collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition
Version 2.0
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
1
Encryption – Authorization Acquisition
2
Version 2.0
3
September 09, 2016
4
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Acknowledgements
1
This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) was developed by the Full Drive Encryption
2
international Technical Community with representatives from industry, Government
3
agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.
4
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0. Preface
1
0.1 Objectives of Document
2
This document presents the Common Criteria (CC) collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) to
3
express the security functional requirements (SFRs) and security assurance requirements
4
(SARs) for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition. The Evaluation Activities that
5
specify the actions the evaluator performs to determine if a product satisfies the SFRs
6
captured within this cPP are described in the Supporting Document (Mandatory Technical
7
Document) Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition September 2016.
8
A complete FDE solution requires both an Authorization Acquisition component and
9
Encryption Engine component. A product may provide the entire solution and claim
10
conformance to this cPP (Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition (FDE-AA)), and
11
the Full Drive Encryption: Encryption Engine (FDE-EE) cPP.
12
However, because the FDE-AA/EE Protection Profile suite is in its infancy, it is not yet
13
possible to mandate that all dependent products will conform to a cPP. Non-validated
14
dependent products (i.e., EE) may be considered to be an acceptable part of the Operational
15
Environment for the AA TOE/product on a case-by-case basis as determined by the relevant
16
national scheme.
17
The FDE iTC intends to develop guidance for developers whose products provide both
18
components (i.e., an AA and EE) to aid them in developing a Security Target (ST) that can
19
claim conformance to both FDE cPPs. One important aspect to note is:
20
Note to ST authors: There is a selection in the ASE_TSS that must be completed. One
21
cannot simply reference the SARs in this cPP.
22
0.2 Scope of Document
23
The scope of the cPP within the development and evaluation process is described in the
24
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. In particular, a cPP
25
defines the IT security requirements of a technology specific type of TOE and specifies the
26
functional and assurance security requirements to be met by a compliant TOE.
27
0.3 Intended Readership
28
The target audiences of this cPP are developers, CC consumers, system integrators,
29
evaluators and schemes.
30
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0.4 Related Documents
1
Protection Profiles
2
[FDE – EE] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Encryption
3
Engine, Version 2.0, September 09, 2016
4
Common Criteria1
5
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and General Model,
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security Functional Components,
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security Assurance Components,
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology,
CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[SD] Supporting Document (Mandatory Technical Document), Full Drive
Encryption: Authorization Acquisition September 2016
6
1
For details see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
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0.5 Revision History
1
Version Date Description
0.1 August 26, 2014 Initial Release for iTC review
0.2 September 5, 2014 Draft published for Public review
0.14 October 17, 2014 Incorporated comments received from the Public review
1.0 January 26, 2015 Incorporated comments from CCDB review
1.5 September 22, 2015 Revised based on additional use cases developed by iTC
2.0 September 09, 2016 Incorporated comments received from the public review, and also
updated the Key Destruction section and AVA_VAN.
2
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Contents
1
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................ 2
2
0. Preface .............................................................................................................................................................. 3
3
0.1 Objectives of Document ........................................................................................................................ 3
4
0.2 Scope of Document................................................................................................................................ 3
5
0.3 Intended Readership .............................................................................................................................. 3
6
0.4 Related Documents................................................................................................................................ 4
7
Protection Profiles............................................................................................................................................. 4
8
Common Criteria .............................................................................................................................................. 4
9
0.5 Revision History.................................................................................................................................... 5
10
1. PP Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 10
11
1.1 PP Reference Identification ................................................................................................................. 10
12
1.2 Introduction to the FDE Collaborative Protection Profiles (cPPs) Effort............................................ 10
13
1.3 Implementations .................................................................................................................................. 11
14
1.4 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Overview ................................................................................................ 11
15
1.4.1 Authorization Acquisition Introduction ................................................................................ 12
16
1.4.2 Authorization Acquisition Security Capabilities................................................................... 13
17
1.4.3 Interface/Boundary................................................................................................................ 13
18
1.5 The TOE and the Operational/Pre-Boot Environments ....................................................................... 13
19
1.6 TOE Use Case ..................................................................................................................................... 14
20
2. CC Conformance Claims ................................................................................................................................ 15
21
3. Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................................................... 16
22
3.1 Threats ................................................................................................................................................. 16
23
3.2 Assumptions ........................................................................................................................................ 19
24
3.3 Organizational Security Policy ............................................................................................................ 21
25
4. Security Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 22
26
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ......................................................................... 22
27
5. Security Functional Requirements .................................................................................................................. 24
28
5.1 Conventions......................................................................................................................................... 24
29
5.2 SFR Architecture ................................................................................................................................. 25
30
5.3 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS) ................................................................................................... 25
31
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition.......................................................................... 25
32
FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition......................................................... 26
33
FCS_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) ............................................. 26
34
FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)......................... 26
35
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing) ....... 27
36
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management) ...... 28
37
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator) ....................................................................................... 28
38
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)....... 29
39
5.4 Class: Security Management (FMT).................................................................................................... 30
40
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior ............................................................................. 30
41
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ....................................................................... 30
42
5.5 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)...................................................................................................... 31
43
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material...................................................................... 31
44
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Power Saving States ............................................................................................. 31
45
FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States ............................................................................ 31
46
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update...................................................................................................... 32
47
6. Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................................................... 33
48
6.1 ASE: Security Target........................................................................................................................... 33
49
6.2 ADV: Development............................................................................................................................. 34
50
6.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)...................................................................... 34
51
6.3 AGD: Guidance Documentation.......................................................................................................... 34
52
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6.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) .......................................................................... 35
1
6.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1) ................................................................................. 35
2
6.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support............................................................................................................ 35
3
6.4.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1) ................................................................................... 35
4
6.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)....................................................................................... 35
5
6.5 Class ATE: Tests ................................................................................................................................. 35
6
6.5.1 Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1) ............................................................. 36
7
6.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment................................................................................................ 36
8
6.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1) ................................................................................... 36
9
Appendix A: Optional Requirements ................................................................................................................... 37
10
A.1 Internal Cryptographic Implementation............................................................................................... 37
11
A.2 TSF Self-Testing.................................................................................................................................. 37
12
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing............................................................................................................ 38
13
Appendix B: Selection-Based Requirements........................................................................................................ 39
14
B.1 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)........................................................................................................ 39
15
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys) ................................................. 39
16
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys) ................................................... 40
17
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) ..................................................... 40
18
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)............................................................... 41
19
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) ................................................... 41
20
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)................................................................. 41
21
FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport) ................................................................. 42
22
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) ................................... 42
23
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption) ............................................................... 42
24
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation.............................................................................. 43
25
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning........................................... 43
26
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)............................................. 43
27
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining............................................................................................. 44
28
FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation ............................................................................................................. 44
29
Appendix C: Extended Component Definitions ................................................................................................... 46
30
C.1 Background and Scope............................................................................................................................. 46
31
C.2 Extended Component Definitions ............................................................................................................ 46
32
FCS_AFA_EXT Authorization Factor Acquisition............................................................................. 46
33
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management ............................................................................ 48
34
FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation................................................................................. 49
35
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining........................................................................................................... 50
36
FCS_PCC_EXT Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning......................................... 53
37
FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation ........................................................................................... 54
38
FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining................................................................................................ 55
39
FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation........... 55
40
FPT_KYP_EXT Key and Key Material Protection............................................................................. 59
41
FPT_PWR_EXT Power Management ................................................................................................. 61
42
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing............................................................................................................... 62
43
FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update......................................................................................................... 63
44
Appendix D: Entropy Documentation and Assessment........................................................................................ 65
45
D.1 Design Description................................................................................................................................... 65
46
D.2 Entropy Justification ................................................................................................................................ 65
47
D.3 Operating Conditions ............................................................................................................................... 66
48
D.4 Health Testing.......................................................................................................................................... 66
49
Appendix E: Key Management Description......................................................................................................... 67
50
Appendix F: Glossary........................................................................................................................................... 69
51
Appendix G: Acronyms........................................................................................................................................ 71
52
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Appendix H: References....................................................................................................................................... 73
1
2
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Figures / Tables
1
Figure 1: FDE components...................................................................................................................................10
2
Table 1: Examples of cPP Implementations .........................................................................................................11
3
Figure 2: Authorization Acquisition Details.........................................................................................................12
4
Figure 3: Operational Environment ......................................................................................................................14
5
Table 2: TOE Security Functional Requirements.................................................................................................25
6
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements .................................................................................................33
7
Table 4: Extended Components............................................................................................................................46
8
9
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1. PP Introduction
1
1.1 PP Reference Identification
2
PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization
3
Acquisition
4
PP Version: 2.0
5
PP Date: September 09, 2016
6
1.2 Introduction to the FDE Collaborative Protection Profiles (cPPs)
7
Effort
8
The purpose of the first set of Collaborative Protection Profiles (cPPs) for Full Drive
9
Encryption (FDE): Authorization Acquisition (AA) and Encryption Engine (EE) is to provide
10
requirements for Data-at-Rest protection for a lost device that contains storage. These cPPs
11
allow FDE solutions based in software and/or hardware to meet the requirements. The form
12
factor for a storage device may vary, but could include: system hard drives/solid state drives
13
in servers, workstations, laptops, mobile devices, tablets, and external media. A hardware
14
solution could be a Self-Encrypting Drive or other hardware-based solutions; the interface
15
(USB, SATA, etc.) used to connect the storage device to the host machine is outside the
16
scope of this cPP.
17
Full Drive Encryption encrypts all data (with certain exceptions) on the storage device and
18
permits access to the data only after successful authorization to the FDE solution. The
19
exceptions include the necessity to leave a portion of the storage device (the size may vary
20
based on implementation) unencrypted for such things as the Master Boot Record (MBR) or
21
other AA/EE pre-authentication software. These FDE cPPs interpret the term “full drive
22
encryption” to allow FDE solutions to leave a portion of the storage device unencrypted so
23
long as it contains plaintext user or plaintext authorization data.
24
Since the FDE cPPs support a variety of solutions, two cPPs describe the requirements for the
25
FDE components shown in Figure 1.
26
27
The FDE cPP - Authorization Acquisition describes the requirements for the Authorization
28
Acquisition piece and details the security requirements and assurance activities necessary to
29
interact with a user and result in the availability of sending a Border Encryption Value (BEV)
30
to the Encryption Engine.
31
Authorization
Acquisition
Encryption
Engine
Figure 1: FDE components
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The FDE cPP - Encryption Engine describes the requirements for the Encryption Engine
1
piece and details the necessary security requirements and assurance activities for the actual
2
encryption/decryption of the data by the DEK. Each cPP will also have a set of core
3
requirements for management functions, proper handling of cryptographic keys, updates
4
performed in a trusted manner, audit and self-tests.
5
This TOE description defines the scope and functionality of the Authorization Acquisition,
6
and the Security Problem Definition describes the assumptions made about the operating
7
environment and the threats to the AA that the cPP requirements address.
8
1.3 Implementations
9
Full Drive Encryption solutions vary with implementation and vendor combinations.
10
Therefore, vendors will evaluate products that provide both components of the Full Disk
11
Encryption Solution (AA and EE) against both cPPs – could be done in a single evaluation
12
with one ST. A vendor that provides a single component of a FDE solution would only
13
evaluate against the applicable cPP. The FDE cPP is divided into two documents to allow
14
labs to independently evaluate solutions tailored to one cPP or the other. When a customer
15
acquires an FDE solution, they will either obtain a single vendor product that meets the AA +
16
EE cPPs or two products, one of which meets the AA and the other of which meets the EE
17
cPPs.
18
The table below illustrates a few examples for certification.
19
Table 1: Examples of cPP Implementations
20
Implementation cPP Description
Host AA Host software provides the interface to a self-encrypting drive
Self-Encrypting
Drive (SED)
EE
A self-encrypting drive used in combination with separate host
software
Software FDE AA + EE A software full drive encryption solution
Hybrid AA + EE
A single vendor’s combination of hardware (e.g. hardware encryption
engine, cryptographic co-processor) and software
1.4 Target of Evaluation (TOE) Overview
21
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this cPP (Authorization Acquisition) may be either a
22
Host software solution that manages a HW Encryption Engine (e.g. a SED) or as part of a
23
combined evaluation of this cPP and the Encryption Engine cPP for a vendor that is
24
providing a solution that includes both components.
