BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
Common Criteria Protection Profile
electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT)
Version 1.73
from the
Federal Office for Information Security
on behalf of the
Federal Ministry of Health
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-407 V3.02
BSI – Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
Common Criteria Protection Profile
electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT)
Version 1.73
developed by Federal Office for Information Security
on behalf of Federal Ministry of Health
Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by
ADO_DEL.2 – Detection of modification
ADV_LLD.1 – Descriptive low-level design
ADV_IMP.1 – Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_SPM.1 – Informal TOE security policy model
ALC_TAT.1 – Well-defined development tools
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
Common Criteria
Arrangement
The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, (CEM), Version 2.3
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction
with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection
Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect
to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 07. December 2007
The President of the Federal Office for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
IV
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for
Protection Profiles (PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for
a category of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for
IT security. The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an
existent one gives consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs
without referring to a special product. Product or system certifications can be
based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on
a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued.
Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI
or a sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the
Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1].
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different
countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such
certificates are based on CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
2.1 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of
Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The PP electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73 has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the PP electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73
was conducted by the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 04. December 2007. The ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Federal Ministry of
Health
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as
indicated.
In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity
can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor
applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the
modified Protection Profile, in accordance with the procedural requirements,
and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-2
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
5 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-8.
The PP electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified Protection Profiles, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the Protection Profile. The Certification Report may also be obtained in
electronic form at the internet address stated above.
7
Federal Office for Information Security
Godesberger Allee 185-189
53175 Bonn, Germany
A-3
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
A-4
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the certified Protection Profile,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Protection Profile Overview 3
2 Security Functional Requirements 3
3 Assurance Requirements 4
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation 5
5 Obligations and notes for the usage 5
6 Protection Profile Document 5
7 Definitions 5
8 Bibliography 7
B-2
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
1 Protection Profile Overview
This Protection Profile electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73 is
established by the Federal Ministry of Health as a basis for the development of
Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product (TOE).
The TOE described in this Protection Profile is a smart card terminal which is
intended to be used together with the German electronic Health Card (eHC) and
the German Health Professional Card (HPC) based on the regulations of the
German healthcare system.
This terminal bases on the specification for a “Secure Interoperable Chip Card
terminal” ([9]) extended and limited by the specifications for the e-health
terminal itself ([8]).
In its core functionality the TOE is not different from any other smart card
terminal which provides an interface to one or more smart cards including a
mean to securely enter a PIN.
Additionally the TOE provides a network interface which allows to route the
communication of a smart card to a remote IT product outside the TOE. The
TOE provides the following main functions:
• access to one or more slots for smart cards,
• secure network connectivity,
• secure PIN entry functionality,
• enforcement of the encryption of communication,
• user authentication,
• management of network settings and
• update of Firmware
The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are
defined in the Protection Profile [7], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the
security environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and
Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Protection Profile [7],
chapter 3.
These Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies are split into
Security Objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP
and Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the IT-Environment of a TOE claiming
conformance to this PP.
2 Security Functional Requirements
Based on the Security Objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance
to this PP the security policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional
Requirements to be implemented by a TOE. It covers the following issues:
B-3
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
• The smart card terminal signals that it is in a secure state. Only in this state
the user shall enter confidential data like the PIN for the creation of digital
signatures.
• If the smart card terminal is in its secure state all data exchanged with a
connector must be protected by means of the TLS-protocol.
• The SFP of the smart card terminal requires several mechanisms for the
mutual or unidirectional authentication towards a connector.
• The smart card terminal provides a functionality to update the firmware. The
security policy requires that an update is only permitted if certain access
conditions are fulfilled.
• The management of security relevant settings is restricted to successfully
identified and authenticated personnel.
• A TOE conformant to this PP must be able to perform self tests and react
securely if these tests fail.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) are outlined in the PP [7],
chapter 5. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the SFR
claim is called:
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
The Protection Profile defines Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the IT-
Environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP. These objectives are
outlined in the PP [7], chapter 4.2.
3 Assurance Requirements
The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based
entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria.
Thus, this assurance package is called:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by
ADO_DEL.2 – Detection of modification
ADV_LLD.1 – Descriptive low-level design
ADV_IMP.1 – Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_SPM.1 – Informal TOE security policy model
ALC_TAT.1 – Well-defined development tools
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see part C
of this report or [1], part 3 for details).
B-4
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [6] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance
components of the class APE.
The following assurance components were used:
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_DES.1 TOE description
APE_ENV.1 Security Environment
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives
APE_SRE.1 Explicitly stated IT security requirements
APE_REQ.1 IT security requirements
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as
defined in chapter 1.
5 Obligations and notes for the usage
The Protection Profile was developed in accordance with the corresponding
specifications [8] and [9]. An update of these specifications may imply changes
on the Protection Profile to cover the requirements of the changed specification.
6 Protection Profile Document
The Protection Profile electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73 [7]
is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
7 Definitions
7.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eHC electronic Health Card
eHCT electronic Health Card Terminal
HPC Health Professional Card
IT Information Technology
B-5
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
7.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
B-6
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
Transport Layer Security Protocol - The TLS protocol allows applications to
communicate across a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
8 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
- AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-
schema.
- AIS 38, Version 2, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation
results
B-7
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
B-8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Version, Date, Document Title, T-Systems
GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Protection Profile, electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73,
29.11.2007, Federal Office for Information Security
[8] Spezifikation eHealth-Kartenterminal, Version 2.2.0, 24.08.2007, gematik
Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
[9] SICCT Secure Interoperable ChipCard Terminal, Version 1.20,
19.11.2007, TeleTrusT Deutschland e.V.
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
C-1
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements”
C-2
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
C-3
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-4
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
C-5
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
C-6
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
C-7
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
C-8
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Common Criteria Protection Profile electronic Health Card
Terminal (eHCT), version 1.73 [7] is provided within a separate
document.
D-1
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0032-2007
D-2
This page is intentionally left blank.