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	IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4 BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010	IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4 None
name	IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4	IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
category	ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems	ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems
scheme	DE	DE
status	archived	archived
not_valid_after	01.09.2019	01.09.2019
not_valid_before	16.02.2010	01.09.2005
cert_link	None	None
report_link	https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0662a_pdf.pdf	https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308a_pdf.pdf
st_link	https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf	https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf
manufacturer	Sony Corporation	Sony Corporation
manufacturer_web	https://www.sony.com/	https://www.sony.com/
security_level	EAL4	EAL4
dgst	f3abe81c51dd5651	5d560fb6108db342
heuristics/cert_id	BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010	None
heuristics/cert_lab	BSI	[]
heuristics/cpe_matches	{}	{}
heuristics/direct_transitive_cves	{}	{}
heuristics/extracted_sars	ATE_COV.2, ADV_LLD.1, AVA_SOF.1, AGD_ADM.1, ALC_DVS.1, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_LCD.1, AVA_MSU.2, AGD_USR.1, ATE_DPT.1, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1, ADV_IMP.1, ATE_FUN.1, ADV_SPM.1, ATE_IND.2, AVA_VLA.2	ATE_COV.2, ADV_LLD.1, AVA_SOF.1, AGD_ADM.1, ALC_DVS.1, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_LCD.1, AVA_MSU.2, AGD_USR.1, ATE_DPT.1, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1, ADV_IMP.1, ATE_FUN.1, ADV_SPM.1, ATE_IND.2, AVA_VLA.2
heuristics/extracted_versions	4	4
heuristics/indirect_transitive_cves	{}	{}
heuristics/related_cves	{}	{}
heuristics/report_references/directly_referenced_by	{}	{}
heuristics/report_references/directly_referencing	{}	{}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referenced_by	{}	{}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referencing	{}	{}
heuristics/scheme_data
heuristics/st_references/directly_referenced_by	{}	{}
heuristics/st_references/directly_referencing	{}	{}
heuristics/st_references/indirectly_referenced_by	{}	{}
heuristics/st_references/indirectly_referencing	{}	{}
heuristics/verified_cpe_matches	{}	{}
maintenance_updates
protection_profiles
pdf_data/cert_filename	None	None
pdf_data/cert_frontpage
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_cert_id
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_security_level
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_sar
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_sfr
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_claims
pdf_data/cert_keywords/vendor
pdf_data/cert_keywords/eval_facility
pdf_data/cert_keywords/symmetric_crypto
pdf_data/cert_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
pdf_data/cert_keywords/pq_crypto
pdf_data/cert_keywords/hash_function
pdf_data/cert_keywords/crypto_scheme
pdf_data/cert_keywords/crypto_protocol
pdf_data/cert_keywords/randomness
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cipher_mode
pdf_data/cert_keywords/ecc_curve
pdf_data/cert_keywords/crypto_engine
pdf_data/cert_keywords/tls_cipher_suite
pdf_data/cert_keywords/crypto_library
pdf_data/cert_keywords/vulnerability
pdf_data/cert_keywords/side_channel_analysis
