 is valid until 5 July 2023 Validity can be re-newed by re-certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\u0027s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14 45886 Gelsenkirchen Deutschland 9 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of \u25cf the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, \u25cf the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and \u25cf complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation. The TOE is named NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation and short named ePasslet3.0/SSCD. It is intended for use as a Secure Signature Creation Device. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue TSF_Access Access Control TSF_Admin Administration TSF_Secret Secret key management TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging TSF_Auth Authentication protocols TSF_Integrity Integrity protection TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 3. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this 11 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No. Type Item / Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW+SW NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite on platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) 3.0 Two different ways of delivery of the TOE are described. Either, the customer collects the product at the NXP site itself, or the product is sent by NXP to the customer. Here, the product is delivered in parcels sealed with special tapes to detect manipulation of the tapes. 2 DOC Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on- chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization Operational Guidance [12] 3.0.12 The TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form (encrypted) according to defined mailing procedures by NXP. 3 DOC Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on- chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization Preparation Guidance [13] 3.0.13 4 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications Guidance Manual [11] 3.0.9 Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the crypto lib, the JCOP operating system and the NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. There the JCOP operating system and the applet is integrated into the ordered IC variant by masking during the chip production by the manufacturer, according to the configuration information contained in the OEF (Order Entry Form). Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in 12 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite product as the delivery process covered by the certified JCOP platform [14]. The TOE identification comprises several steps. The correctness of the IC and the existence of an additional banking applet can be checked with the custom mask ID by using GET DATA (Identify) command. The verification of the correct eDoc Suite version can be done by requesting data from the Issuer Security Domain by using GET DATA (Verify Package) command. Detailed information on the TOE identification can be found in the guidance documents for the TOE [11] [12] [13] and the platform [20]. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: \u25cf Cryptographic Support, \u25cf User Data Protection, \u25cf Identification and Authentication, \u25cf Security Management, and \u25cf Protection of the TSF. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 6.2 of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [9]. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: \u2022 OE.SVD_Auth, \u2022 OE.CGA_QCert, \u2022 OE.SSCD_Prov_Service, \u2022 OE.HID_VAD, \u2022 OE.DTBS_Intend, \u2022 OE.DTBS_Protect, \u2022 OE.Signatory, \u2022 OE.APPLET, \u2022 OE.VERIFICATION, \u2022 OE.CODE-EVIDENCE, \u2022 OE.APPS-PROVIDE, \u2022 OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY, 13 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 \u2022 OE.KEY-CHANGE, \u2022 OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS, \u2022 OE.USE_DIAG, \u2022 OE.USE_KEYS, and \u2022 OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance documents. 5. Architectural Information The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform comprised of eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization: \u25cf Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control. \u25cf Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying JCOP platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library. \u25cf Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated. \u25cf Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events. \u25cf Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if special APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering all applet commands. \u25cf Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging. \u25cf File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management by a representation of the existing elements. \u25cf State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the authentication status of the terminal and the challenge. 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 14 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report 7. IT Product Testing Developer\u0027s Test according to ATE_FUN The developer\u2019s testing effort is summarised as follows: TOE configurations tested: The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product ePasslet3.0/SSCD on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS by NXP, in all variants (except the different memory configurations) in scope of the certification, including those used for the independent tests: \u25cf J3H145CEX30, \u25cf J3H145CAX30, and \u25cf J3H145CGX30. Developer\u2019s testing approach: The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach: \u25cf Tests to cover all actions defined in [21], \u25cf Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the document [21] and executable on the TOE, \u25cf Access rules test as part of the requirements on TSF data, \u25cf Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design. Verdict for the activity: All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer\u2019s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected. Evaluator Tests Independent Testing according to ATE_IND The evaluator\u2019s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach, configuration, depth and results. Test Approach and Set-up: The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/SSCD application installed on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator\u2019s test software. Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used. The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to: \u25cf Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms), \u25cf Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution), \u25cf Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging), \u25cf Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance [12]. \u25cf The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the following approach: 15 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 \u25cf Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases. \u25cf Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer\u2019s tests the tests are also selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality. \u25cf Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented. \u25cf The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing. \u25cf Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps were performed and described for nearly each test case. \u25cf The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body. Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform evaluation (except the SHA perturbation resistance). \u25cf Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with the certification body. Configuration: The TOE was tested in the HW variants: \u25cf J3H145CAX30, \u25cf J3H145CEX30, and \u25cf J3H145CGX30. All TOE variants were used for different tests with the ROM values, see [6]. The keys and personalization data used in the test configurations were provided by the developer. Test Results: The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The test results are logged. The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the actual test results. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN Overview: The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body T\u00dcViT in the evaluator\u2019s test environment with the evaluator\u2019s test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested. The overall 16 / 28 BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 Certification Report result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually successful. Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional developer tests. The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases. The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE\u2019s operational environment for which an appropriate test set was devised. TOE test configurations: The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered into the personalization agent stated in the security target. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful in the TOE\u2019s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite that is part of the ROM of platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) by NXP. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in [12] and [13]. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: 17 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 \u25cf Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, \u25cf Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, \u25cf Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, \u25cf Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6, \u25cf Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, \u25cf Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform [20] and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (see [4], 26, 34, 36, 46). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]). As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: \u25cf All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) \u25cf The components AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: \u25cf PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8] \u25cf for the"
      }
    },
    "report_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {
        "ECC": {
          "ECC": {
            "ECC": 2
          },
          "ECDSA": {
            "ECDSA": 1
          }
        },
        "FF": {
          "DH": {
            "Diffie-Hellman": 1
          },
          "DSA": {
            "DSA": 1
          }
        }
      },
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016": 2,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1024": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018": 18
        },
        "NL": {
          "CC-98209-CR2": 1,
          "NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2": 2,
          "NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {
        "OE": {
          "OE.APPLET": 1,
          "OE.APPS-PROVIDE": 1,
          "OE.CODE-EVIDENCE": 1,
          "OE.HID_VAD": 1,
          "OE.KEY-CHANGE": 1,
          "OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC": 1,
          "OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS": 1,
          "OE.USE_DIAG": 1,
          "OE.USE_KEYS": 1,
          "OE.VERIFICATION": 1,
          "OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02": 5
        }
      },
      "cc_sar": {
        "ADV": {
          "ADV_FSP": 1
        },
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_CMC.4": 1,
          "ALC_CMS.5": 1,
          "ALC_COMP.1": 1,
          "ALC_DEL.1": 1,
          "ALC_DVS.1": 1,
          "ALC_FLR": 3,
          "ALC_LCD.1": 1,
          "ALC_TAT.2": 1
        },
        "ATE": {
          "ATE_FUN": 1,
          "ATE_IND": 1
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN": 1,
          "AVA_VAN.5": 4
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 1": 1,
          "EAL 2": 3,
          "EAL 4": 1,
          "EAL 5": 6,
          "EAL 5 augmented": 3,
          "EAL 5+": 1,
          "EAL 6": 1,
          "EAL5+": 2,
