Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)

Heuristics ?

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Updates ?

• 21.11.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The following values were inserted: {'prev_certificates': [], 'next_certificates': []}.
• 22.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

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  The PDF extraction data was updated.

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  • The cert_metadata property was set to {'pdf_file_size_bytes': 420574, 'pdf_is_encrypted': False, 'pdf_number_of_pages': 1, '/Author': 'Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik', '/CreationDate': "D:20190109152001+01'00'", '/Creator': 'Writer', '/Keywords': 'Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2', '/ModDate': "D:20190109152110+01'00'", '/Producer': 'LibreOffice 5.2', '/Subject': 'Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)', '/Title': 'Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018', 'pdf_hyperlinks': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': []}}.
  • The report_frontpage property was set to {'DE': {'match_rules': ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)'], 'cert_id': 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018', 'cert_item': 'Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD', 'developer': 'Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR', 'cert_lab': 'BSI', 'ref_protection_profiles': 'EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA- 02 (**) Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4. (**) The IT Product identified in this certificate is a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3) and a compliant seal creation device according to Article 39(2) of eIDAS Regulation (Regulation No 910/2014 of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014) if the operational conditions as outlined in this certification report are followed. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 18 December 2018 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 only Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report Contents A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8 5. Validity of te Certification Result....................................................................................8 6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12 3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13 5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14 6. Documentation............................................................................................................14 7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15 8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17 9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19 11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................19 13. Definitions..................................................................................................................21 14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22 C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27 D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................28 5 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 ● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 ● BSI Schedule of Costs3 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 6 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045 ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 components. 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 December 2018. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the applicant is: Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR. The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of te Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\'s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18 December 2018 is valid until 17 December 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re- certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\'s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI- Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14 45886 Gelsenkirchen Deutschland 9 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation. The TOE is named Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD). It consists of an applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD provided by the Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite for secure signature creation devices with PIN and PACE (Password Authenticated Connection Establishment) authentication (PACE only for contactless variant), the corresponding guidance documents, the underlying operating system with the crypto library and the hardware platform. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue TSF_Access Access Control TSF_Admin Administration TSF_Secret Secret key management TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging TSF_Auth Authentication protocols TSF_Integrity Integrity protection TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 11 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW+ SW Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite on platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 3.0 The delivery is performed with sealed boxes by courier. The delivery process is included in the evaluation of the underlying smartcard OS. 2 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE) [10] 3.0.19 The delivery process is included in the evaluation of the underlying smartcard OS. Signed and encrypted Email delivery using PGP RSA 2048 bit is used. 3 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications - Guidance Manual [11] 3.0.11 4 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization - Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE) [12] 3.0.25 5 DOC Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 [13] 3.6 6 DOC Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 7.0 C3 [14] 5.2 Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 operating system including the crypto library and the Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. Either the SmartCafe operating system with the applet is integrated into the ordered IC by the IC manufacturer, or the smartcard embedded software developer, here Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (G+D), loads the SW part with the flash loader. Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite product as the 12 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report delivery process covered by the certified SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 platform. The ST [22] and the guidance [14] of the platform outline the delivery procedure. The product is delivered within sealed boxes by courier and is additionally secured by the hardware and operating system security mechanisms. The TOE guidance is delivered in electronic form (encrypted and signed) according to defined mailing procedures by G+D. The delivery in sense of CC is fully covered by the underlying platform certification of the SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3. The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in [6] and [12]. After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response sequence as outlined in [6] and [12], verifying the configuration and the life cycle of the underlying platform OS, as well as the CPLC-Data. After instantiation of the applet it can be selected and the version of the applet can be verified, as well as the internal version numbers, see [12].There are two software versions with different internal version numbers that fall under this certification. Details regarding the identification of the two versions are described in [12]. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: ● Cryptographic Support, ● User Data Protection, ● Identification and Authentication, ● Security Management, and ● Protection of the TSF. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 6.2 of the Security Target [6]. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: ● OE.SVD_Auth, ● OE.CGA_QCert, ● OE.SSCD_Prov_Service, ● OE.HID_VAD, ● OE.DTBS_Intend, ● OE.DTBS_Protect, ● OE.Signatory, ● OE.APPLET, ● OE.VERIFICATION, and 13 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 ● OE.CODE-EVIDENCE. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance documents. 5. Architectural Information The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform that comprises eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization: ● Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control. ● Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying SCE platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library. ● Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated. ● Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events. ● Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if specific APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering all applet commands. ● Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging. ● File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management by a representation of the existing elements. ● State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the authentication status of the terminal and the challenge. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Java Card platform see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 [15, 16, 19, 20]. 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 14 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 7. IT Product Testing Developer\'s Test according to ATE_FUN The developer’s testing effort is summarised as follows: TOE configurations tested: The tests were performed with the composite smart card product ePasslet3.0/SSCD on G&D OS SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3, in the one configuration in scope of the certification. Developer’s testing approach: The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach: ● Tests to cover all actions defined in the functional specification, ● Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the functional specification and executable on the TOE, ● Access rules tests as part of the requirements on TSF data, ● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design. Verdict for the activity: All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected. Evaluator Tests Independent Testing according to ATE_IND The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach, configuration, depth and results. Test Approach and Set-up: The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/SSCD application installed on SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 OS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test software. Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used. The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to: ● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms), ● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution), ● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging), ● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation [11] and [12]. The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the following approach: ● Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases, ● Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality, 15 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 ● Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented, ● The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing, ● Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps were performed and described for nearly each test case, ● The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body. Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform evaluation, ● Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with the certification body. Configuration: The TOE was tested in the one configuration in scope of the certification. The keys and personalization data used in the test configuration were provided by the developer. Test Results: The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The test results are logged. The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the actual test results. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN Overview: The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The one configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually successful. Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional developer tests. 16 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases. The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test set was devised. TOE test configurations: The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered in to the personalization agent and as stated in the security target. Verdict for the sub-activity: The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential of High was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite and loaded in the underlying certified OS platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in [11] and [12]. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, (ii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, (iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, 17 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 (iv) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6, (v) Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, (vi) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 20, 21]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (see [4], AIS 26, 33, 34, 36, 46). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]). As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8] ● for the', 'cc_version': 'PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the', 'cc_security_level': "Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 The cryptographic algorithms outlined in Table 4, Annex C (except PACEv2) are implemented in the Java Card Platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 that is part of the TOE and on which the Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation is set up. Except for the PACEv2-implementation the security evaluation of the implementation of all other cryptographic algorithms depicted in Table 4 was performed in the framework of the certification of the Java Card Platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 (refer to the Certification Report [15][16] and related Security Target [25]). The TOE and its specific applet rely on the correct (i.e. standard-conform) and secure implementation of these cryptographic algorithms. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and therefore relies on the platform certifications of the used platform (certification ID BSI-DSZ- CC-1028-2017-MA01) [15, 16, 19, 20]. The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be resistant against attackers with attack potential high. 18 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de). The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only. 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES"}}.
  • The report_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018': 18, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01': 3, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1032': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017': 3, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015': 2, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01': 2}, 'NL': {'CC-1028-2017-MA01': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 4}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5': 8, 'EAL 2': 3, 'EAL 1': 1, 'EAL 4': 1, 'EAL5+': 1, 'EAL6': 1, 'EAL 5+': 1, 'EAL 6': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 3}}, 'cc_sar': {'AGD': {'AGD_OPE': 2, 'AGD_PRE': 2}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 5, 'ALC_FLR': 1, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.5': 1, 'ALC_DEL.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.2': 1, 'ALC_COMP.1': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_FUN': 1, 'ATE_IND': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 4, 'AVA_VAN': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {'OE': {'OE.HID_VAD': 1, 'OE.APPLET': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION': 1, 'OE.CODE-EVIDENCE': 1}}, 'vendor': {'Infineon': {'Infineon': 2, 'Infineon Technologies AG': 2}, 'GD': {'G+D': 5, 'Giesecke+Devrient': 2, 'G&D': 2, 'Giesecke & Devrient': 3}}, 'eval_facility': {'TUV': {'TÜV Informationstechnik': 5, 'TÜViT': 2}}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 10}}, 'DES': {'DES': {'DES': 1}}, 'constructions': {'MAC': {'CMAC': 3}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'RSA': {'RSA 2048': 1}, 'ECC': {'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 2}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 5}}, 'FF': {'DH': {'Diffie-Hellman': 1}, 'DSA': {'DSA': 1}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 3, 'SHA-256': 3, 'SHA-384': 5, 'SHA-512': 4, 'SHA-2': 4}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 2}, 'KEX': {'Key Exchange': 1}, 'KA': {'Key Agreement': 1}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 5}, 'PGP': {'PGP': 1}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 2}}, 'cipher_mode': {'CBC': {'CBC': 2}}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'other': {'JIL': 2}}, 'technical_report_id': {'BSI': {'BSI TR-02102': 1, 'BSI 7148': 1}}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS PUB 186-3': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#1': 4, 'PKCS #1': 1}, 'BSI': {'AIS 34': 2, 'AIS 36': 4, 'AIS 26': 2, 'AIS 20': 3, 'AIS 32': 1, 'AIS 46': 1}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 4, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 4, 'ISO/IEC 17065': 2}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'ConfidentialDocument': {'being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification': 1, 'with Key generation (SSCD) 3.0, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [8] EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device': 1, 'Configuration list for the TOE, 2018-12-07, File 1032_SSCD_conflist-SCE.xls, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [10] Guidance Document for the TOE: Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card': 1}}}.
  • The st_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1032': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01': 3, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01': 3, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017': 1, 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015': 2}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02': 3, 'BSI-CC-PP-0059-': 1, 'BSI-PP-0006-2002T': 1, 'BSI-CC-PP-0084-': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5+': 3, 'EAL5': 4, 'EAL 5': 2, 'EAL4': 1, 'EAL5 augmented': 3, 'EAL4 augmented': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ADV': {'ADV_ARC.1': 3, 'ADV_FSP.5': 1, 'ADV_IMP.1': 2, 'ADV_TDS.4': 1, 'ADV_INT.2': 1, 'ADV_FSP.4': 1, 'ADV_TDS.3': 1}, 'AGD': {'AGD_PRE': 6, 'AGD_OPE.1': 2, 'AGD_PRE.1': 2}, 'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 7, 'ALC_CMC.4': 1, 'ALC_CMS.5': 1, 'ALC_DEL.1': 1, 'ALC_LCD.1': 1, 'ALC_TAT.2': 1}, 'ATE': {'ATE_COV.2': 1, 'ATE_DPT.3': 1, 'ATE_FUN.1': 1, 'ATE_IND.2': 1, 'ATE_DPT.1': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 8}, 'ASE': {'ASE_CCL.1': 1, 'ASE_ECD.1': 1, 'ASE_INT.1': 1, 'ASE_OBJ.2': 1, 'ASE_REQ.2': 1, 'ASE_SPD.1': 1, 'ASE_TSS.1': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {'FAU': {'FAU_ARP.1': 1, 'FAU_GEN': 1}, 'FCO': {'FCO_NRO': 1}, 'FCS': {'FCS_RND': 8, 'FCS_CKM': 2, 'FCS_COP': 22, 'FCS_RND.1': 10, 'FCS_CKM.1': 24, 'FCS_CKM.2': 3, 'FCS_CKM.3': 1, 'FCS_CKM.4': 14, 'FCS_COP.1': 23, 'FCS_RNG.1': 2, 'FCS_RND.1.1': 2, 'FCS_CKM.1.1': 1, 'FCS_CKM.4.1': 3}, 'FDP': {'FDP_ACC': 28, 'FDP_ACF': 19, 'FDP_IFC': 2, 'FDP_IFF': 2, 'FDP_RIP': 8, 'FDP_ROL': 1, 'FDP_SDI.2': 11, 'FDP_ITC': 2, 'FDP_UIT': 1, 'FDP_ITC.1': 6, 'FDP_ITC.2': 6, 'FDP_ACF.1': 42, 'FDP_ACC.1': 23, 'FDP_RIP.1': 5, 'FDP_RIP.1.1': 2, 'FDP_SDI': 13, 'FDP_SDI.1': 2, 'FDP_IFC.1': 8}, 'FIA': {'FIA_ATD': 1, 'FIA_UID': 2, 'FIA_USB': 1, 'FIA_UID.1': 13, 'FIA_UID.1.1': 3, 'FIA_UID.1.2': 3, 'FIA_UAU.1': 8, 'FIA_UAU.1.1': 4, 'FIA_UAU.1.2': 3, 'FIA_AFL.1': 5, 'FIA_AFL.1.1': 3, 'FIA_AFL.1.2': 3}, 'FMT': {'FMT_MSA': 23, 'FMT_SMF.1': 22, 'FMT_SMR.1': 24, 'FMT_MTD': 15, 'FMT_SMR': 3, 'FMT_SMF': 2, 'FMT_MSA.3': 16, 'FMT_SMR.1.1': 4, 'FMT_SMR.1.2': 3, 'FMT_SMF.1.1': 2, 'FMT_MOF.1': 6, 'FMT_MOF.1.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA.1': 7, 'FMT_MSA.2': 6, 'FMT_MSA.2.