pdf_data/cert_keywords/technical_report_id
pdf_data/cert_keywords/device_model
pdf_data/cert_keywords/tee_name
pdf_data/cert_keywords/os_name
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cplc_data
pdf_data/cert_keywords/ic_data_group
pdf_data/cert_keywords/standard_id
pdf_data/cert_keywords/javacard_version
pdf_data/cert_keywords/javacard_api_const
pdf_data/cert_keywords/javacard_packages
pdf_data/cert_keywords/certification_process
pdf_data/cert_metadata
pdf_data/report_filename	0662a_pdf.pdf	None
pdf_data/report_frontpage	DE: cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 cert_item: IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4 cert_lab: BSI developer: Sony Corporation match_rules: *['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for\|For) (.+?) from (.)']**	DE:
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id	DE: BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009: 2 BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010: 18 NL: CC-0590-2009: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level	EAL: EAL 1: 1 EAL 4: 5 EAL 7: 1 EAL1: 5 EAL2: 3 EAL3: 4 EAL4: 4 EAL5: 6 EAL6: 3 EAL7: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar	ACM: ACM_AUT: 2 ACM_AUT.1: 1 ACM_CAP: 2 ACM_CAP.4: 1 ACM_SCP: 2 ACM_SCP.2: 1 ADO: ADO_DEL: 2 ADO_DEL.2: 1 ADO_IGS: 2 ADO_IGS.1: 1 ADV: ADV_FSP: 2 ADV_HLD: 2 ADV_IMP: 2 ADV_INT: 2 ADV_LLD: 2 ADV_RCR: 2 ADV_SPM: 2 AGD: AGD_ADM: 2 AGD_USR: 2 ALC: ALC_DVS: 2 ALC_DVS.1: 1 ALC_FLR: 2 ALC_LCD: 1 ALC_LCD.1: 1 ALC_TAT: 2 ALC_TAT.1: 1 APE: APE_DES: 1 APE_ENV: 1 APE_INT: 1 APE_OBJ: 1 APE_REQ: 1 APE_SRE: 1 ASE: ASE_DES: 1 ASE_ENV: 1 ASE_INT: 1 ASE_OBJ: 1 ASE_PPC: 1 ASE_REQ: 1 ASE_SRE: 1 ASE_TSS: 1 ATE: ATE_COV: 2 ATE_DPT: 2 ATE_FUN: 4 ATE_IND: 2 AVA: AVA_CCA: 2 AVA_MSU: 2 AVA_SOF: 3 AVA_VLA: 3 AVA_VLA.2: 1 AVA_VLA.3: 1 AVA_VLA.4: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sfr
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_claims
pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility	BrightSight: Brightsight: 2 TUV: TÜV Informationstechnik: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto	DES: DES: DES: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
pdf_data/report_keywords/pq_crypto
pdf_data/report_keywords/hash_function
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_scheme
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_protocol
pdf_data/report_keywords/randomness	RNG: RNG: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cipher_mode	CBC: CBC: 2 ECB: ECB: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/ecc_curve
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_engine
pdf_data/report_keywords/tls_cipher_suite
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_library
pdf_data/report_keywords/vulnerability
pdf_data/report_keywords/side_channel_analysis	other: JIL: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/technical_report_id	BSI: BSI 7125: 2 BSI 7148: 1 BSI 7149: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/device_model
pdf_data/report_keywords/tee_name
pdf_data/report_keywords/os_name
pdf_data/report_keywords/cplc_data
pdf_data/report_keywords/ic_data_group
pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id	BSI: AIS 20: 3 AIS 25: 3 AIS 26: 3 AIS 32: 1 AIS 35: 2 AIS 38: 1 ISO: ISO/IEC 15408: 2005: 1 ISO/IEC 15408:1999: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_version
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_api_const