          "EAL6": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {
        "FCS": {
          "FCS_RNG.1": 1
        }
      },
      "certification_process": {
        "ConfidentialDocument": {
          "Composition NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) \u2013 EAL5+, version 3.0, 04 December 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential document) [16] Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Certificate number CC-17- 67206": 1,
          "Functional Specification ADV_FSP. Version 3.0.4, 29 September 2017, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) 23 / 28 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018 C. Excerpts from the Criteria For the meaning": 1,
          "Report for Composite Evaluation P6022y VB, version 1, 25 August 2016, T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [20] Guidance Document for the platform: JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS User Guidance and Administration": 1,
          "Revision 13240, 18 June 2018, File 2018-06- 18_conflist-JCOP3_rev13240.xlsx, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [11] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card": 1,
          "T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH \u2013 Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [8] EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device": 1,
          "being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification": 1,
          "providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD), cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024, Version 4, 18 June 2018, ETR Summary \u2013 ePasslet 3": 1
        }
      },
      "cipher_mode": {
        "CBC": {
          "CBC": 2
        }
      },
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {
        "PACE": {
          "PACE": 2
        }
      },
      "crypto_scheme": {
        "KA": {
          "Key Agreement": 1
        },
        "KEX": {
          "Key Exchange": 1
        },
        "MAC": {
          "MAC": 1
        }
      },
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {},
      "eval_facility": {
        "BrightSight": {
          "Brightsight": 2
        },
        "TUV": {
          "T\u00dcV Informationstechnik": 4,
          "T\u00dcViT": 1
        }
      },
      "hash_function": {
        "SHA": {
          "SHA2": {
            "SHA-224": 2,
            "SHA-384": 2,
            "SHA-512": 2
          }
        }
      },
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {
        "JCOP": {
          "JCOP 3": 8
        }
      },
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {
        "RNG": {
          "RNG": 2
        }
      },
      "side_channel_analysis": {
        "other": {
          "JIL": 3
        }
      },
      "standard_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "AIS 20": 2,
          "AIS 26": 1,
          "AIS 32": 1,
          "AIS 34": 2,
          "AIS 35": 2,
          "AIS 36": 2,
          "AIS 46": 1,
          "AIS20": 1,
          "AIS35": 1,
          "AIS36": 1
        },
        "FIPS": {
          "FIPS180-4": 2,
          "FIPS186-3": 2,
          "FIPS197": 2
        },
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 15408": 4,
          "ISO/IEC 17065": 2,
          "ISO/IEC 18045": 4
        },
        "PKCS": {
          "PKCS#1": 1,
          "PKCS1": 1
        },
        "RFC": {
          "RFC 5639": 2
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {
        "AES_competition": {
          "AES": {
            "AES": 8
          }
        },
        "constructions": {
          "MAC": {
            "CMAC": 2
          }
        }
      },
      "technical_report_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI 7148": 1,
          "BSI TR-02102": 1
        }
      },
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "NXP": {
          "NXP": 28,
          "NXP Semiconductors": 4
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "report_metadata": {
      "/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20180718094821+02\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Writer",
      "/Keywords": "\"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2\"",
      "/ModDate": "D:20180718103620+02\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "LibreOffice 5.2",
      "/Subject": "NXP eDoc Suite - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Device with Key generation (SSCD) V3.0",
      "/Title": "Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1024-2018",
      "pdf_file_size_bytes": 798956,
      "pdf_hyperlinks": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung",
          "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/",
          "http://www.sogisportal.eu/",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte",
          "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/"
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      "pdf_is_encrypted": false,
      "pdf_number_of_pages": 28
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    "st_filename": "1024b_pdf.pdf",
    "st_frontpage": null,
    "st_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {
        "ECC": {
          "ECC": {
            "ECC": 7
          },
          "ECDSA": {
            "ECDSA": 4
          }
        },
        "FF": {
          "DH": {
            "Diffie-Hellman": 1
          }
        }
      },
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-2016": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1024": 1
        },
        "NL": {
          "NSCIB-CC-15-67206-CR": 2,
          "NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2": 2
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {
        "A": {
          "A.APPLET": 1,
          "A.APPS-PROVIDER": 1,
          "A.CGA": 2,
          "A.PPROCESS-SEC-IC": 3,
          "A.SCA": 2,
          "A.USE_DIAG": 1,
          "A.USE_KEYS": 1,
          "A.VERIFICATION": 1,
          "A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY": 1
        },
        "OE": {
          "OE.APPLET": 1,
          "OE.APPS-PROVIDER": 1,
          "OE.CODE-EVIDENCE": 1,
          "OE.HID_VAD": 3,
