

# Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V3.0

2022. 10. 14.



The certified Protection Profile is written in Korean. This document is a translation of the original from Korean into English.

## Foreword

This Protection Profile has been developed with the support of National Security Research Institute (NSR) under the agreement between National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT). The Protection Profile author converted Part 2, Common Security Requirements of 'Security Requirements for Government V3.0 for the Information Security Systems and Network Devices' and Security Requirements described in 'Single Sign On Product Testing Criteria(2022-03-15)' in conformity with the Common Criteria. The accurate interpretation of the requirements was made through the advice of the National Cyber Security Center of the National Intelligence Service. The Protection Profile includes application notes which give the additional interpretation and guidance for the evaluation and certification based on the Common Criteria, and the separated guidance supporting document (Korean only) for the Protection Profile is provided.

## Revision History

| Version | Date         | Content  |
|---------|--------------|--|
| 3.0     | 2022. 10. 14 | o Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V3.0 First Issue |
|         |              |  |

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# 1. PP introduction

## 1.1. PP reference

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| Title                      | Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On          |
| Version                    | 3.0  |
| Evaluation Assurance Level | EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)   |
| Developer                  | National Security Research Institute                           |
| Evaluation Criteria        | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation |
| Common Criteria version    | CC V3.1 r5   |
| Certification Number       |  |
| Keywords                   | Single Sign On, SSO  |

## 1.2. TOE overview

### 1.2.1. Single Sign On overview

'Single Sign On (SSO)' (hereinafter referred to as "TOE") is used to enable the user to access various business systems and use the service through a single user login without additional login action. The TOE performs user identification and authentication, authentication token(hereinafter referred to as "token") issue and validity verification according to the user authentication policy.

The TOE shall provide the user login capability using various authentication methods (e.g., ID and password, certificate, security card), issue a token during user login, and verify the issued token if accessing another business system after user login. Authentication functions based on ID and password for authorized administrators and authorized end users in the TOE are mandatorily required. For end users, however, authentication functions are only applied when the TOE, not external authentication system, provides them in the initial authentication phase of single sign on.

The primary security features provided by the TOE include user identification and authentication, token issue, storage, verification and destruction. During the generation of authentication token and user single sign on based on the authentication token, the TOE must use a validated cryptographic module whose security and implementation conformance are validated by the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).

### 1.2.2. TOE type and scope

The TOE defined by this Protection Profile is SSO that enables the user to access various business systems through a single user login, and the TOE components are provided in the form of appliance or software.

The agent and the server are the indispensable TOE component defined in this PP. In compliance with PP, the ST author can include a management console or client as an option, if necessary. The TOE is composed of the server that processes user login, manages the token, and sets the policy, etc; and the agent that is installed in each business system performs the function of token issue and verification, etc. In addition, the agent can be one of the 'API type' composed of the library file, the 'process type' composed of the executable file, or a combination of these two types.

If a client or management console is added as a TOE component, the ST author shall define the role of the added component from the viewpoint of 'Single Sign on'.

This PP defines the minimum mandatory security functional requirements, conditional mandatory security functional requirements, and optional security functional requirements that shall be provided by the agent and server, which are the indispensable TOE component, and the TOE shall implement those security functional requirements. If a client or management console is added to the ST in compliance with PP, the mandatory security functional requirement, conditional mandatory security functional requirements, and optional security functional requirement shall be applied to the client and management console according to the application notes.

### **1.2.3. TOE usage and major security features**

The TOE performs user identification and authentication to enable the user to access various business systems and use the service through a single user login without additional login action, and the TOE can be supported by user identification and authentication that the external authentication systems(e.g., RADIUS, TACACS, Kerberos, or other authentication server within the organization) provide. The support by the external authentication system, however, is only allowed for the authorized end-user.

The TOE provides the security audit function that records and manages a critical events as audit data when activating the security functionality and management function, function of protecting the data that stored in the TSF controlled repository, and TSF protection function including TSF self-testing, etc. In addition, the TOE provides identification and authentication function such as authentication failure handling, mutual authentication between the TOE components, cryptographic support function such as cryptographic key management and cryptographic operation for issuing a token, security management function such as management of security functions behaviour and configuration setting, and the TOE access function to manage the authorized administrator's access session.

In addition, the token requires confidentiality and integrity protection, and the TOE executable code requires integrity protection.

Figure 1 shows the user identification and authentication procedure of the general TOE. The detailed execution procedure can vary depending on the TOE implementation.


The user identification and authentication procedure can be grouped into the initial authentication phase using ID/PW alone or in parallel with ID/PW, certificate, security card, etc., and the token-based authentication phase that accesses the business system using the token issued during the initial authentication procedure. The detailed execution procedure of each authentication phase



can vary according to the implementation of the TOE. The following describes one process among the general authentication procedure.

