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Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone 14 Pro with A16 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1Version iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) ( ANSSI-CC-2023/59)
ANSSI-CC-2023/59 		Strong Customer Authentication pour Apple Pay sur Mac mini avec M1 et Magic keyboard avec Touch ID, exécutant macOS Monterey 12.3.1 (Version 12.3.1 (build 21E258))
ANSSI-CC-2023/19
name Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone 14 Pro with A16 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1Version iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) ( ANSSI-CC-2023/59) Strong Customer Authentication pour Apple Pay sur Mac mini avec M1 et Magic keyboard avec Touch ID, exécutant macOS Monterey 12.3.1 (Version 12.3.1 (build 21E258))
category ICs, Smart Cards and Smart Card-Related Devices and Systems Mobility
not_valid_before 2023-12-28 2023-03-27
not_valid_after 2028-12-28 2028-03-27
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_59en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/anssi-cible-cc-2023_19en.pdf
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/ANSSI-CC-2023_59en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/anssi-cc-2023_19fr-2.pdf
cert_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/certificat-CC-2023_59en.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/certificat-cc-2023_19.pdf
state/cert/extract_ok True False
state/cert/pdf_hash ca798a8678c606e1a601ebb9e1da8ca09cbef656c1bfbb3f868d5046c0cec8e2 a98b1eea87c2d2255425d55f7afdbc3247eb1c60f8c0238baaaf318fb8917cdd
state/cert/txt_hash 3feff5c9858eae44a5dfd96fce55ab212e3848e962cd31c4aee4a3ff690d63cd defae4a13ae232a30f9fa6a5f4d6b225d19787f4da43fdaf179d5c0e53e04d60
state/report/extract_ok True False
state/report/pdf_hash c69a76645d475619fb0cbcc158f980c919fac7230089331e95b51efdc7425d55 ea3b0c48b41ec4fa131af6ae6636b28bc1f319fa9bbe170def0c9a3eb36beec3
state/report/txt_hash 18b914ee117db29eaca1475c6db21b5d4193cfd24f13bd710a53bede88726220 905daf4881d52a2fa7466600f8d110518698dc07d4977cb29f101e4d3c7097d0
state/st/extract_ok True False
state/st/pdf_hash e5fdd311e271e1438728e8016f96e69565dedfd6000ba5e316945c5693eab587 cb5454791a072c000cb50e5e5c93c58cc6c954c5b598ae6a71127da88a89d060
state/st/txt_hash 97bc32b32d57ede87b39fdc22d66d61f13b1bdbb893d26d97fd5600c44810c93 bf36bbc397a1bf669e563192a383146ed28ed9f776ec67c7ebeb0be3b8586ffb
heuristics/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/59 ANSSI-CC-2023/19
heuristics/cpe_matches cpe:2.3:o:apple:iphone_os:16.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:apple:macos:12.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
heuristics/extracted_versions 16.4.1 12.3.1
heuristics/scheme_data/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/59 ANSSI-CC-2023/19
heuristics/scheme_data/description Le produit évalué est « Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone 14 Pro with A16 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1, iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) » développé par APPLE INC.. Le produit évalué est « Strong Customer Authentication pour Apple Pay sur Mac mini avec M1 et Magic keyboard avec Touch ID, exécutant macOS Monterey 12.3.1, Version 12.3.1 (build 21E258) » développé par APPLE INC. Apple Pay est une solution de paiement mobile développée par la société APPLE INC. Après avoir enregistré une carte bancaire dans son équipement Apple, l’utilisateur peut faire des paie
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced
  • cert_id: ANSSI-CC-2023/59
  • certification_date: 28/12/2023
  • expiration_date: 28/12/2028
  • category: Divers
  • cc_version: Critères Communs version 3.1r5
  • developer: APPLE INC.
  • sponsor: APPLE INC.
  • evaluation_facility: THALES / CNES
  • level: EAL2+
  • protection_profile:
  • mutual_recognition: CCRA SOG-IS
  • augmented: ADV_FSP.3
  • report_link: https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-CC-2023_59en.pdf
  • target_link: https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_59en.pdf
  • cert_link: https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/certificat-CC-2023_59en.pdf
  • cert_id: ANSSI-CC-2023/19
  • certification_date: 27/03/2023
  • expiration_date: 26/03/2028
  • category: Divers
  • cc_version: Critères Communs version 3.1r5
  • developer: APPLE INC.
  • sponsor: APPLE INC.