          "OE.KEY-CHANGE": 1,
          "OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC": 1,
          "OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS": 1,
          "OE.USE_DIAG": 1,
          "OE.USE_KEYS": 1,
          "OE.VERIFICATION": 1,
          "OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY": 1
        },
        "OT": {
          "OT.ALARM": 1,
          "OT.APPLI-AUTH": 1,
          "OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT": 1,
          "OT.CIPHER": 1,
          "OT.COMM_AUTH": 1,
          "OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY": 1,
          "OT.COMM_INTEGRITY": 1,
          "OT.CONFIG-LIMIT": 1,
          "OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS": 1,
          "OT.EXT-MEM": 1,
          "OT.FIREWALL": 1,
          "OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID": 1,
          "OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG": 1,
          "OT.IDENTIFICATION": 1,
          "OT.KEY-MNGT": 1,
          "OT.NATIVE": 1,
          "OT.OBJ-DELETION": 1,
          "OT.OPERATE": 1,
          "OT.PIN-MNGT": 1,
          "OT.REALLOCATION": 1,
          "OT.RESOURCES": 1,
          "OT.RND": 1,
          "OT.SCP": 3,
          "OT.SEC_BOX_FW": 1,
          "OT.SID": 1,
          "OT.TRANSACTION": 1
        },
        "T": {
          "T.COM_EXPLOIT": 1,
          "T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA": 1,
          "T.CONFID-JCS-CODE": 1,
          "T.CONFID-JCS-DATA": 1,
          "T.CONFIG": 1,
          "T.EXE-CODE": 2,
          "T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE": 2,
          "T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA": 2,
          "T.INTEG-JCS-CODE": 1,
          "T.INTEG-JCS-DATA": 1,
          "T.LIFE_CYCLE": 1,
          "T.NATIVE": 1,
          "T.OBJ-DELETION": 1,
          "T.OS_OPERATE": 1,
          "T.PHYSICAL": 1,
          "T.RESOURCES": 1,
          "T.RND": 1,
          "T.SID": 2,
          "T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT": 1
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      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02": 3,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0084-": 1,
          "BSI-PP-0006-2002T": 1
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      },
      "cc_sar": {
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          "ADV_FSP.4": 1,
          "ADV_FSP.5": 1,
          "ADV_IMP.1": 2,
          "ADV_INT.2": 1,
          "ADV_TDS.3": 2
        },
        "AGD": {
          "AGD_OPE.1": 2,
          "AGD_PRE": 1,
          "AGD_PRE.1": 2
        },
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_CMC.4": 1,
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          "ALC_LCD.1": 1,
          "ALC_TAT.2": 1
        },
        "ASE": {
          "ASE_CCL.1": 1,
          "ASE_ECD.1": 1,
          "ASE_INT.1": 1,
          "ASE_OBJ.2": 1,
          "ASE_REQ.2": 1,
          "ASE_SPD.1": 1,
          "ASE_TSS.1": 1
        },
        "ATE": {
          "ATE_COV.2": 1,
          "ATE_DPT.1": 1,
          "ATE_DPT.3": 1,
          "ATE_FUN.1": 1,
          "ATE_IND.2": 1
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN.5": 7
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 5": 2,
          "EAL 5 augmented": 1,
          "EAL 5+": 3,
          "EAL4": 1,
          "EAL4 augmented": 1,
          "EAL5": 4,
          "EAL5 augmented": 3
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {
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          "FAU_ARP.1": 1,
          "FAU_GEN": 1,
          "FAU_SAS.1": 1
        },
        "FCO": {
          "FCO_NRO.2": 1
        },
        "FCS": {
          "FCS_CKM": 1,
          "FCS_CKM.1": 19,
          "FCS_CKM.1.1": 1,
          "FCS_CKM.2": 3,
          "FCS_CKM.3": 1,
          "FCS_CKM.4": 14,
          "FCS_CKM.4.1": 3,
          "FCS_COP": 19,
          "FCS_COP.1": 8,
          "FCS_COP.1.1": 15,
          "FCS_RND": 8,
          "FCS_RND.1": 10,
          "FCS_RND.1.1": 2,
          "FCS_RNG.1": 2
        },
        "FDP": {
          "FDP_ACC": 26,
          "FDP_ACC.1": 26,
          "FDP_ACC.2": 3,
          "FDP_ACF": 17,
          "FDP_ACF.1": 48,
          "FDP_IFC.1": 9,
          "FDP_IFC.2": 1,
          "FDP_IFF.1": 2,
          "FDP_ITC": 1,
          "FDP_ITC.1": 6,
          "FDP_ITC.2": 7,
          "FDP_RIP.1": 13,
          "FDP_RIP.1.1": 2,
          "FDP_ROL.1": 2,
          "FDP_SDI": 13,
          "FDP_SDI.1": 2,
          "FDP_SDI.2": 11,
          "FDP_UIT.1": 1
        },
        "FIA": {
          "FIA_AFL.1": 7,
          "FIA_AFL.1.1": 3,
          "FIA_AFL.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_ATD.1": 1,
          "FIA_UAU.1": 10,
          "FIA_UAU.1.1": 4,
          "FIA_UAU.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_UAU.4": 1,
          "FIA_UID.1": 15,
          "FIA_UID.1.1": 3,
          "FIA_UID.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_UID.2": 1,
          "FIA_USB.1": 1
        },
        "FMT": {
          "FMT_MOF.1": 6,
          "FMT_MOF.1.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA": 13,
          "FMT_MSA.1": 15,
          "FMT_MSA.2": 8,
          "FMT_MSA.2.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.3": 24,
          "FMT_MSA.3.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.3.2": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.4": 7,
          "FMT_MSA.4.1": 2,
          "FMT_MTD": 13,
          "FMT_MTD.1": 7,
          "FMT_MTD.3": 1,
          "FMT_SMF.1": 28,
          "FMT_SMF.1.1": 2,
          "FMT_SMR.1": 28,
          "FMT_SMR.1.1": 4,
          "FMT_SMR.1.2": 3
        },
        "FPR": {
          "FPR_UNO.1": 1
        },
        "FPT": {
          "FPT_EMS": 8,
          "FPT_EMS.1": 11,
          "FPT_EMS.1.1": 5,
          "FPT_EMS.1.2": 4,
          "FPT_FLS.1": 16,
          "FPT_FLS.1.1": 2,
          "FPT_PHP.1": 6,
          "FPT_PHP.1.1": 3,
          "FPT_PHP.1.2": 3,
          "FPT_PHP.3": 11,
          "FPT_PHP.3.1": 3,
          "FPT_RCV.3": 1,
          "FPT_TDC.1": 1,
