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Secure Smart Card Controller E201382
ANSSI-CC-2016/08
IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
name Secure Smart Card Controller E201382 IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
scheme FR DE
not_valid_after 01.03.2021 01.09.2019
not_valid_before 29.02.2016 16.02.2010
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC-2016_08fr.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0662a_pdf.pdf
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI_cible2016_08en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf
manufacturer NXP Semiconductors Sony Corporation
manufacturer_web https://www.nxp.com/ https://www.sony.com/
security_level EAL5+, ASE_TSS.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 EAL4
dgst 9ea0321b93567d1e f3abe81c51dd5651
heuristics/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2016/08 BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
heuristics/cert_lab SERMA BSI
heuristics/extracted_sars ASE_INT.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_CMC.4, ASE_ECD.1, ADV_IMP.1, ATE_COV.2, ASE_SPD.1, ALC_CMS.5, AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_LCD.1, ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1, ADV_INT.2, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_DPT.3, ADV_ARC.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ADV_TDS.4, ASE_TSS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ASE_REQ.2, ATE_IND.2, ASE_CCL.1 ALC_DVS.1, ATE_COV.2, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VLA.2, AVA_MSU.2, ADV_HLD.2, ATE_FUN.1, AGD_USR.1, AVA_SOF.1, ATE_IND.2, AGD_ADM.1, ADV_LLD.1, ALC_LCD.1, ATE_DPT.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_IMP.1
heuristics/extracted_versions - 4
heuristics/report_references/directly_referenced_by ANSSI-CC-2016/32 {}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referenced_by ANSSI-CC-2016/32 {}
heuristics/protection_profiles cf0f01bcd7be3e9c {}
maintenance_updates
protection_profile_links https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfiles/pp0084b_pdf.pdf {}
pdf_data/report_filename ANSSI-CC-2016_08fr.pdf 0662a_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/report_frontpage
  • FR:
    • cc_security_level: EAL 5 augmenté ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ASE_TSS.2
    • cc_version: Critères Communs version 3.1 révision 4
    • cert_id: ANSSI-CC-2016/08
    • cert_item: Secure Smart Card Controller E201382
    • cert_item_version: IC Hardware versions VA and VB, ID Dedicated Support Software version 1.0
    • cert_lab: Serma Safety & Technology 14 rue Galilée, CS 10055, 33615 Pessac Cedex, France
    • developer: NXP Semiconductors Stresemannallee 101 22529 Hamburg, GERMANY Commanditaire NXP Semiconductors Stresemannallee 101 22529 Hamburg, GERMANY
    • match_rules: ['Référence du rapport de certification(.+)Nom du produit(.+)Référence/version du produit(.+)Conformité à un profil de protection(.+)Critères d’évaluation et version(.+)Niveau d’évaluation(.+)Développeur (.+)Centre d’évaluation(.+)Accords de reconnaissance applicables']
    • ref_protection_profiles: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, version 1.0, certifié BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 le 19 february 2014 avec conformité à “Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in Secured Environment only
  • DE:
  • FR:
  • DE:
    • cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
    • cert_item: IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4
    • cert_lab: BSI
    • developer: Sony Corporation
    • match_rules: ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)']
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • FR:
    • ANSSI-CC-2016/08: 15
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0590-2009: 2
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010: 18
  • NL:
    • CC-0590-2009: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL 1: 1
    • EAL 3: 1
    • EAL 5: 3
    • EAL 7: 1
    • EAL2: 2
    • EAL7: 1
  • ITSEC:
    • ITSEC E6 Elevé: 1
  • EAL:
    • EAL 1: 1
    • EAL 4: 5
    • EAL 7: 1
    • EAL1: 5
    • EAL2: 3
    • EAL3: 4
    • EAL4: 4
    • EAL5: 6
    • EAL6: 3
    • EAL7: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC: 1
    • ADV_FSP: 1
    • ADV_IMP: 1
    • ADV_INT: 1
    • ADV_SPM: 1
    • ADV_TDS: 1
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE: 1
    • AGD_PRE: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC: 1
    • ALC_CMS: 1
    • ALC_DEL: 1
    • ALC_DVS: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 2
    • ALC_FLR: 2
    • ALC_TAT: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_CCL: 1
    • ASE_ECD: 1
    • ASE_INT: 1
    • ASE_OBJ: 1
    • ASE_REQ: 1
    • ASE_SPD: 1
    • ASE_TSS: 1
    • ASE_TSS.2: 2
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN: 2
    • AVA_VAN.5: 3
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT: 2
    • ACM_AUT.1: 1
    • ACM_CAP: 2
    • ACM_CAP.4: 1
    • ACM_SCP: 2
