Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI-PP-0026-2006 Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application“ Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 developed on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn Telefon +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111, Telefax +49 (0)3018 9582-455 Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-306 V2.01 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185 - 189 – D-53175 Bonn – Postfach 20 03 63 – D-53133 Bonn Telefon +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111, Telefax +49 (0)3018 9582-455 Certificate BSI-PP-0026-2006 Protection Profile for a Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application“ Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 developed on behalf of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany Assurance Package: EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 Common Criteria Arrangement Bonn, 11 December 2006 The Vice President of the Federal Office for Information Security Hange L.S. The Protection Profile mentioned above was evaluated at an accredited and licenced/approved evaluation facility on the basis of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408) applying the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 2.3 and including final interpretations. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the Federal Office for Information Security. The conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-306 V2.01 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles (PP). A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a category of TOEs which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security. The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an existent one gives consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a special product. Product or system certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued. Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1]. The evaluation is carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by the BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. 1 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 Contents Part A: Certification Part B: Certification Results Annex: Protection Profile VI BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: • BSIG2 • BSI Certification Ordinance3 • BSI Schedule of Costs4 • Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) • DIN EN 45011 • BSI Certification – Description of the Procedure [3] • Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI • Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [1]5 • Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2] • BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)[4] 2 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834 3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230 4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI- Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Inneren of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730 A-1 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a mutual recognition of Protection Profile certificates under certain conditions was agreed. An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic of Singapore in March 2005 and India in April 2005. A-2 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 has undergone the certification procedure at the BSI. The evaluation of the Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation facility of SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by BSI. Developer is the ‘Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)‘ on behalf of the ‘Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany’ The certification was concluded with • the comparability check and • the preparation of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI on 11 December 2006. 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility A-3 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 4 Publication The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-11. The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 has been included in the BSI list of certified and registered Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained via the BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report may be ordered from the BSI7 . The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above 7 BSI- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455 A-4 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report B Certification Results Content of the Certification Results 1 PP Overview 2 2 Security Functional Requirements 4 3 Assurance Package 8 4 Strength of Functions 8 5 Results of the Evaluation 8 6 Definitions 9 7 Bibliography 11 B-1 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 1 PP Overview The Protection Profile (PP) [7] defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security method Basic Access Control (BAC) Extended Access Control (EAC) and chip authentication similar to the Active Authentication in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) defined in the PP is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [8] and providing the Basic Access Control, the Extended Access Control according to the ICAO document and the chip authentication according to the technical report [9]. The TOE comprises the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors, the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software, the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the associated guidance documentation. The TOE is usually integrated into a passport book of an MRTD holder for whom the issuing state or organisation has personalised the MRTD. The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases: Phase 1 “Development”, Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The intention of the PP is to consider at least the phases 1 and 2 as part of the evaluation and therefore define TOE delivery according to CC after phase 2 or later. B-2 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report The PP defines the following Security Objectives for the TOE: Identifier for Sec.Objective Issue addressed by the Security Objective Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD OT.AC_Pers OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal Data Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data OT.Sens_Data_Conf OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions Table 1: Security Objectives for the TOE The PP defines the Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE divided into several categories: Identifier for Sec. Objective Iissue addressed by the Security Objectiv Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment OD.Assurance OD.Material Control over MRTD Material Security Objectives for the Operational Environment OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data For the Receiving State or organization OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems Table 2: Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE B-3 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 For details and application notes refer to the PP chapter 3.5. Security Functional Requirements for the TOE and for the IT-Environment are derived from these Security Objectives as outlined in the following chapter. 2 Security Functional Requirements This section contains the functional requirements that must be satisfied by a TOE claiming compliance to the Protection Profile. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables. The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2: Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue FCS Cryptographic support Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the MRTD FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER FDP User data protection Subset access control – Primary Access Control FDP_ACC.1 (PRIM) FDP_ACC.1 (BASIC) Subset access control – Basic Access control Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control FDP_ACF.1 (Basic) Security attribute based access control – Primary Access Control FDP_ACF.1 (PRIM) FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity – MRTD FIA Identification and authentication FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE FIA_UAU.6/MRTD FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling B-4 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue FMT Security Management FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre- personalization Data FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Initialisation of CVCA Certificate and Current Date FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Authority FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD FMT_MTD.1/DATE Date Management of TSF data – Current date FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key FMT_MTD.1/CAPK FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_TST.1 TSF testing FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from the CC Part 2 B-5 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined: Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue FAU Security Audit FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FCS_RND Generation of random numbers FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers FIA_API Authentication Proof of identity FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of identity-MRTD FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1 Limited availability FMT_LIM.2 FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the PP chapter 5. The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT- Environment of the TOE: Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue FDP User data protectiont Basic data authentication - Passive Authentication FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data exchange confidentiality – General Inspection System FDP_UCT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity - General Inspection System FDP_UIT.1/GIS FCS Cryptographic support Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys FCS_CKM.1/PKI FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction – BT Cryptographic-operation-Hash Function by the Basic Terminal FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the Basic Terminal FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message Authentication Code by the Basic B-6 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue Terminal Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS FIA Identification and authentication Single-use authentication mechanisms – Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the GIS FIA_UAU.4/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System FIA_UAU.5/GIS Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General Inspection System FIA_UAU.6/GIS Single-use authentication mechanism-Basic Terminal FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication Basic-Terminal Authentication Proof of Identity – Personalization Terminal Authentication with Symmetric Key FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment, taken from CC part 2 Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the PP chapter 5. The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined for the IT Environment of the TOE: Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue FCS Cryptographic support Quality metric for random numbers-Basic Terminal FCS_RND.1/BT FIA Identification and authentication Authentication Proof of Identity –Extended Inspection System FIA_API.1/EIS Table 6: SFRs for the IT-Environment, CC part 2 extended B-7 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 3 Assurance Package The security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. The assurance requirements comply with assurance level EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows the augmented assurance components: Requirement Identifier EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed and tested +: ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF +: ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures +: AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states +: AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant Table 7: TOE security assurance requirements 4 Strength of Functions The minimum strength of function level is claimed SOF-high and covers but is not limited to the TSF required by the SFR FIA_UAU.4, FCS_RND.1 and FPT_FLS.1 as far as probabilistic or permutational mechanisms are involved. A TOEs implemented security functions shall meet this claimed strength from design and construction point of view. The strength of function available in a specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the selection of the data used to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore the issuing state or organisation is responsible for the strength of function that can be achieved in a specific system context. This has to be assessed in the specific system context. 5 Results of the Evaluation The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the scheme [4] as relevant for the TOE. The verdict for the CC, Part 3 assurance component (according the class APE for the Protection Profile evaluation) is summarised in the following table: B-8 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report CC Aspect Result CC Class APE PASS APE_DES.1 PASS APE_ENV.1 PASS APE_INT.1 PASS APE_OBJ.1 PASS APE_REQ.1 PASS APE_SRE.1 PASS Table 8: Assurance class The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.1 meets the requirements for Protection Profiles as specified in class APE of the CC. 6 Definitions 6.1 Acronyms CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation EAL Evaluation Assurance Level IT Information Technology ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility PP Protection Profile SF Security Function SFP Security Function Policy SOF Strength of Function ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation TSC TSF Scope of Control TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy B-9 Certification Report BSI-PP-0026-2006 6.2 Glossary Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package. Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in Part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 of the CC. Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts. Informal - Expressed in natural language. Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require- ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs. Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP. Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined seman- tics. Strength of Function – A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms. Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed. Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evalua- tion. TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firm- ware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP. TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE. TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP. B-10 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report 7 Bibliography [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2] Common Methodology for Information Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [3] BSI Certification – Description of the Procedure (BSI 7125) [4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149) [6] Evaluation Technical Report for a PP evaluation, Version 1.1, 7. September 2006, Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, SRC (confidential document) [7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, BSI- PP-0026, Version 1.1, 7. September 2006, BSI [8] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18 [9] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization B-11 BSI-PP-0026-2006 Certification Report Annex: Protection Profile C-1