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA.3.1': 2, 'FMT_MSA.3.2': 2, 'FMT_MSA.4': 7, 'FMT_MSA.4.1': 2, 'FMT_MTD.1': 6}, 'FPR': {'FPR_UNO.1': 1}, 'FPT': {'FPT_EMS': 8, 'FPT_FLS.1': 12, 'FPT_PHP.3': 11, 'FPT_EMS.1': 11, 'FPT_TDC.1': 1, 'FPT_TST.1': 15, 'FPT_FLS': 3, 'FPT_RCV': 1, 'FPT_EMS.1.1': 5, 'FPT_EMS.1.2': 4, 'FPT_FLS.1.1': 2, 'FPT_TST': 2, 'FPT_PHP.1': 6, 'FPT_PHP.1.1': 3, 'FPT_PHP.1.2': 3, 'FPT_PHP.3.1': 3, 'FPT_TST.1.1': 2, 'FPT_TST.1.2': 2, 'FPT_TST.1.3': 2}, 'FTP': {'FTP_ITC': 2}}, 'cc_claims': {'O': {'O.SID': 1, 'O.FIREWALL': 1, 'O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID': 1, 'O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG': 1, 'O.NATIVE': 1, 'O.OPERATE': 1, 'O.REALLOCATION': 1, 'O.RESOURCES': 1, 'O.ALARM': 1, 'O.CIPHER': 1, 'O.KEY-MNGT': 1, 'O.PIN-MNGT': 1, 'O.TRANSACTION': 1, 'O.OBJ-DELETION': 1, 'O.DELETION': 1, 'O.LOAD': 1, 'O.INSTALL': 1, 'O.CARD-MANAGEMENT': 1, 'O.SCP': 3}, 'T': {'T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA': 1, 'T.CONFID-JCS-CODE': 1, 'T.CONFID-JCS-DATA': 1, 'T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE': 2, 'T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA': 2, 'T.INTEG-JCS-CODE': 1, 'T.INTEG-JCS-DATA': 1, 'T.SID': 2, 'T.EXE-CODE': 2, 'T.NATIVE': 1, 'T.RESOURCES': 1, 'T.DELETION': 1, 'T.SECURE_DELETION': 1, 'T.INSTALL': 1, 'T.OBJ-DELETION': 1, 'T.PHYSICAL': 1}, 'A': {'A.APPLET': 1, 'A.VERIFICATION': 1, 'A.CGA': 2, 'A.SCA': 2}, 'OE': {'OE.APPLET': 1, 'OE.VERIFICATION': 1, 'OE.CODE-EVIDENCE': 1, 'OE.HID_VAD': 3}}, 'vendor': {'Infineon': {'Infineon': 6, 'Infineon Technologies AG': 2}, 'GD': {'Giesecke & Devrient': 1, 'G&D': 1, 'Giesecke+Devrient': 1}}, 'eval_facility': {}, 'symmetric_crypto': {'AES_competition': {'AES': {'AES': 9}}}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {'ECC': {'ECDSA': {'ECDSA': 5}, 'ECC': {'ECC': 6}}}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {'SHA': {'SHA2': {'SHA-224': 3, 'SHA-256': 3, 'SHA-384': 5, 'SHA-512': 6, 'SHA-2': 2}}}, 'crypto_scheme': {'MAC': {'MAC': 1}}, 'crypto_protocol': {'PACE': {'PACE': 18}}, 'randomness': {'RNG': {'RNG': 9}}, 'cipher_mode': {}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {'SCA': {'physical probing': 1, 'SPA': 2, 'DPA': 2, 'timing attacks': 2}, 'FI': {'physical tampering': 11, 'malfunction': 1, 'DFA': 1, 'fault injection': 1}}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'FIPS': {'FIPS186-3': 2, 'FIPS180-4': 3, 'FIPS197': 2, 'FIPS PUB 186-3': 1}, 'PKCS': {'PKCS#15': 3, 'PKCS1': 3}, 'BSI': {'AIS20': 6, 'AIS 20': 1}, 'RFC': {'RFC5639': 3, 'RFC 5639': 1}, 'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 7816-4': 1}, 'ICAO': {'ICAO': 7}, 'X509': {'X.509': 1}, 'CC': {'CCMB-2012-09-001': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-002': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-003': 1, 'CCMB-2012-09-004': 1}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {'OutOfScope': {'out of scope': 1, 'Out of scope': 82, ' While D.Sig provides the TOE’s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification': 1, 'chapter 8.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL-JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall': 1, 'DRG.4) that can be used directly. FDP_RIP.1/ABORT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/bArray No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'chapter 8.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1/AID No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1/AID No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_UIT.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality': 1, ' While D.Sig provides the TOE’s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification. 1.3.2.1 TOE identification Identification of the TOE is performed by several': 1, 'platform ST) Firewall Policy (chapter 8.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision': 1, 'the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 1, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_IFC.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/JCVM No correspondence Out': 1, 'internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCRE No correspondence Out': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL-JCVM No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 2, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User': 1, 'of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of': 1, 'internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. Application Programming Interface': 1, 'The requirement in this ST is equiva- lent to parts of the platform ST. FCS_CKM.2 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST. Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision': 1, '17 of 72 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 The requirements': 1, 'a defined quality met- ric (DRG.4) that can be used directly. FDP_RIP.1/ABORT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/APDU No correspondence': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/bArray No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/KEYS No correspondence': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL No': 1, 'complement Java Card OS mechanisms. No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TDC.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Self-testing': 1, 'initial start-up. Aid Management (chapter 8.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1/AID No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.2/AID No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1/AID No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.1/JCRE No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. INSTG Security Functional': 1, 'which addresses security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ITC.2/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/Installer No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/Installer No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3/Installer No': 1, 'Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Veridos Suite v3.0 -': 1, 'manager (ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1/ADEL No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/ADEL No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/ADEL No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/ADEL No correspondence': 1, 'that owns the deleted objects by invoking a specific API method. FDP_RIP.1/ODEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/ODEL FPT_FLS.1 The': 1, 'verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification. FCO_NRO.2/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2/CM No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_UIT.1/CM No correspondence': 1, '20 of 72 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FIA_UID.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/CM No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/CM No correspondence': 1, 'internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1/CM No correspondence': 1, 'objectives for the TOE and are covered by SFRs in the platform ST. FTP_ITC.1/CMGR No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. SCPG Security Functional': 1, 'objectives. Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks O.SID No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE No contradiction to this ST. O.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST': 1, '72 Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks O.REALLOCATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'the plat- form leads to secrecy of SCD. No contradiction to this ST. O.PIN-MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.TRANSACTION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. O.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'O.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.INSTALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.CARD-MANAGEMENT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'The objectives are related. No con- tradiction to this ST. O.SCP.RECOVERY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.SCP.SUPPORT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No': 1, 'DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.INTEG-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SID.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST': 1, 'SID.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'T.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this': 1, 'T.DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SECURE_DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1, 'ST. T.INSTALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to': 1}}}.
  • The cert_keywords property was set to {'cc_cert_id': {'DE': {'BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018': 1}}, 'cc_protection_profile_id': {'BSI': {'BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-': 1}}, 'cc_security_level': {'EAL': {'EAL 5': 2, 'EAL 2': 1, 'EAL 5 augmented': 1}}, 'cc_sar': {'ALC': {'ALC_DVS.2': 1}, 'AVA': {'AVA_VAN.5': 1}}, 'cc_sfr': {}, 'cc_claims': {}, 'vendor': {'GD': {'G+D': 1}}, 'eval_facility': {}, 'symmetric_crypto': {}, 'asymmetric_crypto': {}, 'pq_crypto': {}, 'hash_function': {}, 'crypto_scheme': {}, 'crypto_protocol': {}, 'randomness': {}, 'cipher_mode': {}, 'ecc_curve': {}, 'crypto_engine': {}, 'tls_cipher_suite': {}, 'crypto_library': {}, 'vulnerability': {}, 'side_channel_analysis': {}, 'technical_report_id': {}, 'device_model': {}, 'tee_name': {}, 'os_name': {}, 'cplc_data': {}, 'ic_data_group': {}, 'standard_id': {'ISO': {'ISO/IEC 15408': 2, 'ISO/IEC 18045': 2}}, 'javacard_version': {}, 'javacard_api_const': {}, 'javacard_packages': {}, 'certification_process': {}}.
  • The report_filename property was set to 1032a_pdf.pdf.
  • The st_filename property was set to 1032b_pdf.pdf.
  • The cert_filename property was set to 1032c_pdf.pdf.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The cert_lab property was set to ['BSI'].
  • The cert_id property was set to BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018.
  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015']}} data.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015']}, 'indirectly_referencing': {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': ['BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014', 'BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015']}} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_INT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_ECD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_COMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_CCL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_SPD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_OBJ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_INT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_REQ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_IND', 'level': 2}]} values added.
• 17.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The report_link was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1032a_pdf.pdf.

