Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Certification Report
BSI-PP-0017-2005
Protection Profile
for
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control
Version 1.0
developed on behalf of the
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Certificate BSI-PP-0017-2005
Protection Profile
for
Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control, Version 1.0
developed on behalf of the
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany
Assurance Package: EAL 4 augmented with
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria Arrangement
Bonn, 26. October 2005 The Vice President of the Federal
Office for Information Security
Hange L.S.
The Protection Profile mentioned above was evaluated at an accredited and licenced/approved evaluation facility on the basis of the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408) applying the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification
Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the Federal Office for Information
Security. The conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as
well as for Protection Profiles (PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for
a category of TOEs which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT
security. The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an
existent one gives consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs
without referring to a special product. Product or system certifications can be
based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on
a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued.
Certification of a Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the author,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the
Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1].
The evaluation is carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or
by the BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-PP-0017-2005
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Annex: Protection Profile
VI
BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011
• BSI Certification - Description of the Procedure (BSI 7125)
• Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6,
Part 2 Version 1.0
• Biometrics Evaluation Methodology Supplement, Version 1.0, August
2002
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Bundesamtes für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamtes für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July
1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0017-2005
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different
countries a mutual recognition of Protection Profile certificates under certain
conditions was agreed.
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005 and India in April 2005.
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BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, Version 1.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at the BSI.
The evaluation of the Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, Version 1.0 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation facility of SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
Developer is the ‘Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)‘ on behalf of the
‘Federal Ministry of the Interior, Germany’.
The certification was concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the preparation of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 26. October 2005.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0017-2005
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-10.
The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, Version 1.0 has been included in the BSI list
of certified and registered Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained via
the BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report may be ordered from the BSI7
. The
Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
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BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
B Certification Results
Content of the Certification Results
1 PP Overview 2
2 Security Functional Requirements 3
3 Assurance Package 6
4 Strength of Functions 6
5 Results of the Evaluation 6
6 Definitions 7
7 Bibliography 8
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1 PP Overview
The Protection Profile (PP) [7] defines the security objectives and requirements
for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based
on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the security method Basic Access Control in
the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) defined in the PP is the contactless integrated
circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [8] and providing the Basic
Access Control according to the ICAO document [9].
The TOE comprises the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors, the IC
Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software, the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
the MRTD application and the associated guidance documentation. The TOE is
usually integrated into a passport book of an MRTD holder for whom the issuing
state or organisation has personalised the MRTD.
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases: Phase 1
“Development”, Phase 2 “Manufacturing”, Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”, Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The intention of the PP is to consider at
least the phases 1 and 2 as part of the evaluation and therefore define TOE
delivery according to CC after phase 2 or later.
The PP defines the following Security Objectives for the TOE:
Identifier for Sec.Objective Issue addressed by the Security Objective
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
Table 1: Security Objectives for the TOE
The PP defines the Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE divided
into several categories:
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BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
Identifier for Sec.Objective Issue addressed by the Security Objective
Security Objectives for the
Development and Manufacturing
Environment
OD.Assurance Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment
OD.Material Control over MRTD Material
Security Objectives for the
Operational Environment
For the Issuing State or Organisation:
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
For the Receiving State or
organization:
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD
For the MRTD Holder:
OE.Secure_Handling Secure handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder
Table 2: Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE
For details and application notes refer to the PP chapter 3.5. Security
Functional Requirements for the TOE and for the IT-Environment are derived
from these Security Objectives as outlined in the following chapter.
2 Security Functional Requirements
This section contains the functional requirements that must be satisfied by a
TOE which is compliant to the Protection Profile. The TOE Security Functional
Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part
2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0017-2005
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 (PRIM) Subset access control – Primary Access
Control
FDP_ACC.1 (BASIC) Subset access control – Basic Access
control
FDP_ACF.1 (PRIM) Security attribute based access control –
Primary Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 (Basic) Security attribute based access control –
Basic Access Control
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms -
Single-use authentication of the Terminal by
the TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of
Terminal by the TOE
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
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The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the PP chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction – BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure
messaging Message Authentication Code by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic
Terminal
FDP User data protection
FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive
Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic
Terminal
FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –
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Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity -
Personalization Terminal Authentication with
Symmetric Key
Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the PP chapter 5.
3 Assurance Package
The security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. The assurance
requirements comply with assurance level EAL 4 augmented (Evaluation
Assurance Level 4 augmented).
The following table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed and tested
+: ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
Table 6: SFRs for the IT-Environment
4 Strength of Functions
The minimum strength of function level is claimed SOF-high and covers but is
not limited to the TSF required by the SFR FIA_UAU.4, FCS_RND.1 and
FPT_FLS.1 as far as probabilistic or permutational mechanisms are involved.
A TOEs implemented security functions shall meet this claimed strength from
design and construction point of view. The strength of function available in a
specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the selection of the
data used to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore the issuing state
or organisation is responsible for the strength of function that can be achieved
in a specific system context. This has to be assessed in the specific system
context.
5 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [6] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
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BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
The verdict for the CC, Part 3 assurance component (according the class APE
for the Protection Profile evaluation) is summarised in the following table.
CC Aspect Result
CC Class APE PASS
APE_DES.1 PASS
APE_ENV.1 PASS
APE_INT.1 PASS
APE_OBJ.1 PASS
APE_REQ.1 PASS
APE_SRE.1 PASS
Table 7: Assurance class
The Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, Version 1.0 meets the requirements for
Protection Profiles as specified in class APE of the CC.
6 Definitions
6.1 Acronyms
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD Machine readable travel document
MRZ Machine readable zone
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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6.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in Part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 of
the CC.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE secu-
rity by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or inten-
tional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack poten-
tial.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack poten-
tial.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evalua-
tion.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firm-
ware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
8 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
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BSI-PP-0017-2005 Certification Report
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Evaluation Technical Report for a PP evaluation, Version 1.1, 26. August
2005, Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, SRC
(confidential document)
[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, Version
1.0, 18. August 2005, BSI
[8] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[9] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version -
1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organization
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C Annex: Protection Profile
The Protection Profile (PP) [7] is provided within a separate document.
C-1