Comparing certificates Experimental feature

You are comparing two certificates. By default, only different attributes are shown. Use the button below to show/hide all attributes.

Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone SE (3rd generation) with A15 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) (ANSSI-CC-2023/58)
ANSSI-CC-2023/58 		Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on Mac mini with M2 and Magic keyboard with Touch ID, running macOS Ventura 13.3.1 , macOS Ventura 13.3.1 (build 22E261) ( ANSSI-CC-2023/61)
ANSSI-CC-2023/61
name Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone SE (3rd generation) with A15 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) (ANSSI-CC-2023/58) Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on Mac mini with M2 and Magic keyboard with Touch ID, running macOS Ventura 13.3.1 , macOS Ventura 13.3.1 (build 22E261) ( ANSSI-CC-2023/61)
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_61en.pdf
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC-2023_61en.pdf
cert_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/certificat-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/certificat-CC-2023_61en.pdf
state/cert/pdf_hash aa1308aebbe2495a638eab65bd5e80db992bed1e7718aa13053a75e4cbdfe30c f9904c33a3da40eceacbea0a231cfd0a52340cb34599c1a160574f96336ebf57
state/cert/txt_hash 5ed497c7602db8e0121211a132cad0cf0313a2fcb02e53227b0a7b2dc56c748c 964e8be87743c7c4d6827e3dfc178ca3755d651db7b5797d8209c52c1fffe466
state/report/pdf_hash 14df361cd1dca720cf1ee0b52c5e1c240be46753fa00cacc4bc3b026cb34a295 1aa2706b18f951f16655b8e5d76bb670d733f005b0144e5478c3756a92853151
state/report/txt_hash 07c310aa55f4c1fcdc4dacba2631a1261617724d162b09969db735d1fe3d8149 bedda77fe46aa241810159a366524aebfeefca15fd147bf8e3125949a7a5b3ff
state/st/pdf_hash 26c0804b543be2fcfd21ebba6f61d67ab3a2210e1ad677b066559fbeb4ddd088 e2ce81c073ea3d6f4b5b0fa8962b1889260c8e7eb293c3760bd60011a5032949
state/st/txt_hash 195057752a39cb59cdd8d30e8f4016804141ba865d6b474fce016369226d4a33 a6cd365236aa1a5ecedfb11531f99c1581659e19f1a77698a403b81b075b9ade
heuristics/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/58 ANSSI-CC-2023/61
heuristics/cpe_matches cpe:2.3:o:apple:iphone_os:16.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:apple:macos:13.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:o:apple:macos:13.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
heuristics/extracted_versions 16.4.1 13.3.1
heuristics/scheme_data/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/58 ANSSI-CC-2023/61
heuristics/scheme_data/description Le produit évalué est « Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone SE (3rd generation) with A15 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1, iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) » développé par APPLE INC. Le produit évalué est « Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on Mac mini with M2 and Magic keyboard with Touch ID, running macOS Ventura 13.3.1, macOS Ventura 13.3.1 (build 22E261) » développé par APPLE INC.
