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MX-FR14 Version:C.10
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0245
IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
None
name MX-FR14 Version:C.10 IC chip for the reader / writer RC-S940 (CXD9768GG), version 4
category Multi-Function Devices ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems
scheme JP DE
not_valid_after 01.03.2015 01.09.2019
not_valid_before 25.02.2010 01.09.2005
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/c0245_erpt.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308a_pdf.pdf
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/c0245_est.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/0308b_pdf.pdf
manufacturer Sharp Corporation Sony Corporation
manufacturer_web https://sharp-world.com/ https://www.sony.com/
security_level EAL3 EAL4
dgst 9df05887d4f57296 5d560fb6108db342
heuristics/cert_id JISEC-CC-CRP-C0245
heuristics/extracted_sars ASE_INT.1, AVA_VAN.2, ALC_CMC.3, ALC_CMS.3, ASE_ECD.1, ATE_COV.2, ASE_TSS.1, ASE_SPD.1, ADV_TDS.2, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_LCD.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_FUN.1, ADV_ARC.1, ASE_OBJ.2, ATE_DPT.1, ASE_REQ.2, ALC_DVS.1, ATE_IND.2, ADV_FSP.3, ASE_CCL.1 ALC_DVS.1, ATE_COV.2, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1, AVA_VLA.2, AVA_MSU.2, ADV_HLD.2, ATE_FUN.1, AGD_USR.1, AVA_SOF.1, ATE_IND.2, AGD_ADM.1, ADV_LLD.1, ALC_LCD.1, ATE_DPT.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_IMP.1
heuristics/extracted_versions 10 4
heuristics/scheme_data
  • cert_id: JISEC-CC-CRP-C0245
  • certification_date: 01.02.2010
  • claim: EAL3
  • enhanced:
    • assurance_level: EAL3
    • cc_version: 3.1
    • cert_link: https://www.ipa.go.jp/en/security/c0245_eimg.pdf
    • description: PRODUCT DESCRIPTION Description of TOE The TOE is an IT product, composed of 2 parts, to protect data in a Multi Function Device (hereafter referred to as an “MFD”. One part is a hardware part in an MFD and provided in the form of an MFD. The other part is a firmware product and provided as an upgrade kit for the firmware of the MFD. ROMs in this product replace standard firmware ROMs in an MFD. Among MFD models that the TOE supports, some MFD models require a Sharp genuine option that contains an HDD, in order that the TOE can run on them. An MFD is an office machine that has imaging functions such as copy, printer, image scanning and fax. TOE security functionality The TOE counters unauthorized disclosure of image data by: a) The encryption function, which encrypts data, such as image data that the MFD handles, before storing the data to the HDD or the Flash memory in the MFD, b) The cryptographic key generation function, generates a seed for a cryptographic key once when the TOE is installed, and generates a constant cryptographic key from the seed whenever the MFD is powered, and stores the key in a volatile memory for the encryption function, c) The data erasure function, which automatically overwrites to erase image data no longer in use in storages such as HDD, and overwrites to erase all data when invoked by the administrator of an MFD in use or no longer in use, d) The authentication function, which authenticates the TOE administrator with a password, and provides the TOE administrator with a management function for changing his password, e) The confidential file function, which provides image data filed by users with password protection, and f) The network protection functions, which are: - The IP/MAC address filter function, which refuses unauthorized network accesses, - The SSL function, which protects communications data against wiretapping, and - The network settings protection function, which provides only the TOE administrator with management functions of network settings such as IP address and DNS, and protects them from other users.
