



Federal Office
for Information Security



Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP)

Schutzprofil für das Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen



SecMod-PP

Version 1.02 – 18 October 2013

Certification-ID BSI-CC-PP-0077

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Postfach 20 03 63
53133 Bonn
Tel.: +49 228 99 9582-0
E-Mail: bsi@bsi.bund.de
Internet: <http://www.bsi.bund.de>
© Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 2013

Table of content

1. PP Introduction.....	5
1.1 Introduction.....	5
1.2 PP Reference.....	6
1.3 Specific Terms.....	6
1.4 TOE Overview.....	8
1.4.1 Introduction.....	8
1.4.2 Description of the Smart Metering System.....	9
1.4.3 The TOE in the Smart Metering System.....	10
1.4.4 TOE Type.....	11
1.4.5 TOE Physical Boundary.....	11
1.4.6 TOE Logical Boundary.....	11
1.4.7 Interface of the TOE.....	12
1.4.8 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware.....	12
1.5 TOE Life Cycle Model.....	12
2. Conformance Claim.....	17
2.1 CC Conformance Claim.....	17
2.2 PP Claim.....	17
2.3 Package Claim.....	17
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale.....	18
2.5 Conformance Statement.....	18
3. Security Problem Definition.....	19
3.1 Subjects and External Entities.....	19
3.2 Assets.....	20
3.3 Assumptions.....	23
3.4 Threats.....	24
3.5 Organisational Security Policies	27
4. Security Objectives.....	29
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.....	29
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.....	32
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....	34
4.3.1 Overview.....	34
4.3.2 Countering the Threats.....	36
4.3.3 Coverage of Organisational Security Policies.....	39
4.3.4 Coverage of Assumptions.....	40
5. Extended Component Definition.....	41
5.1 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS.....	41
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG.....	42
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM.....	43

6. Security Requirements.....	45
6.1 Overview.....	45
6.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.....	47
6.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection.....	56
6.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication.....	61
6.5 Class FMT: Security Management.....	65
6.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.....	67
6.7 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels.....	70
6.8 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.....	70
6.9 Security Requirements Rationale.....	71
6.9.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.....	71
6.9.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.....	80
6.9.3 Security Requirements – Internal Consistency.....	80
7. Appendix.....	82
7.1 Acronyms.....	82
7.2 Glossary.....	83
7.3 Mapping from English to German Terms.....	84
7.4 References.....	85
7.4.1 Common Criteria.....	85
7.4.2 Protection Profiles.....	86
7.4.3 Technical Guidelines and Specifications	86
7.4.4 Other Sources.....	87

List of Tables

Table 1: Specific Terms.....	8
Table 2: TOE Life Cycle Model.....	15
Table 3: External Entities and Subjects.....	20
Table 4: Assets / User Data.....	22
Table 5: Assets / TSF Data.....	22
Table 6: Rationale for Security Objectives for the TOE.....	34
Table 7: Rationale for Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.....	35
Table 8: List of Security Functional Requirements.....	46
Table 9: Assurance Requirements.....	71
Table 10: Fulfilment of Security Objectives.....	73
Table 11: SFR Dependencies.....	79

List of Figures

Figure 1: The TOE and its Direct Environment.....	9
---	---

1. PP Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The increasing use of *green energy* and upcoming technologies around e-mobility lead to an increasing demand for functions of a so called smart grid. A smart grid hereby refers to a commodity¹ network that intelligently integrates the behaviour and actions of all entities connected to it – suppliers of natural resources and energy, its consumers and those that are both – in order to efficiently ensure a more sustainable, economic and secure supply of a certain commodity (definition adopted from [CEN]).

In its vision such a smart grid would allow to invoke consumer devices to regulate the load and availability of resources or energy in the grid, e.g. by using consumer devices to store energy or by triggering the use of energy based upon the current load of the grid²). Basic features of such a smart use of energy or resources are already reality. Providers of electricity in Germany, for example, have to offer at least one tariff that has the purpose to motivate the consumer to save energy.

In the past, the production of electricity followed the demand/consumption of the consumers. Considering the strong increase in renewable energy and the production of energy as a side effect in heat generation today, the consumption/demand has to follow the – often externally controlled – production of energy. Similar mechanisms can exist for the gas network to control the feed of biogas or hydrogen based on information submitted by consumer devices.

An essential aspect for all considerations of a smart grid is the so called Smart Metering System that meters the consumption or production of certain commodities at the consumer's side and allows sending the information about the consumption or production to external entities, which is then the basis for e.g. billing the consumption or production. The central communication component of such a Smart Metering System (please refer to chapter 1.4.2 for a more detailed overview) is a Gateway that connects to the LAN of the consumer and the outside world. The Gateway collects, processes and stores the records from Meter(s) and ensures that only authorised parties have access to them or derivatives thereof. Relevant information will be signed and encrypted before sending using the cryptographic services of a Security Module, which is embedded as an integral part into a Gateway.

This Protection Profile defines the security objectives and corresponding security requirements for a Security Module that is utilised by the Gateway for cryptographic support. Typically, a Security Module is realised in form of a smart card (but is not limited to that). The PP is directed to developers of Smart Metering Systems (or their components) and informs them about the security requirements that have to be implemented. It is further directed to stakeholders being responsible for purchasing Smart Metering Systems.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) that is described in this document is an electronic unit comprising hardware and software used by the Gateway for central cryptographic services and secure storage of cryptographic keys and further data relevant to the Gateway.

¹ Commodities can be electricity, gas, water or heat which is distributed from its generator to the consumer through a grid (network).

² Please note that such a functionality requires a consent or a contract between the supplier and the consumer, alternatively a regulatory requirement.

The TOE is intended to be used by the Gateway for its operation in a Smart Metering System as a cryptographic service provider for different cryptographic functionalities based on elliptic curve cryptography as the generation and verification of digital signatures and key agreement which is used by the Gateway in the framework of TLS, content data signature and content data encryption. The Security Module contains the cryptographic identity of the Gateway, and it serves as a reliable source for random numbers as well as a secure storage for cryptographic keys and certificates.

1.2 PP Reference

Title:	Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP)
Version:	1.02
Date:	18 October 2013
Authors:	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) / Federal Office for Information Security, Germany
Registration:	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) / Federal Office for Information Security Germany
Certification-ID:	BSI-CC-PP-0077
Evaluation Assurance Level:	The assurance level for this PP is EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
CC Version:	V3.1 Revision 4
Keywords:	Smart Metering, Smart Meter Gateway, Meter, Security Module, Protection Profile, PP

1.3 Specific Terms

Various different vocabularies exist in the area of Smart Grid, Smart Metering, and Home Automation. Further, the Common Criteria maintain their own vocabulary. The following table provides an overview over the most prominent terms that are used in this Protection Profile and should serve to avoid any bias. A list of acronyms, a glossary and a mapping from English to German terms can be found in chapters 7.1 to 7.3.

Term	Definition	Source
CLS, Controllable Local Systems	CLS are systems containing IT-components in the Home Area Network (HAN) of the consumer that do not belong to the Smart Metering System but may	[PP 73]

Term	Definition	Source
	<p>use the Gateway for dedicated communication purposes.</p> <p>CLS may range from local power generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household appliances (“white goods”) to applications in home automation.</p>	
Commodity	Electricity, gas, water or heat ³ .	---
Consumer	End user or local producer of electricity, gas, water or heat (or other commodities).	[CEN]
Gateway Smart Meter Gateway ⁴	<p>Device or unit responsible for collecting Meter Data, processing Meter Data, providing communication capabilities for devices in the LMN, protecting devices in the LAN and providing cryptographic primitives (in cooperation with the TOE).</p> <p>The Gateway is specified in [PP 73] and combines aspects of the following devices according to [CEN]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meter Data Collector • Meter Data Management System • Meter Data Aggregator <p>The Gateway does not aim to be a complete implementation of those devices but focusses on the required security functionality.</p>	---
HAN, Home Area Network	In-house data communication network which interconnects domestic equipment and can be used for energy management purposes.	[CEN], adopted
LAN, Local Area Network	Data communication network, connecting a limited number of communication devices (Meters and other devices) and covering a moderately sized geographical area within the premises of the consumer. In the context of this PP the term LAN is used as a hypernym for HAN and LMN.	[CEN], adopted
LMN, Local Metrological Network	In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment.	---

³ Please note that this list does not claim to be complete.

⁴ Please note that the terms “Gateway” and “Smart Meter Gateway” are used synonymously within this document.

Term	Definition	Source
Meter	<p>The term Meter refers to a unit for measuring the consumption or production of a certain commodity with additional functionality. It collects consumption or production data and transmit these data to the gateway. As not all aspects of a Smart Meter according to [CEN] are implemented in the descriptions within this document the term Meter is used.</p> <p>The Meter has to be able to encrypt and sign the data it sends and will typically deploy a Security Module for this.</p> <p>Please note that the term Meter refers to metering devices for all kinds of commodities.</p>	[CEN], adopted
Meter Data	<p>Meter readings that allow calculation of the quantity of a commodity, for example electricity, gas, water or heat consumed or produced over a period.</p> <p>Other readings and data may also be included⁵ (such as quality data, events and alarms).</p>	[CEN]
Security Module	Security Module that is utilised by the Gateway for cryptographic support – e.g. realised in form of a smart card. The requirements for the Security Module are defined in this PP.	---
User, external entity	Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary.	[CC1]
WAN, Wide Area Network	Extended data communication network connecting a large number of communication devices over a large geographical area.	[CEN]

Table 1: Specific Terms

1.4 TOE Overview

1.4.1 Introduction

The TOE as defined in this Protection Profile is the Security Module contained in the Gateway of a Smart Metering System. In the following chapters, the overall Smart Metering System will be described at first and afterwards the Gateway and the Security Module itself.

⁵ Please note that these readings and data may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer.

1.4.2 Description of the Smart Metering System

The following figure provides an overview over the TOE as part of a complete Smart Metering System from a purely functional perspective as used in this PP.⁶ Please note that the arrows of the interfaces within the Smart Metering System as shown in Figure 1 indicate the flow of information (which is bi-directional). However, it does not indicate that a communication flow can be initiated bi-directionally.




Figure 1: The TOE and its Direct Environment

As can be seen in Figure 1, a Smart Metering System comprises different functional units in the context of the descriptions in this PP:

- The **Gateway** (as defined in [PP 73]) serves as the communication component between the components in the LAN of the consumer and the outside world. It can be seen as a special kind of firewall dedicated to the Smart Metering functionality. It also collects, processes and stores the records from Meter(s) and ensures that only authorised parties have access to them or derivatives thereof. Before sending relevant information⁷ the information will be signed and encrypted using the services of the TOE. The Gateway features a mandatory user interface, enabling authorised consumers to access the data relevant to them. The Gateways will be evaluated

⁶ It should be noted that this description purely contains aspects that are relevant to motivate and understand the functionalities of the Security Module as described in this PP. It does not aim to provide a universal description of a Smart Metering System for all application cases.

⁷ Please note that these readings and data which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer.

separately according to the requirements in the corresponding Protection Profile (see [PP 73]).

- The **Meter** itself records the consumption or production of one or more commodities (e.g. electricity, gas, water, heat) in defined intervals and submits those records to the Gateway. The Meter Data has to be signed before transfer in order to ensure their authenticity and integrity. The Meter is comparable to a classical meter⁸ and has comparable security requirements; it will be sealed as classical meters are today according to the regulations of [PTB_A50.7]. The Meter further supports the encryption of its connection to the Gateway⁹.
- The Gateway utilises the services of a **Security Module** as a cryptographic service provider for different cryptographic functionalities based on elliptic curve cryptography as the generation and verification of digital signatures and key agreement which is used by the Gateway in the framework of TLS, content data signature and content data encryption. The Security Module contains the cryptographic identity of the Gateway, and it serves as a reliable source for random numbers as well as a secure storage for cryptographic keys and certificates. The Security Module is addressed within this Protection Profile. It is embedded into the Gateway and directly communicates with the Gateway.
- **Controllable Local Systems** (CLS, as shown in Figure 1) may range from local power generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household appliances (“white goods”) to applications in home automation. CLS may utilise the services of the Gateway for communication services.