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_packages
pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process	ConfidentialDocument: IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential document: 1 Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4: 1 OutOfScope: EEPROM built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher: 1 RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE: 1 built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher: 1 communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and: 1 cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE: 1 cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE: 1 i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1 interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent: 1 of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as: 1 of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and: 1 out of scope: 7 secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode: 1 this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE: 1 which is out of scope of the TOE: 2
pdf_data/report_metadata	/Author: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der informationstechnik /CreationDate: D:20100303105054+01'00' /Creator: Writer /Keywords: "Common Criteria, CC, Sony Corporation, IC chip for the reader / writerRC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4" /ModDate: D:20100308120846+01'00' /Producer: OpenOffice.org 3.1 /Subject: Common Criteria Certification /Title: Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010 pdf_file_size_bytes: 767988 pdf_hyperlinks: http://www.bsi.bund.de/ pdf_is_encrypted: False pdf_number_of_pages: 34
pdf_data/st_filename	0308b_pdf.pdf	0308b_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/st_frontpage
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_cert_id
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_security_level	EAL: EAL4: 10	EAL: EAL4: 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar	ACM: ACM_AUT.1: 3 ACM_CAP.3: 1 ACM_CAP.4: 3 ACM_SCP.1: 1 ACM_SCP.2: 3 ADO: ADO_DEL.2: 3 ADO_IGS.1: 4 ADV: ADV_FSP.1: 7 ADV_FSP.2: 3 ADV_HLD.1: 2 ADV_HLD.2: 5 ADV_IMP.1: 4 ADV_LLD.1: 5 ADV_RCR.1: 4 ADV_SPM.1: 6 AGD: AGD_ADM.1: 7 AGD_USR.1: 3 ALC: ALC_DVS.1: 4 ALC_LCD.1: 3 ALC_TAT.1: 4 ATE: ATE_COV.2: 3 ATE_DPT.1: 3 ATE_FUN.1: 3 ATE_IND.2: 3 AVA: AVA_MSU.2: 3 AVA_SOF.1: 3 AVA_VLA.2: 3	ACM: ACM_AUT.1: 3 ACM_CAP.3: 1 ACM_CAP.4: 3 ACM_SCP.1: 1 ACM_SCP.2: 3 ADO: ADO_DEL.2: 3 ADO_IGS.1: 4 ADV: ADV_FSP.1: 7 ADV_FSP.2: 3 ADV_HLD.1: 2 ADV_HLD.2: 5 ADV_IMP.1: 4 ADV_LLD.1: 5 ADV_RCR.1: 4 ADV_SPM.1: 6 AGD: AGD_ADM.1: 7 AGD_USR.1: 3 ALC: ALC_DVS.1: 4 ALC_LCD.1: 3 ALC_TAT.1: 4 ATE: ATE_COV.2: 3 ATE_DPT.1: 3 ATE_FUN.1: 3 ATE_IND.2: 3 AVA: AVA_MSU.2: 3 AVA_SOF.1: 3 AVA_VLA.2: 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr	FCS: FCS_CKM.1: 20 FCS_CKM.1.1: 2 FCS_CKM.4: 16 FCS_CKM.4.1: 2 FCS_COP.1: 22 FCS_COP.1.1: 2 FDP: FDP_ACC: 3 FDP_ACC.1: 13 FDP_ACC.1.1: 1 FDP_ACF.1: 10 FDP_ACF.1.1: 1 FDP_ACF.1.2: 1 FDP_ACF.1.3: 1 FDP_ACF.1.4: 1 FDP_IFC.1: 20 FDP_IFC.1.1: 1 FDP_IFF.1: 15 FDP_IFF.1.1: 1 FDP_IFF.1.2: 1 FDP_IFF.1.3: 1 FDP_IFF.1.4: 1 FDP_IFF.1.5: 1 FDP_IFF.1.6: 1 FDP_ITC.1: 2 FDP_ITT.1: 12 FDP_ITT.1.1: 1 FDP_SDI.1: 14 FDP_SDI.1.1: 1 FDP_UCT.1: 11 FDP_UCT.1.1: 1 FDP_UIT.1: 11 FDP_UIT.1.1: 1 FDP_UIT.1.2: 1 FIA: FIA_AFL: 1 FIA_AFL.1: 7 FIA_AFL.1.1: 1 FIA_AFL.1.2: 2 FIA_ALF.1: 2 FIA_UAU: 1 FIA_UAU.2: 10 FIA_UAU.2.1: 1 FIA_UID.1: 11 FIA_UID.1.1: 