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STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0682-2010 		IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
None
name STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1 IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
not_valid_before 17.12.2010 01.09.2005
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0682a_pdf.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308a_pdf.pdf
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0682b_pdf.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf
manufacturer G+D Mobile Security GmbH Sony Corporation
manufacturer_web https://www.gi-de.com/de/de/mobile-security/ https://www.sony.com/
security_level EAL4+, ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 EAL4
dgst a64327c573cc5f89 5d560fb6108db342
heuristics/cert_id BSI-DSZ-CC-0682-2010
heuristics/cert_lab BSI []
heuristics/extracted_sars ALC_LCD.2, ASE_INT.1, ALC_DVS.2, ASE_ECD.1, APE_ECD.1, ADV_IMP.1, ASE_SPD.1, ATE_DPT.2, ALC_CMS.5, AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_TAT.3, ALC_FLR.3, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_IND.3, ATE_FUN.1, APE_REQ.2, ADV_ARC.1, ASE_OBJ.2, APE_CCL.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_CMC.5, ASE_TSS.2, ASE_REQ.2, ADV_INT.3, APE_INT.1, APE_SPD.1, ADV_FSP.4, APE_OBJ.2, ASE_CCL.1, ATE_COV.3, ADV_SPM.1 ALC_DVS.1, ATE_COV.2, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VLA.2, AVA_MSU.2, ADV_HLD.2, ATE_FUN.1, AGD_USR.1, AVA_SOF.1, ATE_IND.2, AGD_ADM.1, ADV_LLD.1, ALC_LCD.1, ATE_DPT.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_IMP.1
heuristics/extracted_versions 3.5 4
heuristics/report_references/directly_referenced_by BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012 {}
heuristics/report_references/directly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 {}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referenced_by BSI-DSZ-CC-0800-2012 {}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 {}
heuristics/protection_profiles 0e62a9ea5e7ca3a7 {}
protection_profile_links https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/ppfiles/pp0061b_pdf.pdf {}
pdf_data/report_filename 0682a_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/report_frontpage
  • DE:
    • cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-0682-2010
    • cert_item: STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1
    • cert_lab: BSI
    • developer: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
    • match_rules: ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)']
  • DE:
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010: 3
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0682-2010: 21
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004-2010: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0061-2009: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0061-2009: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL 4: 9
    • EAL 4 augmented: 3
    • EAL1: 7
    • EAL2: 3
    • EAL3: 4
    • EAL4: 8
    • EAL5: 6
    • EAL5+: 1
    • EAL6: 4
    • EAL7: 4
  • ITSEC:
    • ITSEC Evaluation: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC: 1
    • ADV_ARC.1: 1
    • ADV_FSP: 1
    • ADV_FSP.1: 1
    • ADV_FSP.2: 1
    • ADV_FSP.3: 1
    • ADV_FSP.4: 1
    • ADV_FSP.5: 1
    • ADV_FSP.6: 1
    • ADV_IMP: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 1
    • ADV_IMP.2: 1
    • ADV_INT: 1
    • ADV_INT.1: 1
    • ADV_INT.2: 1
    • ADV_INT.3: 1
    • ADV_SPM: 1
    • ADV_SPM.1: 1
    • ADV_TDS: 1
    • ADV_TDS.1: 1
    • ADV_TDS.2: 1
    • ADV_TDS.3: 1
    • ADV_TDS.4: 1
    • ADV_TDS.5: 1
    • ADV_TDS.6: 1
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE: 1
    • AGD_OPE.1: 1
    • AGD_PRE: 1
    • AGD_PRE.1: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC: 1
    • ALC_CMC.1: 1
    • ALC_CMC.2: 1
    • ALC_CMC.3: 1
    • ALC_CMC.4: 2
    • ALC_CMC.5: 1
    • ALC_CMS: 1
    • ALC_CMS.1: 1
    • ALC_CMS.2: 1
    • ALC_CMS.3: 1
    • ALC_CMS.4: 2
    • ALC_CMS.5: 1
    • ALC_DEL: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 2
    • ALC_DVS: 1
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 6
    • ALC_FLR: 1
    • ALC_FLR.1: 1
    • ALC_FLR.2: 1
    • ALC_FLR.3: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 2
    • ALC_LCD.2: 1
    • ALC_TAT: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 2
    • ALC_TAT.2: 1
    • ALC_TAT.3: 1
  • APE:
    • APE_CCL.1: 1
    • APE_ECD.1: 1
    • APE_INT.1: 1
    • APE_OBJ.1: 1
    • APE_OBJ.2: 1
    • APE_REQ.1: 1
    • APE_REQ.2: 1
    • APE_SPD.1: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_CCL: 1
    • ASE_CCL.1: 1
    • ASE_ECD: 1
    • ASE_ECD.1: 1
    • ASE_INT: 1
    • ASE_INT.1: 1
    • ASE_OBJ: 1
    • ASE_OBJ.1: 1
    • ASE_OBJ.2: 1
    • ASE_REQ.1: 1
    • ASE_REQ.2: 1
    • ASE_SPD: 1
    • ASE_SPD.1: 1
    • ASE_TSS: 1
    • ASE_TSS.1: 1
    • ASE_TSS.2: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_COV.1: 1