  The st_link was updated.

  • The new value is https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1032b_pdf.pdf.

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The st property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.
  • The cert property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The st_metadata property was set to None.
  • The cert_metadata property was set to None.
  • The st_keywords property was set to None.
  • The cert_keywords property was set to None.
  • The st_filename property was set to None.
  • The cert_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The cert_id property was set to None.
  • The st_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMS', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_INT', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_FUN', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_IMP', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_DPT', 'level': 3}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_TSS', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_PRE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_CCL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_IND', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_SPD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_OBJ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ATE_COV', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_TAT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_INT', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_REQ', 'level': 2}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_CMC', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_FSP', 'level': 5}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_ARC', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'AGD_OPE', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_DEL', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_LCD', 'level': 1}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ADV_TDS', 'level': 4}, {'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ASE_ECD', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 12.08.2024 The certificate data changed. Show diff

  Certificate changed

  The state of the certificate object was updated.

  • The report property was updated, with the {'download_ok': False, 'convert_ok': False, 'extract_ok': False, 'pdf_hash': None, 'txt_hash': None} data.

  The PDF extraction data was updated.

  • The report_metadata property was set to None.
  • The report_frontpage property was set to None.
  • The report_keywords property was set to None.
  • The report_filename property was set to None.

  The computed heuristics were updated.

  • The cert_lab property was set to None.
  • The report_references property was updated, with the {'directly_referencing': None, 'indirectly_referencing': None} data.
  • The extracted_sars property was updated, with the {'_type': 'Set', 'elements': [{'_type': 'sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR', 'family': 'ALC_COMP', 'level': 1}]} values discarded.
• 23.07.2024 The certificate was first processed. Show diff

  New certificate

  A new Common Criteria certificate with the product name Veridos Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) was processed.

