Comparing certificates Experimental feature

You are comparing two certificates. By default, only differing attributes are shown. Use the button below to show/hide all attributes.

Showing only differing attributes.
CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 		CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023
name CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1
not_valid_after 10.11.2026 17.10.2028
not_valid_before 10.11.2021 17.10.2023
cert_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162c_pdf.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162V2c_pdf.pdf
report_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162a_pdf.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162V2a_pdf.pdf
st_link https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162b_pdf.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/nfs/ccpfiles/files/epfiles/1162V2b_pdf.pdf
manufacturer Atos Information Technology GmbH Eviden Germany GmbH
manufacturer_web https://www.de.atos.net https://eviden.com
dgst 0d51715972b53a28 f720e5aa107bdbbe
heuristics/cert_id BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023
heuristics/extracted_versions 6.0, 1.0 6.0, 1.1
heuristics/prev_certificates {} BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021
heuristics/next_certificates BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023 {}
heuristics/report_references/directly_referenced_by BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022, BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023 {}
heuristics/report_references/directly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021 BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022, BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referenced_by BSI-DSZ-CC-1172-2022, BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023 {}
heuristics/report_references/indirectly_referencing BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V3-2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V2-2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-2017, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V2-2019, BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-2019, BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020, BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021 BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V3-2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-V2-2018, BSI-DSZ-CC-0945-2017, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V2-2019, BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-2019, BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V3-2020, BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V2-2016, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021, BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021
heuristics/scheme_data
  • category: Digital signature
  • cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V3-2024
  • certification_date: 04.12.2024
  • enhanced:
    • applicant: Eviden Germany GmbH Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 81739 München
    • assurance_level: EAL4+,AVA_VAN.5,ALC_DVS.2,ATE_DPT.2
    • cert_link: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Reporte/Reporte1100/1162V3c_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
    • certification_date: 04.12.2024
    • description: The composite TOE is named CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (developed by Atos Information Technology GmbH). The TOE is a smart card operating system on an IC with at least one application. Applications covered by this TOE comprise an electronic passport (ePass) application and/or a signature (eSign) application. The IC platform comprises the integrated circuit SLC52GDA448* (IFX_CCI_000005 Design Step H13) and the cryptographic libraries RSA v2.08.007, EC v2.08.007, Toolbox v2.08.007, Base v2.08.007, HCL2 v1.12.001 (hash library) and Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.04.002 certified according CC v3.1 with ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021.
    • entries: [frozendict({'id': 'EN', 'description': 'May'}), frozendict({'id': 'Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application,', 'description': 'October'}), frozendict({'id': 'Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to signature creation application,', 'description': 'October'}), frozendict({'id': 'Machine Readable Travel Document with "', 'description': '5 December'}), frozendict({'id': 'Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with', 'description': 'July'})]
    • evaluation_facility: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
    • expiration_date: 03.12.2029
    • product: CardOS V6.0 ID R1.2
    • protection_profile: EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation, 18 May 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02,Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application, CEN / ISSS - Information Society Standardization System, 12 October 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01,Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to signature creation application, CEN / ISSS - Information Society Standardization System, 12 October 2013, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01,Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02,Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
    • report_link: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Reporte/Reporte1100/1162V3a_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
    • target_link: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/Reporte/Reporte1100/1162V3b_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
  • product: CardOS V6.0 ID R1.2
  • subcategory: Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCD)
  • url: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Zertifikate_CC/CC/Digitale_Signatur-Sichere_Signaturerstellungseinheiten/1162.html
  • vendor: Eviden Germany GmbH
maintenance_updates
pdf_data/cert_filename 1162c_pdf.pdf 1162V2c_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/cert_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021: 1
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023: 1
pdf_data/cert_metadata
  • /Author: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
  • /CreationDate: D:20211115142636+01'00'
  • /Creator: Writer