  • evaluation_facility: THALES / CNES
  • level: EAL2+
  • protection_profile:
  • mutual_recognition: CCRA SOG-IS
  • augmented: ADV_FSP.3 et ALC_FLR.3
  • cert_link: https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/Certificat-CC-2023_19.pdf
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/augmented ADV_FSP.3 ADV_FSP.3 et ALC_FLR.3
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/cert_id ANSSI-CC-2023/59 ANSSI-CC-2023/19
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/cert_link https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/certificat-CC-2023_59en.pdf https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document_type/Certificat-CC-2023_19.pdf
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/certification_date 28/12/2023 27/03/2023
heuristics/scheme_data/enhanced/expiration_date 28/12/2028 26/03/2028
heuristics/scheme_data/expiration_date 28 Décembre 2028 26 Mars 2028
heuristics/scheme_data/product Strong Customer Authentication for Apple Pay on iPhone 14 Pro with A16 Bionic running iOS 16.4.1 Version iOS 16.4.1 (build 20E252) Strong Customer Authentication pour Apple Pay sur Mac mini avec M1 et Magic keyboard avec Touch ID, exécutant macOS Monterey 12.3.1 (Version 12.3.1 (build 21E258))
heuristics/scheme_data/url https://cyber.gouv.fr/produits-certifies/strong-customer-authentication-apple-pay-iphone-14-pro-a16-bionic-running-ios https://cyber.gouv.fr/produits-certifies/strong-customer-authentication-pour-apple-pay-sur-mac-mini-avec-m1-et-magic
pdf_data/cert_filename certificat-CC-2023_59en.pdf certificat-cc-2023_19.pdf
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_cert_id/FR
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/59: 2
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/19: 2
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.3: 1
  • ADV:
    • ADV_FSP.3: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_FLR.3: 1
pdf_data/cert_keywords/eval_facility
  • Thales:
    • THALES/CNES: 2
pdf_data/cert_metadata
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 138174
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 2
  • /CreationDate: D:20240222154612+01'00'
  • /Creator: Acrobat PDFMaker 23 pour Word
  • /Keywords:
  • /ModDate: D:20240222155210+01'00'
  • /Producer: Adobe PDF Library 23.1.175
  • pdf_hyperlinks:
None
pdf_data/report_filename ANSSI-CC-2023_59en.pdf anssi-cc-2023_19fr-2.pdf
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id/FR
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/59: 2
  • ANSSI-CC-2023/19: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar/ALC
  • ALC_FLR: 1
  • ALC_FLR.3: 2
  • ALC_FLR: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level/EAL
  • EAL2: 3
  • EAL4: 1
  • EAL2 augmented: 1
  • EAL2: 3
  • EAL7: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level/ITSEC
  • ITSEC E3 Basic: 1
  • ITSEC E6 Elevé: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
  • Thales:
    • THALES/CNES: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/symmetric_crypto
  • DES:
    • DES:
      • DES: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/tee_name
  • IBM:
    • SE: 1
pdf_data/report_metadata
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 427149
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 13
  • /CreationDate: D:20240222154515+01'00'
  • /Creator: Acrobat PDFMaker 23 pour Word
  • /Keywords:
  • /ModDate: D:20240222155210+01'00'
  • /Producer: Adobe PDF Library 23.1.175
  • pdf_hyperlinks: mailto:[email protected], http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/, http://www.sogis.eu/
 None
pdf_data/st_filename ANSSI-cible-CC-2023_59en.pdf anssi-cible-cc-2023_19en.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • D:
    • D.OS: 17
    • D.SEP_SE: 3
  • T:
    • T.CORRUPT: 2
    • T.PHYSICAL: 2
    • T.RECOVER: 2
    • T.REPLAY: 2
    • T.SILENT: 2
    • T.SKIMMING: 2
    • T.USURP: 2
  • A:
    • A.DE-: 2
    • A.PERSO: 3
    • A.CDCVM: 3
    • A.WATCH_USER: 3
    • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 1
  • OE:
    • OE.CDCVM: 3
  • D:
    • D.OS: 17
    • D.SEP_SE: 3
  • T:
    • T.COR-: 1
    • T.PHYSIC-: 1
    • T.RECOV-: 1
    • T.REPLAY: 2
    • T.SILENT: 2
    • T.SKIM-: 1
    • T.USURP: 2
    • T.SKIMMING: 1
    • T.RECOVER: 1
    • T.CORRUPT: 1
    • T.PHYSICAL: 1
  • A:
    • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 3
    • A.PERSO: 3
    • A.WATCH_USER: 3
    • A.NO_EVIL_ROOT_USER: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/A
  • A.DE-: 2
  • A.PERSO: 3
  • A.CDCVM: 3
  • A.WATCH_USER: 3
  • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 1
  • A.DEVICE_AUTH: 3
  • A.PERSO: 3
  • A.WATCH_USER: 3
  • A.NO_EVIL_ROOT_USER: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/A/A.DEVICE_AUTH 1 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T
  • T.CORRUPT: 2
  • T.PHYSICAL: 2
  • T.RECOVER: 2
  • T.REPLAY: 2
  • T.SILENT: 2
  • T.SKIMMING: 2
  • T.USURP: 2
  • T.COR-: 1
  • T.PHYSIC-: 1
  • T.RECOV-: 1
  • T.REPLAY: 2
  • T.SILENT: 2
  • T.SKIM-: 1
  • T.USURP: 2
  • T.SKIMMING: 1