25
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The following sections provide an overview of the functionality of the FDE AA as well as the
1
security capabilities.
2
1.4.1 Authorization Acquisition Introduction
3
The Authorization Acquisition sends a Border Encryption Value (BEV), which could be a
4
Key Encryption Key (KEK), a Key Releasing Key (KRK), or some other type of key to the
5
Encryption Engine. The EE does not have to use this value directly as the key to decrypt or
6
release the DEK. It may use it as part of a scheme that uses other intermediate keys to
7
eventually protect the DEK. A KEK wraps other keys, notably the DEK or other intermediary
8
keys which chain to the DEK. Key Releasing Keys (KRKs) authorize the EE to release either
9
the DEK or other intermediary keys which chain to the DEK. Figure 2 illustrates the
10
components within AA and its relationship with EE.
11
Authorization factors may be unique to individual users or may be used by a group of
12
individuals. In other words, the EE requires authorization factors from the AA to establish
13
that the possessor of the authorization factor belongs to the community of users authorized to
14
access information stored on the storage device (and does not require specific user
15
authorization). Examples of authorization factors include, but are not limited to, passwords,
16
passphrases, or randomly generated values stored on USB tokens or a pin to release a key on
17
hardware storage media such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
18
Authorization Acquisition
Authorization Factors
Hardware Key
Storage
Passwords
External Token
Conditioning
/Combining
Encryption
Engine
Figure 2: Authorization Acquisition Details
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1.4.2 Authorization Acquisition Security Capabilities
1
The AA collects authorization factors which the EE uses to access data on the storage device
2
and perform a variety of management functions. Depending on the type of authorization
3
factor, the AA may condition them further. For example, it may apply an approved password-
4
based key derivation function (e.g. PBKDF2) on passwords. An external token containing a
5
randomly generated value of sufficient strength may require no further conditioning on the
6
authorization factors. The AA may then combine one or more authorization factors in such a
7
way that maintains the strength of both factors.
8
The AA serves as the main management interface to the EE. However, the EE may also offer
9
management functionality. The requirements in the EE cPP address how the EE should
10
handle these features. The management functionality may include the ability to send
11
commands to the EE such as changing a DEK, setting up new users, managing KEKs and
12
other intermediate keys, and performing a key sanitization (e.g. overwrite of the DEK). It
13
may also forward commands that partition the drive for use by multiple users. However, this
14
document defers the management of partitions and assumes that administrators and users will
15
only provision and manage the data on whole drives.
16
1.4.3 Interface/Boundary
17
The interface and boundary between the AA and the EE will vary based on the
18
implementation. If one vendor provides the entire FDE solution, then it is may choose to not
19
implement an interface between the AA and EE components. If a vendor provides a solution
20
for one of the components, then the assumptions below state that the channel between the two
21
components is sufficiently secure. Although standards and specifications exist for the
22
interface between AA and EE components, the cPP does not require vendors to follow the
23
standards in this version.
24
1.5 The TOE and the Operational/Pre-Boot Environments
25
The environment in which the AA functions may differ depending on the boot stage of the
26
platform in which it operates, see Figure 3. Depending on the solution’s archiecture, aspects
27
of provisioning, initialization, and authorization may be performed in the Pre-Boot
28
environment, while encryption, decryption and management functionality are likely
29
performed in the Operating System environment. In non-software solutions,
30
encryption/decryption starts in Pre-OS environment and continues into OS present
31
environment.
32
In the Operating System environment, the Authorization Acquisition has the full range of
33
services available from the operating system (OS), including hardware drivers, cryptographic
34
libraries, and perhaps other services external to the TOE.
35
The Pre-Boot environment is much more constrained with limited capabilities. This
36
environment turns on the minimum number of peripherals and loads only those drivers
37
necessary to bring the platform from a cold start to executing a fully functional operating
38
system with running applications.
39
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The AA TOE may include or leverage features and functions within the operational
1
environment.
2
3
1.6 TOE Use Case
4
The use case for a product conforming to the FDE cPPs is to protect data at rest on a device
5
that is lost or stolen while powered off without any prior access by an adversary. The use case
6
where an adversary obtains a device that is in a powered state and is able to make
7
modifications to the environment or the TOE itself (e.g., evil maid attacks) is not addressed
8
by these cPPs (i.e., FDE-AA and FDE- EE).
9
Applications
Figure 3: Operational Environment
Operating System
Device Drivers
Hardware
Platform
Firmware
Run
Time
Boot
Operating
System
Environment
Pre-Boot
Environment
Operational
Environment
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2. CC Conformance Claims
1
As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2], and [CC3], this cPP conforms to the
2
requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Release 4. This cPP is conformant to CC v3.1, r4, CC
3
Part 2 and CC Part 3 conformant. Extended component definitions can be found in Appendix
4
C.
5
The methodology applied for the cPP evaluation is defined in [CEM].
6
This cPP satisfies the following Assurance Families: APE_CCL.1, APE_ECD.1, APE_INT.1,
7
APE_OBJ.1, APE_REQ.1 and APE_SPD.1.
8
This cPP does not claim conformance to another PP.
9
In order to be conformant to this cPP, a TOE must demonstrate Exact Conformance. Exact
10
Conformance is defined as the ST containing all of the requirements in section 5 of this cPP,
11
and potentially requirements from Appendix A or Appendix B of this cPP. While iteration is
12
allowed, no additional requirements (from the CC parts 2 or 3) are allowed to be included in
13
the ST. Further, no requirements in section 5 of this cPP are allowed to be omitted.
14
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3. Security Problem Definition
1
3.1 Threats
2
This section provides a narrative that describes how the requirements mitigate the mapped
3
threats. A requirement may mitigate aspects of multiple threats. A requirement may only
4
mitigate a threat in a limited way. Some requirements are optional, either because the TSF
5
fully mitigates the threat without the additional requirement(s) being claimed or because the
6
TSF relies on its Operational Environment to provide the functionality that is described by
7
the optional requirement(s).
8
A threat consists of a threat agent, an asset and an adverse action of that threat agent on that
9
asset. The threat agents are the entities that put the assets at risk if an adversary obtains a lost
10
or stolen storage device. Threats drive the functional requirements for the target of evaluation
11
(TOE). For instance, one threat below is T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS. The threat
12
agent is the possessor (unauthorized user) of a lost or stolen storage device. The asset is the
13
data on the storage device, while the adverse action is to attempt to obtain those data from the
14
storage device. This threat drives the functional requirements for the storage device
15
encryption (TOE) to authorize who can use the TOE to access the hard disk and
16
encrypt/decrypt the data. Since possession of the KEK, DEK, intermediate keys,
17
authorization factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values that contribute to
18
the creation of keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to defeat the
19
encryption, this SPD considers key material equivalent to the data in importance and they
20
appear among the other assets addressed below.
21
It is important to reemphasize at this point that this collaborative Protection Profile does not
22
expect the product (TOE) to defend against the possessor of the lost or stolen hard disk who
23
can introduce malicious code or exploitable hardware components into the Target of
24
Evaluation (TOE) or the Operational Environment. It assumes that the user physically
25
protects the TOE and that the Operational Environment provides sufficient protection against
26
logical attacks. One specific area where a conformant TOE offers some protection is in
27
providing updates to the TOE; other than this area, though, this cPP mandates no other
28
countermeasures. Similarly, these requirements do not address the “lost and found” hard disk
29
problem, where an adversary may have taken the hard disk, compromised the unencrypted
30
portions of the boot device (e.g., MBR, boot partition), and then made it available to be
31
recovered by the original user so that they would execute the compromised code.
32
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(T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS) The cPP addresses the primary threat of
1
unauthorized disclosure of protected data stored on a storage device. If an adversary obtains a
2
lost or stolen storage device (e.g., a storage device contained in a laptop or a portable external
3
storage device), they may attempt to connect a targeted storage device to a host of which they
4
have complete control and have raw access to the storage device (e.g., to specified disk
5
sectors, to specified blocks).
6
[FCS_AFA_EXT.2, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_SMF.1, FPT_PWR_EXT.1,
7
FPT_PWR_EXT.2, FCS_VAL_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1]
8
Rationale: [FCS_AFA_EXT.2] requires authentication to be re-entered upon return
9
from a compliant power state. [FMT_MOF.1] restricts the ability to modify compliant
10
power states to administrators. [FPT_PWR_EXT.1] defines what power states are
11
compliant for the TOE. [FPT_PWR_EXT.2] defines conditions in which the TOE will
12
enter a compliant power state. These requirements ensure the device is secure if lost in
13
a compliant power state.
14
[FMT_SMF.1] ensures the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important
15
aspects of the TOE including requests to change and erase the DEK. The correct
16
behaviour of all cryptographic functionality is verified through the use of self-tests
17
[FPT_TST_EXT.1]. [FCS_VAL_EXT.1] verifies correct authentication and limits
18
attempts to decrypt the data.
19
(T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE) Possession of any of the keys, authorization
20
factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values that contribute to the creation of
21
keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to defeat the encryption. The
22
cPP considers possession of key material of equal importance to the data itself. Threat agents
23
may look for key material in unencrypted sectors of the storage device and on other
24
peripherals in the operating environment (OE), e.g. BIOS configuration, SPI flash.
25
[FCS_AFA_EXT.1, FCS_AFA_EXT.2, FCS_CKM.4(a), FCS_CKM.4(b),
26
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a), FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b), FCS_KYC_EXT.1, FMT_MOF.1,
27
FMT_SMF_.1, FCS_KYP_EXT.1, FPT_PWR_EXT.1, FPT_PWR_EXT.2,
28
FCS_SNI_EXT.1, FCS_VAL_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1(a),
29
FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c), FCS_COP.1(d), FCS_COP.1(e),
30
FCS_COP.1(f), FCS_COP.1(g), FCS_KDF_EXT.1, FCS_PCC_EXT.1,
31
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_SMC_EXT.1]
32
Rationale: The keying material that threat agents may attempt to compromise are
33
generated as specified by [FCS_CKM.1(a) and (b)], both of which are generated
34
properly via [FCS_RBG_EXT.1]. One or more submasks [FCS_AFA_EXT.1] may be
35
combined [FCS_SMC_EXT.1] and/or chained [FCS_KYC_EXT.1] to produce the
36
BEV. The key chain can be maintained by several methods, including:
37
 Key derivation [FCS_KDF_EXT.1]
38
 Key wrapping [FCS_COP.1(d)]
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 Key combining [FCS_SMC_EXT.1]
1
 Key transport [FCS_COP.1(e)]
2
 Key encryption [FCS_COP.1(g)]
3
These requirements ensure the BEV is properly generated and protected. Proper
4
generation of salts, nonces, and IVs [FCS_SNI_EXT.1] ensures conditioning of
5
authentication factors and to support cryptographic functions requiring their use (such
6
as symmetric key generation and AES encryption and decryption using Galois/Counter
7
Mode [GCM]). FCS_VAL_EXT.1 defines methods for validation of keying material
8
such as hashing [FCS_COP.1(b)], keyed-hash message authentication [FCS_COP.1(c)],
9
and decrypting a known value with the keying material [FCS_COP.1(f)]. Key data can
10
also be protected using submask combining [FCS_SMC_EXT.1] which can also be
11
done using a hash function. The correct behavior of all cryptographic functionality is
12
verified through the use of self-tests [FPT_TST_EXT.1].
13
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 ensures unwrapped key material is not stored in non-volatile
14
memory and [FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a)] along with [FCS_CKM.4(a)] ensures proper key
15
material destruction; minimizing the exposure of plaintext keys and key material.
16
Secure power management is essential to ensuring that power saving states cannot be
17
used by an attacker to access plaintext keying material. The TSF defines Compliant
18
power saving states [FPT_PWR_EXT.1] that encrypt or destroy [FCS_CKM.4(b),
19
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b)] all keying material when entered by various conditions
20
[FPT_PWR_EXT.2]. This material is not decrypted until a valid authorization factor is
21
provided [FCS_AFA_EXT.2]. FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to modify compliant
22
power states to administrators.
23
FMT_SMF.1 ensures the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important
24
aspects of the TOE including generating and configuring authorization factors and the
25
power saving states that the TSF uses.