  • /Keywords: Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Smartcard, MRTD, SSCD
  • /ModDate: D:20211115142939+01'00'
  • /Producer: LibreOffice 6.3
  • /Subject: Common Criteria Certification
  • /Title: Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 250580
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 1
  • /Author: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
  • /Keywords: "Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Smartcard, MRTD, SSCD, CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1, Eviden Germany GmbH"
  • /Subject: Common Criteria, Certification, Zertifizierung, Smartcard, MRTD, SSCD, CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1, Eviden Germany GmbH
  • /Title: Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 232198
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: False
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 1
pdf_data/report_filename 1162a_pdf.pdf 1162V2a_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/report_frontpage
  • DE:
    • cc_security_level: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and therefore relies on the platform certification of the used IC (certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC- 1110-V4-2021) [9], [10]. 9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de). The table A.1 presented in the Security Target gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE. The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate. The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too. Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on top. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. 20 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report 11. Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES
    • cc_version: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the
    • cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021
    • cert_item: CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0
    • cert_lab: BSI
    • developer: Atos Information Technology GmbH
    • match_rules: ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)']
    • ref_protection_profiles: BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 EN 419211-2:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02), EN 419211-4:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01), EN 419211-5:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01 (**) Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045. (*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5. (**) "The IT Product identified in this certificate fulfils PP EN 419211-2:2013, PP EN 419211-4:2013 as well as PP EN 419211-5:2013 and is therefore a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3.(a)) (“Certification of qualified electronic signature creation devices”, 3.(a)) of eIDAS Regulation (Regulation No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014). The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 10 November 2021 For the Federal Office for Information Security Sandro Amendola L.S. Head of Division Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 SOGIS Recognition Agreement Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement recognition for components up to EAL 2 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report Contents A. Certification......................................................................................................................6 1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6 3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8 5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8 6. Publication....................................................................................................................9 B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10 1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11 2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12 3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14 5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14 6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15 7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15 8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18 9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20 11. Security Target..........................................................................................................21 12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................21 13. Definitions.................................................................................................................22 14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................24 C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................27 D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................28 5 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 A. Certification 1. Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1 ● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2 ● BSI Schedule of Costs BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC- Produkte) [3] ● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3] 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 2 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231 3 BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI- Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365 6 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14 [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408. ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045 ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 3. Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu. The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected. 3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA) The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP). The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition. 4 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730 7 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components. 4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 2 November 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Atos Information Technology GmbH. The product was developed by: Atos Information Technology GmbH. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 5. Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, ● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 10 November 2021 is valid until 9 November 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re- certification. The owner of the certificate is obliged: 5 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report 1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product, 2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate, 3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 6. Publication The product CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 6 Atos Information Technology GmbH Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 81739 München Deutschland 9 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 B. Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 10 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report 1. Executive Summary The composite TOE is named CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (developed by Atos Information Technology GmbH). The TOE is a smart card operating system on an IC with at least one application. Applications covered by this TOE comprise an electronic passport (ePass) application and/or a signature (eSign) application. The IC platform comprises the integrated circuit SLC52GDA448* (IFX_CCI_000005 Design Step H13) and the cryptographic libraries RSA v2.08.007, EC v2.08.007, Toolbox v2.08.007, Base v2.08.007, HCL2 v1.12.001 (hash library) and Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) v2.04.002 certified according CC v3.1 with ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021. Three major configurations of the TOE are defined which differ in the description of the object system: ● ePassport: User data are stored in an ICAO-compliant ePass Application protected by PACE and EAC1. Here, EAC1 is used only for data groups 3 and 4. ● SSCD: User data are stored in an eSign Application conformant to “Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation”. ● eID: User data are contained in an ICAO-compliant ePass Application, in an eSign Application conformant to “Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation“, and optional eID applications. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profiles [8] ● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation, CEN/ISSS, EN 419211-2:2013, 2016-06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02, ● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application, CEN/ISSS, EN 419211-4:2013, 2016-06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01, ● Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application, CEN/ ISSS, EN 419211-5:2013, 2016-06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01, ● Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02, ● Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP- 0068-V2-2011-MA-01. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 7.6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality: 11 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 TOE Security Functionality User Identification and Authentication (ePass) User Identification and Authentication (eSign) Advanced Inspection Procedure with PACE Protocols (PACE, Chip Authentication v1, Active Authentication, Terminal Authentication Protocol v1, Passive Authentication) Access Control (General and ePass) AccessControl (eSign) Key management Signature Creation Test features Protection Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 4.4, 4.2 and 4.3. This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2. Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1 HW Infineon SLC52G52GDA448* IFX_CCI_000005 Design Step H13 Wafer, module or a packaged component. 2 SW CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 V6.0 / R1.0 3 SW (Infineon) RSA Library v2.08.007 4 EC Library v2.08.007 5 Toolbox Library v2.08.007 6 Base Library v2.08.007 12 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 7 Hash Library v1.12.001 8 Symmetric Crypto Library v2.04.002 9 DOC [12] CardOS V6.0 User’s Manual 08/2021 As PDF via signed and encrypted mail. 10 User Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’ 1.20R 11 Administrator Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’ 1.31R 12 Application Base Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’ 1.33R 13 Application ePassport Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’ePassport Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID’ 1.32R 14 Application eSign Guidance ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’ 1.22R 15 DATA Configuration Scripts for initialization and personalization R1.02 As PDF via signed and encrypted mail. 16 StartKey for initialization - Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE Components No. 1 to No. 8 are actually delivered as one item, namely the IC platform containing the software mask. Items No. 15 represents the configuration files for initialization and personalization. These represent possible configurations and changes on values and parameters to be applied as outlined in the scripts itself and according to the guidance documents. The OS software pre-loaded on the IC hardware is sent directly from the chip manufacturer to the Trust Center or via logistic centers or distributors. This is possible since the TOE protects itself during delivery and standard procedures for packing, storage and distribution can be applied. Only with knowledge of the StartKey it is possible to continue the process of setting up the TOE. The Trust Center is also provided with the guidance and initialization / personalization scripts from the developer Atos Information Technology GmbH. All data and documents are sent signed and encrypted by mail. The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in Administrator Guidance chap. 5.1, User Guidance chap. 4.2 and Application Base Guidance chap. 4.1 [12]. After the delivery the TOE can be identified by the command response sequence as 13 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 outlined in Application Base Guidance chap. 4.1 and Administrator Guidance chap. 5.1 [12], verifying the OS version, product name, version and year, chip identification and loaded packages (i.e. none in this case). 3. Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: • Security Audit • Cryptographic Support • User Data Protection • Identification and Authentication • Security Management • Protection of the TSF • Trusted Path/Channels Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter 7.6 of the Security Target (ST). 