Raw data

{
  "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate",
  "category": "Products for Digital Signatures",
  "cert_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1032c_pdf.pdf",
  "dgst": "85d48246f67978b2",
  "heuristics": {
    "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.Heuristics",
    "annotated_references": null,
    "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018",
    "cert_lab": [
      "BSI"
    ],
    "cpe_matches": null,
    "direct_transitive_cves": null,
    "extracted_sars": {
      "_type": "Set",
      "elements": [
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_CMC",
          "level": 4
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_INT",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_FSP",
          "level": 5
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_ARC",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_COMP",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_INT",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_FUN",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_DPT",
          "level": 3
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AVA_VAN",
          "level": 5
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_OBJ",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_REQ",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AGD_PRE",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DEL",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_LCD",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_TDS",
          "level": 4
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_ECD",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_SPD",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_CCL",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_DVS",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_COV",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ASE_TSS",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ATE_IND",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ADV_IMP",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "AGD_OPE",
          "level": 1
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_TAT",
          "level": 2
        },
        {
          "_type": "sec_certs.sample.sar.SAR",
          "family": "ALC_CMS",
          "level": 5
        }
      ]
    },
    "extracted_versions": {
      "_type": "Set",
      "elements": [
        "3.0"
      ]
    },
    "indirect_transitive_cves": null,
    "next_certificates": [],
    "prev_certificates": [],
    "related_cves": null,
    "report_references": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
      "directly_referenced_by": null,
      "directly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015"
        ]
      },
      "indirectly_referenced_by": null,
      "indirectly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0868-2014",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015"
        ]
      }
    },
    "scheme_data": null,
    "st_references": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.certificate.References",
      "directly_referenced_by": null,
      "directly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015"
        ]
      },
      "indirectly_referenced_by": null,
      "indirectly_referencing": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017",
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015"
        ]
      }
    },
    "verified_cpe_matches": null
  },
  "maintenance_updates": {
    "_type": "Set",
    "elements": []
  },
  "manufacturer": "Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by Giesecke \u0026 Devrient and Bundesdruckerei",
  "manufacturer_web": "https://www.veridos.com",
  "name": "Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)",
  "not_valid_after": "2023-12-18",
  "not_valid_before": "2018-12-18",
  "pdf_data": {
    "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.PdfData",
    "cert_filename": "1032c_pdf.pdf",
    "cert_frontpage": null,
    "cert_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {},
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {},
      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sar": {
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_DVS.2": 1
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN.5": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 2": 1,
          "EAL 5": 2,
          "EAL 5 augmented": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {},
      "certification_process": {},
      "cipher_mode": {},
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {},
      "crypto_scheme": {},
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {},
      "eval_facility": {},
      "hash_function": {},
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {},
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {},
      "side_channel_analysis": {},
      "standard_id": {
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 15408": 2,
          "ISO/IEC 18045": 2
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {},
      "technical_report_id": {},
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "GD": {
          "G+D": 1
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "cert_metadata": {
      "/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20190109152001+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Writer",
      "/Keywords": "Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2",
      "/ModDate": "D:20190109152110+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "LibreOffice 5.2",
      "/Subject": "Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)",
      "/Title": "Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018",
      "pdf_file_size_bytes": 420574,
      "pdf_hyperlinks": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": []
      },
      "pdf_is_encrypted": false,
      "pdf_number_of_pages": 1
    },
    "report_filename": "1032a_pdf.pdf",
    "report_frontpage": {
      "DE": {
        "cc_security_level": "Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 The cryptographic algorithms outlined in Table 4, Annex C (except PACEv2) are implemented in the Java Card Platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 that is part of the TOE and on which the Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation is set up. Except for the PACEv2-implementation the security evaluation of the implementation of all other cryptographic algorithms depicted in Table 4 was performed in the framework of the certification of the Java Card Platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 (refer to the Certification Report [15][16] and related Security Target [25]). The TOE and its specific applet rely on the correct (i.e. standard-conform) and secure implementation of these cryptographic algorithms. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and therefore relies on the platform certifications of the used platform (certification ID BSI-DSZ- CC-1028-2017-MA01) [15, 16, 19, 20]. The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be resistant against attackers with attack potential high. 18 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the \u0027Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102\u0027 (https://www.bsi.bund.de). The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column \u0027Security Level above 100 Bits\u0027 of the following table with \u0027no\u0027 achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only. 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES",
        "cc_version": "PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended \u25cf for the",
        "cert_id": "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018",
        "cert_item": "Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD",
        "cert_lab": "BSI",
        "developer": "Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR",
        "match_rules": [
          "(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)"
        ],
        "ref_protection_profiles": "EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA- 02 (**) Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4. (**) The IT Product identified in this certificate is a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3) and a compliant seal creation device according to Article 39(2) of eIDAS Regulation (Regulation No 910/2014 of THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014) if the operational conditions as outlined in this certification report are followed. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 18 December 2018 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Division Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 only Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report Contents A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8 5. Validity of te Certification Result....................................................................................8 6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12 3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13 5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14 6. Documentation............................................................................................................14 7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15 8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17 9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................17 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19 11. Security Target...........................................................................................................19 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................19 13. Definitions..................................................................................................................21 14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22 C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................27 D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................28 5 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: \u25cf Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 \u25cf BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 \u25cf BSI Schedule of Costs3 \u25cf Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) \u25cf DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] \u25cf BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] \u25cf Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 6 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report \u25cf Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045 \u25cf BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For \"Smartcards and similar devices\" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For \"HW Devices with Security Boxes\" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC \u2013 Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2 components. 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) was conducted by T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 December 2018. T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the applicant is: Veridos GmbH - Identity Solutions by G+D BDR. The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of te Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that \u25cf all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, \u25cf the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user\u0027s risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18 December 2018 is valid until 17 December 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re- certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product\u0027s certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI- Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14 45886 Gelsenkirchen Deutschland 9 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of \u25cf the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, \u25cf the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and \u25cf complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) with Key generation. The TOE is named Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD). It consists of an applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD provided by the Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite for secure signature creation devices with PIN and PACE (Password Authenticated Connection Establishment) authentication (PACE only for contactless variant), the corresponding guidance documents, the underlying operating system with the crypto library and the hardware platform. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8]. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue TSF_Access Access Control TSF_Admin Administration TSF_Secret Secret key management TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging TSF_Auth Authentication protocols TSF_Integrity Integrity protection TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). 11 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD) The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW+ SW Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite on platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 3.0 The delivery is performed with sealed boxes by courier. The delivery process is included in the evaluation of the underlying smartcard OS. 2 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE) [10] 3.0.19 The delivery process is included in the evaluation of the underlying smartcard OS. Signed and encrypted Email delivery using PGP RSA 2048 bit is used. 3 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications - Guidance Manual [11] 3.0.11 4 DOC Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing a Secure Signature Creation Device application with on-chip key generation (SSCD Type 3) and supporting PKI utilization - Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE) [12] 3.0.25 5 DOC Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCaf\u00e9\u00ae Expert 7.0 C3 [13] 3.6 6 DOC Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCaf\u00e9\u00ae Expert 7.0 C3 [14] 5.2 Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 operating system including the crypto library and the Veridos eDoc Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet configuration ePasslet3.0/SSCD. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. Either the SmartCafe operating system with the applet is integrated into the ordered IC by the IC manufacturer, or the smartcard embedded software developer, here Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH (G+D), loads the SW part with the flash loader. Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite product as the 12 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report delivery process covered by the certified SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 platform. The ST [22] and the guidance [14] of the platform outline the delivery procedure. The product is delivered within sealed boxes by courier and is additionally secured by the hardware and operating system security mechanisms. The TOE guidance is delivered in electronic form (encrypted and signed) according to defined mailing procedures by G+D. The delivery in sense of CC is fully covered by the underlying platform certification of the SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3. The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in [6] and [12]. After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response sequence as outlined in [6] and [12], verifying the configuration and the life cycle of the underlying platform OS, as well as the CPLC-Data. After instantiation of the applet it can be selected and the version of the applet can be verified, as well as the internal version numbers, see [12].There are two software versions with different internal version numbers that fall under this certification. Details regarding the identification of the two versions are described in [12]. 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: \u25cf Cryptographic Support, \u25cf User Data Protection, \u25cf Identification and Authentication, \u25cf Security Management, and \u25cf Protection of the TSF. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 6.2 of the Security Target [6]. 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: \u25cf OE.SVD_Auth, \u25cf OE.CGA_QCert, \u25cf OE.SSCD_Prov_Service, \u25cf OE.HID_VAD, \u25cf OE.DTBS_Intend, \u25cf OE.DTBS_Protect, \u25cf OE.Signatory, \u25cf OE.APPLET, \u25cf OE.VERIFICATION, and 13 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 \u25cf OE.CODE-EVIDENCE. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance documents. 5. Architectural Information The composite TOE is a Java Card applet based on a certified Java Card platform that comprises eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization: \u25cf Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control. \u25cf Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying SCE platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library. \u25cf Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated. \u25cf Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events. \u25cf Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if specific APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering all applet commands. \u25cf Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging. \u25cf File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management by a representation of the existing elements. \u25cf State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the authentication status of the terminal and the challenge. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the Java Card platform see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01 [15, 16, 19, 20]. 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 14 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report 7. IT Product Testing Developer\u0027s Test according to ATE_FUN The developer\u2019s testing effort is summarised as follows: TOE configurations tested: The tests were performed with the composite smart card product ePasslet3.0/SSCD on G\u0026D OS SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3, in the one configuration in scope of the certification. Developer\u2019s testing approach: The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach: \u25cf Tests to cover all actions defined in the functional specification, \u25cf Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the functional specification and executable on the TOE, \u25cf Access rules tests as part of the requirements on TSF data, \u25cf Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design. Verdict for the activity: All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer\u2019s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected. Evaluator Tests Independent Testing according to ATE_IND The evaluator\u2019s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach, configuration, depth and results. Test Approach and Set-up: The TOE consists of the ePasslet3.0/SSCD application installed on SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3 OS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well as evaluator\u2019s test software. Further, for some tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used. The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to: \u25cf Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms), \u25cf Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution), \u25cf Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging), \u25cf Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation [11] and [12]. The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the following approach: \u25cf Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases, \u25cf Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer\u2019s tests the tests are also selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality, 15 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 \u25cf Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented, \u25cf The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing, \u25cf Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps were performed and described for nearly each test case, \u25cf The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body. Therefore all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform evaluation, \u25cf Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during online and offline meetings with the certification body. Configuration: The TOE was tested in the one configuration in scope of the certification. The keys and personalization data used in the test configuration were provided by the developer. Test Results: The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The test results are logged. The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the actual test results. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN Overview: The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body T\u00dcViT in the evaluator\u2019s test environment with the evaluator\u2019s test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and parametrized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. The one configuration of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation was tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually successful. Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional developer tests. 16 / 31 BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 Certification Report The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases. The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE\u2019s operational environment for which an appropriate test set was devised. TOE test configurations: The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered in to the personalization agent and as stated in the security target. Verdict for the sub-activity: The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential of High was actually successful in the TOE\u2019s operational environment as defined in the security target provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually successful in the TOE\u2019s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. 8. Evaluated Configuration This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and parametrized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite and loaded in the underlying certified OS platform SmartCafe Expert 7.0 C3. The ePasslet3.0/SSCD applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in [11] and [12]. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, (ii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, (iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, 17 / 31 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018 (iv) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6, (v) Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, (vi) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [15, 16, 17, 18, 19. 20, 21]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation. (see [4], AIS 26, 33, 34, 36, 46). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]). As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: \u25cf All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) \u25cf The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: \u25cf PP Conformance: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [8] \u25cf for the"
      }
    },
    "report_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {
        "ECC": {
          "ECC": {
            "ECC": 5
          },
          "ECDSA": {
            "ECDSA": 2
          }
        },
        "FF": {
          "DH": {
            "Diffie-Hellman": 1
          },
          "DSA": {
            "DSA": 1
          }
        },
        "RSA": {
          "RSA 2048": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015": 2,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01": 2,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017": 3,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01": 3,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018": 18
        },
        "NL": {
          "CC-1028-2017-MA01": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {
        "OE": {