1.4.3 The TOE in the Smart Metering System

While the Gateway is the central unit in the Smart Metering System that collects, processes and stores Meter Data and that communicates with external parties, the Security Module (TOE) supports the Gateway for specific cryptographic needs and is responsible for certain cryptographic services that are invoked by the Gateway for its operation in a Smart Metering System. These services are in detail:

- Digital Signature Generation,
- Digital Signature Verification,
- Key Agreement for TLS,
- Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
- Key Pair Generation,
- Random Number Generation,
- Component Authentication via the PACE-Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
- Secure Messaging, and

⁸ In this context, a classical meter denotes a meter without a communication channel, i.e. whose values have to be read out locally.

⁹ It should be noted that it is not implied that the connection is cable based. It is also possible that the connections as shown in Figure 1 are realised deploying a wireless technology. However, the requirements on how the connections shall be secured apply regardless of the realisation.

- Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.

1.4.4 TOE Type

The Security Module (TOE) is a service provider for the Gateway for cryptographic functionality in type of a hardware security module with appropriate software installed. It provides an external communication interface to the Gateway, so that the cryptographic service functionality provided by the TOE can be utilized by the Gateway via this interface. Moreover, the TOE serves as a secure storage for cryptographic keys and certificates and further sensitive data relevant for the Gateway.

1.4.5 TOE Physical Boundary

The TOE comprises the hardware and software that is relevant for the security functionality of the Security Module as defined in this PP.

Hint: The Security Module is physically embedded into the Gateway and is therefore physically protected by the same level of physical protection as assumed for and provided by the environment of the Gateway.

1.4.6 TOE Logical Boundary

The logical boundary of the Security Module (TOE) can be defined by its major security functionality:

- Digital Signature Generation,
- Digital Signature Verification,
- Key Agreement for TLS,
- Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
- Key Pair Generation,
- Random Number Generation,
- Component Authentication via the PACE-Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
- Secure Messaging, and
- Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.

All these security features are used by the Gateway to uphold the overall security of the Smart Metering System.

The TOE and its security functionality is specified from a technical point of view in [TR-03109-2]. A detailed description of the security functionality provided by the TOE for use by the Gateway and in particular a detailed description of the TOE's collaboration and interaction with the Gateway can be found in [TR-03109-1], [TR-03109-2] and [PP 73].

1.4.7 Interface of the TOE

Neither [TR-03109-1] and [TR-03109-2] nor this PP prescribe the technology for the communication between the TOE and the Gateway on the physical level. On a logical level the communication between the TOE and the Gateway follows the requirements outlined in [TR-03109-2] and is therefore oriented on [ISO 7816-4], [ISO 7816-8] and [ISO 7816-9].

1.4.8 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE is the Security Module intended to be used by a Smart Meter Gateway in a Smart Metering System. It is an independent product in the sense that it does not require any additional hardware, firmware or software to ensure its security. However, as the Security Module is physically embedded into the Smart Meter Gateway the Security Module is in addition protected by the same level of physical protection as assumed for and provided by the environment of the Smart Meter Gateway.

In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate the TOE needs an appropriate device for power supply. For regular communication, the TOE requires a device whose implementation matches the TOE's interface specification, refer to [TR-03109-2].

1.5 TOE Life Cycle Model

The TOE life cycle model is oriented on a life cycle model typically used for smartcards and similar devices and is adapted appropriately for the needs in the framework of Smart Metering Systems. Refer in addition to [TR-03109-1] and [TR-03109-2] where a detailed description of the overall life cycle of a Gateway and its Security Module can be found.

In detail, the specific TOE life cycle model covers the following life cycle phases:

Life Cycle Phase		Description
1	Security Module Embedded Software Development	<p>The Security Module Embedded Software Developer is in charge of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the development of the Security Module Embedded Software of the TOE, • the development of the TOE related Application, and • the specification of the IC initialisation and pre-personalisation requirements. <p>The purpose of the Security Module Embedded Software and Application designed and implemented during phase 1 is to control and protect the TOE during the following phases (product usage). The global security requirements of the TOE are such that it is mandatory during the development phase to anticipate the security threats of the other phases.</p>

Life Cycle Phase		Description
2	IC Development	<p>The IC Designer</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • designs the IC, • develops the IC Dedicated Software, • provides information, software or tools to the Security Module Embedded Software Developer, and • receives the Security Module Embedded Software from the developer through trusted delivery and verification procedures (if applicable).
3	IC Manufacturing, Packaging and Testing	<p>The IC Manufacturer and IC Packaging Manufacturer are responsible for producing the IC including</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IC manufacturing, • IC pre-personalisation, • implementing/installing the Security Module Embedded Software in the IC, • IC testing, and • IC packaging (production of IC modules). <p>Depending on the IC technology respective IC type, the concrete processes performed in this phase in combination with the preceding phase 2 can vary. The delivery of the Security Module Embedded Software from the developer is done through trusted delivery and verification procedures.</p>
4	Security Module Product Finishing Process	<p>The Security Module Product Manufacturer is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the initialisation of the TOE, i.e. loading of the initialisation data into the TOE, and • testing of the TOE. <p>The Security Module product finishing process comprises the embedding of the IC modules for the TOE (manufactured in phase 3) and the card production (if applicable, e.g. if the Security Module is realised as a smart card) what may be done alternatively by the Security Module Product</p>

Life Cycle Phase		Description
		Manufacturer or by his customer (e. g. Security Module Issuer).
5	Security Module Integration	<p>The Integrator is responsible for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the integration of the initialised Security Module and the Gateway, and the pre-personalisation of the Security Module, i.e. the generation, installation and import of initial and preliminary key material and certificates on/to the Security Module. <p>The Gateway Administrator is responsible for preparing the initial key and certificate material as relevant for the integration phase.</p> <p>A detailed description of the integration process and its single steps can be found in [TR-03109-1] and [TR-03109-2].</p> <p>Result of this integration phase is the integrated Gateway, consisting of the Gateway and its assigned Security Module. The Gateway and the Security Module are physically and logically connected, the pairing between the Gateway and its Security Module has been carried out, and the Security Module is equipped with initial and preliminary key and certificate material.</p>
6	Security Module End-Usage	<p>At first, during the personalisation of the Security Module in the integrated Gateway, operational key and certificate material is generated, installed and imported on/to the Security Module. This personalisation of the Security Module is task of the Gateway Administrator and is secured by using the initial and preliminary key and certificate material that was set-up in the preceding integration phase (phase 5).</p> <p>Afterwards, the Security Module is used by the Gateway in the Smart Metering System as cryptographic service provider. Administration of the integrated Gateway with its Security Module is performed by the Gateway Administrator.</p> <p>A detailed description of the TOE's end-usage and the TOE's collaboration and interaction with the Gateway in the operational phase (including personalisation, administration and normal operation) can be found in</p>

Life Cycle Phase	Description
	[TR-03109-1], [TR-03109-2] and [PP 73].

Table 2: TOE Life Cycle Model

The CC themselves do not prescribe any specific life cycle model. However, in order to define the application of the assurance classes, the CC assume the following implicit generic life cycle model consisting of the following three phases:

- TOE development (including the development as well as the production of the TOE)
- TOE delivery
- TOE operational use

These three generic phases in the sense of the CC are filled with the specific TOE life cycle model and its six phases as defined in Table 2 above in the following way:

- For the evaluation of the TOE, the phases 1 up to 3 of the TOE life cycle model as defined in Table 2 are part of the phase 'TOE development' in the sense of the CC.
- The phase 4 with the initialisation of the TOE as phase of the TOE life cycle model as defined in Table 2 may alternatively be part of the phase 'TOE development' or the phase 'TOE operational use' in the sense of the CC. The Security Target (ST) author shall define the exact boundary. However, this PP requires that the following conditions have to be met:
 - All executable software in the TOE has to be covered by the evaluation of the TOE.
 - The data structures and the access rights to these data as defined in the Security Module specification [TR-03109-2], in particular the initialisation file itself and its creation and handling are covered by the evaluation of the TOE.
 - The initialisation mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE and their security are as well in the scope of the evaluation of the TOE.
- The phases 5 and 6 with the integration and end-usage of the TOE as phases of the TOE life cycle model as defined in Table 2 are part of the phase 'TOE operational use' in the sense of the CC. These phases 5 and 6 are explicitly in focus of the current PP and its modelling of the TOE's security functionality as carried out in the chapters for the Security Problem Definition, the Security Objectives and the Security Requirements (refer to chapters 3, 4 and 6).

The TOE delivery can take place before or after the TOE's initialisation in phase 4 of the TOE life cycle model as defined in Table 2 above is finished. The ST author has to define the TOE delivery and its time point in the TOE life cycle model exactly. Depending on the TOE delivery concerning the chosen life cycle step the corresponding guidances for the TOE's initialisation as well as the initialisation data have to be prepared and delivered too. It is assumed in this PP that the complete initialisation activities will take place in a secure environment.

The ST author may extend the TOE security functionality with respect to the TOE's initialisation if this takes place after delivery. If not and since the specific production steps of the initialisation are of major security relevance these initialisation steps have to be part of the CC evaluation under ALC. Nevertheless the decision about this has to be taken by the certification body. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the end-usage have to be considered in the product evaluation process under the AGD assurance class.

2. Conformance Claim

2.1 CC Conformance Claim

This Protection Profile claims conformance to

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

as follows

- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant.

This Protection Profile has been developed using Version 3.1 Revision 4 of Common Criteria [CC1], [CC2], [CC3].

This Protection Profile is conformant to CC Part 2 [CC2] extended due to the use of FCS_RNG.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, and FPT_EMS.1.

This Protection Profile is conformant to CC Part 3 [CC3]. No extended assurance components have been defined.

The

- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

has to be taken into account.

2.2 PP Claim

This Protection Profile does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile.

2.3 Package Claim

This Protection Profile conforms to assurance package EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 as defined in CC Part 3 [CC3].

2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale

As this Protection Profile does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile, this section is not applicable.

2.5 Conformance Statement

The Protection Profile requires **strict conformance** of any PP/ST claiming conformance to this PP.

3. Security Problem Definition

3.1 Subjects and External Entities

The only external entity that directly interacts with the TOE in its operational phase is the corresponding Smart Meter Gateway of the Smart Metering System (called Gateway for short, in the following) as defined in [PP 73]. In view of the TOE, the Gateway is responsible for sending and receiving TOE commands including the necessary data preparation and post-processing.

In addition, the Gateway Administrator who is in charge of the administration of the Gateway and its integrated Security Module (TOE), in particular the management of keys and certificates, is interacting with the TOE via the Gateway.

In the operational phase, there are further external entities communicating with the Gateway, as e.g.:

- **Consumer:** The individual or organization that “owns” the Meter Data. In most cases this will be tenants or house owners consuming electricity, water, gas or further commodities. However, it is also possible that the consumer produces or stores energy (e.g. with their own solar plant).
- **Gateway Operator:** Responsible for installing and maintaining the Gateway. Responsible for gathering Meter Data from the Gateway and for providing these data to the corresponding external entities.

As these external entities do not directly interact with the TOE, these entities are out of scope for this PP.

During its pre-operational phases the TOE interacts with the Integrator and the Gateway Administrator. The Integrator is responsible for the integration of the Gateway and the TOE as well as for generating, installing and importing initial respective preliminary key and certificate material. The Gateway Administrator is in charge of preparing the initial key material as relevant for the integration phase. In addition, in the following personalisation phase (part of the operational phase), the Gateway Administrator is responsible for the exchange of the preliminary key and certificate material by operational key and certificate material. Refer for details to the description of the TOE life cycle model in chapter 1.5 and [TR-03109-1] and [TR-03109-2].

