Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
Encryption – Authorization Acquisition, Version 1.0,
January 26, 2015
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-PP-0037
Dated: 15 September 2017
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Base and Additional Requirements
UL Verification Services Inc.
709 Fiero Ln Suite 25
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary..................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification................................................................................................................ 4
3 CPPFDEAA Description............................................................................................. 5
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives............................................................. 5
4.1 Assumptions......................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Threats.................................................................................................................. 7
4.3 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................... 7
4.4 Security Objectives .............................................................................................. 7
5 Requirements............................................................................................................... 8
6 Assurance Requirements ........................................................................................... 10
7 Results of the evaluation............................................................................................ 10
8 Glossary..................................................................................................................... 11
9 Bibliography.............................................................................................................. 11
Table of Tables
Table 1: Assumptions ......................................................................................................... 6
Table 2: Threats .................................................................................................................. 7
Table 3: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.......................................... 8
Table 4: TOE Security Functional Requirements............................................................... 8
Table 5: Optional Requirements......................................................................................... 9
Table 6: Selection-Based Requirements ............................................................................. 9
Table 7: Assurance Requirements .................................................................................... 10
Table 8: Results................................................................................................................. 10
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of the Security Requirements for Full Drive Encryption -
Authorization Acquisition (Version 1.0) collaborative Protection Profile (cPPFDEAA10). It presents
a summary of the cPPFDEAA10 and the evaluation results.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the cPPFDEAA10 was performed
concurrent with the first product evaluation against the cPP’s requirements. In this case the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) for this first product was the ASURRE-StorTM Solid State Self-Encrypting Drives.
The evaluation was performed by the UL Verification Services, Inc. Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) in San Luis Obispo, California, United States of America, and was completed in
August 2017. This evaluation addressed the base requirements of the cPPFDEAA10 as well as some,
but not all, of the objective and selection-based requirements in the cPP.
Additional review of the cPP to confirm that it meets the claimed APE assurance requirements was
performed independently by the VR author as part of the completion of this VR.
The evaluation determined that the CPPFDEAA v.3.0 is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and
Part 3 Conformant. The cPP identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 4). Because the ST contains material drawn directly from the cPPFDEAA10,
performance of the majority of the ASE work units serves to satisfy the APE work units as well.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the cPPFDEAA10 meets the requirements
of the APE components. These findings were confirmed by the VR author. The conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the assurance activity report are consistent with the evidence produced.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile
containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of CEM work units specific to the
technology described by the cPP.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the cPPFDEAA10 was performed
concurrent with the first product evaluation against the cPP. In this case the TOE for this first product
was Mercury Systems ASURRE-StorTM Solid State Self-Encrypting Drives. The evaluation was
performed by the UL Verification Services Inc. Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in San
Luis Obispo, CA, United States of America, and was completed in August 2017.
The cPPFDEAA10 contains a set of “base” requirements that all conformant STs must include, and in
addition, contains “Optional” and “Selection-Based” requirements. Optional requirements are those
that that specify security functionality that is desirable but is not explicitly required by the cPP. The
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
vendor may choose to include such requirements in the ST and still claim conformance to this cPP.
Selection-Based requirements are those that must be claimed only in certain situations, depending on
the selections made in the base requirements.
Because these discretionary requirements may not be included in a particular ST, the initial use of the
cPP will address (in terms of the cPP evaluation) the base requirements as well as any additional
requirements that are incorporated into that initial ST. Subsequently, TOEs that are evaluated against
the cPPFDEAA10 that incorporate additional requirements that have not been included in any ST prior
to that will be used to evaluate those requirements (APE_REQ), and any appropriate updates to this
validation report will be made.
The following identifies the cPP subject to the evaluation/validation, as well as the supporting
information from the base evaluation performed against this cPP, as well as subsequent evaluations
that address additional optional requirements in the cPPFDEAA10.