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/58 ANSSI-CC-2023/61
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/cert_link https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/certificat-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/certificat-CC-2023_61en.pdf
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/report_link https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-CC-2023_61en.pdf
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/target_link https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_58en.pdf https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_61en.pdf
heuristics/scheme_data/product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone SE (3rd generation) with A15 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1 (iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252)) Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on Mac mini with M2 and Magic keyboard with Touch ID, running macOS Ventura 13.3.1 macOS Ventura 13.3.1 (build 22E261)
heuristics/scheme_data/url https://cyber.gouv.fr/produits-certifies/strong-customer-authentication-apple-pay-iphone-se-3rd-generation-a15-bionic https://cyber.gouv.fr/produits-certifies/strong-customer-authentication-apple-pay-mac-mini-m2-and-magic-keyboard-touch-id
pdf_data/cert_filename certificat-CC-2023_58en.pdf certificat-CC-2023_61en.pdf
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_cert_id/FR
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/58: 2
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/61: 2
pdf_data/cert_keywords/tee_name
  • IBM:
    • SE: 1
pdf_data/cert_metadata//CreationDate D:20240222154440+01'00' D:20240222154936+01'00'
pdf_data/cert_metadata//ModDate D:20240222155211+01'00' D:20240222155209+01'00'
pdf_data/cert_metadata/pdf_file_size_bytes 138204 136188
pdf_data/report_filename ANSSI-CC-2023_58en.pdf ANSSI-CC-2023_61en.pdf
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id/FR
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/58: 2
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/61: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/tee_name
  • IBM:
    • SE: 12
pdf_data/report_metadata//CreationDate D:20240222154309+01'00' D:20240222155049+01'00'
pdf_data/report_metadata//ModDate D:20240222155212+01'00' D:20240222155208+01'00'
pdf_data/report_metadata/pdf_file_size_bytes 453717 396092
pdf_data/st_filename ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_58en.pdf ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_61en.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • D:
    • D.OS: 17
    • D.SEP_SE: 3
  • T:
    • T.COR-: 1
    • T.PHYSI-: 1
    • T.RECOVER: 2
    • T.REPLAY: 2
    • T.SILENT: 2
    • T.SKIM-: 1
    • T.USURP: 2
    • T.SKIMMING: 1
    • T.CORRUPT: 1
    • T.PHYSICAL: 1
  • A:
    • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 2
    • A.PERSO: 3
    • A.CDCVM: 3
    • A.DE-: 1
  • OE:
    • OE.CDCVM: 3
  • D:
    • D.OS: 17
    • D.SEP_SE: 3
  • T:
    • T.COR-: 1
    • T.PHYSI-: 1
    • T.RE-: 1
    • T.REPLAY: 2
    • T.SILENT: 2
    • T.SKIM-: 1
    • T.USURP: 2
    • T.SKIMMING: 1
    • T.RECOVER: 1
    • T.CORRUPT: 1
    • T.PHYSICAL: 1
  • A:
    • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 3
    • A.PERSO: 3
    • A.WATCH_USER: 3
    • A.NO_EVIL_ROOT_USER: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/A
  • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 2
  • A.PERSO: 3
  • A.CDCVM: 3
  • A.DE-: 1
  • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 3
  • A.PERSO: 3
  • A.WATCH_USER: 3
  • A.NO_EVIL_ROOT_USER: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/A/A.DEVICE_AUTH 2 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T
  • T.COR-: 1
  • T.PHYSI-: 1
  • T.RECOVER: 2
  • T.REPLAY: 2
  • T.SILENT: 2
  • T.SKIM-: 1
  • T.USURP: 2
  • T.SKIMMING: 1
  • T.CORRUPT: 1
  • T.PHYSICAL: 1
  • T.COR-: 1
  • T.PHYSI-: 1
  • T.RE-: 1
  • T.REPLAY: 2
  • T.SILENT: 2
  • T.SKIM-: 1
  • T.USURP: 2
  • T.SKIMMING: 1
  • T.RECOVER: 1
  • T.CORRUPT: 1
  • T.PHYSICAL: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T/T.RECOVER 2 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar/ASE/ASE_SPD.1 1 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP
  • FDP_DAU.1: 4
  • FDP_DAU.1.1: 1
  • FDP_DAU.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACC: 23
  • FDP_ACC.2: 4
  • FDP_ACF: 19
  • FDP_ACF.1: 12
  • FDP_ITT.1: 4
  • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ETC: 8
  • FDP_ETC.2.1: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.2: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.3: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.4: 2
  • FDP_ACC.2.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.2.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
  • FDP_ITC: 5
  • FDP_ITC.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FDP_UCT: 4
  • FDP_UCT.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT: 4
  • FDP_UIT.1: 2