26
(T.AUTHORIZATION_GUESSING) Threat agents may exercise host software to repeatedly
27
guess authorization factors, such as passwords and PINs. Successful guessing of the
28
authorization factors may cause the TOE to release BEV or otherwise put it in a state in
29
which it discloses protected data to unauthorized users.
30
[FCS_AFA_EXT.1, FCS_SNI_EXT.1, FCS_PCC_EXT.1, FCS_SMC_EXT.1
31
FCS_VAL_EXT.1]
32
Rationale: [FCS_VAL_EXT.1] requires several options for enforcing validation, such
33
as key sanitization of the DEK or when a configurable number of failed validation
34
attempts is reached within a 24 hour period. This mitigates brute force attacks against
35
authorization factors such as passwords and pins.
36
[FCS_AFA_EXT.1] requires a set of authorization factors that will be difficult to guess,
37
user provides factors are conditioned [FCS_PCC_EXT.1] to increase the cost of
38
repeatedly guessing a user provided value. [FCS_SNI_EXT.1] requires proper salts,
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which will prevent pre-computed attacks. FCS_SMC_EXT.1 allows for multifactor
1
authentication options, further increasing the difficulty of guessing a authentication
2
factor.
3
(T.KEYSPACE_EXHAUST) Threat agents may perform a cryptographic exhaust against the
4
key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms and/or parameters allow attackers to exhaust
5
the key space through brute force and give them unauthorized access to the data.
6
[FCS_KYC_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1(a), FCS_CKM.1(b), FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
7
Rationale: [FCS_CKM.1(a) and (b)] and [FCS_RBG_EXT.1] ensure cryptographic
8
keys are random and of an appropriate strength/length to make exhaustion attempts
9
cryptographically difficult and cost prohibitive. [FCS_KYC_EXT.1] ensures all keys
10
protecting the BEV are of the same strength.
11
(T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE) Threat agents may attempt to perform an update of the
12
product which compromises the security features of the TOE. Poorly chosen update
13
protocols, signature generation and verification algorithms, and parameters may allow
14
attackers to install software and/or firmware that bypasses the intended security features and
15
provides them unauthorized access to data.
16
[FCS_COP.1(a) (optional), FMT_SMF.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1]
17
Rationale: FPT_TUD_EXT.1 provides authorized users the ability to query the current
18
version of the TOE software/firmware, initiate updates, and verify updates prior to
19
installation using a manufacturer digital signature. FCS_COP.1(a) defines the signature
20
function that is used to verify updates.
21
FMT_SMF.1 ensures the TSF provides the functions necessary to manage important
22
behavior of the TOE which includes the initiation of system firmware/software updates.
23
3.2 Assumptions
24
Assumptions that must remain true in order to mitigate the threats appear below:
25
(A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE) Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned
26
or initialized storage device free of protected data in areas not targeted for encryption. The
27
cPP does not intend to include requirements to find all the areas on storage devices that
28
potentially contain protected data. In some cases, it may not be possible - for example, data
29
contained in “bad” sectors.
30
While inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad sectors or un-partitioned space is
31
unlikely, one may use forensics tools to recover data from such areas of the storage device.
32
Consequently, the cPP assumes bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that must contain
33
unencrypted code (e.g., MBR and AA/EE pre-authentication software) contain no protected
34
data.
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[OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE]
1
(A.SECURE_STATE) Upon the completion of proper provisioning, the drive is only
2
assumed secure when in a powered off state up until it is powered on and receives initial
3
authorization.
4
[OE.POWER_DOWN]
5
(A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL) Communication among and between product components (e.g.,
6
AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure. In cases in which a
7
single product fulfils both cPPs, then the communication between the components does not
8
extend beyond the boundary of the TOE (e.g., communication path is within the TOE
9
boundary). In cases in which independent products satisfy the requirements of the AA and
10
EE, the physically close proximity of the two products during their operation means that the
11
threat agent has very little opportunity to interpose itself in the channel between the two
12
without the user noticing and taking appropriate actions.
13
[OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL]
14
(A.TRAINED_USER) Authorized users follow all provided user guidance, including keeping
15
password/passphrases and external tokens securely stored separately from the storage device
16
and/or platform.
17
[OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH, OE.POWER_DOWN, OE.SINGLE_USE_ET,
18
OE.TRAINED_USERS]
19
(A.PLATFORM_STATE) The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external
20
storage device is connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation
21
of the product.
22
[OE.PLATFORM_STATE]
23
(A.SINGLE_USE_ET) External tokens that contain authorization factors are used for no
24
other purpose than to store the external token authorization factors.
25
[OE.SINGLE_USE_ET]
26
(A.POWER_DOWN) The user does not leave the platform and/or storage device unattended
27
until all volatile memory is cleared after a power-off, so memory remnant attacks are
28
infeasible.
29
Authorized users do not leave the platform and/or storage device in a mode where sensitive
30
information persists in non-volatile storage (e.g., lock screen). Users power the platform
31
and/or storage device down or place it into a power managed state, such as a “hibernation
32
mode”.
33
[OE.POWER_DOWN]
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(A.PASSWORD_STRENGTH) Authorized administrators ensure password/passphrase
1
authorization factors have sufficient strength and entropy to reflect the sensitivity of the data
2
being protected.
3
[OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH]
4
(A.PLATFORM_I&A) The product does not interfere with or change the normal platform
5
identification and authentication functionality such as the operating system login. It may
6
provide authorization factors to the operating system's login interface, but it will not change
7
or degrade the functionality of the actual interface.
8
[OE.PLATFORM_I&A]
9
(A.STRONG_CRYPTO) All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and
10
used by the product meets the requirements listed in the cPP. This includes generation of
11
external token authorization factors by a RBG.
12
[OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO]
13
(A.PHYSICAL) The platform is assumed to be physically protected in its Operational
14
Environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
15
with the platform’s correct operation.
16
[OE.PHYSICAL]
17
3.3 Organizational Security Policy
18
There are no organizational security policies addressed by this cPP.
19
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4. Security Objectives
1
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
2
The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to
3
assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. This part wise solution forms
4
the security objectives for the Operational Environment and consists of a set of statements
5
describing the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve.
6
(OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL) Communication among and between product components (i.e.,
7
AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure.
8
Rationale: In situations where there is an opportunity for an adversary to interpose
9
themselves in the channel between the AA and the EE a trusted channel must be
10
established to prevent exploitation. [A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL] assumes the existence
11
of a trusted channel between the AA and EE, except for when the boundary is within
12
and does not breach the TOE or is in such close proximity that a breach is not possible
13
without detection.
14
(OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE) The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage
15
device free of protected data in areas not targeted for encryption.
16
Rationale: Since the cPP requires all protected data to encrypted A.
17
INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE assumes that the initial state of the device targeted for FDE
18
is free of protected data in those areas of the drive where encryption will not be invoked
19
(e.g., MBR and AA/EE pre-authentication software). Given this known start state, the
20
product (once installed and operational) ensures partitions of logical blocks of user
21
accessible data is protected.
22
(OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH) An authorized administrator will be responsible for
23
ensuring that the passphrase authorization factor conforms to guidance from the Enterprise
24
using the TOE.
25
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to create authorization
26
factors that conform to administrative guidance.
27
(OE.POWER_DOWN) Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant
28
attacks are infeasible.
29
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to not leave the storage
30
device unattended until powered down or placed in a managed power state such as
31
“hibernation mode”. A.POWER_DOWN stipulates that such memory remnant attacks
32
are infeasible given the device is in a powered-down or “hibernation mode” state.
33
(OE.SINGLE_USE_ET) External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for
34
no other purpose than to store the external token authorization factor.
35
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Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to use external token
1
authorization factors as intended and for no other purpose.
2
(OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO) The Operating Environment will provide a
3
cryptographic function capability that is commensurate with the requirements and capabilities
4
of the TOE and Appendix A.
5
Rationale: All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and used by
6
the product meets the requirements listed in this cPP [A.STRONG_CRYPTO].
7
(OE.TRAINED_USERS) Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance
8
for securing the TOE and authorization factors.
9
Rationale: Users are properly trained [A.TRAINED_USER] to create authorization
10
factors that conform to guidance, not store external token authorization factors with
11
the device, and power down the TOE when required (OE.PLATFORM_STATE) The
12
platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is
13
connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the
14
product.
15
A platform free of malware [A.PLATFORM_STATE] prevents an attack vector that
16
could potentially interfere with the correct operation of the product.
17
(OE.PLATFORM_STATE) The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external
18
storage device is connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation
19
of the product.
20
Rationale: A platform free of malware [A.PLATFORM_STATE] prevents an attack
21
vector that could potentially interfere with the correct operation of the product.
22
(OE.PLATFORM_I&A) The Operational Environment will provide individual user
23
identification and authentication mechanisms that operate independently of the authorization
24
factors used by the TOE.
25
Rationale: While the product may provide authorization factors to the Operating
26
system's login interface, it must not change or degrade the functionality of the actual
27
interface. A.PLATFORM_I&A requires that the product not interfere or change the
28
normal platform I&A functionality.
29
(OE.PHYSICAL) The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing
30
space such than an adversary is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the
31
TOE itself.
32
Rationale: As stated in section 1.6, the use case for this cPP is to protect data at rest on a
33
device where the adversary receives it in a powered off state and has no prior access.
34
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5. Security Functional Requirements
1
The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below. Based on
2
selections made in these SFRs it will also be necessary to include some of the selection-based
3
SFRs in Appendix B. Additional optional SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in
4
Appendix A for those functions that are provided by the TOE instead of its Operational
5
Environment.
6
The Evaluation Activities defined in [SD] describe actions that the evaluator will take in
7
order to determine compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these
8
Evaluation Activities will therefore provide more insight into deliverables required from TOE
9
Developers.
10
5.1 Conventions
11
The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:
12
 Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
13
 Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text or strikethroughs for text
14
that is added to or removed from the original SFR;
15
 Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
16
 Assignment within a Selection: Indicated with italicized and underlined text;
17
 Iteration: Indicated by appending the SFR with parentheses that contain a letter that is
18
unique for each iteration, e.g. (a), (b), (c) and/or with a slash (/) followed by a
19
descriptive string for the SFR’s purpose, e.g. /Server.
20
SFR text that is bold, italicized, and underlined indicates that the original SFR defined an
21
assignment operation but the PP author completed that assignment by redefining it as a
22
selection operation, which is also considered to be a refinement of the original SFR.
23
If the selection or assignment is to be completed by the ST author, it is preceded by
24
‘selection:’ or ‘assignment:’. If the selection or assignment has been completed by the PP
25
author and the ST author does not have the ability to modify it, the proper formatting
26
convention is applied but the preceding word is not included. The exception to this is if the
27
SFR definition includes multiple options in a selection or assignment and the PP has excluded
28
certain options but at least two remain. In this case, the selection or assignment operations
29
that are not permitted by this PP were removed without applying additional formatting and
30
the ‘selection:’ or ‘assignment:’ text is preserved to show that the ST author still has the
31
ability to choose from the reduced set of options.
32
Extended SFRs (i.e. those SFRs that are not defined in CC Part 2) are identified by having a
33
label ‘_EXT’ at the end of the SFR name.
34
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5.2 SFR Architecture
1
The following table lists the SFRs that are mandated by this cPP.
2
Table 2: TOE Security Functional Requirements
3
Functional Class Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition
FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
FCS_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Destruction Timing)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Power Management)
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator)
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Power Saving States
FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
5.3 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
4
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition
5
FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors: [selection:
6
 a submask derived from a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in
7
FCS_PCC_EXT.1,
8
 an external Smartcard factor that is at least the same bit-length as the DEK, and is
9
protecting a submask that is [selection: generated by the TOE (using the RBG as
10
specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), generated by the Host Platform] protected using
11
RSA with key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], with user presence
12
proved by presentation of the smartcard and [selection: none, an OE defined PIN,
13
a configurable PIN].
14
 an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the BEV,
15
and is providing a submask generated by the TOE, using the RBG as specified in
16
FCS_RBG_EXT.1,
17
 an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the BEV,
18
and is providing a submask generated by the Host Platform
19
].