Protection Profile Collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption – Authorization
Acquisition, Version 1.0, 26 January 2015
ST (Base) Security Target for Mercury Systems ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-Encrypting
Drives Security Target, Version 1.0, August 21, 2017
Assurance Activity
Report (Base)
Assurance Activity Report VID 10783 17-3660-R-0008, Version 1.2, August 24,
2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Conformant
CCTL UL Verification Services, San Luis Obispo, CA
CCEVS Validators James J. Donndelinger, Aerospace
Kenneth B. Elliot, Aerospace
Herbert J. Ellis, Aerospace
3 CPPFDEAA Description
The cPPFDEAA10 describes the requirements for the Authorization Acquisition piece of a full
drive encryption (FDE) solution and details the security requirements and assurance activities
necessary to interact with a user and result in the availability of sending a Border Encryption
Value (BEV) to the Encryption Engine portion of an FDE.
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives
4.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
Operational Environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the
TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
Table 1: Assumptions
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
A.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE Users enable Full Drive Encryption on a newly provisioned or
initialized storage device free of protected data in areas not
targeted for encryption. The cPP does not intend to include
requirements to find all the areas on storage devices that
potentially contain protected data. In some cases, it may not be
possible - for example, data contained in “bad” sectors. While
inadvertent exposure to data contained in bad sectors or un-
partitioned space is unlikely, one may use forensics tools to
recover data from such areas of the storage device. Consequently,
the cPP assumes bad sectors, un-partitioned space, and areas that
must contain unencrypted code (e.g., MBR and AA/EE pre-
authentication software) contain no protected data.
A.TRUSTED_CHANNEL Communication among and between product components (e.g.,
AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information
disclosure. In cases in which a single product fulfils both cPPs, then
the communication between the components does not extend
beyond the boundary of the TOE (e.g., communication path is
within the TOE boundary). In cases in which independent products
satisfy the requirements of the AA and EE, the physically close
proximity of the two products during their operation means that
the threat agent has very little opportunity to interpose itself in the
channel between the two without the user noticing and taking
appropriate actions.
A.TRAINED_USER Authorized users follow all provided user guidance, including
keeping password/passphrases and external tokens securely
stored separately from the storage device and/or platform.
A.PLATFORM_STATE The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external
storage device is connected) is free of malware that could interfere
with the correct operation of the product.
A.SINGLE_USE_ET External tokens that contain authorization factors are used for no
other purpose than to store the external token authorization
factors.
A.POWER_DOWN The user does not leave the platform and/or storage device
unattended until all volatile memory is cleared after a power-off,
so memory remnant attacks are infeasible. Authorized users do not
leave the platform and/or storage device in a mode where
sensitive information persists in non-volatile storage (e.g.,
Lockscreen). Users power the platform and/or storage device
down or place it into a power managed state, such as a
“hibernation mode”.
A.PASSWORD_STRENGTH Authorized administrators ensure password/passphrase
authorization factors have sufficient strength and entropy to
reflect the sensitivity of the data being protected.
A.PLATFORM_I&A The product does not interfere with or change the normal platform
identification and authentication functionality such as the
operating system login. It may provide authorization factors to the
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
Operating system's login interface, but it will not change or
degrade the functionality of the actual interface.
A.STRONG_CRYPTO All cryptography implemented in the Operational Environment and
used by the product meets the requirements listed in the cPP. This
includes generation of external token authorization factors by a
RBG.
4.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats for the TOE.
Table 2: Threats
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE Possession of any of the keys, authorization factors,
submasks, and random numbers or any other values that
contribute to the creation of keys or authorization factors
could allow an unauthorized user to defeat the encryption.
The cPP considers possession of key material of equal
importance to the data itself. Threat agents may look for key
material in unencrypted sectors of the storage device and on
other peripherals in the operating environment (OE), e.g.
BIOS configuration, SPI flash.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS The cPP addresses the primary threat of unauthorized
disclosure of protected data stored on a storage device. If an
adversary obtains a lost or stolen storage device (e.g., a
storage device contained in a laptop or a portable external
storage device), they may attempt to connect a targeted
storage device to a host of which they have complete control
and have raw access to the storage device (e.g., to specified
disk sectors, to specified blocks).
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE Threat agents may attempt to perform an update of the
product which compromises the security features of the TOE.
Poorly chosen update protocols, signature generation and
verification algorithms, and parameters may allow attackers
to install software and/or firmware that bypasses the
intended security features and provides them unauthorized
to access to data.
4.3 Organizational Security Policies
No organizational policies have been identified that are specific to this cPP.