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_COV.3: 1
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_DPT.1: 1
    • ATE_DPT.2: 6
    • ATE_DPT.3: 1
    • ATE_DPT.4: 1
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
    • ATE_FUN.2: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
    • ATE_IND.1: 1
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
    • ATE_IND.3: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN: 2
    • AVA_VAN.1: 1
    • AVA_VAN.2: 1
    • AVA_VAN.3: 1
    • AVA_VAN.4: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 6
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sfr
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM: 3
    • FCS_COP: 5
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_claims
pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
  • GD:
    • Giesecke & Devrient: 14
  • NXP:
    • NXP: 8
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
  • SRC:
    • SRC Security Research & Consulting: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • AES_competition:
    • AES:
      • AES: 3
  • constructions:
    • MAC:
      • CMAC: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 3
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 2
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 3
pdf_data/report_keywords/pq_crypto
pdf_data/report_keywords/hash_function
  • SHA:
    • SHA1:
      • SHA-1: 1
    • SHA2:
      • SHA-256: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_scheme
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_protocol
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/randomness
pdf_data/report_keywords/cipher_mode
pdf_data/report_keywords/ecc_curve
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_engine
pdf_data/report_keywords/tls_cipher_suite
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_library
pdf_data/report_keywords/vulnerability
pdf_data/report_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • FI:
    • fault injection: 1
    • physical tampering: 1
  • SCA:
    • side channel: 1
  • other:
    • JIL: 5
pdf_data/report_keywords/technical_report_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI 21: 1
    • BSI 7125: 2
    • BSI 7148: 1
    • BSI 7149: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/device_model
pdf_data/report_keywords/tee_name
pdf_data/report_keywords/os_name
  • STARCOS:
    • STARCOS 3: 28
pdf_data/report_keywords/cplc_data
pdf_data/report_keywords/ic_data_group
pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS 25: 2
    • AIS 26: 2
    • AIS 32: 1
    • AIS 34: 2
    • AIS 35: 3
    • AIS 36: 2
    • AIS 38: 1
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS 180-2: 2
    • FIPS 197: 1
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_version
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_api_const
pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_packages
pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process
  • ConfidentialDocument:
    • Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document) [10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP P5Cx128V0A/P5Cx145V0A: 1
    • GCC C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document) [12] STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1 Guidance for Inlay Production, Version 1.0, 16.08.2010, Giesecke &: 1
    • Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.1, 15.07.2010, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document) [11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.5, 14.12.2010, Konfigurationsliste von STARCOS 3.5: 1
    • Version 2.5, 14.12.2010, STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1 Security Target, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document) [7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Identity Card (ID_Card PP), Version 1.03, 15: 1
pdf_data/report_metadata
  • /Author: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
  • /CreationDate: D:20101229083457+01'00'
  • /Creator: Writer
  • /Keywords: "Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, nPA, elektronischer Personalausweis, neuer Personalausweis, eID, electronic Identity Card, ID_Card, ID Card"
  • /ModDate: D:20101229083826+01'00'
  • /Producer: OpenOffice.org 3.1
  • /Subject: STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C1
  • /Title: Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0682-2010
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 956429
  • pdf_hyperlinks: http://www.bsi.bund.de/
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 36
pdf_data/st_filename 0682b_pdf.pdf 0308b_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-0645: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0035: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0061: 1
    • BSI-PP-0055: 1
    • BSI-PP-0056: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL 4: 2
    • EAL 5: 2
    • EAL4: 13
    • EAL4 augmented: 3