20
Application Note: This requirement specifies what authorization factors the TOE accepts
21
from the user. A password entered by the user is one authorization factor that the TOE must
22
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be able to condition, as specified in FCS_PCC_EXT.1. Another option is a smart card
1
authorization factor, with the differentiating feature being how the value is generated – either
2
by the TOE’s RBG or by the platform. An external USB token may also be used, with the
3
submask value generated either by the TOE’s RBG or by the platform.
4
The TOE may accept any number of authorization factors, and these are categorized as
5
“submasks”. The ST author selects the authorization factors they support, and there may be
6
multiple methods for a selection.
7
Use of multiple authorization factors is preferable; if more than one authorization factor is
8
used, the submasks produced must be combined using FCS_SMC_EXT.1 specified in
9
Appendix A.
10
FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
11
FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in
12
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition from any Compliant power saving state specified in
13
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access to plaintext data.
14
Application Note: This should be accomplished by clearing keys that are no longer needed so
15
that keys must be derived or decrypted again.
16
FCS_CKM.4(a) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
17
FCS_CKM.4.1(a) The TSF shall [selection: instruct the Operational Environment to clear,
18
erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when transitioning to a
19
Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the following: [a
20
key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM.4(d)].
21
Application Note: In some cases, erasure of keys from volatile memory is only supported by
22
the Operational Environment, in which case the Operational Environment must expose a
23
well-documented mechanism or interface to invoke the memory clearing operation.
24
FCS_CKM.4(d) Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd Party Storage)
25
FCS_CKM.4.1(d) Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance
26
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [selection:
27
 For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:
28
o single overwrite consisting of [selection:
29
 a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF’s RBG,
30
 zeroes,
31
 ones,
32
 a new value of a key,
33
 [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],
34
o removal of power to the memory,
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o destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage
1
collection];
2
 For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by
3
the underlying platform that [selection:
4
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection:
5
single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of
6
[selection:
7
 a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF’s RBG,
8
 zeroes,
9
 ones,
10
 a new value of a key,
11
 [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP];
12
o instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that represents
13
the key]
14
]
15
that meets the following: [no standard].
16
Application Note: This SFR is FCS_CKM.4(d), to align with the numbering in the FDE EE
17
cPP.
18
The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of
19
which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels
20
of abstraction visible. For instance, in a given implementation the application may have
21
access to the file system details and may be able to logically address specific memory
22
locations. In another implementation the application may simply have a handle to a resource
23
and can only ask the platform to delete the resource. The level of detail to which the TOE has
24
access will be reflected in the TSS section of the ST.
25
Several selections allow assignment of a ‘value that does not contain any CSP’. This means
26
that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting
27
FCS_RBG_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other
28
selection options. The point of the phrase ‘does not contain any CSP’ is to ensure that the
29
overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general ‘pool’ that might contain
30
current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.
31
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction
32
Timing)
33
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a) The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer
34
needed.
35
Application Note: Keys, including intermediate keys and key material that are no longer
36
needed are destroyed by using an approved method, FCS_CKM.4(d). Examples of keys are
37
intermediate keys, submasks, and BEV. There may be instances where keys or key material
38
that are contained in persistent storage are no longer needed and require destruction. Based
39
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on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. There
1
are multiple situations in which key material is no longer necessary, for example, a wrapped
2
key may need to be destroyed when a password is changed. However, there are instances
3
when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key. If a
4
PIN was used for a SmartCard, ensuring that the PIN was properly destroyed shall be
5
addressed.
6
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b) Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power
7
Management)
8
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and
9
authentication factors stored in plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power
10
saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
11
Application Note: The TOE may end up in a non-Compliant power saving state
12
indistinguishable from a Compliant power state (e.g. as result of sudden and/or unexpected
13
power loss). For those scenarios, the TOE or the Operational Environment guidance
14
documentation must provide procedure(s) to support destruction of key material (e.g.
15
automated reboot with memory clearing in early stages of the system’s power-on sequence).
16
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator)
17
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection:
18
 one, using a submask as the BEV;
19
 intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV using the
20
following method(s): [selection:
21
o key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
22
o key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
23
o key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
24
o key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(e),
25
o key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(g)]]
26
while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys
27
and an effective strength of [selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]
28
for asymmetric keys.
29
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide at least a [selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] BEV to
30
[assignment: one or more external entities] [selection:
31
 after the TSF has successfully performed the validation process as specified in
32
FCS_VAL_EXT.1,
33
 without validation taking place].
34
Application Note: Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to
35
ultimately secure the BEV. The number of intermediate keys will vary – from one (e.g., taking
36
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the conditioned password authorization factor and directly using it as the BEV) to many. This
1
applies to all keys that contribute to the ultimate wrapping or derivation of the BEV;
2
including those in areas of protected storage (e.g. TPM stored keys, comparison values).
3
Multiple key chains to the BEV are allowed, as long as all chains meet the key chain
4
requirement.
5
The BEV is considered to be equivalent to keying material and therefore additional
6
checksums or similar values are not the BEV, even if they are sent with the BEV.
7
Once the ST author has selected a method to create the chain (either by deriving keys or
8
unwrapping them or encrypting keys or using RSA Key Transport), they pull the appropriate
9
requirement out of Appendix B. It is allowable for an implementation to use any or all
10
methods.
11
For FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2, the validation process is defined in FCS_VAL_EXT.1, Appendix B.
12
If that selection is made by the ST author, then FCS_VAL_EXT.1 is included in the body of
13
the ST.
14
The method the TOE uses to chain keys and manage/protect them is described in the Key
15
Management Description; see Appendix E for more information.
16
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
17
Generation)
18
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: use no salts, use salts that are generated by a
19
[selection: DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, DRBG provided by the host platform]].
20
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall use [selection: no nonces, unique nonces with a minimum
21
size of [64] bits].
22
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [selection:
23
 CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
24
 CCM: Nonce shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
25
 XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively,
26
and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer;
27
 GCM: IV shall be non-repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed
28
2^32 for a given secret key].
29
Application Note: This requirement covers several important factors – the salt must be
30
random, but the nonces only have to be unique. FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 specifies how the IV
31
should be handled for each encryption mode. CBC, XTS, and GCM are allowed for AES
32
encryption of the data. AES-CCM is an allowed mode for Key Wrapping.
33
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5.4 Class: Security Management (FMT)
1
FMT_MOF.1 Management of Functions Behavior
2
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions
3
[use of Compliant power saving state] to [authorized administrators].
4
Application Note: “Modify the behaviour of” refers to any change in how or when a
5
Compliant power state may occur. Only privileged users are allowed to enable or disable
6
Compliant power saving state(s) via modification of “use of Compliant power saving state”
7
function.
8
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
9
FMT_SMF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
10
management functions: [
11
a) forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE,
12
b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE,
13
c) allowing authorized users to change authorization factors or set of authorization
14
factors used,
15
d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
16
e) [selection: no other functions, specify the power saving state properties, define the
17
allowable power saving states, generate authorization factors using the TSF RBG,
18
configure authorization factors, configure cryptographic functionality, disable key
19
recovery functionality, securely update the public key needed for trusted update,
20
configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective
21
behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive
22
number of failed validation attempts, [assignment: other management functions
23
provided by the TSF]]].
24
Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to express the management capabilities
25
that the TOE possesses. This means that the TOE must be able to perform the listed functions.
26
Item (e) is used to specify functionality that may be included in the TOE, but is not required
27
to conform to the cPP. “Configure cryptographic functionality” could include key
28
management functions; for example, the BEV will be wrapped or encrypted, and the EE will
29
need to unwrap or decrypt the BEV. In item e, if no other management functions are
30
provided (or claimed), then “no other functions” should be selected.
31
Changing the DEK would require the data to be re-encrypted with the new DEK, but allows
32
the user the ability to generate new DEKs.
33
For the purposes of this document, key sanitization means to destroy the DEK, using one of
34
the approved destruction methods. In some implementations, changing the DEK could be the
35
same functionality as cryptographically erasing the DEK.
36
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5.5 Class: Protection of the TSF (FPT)
1
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material
2
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: not store keys in non-volatile memory, only
3
store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d), or
4
encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)], unless the key meets any one of
5
following criteria [selection:
6
 The plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
7
 The plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial
8
provisioning.
9
 The plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
10
and the other half of the key split is [selection:
11
o wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
12
o encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e),
13
o derived and not stored in non-volatile memory].
14
 The plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization
15
factor.
16
 The plaintext key is [selection:
17
o used to wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
18
o encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)] that is already
19
[selection:
20
 wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
21
 encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)]].
22
Application Note: The plaintext key storage in non-volatile memory is allowed for several
23
reasons. If the keys exist within protected memory that is not user accessible on the TOE or
24
OE, the only methods that allow it to play a security relevant role for protecting the BEV or
25
the DEK are if it is a key split or providing additional layers of wrapping or encryption on
26
keys that have already been protected.
27
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Power Saving States
28
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states:
29
[selection: choose at least one of: S3, S4, G2(S5), G3, [assignment: other power saving
30
states]].
31
Application Note: Power saving states S3, S4, G2(S5), G3 are defined by the Advanced
32
Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) standard.
33
FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Timing of Power Saving States
34
FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1 For each Compliant power saving state defined in
35
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the
36
following conditions occur: [user-initiated request], [selection: choose at least one of: system
37
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shutdown, user inactivity, request initiated by remote management system, [assignment:
1
other conditions], no other conditions].
2
Application Note: If volatile memory is not cleared as part of an unexpected power shutdown
3
sequence then guidance documentation must define mitigation activities (e.g. how long users
4
should wait after an unexpected power-down before volatile memory can be considered
5
cleared).
6
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
7
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to
8
query the current version of the TOE [selection: software, firmware] software/firmware.
9
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall provide [authorized users] the ability to
10
initiate updates to TOE [selection: software, firmware] software/firmware.
11
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a
12
[digital signature as specified in FCS_COP.1(a)] by the manufacturer prior to installing
13
those updates.
14
Application Note: While this component requires the TOE to implement the update
15
functionality itself, it is acceptable to perform the cryptographic checks using functionality
16
available in the Operational Environment.
17
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6. Security Assurance Requirements
1
This cPP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which
2
the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs
3
independent testing. Individual Evaluation Activities to be performed are specified in
4
Supporting Document (Mandatory Technical Document) Full Drive Encryption:
5
Authorization Acquisition September 2016.
6
Note to ST authors: There is a selection in the ASE_TSS that must be completed. One
7
cannot simply reference the SARs in this cPP.
8
The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this cPP is as
9
follows: after the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the TOE,
10
supporting environmental IT (if required), and the administrative/user guides for the TOE.
11
The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation
12
Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Evaluation
13
Activities contained within the SD, which are intended to be an interpretation of the other
14
CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the
15
TOE. The Evaluation Activities that are captured in the SD also provide clarification as to
16
what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the cPP.
17
Table 3: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
18
Functional Class Functional Components
Security Target (ASE)
Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD)
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC)
Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent Testing – Sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
19
6.1 ASE: Security Target
20
The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be
21
Evaluation Activities specified within the SD that call for necessary descriptions to be
22
included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.
23
The SFRs in this cPP allow for conformant implementations to incorporate a wide range of
24
acceptable key management approaches as long as basic principles are satisfied. Given the
25
criticality of the key management scheme, this cPP requires the developer to provide a
26
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detailed description of their key management implementation. This information can be
1
submitted as an appendix to the ST and marked proprietary, as this level of detailed
2
information is not expected to be made publicly available. See Appendix E for details on the
3
expectation of the developer’s Key Management Description.
4
In addition, if the TOE includes a random bit generator Appendix D provides a description of
5
the information expected to be provided regarding the quality of the entropy.
6
ASE_TSS.1.1C Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE
7
meets each SFR, including a proprietary Key Management Description (Appendix E),
8
and [selection: Entropy Essay, list of all of 3rd party software libraries (including
9
version numbers), 3rd party hardware components (including model/version numbers),
10
no other cPP specified proprietary documentation].
11
6.2 ADV: Development
12
The design information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available
13
to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST, and any additional information required
14
by this cPP that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Essay) .
15
6.2.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
16
The functional specification describes the TOE Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is
17
not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally,
18
because TOEs conforming to this cPP will may interfaces to the Operational Environment
19
that are not directly invoked by TOE users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces
20
be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be
21
possible. For this cPP, the Evaluation Activities for this family focus on understanding the
22
interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces
23
presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification”
24
documentation is necessary to satisfy the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.