1 FIA_UID.1.2: 1 FMT: FMT_MSA: 1 FMT_MSA.1: 22 FMT_MSA.1.1: 2 FMT_MSA.2: 11 FMT_MSA.2.1: 1 FMT_MSA.3: 12 FMT_MSA.3.1: 1 FMT_MSA.3.2: 1 FMT_MTD.1: 10 FMT_MTD.1.1: 1 FMT_SMF.1: 11 FMT_SMF.1.1: 1 FMT_SMR.1: 15 FMT_SMR.1.1: 1 FMT_SMR.1.2: 1 FPT: FPT_AMT.1: 3 FPT_FLS.1: 19 FPT_FLS.1.1: 1 FPT_ITT.1: 12 FPT_ITT.1.1: 1 FPT_PHP.3: 14 FPT_PHP.3.1: 1 FPT_RCV.4: 20 FPT_RCV.4.1: 1 FPT_SDI.1: 1 FPT_TST: 1 FPT_TST.1: 11 FPT_TST.1.1: 1 FPT_TST.1.2: 1 FPT_TST.1.3: 1 FTP: FTP_ITC.1: 22 FTP_ITC.1.1: 2 FTP_ITC.1.2: 2 FTP_ITC.1.3: 2 FTP_TRP.1: 2	FCS: FCS_CKM.1: 20 FCS_CKM.1.1: 2 FCS_CKM.4: 16 FCS_CKM.4.1: 2 FCS_COP.1: 22 FCS_COP.1.1: 2 FDP: FDP_ACC: 3 FDP_ACC.1: 13 FDP_ACC.1.1: 1 FDP_ACF.1: 10 FDP_ACF.1.1: 1 FDP_ACF.1.2: 1 FDP_ACF.1.3: 1 FDP_ACF.1.4: 1 FDP_IFC.1: 20 FDP_IFC.1.1: 1 FDP_IFF.1: 15 FDP_IFF.1.1: 1 FDP_IFF.1.2: 1 FDP_IFF.1.3: 1 FDP_IFF.1.4: 1 FDP_IFF.1.5: 1 FDP_IFF.1.6: 1 FDP_ITC.1: 2 FDP_ITT.1: 12 FDP_ITT.1.1: 1 FDP_SDI.1: 14 FDP_SDI.1.1: 1 FDP_UCT.1: 11 FDP_UCT.1.1: 1 FDP_UIT.1: 11 FDP_UIT.1.1: 1 FDP_UIT.1.2: 1 FIA: FIA_AFL: 1 FIA_AFL.1: 7 FIA_AFL.1.1: 1 FIA_AFL.1.2: 2 FIA_ALF.1: 2 FIA_UAU: 1 FIA_UAU.2: 10 FIA_UAU.2.1: 1 FIA_UID.1: 11 FIA_UID.1.1: 1 FIA_UID.1.2: 1 FMT: FMT_MSA: 1 FMT_MSA.1: 22 FMT_MSA.1.1: 2 FMT_MSA.2: 11 FMT_MSA.2.1: 1 FMT_MSA.3: 12 FMT_MSA.3.1: 1 FMT_MSA.3.2: 1 FMT_MTD.1: 10 FMT_MTD.1.1: 1 FMT_SMF.1: 11 FMT_SMF.1.1: 1 FMT_SMR.1: 15 FMT_SMR.1.1: 1 FMT_SMR.1.2: 1 FPT: FPT_AMT.1: 3 FPT_FLS.1: 19 FPT_FLS.1.1: 1 FPT_ITT.1: 12 FPT_ITT.1.1: 1 FPT_PHP.3: 14 FPT_PHP.3.1: 1 FPT_RCV.4: 20 FPT_RCV.4.1: 1 FPT_SDI.1: 1 FPT_TST: 1 FPT_TST.1: 11 FPT_TST.1.1: 1 FPT_TST.1.2: 1 FPT_TST.1.3: 1 FTP: FTP_ITC.1: 22 FTP_ITC.1.1: 2 FTP_ITC.1.2: 2 FTP_ITC.1.3: 2 FTP_TRP.1: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
pdf_data/st_keywords/vendor
pdf_data/st_keywords/eval_facility	TUV: TÜV Informationstechnik: 1	TUV: TÜV Informationstechnik: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/symmetric_crypto	DES: 3DES: Triple-DES: 4 DES: DES: 17	DES: 3DES: Triple-DES: 4 DES: DES: 17
pdf_data/st_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
pdf_data/st_keywords/pq_crypto
pdf_data/st_keywords/hash_function
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_protocol
pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness	RNG: RNG: 1	RNG: RNG: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cipher_mode	CBC: CBC: 1	CBC: CBC: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/ecc_curve
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_engine
pdf_data/st_keywords/tls_cipher_suite
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_library
pdf_data/st_keywords/vulnerability
pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis	FI: DFA: 1 Malfunction: 26 SCA: DPA: 1 Physical Probing: 5 physical probing: 3 other: reverse engineering: 1	FI: DFA: 1 Malfunction: 26 SCA: DPA: 1 Physical Probing: 5 physical probing: 3 other: reverse engineering: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/technical_report_id
pdf_data/st_keywords/device_model
pdf_data/st_keywords/tee_name
pdf_data/st_keywords/os_name
pdf_data/st_keywords/cplc_data
pdf_data/st_keywords/ic_data_group
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id	BSI: AIS 20: 1 AIS20: 2 CC: CCIMB-99-031: 1 CCIMB-99-032: 1 CCIMB-99-033: 1 ISO: ISO/IEC 15408: 6 ISO/IEC 18092: 2	BSI: AIS 20: 1 AIS20: 2 CC: CCIMB-99-031: 1 CCIMB-99-032: 1 CCIMB-99-033: 1 ISO: ISO/IEC 15408: 6 ISO/IEC 18092: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/javacard_version