    • EAL5+: 1
  • EAL:
    • EAL4: 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC.1: 4
    • ADV_FSP.4: 1
    • ADV_IMP.1: 1
    • ADV_TDS.3: 2
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE.1: 1
    • AGD_PRE.1: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 8
  • APE:
    • APE_ECD: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_ECD: 2
    • ASE_TSS.2: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_DPT.1: 2
    • ATE_DPT.2: 8
    • ATE_FUN.1: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN.5: 6
  • ACM:
    • ACM_AUT.1: 3
    • ACM_CAP.3: 1
    • ACM_CAP.4: 3
    • ACM_SCP.1: 1
    • ACM_SCP.2: 3
  • ADO:
    • ADO_DEL.2: 3
    • ADO_IGS.1: 4
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.1: 7
    • ADV_FSP.2: 3
    • ADV_HLD.1: 2
    • ADV_HLD.2: 5
    • ADV_IMP.1: 4
    • ADV_LLD.1: 5
    • ADV_RCR.1: 4
    • ADV_SPM.1: 6
  • AGD:
    • AGD_ADM.1: 7
    • AGD_USR.1: 3
  • ALC:
    • ALC_DVS.1: 4
    • ALC_LCD.1: 3
    • ALC_TAT.1: 4
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 3
    • ATE_DPT.1: 3
    • ATE_FUN.1: 3
    • ATE_IND.2: 3
  • AVA:
    • AVA_MSU.2: 3
    • AVA_SOF.1: 3
    • AVA_VLA.2: 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr
  • FAU:
    • FAU_GEN: 1
    • FAU_SAS: 5
    • FAU_SAS.1: 17
    • FAU_SAS.1.1: 2
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM: 46
    • FCS_CKM.1: 14
    • FCS_CKM.2: 3
    • FCS_CKM.4: 18
    • FCS_COP: 44
    • FCS_COP.1: 11
    • FCS_RND: 7
    • FCS_RND.1: 14
    • FCS_RND.1.1: 2
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 17
    • FDP_ACC.1: 11
    • FDP_ACC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF: 21
    • FDP_ACF.1: 20
    • FDP_IFC.1: 5
    • FDP_ITC.1: 6
    • FDP_ITC.2: 8
    • FDP_ITT.1: 1
    • FDP_RIP: 4
    • FDP_RIP.1: 12
    • FDP_SDI: 8
    • FDP_SDI.1: 2
    • FDP_SDI.2: 4
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL: 29
    • FIA_AFL.1: 9
    • FIA_API: 18
    • FIA_API.1: 6
    • FIA_API.1.1: 2
    • FIA_SOS.2: 1
    • FIA_UAU: 42
    • FIA_UAU.1: 10
    • FIA_UAU.4: 6
    • FIA_UAU.4.1: 1
    • FIA_UAU.5: 13
    • FIA_UAU.6: 6
    • FIA_UIA: 1
    • FIA_UID: 24
    • FIA_UID.1: 11
  • FMT:
    • FMT_LIM: 13
    • FMT_LIM.1: 16
    • FMT_LIM.1.1: 2
    • FMT_LIM.2: 14
    • FMT_LIM.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MOF: 2
    • FMT_MOF.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA: 14
    • FMT_MSA.1: 6
    • FMT_MSA.2: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3: 8
    • FMT_MSA.4: 1
    • FMT_MTD: 76
    • FMT_MTD.1: 12
    • FMT_MTD.1.1: 1
    • FMT_MTD.3: 9
    • FMT_MTD.3.1: 1
    • FMT_SMF: 4
    • FMT_SMF.1: 34
    • FMT_SMR: 5
    • FMT_SMR.1: 28
  • FPT:
    • FPT_FLS: 4
    • FPT_FLS.1: 10
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP: 6
    • FPT_PHP.1: 5
    • FPT_PHP.3: 13
    • FPT_SEP.1: 1
    • FPT_TST: 4
    • FPT_TST.1: 10
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 1
  • FRU:
    • FRU_FLT.2: 2
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC: 18
    • FTP_ITC.1: 8
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM.1: 20
    • FCS_CKM.1.1: 2
    • FCS_CKM.4: 16
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
    • FCS_COP.1: 22
    • FCS_COP.1.1: 2
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 3
    • FDP_ACC.1: 13
    • FDP_ACC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1: 10
    • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_IFC.1: 20
    • FDP_IFC.1.1: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1: 15
    • FDP_IFF.1.1: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.2: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.3: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.4: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.5: 1
    • FDP_IFF.1.6: 1
    • FDP_ITC.1: 2
    • FDP_ITT.1: 12
    • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI.1: 14
    • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UCT.1: 11
    • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UIT.1: 11
    • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
    • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL: 1
    • FIA_AFL.1: 7
    • FIA_AFL.1.1: 1
    • FIA_AFL.1.2: 2
    • FIA_ALF.1: 2
    • FIA_UAU: 1
    • FIA_UAU.2: 10
    • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
    • FIA_UID.1: 11
    • FIA_UID.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_MSA: 1
    • FMT_MSA.1: 22
    • FMT_MSA.1.1: 2
    • FMT_MSA.2: 11
    • FMT_MSA.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3: 12
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_MTD.1: 10
    • FMT_MTD.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 11
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1: 15
    • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
  • FPT:
    • FPT_AMT.1: 3
    • FPT_FLS.1: 19
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 12
    • FPT_ITT.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 14