For the operational phase, this PP considers the following external entities and subjects:

External Entity / Subject	Role	Definition
External World	User	Human or IT entity, possibly unauthenticated
Gateway	Authenticated Gateway	Successful authentication via PACE protocol between Gateway and TOE

External Entity / Subject	Role	Definition
Gateway Administrator	Authenticated Gateway Administrator	Successful external authentication of the Administrator against the TOE

Table 3: External Entities and Subjects

This table defines external entities and subjects in the sense of [CC1]. Subjects can be recognised by the TOE independent of their nature (human or technical user). As result of an appropriate identification and authentication process, the TOE creates – for each of the respective external entity – an ‘image’ inside and ‘works’ then with this TOE internal image (also called subject in [CC1]). From this point of view, the TOE itself perceives only ‘subjects’ and, for them, does not differ between ‘subjects’ and ‘external entities’. There is no dedicated subject with the role ‘attacker’ within the current security policy, whereby an attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.

3.2 Assets

The Security Module (TOE) of a Smart Metering System can be seen as a cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway. It provides different cryptographic functionalities based on elliptic curve cryptography, implements the cryptographic identities of the Gateway, and serves as a secure storage for cryptographic keys and certificates. More detailed, the main cryptographic services provided by the TOE cover the following issues:

- Digital Signature Generation,
- Digital Signature Verification,
- Key Agreement for TLS,
- Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption,
- Key Pair Generation,
- Random Number Generation,
- Component Authentication via the PACE-Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys,
- Secure Messaging, and
- Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.

The sum of that information lead to the relevant assets for this Protection Profile, which are summarized in Table 4 and Table 5. The tables focus on the assets that are relevant for the TOE and does not claim to provide an overview over all assets in the Smart Metering System or for other devices in the LMN. In the tables, for the assets a distinction related to their need for protection in view of confidentiality (Conf.), integrity (Int.) and authenticity (Auth.) is made.

In the following Table 4 the User Data to be protected by the TOE (as long as in scope of the TOE) are described:

Asset / User Data	Description	Need for Protection		
		Conf.	Int.	Auth.
Key Pair Object	<p>Contains for the TOE's asymmetric cryptographic functionality the private key data and optionally the corresponding public key data of a key pair. In addition, the corresponding key attributes (as e.g. information on the related elliptic curve, on the key usage etc.) are stored.</p> <p>A key pair object can be used for the following purposes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TLS • SIG (content data signature) • ENC (content data encryption) 	X	X	X
Public Key Object	<p>Contains for the TOE's asymmetric cryptographic functionality the public key data of a public key. In addition, the corresponding key attributes (as e.g. information on the related elliptic curve, on the key usage etc.) are stored.</p> <p>A public key object can be used for the following purposes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TLS • SIG (content data signature) • ENC (content data encryption) • AUTH (external authentication) 		X	X
Certificate of SM-PKI-Root	X.509 Certificate of the SM-PKI-Root. The Certificate and its contained Public Key is to be considered as a trust anchor.		X	X
Public Key of SM-PKI-Root	In addition to the Certificate of the SM-PKI-Root, the Public Key of the SM-PKI-Root is stored in a dedicated Public Key Object of the TOE. The Public Key is to be considered as a trust anchor.		X	X
Quality of Seal Certificates of the Gateway	X.509 Certificates of the Gateway for preliminary Key Pair Objects used for TLS, SIG and ENC.		X	X

Asset / User Data	Description	Need for Protection		
		Conf.	Int.	Auth.
GW-Key	Symmetric key used by the Gateway to secure its memory.	X	X	X

Table 4: Assets / User Data

In the following Table 5 the TSF Data to be protected by the TOE (as long as in scope of the TOE) are described:

Asset / TSF Data	Description	Need for Protection		
		Conf.	Int.	Auth.
Ephemeral Keys	Negotiated during the PACE protocol between the Gateway and the TOE, during the DH key agreement protocol (ECKA-DH) respective during the ElGamal key agreement protocol (ECKA-EG).	X	X	X
Shared Secret Value / ECKA-DH	Value Z_{AB} negotiated in the framework of the DH key agreement protocol (ECKA-DH). Used by the Gateway for the TLS handshake.	X	X	X
Shared Secret Value / ECKA-EG	Value Z_{AB} negotiated in the framework of the ElGamal key agreement protocol (ECKA-EG). Used by the Gateway for content data encryption.	X	X	X
Session Keys	Negotiated during the PACE protocol between the Gateway and the TOE and used afterwards for a trusted channel (secure messaging) between the Gateway and the TOE.	X	X	X
Domain Parameters of Elliptic Curves	Domain Parameters of the elliptic curves that are used by the key objects (key pair objects, public key objects) respective by the cryptographic functionality provided by the TOE.		X	X
GW-PIN	Reference value of the system PACE-PIN of the Gateway for use in the PACE protocol between the Gateway and the TOE.	X	X	X

Table 5: Assets / TSF Data

3.3 Assumptions

In the following, according to the threat model as outlined in the following chapter 3.4, assumptions about the environment of the TOE that need to be taken into account in order to ensure a secure operation of the TOE are listed.

The assumptions for the TOE (A) will be defined in the following manner:

A.Name	<p>Short title</p> <p>Description of the assumption.</p>
A.Integration	<p>Integration phase of the Gateway and TOE</p> <p>It is assumed that appropriate technical and/or organisational security measures in the phase of the integration of the Gateway and the TOE in the life cycle model guarantee for the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the assets of the TOE to be protected with respect to their protection need (see also Table 4 and Table 5 in chap. 3.2).</p> <p>In particular, this holds for the generation, installation and import of initial key, certificate and PIN material.</p>
A.OperationalPhase	<p>Operational phase of the integrated Gateway</p> <p>It is assumed that appropriate technical and/or organisational measures in the operational phase of the integrated Gateway guarantee for the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the assets of the TOE to be protected with respect to their protection need (see also Table 4 and Table 5 in chap. 3.2).</p> <p>In particular, this holds for key and PIN objects stored, generated and processed in the operational phase of the integrated Gateway.</p>
A.TrustedAdmin	<p>Trustworthiness of the Gateway Administrator</p> <p>It is assumed that the Gateway Administrator is trustworthy and well-trained.</p>
A.PhysicalProtection	<p>Physical protection of the TOE</p> <p>It is assumed that the TOE is physically and logically embedded into a Gateway that is certified according to [PP 73] (whereby the integration is performed during the integration phase of the life cycle model).</p> <p>It is further assumed that the Gateway is installed in a non-public environment within the premises of the consumer that provides a basic level of physical protection. This protection covers the Gateway, the TOE, the Meters that the Gateway communicates with and the communication channel between the Gateway and the TOE.</p>

3.4 Threats

In the following, the threats that are posed against the assets handled by the TOE are defined. Those threats are the result of a threat model that has been developed for the whole Smart Metering System at first and then has been focussed on the threats against the TOE.

The overall threat model for the Smart Metering System considers two different kinds of attackers to the Gateway and its integrated TOE, distinguishing between their different attack paths:

- Local attacker having physical access to the Gateway and its integrated TOE or a connection to these components.
- Attacker located in the WAN (WAN attacker) who uses the WAN connection for his attack.

Please note that the threat model assumes that the local attacker has less motivation than the WAN attacker (see below) as a successful attack of a local attacker will always only impact one Gateway respective its integrated TOE. Please further note that the local attacker includes the consumer.

Goal of the attack on the Gateway and its integrated TOE is to try to disclose or alter data while stored in the Gateway or TOE, while processed in the Gateway or TOE, while generated by the Gateway or TOE or while transmitted between the Gateway and the TOE. In particular, as the TOE serves as central cryptographic service provider and secure storage for key and certificate material for the Gateway, the assets stored, processed, generated and transmitted by the TOE are in focus of the attacker.

Taking the preceding considerations into account, the following threats to the TOE are of relevance.

The threats to the TOE (T) will be defined in the following manner:

T.Name**Short title**

Description of the threats.

T.ForgeInternalData**Forgery of User Data or TSF Data**

An attacker with high attack potential tries to forge internal User Data or TSF Data via the regular communication interface of the TOE.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios of forgery of internal User Data or TSF Data. The attacker may try to alter User Data e.g. by deleting and replacing persistently stored key objects or adding data to data already stored in elementary files. The attacker may misuse the TSF management function to change the user authentication data (GW-PIN) to a known value.

T.CompromiseInternalData Compromise of confidential User Data or TSF Data

An attacker with high attack potential tries to compromise confidential User Data or TSF Data via the regular communication interface of the TOE.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios of revealing confidential internal User Data or TSF Data. The attacker may try to compromise the user authentication data (GW-PIN), to reconstruct a private signing key by using the regular command interface and the related response codes, or to compromise generated shared secret values or ephemeral keys.

T.Misuse**Misuse of TOE functions**

An attacker with high attack potential tries to use the TOE functions to gain access to access control protected assets without knowledge of user authentication data or any implicit authorisation.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios. The attacker may try to circumvent the user authentication mechanism to access assets or functionality of the TOE that underlie the TOE's access control and require user authentication. The attacker may try to alter the TSF data e.g. to extend the user rights after successful authentication.

T.Intercept**Interception of communication**

An attacker with high attack potential tries to intercept the communication between the TOE and the Gateway to disclose, to forge or to delete transmitted (sensitive) data or to insert data in the data exchange.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios. An attacker may read data during data transmission in order to gain access to user authentication data (GW-PIN) or sensitive material as generated ephemeral keys or shared secret values. An attacker may try to forge public keys during their import to respective export from the TOE.

T.Leakage**Leakage**

An attacker with high attack potential tries to launch a cryptographic attack against the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms or tries to guess keys using a brute-force attack on the function inputs.

This threat comprises several attack scenarios. An attacker may try to predict the output of the random number generator in order to get information about a generated

session key, shared secret value or ephemeral key. An attacker may try to exploit leakage during a cryptographic operation in order to use SPA, DPA, DFA, SEMA or DEMA techniques with the goal to compromise the processed keys, the GW-PIN or to get knowledge of other sensitive TSF or User data. Furthermore an attacker could try guessing the processed key by using a brute-force attack. In addition, timing attacks have to be taken into account.

The sources for this leakage information can be the measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines (side channels).

T.PhysicalTampering

Physical tampering

An attacker with high attack potential tries to manipulate the TOE through physical tampering, probing or modification in order to extract or alter User Data or TSF Data stored in or processed by the TOE. Alternatively, the attacker tries to change TOE functions (as e.g. cryptographic functions provided by the TOE) by physical means (e.g. through fault injection).

T.AbuseFunctionality

Abuse of functionality

An attacker with high attack potential tries to use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data, (ii) to manipulate the TOE's software or (iii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE.

In particular, the TOE shall ensure that functionality that shall not be usable in the operational phase, but which is present during the phases of the TOE's manufacturing and initialisation as well as during the integration phase of the Gateway and the TOE, is deactivated before the TOE enters the operational phase. Such functionality includes in particular testing, debugging and initialisation functions.

T.Malfunction

Malfunction of the TOE

An attacker with high attack potential tries to cause a malfunction of the TSF or of the IC Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security functions of the IC Embedded Software.

This may be achieved e.g. by operating the IC outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the IC Embedded Software or misuse of administration function. To exploit this an attacker needs information about the functional operation.

3.5 Organisational Security Policies

This section specifies the organisational security policies (OSP) that the TOE and its environment shall comply with in order to support the Gateway. These OSPs incorporate in particular the organisational security policy OSP.SM defined in the Gateway Protection Profile [PP 73].