pdf_data/st_keywords/javacard_api_const
pdf_data/st_keywords/javacard_packages
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process	OutOfScope: 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of: 1 Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information: 1 Out of scope: 1 Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE: 1 i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1 level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the: 1 mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer: 1 of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious: 1 of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip: 1 out of scope: 10 parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04: 1 processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE: 1 results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data: 1 that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The: 1 up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the: 1 utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the: 1	OutOfScope: 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of: 1 Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information: 1 Out of scope: 1 Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE: 1 i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1 level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the: 1 mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer: 1 of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious: 1 of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip: 1 out of scope: 10 parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04: 1 processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE: 1 results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data: 1 that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The: 1 up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the: 1 utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the: 1
pdf_data/st_metadata	/Author: EbisawaHiroki /Comments: 英文校正 by H.Hamada /Company: Sony Corporation /CreationDate: D:20050819223433+09'00' /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0 /ModDate: D:20050819223926+09'00' /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows) /Subject: 英文(K.H.) /Title: MDPU2 ST Ver1.11 pdf_file_size_bytes: 309061 pdf_hyperlinks: {} pdf_is_encrypted: True pdf_number_of_pages: 70	/Author: EbisawaHiroki /Comments: 英文校正 by H.Hamada /Company: Sony Corporation /CreationDate: D:20050819223433+09'00' /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0 /ModDate: D:20050819223926+09'00' /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows) /Subject: 英文(K.H.) /Title: MDPU2 ST Ver1.11 pdf_file_size_bytes: 309061 pdf_hyperlinks: {} pdf_is_encrypted: True pdf_number_of_pages: 70
state/cert/convert_garbage	False	False
state/cert/convert_ok	False	False
state/cert/download_ok	False	False
state/cert/extract_ok	False	False
state/cert/pdf_hash	Equal	Equal
state/cert/txt_hash	Equal	Equal
state/report/convert_garbage	False	False
state/report/convert_ok	True	False
state/report/download_ok	True	False
state/report/extract_ok	True	False
state/report/pdf_hash	Different	Different
state/report/txt_hash	Different	Different
state/st/convert_garbage	False	False
state/st/convert_ok	True	True
state/st/download_ok	True	True
state/st/extract_ok	True	True
state/st/pdf_hash	Equal	Equal
state/st/txt_hash	Equal	Equal