25
The Evaluation Activities in the SD are associated with the applicable SFRs; since these are
26
directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already
27
done and no additional documentation is necessary.
28
6.3 AGD: Guidance Documentation
29
The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description
30
of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the
31
security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the
32
IT personnel.
33
Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as
34
claimed in the ST. This guidance includes:
35
 instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
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 instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of
1
the larger operational environment; and
2
 Instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.
3
Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements
4
on such guidance are contained in the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.
5
6.3.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
6
The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance
7
to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web
8
pages.
9
The developer should review the Evaluation Activities contained in the SD to ascertain the
10
specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the
11
necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.
12
6.3.2 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
13
As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to
14
determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.
15
6.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support
16
At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this cPP, life-cycle support is limited
17
to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor’s
18
development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the
19
critical role that a developer’s practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a
20
product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this
21
assurance level.
22
6.4.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
23
This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from
24
other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being
25
procured by an end user. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with
26
ALC_CMC.1
27
6.4.2 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
28
Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the
29
evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC_CMS.1.
30
6.5 Class ATE: Tests
31
Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage
32
of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE_IND family,
33
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while the latter is through the AVA_VAN family. For this cPP, testing is based on advertised
1
functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One
2
of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following
3
requirements.
4
6.5.1 Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
5
Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the
6
operational guidance (includes “evaluated configuration” instructions). The focus of the
7
testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5 are being met. The
8
Evaluation Activities in the SD identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify
9
compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and
10
results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations
11
that are claiming conformance to this cPP.
12
6.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
13
For the current generation of this cPP, the iTC is expected to survey open sources to discover
14
what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products and provide that content
15
into the AVA_VAN discussion. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require
16
sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. This information will be used in the
17
development of future Protection Profiles.
18
6.6.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
19
Appendix A in the companion Supporting Document provides a guide to the evaluator in
20
performing a vulnerability analysis.
21
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Appendix A: Optional Requirements
1
As indicated in the introduction to this cPP, the baseline requirements (those that must be
2
performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this cPP. Additionally, there are two
3
other types of requirements specified in Appendices A and B.
4
The first type (in this Appendix) is requirements that can be included in the ST, but do not
5
have to be in order for a TOE to claim conformance to this cPP. The second type (in
6
Appendix B) is requirements based on selections in the body of the cPP: if certain selections
7
are made, then additional requirements in that appendix will need to be included in the body
8
of the ST (e.g., cryptographic protocols selected in a trusted channel requirement).
9
Some of the requirements in this section are iterated, but since the ST author is responsible
10
for incorporating the appropriate requirements from the appendices into the body of their ST,
11
the correct iteration numbering is left to the ST author.
12
A.1 Internal Cryptographic Implementation
13
As indicated in the body of this cPP, it is acceptable for the TOE to either directly implement
14
cryptographic functionality that supports the drive encryption/decryption process, or to use
15
that functionality in the Operational Environment (for example, calling an Operating System's
16
cryptographic provider interface; a third-party cryptographic library; or a hardware
17
cryptographic accelerator). However, each one of these SFRs that can optionally be
18
implemented by the Operational Environment are also considered to be ‘selection-based’
19
SFRs due to the fact that their functionality is contingent on the ST author make certain
20
selections in other SFRs. Because of this, these SFRs have been placed in Appendix B. Note
21
however that there is still an expectation that some of these functions may be provided by the
22
Operational Environment, in which case it is acceptable to omit the SFRs in question so long
23
as the ST author can provide evidence that the Operational Environment will include a
24
cryptographic interface to the TSF that allows for secure usage of these functions, and that
25
the functions have been validated to the same level of rigor as is described in [SD].
26
If all of the cryptographic functionality is implemented by the TSF and the TOE does not rely
27
on its Operational Environment to provide any cryptographic services, the ST author shall
28
omit OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO and its corresponding assumption since the
29
environment does not need to satisfy the objective in this case.
30
A.2 TSF Self-Testing
31
In order to ensure that any cryptographic primitives provided by the TOE is functioning
32
properly, it is necessary for the TSF to provide a self-test function that is used to verify their
33
integrity. The ST author shall include the following SFR if the TSF includes
34
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 or any iteration of FCS_COP.1:
35
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FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
1
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: during
2
initial start-up (on power on), at the conditions [before the function is first invoked]] to
3
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [assignment: list of self-tests run by the TSF].
4
Application Note: The tests regarding cryptographic functions implemented in the TOE can
5
be deferred, as long as the tests are performed before the function is invoked.
6
If FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is implemented by the TOE and according to NIST SP 800-90, the
7
evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes health tests that are consistent with section 11.3
8
of NIST SP 800-90.
9
If any FCS_COP functions are implemented by the TOE, the TSS shall describe the known
10
answer self-tests for those functions.
11
The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes, for some set of non-cryptographic functions
12
affecting the correct operation of the TSF, the method by which those functions are tested.
13
The TSS will describe, for each of these functions, the method by which correct operation of
14
the function/component is verified. The evaluator shall determine that all of the identified
15
functions/components are adequately tested on start-up.
16
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Appendix B: Selection-Based Requirements
1
As indicated in the introduction to this cPP, the baseline requirements (those that must be
2
performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this cPP.
3
There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the cPP: if certain
4
selections are made, then additional requirements below may need to be included.
5
Note that many of these selection-based SFRs could also be implemented by cryptographic
6
services in the TOE’s Operational Environment. If this is the case, it is not necessary to
7
include the SFRs in question so long as the Operational Environment can be shown to
8
provide equivalent functionality.
9
B.1 Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
10
If FCS_VAL_EXT.1 is included in the ST, the evaluator shall add the following threat to the
11
ST:
12
(T.AUTHORIZATION_GUESSING) Threat agents may exercise host software to
13
repeated guess authorization factors, such as passwords and pins. Successful guessing
14
of the authorization factors may cause the TOE to release DEKs or otherwise put it in
15
a state in which it discloses protected data to unauthorized users.
16
[FCS_VAL_EXT.1]
17
Rationale: Only valid BEV’s [FCS_VAL_EXT.1] are forwarded to the EE
18
[FCS_VAL_EXT.1]. The response to failed validation attempt [FCS_VAL_EXT.1]
19
mitigates the threat of successful authorization factor guessing.
20
FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)
21
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in
22
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [selection:
23
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [selection: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-
24
bit] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
25
Appendix B.3;
26
● ECC schemes using “NIST curves” of [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet
27
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
28
B.4;
29
● FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [selection: 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-
30
bit] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
31
Appendix B.1
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] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet
1
the following: [assignment: list of standards].
2
Application Note: Asymmetric keys may be used to “wrap” a key or submask. This SFR
3
should be included by the ST author when making the appropriate selection in FCS_COP.
4
Asymmetric Keys may also be used for the key chain. Therefore, the ST author should select
5
FCS_CKM.1(a), if Asymmetric key generation is used.
6
If the TOE acts as a receiver in the RSA key establishment scheme, the TOE does not need to
7
implement RSA key generation.
8
For all schemes (RSA schemes, ECC schemes, FFC schemes), an RBG is needed to a)
9
generate seeds for RSA and to b) generate private keys directly for ECC and FFC. So
10
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is used together with this SFR. A hash algorithm is also required when the
11
key pair generation algorithm is selected based on either Appendix B.3.2 or B.3.5 of FIPS
12
186-4. So in such case, FCS_COP.1(d) is used together with this SFR.
13
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
14
FCS_CKM.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys
15
using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified
16
cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the following: [no standard].
17
Application Note: Symmetric keys may be used to generate keys along the key chain.
18
Therefore, the ST author should select FCS_CKM.1(b), if Symmetric key generation is used.
19
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
20
FCS_COP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services
21
(verification)] in accordance with a [selection:
22
● RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size (modulus)of 2048 bits or greater,
23
● Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater
24
]
25
that meet the following: [selection:
26
● FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1
27
v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5; ISO/IEC
28
9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, for RSA schemes
29
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● FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D,
1
Implementing “NIST curves” [selection: P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3,
2
Section 6.4, for ECDSA schemes
3
].
4
Application Note: The ST author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital
5
signatures. For the algorithm(s) chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate
6
assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.
7
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
8
FCS_COP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in
9
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
10
512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
11
following: [ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004].
12
Application Note: The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the
13
algorithm used for FCS_COP.1(a). For example, SHA-256 should be chosen for 2048-bit
14
RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 should be chosen for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC
15
with P-384, and SHA-512 should be chosen for ECC with P-521. The selection of the
16
standard is made based on the algorithms selected.
17
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
18
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication]
19
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: HMAC-SHA-256,
20
HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: key size (in
21
bits) used in HMAC] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC
22
Algorithm 2”].
23
Application Note: The key size [k] in the assignment falls into a range between L1 and L2
24
(defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function for example for SHA-256 L1 =
25
512, L2 =256) where L2 ≤ k ≤ L1.
26
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
27
FCS_COP.1.1(d) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [key wrapping] in accordance with a
28
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the following modes [selection: KW, KWP,
29
GCM, CCM] and the cryptographic key size [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the
30
following: [AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [selection: NIST SP 800-38F, ISO/IEC
31
19772, no other standards]].
32
Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to
33
use key wrapping in the key chaining approach that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
34
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FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport)
1
FCS_COP.1.1(e) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [key transport] in accordance with a
2
specified cryptographic algorithm [RSA in the following modes [selection: KTS-OAEP, KTS-
3
KEM-KWS]] and the cryptographic key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits] that meet the
4
following: [NIST SP 800-56B, Revision 1].
5
Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to
6
use key transport in the key chaining approach that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
7
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
8
FCS_COP.1.1(f) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [data encryption and decryption] in
9
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [selection: CBC, GCM,
10
XTS] mode] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the
11
following: [AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC
12
10116, GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772, XTS as specified in IEEE 1619]].
13
Application Note: The intent of this requirement in the context of this cPP is to provide a
14
SFR that expresses the appropriate symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms suitable for
15
use in the TOE. If the ST author incorporates the validation requirement (FCS_VAL_EXT.1)
16
and chooses to select the option to decrypt a known value and perform a comparison, this is
17
the requirement used to specify the algorithm, modes, and key sizes the ST author can choose
18
from. Or, this requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use AES
19
encryption/decryption for protecting the keys as part of the key chaining approach that is
20
specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
21
When the XTS mode is selected, a cryptographic key of 256-bit or of 512-bit is allowed as
22
specified in IEEE 1619. XTS-AES key is divided into two AES keys of equal size - for
23
example, AES-128 is used as the underlying algorithm, when 256-bit key and XTS mode are
24
selected. AES-256 is used when a 512-bit key and XTS mode are selected.
25
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
26
FCS_COP.1.1(g) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] in
27
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES used in [selection: CBC, GCM]
28
mode] and cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following:
29
[AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [selection: CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116,
30
GCM as specified in ISO/IEC 19772]].
31
Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to
32
use AES encryption/decryption for protecting the keys as part of the key chaining approach
33
that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
34
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FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation
1
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified
2
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an
3
intermediate key, as defined in [selection:
4
 NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF
5
in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode],
6
 NIST SP 800-132],
7
using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the output is at least of
8
equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
9
Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to
10
use key derivation in the key chaining approach that is specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
11
This requirement establishes acceptable methods for generating a new random key or an
12
existing submask to create a new key along the key chain.
13
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
14
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1 A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor
15
shall enable up to [assignment: positive integer of 64 or more] characters in the set of {upper case
16
characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [assignment: other supported special
17
characters]} and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a
18
specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA-512], with [assignment:
19
positive integer of 1000 or more] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128
20
bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].
21
Application Note: The password is represented on the host machine as a sequence of
22
characters whose encoding depends on the TOE and the underlying OS. This sequence must
23
be conditioned into a string of bits that forms the submask to be used as input into the key
24
chain. Conditioning can be performed using one of the identified hash functions or the
25
process described in NIST SP 800-132; the method used is selected by the ST author. If 800-
26
132 conditioning is specified, then the ST author fills in the number of iterations that are
27
performed. 800-132 also requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of
28
HMAC with an approved hash function. The ST author selects the hash function used which
29
also includes the appropriate requirements for HMAC.