          "OE.APPLET": 1,
          "OE.CODE-EVIDENCE": 1,
          "OE.HID_VAD": 1,
          "OE.VERIFICATION": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-": 1,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02": 4
        }
      },
      "cc_sar": {
        "AGD": {
          "AGD_OPE": 2,
          "AGD_PRE": 2
        },
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_CMC.4": 1,
          "ALC_CMS.5": 1,
          "ALC_COMP.1": 1,
          "ALC_DEL.1": 1,
          "ALC_DVS.2": 5,
          "ALC_FLR": 1,
          "ALC_LCD.1": 1,
          "ALC_TAT.2": 1
        },
        "ATE": {
          "ATE_FUN": 1,
          "ATE_IND": 1
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN": 1,
          "AVA_VAN.5": 4
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 1": 1,
          "EAL 2": 3,
          "EAL 4": 1,
          "EAL 5": 8,
          "EAL 5 augmented": 3,
          "EAL 5+": 1,
          "EAL 6": 1,
          "EAL5+": 1,
          "EAL6": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {},
      "certification_process": {
        "ConfidentialDocument": {
          "Configuration list for the TOE, 2018-12-07, File 1032_SSCD_conflist-SCE.xls, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document) [10] Guidance Document for the TOE: Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card": 1,
          "being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification": 1,
          "with Key generation (SSCD) 3.0, T\u00dcV Informationstechnik GmbH \u2013 Evaluation Body for IT Security (confidential document) [8] EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device": 1
        }
      },
      "cipher_mode": {
        "CBC": {
          "CBC": 2
        }
      },
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {
        "PACE": {
          "PACE": 5
        },
        "PGP": {
          "PGP": 1
        }
      },
      "crypto_scheme": {
        "KA": {
          "Key Agreement": 1
        },
        "KEX": {
          "Key Exchange": 1
        },
        "MAC": {
          "MAC": 2
        }
      },
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {},
      "eval_facility": {
        "TUV": {
          "T\u00dcV Informationstechnik": 5,
          "T\u00dcViT": 2
        }
      },
      "hash_function": {
        "SHA": {
          "SHA2": {
            "SHA-2": 4,
            "SHA-224": 3,
            "SHA-256": 3,
            "SHA-384": 5,
            "SHA-512": 4
          }
        }
      },
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {},
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {
        "RNG": {
          "RNG": 2
        }
      },
      "side_channel_analysis": {
        "other": {
          "JIL": 2
        }
      },
      "standard_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "AIS 20": 3,
          "AIS 26": 2,
          "AIS 32": 1,
          "AIS 34": 2,
          "AIS 36": 4,
          "AIS 46": 1
        },
        "FIPS": {
          "FIPS PUB 186-3": 1
        },
        "ICAO": {
          "ICAO": 1
        },
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 15408": 4,
          "ISO/IEC 17065": 2,
          "ISO/IEC 18045": 4
        },
        "PKCS": {
          "PKCS #1": 1,
          "PKCS#1": 4
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {
        "AES_competition": {
          "AES": {
            "AES": 10
          }
        },
        "DES": {
          "DES": {
            "DES": 1
          }
        },
        "constructions": {
          "MAC": {
            "CMAC": 3
          }
        }
      },
      "technical_report_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI 7148": 1,
          "BSI TR-02102": 1
        }
      },
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "GD": {
          "G\u0026D": 2,
          "G+D": 5,
          "Giesecke \u0026 Devrient": 3,
          "Giesecke+Devrient": 2
        },
        "Infineon": {
          "Infineon": 2,
          "Infineon Technologies AG": 2
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "report_metadata": {
      "/Author": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20190109145831+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Writer",
      "/Keywords": "\"Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, SSCD, Secure Signature Creation Device, PP-0059, prEN 14169-2\"",
      "/ModDate": "D:20190109151922+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "LibreOffice 5.2",
      "/Subject": "Veridos Suite v3.0 \u2013 cryptovision ePasslet Suite \u2013 Java Card applet configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with Key generation (SSCD)",
      "/Title": "Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1032-2018",
      "pdf_file_size_bytes": 935134,
      "pdf_hyperlinks": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": [
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung",
          "http://www.sogisportal.eu/",
          "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte",
          "https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS",
          "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/"
        ]
      },
      "pdf_is_encrypted": false,
      "pdf_number_of_pages": 31
    },
    "st_filename": "1032b_pdf.pdf",
    "st_frontpage": null,
    "st_keywords": {
      "asymmetric_crypto": {
        "ECC": {
          "ECC": {
            "ECC": 6
          },
          "ECDSA": {
            "ECDSA": 5
          }
        }
      },
      "cc_cert_id": {
        "DE": {
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015": 2,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-0951-2015-RA-01": 3,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017": 1,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1028-2017-MA-01": 3,
          "BSI-DSZ-CC-1032": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_claims": {
        "A": {
          "A.APPLET": 1,
          "A.CGA": 2,
          "A.SCA": 2,
          "A.VERIFICATION": 1
        },
        "O": {
          "O.ALARM": 1,
          "O.CARD-MANAGEMENT": 1,
          "O.CIPHER": 1,
          "O.DELETION": 1,
          "O.FIREWALL": 1,
          "O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID": 1,
          "O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG": 1,
          "O.INSTALL": 1,
          "O.KEY-MNGT": 1,
          "O.LOAD": 1,
          "O.NATIVE": 1,
          "O.OBJ-DELETION": 1,
          "O.OPERATE": 1,
          "O.PIN-MNGT": 1,
          "O.REALLOCATION": 1,
          "O.RESOURCES": 1,
          "O.SCP": 3,
          "O.SID": 1,
          "O.TRANSACTION": 1
        },
        "OE": {
          "OE.APPLET": 1,
          "OE.CODE-EVIDENCE": 1,
          "OE.HID_VAD": 3,
          "OE.VERIFICATION": 1
        },
        "T": {
          "T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA": 1,
          "T.CONFID-JCS-CODE": 1,
          "T.CONFID-JCS-DATA": 1,
          "T.DELETION": 1,
          "T.EXE-CODE": 2,
          "T.INSTALL": 1,
          "T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE": 2,
          "T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA": 2,
          "T.INTEG-JCS-CODE": 1,
          "T.INTEG-JCS-DATA": 1,
          "T.NATIVE": 1,
          "T.OBJ-DELETION": 1,
          "T.PHYSICAL": 1,
          "T.RESOURCES": 1,
          "T.SECURE_DELETION": 1,
          "T.SID": 2
        }
      },
      "cc_protection_profile_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-": 1,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02": 3,
          "BSI-CC-PP-0084-": 1,
          "BSI-PP-0006-2002T": 1
        }
      },
      "cc_sar": {
        "ADV": {
          "ADV_ARC.1": 3,
          "ADV_FSP.4": 1,
          "ADV_FSP.5": 1,
          "ADV_IMP.1": 2,
          "ADV_INT.2": 1,
          "ADV_TDS.3": 1,
          "ADV_TDS.4": 1
        },
        "AGD": {
          "AGD_OPE.1": 2,
          "AGD_PRE": 6,
          "AGD_PRE.1": 2
        },
        "ALC": {
          "ALC_CMC.4": 1,
          "ALC_CMS.5": 1,
          "ALC_DEL.1": 1,
          "ALC_DVS.2": 7,
          "ALC_LCD.1": 1,
          "ALC_TAT.2": 1
        },
        "ASE": {
          "ASE_CCL.1": 1,
          "ASE_ECD.1": 1,
          "ASE_INT.1": 1,
          "ASE_OBJ.2": 1,
          "ASE_REQ.2": 1,
          "ASE_SPD.1": 1,
          "ASE_TSS.1": 1
        },
        "ATE": {
          "ATE_COV.2": 1,
          "ATE_DPT.1": 1,
          "ATE_DPT.3": 1,
          "ATE_FUN.1": 1,
          "ATE_IND.2": 1
        },
        "AVA": {
          "AVA_VAN.5": 8
        }
      },
      "cc_security_level": {
        "EAL": {
          "EAL 5": 2,
          "EAL 5 augmented": 1,
          "EAL 5+": 3,
          "EAL4": 1,
          "EAL4 augmented": 1,
          "EAL5": 4,
          "EAL5 augmented": 3
        }
      },
      "cc_sfr": {
        "FAU": {
          "FAU_ARP.1": 1,
          "FAU_GEN": 1
        },
        "FCO": {
          "FCO_NRO": 1
        },
        "FCS": {
          "FCS_CKM": 2,
          "FCS_CKM.1": 24,
          "FCS_CKM.1.1": 1,
          "FCS_CKM.2": 3,
          "FCS_CKM.3": 1,
          "FCS_CKM.4": 14,
          "FCS_CKM.4.1": 3,
          "FCS_COP": 22,
          "FCS_COP.1": 23,
          "FCS_RND": 8,
          "FCS_RND.1": 10,
          "FCS_RND.1.1": 2,
          "FCS_RNG.1": 2
        },
        "FDP": {
          "FDP_ACC": 28,
          "FDP_ACC.1": 23,
          "FDP_ACF": 19,
          "FDP_ACF.1": 42,
          "FDP_IFC": 2,
          "FDP_IFC.1": 8,
          "FDP_IFF": 2,
          "FDP_ITC": 2,
          "FDP_ITC.1": 6,
          "FDP_ITC.2": 6,
          "FDP_RIP": 8,
          "FDP_RIP.1": 5,
          "FDP_RIP.1.1": 2,
          "FDP_ROL": 1,
          "FDP_SDI": 13,
          "FDP_SDI.1": 2,
          "FDP_SDI.2": 11,
          "FDP_UIT": 1
        },
        "FIA": {
          "FIA_AFL.1": 5,
          "FIA_AFL.1.1": 3,
          "FIA_AFL.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_ATD": 1,
          "FIA_UAU.1": 8,
          "FIA_UAU.1.1": 4,
          "FIA_UAU.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_UID": 2,
          "FIA_UID.1": 13,
          "FIA_UID.1.1": 3,
          "FIA_UID.1.2": 3,
          "FIA_USB": 1
        },
        "FMT": {
          "FMT_MOF.1": 6,
          "FMT_MOF.1.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA": 23,
          "FMT_MSA.1": 7,
          "FMT_MSA.2": 6,
          "FMT_MSA.2.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.3": 16,
          "FMT_MSA.3.1": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.3.2": 2,
          "FMT_MSA.4": 7,
          "FMT_MSA.4.1": 2,
          "FMT_MTD": 15,
          "FMT_MTD.1": 6,
          "FMT_SMF": 2,
          "FMT_SMF.1": 22,
          "FMT_SMF.1.1": 2,
          "FMT_SMR": 3,
          "FMT_SMR.1": 24,
          "FMT_SMR.1.1": 4,
          "FMT_SMR.1.2": 3
        },
        "FPR": {
          "FPR_UNO.1": 1
        },
        "FPT": {
          "FPT_EMS": 8,
          "FPT_EMS.1": 11,
          "FPT_EMS.1.1": 5,
          "FPT_EMS.1.2": 4,
          "FPT_FLS": 3,
          "FPT_FLS.1": 12,
          "FPT_FLS.1.1": 2,
          "FPT_PHP.1": 6,
          "FPT_PHP.1.1": 3,
          "FPT_PHP.1.2": 3,
          "FPT_PHP.3": 11,
          "FPT_PHP.3.1": 3,
          "FPT_RCV": 1,
          "FPT_TDC.1": 1,
          "FPT_TST": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1": 15,
          "FPT_TST.1.1": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1.2": 2,
          "FPT_TST.1.3": 2
        },
        "FTP": {
          "FTP_ITC": 2
        }
      },
      "certification_process": {
        "OutOfScope": {
          " No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/bArray No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL-JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          " While D.Sig provides the TOE\u2019s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification": 1,
          " While D.Sig provides the TOE\u2019s functionality claimed by this security target, the PKCS#15 part is out of scope of the certification. 1.3.2.1 TOE identification Identification of the TOE is performed by several": 1,