4.4 Security Objectives
The following table contains objectives for the Operational Environment.
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
Table 3: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Environmental Security Obj. Environmental Security Objective Definition
OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL Communication among and between product components (i.e.,
AA and EE) is sufficiently protected to prevent information
disclosure.
OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage
device free of protected data in areas not targeted for
encryption.
OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring
that the passphrase authorization factor conforms to guidance
from the Enterprise using the TOE.
OE.POWER_DOWN Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant
attacks are infeasible.
OE.SINGLE_USE_ET External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used
for no other purpose than to store the external token
authorization factor.
OE.TRAINED_USERS Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance
for securing the TOE and authorization factors.
OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO The Operating environment will provide a cryptographic
function capability that is commensurate with the requirements
and capabilities of the TOE
OE.PLATFORM_STATE The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external
storage device is connected) is free of malware that could
interfere with the correct operation of the product.
OE.PLATFORM_I&A The Operational Environment will provide individual user
identification and authentication mechanisms that operate
independently of the authorization factors used by the TOE.
5 Requirements
As indicated above, requirements in the cPPFDEAA10 are comprised of the “base” requirements and
optional additional requirements. The following are table contains the “base” requirements that were
validated as part of the Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition evaluation activity
referenced above. The following table lists the TOE Security Functional Requirements/
Table 4: TOE Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FCS:
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor
Acquisition
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key and Key
Material Destruction
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management
Functions
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key
Material
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
The table below lists the “Optional” requirements.
Table 5: Optional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FCS:
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Salt, Nonce, and Initialization
Vector Generation
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
(Asymmetric Keys)
FCS_CKM.1(c): Cryptographic Key Generation
(Symmetric Keys)
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_COP.1(a): Signature Verification ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_COP.1(b): Hash Algorithm ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_COP.1(c): Keyed Hash Algorithm ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_SMC_EXT.1: Submask Combining
FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
The table below lists the “Selection-Based” requirements.
Table 6: Selection-Based Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FCS:
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_COP.1(d): Cryptographic Operation (Key
Wrapping)
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_COP.1(e): Cryptographic Operation (Key
Transport)
FCS_COP.1(f): Cryptographic Operation (AES
Data Encryption/ Decryption)
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic Operation (Key
Encryption)
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation
(Random Bit Generation)
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password
Construct and Conditioning
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
6 Assurance Requirements
The following are the assurance requirements contained in the cPPFDEAA10:
Table 7: Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
ASE: Security
Target
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance Claims ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_ECD.1: Extended Components
Definition
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_INT.1: ST Introduction ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_OBJ.1: Security Objectives for the
Operational Environment
ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_REQ.1: Stated Security Requirements ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_SPD.1: Security Problem Definition ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ASE_TSS.1: TOE Summary Specification ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ADV:
Development
ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.1: Labeling of the TOE ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Sample ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
AVA: Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
7 Results of the evaluation
Note that for APE elements and work units that are identical to APE elements and work units, the lab
performed the APE work units concurrent to the ASE work units.
Table 8: Results
APE Requirement Evaluation Verdict Verified By
APE_CCL.1 Pass ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
APE_ECD.1 Pass ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
APE_INT.1 Pass ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
APE_OBJ.1 Pass ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
APE_REQ.1 Pass ASURRE-StorTM
Solid State Self-
Encrypting Drives Security Target
8 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is
correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology as interpreted by the supplemental guidance in the CPPFDEAA
Assurance Activities to determine whether or not the claims made are justified.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer
by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
9 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, dated: September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, dated: September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, dated: September 2012.
Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition (FDE AA) 1.0 Validation Report, 15 September 2017
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
dated: September 2012.
[5] UL Verification Services Inc., Assurance Activity Report VID 10783 17-3660-R-0008, Version
1.2, 24 August 2017.
[6] UL Verification Services Inc., Security Target for Mercury Systems ASURRE-StorTM
Solid
State Self-Encrypting Drives, Version 1.0, 21 August 2017.
[7] Full Drive Encryption – Authorization Acquisition Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 26
January 2015
[8] Full Drive Encryption: Authorization Acquisition Supporting Document, Version 1.0,
January 2015