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: • P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip) • P.Pre-Operational (Pre-operational handling of the travel document) • P.Card_PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)) • P.Trustworthy_PKI (Trustworthiness of PKI) • P.Terminal (Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals) • P.Sensitive_Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data) • P.Personalisation (Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisation only) • P.CSP_QCert (Qualified certificate) • P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) • P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature creation device) • P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 5. 5. Architectural Information The composite TOE CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 is a smart card operating system based on a certified hardware platform together with the cryptographic libraries and object system that 14 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report defines its applications. The TOE comprises ten subsystems, listed with a short description in the following itemization: • Startup: Performs actions needed at startup only and not further used after entry into user commands processing loop. • Command Manager: The main loop within the Command Manager is the most central part of CardOS. • Protocol Manager: The Protocol Manager takes care of command reception and transmission of response data. • Command Layer: Implements the APDU command set, enables secure access to data and allows for package download. • Security: Selects appropriate rules and the corresponding evaluation, manages the administration of access rights, provides secure messaging processing, evaluates an entities life cycle when influencing access rules, protects the TOE against attacks using the underlying hardware security features. • Entities: Provides the mediation of access to the application and its objects, provides file system administration, setting of authorization flags, provides PIN/PUK blocking functionality, handles private keys for signature generation with appropriate parameters, handles SCP functionality, provides integrity mechanisms (CRC), checks file status and provides countermeasures against fault induction attacks. • Cryptography: Provides wrapper modules for IFX platform libraries, padding routines and generic management of cryptography. • CBIOS: Provides interface functionality to the hardware peripherals (UART, CRC generator) and provides utility functions (memory management, transaction management, interrupt service routines). • IC: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite TOE, which interacts with the operating system. • Retrieval functions: This subsystem retrieves the results of performed routines. 6. Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7. IT Product Testing Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN Testing Approach: Originating from the behaviour defined in the SFRs of the ST, the developer specified test cases for all SFRs in order to cover the TSF. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken into account and mapped to these test cases. The main test focus was laid upon the access right management and commands and that are used in the operational usage phase to 15 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 allow signature creation. Tests using multiple application DFs to verify their separation were performed. Additional test cases that could not be performed on a real smartcard (e.g. memory faults and manipulation) were performed on an emulator. Verdict for the activity: The testing approach covers all TSFI as described in the functional specification and all subsystems of the TOE design adequately. All configuration options as described in the ST are covered and a well-defined approach of possible combinations of options was applied. All test results collected in the test reports are as expected and in accordance with the TOE design and the desired TOE functionality. Independent Testing according to ATE_IND Approach for independent testing: • Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps. • Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified using iterations of developer’s tests. • Independent testing was performed by the evaluator at the ITSEF using developer’s and evaluator’s test equipment. TOE test configurations: • Tests were done in different life-cycle phases (personalisation / operational), • eSign and ePassport application, combinations of both applications and multiple instances were considered in the configurations, • Different options on application parameters were tested, for example RSA or EC- based cryptography (Brainpool and NIST curves), different key lengths or PIN/PUK options. Subset size chosen: • During sample testing the evaluator chose to sample the developer functional tests at the Evaluation Body for IT Security in Essen. Emulator tests with similar test focus were omitted. • During independent testing the evaluator focussed on the main security functionality as described in the ST. Access control and user authentication was mainly in focus. • Penetration tests as outcome of the vulnerability analysis were performed to cover potential vulnerabilities. Fuzzy tests, laser fault injections and side-channel analysis were conducted during testing. Developer tests performed: • The developer performed tests of all TSF and interfaces with script based tests and emulator test cases. • The evaluator selected a set of functional tests of the developer’s testing documentation for sampling. Test cases with similar test focus were omitted. Verdict for the activity: • During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. 16 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report The evaluator verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of the developer’s tests and verifying the test results for successful execution. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN Overview: The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and developer. The test samples were configured and parameterized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. Different configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were tested using a distribution of configuration parameters to achieve a well-defined and wide coverage. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of High was actually successful. Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created within the vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional developer tests. The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be covered by test cases. The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test set was devised. TOE test configurations: The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the ST and guidance documentation. The samples were identified using the method as described by the developer in its guidance documentation. TOEs were configured with a reasonable coverage for different support of cryptographic algorithms and key sizes. Both, contactless and contactbased interface were covered during testing. Test configurations were used that allow to reset the TOE in its initial state before initialisation/personalisation. For testing, the different variants of the IC platform were used. Whenever possible, the TOE as a whole (embedded software on IC) was used. For some test scenarios however, an emulator was used that would allow to directly view and manipulate the memory of the TOE. Verdict for the sub-activity: The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by the developer are applied. 17 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 8. Evaluated Configuration The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product CardOS V6.0 ID on the IC SLC52GDA448* (IFX_CCI_000005 Design Step H13). The developer tested a wide spectrum of configurations and configuration parameters, basically categorized as follows ● Configuration variants with ECC ePassport application, ● Configuration variants with RSA ePassport application, ● Configuration variants with ECC eSign application, ● Configuration variants with RSA eSign application, ● Configuration variants with eSign and ePassport applications: • Both ECC-based, • Both RSA-based, • One ECC-based and one RSA-based, and • A 4th configuration with ECC and RSA vice versa. A special test configuration was used for test cases where the TOE shall be in the MANUFACTURING card life cycle before delivery. The tested configurations take into account the configurable options of the TOE as e.g. the use of elliptic curves or RSA, different key lengths, use of Brainpool or NIST elliptic curves, contact and contactless interface, and other options related to PIN secrets or Active Authentication. All configurations were tested appropriately with a similar amount of tests. The tests were performed in all life-cycle phases that are in scope after TOE delivery within the according operation environment. 9. Results of the Evaluation 9.1. CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5. The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers (ii) AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) (iii) AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) (iv) AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren (v) AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document 18 / 29 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 Certification Report (vi) AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren (vii) AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema (viii) AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1) (ix) AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies (x) AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document (xi) AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen (xii) AIS 45, Version 2, Erstellung und Pflege von Meilensteinplänen (xiii) AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 36 were used (see [4]). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 and AIS 20 were used (see [4]). As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device with key generation, CEN/ISSS, EN 419211-2:2013, 2016- 06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 4: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application, CEN/ISSS, EN 419211-4:2013, 2016-06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application, CEN/ISSS, EN 419211-5:2013, 2016-06-30, BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01 Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE 19 / 29 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021 (PACE_PP), Version 1.01, 22 July 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2- 2011-MA-01 [8] ● for the
  • DE:
    • cc_security_level: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5 valid until: 16 October 2028
    • cc_version: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended
    • cert_id: BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023
    • cert_item: CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1
    • cert_lab: BSI
    • developer: Eviden Germany GmbH
    • match_rules: ['(BSI-DSZ-CC-.+?) (?:for|For) (.+?) from (.*)']
    • ref_protection_profiles: BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01 EN 419211-2:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02) EN 419211-4:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01) EN 419211-5:2013 (BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4-2021: 2
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021: 16
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V5-2022-MA-01: 6
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021: 3
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-2021-MA-01: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023: 19
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 3
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02: 4
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01: 3
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01: 3
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01: 2
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_security_level
  • EAL:
    • EAL 1: 1
    • EAL 2: 2
    • EAL 2+: 1
    • EAL 4: 5
    • EAL 4 augmented: 3
    • EAL 5: 4
    • EAL 5+: 2
    • EAL 6: 2
  • EAL:
    • EAL 1: 1
    • EAL 2: 3
    • EAL 4: 5
    • EAL 4 augmented: 3
    • EAL 5: 4
    • EAL 5+: 1
    • EAL 6: 1
    • EAL5+: 1