30
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
31
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1: The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services
32
in accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using [selection:
33
Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
34
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
35
that accumulates entropy from [selection:
36
 [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s),
37
 [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)]
38
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with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest
1
security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for
2
Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
3
Application Note: ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains different methods of generating random
4
numbers; each of these, in turn, depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash
5
functions/ciphers). The ST author will select the function used and include the specific
6
underlying cryptographic primitives used in the requirement. While any of the identified hash
7
functions (SHA-256, SHA-512) are allowed for Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, only AES-
8
based implementations for CTR_DRBG are allowed. Table C.2 in ISO/IEC 18031:2011
9
provides an identification of Security strengths, Entropy and Seed length requirements for the
10
AES-128 and 256 Block Cipher.
11
The CTR_DRBG in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 requires using derivation function, whereas NIST
12
SP 800-90A does not. Either model is acceptable. In the first selection in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1,
13
the ST author choses the standard to which the TSF is compliant.
14
In the first selection in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 the ST author fills in how many entropy sources
15
are used for each type of entropy source they employ. It should be noted that a combination
16
of hardware and software based noise sources is acceptable.
17
It should be noted that the entropy source is considered to be a part of the DRBG and if the
18
DRBG is included in the TOE, the developer is required to provide the entropy description
19
outlined in Appendix D. The documentation *and tests* required in the Evaluation Activity
20
for this element necessarily cover each source indicated in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2. Individual
21
contributions to the entropy pool may be combined to provide the minimum amount of
22
entropy as long as the Entropy Documentation demonstrates that entropy from each of these
23
individual sources is generated independently.
24
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining
25
26
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method
27
[selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] to generate an
28
[intermediary key or BEV].
29
Application Note: This requirement specifies the way that a product may combine the
30
various submasks by using either an XOR or an approved SHA-hash. The approved hash
31
functions are captured in FCS_COP.1(b).
32
FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation
33
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform validation of the [selection: submask,
34
intermediate key, BEV] using the following method(s): [selection:
35
 key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d);
36
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 hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] as specified in [selection:
1
FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c)] and compare it to a stored hashed [selection:
2
submask, intermediate key, BEV];
3
 decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] as
4
specified in FCS_COP.1(f) and compare it against a stored known value]
5
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require validation of the [BEV] prior to [forwarding the
6
BEV to the EE].
7
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [selection:
8
 [perform a key sanitization of the DEK] upon a configurable number of consecutive
9
failed validation attempts,
10
 institute a delay such that only [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts]
11
can be made within a 24 hour period,
12
 block validation after [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts] of
13
consecutive failed validation attempts,
14
 require power cycle/reset the TOE after [assignment: ST author specified number of
15
attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts].
16
Application Note: The purpose of performing secure validation is to not expose any material
17
that might compromise the submask(s). For the selections in FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1, the ST
18
author must clarify in the KMD which specific entities are referred to in this SFR if multiple
19
entities of a type exist.
20
The TOE validates the submask(s) (e.g., authorization factor(s)) prior to presenting the BEV
21
to the EE. When a password is used as an authorization factor, it is conditioned before any
22
attempts to validate. In cases where validation of the authorization factor(s) fails, the product
23
will not forward a BEV to EE.
24
When the key wrap in FCS_COP.1(d) is used, the validation is performed inherently.
25
The delay must be enforced by the TOE, but this requirement is not intended to address
26
attacks that bypass the product (e.g. attacker obtains hash value or “known” crypto value
27
and mounts attacks outside of the TOE, such as a third party password crackers). The
28
cryptographic functions (i.e., hash, decryption) performed are those specified in
29
FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c), and FCS_COP.1(f).
30
The ST author may need to iterate this requirement if multiple authentication factors are
31
used, and either different methods are used to validate, or in some cases one or more
32
authentication factors may be validated, and one or more are not validated.
33
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Appendix C: Extended Component Definitions
1
This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the cPP,
2
including those used in Appendices A and B.
3
Note that several of the extended requirements used for this cPP have dependencies on SFRs
4
that are iterated in the cPP (e.g. FCS_COP.1(d)). The reader is advised that the SFR names
5
for these dependencies may differ if the same extended components are used in other
6
Protection Profiles.
7
C.1 Background and Scope
8
This document provides a definition for all of the extended components used in this cPP.
9
These components are identified in the following table:
10
Table 4: Extended Components
11
Functional Class Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_AFA_EXT Authorization Factor Acquisition
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management
FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining
FCS_PCC_EXT Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning
FCS_RBG_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining
FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization
Vector Generation)
FCS_VAL_EXT Validation of Cryptographic Elements
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_KYP_EXT Key and Key Material Protection
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update
Note that several of the extended components define dependencies on iterated Part 2 SFRs
12
that are defined in this cPP. This definition mandates that these dependencies be included in a
13
PP that claims the SFR but it does not mandate that the dependent SFRs are defined using the
14
same iteration identifiers (e.g. inclusion of FCS_KDF_EXT.1 does not require the dependent
15
SFR for keyed-hash message authentication to be identified specifically as FCS_COP.1(c),
16
only that an FCS_COP.1 iteration exists and defines the same behavior as what this cPP
17
defines as FCS_COP.1(c)).
18
C.2 Extended Component Definitions
19
FCS_AFA_EXT Authorization Factor Acquisition
20
Family Behavior
21
Components in this family address the ability for the TOE to accept a variety of authorization
22
factors.
23
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Component Leveling
1
FCS_AFA_EXT Authorization Factor
Acquisition
1
2
2
FCS_AFA_EXT.1, Authorization Factor Acquisition, requires authorization factors to be
3
accepted by the TOE.
4
FCS_AFA_EXT.2, Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition, defines situations in which
5
the TOE is to accept authorization factors.
6
Management: FCS_AFA_EXT.1
7
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
8
 Change the authorization factors to be used
9
 Generate external authorization factors using the TSF DRBG
10
Audit: FCS_AFA_EXT.1
11
There are no auditable events foreseen.
12
Management: FCS_AFA_EXT.2
13
There are no management activities foreseen.
14
Audit: FCS_AFA_EXT.2
15
There are no auditable events foreseen.
16
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition
17
Hierarchical to: No other components
18
Dependencies: No dependencies
19
FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors: [selection:
20
 a submask derived from a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in
21
FCS_PCC_EXT.1,
22
 an external Smartcard factor that is at least the same bit-length as the DEK, and is
23
protecting a submask that is [selection: generated by the TOE (using the RBG as
24
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specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1), generated by the Host Platform] protected using
1
RSA with key size [selection: 2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits], with user presence
2
proved by presentation of the smartcard and [selection: none, an OE defined PIN,
3
a configurable PIN],
4
 an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the BEV,
5
and is providing a submask generated by the TOE, using the RBG as specified in
6
FCS_RBG_EXT.1,
7
 an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the BEV,
8
and is providing a submask generated by the Host Platform
9
].
10
FCS_AFA_EXT.2 Authorization Factor Acquisition
11
Hierarchical to: No other components
12
Dependencies: FCS_AFA_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition,
13
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Power Saving States
14
FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in
15
FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition from any Compliant power saving state specified in
16
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access to plaintext data.
17
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management
18
Family Behavior
19
Cryptographic keys must be managed throughout their life cycle. This family is intended to
20
support that lifecycle and consequently defines requirements for the following activities:
21
cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic key access and
22
cryptographic key destruction. This family should be included whenever there are functional
23
requirements for the management of cryptographic keys.
24
The creation of this family is necessary because CC Part 2 provides the ability to specify the
25
method of key destruction but does not define SFRs for the timing of key destruction or the
26
ability to implement multiple key destruction methods.
27
Component Leveling
28
FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key
Management
4
6
29
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4, Key and Key Material Destruction, requires the TSF to specify
1
circumstances when keys are destroyed (as opposed to the actual method of destruction,
2
which is defined in CC Part 2 as FCS_CKM.4). The number 4 was chosen to reflect the
3
similarity between the two SFRs.
4
FCS_CKM_EXT.6, Cryptographic Key Destruction Types, provides the TOE with the ability
5
to select between multiple methods of key destruction.
6
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
7
No specific management functions are identified.
8
Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
9
There are no auditable events foreseen.
10
Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
11
No specific management functions are identified.
12
Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.4
13
There are no auditable events foreseen.
14
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
15
Hierarchical to: No other components
16
Dependencies: No dependencies
17
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer
18
needed.
19
FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
20
Hierarchical to: No other components
21
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
22
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1 The TSF shall use [assignment: two or more iterations of FCS_CKM.4
23
defined elsewhere in the Security Target] key destruction methods.
24
FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation
25
Family Behavior
26
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This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set
1
of submasks.
2
Component Leveling
3
FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key
Derivation
1
4
FCS_KDF_EXT.1, Cryptographic Key Derivation, requires the TSF to derive intermediate
5
keys from submasks using the specified hash functions.
6
Management: FCS_KDF_EXT.1
7
No specific management functions are identified.
8
Audit: FCS_KDF_EXT.1
9
There are no auditable events foreseen.
10
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation
11
Hierarchical to: No other components
12
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
13
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified
14
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to derive an
15
intermediate key, as defined in [selection:
16
 NIST SP 800-108 [selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF
17
in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode],
18
 NIST SP 800-132],
19
using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the output is at least of
20
equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
21
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining
22
Family Behavior
23
This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys
24
to ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the drive.
25
Component Leveling
26
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FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining
1
2
1
FCS_KYC_EXT.1, Key Chaining (Initiator), requires the TSF to maintain a key chain for a
2
BEV that is provided to a component external to the TOE.
3
FCS_KYC_EXT.2, Key Chaining (Recipient), requires the TSF to be able to accept a BEV
4
that is then chained to a DEK used by the TSF through some method.
5
Note that this cPP does not include FCS_KYC_EXT.2; it is only included here to provide a
6
complete definition of the FCS_KYC_EXT family.
7
Management: FCS_KYC_EXT.1
8
No specific management functions are identified.
9
Audit: FCS_KYC_EXT.1
10
There are no auditable events foreseen.
11
Management: FCS_KYC_EXT.2
12
No specific management functions are identified.
13
Audit: FCS_KYC_EXT.2
14
There are no auditable events foreseen.
15
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator)
16
Hierarchical to: No other components
17
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys),
18
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Keys),
19
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping),
20
FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport),
21
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption),
22
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining,
23
FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation
24
FCS_VAL_EXT.2 User Validation
25
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection:
26
 one, using a submask as the BEV;
27
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 intermediate keys generated by the TSF using the following method(s): [selection:
1
o asymmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(a),
2
o symmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(b)];
3
 intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s) to the BEV using the
4
following method(s): [selection:
5
o key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
6
o key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
7
o key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
8
o key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(e),
9
o key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(g)]]
10
while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys
11
and an effective strength of [selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]
12
for asymmetric keys.
13
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide a at least [selection: 128 bit, 256 bit] BEV to
14
[assignment: one or more external entities] [selection:
15
 after the TSF has successfully performed the validation process as specified in
16
FCS_VAL_EXT.1,
17
 without validation taking place].
18
Application Note: Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to
19
ultimately secure the BEV. The number of intermediate keys will vary – from one (e.g., taking
20
the conditioned password authorization factor and directly using it as the BEV) to many. This
21
applies to all keys that contribute to the ultimate wrapping or derivation of the BEV;
22
including those in areas of protected storage (e.g. TPM stored keys, comparison values).
23
FCS_KYC_EXT.2 Key Chaining (Recipient)
24
Hierarchical to: No other components
25
Dependencies: No dependencies
26
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]
27
from [assignment: one or more external entities].
28
FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from
29
the BEV to the DEK using the following method(s): [selection:
30
 asymmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(a)
31
 symmetric key generation as specified in FCS_CKM.1(b)
32
 key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
33
 key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
34
 key transport as specified in FCS_COP.1(e),
35
 key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(g)]
36
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while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] while maintaining an
1
effective strength of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective
2
strength of [selection: not applicable, 112 bits, 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] for asymmetric
3
keys.
4
Application Note: Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to
5
ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the drive. The number of intermediate keys
6
will vary – from one (e.g., using the BEV as a key encrypting key (KEK)) to many. This
7
applies to all keys that contribute to the ultimate wrapping or derivation of the DEK;
8
including those in areas of protected storage (e.g. TPM stored keys, comparison values).