The organisational security policies for the TOE (P) will be defined in the following manner:

P.Name	Short title
	Description of the organisational security policy.
P.Sign	Signature generation and verification
	The TOE shall generate and verify digital signatures according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].
	The explicit generation and verification of digital signatures is used by the Gateway especially in the framework of the TLS handshake, the content data signature and the verification of certificates and certificate chains.
P.KeyAgreementDH	DH key agreement
	The TOE and the Gateway shall implement the DH key agreement (ECKA-DH) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].
	The DH key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the TLS handshake. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the pre-master secret and with random numbers as well generated by the TOE afterwards to create the master secret.
P.KeyAgreementEG	EIGamal key agreement
	The TOE and the Gateway shall implement the EIGamal key agreement (ECKA-EG) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].
	The EIGamal key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the content data encryption. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the symmetric encryption keys (hybrid encryption/decryption

scheme).

P.Random

Random number generation

The TOE shall generate random numbers for its own use (e.g. for the generation of ECC key pairs and session keys) and for use by the Gateway itself according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

P.PACE

PACE

The TOE and the Gateway shall implement the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] for component authentication between the Gateway and the TOE. In the framework of the PACE protocol session keys for securing the data exchange between the Gateway and the TOE (trusted channel) are negotiated.

4. Security Objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.

The security objectives for the TOE (O) and the security objectives for the operational environment (OE) will be defined in the following manner:

O/OE.Name	Short title
	Description of the objective.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE which address the aspects of the identified threats to be countered by the TOE independently of the operational environment as well as the organisational security policies to be met by the TOE independently of the operational environment.

O.Integrity	Integrity of User Data or TSF Data The TOE shall ensure the integrity of the User Data, the security services provided by the TOE and the TSF Data under the TSF scope of control.
O.Confidentiality	Confidentiality of User Data or TSF Data The TOE shall ensure the confidentiality of private keys and other confidential User Data and confidential TSF Data (especially the user authentication data as the GW-PIN) under the TSF scope of control.
O.Authentication	Authentication of external entities The TOE shall support the authentication of human users (Gateway Administrator) and the Gateway. The TOE shall be able to authenticate itself to the Gateway.
O.AccessControl	Access control for functionality and objects The TOE shall provide and enforce the functionality of access right control. The access right control shall cover the functionality provided by the TOE (including its management functionality) and the objects stored in or processed by the TOE. The TOE shall enforce that only authenticated entities with sufficient access control rights can access restricted objects and services. The access control policy of the TOE shall bind the access control right to an object to authenticated entities.

O.KeyManagement

Key management

The TOE shall enforce the secure generation, import, distribution, access control and destruction of cryptographic keys. The TOE shall support the public key import from and export to the Gateway.

O.TrustedChannel

Trusted channel

The TOE shall establish a trusted channel for protection of the confidentiality and the integrity of the transmitted data between the TOE and the successfully authenticated Gateway. The TOE shall enforce the use of a trusted channel if defined by the access condition of an object.

O.Leakage

Leakage protection

The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits.

The TOE shall provide side channel resistance, i.e. shall be able to prevent appropriately leakage of information, e.g. electrical characteristics like power consumption or electromagnetic emanations that would allow an attacker to learn about

- private key material,
- confidential results or intermediate results of cryptographic computations,
- the GW-PIN.

O.PhysicalTampering

Protection against physical tampering

The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering, probing and manipulation of its components against an attacker with high attack potential, and uses those features to limit security breaches.

The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering, probing and manipulation with specified system devices and components.

O.AbuseFunctionality

Protection against abuse of functionality

The TOE shall prevent that functions intended for the testing and production of the TOE and which must not be accessible after TOE delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data, (ii) to manipulate the TOE's software or (iii) to bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Application Note: Details depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated

Test Software which are not specified here.

In particular, the TOE shall ensure that functionality that shall not be usable in the operational phase, but which is present during the phases of the TOE's manufacturing and initialisation as well as during the integration phase of the Gateway and the TOE, is deactivated before the TOE enters the operational phase. Such functionality includes in particular testing, debugging and initialisation functions.

O.Malfunction

Protection against malfunction of the TOE

The TOE shall ensure its correct operation. The TOE shall prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. The TOE shall preserve a secure state to prevent errors and deactivation of security features of functions. The environmental conditions include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, and temperature.

O.Sign

Signature generation and verification

The TOE shall securely generate and verify digital signatures according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

The explicit generation and verification of digital signatures is used by the Gateway especially in the framework of the TLS handshake, the content data signature and the verification of certificates and certificate chains.

O.KeyAgreementDH

DH key agreement

The TOE shall securely implement the DH key agreement (ECKA-DH) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

The DH key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the TLS handshake. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the pre-master secret and with random numbers as well generated by the TOE afterwards to create the master secret.

O.KeyAgreementEG

EIGamal key agreement

The TOE shall securely implement the EIGamal key agreement (ECKA-EG) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

The EIGamal key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the content data encryption. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the symmetric encryption keys (hybrid encryption/decryption

scheme).

O.Random

Random number generation

The TOE shall securely generate random numbers for its own use (e.g. for the generation of ECC key pairs and session keys) and for use by the Gateway itself according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

O.PACE

PACE

The TOE shall securely implement the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] for component authentication between the Gateway and the TOE. In the framework of the PACE protocol session keys for securing the data exchange between the Gateway and the TOE (trusted channel) are negotiated.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE are defined:

OE.Integration

Integration phase of the Gateway and TOE

Appropriate technical and/or organisational security measures in the phase of the integration of the Gateway and the TOE in the life cycle model shall be applied in order to guarantee for the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the assets of the TOE to be protected with respect to their protection need (see also Table 4 and Table 5 in chap. 3.2).

In particular, for the TOE, this shall hold for the generation, installation and import of initial key, certificate and PIN material.

OE.OperationalPhase

Operational phase of the integrated Gateway

Appropriate technical and/or organisational measures in the operational phase of the integrated Gateway shall be applied in order to guarantee for the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the assets of the TOE to be protected with respect to their protection need (see also Table 4 and Table 5 in chap. 3.2).

In particular, this shall hold for key and PIN objects stored, generated and processed in the operational phase of the integrated Gateway.

OE.TrustedAdmin Trustworthiness of the Gateway Administrator

The Gateway Administrator shall be trustworthy and well-trained.

OE.PhysicalProtection Physical protection of the TOE

The TOE shall be physically and logically embedded into a Gateway that is certified according to [PP 73] (whereby the integration is performed during the integration phase of the life cycle model).

The Gateway shall be installed in a non-public environment within the premises of the consumer that provides a basic level of physical protection. This protection shall cover the Gateway, the TOE, the Meters that the Gateway communicates with and the communication channel between the Gateway and the TOE.

OE.KeyAgreementDH DH key agreement

The Gateway shall securely implement the DH key agreement (ECKA-DH) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

The DH key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the TLS handshake. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the pre-master secret and with random numbers as well generated by the TOE afterwards to create the master secret.

OE.KeyAgreementEG ElGamal key agreement

The Gateway shall securely implement the ElGamal key agreement (ECKA-EG) according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2].

The ElGamal key agreement is used by the Gateway in the framework of the content data encryption. The Gateway uses the generated shared secret value Z_{AB} for the generation of the symmetric encryption keys (hybrid encryption/decryption scheme).

OE.PACE PACE

The Gateway shall securely implement the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] for component authentication between the Gateway and the TOE. In the framework of the PACE protocol session keys for securing the data exchange between the Gateway and the TOE (trusted channel) are negotiated.

OE.TrustedChannel Trusted channel

The Gateway shall perform a trusted channel between the

Gateway and the TOE for protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive data transmitted between the authenticated Gateway and the TOE.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

4.3.1 Overview

The following tables give an overview how the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are addressed by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. Because of the amount of security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, the mapping between the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies on the one hand and the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment on the other hand is split into two tables. Hence, there is one mapping table covering the security objectives for the TOE (see Table 6) and a further table addressing the security objectives for the operational environment (see Table 7).

The following tables provide an overview for the security objectives coverage (TOE and its operational environment) also giving evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the security objectives defined for the TOE and its operational environment. It shows that all threats are addressed by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, that all organisational security policies are addressed by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, and that all assumptions are addressed by the security objectives for the operational environment.

	O.Integrity	O.Confidentiality	O.Authentication	O.AccessControl	O.KeyManagement	O.TrustedChannel	O.Leakage	O.PhysicalTampering	O.AbuseFunctionality	O.Malfunction	O.Sign	O.KeyAgreementDH	O.KeyAgreementEG	O.Random	O.PACE
T.ForgeInternalData	X														
T.CompromiseInternalData		X													
T.Misuse	X	X	X	X											
T.Intercept				X		X									X
T.Leakage							X	X							
T.PhysicalTampering								X	X						
T.AbuseFunctionality									X						
T.Malfunction										X					
P.Sign					X						X				
P.KeyAgreementDH					X							X			
P.KeyAgreementEG					X								X		
P.Random														X	
P.PACE															X

Table 6: Rationale for Security Objectives for the TOE

	OE.Integration	OE.OperationalPhase	OE.TrustedAdmin	OE.PhysicalProtection	OE.KeyAgreementDH	OE.KeyAgreementEG	OE.PACE	OE.TrustedChannel
T.ForgeInternalData								
T.CompromiseInternalData								
T.Misuse								
T.Intercept							X	X
T.Leakage								
T.PhysicalTampering								
T.AbuseFunctionality								
T.Malfunction								
P.Sign								
P.KeyAgreementDH					X			
P.KeyAgreementEG						X		
P.Random								
P.PACE							X	
A.Integration	X							
A.OperationalPhase		X						
A.TrustedAdmin			X					
A.PhysicalProtection				X				

Table 7: Rationale for Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following chapters provide a detailed justification for this mapping as required to show the suitability and sufficiency of the security objectives to cope with the security problem definition.

4.3.2 Countering the Threats

The following sections provide more detailed information on how the threats are countered by the security objectives for the TOE and the operational environment.

T.ForgeInternalData

The threat **T.ForgeInternalData** is countered by the security objective **O.Integrity**.

The security objective **O.Integrity** directly cares for the integrity of the User Data and the TSF Data under the TSF scope of control as well as for the integrity of the security services provided by the TOE.

T.CompromiseInternalData

The threat **T.CompromiseInternalData** is countered by the security objective **O.Confidentiality**.

The security objective **O.Confidentiality** directly cares for the confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF Data under the TSF scope of control.

T.Misuse

The threat **T.Misuse** is countered by a combination of the security objectives **O.AccessControl**, **O.Authentication**, **O.Integrity** and **O.Confidentiality**.

The security objective **O.AccessControl** prescribes the access control policy defined for the TOE and ensures for its enforcement. Authentication as needed for regulating the access to the TOE's functionality and the assets stored in and processed by the TOE is addressed by the security objective **O.Authentication**. The security objectives **O.Integrity** and **O.Confidentiality** ensure the protection of the assets independent of the TOE functionality used by the attack.

T.Intercept

The threat **T.Intercept** is countered by a combination of the security objectives **O.TrustedChannel**, **OE.TrustedChannel**, **O.PACE**, **OE.PACE** and **O.AccessControl**.

The security objectives **O.TrustedChannel** and **OE.TrustedChannel** provide support for a secure communication channel between the TOE and the Gateway in view of integrity and confidentiality of the data exchange. Compromise, forgery, deletion and insertion of data transmitted between the TOE and the Gateway is countered by an integrity- and confidentiality-preserving communication channel. The session keys used for the trusted channel between the Gateway and the TOE are negotiated via the PACE protocol carried out between the Gateway and the TOE. This is covered by the security objectives **O.PACE** and **OE.PACE**. In addition, the requirement for an integrity- and confidentiality-preserved exchange of sensitive data between the Gateway and the TOE is prescribed in the access control policy defined for the TOE. This access control policy and its enforcement is part of the security objective **O.AccessControl**.

T.Leakage

The threat **T.Leakage** is countered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Leakage** and **O.AbuseFunctionality**.