    • EAL6: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/cc_sar
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC.4: 1
    • ALC_CMS.4: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 5
    • ALC_FLR: 2
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_DPT.2: 4
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 4
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC: 1
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC.4: 1
    • ALC_CMS.4: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 1
    • ALC_DVS.2: 5
    • ALC_FLR: 2
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV: 1
    • ATE_DPT: 1
    • ATE_DPT.2: 4
    • ATE_FUN: 1
    • ATE_IND: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/vendor
  • Infineon:
    • Infineon: 3
    • Infineon Technologies AG: 1
  • Infineon:
    • Infineon: 5
    • Infineon Technologies AG: 5
pdf_data/report_keywords/eval_facility
  • TUV:
    • TÜV Informationstechnik: 3
    • TÜViT: 2
  • TUV:
    • TÜV Informationstechnik: 8
pdf_data/report_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 5
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 1
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 7
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 1
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/hash_function
  • SHA:
    • SHA2:
      • SHA-2: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_protocol
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 10
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 11
pdf_data/report_keywords/ecc_curve
  • NIST:
    • NIST P-256: 1
    • NIST P-384: 1
    • NIST P-521: 1
    • P-256: 1
    • P-384: 1
    • P-521: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/crypto_library
  • Generic:
    • Crypto Library v2.04.002: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/technical_report_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI 7148: 1
    • BSI TR-02102: 1
  • BSI:
    • BSI 7148: 1
    • BSI TR-02102-1: 1
pdf_data/report_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 1: 2
    • AIS 14: 2
    • AIS 19: 2
    • AIS 20: 3
    • AIS 26: 3
    • AIS 31: 3
    • AIS 32: 2
    • AIS 34: 2
    • AIS 35: 2
    • AIS 36: 4
    • AIS 37: 2
    • AIS 45: 2
    • AIS 46: 2
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 4
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408: 4
    • ISO/IEC 17065: 2
    • ISO/IEC 18045: 4
  • PKCS:
    • PKCS #1: 1
    • PKCS#1: 4
  • BSI:
    • AIS 1: 1
    • AIS 14: 1
    • AIS 19: 1
    • AIS 20: 3
    • AIS 25: 4
    • AIS 26: 4
    • AIS 31: 3
    • AIS 32: 1
    • AIS 34: 4
    • AIS 35: 1
    • AIS 36: 5
    • AIS 37: 3
    • AIS 38: 1
    • AIS 46: 3
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 2
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 15408: 4
    • ISO/IEC 17065: 2
    • ISO/IEC 18045: 4
pdf_data/report_keywords/certification_process
  • ConfidentialDocument:
    • 2, 2021-10-27, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document) [8] Protection profiles: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device: 1
    • Atos Information Technology GmbH (confidential document) [12] Guidance documentation for the TOE (confidential documents) CardOS V6.0 User’s Manual, 08/2021, Atos Information Technology GmbH User Guidance ’CardOS V6.0: 1
    • IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h H13, BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V4, Version 1, 2021- 07-01, TÜViT (confidential document) [11] Configuration List ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0’ and ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0 (BAC)’, Version 1.31: 1
    • being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification: 1
  • ConfidentialDocument:
    • ETR-COMP) for BSI-DSZ- CC-1110-V5-2022, Version 1, 2022-03-29, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation Addendum (ETR COMP_ADD_MA-01) for: 1
    • Germany GmbH Packages & Release Notes, CardOS V6.0, 06/2023, Eviden Germany GmbH [13] STAR Reports (confidential documents): Site Technical Audit Report – Munich, Version 2, 2023-09-28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH Site: 1
    • Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary), Version 5, 2023-09-28, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [8] Protection Profiles: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part 2: Device: 1
    • V6.0 ID R1.1 (BAC)’, Version 1.42, 2023-09-27, Eviden Germany GmbH (confidential document) 26 / 30 BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023 Certification Report [12] Guidance documentation for the TOE: 1
    • Version 1, 2022-08- 15, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document) [11] Configuration List for BSI-DSZ-CC-1162-V2-2023, Configuration List ’CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1’ and: 1
    • being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification: 1
pdf_data/report_metadata
pdf_data/st_filename 1162b_pdf.pdf 1162V2b_pdf.pdf
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_cert_id
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162: 1
  • DE:
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-: 1
    • BSI-DSZ-CC-1162: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_protection_profile_id
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0055-110: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0059-2009-MA-02: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 6
    • BSI-CC-PP- 1035: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 1445: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 1895: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0055: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0055-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0055-110: 9
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 21
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02: 29
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-: 4
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 53
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01: 7
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01: 11
    • BSI-CC-PP-0084-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014: 10
    • BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015: 4
  • BSI:
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0055-110: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0059-2009-MA-02: 4
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 7
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0072-2012-MA-01: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 0084-2014: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 2200: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 3020: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP- 5785: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0055: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0055-110: 10
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02: 22
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02: 31
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-: 2
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-: 3
    • BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01: 55
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012-MA-01: 7
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-: 1
    • BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012-MA-01: 11
    • BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014: 10
    • BSI-CC-PP-0086-2015: 4
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sar
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC.1: 6
    • ADV_FSP.4: 3
    • ADV_IMP.1: 3
    • ADV_TDS.3: 4
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE.1: 3
    • AGD_PRE.1: 4
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC.4: 1
    • ALC_CMS.4: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 2
    • ALC_DVS.2: 8
    • ALC_FLR.1: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_CCL.1: 1
    • ASE_ECD.1: 1
    • ASE_INT: 12
    • ASE_INT.1: 1
    • ASE_OBJ.2: 1
    • ASE_REQ: 86
    • ASE_REQ.2: 1
    • ASE_SPD.1: 1
    • ASE_TSS: 30
    • ASE_TSS.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_DPT.1: 2
    • ATE_DPT.2: 7
    • ATE_FUN.1: 2
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN.3: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 8
  • ADV:
    • ADV_ARC.1: 6
    • ADV_FSP.4: 3
    • ADV_IMP.1: 3
    • ADV_TDS.3: 4
  • AGD:
    • AGD_OPE.1: 3
    • AGD_PRE.1: 4
  • ALC:
    • ALC_CMC.4: 1
    • ALC_CMS.4: 1
    • ALC_DEL.1: 2
    • ALC_DVS.2: 9
    • ALC_FLR.1: 1
    • ALC_LCD.1: 1
    • ALC_TAT.1: 1
  • ASE:
    • ASE_CCL.1: 1
    • ASE_ECD.1: 1
    • ASE_INT: 11
    • ASE_INT.1: 1
    • ASE_OBJ.2: 1
    • ASE_REQ: 84
    • ASE_REQ.2: 1
    • ASE_SPD.1: 1
    • ASE_TSS: 29
    • ASE_TSS.1: 1
  • ATE:
    • ATE_COV.2: 1
    • ATE_DPT.1: 2
    • ATE_DPT.2: 7
    • ATE_FUN.1: 2
    • ATE_IND.2: 1
  • AVA:
    • AVA_VAN.3: 1
    • AVA_VAN.5: 9
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_sfr
  • FAU:
    • FAU_SAS.1: 9
    • FAU_SAS.1.1: 1
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM: 134
    • FCS_CKM.1: 37
    • FCS_CKM.2: 14
    • FCS_CKM.4: 85
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
    • FCS_COP: 163
    • FCS_COP.1: 28
    • FCS_ITC: 1
    • FCS_RNG: 1
    • FCS_RNG.1: 23
    • FCS_RNG.1.1: 1
    • FCS_RNG.1.2: 1
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 39
    • FDP_ACC.1: 27
    • FDP_ACF: 35
    • FDP_ACF.1: 53
    • FDP_DAU: 7
    • FDP_DAU.1: 1
    • FDP_DAU.2: 2
    • FDP_IFC.1: 11
    • FDP_ITC.1: 26
    • FDP_ITC.2: 13
    • FDP_ITT.1: 1
    • FDP_LIM: 2
    • FDP_RIP.1: 18
    • FDP_RIP.1.1: 2
    • FDP_SDC.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI: 13
    • FDP_SDI.1: 2
    • FDP_SDI.2: 5
    • FDP_UCT: 12
    • FDP_UCT.1: 3
    • FDP_UIT: 15
    • FDP_UIT.1: 6
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL: 37
    • FIA_AFL.1: 10
    • FIA_API: 15
    • FIA_API.1: 9
    • FIA_API.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UAU: 97
    • FIA_UAU.1: 25
    • FIA_UAU.1.1: 5
    • FIA_UAU.1.2: 1
    • FIA_UAU.4: 2
    • FIA_UAU.5: 17
    • FIA_UAU.6: 4
    • FIA_UID: 14
    • FIA_UID.1: 23
    • FIA_UID.1.1: 3
    • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_LIM: 1
    • FMT_LIM.1: 13
    • FMT_LIM.1.1: 2
    • FMT_LIM.2: 11
    • FMT_LIM.2.1: 3
    • FMT_MOF.1: 5
    • FMT_MOF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA: 14
    • FMT_MSA.1: 7
    • FMT_MSA.2: 12
    • FMT_MSA.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3: 21
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_MSA.4: 8
    • FMT_MSA.4.1: 1
    • FMT_MTD: 100
    • FMT_MTD.1: 12
    • FMT_MTD.3: 9
    • FMT_MTD.3.1: 1
    • FMT_SMF: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 56
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR: 19
    • FMT_SMR.1: 43
    • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
  • FPT:
    • FPT_EMS: 9
    • FPT_EMS.1: 17
    • FPT_EMS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_EMS.1.2: 1
    • FPT_FLS.1: 9
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.1: 5
    • FPT_PHP.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.1.2: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 11
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_TST: 2
    • FPT_TST.1: 17
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 2
    • FPT_TST.2: 1
  • FRU:
    • FRU_FLT.2: 1
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC: 36
    • FTP_ITC.1: 19
    • FTP_TRP.1: 3
  • FAU:
    • FAU_SAS.1: 9
    • FAU_SAS.1.1: 1
  • FCS:
    • FCS_CKM: 138
    • FCS_CKM.1: 35
    • FCS_CKM.2: 14
    • FCS_CKM.4: 68
    • FCS_CKM.4.1: 2
    • FCS_COP: 151
    • FCS_COP.1: 26
    • FCS_ITC: 1
    • FCS_RNG: 1
    • FCS_RNG.1: 24
    • FCS_RNG.1.1: 1
    • FCS_RNG.1.2: 1
  • FDP:
    • FDP_ACC: 39
    • FDP_ACC.1: 27
    • FDP_ACF: 34
    • FDP_ACF.1: 53
    • FDP_DAU: 7
    • FDP_DAU.1: 1
    • FDP_DAU.2: 2
    • FDP_IFC.1: 15
    • FDP_ITC.1: 24
    • FDP_ITC.2: 24
    • FDP_ITT.1: 1
    • FDP_LIM: 2
    • FDP_RIP.1: 22
    • FDP_RIP.1.1: 2
    • FDP_SDC.1: 1
    • FDP_SDI: 12
    • FDP_SDI.1: 2
    • FDP_SDI.2: 5
    • FDP_UCT: 12
    • FDP_UCT.1: 3
    • FDP_UIT: 16
    • FDP_UIT.1: 6
  • FIA:
    • FIA_AFL: 38
    • FIA_AFL.1: 10
    • FIA_API: 15
    • FIA_API.1: 9
    • FIA_API.1.1: 1
    • FIA_UAU: 99
    • FIA_UAU.1: 26
    • FIA_UAU.1.1: 5
    • FIA_UAU.1.2: 1
    • FIA_UAU.4: 2
    • FIA_UAU.5: 17
    • FIA_UAU.6: 4
    • FIA_UID: 14
    • FIA_UID.1: 24
    • FIA_UID.1.1: 3
    • FIA_UID.1.2: 1
  • FMT:
    • FMT_LIM: 1
    • FMT_LIM.1: 13
    • FMT_LIM.1.1: 2
    • FMT_LIM.2: 11