    • evaluation_facility: Mizuho Information & Research Institute, Inc. Center for Evaluation of Information Security
    • product: MX-FR14
    • product_type: Data protection function in Multi Function Device
    • report_link: https://www.ipa.go.jp/en/security/c0245_erpt.pdf
    • target_link: https://www.ipa.go.jp/en/security/c0245_est.pdf
    • toe_version: C.10
    • vendor: Sharp Corporation
  • expiration_date: 01.03.2015
  • revalidations: [frozendict({'date': '2011-08', 'link': 'https://www.ipa.go.jp/en/security/jisec/software/certified-cert/c0245_it9263_02.html'})]
  • supplier: Sharp Corporation
  • toe_japan_name: MX-FR14 C.10
  • toe_overseas_link: https://www.ipa.go.jp/en/security/jisec/software/certified-cert/c0245_it9263.html
  • toe_overseas_name: MX-FR14 C.12
pdf_data/report_filename c0245_erpt.pdf
pdf_data/report_frontpage
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id
      • JP:
        • CRP-C0245-01: 1
        • Certification No. C0245: 1
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level
      • EAL:
        • EAL3: 3
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sfr
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_claims
      • A:
        • A.NETWORK: 1
        • A.OPERATOR: 1
      • T:
        • T.RECOVER: 1
        • T.REMOTE: 1
        • T.SPOOF: 1
        • T.TAMPER: 1
        • T.TAP: 1
      pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
      • Microsoft:
        • Microsoft: 1
      pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
      pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto
      pdf_data/report_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
      pdf_data/report_keywords/pq_crypto
      pdf_data/report_keywords/hash_function
      pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_scheme
      • MAC:
        • MAC: 4
      pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_protocol
      • TLS:
        • SSL:
          • SSL: 5
      pdf_data/report_keywords/randomness
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cipher_mode
      pdf_data/report_keywords/ecc_curve
      pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_engine
      pdf_data/report_keywords/tls_cipher_suite
      pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_library
      pdf_data/report_keywords/vulnerability
      pdf_data/report_keywords/side_channel_analysis
      pdf_data/report_keywords/technical_report_id
      pdf_data/report_keywords/device_model
      pdf_data/report_keywords/tee_name
      pdf_data/report_keywords/os_name
      pdf_data/report_keywords/cplc_data
      pdf_data/report_keywords/ic_data_group
      pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id
      • CC:
        • CCMB-2006-09-001: 2
        • CCMB-2007-09-002: 2
        • CCMB-2007-09-003: 2
        • CCMB-2007-09-004: 2
      pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_version
      pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_api_const
      pdf_data/report_keywords/javacard_packages
      pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process
      pdf_data/report_metadata
      • /Author: IPA/JISEC
      • /Company: IPA
      • /CreationDate: D:20110331094555+09'00'
      • /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 8.1
      • /Manager: IPA
      • /ModDate: D:20110331094557+09'00'
      • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 8.2.3 (Windows)
      • /Title: CRP-e
      • pdf_file_size_bytes: 245769
      • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
      • pdf_is_encrypted: False
      • pdf_number_of_pages: 23
      pdf_data/st_filename c0245_est.pdf 0308b_pdf.pdf
      pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_security_level
      • EAL:
        • EAL3: 4
      • EAL:
        • EAL4: 10
      pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar
      • ADV:
        • ADV_ARC.1: 1
        • ADV_FSP.3: 1
        • ADV_TDS.2: 1
      • AGD:
        • AGD_OPE.1: 1
        • AGD_PRE.1: 1
      • ALC:
        • ALC_CMC.3: 1
        • ALC_CMS.3: 1
        • ALC_DEL.1: 1
        • ALC_DVS.1: 1
        • ALC_LCD.1: 1
      • ASE:
        • ASE_CCL.1: 1
        • ASE_ECD.1: 1
        • ASE_INT.1: 1
        • ASE_OBJ.2: 1
        • ASE_REQ.2: 1
        • ASE_SPD.1: 1
        • ASE_TSS.1: 1
      • ATE:
        • ATE_COV.2: 1
        • ATE_DPT.1: 1
        • ATE_FUN.1: 1
        • ATE_IND.2: 1
      • AVA:
        • AVA_VAN.2: 1
      • ACM:
        • ACM_AUT.1: 3
        • ACM_CAP.3: 1
        • ACM_CAP.4: 3
        • ACM_SCP.1: 1
        • ACM_SCP.2: 3
      • ADO:
        • ADO_DEL.2: 3
        • ADO_IGS.1: 4
      • ADV:
        • ADV_FSP.1: 7
        • ADV_FSP.2: 3
        • ADV_HLD.1: 2
        • ADV_HLD.2: 5
        • ADV_IMP.1: 4
        • ADV_LLD.1: 5
        • ADV_RCR.1: 4
        • ADV_SPM.1: 6
      • AGD:
        • AGD_ADM.1: 7
        • AGD_USR.1: 3
      • ALC:
        • ALC_DVS.1: 4
        • ALC_LCD.1: 3
        • ALC_TAT.1: 4
      • ATE:
        • ATE_COV.2: 3
        • ATE_DPT.1: 3