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_RCV.4: 20
    • FPT_RCV.4.1: 1
    • FPT_SDI.1: 1
    • FPT_TST: 1
    • FPT_TST.1: 11
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 1
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC.1: 22
    • FTP_ITC.1.1: 2
    • FTP_ITC.1.2: 2
    • FTP_ITC.1.3: 2
    • FTP_TRP.1: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • A:
    • A.CGA: 2
    • A.SCA: 2
  • O:
    • O.HW: 1
    • O.HW_AES: 2
    • O.MEM_ACCESS: 1
    • O.MF_FW: 1
    • O.RND: 3
    • O.SFR_ACCESS: 1
  • OE:
    • OE.CGA: 1
    • OE.CGA_Q: 1
    • OE.CGA_SSCD: 3
    • OE.CGA_TC_SV: 1
    • OE.CGA_TC_SVD: 1
    • OE.DTBS_: 1
    • OE.HID_TC_VAD: 1
    • OE.HID_V: 1
    • OE.HID_VAD: 1
    • OE.ID_C: 1
    • OE.SSCD_P: 1
    • OE.SVD: 1
    • OE.SVD_A: 1
  • OT:
    • OT.D: 1
    • OT.P: 3
    • OT.SCD_SVD_C: 1
  • T:
    • T.M: 1
    • T.RND: 3
    • T.SCD_: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/vendor
  • GD:
    • Giesecke & Devrient: 6
  • NXP:
    • NXP: 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/eval_facility
  • TUV:
    • TÜV Informationstechnik: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • AES_competition:
    • AES:
      • AES: 19
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • T-DES: 1
      • Triple-DES: 6
    • DES:
      • DES: 3
  • constructions:
    • MAC:
      • CMAC: 5
      • KMAC: 3
  • DES:
    • 3DES:
      • Triple-DES: 4
    • DES:
      • DES: 17
pdf_data/st_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 1
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 5
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 1
  • FF:
    • DH:
      • DH: 2
      • Diffie-Hellman: 7
    • DSA:
      • DSA: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/hash_function
  • SHA:
    • SHA1:
      • SHA-1: 5
    • SHA2:
      • SHA-2: 1
      • SHA-224: 2
      • SHA-256: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
  • KA:
    • Key Agreement: 1
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_protocol
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 89
pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness
  • RNG:
    • RND: 6
  • TRNG:
    • TRNG: 1
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cipher_mode
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 3
  • CBC:
    • CBC: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • FI:
    • Malfunction: 13
    • Physical Tampering: 3
    • Physical tampering: 2
    • fault injection: 1
    • malfunction: 6
    • physical tampering: 5
  • SCA:
    • DPA: 2
    • Leak-Inherent: 5
    • SPA: 1
    • physical probing: 2
    • timing attacks: 2
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
  • FI:
    • DFA: 1
    • Malfunction: 26
  • SCA:
    • DPA: 1
    • Physical Probing: 5
    • physical probing: 3
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/technical_report_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI TR-03110: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/os_name
  • STARCOS:
    • STARCOS 3: 138
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS 31: 2
    • AIS20: 2
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2009-07-001: 2
    • CCMB-2009-07-002: 2
    • CCMB-2009-07-003: 2
    • CCMB-2009-07-004: 2
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS 180-2: 1
    • FIPS 197: 1
    • FIPS PUB 180-2: 1
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 4
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 14443: 2
    • ISO/IEC 7816-2: 1
    • ISO/IEC 7816-4: 1
  • PKCS:
    • PKCS#3: 3
  • RFC:
    • RFC3369: 2
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS20: 2
  • CC:
    • CCIMB-99-031: 1
    • CCIMB-99-032: 1
    • CCIMB-99-033: 1
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408: 6
    • ISO/IEC 18092: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process
  • OutOfScope:
    • 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of: 1
    • Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information: 1
    • Out of scope: 1
    • Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE: 1
    • i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1
    • level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the: 1
    • mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer: 1
    • of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious: 1
    • of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip: 1
    • out of scope: 10
    • parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04: 1
    • processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE: 1
    • results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data: 1
    • that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The: 1
    • up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the: 1
    • utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the: 1
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