The security objective **O.Leakage** ensures for the resistance of the TOE against side channel attacks and appropriately prevents leakage of information. The security objective **O.AbuseFunctionality** directly averts the threat by ensuring that functions intended for the testing and production of the TOE and which must not be accessible after TOE delivery cannot be abused in order (i) to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data, (ii) to manipulate the TOE's software or (iii) to bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Both objectives together ensure for the TOE's security in view of the emanation of side channel information and therefore contribute to the security of the internal User Data and TSF Data stored in and processed by the TOE as well as contribute to the security of the (cryptographic) services provided by the TOE.

T.PhysicalTampering

The threat **T.PhysicalTampering** is countered by a combination of the security objectives **O.PhysicalTampering** and **O.AbuseFunctionality**.

The security objective **O.PhysicalTampering** ensures for the detection of and the prevention respective resistance of the TOE against physical tampering, probing and manipulation. The security objective **O.AbuseFunctionality** directly averts the threat by ensuring that functions intended for the testing and production of the TOE and which must not be accessible after TOE delivery cannot be abused in order (i) to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data, (ii) to manipulate the TOE's software or (iii) to bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

Both objectives together ensure for the TOE's physical security and therefore contribute to the security of the internal User Data and TSF Data stored in and processed by the TOE as well as contribute to the security and correct functioning of the (cryptographic) services provided by the TOE.

T.AbuseFunctionality

The threat **T.AbuseFunctionality** is countered by the security objective **O.AbuseFunctionality**.

The security objective **O.AbuseFunctionality** directly averts the threat by ensuring that functions intended for the testing and production of the TOE and which must not be accessible after TOE delivery cannot be abused in order (i) to disclose or manipulate sensitive User Data or TSF Data, (ii) to manipulate the TOE's software or (iii) to bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.

T.Malfunction

The threat **T.Malfunction** is countered by the security objective **O.Malfunction**.

The security objective **O.Malfunction** directly averts the threat by ensuring the TOE's correct operation and preservation of a secure state to prevent errors and deactivation of security features of functions even under abnormal environmental conditions.

4.3.3 Coverage of Organisational Security Policies

The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment cover the organisational security policies.

P.Sign

The organisational security policy **P.Sign** that mandates that the TOE implements digital signature generation and verification according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] is directly addressed by the security objective **O.Sign**. The security objective **O.KeyManagement** serves for the availability of the keys as necessary for the cryptographic operation.

P.KeyAgreementDH

The organisational security policy **P.KeyAgreementDH** that mandates that the TOE and the Gateway implement the DH key agreement according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] is directly addressed by the security objectives **O.KeyAgreementDH** and **OE.KeyAgreementDH**. The security objective **O.KeyManagement** serves for the availability of the keys as necessary for the cryptographic operation.

P.KeyAgreementEG

The organisational security policy **P.KeyAgreementEG** that mandates that the TOE and the Gateway implement the ElGamal key agreement according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] is directly addressed by the security objectives **O.KeyAgreementEG** and **OE.KeyAgreementEG**. The security objective **O.KeyManagement** serves for the availability of the keys as necessary for the cryptographic operation.

P.Random

The organisational security policy **P.Random** that mandates that the TOE implements random number generation for its own use and for use by the Gateway according to [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] is directly addressed by the security objective **O.Random**.

P.PACE

The organisational security policy **P.PACE** that mandates that the TOE and the Gateway implement the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] for component authentication between the Gateway and the TOE with negotiation of session keys for securing the following data exchange between the Gateway and the TOE is directly addressed by the security objectives **O.PACE** and **OE.PACE**.

4.3.4 Coverage of Assumptions

The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE cover the assumptions.

A.Integration

The assumption **A.Integration** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.Integration**. The assumption and the objective for the operational environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

A.OperationalPhase

The assumption **A.OperationalPhase** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.OperationalPhase**. The assumption and the objective for the operational environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

A.TrustedAdmin

The assumption **A.TrustedAdmin** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.TrustedAdmin**. The assumption and the objective for the operational environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

A.PhysicalProtection

The assumption **A.PhysicalProtection** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.PhysicalProtection**. The assumption and the objective for the operational environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious.

5. Extended Component Definition

This Protection Profile uses components defined as extensions to CC Part 2 [CC2]. The components FPT_EMS, FCS_RNG and FMT_LIM are common in Protection Profiles for smart cards and similar devices.

5.1 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS

The family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE related to leakage of information based on emanation. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of the TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC Part 2 [CC2].

Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

Component Levelling



FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation defines limits of TOE emanation related to TSF and user data.

Management

FPT_EMS.1 There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit

FPT_EMS.1 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation

FPT_EMS.1	TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1	The TOE shall not emit [assignment: <i>types of emissions</i>] in excess of [assignment: <i>specified limits</i>] enabling access to [assignment: <i>list of types of TSF data</i>] and [assignment: <i>list of types of user data</i>].
FPT_EMS.1.2	The TSF shall ensure [assignment: <i>type of users</i>] are unable to

use the following interface [assignment: *type of connection*] to gain access to [assignment: *list of types of TSF data*] and [assignment: *list of types of user data*].


5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS (Cryptographic Support) is defined here. This extended family FCS_RNG describes an SFR for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.

Family Behaviour

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers, which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

Component Levelling:



FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that the random number generator implements defined security capabilities and the random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Management

FCS_RNG.1 There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit

FCS_RNG.1 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation

FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: *physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*] random number generator that implements: [assignment: *list of security capabilities*].

FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].


5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM

To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.

Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.

Component Levelling



FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life cycle.

Management

FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit

FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: *Limited capability and availability policy*].

Application Note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that

- i. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced,
or conversely,
- ii. the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.

The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.

6. Security Requirements

6.1 Overview

This part of the PP defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE. The statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional security requirements (SFRs) and the assurance security requirements (SARs) that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives for the TOE. These requirements comprise functional components from CC Part 2 [CC2], extended components as defined in Chapter 5, and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 from CC Part 3 [CC3] augmented by AVA_VAN.5.

The CC allows several operations to be performed on security requirements (on the component level); refinement, selection, assignment and iteration are defined in sec. 8.1 of CC Part 1 [CC1].

The **refinement** operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and, thus, further restricts a requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that added words are in **bold text** and removed words are ~~crossed out~~. In some cases an interpretation refinement is given. In such a case an extra paragraph starting with “Refinement” is given.

The **selection** operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. Selections having been made by the PP author are denoted as underlined text. Selections to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made, [selection:], and are *italicised*.

The **assignment** operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments having been made by the PP author are denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are *italicised*. In some cases the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text is underlined and italicised like *this*.

The **iteration** operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier. For the sake of a better readability, the iteration operation may also be applied to some single components (being not repeated) in order to indicate belonging of such SFRs to same functional cluster. In such a case, the iteration operation is applied to only one single component.

It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be ordered alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped.

The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements (SFR) of this PP:

Class FCS: Cryptographic Support	
FCS_CKM.1/ECC	Cryptographic key generation / ECC-Key Pairs
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH	Cryptographic key generation / DH key agreement (for TLS)
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG	Cryptographic key generation / ElGamal key agreement (for content data encryption)
FCS_CKM.1/PACE	Cryptographic key generation / PACE
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA	Cryptographic operation / ECDSA Signature generation
FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA	Cryptographic operation / ECDSA Signature verification
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	Cryptographic operation / External authentication
FCS_COP.1/IMP	Cryptographic operation / Import of Public Keys
FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC	Cryptographic operation / AES in CBC mode for secure messaging
FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC	Cryptographic operation / AES-CMAC for secure messaging
FCS_RNG.1	Random number generation
Class FDP: User Data Protection	
FDP_ACC.2	Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection
FDP_ETC.1	Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1	Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_UCT.1	Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1	Data exchange integrity
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication	
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition

FIA_UAU.1/GW	Timing of authentication (for Gateway)
FIA_UAU.1/GWA	Timing of authentication (for Gateway Administrator)
FIA_UAU.4	Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5	Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding
Class FMT: Security Management	
FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	
FPT_EMS.1	TOE emanation
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels	
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel

Table 8: List of Security Functional Requirements

6.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

The Security Module serves as a cryptographic service provider for the Smart Meter Gateway and provides services in the following cryptographic areas:

- Signature Generation (ECDSA),
- Signature Verification (ECDSA),
- Key Agreement for TLS (ECKA-DH),

- Key Agreement for Content Data Encryption (ECKA-EG),
- Key Pair Generation,
- Random Number Generation,
- Component Authentication via the PACE-Protocol with Negotiation of Session Keys (PACE),
- Secure Messaging, and
- Secure Storage of Key Material and further data relevant for the Gateway.

The exact scope of the functionality in cooperation with the Gateway has been outlined in the chapters 1.1 and 1.4.

The cryptographic algorithms that shall be supported by the Gateway and its Security Module are defined in [TR-03109-3] respective in [TR-03116-3].

[TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3] distinguish between mandatory key sizes and domain parameters for elliptic curves, and key sizes and domain parameters for elliptic curves that are optional to support. **It is however essential that the Security Module supports for ECC key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification, ECKA-DH, ECKA-EG and PACE all the key sizes and domain parameters for elliptic curves that are defined in [TR-03109-3] respective in [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.2.**

Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ECC)” as specified below:

FCS_CKM.1/ECC Cryptographic key generation / ECC-Key Pairs

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/ECC The TSF shall generate cryptographic **ECC** keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: *cryptographic key generation algorithm*] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic key generation algorithm (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present).

Application Note: [TR-03109-2] requires the TOE to implement the command GENERATE ASYMETRIC KEY PAIR. The generated key pairs are

used by the Gateway for TLS as well as for content data encryption and signature.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH)” as specified below:

FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH Cryptographic key generation / DH key agreement

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/ECKA-DH The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECKA-DH and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic key generation algorithm (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECKA-DH can be found.

Application Note: [TR-03109-2] requires the TOE to implement the command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-DH. Please note that the TOE is used by the Gateway for parts of the TLS key negotiation between the Gateway and the external world as outlined in [PP 73]. The TOE creates on behalf of the Gateway the so-called shared secret value Z_{AB} for the pre-master secret. The key derivation function is not part of the TOE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG)” as specified below:

FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG Cryptographic key generation / ElGamal key agreement

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/ECKA-EG The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECKA-EG and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3]

respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic key generation algorithm (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECKA-EG can be found.

Application Note: [TR-03109-2] requires the TOE to implement the command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE / variant ECKA-EG. Please note that the TOE is used for parts of the key agreement of keys that are used afterwards in the framework of content data encryption as outlined in [PP 73]. The TOE creates on behalf of the Gateway the so-called shared secret value Z_{AB} . The key derivation function is not part of the TOE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/PACE)” as specified below:

FCS_CKM.1/PACE Cryptographic key generation / PACE

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_CKM.1.1/PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm PACE and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-2], [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-2], [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic key generation algorithm (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 9 a reference to [TR-03110-2] and [TR-03110-3] with information on the PACE-algorithm specification as relevant for the TOE can be found.

Application Note: [TR-03109-2] requires the TOE to implement the command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE / variant PACE. The TOE exchanges a shared secret with the Gateway during the PACE protocol. The shared secret is used for deriving the AES session keys for message encryption and authentication (secure messaging) as required by

FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC. Secure messaging is carried out for the main data exchange between the Gateway and the TOE.

Application Note: This SFR implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for the key derivation by demanding compliance to [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-2], [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below:

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: *cryptographic key destruction method*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

Application Note: The TOE shall destroy the encryption session keys and the message authentication keys negotiated via the PACE protocol after reset or termination of the secure messaging session (trusted channel) or reaching fail secure state according to FPT_FLS.1. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session keys before starting a new communication with an external entity in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1.

Application Note: Explicit deletion of a secret using the DELETE KEY command should also be taken into account by the ST writer.

Application Note: This SFR requires that the negotiated shared secret value Z_{AB} as required by FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH shall be destroyed after it has been transmitted to the Gateway.