        • ATE_FUN.1: 3
        • ATE_IND.2: 3
      • AVA:
        • AVA_MSU.2: 3
        • AVA_SOF.1: 3
        • AVA_VLA.2: 3
      pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr
      • FCS:
        • FCS_CKM: 19
        • FCS_CKM.1: 5
        • FCS_CKM.2: 3
        • FCS_CKM.4: 12
        • FCS_COP: 21
        • FCS_COP.1: 5
      • FDP:
        • FDP_ITC.1: 3
        • FDP_ITC.2: 3
        • FDP_RIP.1: 7
        • FDP_RIP.1.1: 1
      • FIA:
        • FIA_AFL: 28
        • FIA_AFL.1: 4
        • FIA_SOS: 18
        • FIA_SOS.1: 2
        • FIA_UAU: 46
        • FIA_UAU.1: 10
        • FIA_UAU.2: 2
        • FIA_UAU.7: 2
        • FIA_UID: 25
        • FIA_UID.1: 10
        • FIA_UID.2: 2
      • FMT:
        • FMT_MOF.1: 9
        • FMT_MOF.1.1: 1
        • FMT_MTD: 33
        • FMT_MTD.1: 4
        • FMT_SMF.1: 27
        • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
        • FMT_SMR: 20
        • FMT_SMR.1: 12
      • FTA:
        • FTA_TSE.1: 9
        • FTA_TSE.1.1: 1
      • FTP:
        • FTP_TRP.1: 11
        • FTP_TRP.1.1: 1
        • FTP_TRP.1.2: 1
        • FTP_TRP.1.3: 1
      • FCS:
        • FCS_CKM.1: 20
        • FCS_CKM.1.1: 2
        • FCS_CKM.4: 16
        • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
        • FCS_COP.1: 22
        • FCS_COP.1.1: 2
      • FDP:
        • FDP_ACC: 3
        • FDP_ACC.1: 13
        • FDP_ACC.1.1: 1
        • FDP_ACF.1: 10
        • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
        • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
        • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
        • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
        • FDP_IFC.1: 20
        • FDP_IFC.1.1: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1: 15
        • FDP_IFF.1.1: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1.2: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1.3: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1.4: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1.5: 1
        • FDP_IFF.1.6: 1
        • FDP_ITC.1: 2
        • FDP_ITT.1: 12
        • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
        • FDP_SDI.1: 14
        • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
        • FDP_UCT.1: 11
        • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
        • FDP_UIT.1: 11
        • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
        • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
      • FIA:
        • FIA_AFL: 1
        • FIA_AFL.1: 7
        • FIA_AFL.1.1: 1
        • FIA_AFL.1.2: 2
        • FIA_ALF.1: 2
        • FIA_UAU: 1
        • FIA_UAU.2: 10
        • FIA_UAU.2.1: 1
        • FIA_UID.1: 11
        • FIA_UID.1.1: 1
        • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
      • FMT:
        • FMT_MSA: 1
        • FMT_MSA.1: 22
        • FMT_MSA.1.1: 2
        • FMT_MSA.2: 11
        • FMT_MSA.2.1: 1
        • FMT_MSA.3: 12
        • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
        • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
        • FMT_MTD.1: 10
        • FMT_MTD.1.1: 1
        • FMT_SMF.1: 11
        • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
        • FMT_SMR.1: 15
        • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
        • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
      • FPT:
        • FPT_AMT.1: 3
        • FPT_FLS.1: 19
        • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
        • FPT_ITT.1: 12
        • FPT_ITT.1.1: 1
        • FPT_PHP.3: 14
        • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
        • FPT_RCV.4: 20
        • FPT_RCV.4.1: 1
        • FPT_SDI.1: 1
        • FPT_TST: 1
        • FPT_TST.1: 11
        • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
        • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
        • FPT_TST.1.3: 1
      • FTP:
        • FTP_ITC.1: 22
        • FTP_ITC.1.1: 2
        • FTP_ITC.1.2: 2
        • FTP_ITC.1.3: 2
        • FTP_TRP.1: 2
      pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
      • A:
        • A.NETWORK: 4
        • A.OPERATOR: 4
      • O:
        • O.FILTER: 9
        • O.MANAGE: 11
        • O.REMOVE: 7
        • O.RESIDUAL: 6
        • O.TRP: 8
        • O.USER: 5
      • OE:
        • OE.CIPHER: 3
        • OE.FIREWALL: 3
        • OE.NOECHO: 9
        • OE.OPERATE: 3
        • OE.PC-USER: 4
        • OE.SUBNET: 3
        • OE.USER: 3
      • T:
        • T.RECOVER: 5
        • T.REMOTE: 3
        • T.SPOOF: 4
        • T.TAMPER: 3
        • T.TAP: 4
      pdf_data/st_keywords/vendor
      • Microsoft:
        • Microsoft: 2
      pdf_data/st_keywords/eval_facility
      • TUV:
        • TÜV Informationstechnik: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/symmetric_crypto
      • AES_competition:
        • AES:
          • AES: 5
        • Rijndael:
          • Rijndael: 4
      • DES:
        • 3DES:
          • Triple-DES: 1
        • DES:
          • DES: 1
      • DES:
        • 3DES:
          • Triple-DES: 4
        • DES:
          • DES: 17
      pdf_data/st_keywords/hash_function
      • SHA:
        • SHA1:
          • SHA-1: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
      • MAC:
        • MAC: 19
      pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_protocol
      • TLS:
        • SSL:
          • SSL: 18
          • SSL 3.0: 1
        • TLS:
          • TLS: 1
          • TLS 1.0: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness
      • RNG:
        • RNG: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/cipher_mode
      • CBC:
        • CBC: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis
      • FI:
        • DFA: 1
        • Malfunction: 26
      • SCA:
        • DPA: 1
        • Physical Probing: 5
        • physical probing: 3
      • other:
        • reverse engineering: 1
      pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id
      • FIPS:
        • FIPS PUB 197: 2
      • ISO:
        • ISO/IEC 646: 4
      • BSI:
        • AIS 20: 1
        • AIS20: 2
      • CC:
        • CCIMB-99-031: 1
        • CCIMB-99-032: 1
        • CCIMB-99-033: 1
      • ISO:
        • ISO/IEC 15408: 6
        • ISO/IEC 18092: 2
      pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process
      • OutOfScope:
        • 2.2. Scope of TOE This section describes which IC-chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the “2.1 Product Type”. Be careful that only a part of the IC-Chip components are scope of: 1
        • Information Leakage Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information: 1
        • Out of scope: 1
        • Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE: 1
        • i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation: 1
        • level is sufficient. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 3.1.Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the: 1
        • mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC-S940 from operating. Normal Mode (Out of scope in this evaluation) Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader / writer: 1
        • of the TOE, the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE (i.e. TOE is operating in Normal Mode) is out of scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless, the assumption A.Priv is necessary to ensure, that no malicious: 1
        • of this document. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. 4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE 4.1.1. Security Objectives for the IC-Chip: 1
        • out of scope: 10
        • parts of the TOE. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. Threats: T.Power_Down RC-S940 Security Target (Public Version) Version.2.04: 1
        • processes) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Phys_Prob Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE: 1
        • results) is assumed. Note: The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation. T.Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data: 1
        • that the following paragraphs describe the TOE’s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE. Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC-Chip. The: 1
        • up. Firmware of IC-Chip (Out scope of the TOE) The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE. Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the: 1
        • utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption. Be careful that, however, the firmware out of scopes the TOE. The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the: 1
      pdf_data/st_metadata
      • /Author: K.Nakagawa
      • /Company: Sharp Corporation
      • /CreationDate: D:20110324155343+09'00'
      • /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 8.1
      • /GTS_PDFXConformance: PDF/X-1a:2001
      • /GTS_PDFXVersion: PDF/X-1:2001
      • /ModDate: D:20110324161423+09'00'
      • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 8.2.6 (Windows)
      • /Subject: MX-FR14
      • /Title: Security Target
      • /Trapped: /False
      • pdf_file_size_bytes: 749989
      • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
      • pdf_is_encrypted: False
      • pdf_number_of_pages: 41
      • /Author: EbisawaHiroki
      • /Comments: 英文校正 by H.Hamada
      • /Company: Sony Corporation
      • /CreationDate: D:20050819223433+09'00'
      • /Creator: Word 用 Acrobat PDFMaker 7.0
      • /ModDate: D:20050819223926+09'00'
      • /Producer: Acrobat Distiller 7.0 (Windows)
      • /Subject: 英文(K.H.)
      • /Title: MDPU2 ST Ver1.11
      • pdf_file_size_bytes: 309061
      • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
      • pdf_is_encrypted: True
      • pdf_number_of_pages: 70
      state/report/convert_ok True False
      state/report/download_ok True False
      state/report/extract_ok True False
      state/report/pdf_hash Different Different
      state/report/txt_hash Different Different
      state/st/pdf_hash Different Different
      state/st/txt_hash Different Different