          "FPT_TST": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1": 14,
          "FPT_TST.1.1": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1.2": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1.3": 2
        },
        "FTP": {
          "FTP_ITC": 3,
          "FTP_ITC.1": 1
        }
      },
      "certification_process": {
        "OutOfScope": {
          " No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[bArray] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[Installer] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradictions to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " While D.Sig provides the TOE\u2019s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification": 1,
          " While D.Sig provides the TOE\u2019s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification. 1.3.2.1 TOE identification and TOE variants 2 Please note that there are": 1,
          "1.1[ECDHPACEKeyExchang e]. No contradictions to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[APDU] No": 1,
          "19 of 76 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FPT_FLS.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACC.1[SD] No correspondence": 1,
          "7.1.8 in platform ST) FAU_SAS.1[SCP] No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP) FCS_RNG.1 FCS_RND.1 In this ST, random numbers accord- ing to AIS20 class DRG": 1,
          "76 Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks OT.APPLI-AUTH No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "76 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FMT_MSA.3[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[EXT-MEM] No": 1,
          "ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "Functional Requirements (chapter 7.1.8.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[SecureBox] No": 1,
          "GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE No contradiction to this ST. OT.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "MIFARE functionality or a banking application in ROM; please note that this functionality is out of scope of the TOE\u2019s security functionality claimed by this security target. The correctness of the chip": 1,
          "No direct correspondence. No con- tradiction to this ST. OT.CONFIG-LIMIT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. Table 5: Assessment of the platform objectives. 2.2.4 Assessment of": 1,
          "OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.IC OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, OT.EMSEC_Design The": 1,
          "OT.REALLOCATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "Out of scope": 117,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 2,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Configuration Security": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[bArray] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[EXT-MEM] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SecureBox] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SecureBox] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SecureBox] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3[Installer] No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Further Functional Requirements": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. INSTG Security Functional": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -": 3,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. RMIG Security Functional": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Table 4: Assessment of the": 1,
          "Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks OT.SID No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "Platform Threat Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No": 1,
          "Requirements (chapter 7.1.9 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FMT_SMR.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No": 1,
          "SID.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "ST. OT.COMM_AUTH No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.COMM_INTEGRITY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "ST. OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.EXT-MEM No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "ST. OT.IDENTIFICATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SEC_BOX_FW No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "ST. OT.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite / SSCD Security": 1,
          "ST. T.INTEG-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SID.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST": 1,
          "ST. T.LIFE_CYCLE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "ST. T.PHYSICAL T.Hack_Phys No contradiction to this ST. T.OS_OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RND T.SCD_Derive No direct correspondence, but secure random number": 1,
          "T.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.COM_EXPLOIT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "The requirement in this ST is equiva- lent to parts of the platform ST. FCS_CKM.2 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope": 1,
          "are related. No con- tradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.RECOVERY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.SCP.SUPPORT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "chapter 7.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "chapter 7.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1[AID] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "chapter 7.1.8 in platform ST) FAU_SAS.1[SCP] No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP": 1,
          "chapter 7.1.8.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[SecureBox] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "chapter 7.1.9 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.1[CONFIG-SERVICE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "cure internal signature key gen- eration. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFIG No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. Table 6: Threats of the platform ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -": 1,