Further, the negotiated shared secret value Z_{AB} as required by FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG shall be destroyed after it has been transmitted to the Gateway.

Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA Cryptographic operation / ECDSA Signature generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/SIG-ECDSA The TSF shall perform signature generation for the commands PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE and INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECDSA (in particular, signature generation) can be found.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA Cryptographic operation / ECDSA Signature verification

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/VER-ECDSA The TSF shall perform signature verification for the command PSO VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECDSA (in particular, signature verification) can be found.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/AUTH)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation / External authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform signature verification for external authentication for the command EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECDSA (in particular, signature verification) can be found.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/IMP)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/IMP Cryptographic operation / Import of Public Keys

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/IMP The TSF shall perform signature verification for the import of Public Keys for the command PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at

present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [TR-03111] is given where the specification of ECDSA (in particular, signature verification) can be found.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC Cryptographic operation / AES in CBC mode for secure messaging

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/PACE-ENC The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption for secure messaging and PACE encryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [NIST 197] and [ISO 10116] is given where the specification of AES and the CBC mode can be found.

Application Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES for secure messaging with encryption of transmitted data and for encrypting the nonce in the first step of PACE. The related session keys (for secure messaging) and key for encryption of the PACE nonce are agreed between the TOE and the Gateway as part of the PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/PACE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC)” as specified below:

FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC Cryptographic operation / AES-CMAC for secure messaging

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1.1/PACE-MAC The TSF shall perform computation and verification of cryptographic checksum for secure messaging in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES-CMAC and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], [TR-03109-2], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied cryptographic algorithms (as refinement operation for the generic references given in the PP at present). In [TR-03116-3], chap. 2.1 a reference to [NIST 197] and [RFC 4493] is given where the specification of AES and the AES-CMAC can be found.

Application Note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys (for secure messaging) are agreed between the TOE and the Gateway as part of the PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/PACE.

Random Number Generation (FCS_RNG)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)” as specified below:

FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: *physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic*] random number generator that implements: [assignment: *list of security capabilities*].

FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

Application Note: Based on [TR-03109-3] respective [TR-03116-3], the ST author shall exactly reference the applied RNG class. The quality metric assigned in element FCS_RNG.1.2 shall be chosen to resist attacks with high attack potential.

Application Note: Random numbers are generated for the Gateway and for TOE internal use, in particular for

- support of the TLS handshake (prevention of replay attacks),
- enabling the external authentication of the Gateway,

- PACE protocol,
- DH key agreement,
- ElGamal key agreement,
- generation of ECC key pairs.

In particular, [TR-03109-2] requires the TOE to implement the command GET CHALLENGE for the generation of random numbers that are exported to the external world (here the GW) and if desired are in addition available in the TOE for further use.

6.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection

Access Control Smart Meter SFP

The **Access Control Smart Meter SFP** for the Smart Meter Security Module (TOE) in its operational phase is based on the specification of access rules in [TR-03109-2].

The SFP takes the following subjects, objects, security attributes and operations into account:

Subjects:

- external world
- Gateway
- Gateway Administrator

Security attributes for subjects:

- “authenticated via PACE protocol”
- “authenticated via key-based external authentication”

Objects:

- key pair objects
- public key objects
- certificates
- symmetric keys (GW-keys)

as presented in Table 4.

Security attributes for objects:

- “access rule” (see below)

Operations:

- TOE commands as specified in [TR-03109-2]

The Access Control Smart Meter SFP controls the access of subjects to objects on the basis of security attributes as for subjects and objects described above. An access rule defines the conditions under which a TOE command sent by a subject is allowed to access the demanded object. Hence, an access rule bound to an object specifies for the TOE commands the necessary permission for their execution on this object.

For the Access Control Smart Meter SFP, the access rules are defined as prescribed in [TR-03109-2].

In the following the two SFRs directly related to the access control policy and functionality are given:

Access Control Policy (FDP_ACC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2)” as specified below:

FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control

Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP on Subjects:

- external world
- Gateway
- Gateway Administrator
- [assignment: list of further subjects, or none]

Objects:

- key pair objects, public key objects, certificates, and symmetric keys (GW-keys) as presented in Table 4
- [assignment: list of further objects, or none]

and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Access Control Functions (FDP_ACF)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below:

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

- FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP to objects based on the following:
Subjects:
- external world
 - Gateway with security attribute “authenticated via PACE protocol”
 - Gateway Administrator with security attribute “authenticated via key-based external authentication”
 - [assignment: list of further subjects as listed in FDP_ACC.2 with security attributes, or none]
- Objects:
- key pair objects, public key objects, certificates, and symmetric keys (GW-keys) as presented in Table 4 each with security attribute “access rule”
 - [assignment: list of further objects as listed in FDP_ACC.2 with security attribute, or none].
- FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: Access rules defined in the Access Control Smart Meter SFP (refer to the definition of the SFP above).
- FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
- FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: No entity shall be able to read out private keys from the TOE.

Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” as specified below:

- FDP_SDI.2** Stored data integrity monitoring and action
- Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity errors on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data attributes].
- FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall not use the data and stop the corresponding process accessing the data, warn the entity connected, [assignment: other action to be taken, or none].

Application Note: The requirements in FDP_SDI.2.1 specifically apply to the assets as defined in Table 4.

Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)” as specified below:

FDP_RIP.1	Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: <i>allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from</i>] the following objects: <u>PIN, session keys (immediately after closing related communication session), private cryptographic keys, shared secret value Z_{AB}, ephemeral keys, [assignment: <i>other data objects, or none</i>]</u> .

Application Note: The ST author may want to use iterations of FDP_RIP.1 in order to distinguish between data which must be deleted already upon deallocation and those which can be deleted upon allocation. It is recommended to delete secret/private cryptographic keys and all PIN upon deallocation. For secret user data deletion upon allocation should be sufficient (depending on the resistance of the concrete TOE against physical attacks).

Application Note: Note that the specification of the Security Module allows the creation and deletion of key objects during operational use. Theoretically it could be possible that a newly created key object uses memory areas which belonged to another key object before. Therefore the Security Module must ensure that contents of the old key object are not accessible by using the new key object.

Export from the TOE (FDP_ETC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Export of user data without security attributes (FDP_ETC.1)” as specified below:

FDP_ETC.1	Export of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

- FDP_ETC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP, outside of the TOE.
- FDP_ETC.1.2 The TSF shall export the user data without the user data's associated security attributes.

Import from outside of the TOE (FDP_ITC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)” as specified below:

- FDP_ITC.1** Import of user data without security attributes
- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
- FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
- FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
- FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.

Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality Transfer Protection (FDP_UCT)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below:

- FDP_UCT.1** Basic data exchange confidentiality
- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
- FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP to transmit, receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

Inter-TSF User Data Integrity Transfer Protection (FDP_UIT)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below:

FDP_UIT.1	Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <u>Access Control Smart Meter SFP to transmit, receive</u> user data in a manner protected from <u>modification, deletion, insertion, replay</u> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether <u>modification, deletion, insertion, replay</u> has occurred.

6.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication

User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)” as specified below:

FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>for device (Gateway): authentication state gained via PIN (GW-PIN used within the PACE protocol),</u> • <u>for human user (Gateway Administrator): authentication state gained via asymmetric authentication key (used within the external authentication).</u>

Application Note: Authentication of the Gateway is performed via the PACE protocol between the Gateway and the TOE, refer to the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PACE. Authentication of the Gateway Administrator is performed via a key-based external authentication of the Gateway Administrator against the TOE, refer to the SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH.

User Authentication (FIA_UAU)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1/GW)” as specified below:

FIA_UAU.1/GW	Timing of authentication (for Gateway)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1/GW	The TSF shall allow <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Establishing a communication channel between the TOE and the external world.</u>• <u>Reading the ATR/ATS.</u>• <u>Reading of data fields containing technical information.</u>• <u>[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions, or none]</u> on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/GW	The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note: Authentication of the Gateway is performed via the PACE protocol between the Gateway and the TOE, refer to the SFR FCS_CKM.1/PACE.

Application Note: Please note that the requirement in FIA_UAU.1/GW defines that the user (here: the Gateway) has to be successfully authenticated before allowing use of the TOE's cryptographic functionality or access to the assets stored in and processed by the TOE. The Access Control Smart Meter SFP (see chapter 6.3) prescribes in detail the access rules for the objects stored in and processed by the TOE. In particular, it is defined for which objects and functions authentication of the Gateway is required by the TOE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1/GWA)” as specified below:

FIA_UAU.1/GWA	Timing of authentication (for Gateway Administrator)
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1/GWA	The TSF shall allow <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <u>Establishing a communication channel between the TOE and the external world.</u>• <u>Reading the ATR/ATS.</u>

- Reading of data fields containing technical information.
- Carrying out the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-2], [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] (by means of command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE).
- [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions, or none]

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2/GWA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note: Authentication of the Gateway Administrator is performed via a key-based external authentication of the Gateway Administrator against the TOE, refer to the SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH.

Application Note: Please note that the requirement in FIA_UAU.1/GWA defines that the Gateway is successfully authenticated and that the user (here: the Gateway Administrator) has to be successfully authenticated before allowing administrative tasks as related e.g. to key management or update of certificates. Refer in addition to the SFR FMT_SMF.1. The Access Control Smart Meter SFP (see chapter 6.3) prescribes in detail the access rules for the objects stored in and processed by the TOE. In particular, it is defined for which objects and functions authentication of the Gateway Administrator is required by the TOE.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below:

FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to

- PACE authentication mechanism,
- key-based external authentication mechanism.

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below:

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

- FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
- authentication via the PACE protocol.
 - secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode using PACE session keys.
 - key-based external authentication
- to support user authentication.
- FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following rules:
- PACE/PIN based authentication shall be used for authenticating a device (Gateway) and secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode using PACE session keys shall be used to authenticate its commands if required by the Access Control Smart Meter SFP.
 - key-based authentication shall be used for authenticating a human user (Gateway Administrator).

User Identification (FIA_UID)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below:

- FIA_UID.1** Timing of identification
- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
- Establishing a communication channel between the TOE and the external world.
 - Reading the ATR/ATS.
 - Reading of data fields containing technical information.
 - Carrying out the PACE protocol according to [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-2], [TR-03110-3], [TR-03109-3], [TR-03109-2] (by means of command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE),
 - [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions, or none]
- on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
- FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

User-Subject Binding (FIA_USB)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1)” as specified below:

FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1	The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>authentication state for the Gateway.</u> • <u>authentication state for the Gateway Administrator.</u>
FIA_USB.1.2	The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: <u>initial authentication state is set to “not authenticated”.</u>
FIA_USB.1.3	The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>for device (Gateway): the authentication state is changed to “authenticated Gateway” when the device has successfully authenticated himself by the PACE protocol.</u> • <u>for human user (Gateway Administrator): the authentication state is changed to “authenticated Gateway Administrator” when the user has successfully authenticated himself by the key-based authentication mechanism.</u>

6.5 Class FMT: Security Management

Limited Capabilities and Availability (FMT_LIM)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below:

FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced <u>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF Data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.</u>

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below:

FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced <u>Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF Data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.</u>

Application Note: The SFRs FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF Data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases. The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that

- (1) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced

or conversely

- (2) the TSF is designed with high functionality but is removed or disabled in the product in its user environment.
- (3) The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.

Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below:

FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Management of key objects by means of commands CREATE KEY, DELETE KEY, ACTIVATE KEY, DEACTIVATE KEY, GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR, PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE,</u> • <u>Management of DFs and EFs by means of commands</u>

CREATE DF/EF, ACTIVATE DF/EF, DEACTIVATE DF/EF, DELETE DF/EF, TERMINATE DF/EF,

- Management of PIN objects by means of command CHANGE REFERENCE DATA,
- Life cycle management of the TOE by means of command TERMINATE CARD USAGE,
- Update of keys by means of commands GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR, PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE,
- Update of certificates by means of command UPDATE BINARY,
- Update of symmetric keys (GW-keys) by means of command UPDATE BINARY,
- [assignment: list of further management functions to be provided by the TSF, or none].