    • ACM_SCP.2: 1
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL: 2
    • ADO_DEL.2: 1
    • ADO_IGS: 2
    • ADO_IGS.1: 1
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP: 2
    • ADV_HLD: 2
    • ADV_IMP: 2
    • ADV_INT: 2
    • ADV_LLD: 2
    • ADV_RCR: 2
    • ADV_SPM: 2
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM: 2
    • AGD_USR: 2
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS: 2
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_FLR: 2
    • ALC_LCD: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT: 2
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • APE:
    • APE_DES: 1
    • APE_ENV: 1
    • APE_INT: 1
    • APE_OBJ: 1
    • APE_REQ: 1
    • APE_SRE: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_DES: 1
    • ASE_ENV: 1
    • ASE_INT: 1
    • ASE_OBJ: 1
    • ASE_PPC: 1
    • ASE_REQ: 1
    • ASE_SRE: 1
    • ASE_TSS: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 2
    • ATE_DPT: 2
    • ATE_FUN: 4
    • ATE_IND: 2
  • AVA:
    • AVA_CCA: 2
    • AVA_MSU: 2
    • AVA_SOF: 3
    • AVA_VLA: 3
    • AVA_VLA.2: 1
    • AVA_VLA.3: 1
    • AVA_VLA.4: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_claims
  • O:
    • O.C: 1
  • R:
    • R.O: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
  • NXP:
    • NXP: 19
    • NXP Semiconductors: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
  • Serma:
    • Serma Technologies: 2
  • BrightSight:
    • Brightsight: 2
  • TUV:
    • TÜV Informationstechnik: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • AES_competition:
    • AES:
      • AES: 1
  • DES:
    • DES:
      • DES: 2
  • DES:
    • DES:
      • DES: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/randomness
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cipher_mode
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 2
  • ECB:
    • ECB: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • other:
    • JIL: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/technical_report_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI 7125: 2
    • BSI 7148: 1
    • BSI 7149: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2012-09-001: 1
    • CCMB-2012-09-002: 1
    • CCMB-2012-09-003: 1
    • CCMB-2012-09-004: 1
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 3
    • AIS 25: 3
    • AIS 26: 3
    • AIS 32: 1
    • AIS 35: 2
    • AIS 38: 1
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408: 2005: 1
    • ISO/IEC 15408:1999: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process
  • ConfidentialDocument:
    • IC, Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informations- technik GmbH (confidential document) [8] RC-S940 Configuration List, Version 4.8, 26.08.2009, Sony Corporation (confidential document: 1
    • Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0308-2005, Version 2.04, 13 May 2005, RC-S940 Security Target (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, Date: 06.10.2009, Product: RC-S940 Version 4: 1
  • OutOfScope:
    • EEPROM built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher: 1
    • RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE: 1
    • built in the IC chip. ● A part of data (cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE) stored in the EEPROM. ● Security Logic: The security logic contains a cipher: 1
    • communication with a contactless Smart Card (RF CARD interface and an other inactivated circuit is out of scope of the TOE). This IC chip provides different operating modes. IPL (Initial Program Load) Mode and: 1
    • cryptographic key) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE: 1
    • cryptographic keys) stored in the EEPROM. ● Firmware (out of scope of the TOE: 1
    • i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1
    • interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE). Furthermore, the TOE provides physical and logical security functionality to prevent: 1
    • of the IC chip is stored; in the EEPROM authentication data and a downloadable firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) are stored; in the SRAM area communication data and other processed data are stored as: 1
    • of this evaluation. Normal Mode (i.e. running a firmware, which was downloaded in IPL Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. The IC chip provides the security functionality of mutual authentication and: 1
    • out of scope: 7
    • secure download of some application firmware (which is out of scope of the TOE) to EEPROM used for activation of the external communication interface in Normal Mode: 1
    • this interface and Normal Mode are out of scope of the TOE: 1
    • which is out of scope of the TOE: 2
pdf_data/report_metadata
  • /Author: Coralie
  • /CreationDate: D:20160303092000+01'00'
  • /Creator: Microsoft® Word 2010
  • /Keywords: ANSSI-CC-CER-F-07.017
  • /ModDate: D:20160303092000+01'00'
  • /Producer: Microsoft® Word 2010
  • /Subject: Secure Smart Card Controller E201382
  • /Title: ANSSI-CC-2016/08