          "group includes requirements for managing the external memory. FDP_ACC.1[EXT-MEM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[EXT-MEM] No": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-JCVM] No": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FCO_NRO.2[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACC.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SD] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[SC] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ITC.2[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 -": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.4[SC] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UAU.4[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1[AID] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1[AID] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] No": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SC] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SD] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.1[SC] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1[SD] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FCO_NRO.2[SC] No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1[SC] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. EMG Security Functional": 1,
          "internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine": 1,
          "internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] No correspondence Out": 1,
          "managed within JCOP). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within JCOP": 1,
          "manager (ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[ADEL] No": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] No correspondence Out": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of": 1,
          "out of scope": 2,
          "platform ST) FIA_ATD.1[AID] No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.2[AID] No correspondence": 1,
          "platform ST) Firewall Policy (chapter 7.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 1,
          "that owns the deleted objects by invoking a specific API method. FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] FPT_FLS.1 The": 1,
          "the plat- form leads to secrecy of SCD. No contradiction to this ST. OT.PIN-MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. OT.TRANSACTION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification. FDP_UIT.1[CCM] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1[CCM] No correspondence": 1,
          "vio- lations complement JCOP mecha- nisms. No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TDC.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Aid Management (chapter 7.1.1.4": 1,
          "which addresses security aspects outside the runtime. FMT_SMR.1[Installer] No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1[Installer] No": 1
        }
      },
      "cipher_mode": {
        "CBC": {
          "CBC": 1
        },
        "CCM": {
          "CCM": 4
        }
      },
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {
        "PACE": {
          "PACE": 17
        }
      },
      "crypto_scheme": {
        "MAC": {
          "MAC": 1
        }
      },
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {},
      "eval_facility": {},
      "hash_function": {
        "JH": {
          "JH": 1
        },
        "SHA": {
          "SHA2": {
            "SHA-224": 2,
            "SHA-256": 2,
            "SHA-384": 2,
            "SHA-512": 1
          }
        }
      },
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {
        "JCOP": {
          "JCOP 3": 12
        }
      },
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {
        "RNG": {
          "RND": 2,
          "RNG": 8
        }
      },
      "side_channel_analysis": {
        "FI": {
          "DFA": 1,
          "fault injection": 1,
          "malfunction": 1,
          "physical tampering": 11
        },
        "SCA": {
          "DPA": 2,
          "SPA": 2,
          "physical probing": 1,
          "timing attacks": 2
        }
      },
      "standard_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "AIS 20": 1,
          "AIS20": 6,
          "AIS31": 3
        },
        "CC": {
          "CCMB-2012-09-001": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-002": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-003": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-004": 1
        },
        "FIPS": {
          "FIPS 180-4": 2,
          "FIPS PUB 186-3": 1,
          "FIPS PUB 46-3": 1,
          "FIPS180-4": 1,
          "FIPS186-2": 1,
          "FIPS186-3": 1,
          "FIPS197": 1,
          "FIPS46-3": 1
        },
        "ICAO": {
          "ICAO": 7
        },
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 15946-1": 1,
          "ISO/IEC 15946-2": 1,
          "ISO/IEC 7816-4": 1,
          "ISO/IEC 9796-2": 1
        },
        "PKCS": {
          "PKCS#1": 1,
          "PKCS#15": 3,
          "PKCS3": 1
        },
        "RFC": {
          "RFC 5639": 1,
          "RFC4493": 1
        },
        "X509": {
          "X.509": 1
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {
        "AES_competition": {
          "AES": {
            "AES": 13
          }
        },
        "DES": {
          "3DES": {
            "3DES": 2,
            "TripleDES": 1
          },
          "DES": {
            "DES": 1
          }
        },
        "constructions": {
          "MAC": {
            "CMAC": 2
          }
        }
      },
      "technical_report_id": {},
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "NXP": {
          "NXP": 30,
          "NXP Semiconductors": 1
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "st_metadata": {
      "/Author": "bdrisch",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20180222105849+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2013",
      "/Keywords": "SSCD, ePasslet Suite, electronic Signature",
      "/ModDate": "D:20180222105849+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2013",
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