Application Note: A detailed description of the commands that have to be implemented in the TOE can be found in [TR-03109-2].

Security Management Roles (FMT_SMR)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security Roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below:

FMT_SMR.1	Security Roles
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>user</u> • <u>authenticated Gateway</u> • <u>authenticated Gateway Administrator</u> • <u>[assignment: additional authorised identified roles, or none].</u>
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

6.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below:

FPT_EMS.1	TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:	No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: *types of emissions*] in excess of [assignment: *specified limits*] enabling access to PIN, session keys, shared secret value Z_{AB} , ephemeral keys, [assignment: *list of types of TSF data, or none*] and private asymmetric keys of the user, symmetric keys of the user (GW-keys), [assignment: *list of types of user data, or none*].

FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface circuit surface to gain access to PIN, session keys, shared secret value Z_{AB} , ephemeral keys, [assignment: *list of types of TSF data, or none*] and private asymmetric keys of the user, symmetric keys of the user (GW-keys), [assignment: *list of types of user data, or none*].

Application Note: The ST writer shall perform the operation in FPT_EMS.1.1 and FPT_EMS.1.2. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the security module.

Fail Secure (FPT_FLS)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below:

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:

- power loss,
- exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
- detection of physical manipulation or physical probing,
- integrity errors according to FDP_SDI.2,
- insufficient entropy during random number generation,
- failure detected by the TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
- errors during processing cryptographic operations,
- errors during evaluation of access control rules, and

- [assignment: list of other types of failures in the TSF, or none].

TSF Physical Protection (FPT_PHP)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below:

FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist <u>physical manipulation and physical probing</u> to the <u>all TOE components implementing the TSF</u> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application Note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

TSF Self Test (FPT_TST)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below:

FPT_TST.1	TSF testing
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1	The TSF shall run a suite of self tests <u>during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation</u> to demonstrate the correct operation of <u>the TSF</u> .
FPT_TST.1.2	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>TSF data</u> .
FPT_TST.1.3	The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of <u>TSF</u> .

6.7 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels

Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC)

The TOE shall meet the requirement “Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)” as specified below:

FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1	The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2	The TSF shall permit <u>another trusted IT product</u> to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3	The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted channel for <u>any data exchange between the TOE and the Gateway except reading out the data fields with technical information</u> .

6.8 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

The Evaluation Assurance Level for this Protection Profile is **EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5**.

The following table lists the assurance components which are therefore applicable to this PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Component
Class ADV: Development	Architectural design (ADV_ARC.1)
	Functional specification (ADV_FSP.4)
	Implementation representation (ADV_IMP.1)
	TOE design (ADV_TDS.3)
Class AGD: Guidance documents	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative user guidance (AGD_PRE.1)
Class ALC: Life-cycle support	CM capabilities (ALC_CMC.4)
	CM scope (ALC_CMS.4)
	Delivery (ALC_DEL.1)

Assurance Class	Assurance Component	
	Development security	(ALC_DVS.1)
	Life-cycle definition	(ALC_LCD.1)
	Tools and techniques	(ALC_TAT.1)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	Conformance claims	(ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition	(ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction	(ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives	(ASE_OBJ.2)
	Derived security requirements	(ASE_REQ.2)
	Security problem definition	(ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification	(ASE_TSS.1)
Class ATE: Tests	Coverage	(ATE_COV.2)
	Depth	(ATE_DPT.1)
	Functional tests	(ATE_FUN.1)
	Independent testing	(ATE_IND.2)
Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment	Vulnerability analysis	(AVA_VAN.5)

Table 9: Assurance Requirements

6.9 Security Requirements Rationale

6.9.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale

6.9.1.1 Overview

This chapter proves that the set of security functional requirements (SFR) is suited to fulfil the security objectives for the TOE as described in chapter 4.1 and that each SFR can be traced back to the security objectives for the TOE. Each security objective for the TOE is reached by the SFRs, and at least one security objective exists for each security functional requirement.

The following table gives an overview how the security objectives for the TOE are addressed by the security functional requirements.

	O.Integrity	O.Confidentiality	O.Authentication	O.AccessControl	O.KeyManagement	O.TrustedChannel	O.Leakage	O.PhysicalTampering	O.AbuseFunctionality	O.Malfunction	O.Sign	O.KeyAgreementDH	O.KeyAgreementEG	O.Random	O.PACE
FCS_CKM.1/ECC					X						X			X	
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH												X		X	
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG													X	X	
FCS_CKM.1/PACE	X	X	X	X		X								X	X
FCS_CKM.4					X						X	X	X		X
FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA											X				
FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA											X				
FCS_COP.1/AUTH			X	X											
FCS_COP.1/IMP				X	X						X				
FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC		X				X									X
FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC	X					X									
FCS_RNG.1												X	X	X	X
FDP_ACC.2		X		X											
FDP_ACF.1		X		X											
FDP_SDI.2	X										X	X	X		X
FDP_RIP.1					X						X	X	X	X	X
FDP_ETC.1					X										
FDP_ITC.1					X										
FDP_UCT.1		X				X									
FDP_UIT.1	X					X									
FIA_ATD.1				X											
FIA_UAU.1/GW				X											

	O.Integrity	O.Confidentiality	O.Authentication	O.AccessControl	O.KeyManagement	O.TrustedChannel	O.Leakage	O.PhysicalTampering	O.AbuseFunctionality	O.Malfunction	O.Sign	O.KeyAgreementDH	O.KeyAgreementEG	O.Random	O.PACE
FIA_UAU.1/GWA				X											
FIA_UAU.4			X												
FIA_UAU.5			X												
FIA_UID.1				X											
FIA_USB.1				X											
FMT_LIM.1									X						
FMT_LIM.2									X						
FMT_SMF.1				X	X										
FMT_SMR.1				X											
FPT_EMS.1		X					X	X			X	X	X	X	X
FPT_FLS.1	X						X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
FPT_PHP.3		X					X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
FPT_TST.1	X						X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
FTP_ITC.1	X	X				X									

Table 10: Fulfilment of Security Objectives

The following chapter provides a detailed justification for this mapping as required to show the suitability and sufficiency of the security functional requirements to cope with the security objectives for the TOE.

6.9.1.2 Rationale for the Fulfilment of the Security Objectives for the TOE

In the following, a detailed justification as required to show the suitability and sufficiency of the security functional requirements to achieve the security objectives defined for the TOE is given.

O.Integrity

The security objective **O.Integrity** is met by the SFR **FDP_SDI.2** that defines requirements around the integrity protection for data stored in the TOE. In addition, the SFRs **FPT_TST.1** and **FPT_FLS.1** which guarantee for self testing by the TOE in particular in view of integrity and preservation of a secure failure state in the case of a detected integrity error are present in order to reach this security objective. Furthermore, the trusted channel between the TOE and the Gateway used for the exchange of sensitive data contributes to the data integrity at the TOE's interface. Herefore, the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC**, **FDP_UIT.1**, **FTP_ITC.1** and **FCS_CKM.1/PACE** are involved.

O.Confidentiality

The security objective **O.Confidentiality** is met by the SFRs **FDP_ACC.2** and **FDP_ACF.1** controlling the access to objects stored in or processed by the TOE. The security objective is in addition supported by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1** and **FPT_PHP.3**. Furthermore, the trusted channel between the TOE and the Gateway used for the exchange of sensitive data contributes to the data confidentiality at the TOE's interface. Herefore, the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC**, **FDP_UCT.1**, **FTP_ITC.1** and **FCS_CKM.1/PACE** are involved.

O.Authentication

The security objective **O.Authentication** is addressed by the SFRs **FIA_UAU.4** and **FIA_UAU.5**. Furthermore, in view of the cryptographic functionality of the different authentication mechanisms: For the PACE authentication between the TOE and the Gateway the SFR **FCS_CKM.1/PACE** is of relevance, for the user authentication of the Gateway Administrator the SFR **FCS_COP.1/AUTH** which realises the external authentication mechanism is involved.

O.AccessControl

The security objective **O.AccessControl** is directly addressed by the SFRs **FDP_ACC.2** and **FDP_ACF.1** which enforce the Access Control Smart Meter SFP defined in chapter 6.3. The SFR **FMT_SMF.1** covers the management functions provided by the TOE. A successful authentication for the access to objects as deposited in the Access Control Smart Meter SFP is realised via the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/AUTH** respective **FCS_CKM.1/PACE** for performing the authentication process and the SFR **FCS_COP.1/IMP** for import of the public authentication key (in case of **FCS_COP.1/AUTH**). The SFRs **FIA_ATD.1**, **FIA_USB.1**, **FIA_UID.1**, **FIA_UAU.1/GW**, **FIA_UAU.1/GWA** regulate in addition the access to the TOE's functionality and the objects stored in and processed by the TOE. Distinguishing between different roles is realised via the SFR **FMT_SMR.1**. Refer in addition to the SFRs that are assigned to the security objective **O.Authentication**.

O.KeyManagement

The security objective **O.KeyManagement** is directly addressed by the SFR **FMT_SMF.1** which covers in particular the management functions related to key management and by the SFR **FCS_CKM.1/ECC** for the generation of ECC key pairs. The export respective import of

public keys is reached by the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/IMP**, **FDP_ITC.1** and **FDP_ETC.1**. The deletion of keys is realised by the SFRs **FDP_RIP.1** and **FCS_CKM.4**.

O.TrustedChannel

The security objective **O.TrustedChannel** is directly realised by the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC** and **FDP_UCT.1** (for confidentiality of the data exchange between the TOE and the Gateway) and **FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC** and **FDP_UIT.1** (for integrity of the data exchange between the TOE and the Gateway). Setting up the trusted channel is addressed by the SFR **FDP_ITC.1**, and the session keys used for the trusted channel are negotiated via the SFR **FCS_CKM.1/PACE**.

O.Leakage

The security objective **O.Leakage** is directly addressed by the SFR **FPT_EMS.1** and is supported by the SFRs **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3** and **FPT_TST.1** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE.

O.PhysicalTampering

The security objective **O.PhysicalTampering** is directly addressed by the SFR **FPT_PHP.3** and is supported by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1** and **FPT_TST.1** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE.

O.AbuseFunctionality

The security objective **O.AbuseFunctionality** is directly met by a combination of the SFRs **FMT_LIM.1** and **FMT_LIM.2** which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be available during the TOE operational use phase. **FMT_LIM.1** further ensures that the TOE does not provide any untested functionality.

O.Malfunction

The security objective **O.Malfunction** is directly addressed by the SFRs **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3** and **FPT_TST.1** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE.

O.Sign

The security objective **O.Sign** is covered in view of its cryptographic functionality by the SFRs **FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA** and **FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA**. The key generation for signature keys is covered by the SFR **FCS_CKM.1/ECC**, the import of signature verification keys is covered by the SFR **FCS_COP.1/IMP**. In addition, the correct functioning and security of the digital signature generation and verification operation is addressed by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3**, **FPT_TST.1**, **FDP_RIP.1**, **FDP_SDI.2** and **FCS_CKM.4** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE including memory preparation and key destruction.

O.KeyAgreementDH

The security objective **O.KeyAgreementDH** is covered in view of its cryptographic functionality by the SFRs **FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH** and **FCS_RNG.1**. In addition, the correct functioning and security of the DH key agreement operation is addressed by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3**, **FPT_TST.1**, **FDP_RIP.1**, **FDP_SDI.2** and **FCS_CKM.4** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE including memory preparation and key destruction.

O.KeyAgreementEG

The security objective **O.KeyAgreementEG** is covered in view of its cryptographic functionality by the SFRs **FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG** and **FCS_RNG.1**. In addition, the correct functioning and security of the ElGamal key agreement operation is addressed by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3**, **FPT_TST.1**, **FDP_RIP.1**, **FDP_SDI.2** and **FCS_CKM.4** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE including memory preparation and key destruction.