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 549301
  • pdf_hyperlinks: http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/, mailto:[email protected]
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 14
  • /Author: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der informationstechnik
  • /CreationDate: D:20100303105054+01'00'
  • /Creator: Writer
  • /Keywords: "Common Criteria, CC, Sony Corporation, IC chip for the reader / writerRC-S940 (CXD9768GG) Version 4"
  • /ModDate: D:20100308120846+01'00'
  • /Producer: OpenOffice.org 3.1
  • /Subject: Common Criteria Certification
  • /Title: Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0662-2010
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 767988
  • pdf_hyperlinks: http://www.bsi.bund.de/
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 34
pdf_data/st_filename ANSSI_cible2016_08en.pdf 0308b_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL4: 3
    • EAL4+: 1
    • EAL5: 11
    • EAL5 augmented: 2
  • EAL:
    • EAL4: 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC: 1
    • ADV_ARC.1: 1
    • ADV_FSP: 3
    • ADV_FSP.4: 3
    • ADV_FSP.5: 11
    • ADV_IMP: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 1
    • ADV_INT.2: 1
    • ADV_TDS.4: 1
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE: 1
    • AGD_OPE.1: 1
    • AGD_PRE: 1
    • AGD_PRE.1: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC: 1
    • ALC_CMC.4: 1
    • ALC_CMS: 3
    • ALC_CMS.4: 3
    • ALC_CMS.5: 5
    • ALC_DEL: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 2
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.2: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_CCL.1: 1
    • ASE_ECD.1: 1
    • ASE_INT.1: 1
    • ASE_OBJ.2: 1
    • ASE_REQ.2: 1
    • ASE_SPD.1: 1
    • ASE_TSS.2: 4
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_DPT.3: 1
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 3
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT.1: 3
    • ACM_CAP.3: 1
    • ACM_CAP.4: 3
    • ACM_SCP.1: 1
    • ACM_SCP.2: 3
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL.2: 3
    • ADO_IGS.1: 4
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.1: 7
    • ADV_FSP.2: 3
    • ADV_HLD.1: 2
    • ADV_HLD.2: 5
    • ADV_IMP.1: 4
    • ADV_LLD.1: 5
    • ADV_RCR.1: 4
    • ADV_SPM.1: 6
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM.1: 7
    • AGD_USR.1: 3
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS.1: 4
    • ALC_LCD.1: 3
    • ALC_TAT.1: 4
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 3
    • ATE_DPT.1: 3
    • ATE_FUN.1: 3
    • ATE_IND.2: 3
  • AVA:
    • AVA_MSU.2: 3
    • AVA_SOF.1: 3
    • AVA_VLA.2: 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr
  • FAU:
    • FAU_SAS.1: 7
    • FAU_SAS.1.1: 1
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM.1: 9
    • FCS_CKM.4: 9
    • FCS_COP.1: 47
    • FCS_COP.1.1: 4
    • FCS_RNG.1: 17
    • FCS_RNG.1.1: 4
    • FCS_RNG.1.2: 3
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC.1: 32
    • FDP_ACC.1.1: 2
    • FDP_ACF.1: 23
    • FDP_ACF.1.1: 2
    • FDP_ACF.1.2: 2
    • FDP_ACF.1.3: 2
    • FDP_ACF.1.4: 2
    • FDP_IFC.1: 13
    • FDP_ITC.1: 9
    • FDP_ITC.2: 9
    • FDP_ITT.1: 9
    • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_RIP.1: 13
    • FDP_RIP.1.1: 2
    • FDP_SDC.1: 7
    • FDP_SDC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI.2: 8
    • FDP_SDI.2.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI.2.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_LIM.1: 15
    • FMT_LIM.1.1: 1
    • FMT_LIM.2: 17
    • FMT_LIM.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.1: 23
    • FMT_MSA.1.1: 2
    • FMT_MSA.3: 20
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 2
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 2
    • FMT_SMF.1: 25
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 2
    • FMT_SMR.1: 13
  • FPT:
    • FPT_FLS.1: 9
    • FPT_ITT.1: 11
    • FPT_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 8
    • FPT_TST.1: 7
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 1
  • FRU:
    • FRU_FLT.2: 8
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM.1: 20
    • FCS_CKM.1.1: 2
    • FCS_CKM.4: 16
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
    • FCS_COP.1: 22
    • FCS_COP.1.1: 2
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 3
    • FDP_ACC.1: 13
    • FDP_ACC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1: 10
    • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_IFC.1: 20
    • FDP_IFC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1: 15
    • FDP_IFF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.5: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.6: 1
    • FDP_ITC.1: 2
    • FDP_ITT.1: 12
    • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI.1: 14
    • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UCT.1: 11
    • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UIT.1: 11
    • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL: 1