The execution procedure of the initial authentication phase is as follows. The user requests login by using ID/PW alone or ID/PW and certificate, etc. in parallel, and the SSO agent that receives the login request message sends a login verification request to the SSO server, which in turn checks the authorized user status. Upon receiving the login verification request, the SSO server performs login verification directly using the user information stored in the DBMS, or by interfacing with the authentication system. The SSO server issues a token or requests token issue to the SSO agent if the login verification result is valid. The SSO server or SSO agent transfers an issued token to the user.

The token-based authentication phase is performed only when the token has been normally issued in the initial authentication phase. When the user utilizes business system services, the issued token is transferred to the SSO agent installed in the pertinent business system, and the SSO agent verifies the validity of the token by interfacing with the SSO server upon receiving the token.



[Figure 1] user identification and authentication procedure

The user identification and authentication procedure can be executed with various procedures depending on the TOE implementation. The following table shows the example of operation by phase.

| authentication phase       | example of operation procedure  |
|----------------------------|---|
| initial authentication     | (A) login request 1 → (D) login verification 2 → (E) token issue request → (F) token issue 1                            |
|                            | (A) login request 1 → (B) login verification 1 → (C) login verification 3 ↔ (E) token issue request → (F) token issue 1 |
|                            | (A) login request 1 → (D) login verification 2 → (C) login verification 3 ↔ (E) token issue request → (F) token issue 1 |
|                            | (G) login request 2 and login verification → (H) token issue 2  |
|                            | (G) login request 2 and login verification → (E) token issue request → (F) token issue 1                                |
|                            | (G) login request 2 and login verification → (C) login verification 3 ↔ (E) token issue request → (F) token issue 1     |
| token-based authentication | (I) token-based authentication request 1 → (J) token verification 1   |
|                            | (K) token-based authentication request 2 → (L) token verification 2   |

[Table 2] example of operation procedure by authentication phase

In addition, the subject who issues, stores, and verifies the token can be different, depending on the implementation. The following is an example of the subject who issues, stores, and verifies the token.

- Subject who issues the token: SSO Server, SSO Server + SSO Agent, etc.
- Token storage location: User PC(Web browser/Client), User PC + SSO Agent, etc.
- Subject who verifies the token: SSO Server, SSO Server + SSO Agent, etc.

#### 1.2.4. Non-TOE and TOE operational environment

Figure 2 shows the general TOE operational environment. Figure 2 is one of the various operational environments and is composed of the SSO server and SSO agent. The SSO server verifies user login attempts directly using the user information stored in the DBMS, or provides the user login verification resulted from the authentication system (e.g., RADIUS, TACACS, Kerberos, and other authentication servers inside the organization), the token management, and the policy configuration. The SSO agent is installed in each business system and requests user login verification to the SSO server or issues the token. In addition, the SSO agent can be one of the 'API type' composed of the library file, the 'process type' composed of the executable file, or a combination of two types. In addition, the client program that manages the token in the user PC and the management console for the TOE management can be included in the TOE component according to the implementation.


Authorized administrators may perform security management by accessing the SSO server through web browsers or management consoles. Wrappers which may be used to support various types of authentication mechanisms (e.g., OTP, certificate) or for compatibility with business systems in the

TOE operating environment are out of the TOE scope.

Encrypted communication shall be performed in the communication section among TOE components, and encrypted communication shall also be performed when communication between external IT entities except for the NTP server and TOE components is required.

There may exist various external entities necessary for the operation of the TOE, including the NTP server to synchronize time, log server to store the audit data outside and manage the audit data, email server to notify the authorized administrator in case of audit data loss, and the authentication system for the end-user identification and authentication.

The ST author complying with this PP, shall describe any external entities that interact with the TOE.



[Figure 2] TOE operational environment

The others such as the NTP server, log server, email server, and authentication system except for the TOE correspond to the TOE operational environment. In addition, the part that is not related to a security functional requirement (hereinafter referred to as "SFR"), e.g., the function that is irrelevant to the TOE security functionality, can be classified into the non-TSF of the TOE with consideration for the physical scope of the TOE.

The ST author shall include FAU\_STG.1, which is the conditional mandatory security functional requirement, in the ST if the TOE implements the protected audit trail storage function. If this function is not implemented in the TOE, the operational environment shall provide the function (e.g. using DBMS, etc.) and accordingly, the security objective for the operational environment shall be added.

The ST author shall include FPT\_STM.1, which is the optional security functional requirement, in the ST if the TOE implements the reliable time stamp function. If this function is not implemented in the TOE, the operational environment shall provide the function (e.g. provided by the operating system, etc.) and accordingly, the security objective for the operational environment shall be added.