    • FMT_LIM.2.1: 3
    • FMT_MOF.1: 6
    • FMT_MOF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA: 14
    • FMT_MSA.1: 7
    • FMT_MSA.2: 11
    • FMT_MSA.2.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3: 21
    • FMT_MSA.3.1: 1
    • FMT_MSA.3.2: 1
    • FMT_MSA.4: 8
    • FMT_MSA.4.1: 1
    • FMT_MTD: 97
    • FMT_MTD.1: 11
    • FMT_MTD.3: 9
    • FMT_MTD.3.1: 1
    • FMT_SMF: 1
    • FMT_SMF.1: 55
    • FMT_SMF.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR: 19
    • FMT_SMR.1: 43
    • FMT_SMR.1.1: 1
    • FMT_SMR.1.2: 1
  • FPT:
    • FPT_EMS: 9
    • FPT_EMS.1: 17
    • FPT_EMS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_EMS.1.2: 1
    • FPT_FLS.1: 9
    • FPT_FLS.1.1: 1
    • FPT_ITT.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.1: 6
    • FPT_PHP.1.1: 1
    • FPT_PHP.1.2: 1
    • FPT_PHP.3: 11
    • FPT_PHP.3.1: 1
    • FPT_TST: 2
    • FPT_TST.1: 16
    • FPT_TST.1.1: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.2: 1
    • FPT_TST.1.3: 2
    • FPT_TST.2: 1
  • FRU:
    • FRU_FLT.2: 1
  • FTP:
    • FTP_ITC: 39
    • FTP_ITC.1: 19
    • FTP_TRP.1: 6
pdf_data/st_keywords/cc_claims
  • A:
    • A.CGA: 4
    • A.SCA: 5
  • OE:
    • OE.HID_: 1
    • OE.HID_VAD: 8
    • OE.SCA_: 1
    • OE.SSCD_: 1
  • OT:
    • OT.TOE_: 1
    • OT.TOE_TC_SVD_: 1
  • A:
    • A.CGA: 4
    • A.SCA: 5
  • OE:
    • OE.CGA_TC_: 1
    • OE.HID_VAD: 9
    • OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_: 1
    • OE.SSCD_: 1
  • OT:
    • OT.TOE_: 1
    • OT.TOE_TC_VAD_: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/asymmetric_crypto
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 13
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 16
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 15
  • FF:
    • DH:
      • DH: 11
      • Diffie-Hellman: 14
    • DSA:
      • DSA: 1
  • ECC:
    • ECC:
      • ECC: 9
    • ECDH:
      • ECDH: 16
    • ECDSA:
      • ECDSA: 14
  • FF:
    • DH:
      • DH: 11
      • Diffie-Hellman: 16
    • DSA:
      • DSA: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/hash_function
  • SHA:
    • SHA1:
      • SHA-1: 9
    • SHA2:
      • SHA-2: 4
      • SHA-256: 13
      • SHA-384: 7
      • SHA-512: 6
  • SHA:
    • SHA1:
      • SHA-1: 10
    • SHA2:
      • SHA-2: 3
      • SHA-256: 11
      • SHA-384: 7
      • SHA-512: 6
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_scheme
  • KA:
    • Key Agreement: 4
    • Key agreement: 2
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 44
  • KA:
    • Key Agreement: 4
    • Key agreement: 1
  • MAC:
    • MAC: 42
pdf_data/st_keywords/crypto_protocol
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 422
  • PACE:
    • PACE: 423
pdf_data/st_keywords/randomness
  • PRNG:
    • DRBG: 1
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 9
  • PRNG:
    • DRBG: 1
  • RNG:
    • RNG: 8
pdf_data/st_keywords/ecc_curve
  • Brainpool:
    • brainpoolP256r1: 1
    • brainpoolP384r1: 1
    • brainpoolP512r1: 1
  • NIST:
    • NIST P-384: 4
    • P-256: 4
    • P-384: 8
    • P-521: 4
    • prime256v1: 1
    • secp256r1: 1
    • secp384r1: 1
    • secp521r1: 1
  • Brainpool:
    • brainpoolP256r1: 1
    • brainpoolP384r1: 1
    • brainpoolP512r1: 1
  • NIST:
    • NIST P-384: 4
    • NIST P-521: 4
    • P-256: 4
    • P-384: 8
    • P-521: 8
    • prime256v1: 1
    • secp256r1: 1
    • secp384r1: 1
    • secp521r1: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/side_channel_analysis
  • FI:
    • DFA: 1
    • Malfunction: 7
    • Physical Tampering: 5
    • Physical tampering: 2
    • fault injection: 1
    • malfunction: 6
    • physical tampering: 4
  • SCA:
    • physical probing: 4
    • side channel: 1
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
  • FI:
    • DFA: 1
    • Malfunction: 7
    • Physical Tampering: 6
    • Physical tampering: 2
    • fault injection: 1
    • malfunction: 6
    • physical tampering: 5
  • SCA:
    • physical probing: 4
    • side channel: 1
  • other:
    • reverse engineering: 1
pdf_data/st_keywords/standard_id
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS 31: 2
    • AIS 36: 1
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2017-04-001: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-002: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-003: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-004: 2
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 180-4: 1
    • FIPS PUB 186-4: 1
    • FIPS PUB 197: 2
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 10
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 14443: 2
    • ISO/IEC 7816-2: 1
    • ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2
  • PKCS:
    • PKCS #1: 5
    • PKCS1: 1
  • RFC:
    • RFC 2631: 1
    • RFC 5639: 1
  • BSI:
    • AIS 20: 1
    • AIS 31: 2
    • AIS 36: 1
  • CC:
    • CCMB-2017-04-001: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-002: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-003: 2
    • CCMB-2017-04-004: 2
  • FIPS:
    • FIPS PUB 180-4: 1
    • FIPS PUB 186-4: 1
    • FIPS PUB 197: 2
  • ICAO:
    • ICAO: 10
  • ISO:
    • ISO/IEC 14443: 2
    • ISO/IEC 7816-2: 1
  • PKCS:
    • PKCS #1: 5
    • PKCS1: 1
  • RFC:
    • RFC 2631: 1
    • RFC 5639: 1
pdf_data/st_metadata
  • /Author: Atos Information Technology GmbH
  • /CreationDate: D:20211022104049+02'00'
  • /Creator: LaTeX with hyperref
  • /Keywords: Common Criteria, CardOS, ASE, eID, ICAO, QSCD
  • /ModDate: D:20211022104049+02'00'
  • /PTEX.Fullbanner: This is MiKTeX-pdfTeX 2.9.6870 (1.40.19)
  • /Producer: pdfTeX-1.40.19
  • /Subject: Security Target CardOS V6.0
  • /Title: Security Target 'CardOS V6.0 ID R1.0'
  • /Trapped: /False
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 1694142
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 188
  • /Author: Eviden Germany GmbH
  • /Keywords: Common Criteria, CardOS, ASE, eID, ICAO, QSCD
  • /Subject: Security Target CardOS V6.0
  • /Title: Security Target 'CardOS V6.0 ID R1.1'
  • pdf_file_size_bytes: 1793599
  • pdf_hyperlinks: {}
  • pdf_is_encrypted: True
  • pdf_number_of_pages: 182
state/cert/pdf_hash Different Different
state/cert/txt_hash Different Different
state/report/pdf_hash Different Different
state/report/txt_hash Different Different
state/st/pdf_hash Different Different
state/st/txt_hash Different Different