  • T.RECOVER: 1
  • T.CORRUPT: 1
  • T.PHYSICAL: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T/T.CORRUPT 2 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T/T.PHYSICAL 2 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T/T.RECOVER 2 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims/T/T.SKIMMING 2 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar/ADV
  • ADV_FSP: 1
  • ADV_ARC.1: 3
  • ADV_FSP.3: 2
  • ADV_TDS.1: 4
  • ADV_FSP.2: 4
  • ADV_FSP.1: 2
  • ADV_FSP.3: 3
  • ADV_ARC.1: 3
  • ADV_TDS.1: 4
  • ADV_FSP.2: 4
  • ADV_FSP.1: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar/ADV/ADV_FSP.3 2 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar/ALC
  • ALC_CMC.2: 2
  • ALC_CMS.2: 2
  • ALC_DEL.1: 2
  • ALC_FLR: 1
  • ALC_CMC.2: 2
  • ALC_CMS.2: 2
  • ALC_DEL.1: 2
  • ALC_FLR.3: 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP
  • FDP_DAU.1: 4
  • FDP_DAU.1.1: 1
  • FDP_DAU.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACC: 25
  • FDP_ACC.2: 4
  • FDP_ACF: 23
  • FDP_ACF.1: 12
  • FDP_ITT.1: 4
  • FDP_ITT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ETC: 8
  • FDP_ETC.2.1: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.2: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.3: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.4: 2
  • FDP_ACC.2.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.2.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
  • FDP_ITC: 5
  • FDP_ITC.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FDP_UCT: 10
  • FDP_UCT.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT: 10
  • FDP_UIT.1: 2
  • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
  • FDP_RIP.1: 15
  • FDP_RIP.1.1: 1
  • FDP_SDI.1: 10
  • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.1: 11
  • FDP_IFC.1: 9
  • FDP_ETC.2: 2
  • FDP_DAU.1: 4
  • FDP_DAU.1.1: 1
  • FDP_DAU.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACC: 23
  • FDP_ACF: 19
  • FDP_ACC.2: 4
  • FDP_ACF.1: 12
  • FDP_ETC: 8
  • FDP_ETC.2.1: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.2: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.3: 2
  • FDP_ETC.2.4: 2
  • FDP_ACC.2.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.2.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ACF.1.4: 1
  • FDP_ITC: 4
  • FDP_ITT: 8
  • FDP_ITC.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.2: 1
  • FDP_ITC.1.3: 1
  • FDP_ITT.1.1: 2
  • FDP_UCT: 9
  • FDP_UIT: 10
  • FDP_UCT.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1: 2
  • FDP_UCT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_RIP.1: 12
  • FDP_SDI.1: 9
  • FDP_UIT.1.1: 1
  • FDP_UIT.1.2: 1
  • FDP_RIP.1.1: 1
  • FDP_SDI.1.1: 1
  • FDP_ACC.1: 13
  • FDP_IFC.1: 10
  • FDP_ETC.2: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACC 25 23
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACC.1 11 13
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ACF 23 19
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_IFC.1 9 10
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ITC 5 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_ITT.1.1 1 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_RIP.1 15 12
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_SDI.1 10 9
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FDP/FDP_UCT 10 9
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FIA/FIA_SOS.2 4 3
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPR/FPR_UNO.1 14 17
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPT/FPT_RPL 10 8
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr/FPT/FPT_RPL.1 4 6
pdf_data/st_keywords/certification_process/OutOfScope
  • out of scope: 2
  • Element of the device is separately certified according to the Common Criteria and is there- fore out of scope of this evaluation. Note: In the evaluated configuration the cryptographic modules are supplied by: 1
  • pected to return to its User. Note: Defending against device re-use after physi- cal compromise is out of scope. D.User_Passcode D.User_Bio D.Card_Data D.Unlock_Secret* D.SEP_Watch* T.RECOVER Card Re- covery An: 1
  • out of scope: 2
  • Element of the device is separately certified according to the Common Criteria and is therefore out of scope of this evaluation. Note: In the evaluated configuration the cryptographic modules are supplied by: 1
  • pected to return to its User. Note: Defending against device re-use after physical compromise is out of scope. D.User_Password D.User_Bio D.Card_Data D.Unlock_Secret* D.Keyboard_Secret D.SEP_Watch* T.RECOV- ER: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/ecc_curve
  • NIST:
    • P-256: 2
pdf_data/st_keywords/tee_name/IBM/SE 6 4
pdf_data/st_metadata
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 2520806
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 56
  • /CreationDate: D:20231109105238Z
  • /Creator: Word
  • /ModDate: D:20231109105301Z
  • /Producer: Adobe Mac PDF Plug-in
  • /Title: Microsoft Word - [ST] iPhone_A16Bionic_iOS16_SecurityTarget_v1.4.docx
  • pdf_hyperlinks:
None
dgst 204cb8d5dbf8e997 0a22e011bdec54c4