9
FCS_PCC_EXT Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning
10
Family Behavior
11
This family ensures that passwords used to produce the BEV are robust (in terms of their
12
composition) and are conditioned to provide an appropriate-length bit string.
13
Component Leveling
14
FCS_PCC_EXT Cryptographic Password
Construction and Conditioning
1
15
FCS_PCC_EXT.1, Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning, requires the TSF
16
to accept passwords of a certain composition and condition them appropriately.
17
Management: FCS_PCC_EXT.1
18
No specific management functions are identified.
19
Audit: FCS_PCC_EXT.1
20
There are no auditable events foreseen.
21
FCS_PCC_EXT.1 Cryptographic Password Construction and Conditioning
22
Hierarchical to: No other components
23
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
24
FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1 A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor
25
shall enable up to [assignment: positive integer of 64 or more] characters in the set of {upper case
26
characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [assignment: other supported special
27
characters]} and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a
28
specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA-512], with [assignment:
29
positive integer of 1000 or more] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128
30
bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: PBKDF recommendation or specification].
31
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FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation
1
Family Behavior
2
Components in this family address the requirements for random bit/number generation. This
3
is a new family defined for the FCS class.
4
Component Leveling
5
FCS_RBG_EXT Random Bit Generation 1
6
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, Random Bit Generation, requires random bit generation to be performed
7
in accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
8
Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
9
No specific management functions are identified.
10
Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
11
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
12
included in the PP/ST:
13
 Failure of the randomization process
14
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
15
Hierarchical to: No other components
16
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm),
17
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
18
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services
19
in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: Hash_DRBG (any),
20
HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
21
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source
22
that accumulates entropy from [selection:
23
 [assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source(s),
24
 [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)]
25
with a minimum of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest
26
security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for
27
Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
28
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Application Note: ISO/IEC 18031:2011contains three different methods of generating
1
random numbers; each of these, in turn, depends on underlying cryptographic primitives
2
(hash functions/ciphers). The ST author will select the function used, and include the specific
3
underlying cryptographic primitives used in the requirement. While any of the identified hash
4
functions (SHA-256, SHA-512) are allowed for Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG, only AES-
5
based implementations for CTR_DRBG are allowed.
6
FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining
7
Family Behavior
8
This family specifies the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more
9
than one submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.
10
Component Leveling
11
FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining 1
12
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, Submask Combining, requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a
13
predictable fashion.
14
Management: FCS_SMC_EXT.1
15
No specific management functions are identified.
16
Audit: FCS_SMC_EXT.1
17
There are no auditable events foreseen.
18
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining
19
Hierarchical to: No other components
20
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
21
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method
22
[selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an [assignment: types of
23
keys].
24
FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
25
Generation
26
Family Behavior
27
This family ensures that salts, nonces, and IVs are well formed.
28
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Component Leveling
1
FCS_SNI_EXT Cryptographic Operation (Salt,
Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
1
2
FCS_SNI_EXT.1, Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
3
Generation), requires the generation of salts, nonces, and IVs to be used by the cryptographic
4
components of the TOE to be performed in the specified manner.
5
Management: FCS_SNI_EXT.1
6
No specific management functions are identified.
7
Audit: FCS_SNI_EXT.1
8
There are no auditable events foreseen.
9
FCS_SNI_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector
10
Generation)
11
Hierarchical to: No other components
12
Dependencies: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
13
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: use no salts, use salts that are generated by
14
[selection: DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, DRBG provided by the host platform]].
15
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall use [selection: no nonces, unique nonces with a minimum
16
size of [64] bits].
17
FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [selection:
18
 CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
19
 CCM: Nonce shall be non-repeating and unpredictable;
20
 XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively,
21
and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer;
22
 GCM: IV shall be non-repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed
23
2^32 for a given secret key].
24
FCS_VAL_EXT Validation of Cryptographic Elements
25
Family Behavior
26
This family specifies the means by which submasks and/or BEVs are determined to be valid
27
prior to their use.
28
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Component Leveling
1
FCS_VAL_EXT Validation of
Cryptographic Elements
1
2
2
FCS_VAL_EXT.1, Validation, requires the TSF to validate submasks and BEVs by one or
3
more of the specified methods.
4
FCS_VAL_EXT.2, User Validation, requires the TSF to validate the legitimacy of a user’s
5
request before providing cryptographic data to the user.
6
Management: FCS_VAL_EXT.1
7
No specific management functions are identified.
8
Audit: FCS_VAL_EXT.1
9
There are no auditable events foreseen.
10
Management: FCS_VAL_EXT.2
11
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
12
 Specification of the validation method used
13
 Configuration of number of failed validation attempts that will be accepted by the
14
TSF
15
 Action taken by the TSF in the event an unacceptable number of failed validation
16
attempts are made
17
Audit: FCS_VAL_EXT.2
18
There are no auditable events foreseen.
19
FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation
20
Hierarchical to: No other components
21
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm),
22
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm),
23
FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping),
24
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
25
Encryption/Decryption)
26
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FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform validation of the [selection: submask,
1
intermediate key, BEV] using the following method(s): [selection:
2
 key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1(d);
3
 hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] as specified in [selection:
4
FCS_COP.1(b), FCS_COP.1(c)] and compare it to a stored hashed [selection:
5
submask, intermediate key, BEV];
6
 decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, BEV] as
7
specified in FCS_COP.1(f) and compare it against a stored known value]
8
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require validation of the [selection: submask,
9
intermediate key, BEV] prior to [assignment: activity requiring validation].
10
FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [selection:
11
 [perform a key sanitization of the DEK] upon a configurable number of consecutive
12
failed validation attempts,
13
 institute a delay such that only [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts]
14
can be made within a 24 hour period,
15
 block validation after [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts] of
16
consecutive failed validation attempts,
17
 require power cycle/reset the TOE after [assignment: ST author specified number of
18
attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts].
19
FCS_VAL_EXT.2 User Validation
20
FCS_VAL_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall perform validation of the [user] by receiving assertion of
21
the user’s validity from: [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for
22
user authentication].
23
FCS_VAL_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall require validation of the user prior to [assignment:
24
cryptographic operation or transmission of cryptographic data].
25
FCS_VAL_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall [selection:
26
 [assignment: key sanitization activity] upon receiving a configurable number of
27
consecutive failed validation attempts from the Operational Environment,
28
 institute a delay such that only [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts]
29
can be made within a 24 hour period,
30
 block validation after [assignment: ST author specified number of attempts] of
31
consecutive failed validation attempts,
32
 require power cycle of or reset the TOE after [assignment: ST author specified
33
number of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts].
34
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FPT_KYP_EXT Key and Key Material Protection
1
Family Behavior
2
This family requires that key and key material be protected if and when written to non-
3
volatile storage.
4
Component Leveling
5
FPT_KYP_EXT Key and Key Material
Protection
2
1
3
6
FPT_KYP_EXT.1, Protection of Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to ensure that no
7
plaintext key or key material are written to non-volatile storage.
8
FPT_KYP_EXT.2, Storage of Protected Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to specify
9
the non-volatile storage location in which encrypted key and key material is stored.
10
FPT_KYP_EXT.3, Attribution of Protected Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to
11
maintain an association between encrypted key and key material and the subjects that are
12
authorized to decrypt and/or use the data.
13
Management: FPT_KYP_EXT.1
14
No specific management functions are identified.
15
Audit: FPT_KYP_EXT.1
16
There are no auditable events foreseen.
17
Management: FPT_KYP_EXT.2
18
No specific management functions are identified.
19
Audit: FPT_KYP_EXT.2
20
There are no auditable events foreseen.
21
Management: FPT_KYP_EXT.3
22
No specific management functions are identified.
23
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Audit: FPT_KYP_EXT.3
1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
2
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material
3
Hierarchical to: No other components
4
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping),
5
FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Transport),
6
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption),
7
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining (Initiator),
8
FCS_KYC_EXT.2 Key Chaining (Recipient),
9
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining
10
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: not store keys in non-volatile memory, only
11
store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d) or
12
encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)], unless the key meets any one of
13
following criteria [selection:
14
 The plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in [selection:
15
o FCS_KYC_EXT.1,
16
o FCS_KYC_EXT.2].
17
 The plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial
18
provisioning.
19
 The plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
20
and the other half of the key split is [selection:
21
o wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
22
o encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e),
23
o derived and not stored in non-volatile memory].
24
 The plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization
25
factor.
26
 The plaintext key is [selection:
27
o used to wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
28
o encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)] that is already
29
[selection:
30
 wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(d),
31
 encrypted as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e)]].
32
FPT_KYP_EXT.2 Storage of Protected Key and Key Material
33
Hierarchical to: No other components
34
Dependencies: FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material
35
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FPT_KYP_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall only store protected key and key material [selection:
1
within the TSF, in a SQL database in the Operational Environment, [assignment: other key
2
storage location]].
3
FPT_KYP_EXT.3 Attribution of Protected Key and Key Material
4
Hierarchical to: No other components
5
Dependencies: FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Key and Key Material
6
FPT_KYP_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall maintain an association between [assignment: list of key
7
and key material] and [assignment: subjects that are authorized to use the identified key and
8
key material].
9
FPT_PWR_EXT Power Management
10
Family Behavior
11
This family defines secure behavior of the TSF when the TOE supports multiple power
12
saving states. The use of Compliant power saving states (i.e. power saving states that purge
13
security-relevant data upon entry) is essential for ensuring that state transitions cannot be
14
used as attack vectors to bypass TOE self-protection mechanisms.
15
Component Leveling
16
FPT_PWR_EXT Power Management
1
2
17
FPT_PWR_EXT.1, Power Saving States, defines the Compliant power saving states that are
18
implemented by the TSF.
19
FPT_PWR_EXT.2, Timing of Power Saving States, describes the situations that cause
20
Compliant power saving states to be entered.
21
Management: FPT_PWR_EXT.1
22
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
23
 Enable or disable the use of individual power saving states
24
 Specify one or more power saving state configurations
25
Audit: FPT_PWR_EXT.1
26
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There are no auditable events foreseen.
1
Management: FPT_PWR_EXT.2
2
There are no management activities foreseen.
3
Audit: FPT_PWR_EXT.2
4
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
5
included in the PP/ST:
6
 Transition of the TSF into different power saving states
7
FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition
8
Hierarchical to: No other components
9
Dependencies: No dependencies
10
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states:
11
[selection: choose at least one of: S3, S4, G2(S5), G3, [assignment: other power saving
12
states]].
13
FPT_PWR_EXT.2 Authorization Factor Acquisition
14
Hierarchical to: No other components
15
Dependencies: FPT_PWR_EXT.1 Power Saving States
16
FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1 For each Compliant power saving state defined in
17
FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the Compliant power saving state when the
18
following conditions occur: [selection: choose at least one of: user-initiated request, system
19
shutdown, user inactivity, request initiated by remote management system, [assignment:
20
other conditions], no other conditions].
21
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing
22
Family Behavior
23
Components in this family address the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected
24
correct operation.
25
Component Leveling
26
FPT_TST_EXT TSF Testing 1
27
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FPT_TST_EXT.1, TSF Testing, requires a suite of self-tests to be run during initial start-up
1
in order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.
2
Management: FPT_TST_EXT.1
3
No specific management functions are identified.
4
Audit: FPT_TST_EXT.1
5
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
6
included in the PP/ST:
7
 Indication that TSF self-test was completed
8
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
9
Hierarchical to: No other components
10
Dependencies: No other components
11
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [selection: during
12
initial start-up (on power on), periodically during normal operation, at the request of the
13
authorized user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-tests should
14
occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [assignment: list of self-tests run by
15
the TSF].
16
FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update
17
Family Behavior
18
Components in this family address the requirements for updating the TOE firmware and/or
19
software.
20
Component Leveling
21
FPT_TUD_EXT Trusted Update 1
22
FPT_TUD_EXT.1, Trusted Update, requires the capability to be provided to update the TOE
23
firmware and software, including the ability to verify the updates prior to installation.
24
Management: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
25
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
26
 Ability to update the TOE and to verify the updates
27
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Audit: FPT_TUD_EXT.1
1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
2
included in the PP/ST:
3
 Initiation of the update process.