O.Random

The security objective **O.Random** is covered in view of its functionality by the SFR **FCS_RNG.1** for direct generation of random numbers and the SFRs **FCS_CKM.1/ECC**, **FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH**, **FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG** and **FCS_CKM.1/PACE** where implicitly random numbers are generated. In addition, the correct functioning and security of the random number generation operation is addressed by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3**, **FPT_TST.1** and **FDP_RIP.1** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE.

O.PACE

The security objective **O.PACE** is covered in view of its cryptographic functionality by the SFRs **FCS_CKM.1/PACE**, **FCS_RNG.1** and **FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC**. In addition, the correct functioning and security of the PACE protocol operation is addressed by the SFRs **FPT_EMS.1**, **FPT_FLS.1**, **FPT_PHP.3**, **FPT_TST.1**, **FDP_RIP.1**, **FDP_SDI.2** and **FCS_CKM.4** which support the correct and secure operation of the TOE including memory preparation and key destruction.

6.9.1.3 SFR Dependency Rationale

The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements dependencies of this PP and demonstrates that they are either fulfilled, or a reference to the following chapter 6.9.1.4 is given where a justification for the non-fulfilment of the respective dependency can be found.

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/ECC	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA FCS_CKM.4 Please refer to chapter 6.9.1.4 for missing

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
		dependencies.
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4 Please refer to chapter 6.9.1.4 for missing dependencies.
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.4 Please refer to chapter 6.9.1.4 for missing dependencies.
FCS_CKM.1/PACE	[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	FCS_CKM.1/ECC FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG FCS_CKM.1/PACE FDP_ITC.1
FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.1/ECC FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/VER-ECDSA	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FDP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FDP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/IMP	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]	FDP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.4

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
	FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	
FCS_COP.1/PACE-ENC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.1/PACE FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE-MAC	[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction	FCS_CKM.1/PACE FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RNG.1	-	-
FDP_ACC.2	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.2 Please refer to chapter 6.9.1.4 for missing dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2	-	-
FDP_RIP.1	-	-
FDP_ETC.1	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	FDP_ACC.2
FDP_ITC.1	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FDP_ACC.2 Please refer to chapter 6.9.1.4 for missing dependencies.
FDP_UCT.1	[FTP_ICT.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	FTP_ICT.1 FDP_ACC.2
FDP_UIT.1	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] [FTP_ICT.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]	FDP_ACC.2 FTP_ICT.1
FIA_ATD.1	-	-
FIA_UAU.1/GW	FIA_UID.1 Timing if identification	FIA_UID.1

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FIA_UAU.1/GWA	FIA_UID.1 Timing if identification	FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4	-	-
FIA_UAU.5	-	-
FIA_UID.1	-	-
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition	FIA_ATD.1
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability	FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capability	FMT_LIM.1
FMT_SMF.1	-	-
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing if identification	FIA_UID.1
FPT_EMS.1	-	-
FPT_FLS.1	-	-
FPT_PHP.3	-	-
FPT_TST.1	-	-
FTP_ITC.1	-	-

Table 11: SFR Dependencies

6.9.1.4 Justification for Missing Dependencies

FCS_CKM.1/ECC:

The ECC key pairs generated via the SFR FCS_CKM.1/ECC can be used afterwards by the Gateway for digital signature generation, DH key agreement respective ElGamal key agreement. The related cryptographic operation is covered by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA, FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH respective FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG. For signature keys, the required dependency of FCS_CKM.1/ECC to [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] is directly fulfilled by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG-ECDSA. For key pairs intended to be used for DH key agreement or ElGamal key agreement, the required dependency of FCS_CKM.1/ECC to [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] is replaced without loss of security information by the SFRs FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH respective FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG.

FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-DH:

The dependency to [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] is omitted as the TOE only generates and emits the shared secret value Z_{AB} and the key derivation function for deriving the keys is carried out by the Gateway. Ephemeral keys generated by the TOE during the key agreement protocol are not used anymore by the TOE for further cryptographic operations.

FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-EG:

The dependency to [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] is omitted as the TOE only generates and emits the shared secret value Z_{AB} and the key derivation function for deriving the keys is carried out by the Gateway. Ephemeral keys generated by the TOE during the key agreement protocol are not used anymore by the TOE for further cryptographic operations.

FDP_ACF.1:

The dependency to FMT_MSA.3 is omitted as the security attributes for the security policy are fixed during development of the TOE and cannot be altered afterwards.

FDP_ITC.1:

The dependency to FMT_MSA.3 is omitted as the security attributes for the security policy are fixed during development of the TOE and cannot be altered afterwards.

6.9.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

6.9.2.1 Reasoning for Choice of Assurance Level

The decision on the assurance level has been mainly driven by the assumed attack potential. As outlined in the Gateway Protection Profile [PP 73] it is assumed that – at least from the WAN side – a high attack potential is posed against the security functions of the TOE. This leads to the use of AVA_VAN.5 (Resistance against high attack potential).

In order to keep evaluations according to this Protection Profile commercially feasible EAL 4 has been chosen as assurance level as this is the lowest level that provides the prerequisites for the use of AVA_VAN.5.

6.9.2.2 Dependencies of Assurance Components

The dependencies of the assurance requirements taken from EAL 4 are fulfilled automatically. The augmentation by AVA_VAN.5 does not introduce additional functionalities that are not contained in EAL 4.

6.9.3 Security Requirements – Internal Consistency

The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form an internally consistent whole.

a) SFRs

The dependency analysis in chapter 6.9.1.4 for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.

All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR in the chapters 6.1 to 6.7 are also treated in a consistent way: The SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory property and behaviour of these ‘shared’ items.

b) SARs

The assurance package EAL 4 is a pre-defined set of internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in chapter 6.9.2.2 shows that the assurance requirements are internally consistent, because all (additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.

Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise, if there are functional-assurance dependencies being not met – an opportunity having been shown not to arise in chapters 6.9.1.4 and 6.9.2. Furthermore, as also discussed in chapter 6.9.2, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So, there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.

7. Appendix

7.1 Acronyms

Term	Description
ATR	Answer To Reset
ATS	Answer To Select
AUTH	External Authentication
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DEMA	Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DF	Dedicated File
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EF	Elementary File
Enc	Encryption
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECKA	Elliptic Curve Key Agreement
ECKA-DH	Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - Diffie-Hellman
ECKA-EG	Elliptic Curve Key Agreement - ElGamal
ENC	Content Data Encryption
GW	Gateway
GWA	Gateway Administrator
HAN	Home Area Network
ID	Identifier
IT	Information Technology
KDF	Key Derivation Function

Term	Description
LMN	Local Metrological Network
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKI	Public Key Infrastruktur / Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SecMod	Security Module / Sicherheitsmodul
SEMA	Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SF	Security Function
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SIG	Content Data Signature
Sign	Signature
SM	Smart Meter
SMGW	Smart Meter Gateway
SM-PKI	Smart Metering - Public Key Infrastruktur (SM-PKI)
SPA	Simple Power Analysis
ST	Security Target
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target Of Evaluation
TR	Technische Richtlinie
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
WAN	Wide Area Network

7.2 Glossary

Term	Description
Authenticity	Property that an entity is what it claims to be.

Term	Description
Confidentiality	Property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes.
Consumer	End user of electricity, gas, water or heat (according to [CEN]).
External Entity	See chapter 3.1.
Gateway Administrator	See chapter 1.5 and 3.1.
Home Area Network (HAN)	In-house LAN which interconnects domestic equipment and can be used for energy management purposes (according to [CEN]).
Integrator	See chapter 1.5 and 3.1.
Integrity	Property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner.
IT-System	Computersystem.
LAN, Local Area Network	Data communication network, connecting a limited number of communication devices (Meters and other devices) and covering a moderately sized geographical area within the premises of the consumer. In the context of this PP the term LAN is used as a hypernym for HAN and LMN.
Local Metrological Network (LMN)	In-house LAN which interconnects metrological equipment (i.e. Meters) (according to [CEN]).
Metering Service Provider	Service provider responsible for installing and operating measuring devices in the area of Smart Metering.

7.3 Mapping from English to German Terms

English Term	German Term
CLS, Controllable Local System	Energiemanagementsysteme und dezentral steuerbare Verbraucher- oder Erzeugersysteme
Consumer	Anschlussnutzer, Letztverbraucher (im verbrauchenden Sinne), u. U. auch Einspeiser
Gateway	Kommunikationseinheit
Gateway Operator	Betreiber der Kommunikationseinheit

English Term	German Term
Grid	Netz (für Strom/Gas/Wasser)
LAN, Local Area Network	Lokales Netz (für Kommunikation)
LMN, Local Metrological Network	Lokales Messeinrichtungsnetz
Meter	Messeinrichtung (Teil eines Messsystems)
Meter Operator	Messstellenbetreiber
MSP, Metering Service Provider	Messstellenbetreiber
Security Module	Sicherheitsmodul (z.B. eine Smart Card)
Smart Meter Smart Metering System ¹⁰	Intelligente, in ein Kommunikationsnetz eingebundene, elektronische Messeinrichtung (Messsystem)
TOE	EVG (Evaluierungsgegenstand)
WAN, Wide Area Network	Weitverkehrsnetz (für Kommunikation)

7.4 References

7.4.1 Common Criteria

- [CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-001
- [CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-002
- [CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-003
- [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, CCMB-2012-09-004

¹⁰ Please note that the terms “Smart Meter” and “Smart Metering System” are used synonymously within this document.

7.4.2 Protection Profiles

- [PP 73] Common Criteria Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System, BSI, 2013

7.4.3 Technical Guidelines and Specifications

- [TR-03109] BSI TR-03109 (Dachdokument), BSI, Version 1.0, 2013
- [TR-03109-1] BSI TR-03109-1 Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems, BSI, Version 1.0, 2013
- [TR-03109-2] BSI TR-03109-2 Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an die Funktionalität und Interoperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, BSI, Version 1.0, 2013
- [TR-03109-3] BSI TR-03109-3 Kryptographische Vorgaben, BSI, Version 1.0, 2013
- [TR-03109-4] BSI TR-03109-4 Public Key Infrastruktur für Smart Meter Gateways, BSI, Version 1.0, 2013
- [ISO 7816-4] ISO/IEC 7816-4: Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange, ISO/IEC, DIS 2012
- [ISO 7816-8] ISO/IEC 7816-8: Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 8: Commands for security operations, ISO/IEC, IS 2008
- [ISO 7816-9] ISO/IEC 7816-9: Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 9: Commands for card management, ISO/IEC, IS 2008
- [TR-03111] BSI TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, BSI, Version 2.0, 2012
- [TR-03110-1] BSI TR-03110-1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 1 - eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, BSI, Version 2.10, 2012
- [TR-03110-2] BSI TR-03110-2 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 2 - Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI), BSI, Version 2.10, 2012
- [TR-03110-3] BSI TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 3 - Common Specifications, BSI, Version 2.10, 2012
- [TR-03116-3] BSI TR-03116-3 eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung - Kryptographische Vorgaben für die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen, BSI, current version
- [NIST 197] NIST FIPS 197 - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001
- [ISO 10116] ISO/IEC 10116 Information technology - Security techniques - Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, 2006
- [RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493 J. H. Song, J. Lee, T. Iwata: The AES-CMAC Algorithm, 2006

7.4.4 Other Sources

- [CEN] SMART METERS CO-ORDINATION GROUP (SM-CG) Item 5. M/441 first phase deliverable – Communication – Annex: Glossary (SMCG/Sec0022/DC)
- [PTB_A50.7] Anforderungen an elektronische und software- gesteuerte Messgeräte und Zusatzeinrichtungen für Elektrizität, Gas, Wasser und Wärme, PTB-A 50.7, April 2002