          "17 of 72 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FCS_CKM.3 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST. FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 The requirements": 1,
          "20 of 72 Platform SFR Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks FIA_UID.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/CM No correspondence": 1,
          "72 Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks O.REALLOCATION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "DRG.4) that can be used directly. FDP_RIP.1/ABORT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Forgery No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "O.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE No contradiction to this ST. O.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.OPERATE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST": 1,
          "O.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.INSTALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.CARD-MANAGEMENT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "Out of scope": 82,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 2,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/KEYS No correspondence": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/bArray No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/Installer No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_RCV.3/Installer No": 1,
          "Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. Veridos Suite v3.0 -": 1,
          "SID.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.EXE-CODE.2 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "ST. O.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "ST. T.INSTALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.OBJ-DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD No correspondence Out of scope. No": 1,
          "ST. T.INTEG-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SID.1 No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST": 1,
          "T.DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.SECURE_DELETION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "T.NATIVE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.RESOURCES No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "T.SCD_Divulg, T.SCD_Derive No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-CODE No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. T.CONFID-JCS-DATA No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "The objectives are related. No con- tradiction to this ST. O.SCP.RECOVERY No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.SCP.SUPPORT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "The requirement in this ST is equiva- lent to parts of the platform ST. FCS_CKM.2 No correspondence Out of scope (managed within Java Card OS). No contradiction to this ST. Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision": 1,
          "a defined quality met- ric (DRG.4) that can be used directly. FDP_RIP.1/ABORT No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/APDU No correspondence": 1,
          "chapter 8.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "chapter 8.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1/AID No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "complement Java Card OS mechanisms. No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TDC.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Self-testing": 1,
          "initial start-up. Aid Management (chapter 8.1.1.4 in platform ST) FIA_ATD.1/AID No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_UID.2/AID No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL-JCVM No": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall": 1,
          "internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1 No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. Application Programming Interface": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_UIT.1/CM No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/ADEL No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_UIT.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1/AID No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FIA_USB.1/AID No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.1/JCRE No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/ADEL No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/CM No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MTD.3/JCRE No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. INSTG Security Functional": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/ADEL No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1/CM No correspondence": 1,
          "internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FTP_ITC.1/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality": 1,
          "internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine": 1,
          "internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS No correspondence. Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_MSA.1/JCRE No correspondence Out": 1,
          "manager (ADEL) policy on security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ACC.2/ADEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_ACF.1/ADEL No correspondence": 1,
          "objectives for the TOE and are covered by SFRs in the platform ST. FTP_ITC.1/CMGR No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. SCPG Security Functional": 1,
          "objectives. Platform Objective Correspondence in this ST References/Remarks O.SID No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_IFC.1/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Virtual Machine). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFF.1/JCVM No correspondence Out": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 1,
          "of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FMT_MSA.3/JCVM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMF.1 No correspondence Out of": 1,
          "out of scope": 1,
          "platform ST) Firewall Policy (chapter 8.1.1.1 in platform ST) FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for Veridos Suite v3.0 - cryptovision": 1,
          "that owns the deleted objects by invoking a specific API method. FDP_RIP.1/ODEL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FPT_FLS.1/ODEL FPT_FLS.1 The": 1,
          "the User Guidance of the TOE. No contradic- tion to this ST. FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card Fire- wall). The resulting requirements for applets are reflected in the User": 1,
          "the plat- form leads to secrecy of SCD. No contradiction to this ST. O.PIN-MNGT No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to this ST. O.TRANSACTION No correspondence Out of scope. No contradiction to": 1,
          "verified, or that has been modified after bytecode verification. FCO_NRO.2/CM No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FDP_IFC.2/CM No correspondence": 1,
          "which addresses security aspects outside the runtime. FDP_ITC.2/Installer No correspondence Out of scope (internal Java Card func- tionality). No contradiction to this ST. FMT_SMR.1/Installer No": 1
        }
      },
      "cipher_mode": {},
      "cplc_data": {},
      "crypto_engine": {},
      "crypto_library": {},
      "crypto_protocol": {
        "PACE": {
          "PACE": 18
        }
      },
      "crypto_scheme": {
        "MAC": {
          "MAC": 1
        }
      },
      "device_model": {},
      "ecc_curve": {},
      "eval_facility": {},
      "hash_function": {
        "SHA": {
          "SHA2": {
            "SHA-2": 2,
            "SHA-224": 3,
            "SHA-256": 3,
            "SHA-384": 5,
            "SHA-512": 6
          }
        }
      },
      "ic_data_group": {},
      "javacard_api_const": {},
      "javacard_packages": {},
      "javacard_version": {},
      "os_name": {},
      "pq_crypto": {},
      "randomness": {
        "RNG": {
          "RNG": 9
        }
      },
      "side_channel_analysis": {
        "FI": {
          "DFA": 1,
          "fault injection": 1,
          "malfunction": 1,
          "physical tampering": 11
        },
        "SCA": {
          "DPA": 2,
          "SPA": 2,
          "physical probing": 1,
          "timing attacks": 2
        }
      },
      "standard_id": {
        "BSI": {
          "AIS 20": 1,
          "AIS20": 6
        },
        "CC": {
          "CCMB-2012-09-001": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-002": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-003": 1,
          "CCMB-2012-09-004": 1
        },
        "FIPS": {
          "FIPS PUB 186-3": 1,
          "FIPS180-4": 3,
          "FIPS186-3": 2,
          "FIPS197": 2
        },
        "ICAO": {
          "ICAO": 7
        },
        "ISO": {
          "ISO/IEC 7816-4": 1
        },
        "PKCS": {
          "PKCS#15": 3,
          "PKCS1": 3
        },
        "RFC": {
          "RFC 5639": 1,
          "RFC5639": 3
        },
        "X509": {
          "X.509": 1
        }
      },
      "symmetric_crypto": {
        "AES_competition": {
          "AES": {
            "AES": 9
          }
        }
      },
      "technical_report_id": {},
      "tee_name": {},
      "tls_cipher_suite": {},
      "vendor": {
        "GD": {
          "G\u0026D": 1,
          "Giesecke \u0026 Devrient": 1,
          "Giesecke+Devrient": 1
        },
        "Infineon": {
          "Infineon": 6,
          "Infineon Technologies AG": 2
        }
      },
      "vulnerability": {}
    },
    "st_metadata": {
      "/Author": "bdrisch",
      "/CreationDate": "D:20181207105624+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Creator": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2013",
      "/Keywords": "SSCD, ePasslet Suite, electronic Signature",
      "/ModDate": "D:20181207105624+01\u002700\u0027",
      "/Producer": "Microsoft\u00ae Word 2013",
      "/Title": "Security Target ePasslet/ePKI-SSCD",
      "pdf_file_size_bytes": 2030064,
      "pdf_hyperlinks": {
        "_type": "Set",
        "elements": []
      },
      "pdf_is_encrypted": false,
      "pdf_number_of_pages": 72
    }
  },
  "protection_profiles": {
    "_type": "Set",
    "elements": [
      {
        "_type": "sec_certs.sample.protection_profile.ProtectionProfile",
        "pp_eal": null,
        "pp_ids": null,
        "pp_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfiles/pp0059b_pdf.pdf",
        "pp_name": "Protection Profile for Secure Signature Creation Device - Part 2: Device with Key Generation, Version..."
      }
    ]
  },
  "report_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1032a_pdf.pdf",
  "scheme": "DE",
  "security_level": {
    "_type": "Set",
    "elements": [
      "EAL5+",
      "AVA_VAN.5",
      "ALC_DVS.2"
    ]
  },
  "st_link": "https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1032b_pdf.pdf",
  "state": {
    "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.InternalState",
    "cert": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
      "convert_garbage": false,
      "convert_ok": true,
      "download_ok": true,
      "extract_ok": true,
      "pdf_hash": "10f2bb3fb2a62ddd4e364112f7bed26050781f36bee0b6eb79adf805e3f04aad",
      "txt_hash": "0f9b03a3e5efce6ce28706dfd427dde1ce265f47e9447ee287f9f5ea784a57e1"
    },
    "report": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
      "convert_garbage": false,
      "convert_ok": true,
      "download_ok": true,
      "extract_ok": true,
      "pdf_hash": "ba731d3311a64763ae554f3be3f1bc4bf25abb94f13b0aaf16604a23df8b2444",
      "txt_hash": "cdd2c42682c5ba30dc67b0944894ccb79b2c8597ea4581a9a63e9076594dd84c"
    },
    "st": {
      "_type": "sec_certs.sample.cc.CCCertificate.DocumentState",
      "convert_garbage": false,
      "convert_ok": true,
      "download_ok": true,
      "extract_ok": true,
      "pdf_hash": "bbc79b1dc7a1481d672b0b13edda27d75ca60a218699b93a71a0a08c6781ac32",
      "txt_hash": "b43e66afe94aff0bc00f4dff39de8a7e297aa78d1ca83dcf696f7c2e0029a471"
    }
  },
  "status": "archived"
}