4
 Any failure to verify the integrity of the update
5
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
6
Hierarchical to: No other components
7
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification),
8
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
9
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] the ability to query
10
the current version of the TOE software/firmware.
11
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] the ability to
12
initiate updates to TOE software/firmware.
13
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software/firmware using a
14
[selection: digital signature, published hash] by the manufacturer prior to installing those
15
updates.
16
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Appendix D: Entropy Documentation and Assessment
1
This is an optional appendix in the cPP, and only applies if the TOE is providing
2
deterministic random bit generation services, e.g. the ST claims FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
3
This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used
4
by the TOE.
5
The documentation of the entropy source(s) should be detailed enough that, after reading, the
6
evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to
7
provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections:
8
design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This
9
documentation is not required to be part of the TSS in the public facing ST.
10
D.1 Design Description
11
Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the
12
interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding
13
the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the
14
product.
15
The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include how entropy
16
is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source
17
for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design
18
indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-
19
processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is
20
output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should
21
also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.
22
This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the
23
entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary
24
outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.
25
If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party
26
applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between
27
power-off and power-on shall be included.
28
D.2 Entropy Justification
29
There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from
30
and why there is confidence in the entropy source delivering sufficient entropy for the uses
31
made of the RBG output (by this particular TOE). This argument will include a description of
32
the expected min-entropy rate (i.e. the minimum entropy (in bits) per bit or byte of source
33
data) and explain that sufficient entropy is going into the TOE randomizer seeding process.
34
This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to
35
produce bits with entropy.
36
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The amount of information necessary to justify the expected min-entropy rate depends on the
1
type of entropy source included in the product.
2
3
For developer provided entropy sources, in order to justify the min-entropy rate, it is expected
4
that a large number of raw source bits will be collected, statistical tests will be performed,
5
and the min-entropy rate determined from the statistical tests. While no particular statistical
6
tests are required at this time, it is expected that some testing is necessary in order to
7
determine the amount of min-entropy in each output.
8
9
For third party provided entropy sources, in which the TOE vendor has limited access to the
10
design and raw entropy data of the source, the documentation will indicate an estimate of the
11
amount of min-entropy obtained from this third-party source. It is acceptable for the vendor
12
to “assume” an amount of min-entropy, however, this assumption must be clearly stated in
13
the documentation provided. In particular, the min-entropy estimate must be specified and the
14
assumption included in the ST.
15
Regardless of type of entropy source, the justification will also include how the DRBG is
16
initialized with the entropy stated in the ST, for example by verifying that the min-entropy
17
rate is multiplied by the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG or that the rate of
18
entropy expected based on the amount of source data is explicitly stated and compared to the
19
statistical rate. If the amount of source data used to seed the DRBG is not clear or the
20
calculated rate is not explicitly related to the seed, the documentation will not be considered
21
complete.
22
23
The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or
24
from any state saving between restarts.
25
D.3 Operating Conditions
26
The entropy rate may be affected by conditions outside the control of the entropy source
27
itself. For example, voltage, frequency, temperature, and elapsed time after power-on are just
28
a few of the factors that may affect the operation of the entropy source. As such,
29
documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy
30
source is expected to generate random data. Similarly, documentation shall describe the
31
conditions under which the entropy source is no longer guaranteed to provide sufficient
32
entropy. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.
33
D.4 Health Testing
34
More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This
35
will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health
36
test is performed (e.g., at startup, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each
37
health test, TOE behavior upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test
38
is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.
39
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Appendix E: Key Management Description
1
The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough
2
that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management
3
and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This
4
documentation should include an essay and diagram(s). This documentation is not required to
5
be part of the TSS - it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer
6
proprietary.
7
Essay:
8
The essay will provide the following information for all keys in the key chain:
9
 The purpose of the key
10
 If the key is stored in non-volatile memory
11
 How and when the key is protected
12
 How and when the key is derived
13
 The strength of the key
14
 When or if the key would be no longer needed, along with a justification.
15
The essay will also describe the following topics:
16
 A description of all authorization factors that are supported by the product and how
17
each factor is handled, including any conditioning and combining performed.
18
 If validation is supported, the process for validation shall be described, noting what
19
value is used for validation and the process used to perform the validation. It shall
20
describe how this process ensures no keys in the key chain are weakened or exposed
21
by this process.
22
 The authorization process that leads to the ultimate release of the BEV. This section
23
shall detail the key chain used by the product. It shall describe which keys are used in
24
the protection of the BEV and how they meet the derivation, key wrap, or a
25
combination of the two requirements, including the direct chain from the initial
26
authorization to the BEV. It shall also include any values that add into that key chain
27
or interact with the key chain and the protections that ensure those values do not
28
weaken or expose the overall strength of the key chain.
29
 The diagram and essay will clearly illustrate the key hierarchy to ensure that at no
30
point the chain could be broken without a cryptographic exhaust or all of the initial
31
authorization values and the effective strength of the BEV is maintained throughout
32
the Key Chain.
33
 A description of the data encryption engine, its components, and details about its
34
implementation (e.g. for hardware: integrated within the device’s main SOC or
35
separate co-processor, for software: initialization of the product, drivers, libraries (if
36
applicable), logical interfaces for encryption/decryption, and areas which are not
37
encrypted (e.g. boot loaders, portions associated with the Master Boot Record
38
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(MBRs), partition tables, etc.)). The description should also include the data flow
1
from the device’s host interface to the device’s persistent media storing the data,
2
information on those conditions in which the data bypasses the data encryption engine
3
(e.g. read-write operations to an unencrypted Master Boot Record area). The
4
description should be detailed enough to verify all platforms to ensure that when the
5
user enables encryption, the product encrypts all hard storage devices. It should also
6
describe the platform’s boot initialization, the encryption initialization process, and at
7
what moment the product enables the encryption.
8
 The process for destroying keys when they are no longer needed by describing the
9
storage location of all keys and the protection of all keys stored in non-volatile
10
memory.
11
Diagram:
12
 The diagram will include all keys from the initial authorization factor(s) to the BEV
13
and any keys or values that contribute into the chain. It must list the cryptographic
14
strength of each key and indicate how each key along the chain is protected with
15
either Key Derivation or Key Wrapping (from the allowed options). The diagram
16
should indicate the input used to derive or unwrap each key in the chain.
17
 A functional (block) diagram showing the main components (such as memories and
18
processors) and the data path between, for hardware, the device’s host interface and
19
the device’s persistent media storing the data, or for software, the initial steps needed
20
for the activities the TOE performs to ensure it encrypts the storage device entirely
21
when a user or administrator first provisions the product. The hardware encryption
22
diagram shall show the location of the data encryption engine within the data path.
23
 The hardware encryption diagram shall show the location of the data encryption
24
engine within the data path. The evaluator shall validate that the hardware encryption
25
diagram contains enough detail showing the main components within the data path
26
and that it clearly identifies the data encryption engine.
27
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Appendix F: Glossary
1
Term Meaning
Authorization Factor A value that a user knows, has, or is (e.g. password, token, etc.)
submitted to the TOE to establish that the user is in the community
authorized to use the hard disk. This value is used in the derivation or
decryption of the BEV and eventual decryption of the DEK. Note
that these values may or may not be used to establish the particular
identity of the user.
Assurance Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC1].
Border Encryption Value A value passed from the AA to the EE intended to link the key chains
of the two components.
Key Sanitization A method of sanitizing encrypted data by securely overwriting the
key that was encrypting the data.
Data Encryption Key (DEK) A key used to encrypt data-at-rest.
Full Drive Encryption Refers to partitions of logical blocks of user accessible data as
managed by the host system that indexes and partitions and an
operating system that maps authorization to read or write data to
blocks in these partitions. For the sake of this Security Program
Definition (SPD) and cPP, FDE performs encryption and
authorization on one partition, so defined and supported by the OS
and file system jointly, under consideration. FDE products encrypt all
data (with certain exceptions) on the partition of the storage device
and permits access to the data only after successful authorization to
the FDE solution. The exceptions include the necessity to leave a
portion of the storage device (the size may vary based on
implementation) unencrypted for such things as the Master Boot
Record (MBR) or other AA/EE pre-authentication software. These
FDE cPPs interpret the term “full drive encryption” to allow FDE
solutions to leave a portion of the storage device unencrypted so long
as it contains no protected data.
Intermediate Key A key used in a point between the initial user authorization and the
DEK.
Host Platform The local hardware and software the TOE is running on, and does not
include any peripheral devices (e.g. USB devices) that may be
connected to the local hardware and software.
Key Chaining The method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to protect
data. A top layer key encrypts a lower layer key which encrypts the
data; this method can have any number of layers.
Key Encryption Key (KEK) A key used to encrypt other keys, such as DEKs or storage that
contains keys.
Key Material Key material is commonly known as critical security parameter
(CSP) data, and also includes authorization data, nonces, and
metadata.
Key Release Key (KRK) A key used to release another key from storage, it is not used for the
direct derivation or decryption of another key.
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Term Meaning
Operating System (OS) Software which runs at the highest privilege level and can directly
control hardware resources.
Non-Volatile Memory A type of computer memory that will retain information without
power.
Powered-Off State The device has been shut down.
Protected Data This refers to all data on the storage device with the exception of a
small portion required for the TOE to function correctly. It is all
space on the disk a user could write data to and includes the
operating system, applications, and user data. Protected data does not
include the Master Boot Record or Pre-authentication area of the
drive – areas of the drive that are necessarily unencrypted.
Submask A submask is a bit string that can be generated and stored in a
number of ways.
Target of Evaluation A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance. [CC1]
See [CC1] for other Common Criteria abbreviations and terminology.
1
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Appendix G: Acronyms
1
Acronym Meaning
AA Authorization Acquisition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BEV Border Encryption Value
BIOS Basic Input Output System
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CCM Counter with CBC-Message Authentication Code
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DEK Data Encryption Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS Digital Signature Standard
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EE Encryption Engine
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FDE Full Drive Encryption
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HW Hardware
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
ISO/IEC International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical
Commission
IV Initialization Vector
KEK Key Encryption Key
KMD Key Management Description
KRK Key Release Key
MBR Master Boot Record
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PRF Pseudo Random Function
RBG Random Bit Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SED Self Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SFR Security Functional Requirements
ST Security Target
SPD Security Problem Definition
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Acronym Meaning
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
TOE Target of Evaluation
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSS TOE Summary Specification
USB Universal Serial Bus
XOR Exclusive or
XTS XEX (XOR Encrypt XOR) Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing
1
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Appendix H: References
1
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-38F,
2
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping,
3
National Institute of Standards and Technology, December 2012.
4
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-56B,
5
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization
6
Cryptography, National Institute of Standards and Technology, August 2009.
7
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-88 Revision
8
1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
9
December 2014.
10
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-90A,
11
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
12
Generators, National Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2012.
13
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-132,
14
Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation Part 1: Storage Applications, National
15
Institute of Standards and Technology, December 2010.
16
Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 186-4, Digital Signature
17
Standard (DSS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 2013.
18
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
19
Commission (IEC) 9796-2:2010 (3rd
edition), Information technology — Security techniques
20
— Digital signature schemes giving message recovery, International Organization for
21
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010.
22
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
23
Commission (IEC) 9797-2:2011 (2nd
edition), Information technology — Security techniques
24
— Message Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-
25
function, International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical
26
Commission, 2011.
27
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
28
Commission (IEC) 10116:2006 (3rd
edition), Information technology — Security techniques
29
— Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, International Organization for
30
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission, 2006.
31
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
32
Commission (IEC) 10118-3:2004 (3rd
edition), Information technology — Security
33
techniques — Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions, International Organization
34
for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission, 2004.
35
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International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
1
Commission (IEC) 14888-3:2006 (2nd
edition), Information technology — Security
2
techniques —Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based
3
mechanisms, International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical
4
Commission, 2006.
5
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
6
Commission (IEC) 18031:2011 (2nd
edition), Information technology — Security techniques
7
— Random bit generation, International Organization for Standardization/International
8
Electrotechnical Commission, 2011.
9
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
10
Commission (IEC) 18033-3:2011 (3rd
edition), Information technology — Security
11
techniques — Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, International Organization for
12
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission, 2011.
13
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical
14
Commission (IEC) 19772:2009, Information technology — Security techniques
15
Authenticated encryption, International Organization for Standardization/International
16
Electrotechnical Commission, 2009.
17