    • FIA_AFL.1: 7
    • FIA_AFL.1.1: 1
    • FIA_AFL.1.2: 2
    • FIA_ALF.1: 2
    • FIA_UAU: 1
    • FIA_UAU.2: 10
    • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
    • FIA_UID.1: 11
    • FIA_UID.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_MSA: 1
    • FMT_MSA.1: 22
    • FMT_MSA.1.1: 2
    • FMT_MSA.2: 11
    • FMT_MSA.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3: 12
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_MTD.1: 10
    • FMT_MTD.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 11
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1: 15
    • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
  • FPT:
    • FPT_AMT.1: 3
    • FPT_FLS.1: 19
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 12
    • FPT_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 14
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_RCV.4: 20
    • FPT_RCV.4.1: 1
    • FPT_SDI.1: 1
    • FPT_TST: 1
    • FPT_TST.1: 11
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 1
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC.1: 22
    • FTP_ITC.1.1: 2
    • FTP_ITC.1.2: 2
    • FTP_ITC.1.3: 2
    • FTP_TRP.1: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • O:
    • O.AES: 5
    • O.DES: 4
    • O.HW_REUSE: 5
    • O.INTEGRITY_CHK: 4
    • O.MEM_ACCESS: 5
    • O.NVM_INTEGRITY: 5
    • O.REUSE: 6
    • O.RND: 4
    • O.SFR_ACCESS: 4
  • T:
    • T.RND: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/vendor
  • NXP:
    • NXP: 22
    • NXP Semiconductors: 30
pdf_data/st_keywords/eval_facility
  • TUV:
    • TÜV Informationstechnik: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • AES_competition:
    • AES:
      • AES: 37
    • E2:
      • E2: 1
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • 3DES: 2
      • TDEA: 1
      • TDES: 6
      • Triple-DES: 7
    • DES:
      • DES: 30
  • constructions:
    • MAC:
      • CBC-MAC: 4
      • CMAC: 9
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • Triple-DES: 4
    • DES:
      • DES: 17
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness
  • RNG:
    • RND: 7
    • RNG: 25
  • TRNG:
    • TRNG: 1
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cipher_mode
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 6
  • CCM:
    • CCM: 3
  • ECB:
    • ECB: 6
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_library
  • Generic:
    • Crypto Library 1.0: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • FI:
    • Malfunction: 7
    • malfunction: 3
    • physical tampering: 1
  • SCA:
    • DPA: 1
    • Leak-Inherent: 9
    • Physical Probing: 2
    • physical probing: 1
    • side channel: 3
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
  • FI:
    • DFA: 1
    • Malfunction: 26
  • SCA:
    • DPA: 1
    • Physical Probing: 5
    • physical probing: 3
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS31: 5
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2012-09-001: 2
    • CCMB-2012-09-002: 2
    • CCMB-2012-09-003: 2
    • CCMB-2012-09-004: 2
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 197: 1
    • FIPS PUB 46-3: 2
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 14443: 2
    • ISO/IEC 14443-3: 1
    • ISO/IEC 14443-4: 2
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS20: 2
  • CC:
    • CCIMB-99-031: 1
    • CCIMB-99-032: 1
    • CCIMB-99-033: 1
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408: 6
    • ISO/IEC 18092: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process
  • OutOfScope:
    • 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of: 1
    • Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information: 1
    • Out of scope: 1
    • Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE: 1
    • i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1
    • level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the: 1
    • mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer: 1
    • of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious: 1
    • of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip: 1
    • out of scope: 10
    • parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04: 1
    • processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE: 1
    • results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data: 1
    • that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The: 1
    • up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the: 1
    • utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the: 1
pdf_data/st_metadata
  • /Author: EbisawaHiroki
  • /Comments: 英文校正 by H.Hamada
  • /Company: Sony Corporation
  • /CreationDate: D:20050819223433+09'00'
  • /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0
  • /ModDate: D:20050819223926+09'00'
  • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)
  • /Subject: 英文(K.H.)
  • /Title: MDPU2 ST Ver1.11
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 309061
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 70
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