  • FDP_RIP.1: 15
  • FDP_RIP.1.1: 1
  • FDP_SDI.1: 10
  • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.1: 9
  • FDP_IFC.1: 7
  • FDP_ETC.2: 2
  • FDP_DAU.1: 4
  • FDP_DAU.1.1: 1
  • FDP_DAU.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACC: 25
  • FDP_ACC.2: 4
  • FDP_ACF: 23
  • FDP_ACF.1: 12
  • FDP_ETC: 8
  • FDP_ETC.2.1: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.2: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.3: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.4: 2
  • FDP_ACC.2.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.2.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
  • FDP_ITC: 4
  • FDP_ITC.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ITT: 8
  • FDP_ITT.1.1: 2
  • FDP_UCT: 10
  • FDP_UCT.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT: 10
  • FDP_UIT.1: 2
  • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
  • FDP_RIP.1: 13
  • FDP_RIP.1.1: 1
  • FDP_SDI.1: 9
  • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.1: 13
  • FDP_IFC.1: 10
  • FDP_ETC.2: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACC 23 25
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACC.1 9 13
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACF 19 23
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_IFC.1 7 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ITC 5 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ITT.1.1 1 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_RIP.1 15 13
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_SDI.1 10 9
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_UCT 4 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_UIT 4 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FIA
  • FIA_UID.2: 6
  • FIA_UID.2.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.2: 11
  • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.5: 5
  • FIA_UAU.5.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.5.2: 1
  • FIA_UAU.6: 11
  • FIA_AFL.1: 3
  • FIA_AFL: 7
  • FIA_AFL.1.1: 3
  • FIA_AFL.1.2: 3
  • FIA_UAU.6.1: 2
  • FIA_ATD.1: 4
  • FIA_ATD.1.1: 2
  • FIA_UAU.1: 1
  • FIA_UID.1: 1
  • FIA_UID.2: 6
  • FIA_UID.2.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.2: 11
  • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.5: 5
  • FIA_UAU.5.1: 1
  • FIA_UAU.5.2: 1
  • FIA_UAU.6: 11
  • FIA_AFL.1: 3
  • FIA_AFL: 7
  • FIA_AFL.1.1: 3
  • FIA_AFL.1.2: 3
  • FIA_UAU.6.1: 2
  • FIA_ATD.1: 5
  • FIA_ATD.1.1: 2
  • FIA_SOS.2: 4
  • FIA_SOS.2.1: 1
  • FIA_SOS.2.2: 1
  • FIA_UAU.1: 1
  • FIA_UID.1: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FIA/FIA_ATD.1 4 5
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FMT/FMT_MSA.1 5 6
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPR/FPR_UNO.1 11 17
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPT/FPT_RPL 4 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPT/FPT_RPL.1 2 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FTP
  • FTP_ITC: 6
  • FTP_ITC.1: 5
  • FTP_TRP.1: 2
  • FTP_ITC: 14
  • FTP_ITC.1: 7
  • FTP_ITC.1.1: 1
  • FTP_ITC.1.2: 1
  • FTP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FTP_TRP.1: 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FTP/FTP_ITC 6 14
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FTP/FTP_ITC.1 5 7
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FTP/FTP_TRP.1 2 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process/OutOfScope
  • out of scope: 2
  • Element of the device is separately certified according to the Common Criteria and is there- fore out of scope of this evaluation. Note: In the evaluated configuration the cryptographic modules are supplied by: 1
  • to return to its User. Note: Defending against device re-use after physical com- promise is out of scope. D.User_Passcode D.User_Bio D.Card_Data T.RECOVER Card Re- covery An attacker attempts to recover: 1
  • out of scope: 2
  • Element of the device is separately certified according to the Common Criteria and is there- fore out of scope of this evaluation. Note: In the evaluated configuration the cryptographic modules are supplied by: 1
  • to re- turn to its User. Note: Defending against device re-use after physical compromise is out of scope. D.User_Password D.User_Bio D.Card_Data D.Unlock_Secret* D.Keyboard_Secret D.SEP_Watch* Strong: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/ecc_curve
  • NIST:
    • P-256: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id/FIPS
  • FIPS 140-3: 1
  • FIPS 140-3: 1
  • FIPS 140-2: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/tee_name/IBM/SE 66 4
pdf_data/st_metadata//CreationDate D:20231108181326Z D:20231108164206Z
pdf_data/st_metadata//ModDate D:20231108181351Z D:20231108164224Z
pdf_data/st_metadata//Title Microsoft Word - [ST] iPhone_A15Bionic_iPhoneSE3_iOS16_SecurityTarget_v1.4.docx Microsoft Word - [ST] Macmini_M2_Keyboard_macOS13_SecurityTarget_v1.5.docx
pdf_data/st_metadata/pdf_file_size_bytes 2448380 2390078
dgst a5696b3d01538604 7ace7bd5d375474d