The ST author must include conditional mandatory security functional requirements defined in this PP if the following conditions are met.

- If the TOE provides additional identification and authentication mechanisms (e.g., certificate-based authentication method, OTP method, etc.) in addition to ID/PW-based identification and authentication, FIA\_UAU.5 shall be included.
- When providing additional identification and authentication functions, the TOE can provide those functions by receiving the authentication results of external IT entities that interact with the TOE (e.g., 2FA support device that complies with the FIDO standards), and accordingly FPT\_LEE.1(extended) shall be included instead of FIA\_UAU.5. In this case, the authentication information used by external IT entities to perform additional identification and authentication methods is safely managed by external IT entities, so the security objectives for the operating environment shall be added accordingly.
- When providing additional identification and authentication functions, the TOE can provide those functions by receiving the authentication results of external IT entities that interact with the TOE (e.g., 2FA support device that complies with the FIDO standards), and accordingly FPT\_LEE.1(Extended) shall be included instead of FIA\_UAU.5. In this case, the authentication information used by external IT entities to perform additional identification and authentication methods is safely managed by external IT entities, so the security objectives for the operating environment shall be added accordingly.
- In case of users(authorized administrators and end users) directly access the SSO server through web browsers or terminal access programs, FTP\_TRP.1 shall be included. Assuming that the web server is the TOE operating environment, and if a secure communication path is provided through communication between the user's web browser and web server, the ST author shall add the security objectives for the operational environment instead of including FTP\_TRP.1. And if the user's web browser access the SSO server via the web server, such as when the web server and the TOE server are physically separated to perform communication, FTP\_TRP.1 is included to provide a secure path between the SSO server and the user, and FTP\_ITC.1 shall be included to provide a secure channel between the web server and the SSO server. FPT\_ITT.1 shall be applied when transmitting TSF data between the TOE components which are physically separated.(eg, If communication between the TOE management console and the SSO server is directly implemented, FTT\_ITT.1 shall be applied)
- When the TOE interacts with external IT entities(e.g., mail server, log server, etc.), FTP\_ITC.1 shall be included.

The optional security functional requirements can be optionally included in the ST if the TOE provides the security features that implement the pertinent security functional requirements. The ST author shall pay attention not to omit the security functional requirements for the security features

provided by the TOE by referring to the application notes when applying each optional security functional requirement with regard to the applicability of the optional security functional requirements.

This PP has been developed considering various types of the TOE implementation. The ST author, complying with this PP, shall describe any non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to operate.

### 1.3. Conventions

The notation, formatting and conventions used in this PP are consistent with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection and refinement. Each operation is used in this PP.

#### Iteration

Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of iteration is marked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier, i.e., denoted as (iteration No.).

#### Assignment

This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The result of assignment is indicated in square brackets like [ assignment\_value ].

#### Selection

This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The result of selection is shown as *underlined and italicized*.

#### Refinement

This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement is shown in **bold text**.

#### Security Target (ST) Author

This is used to represent the final decision of attributes being made by the ST author. The ST author's operation is denoted in braces, as in {decided by the ST author}. In addition, operations of SFR not completed in the Protection Profile must be completed by the ST author.

"Application notes" is provided to clarify the intent of requirements, provide the information for the optional items in implementation, and define "Pass/Fail" criteria for a requirement. The application notes is provided with corresponding requirements if necessary.

## 1.4. Terms and definitions

Terms used in this PP, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC.

### Agent Type1

Antivirus products, Software-Based Security USB products, Host Data Loss Prevention products, etc.

- The endpoint on which the agent is located is typically a PC with Windows® operating system accessible to employees within the organization, and if the agent is compromised, data present on the user's host can be compromised and leaked, requiring strict security requirements in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

### Agent Type2

Network Access Control products, Patch Management Systems, etc.

- The endpoint on which the agent is located is typically a PC with Windows® operating system accessible to employees in the organization, and if the agent is compromised, it is unlikely that data present on the user's host will be corrupted or leaked, but it can cause problems in using the resources provided by the organization, requiring security requirements in terms of confidentiality, integrity.

### Agent Type3

Database Access Control products, Access Control in Operating System(Server) products, Enterprise security management products, etc.

- Since the endpoint where the agent is located is generally a physically secure environment that can only be accessed by authorized employees of the organization, it corresponds to a product type with a relatively low threat occurrence.

### Application Programming Interface (API)

A set of software libraries that exist between the application layer and the platform system layer and facilitate the development of applications that run on the platform

### Approved cryptographic algorithm

A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korean Cryptographic Module Validation Authority for block cipher, secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit generation, key agreement, public key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms considering safety, reliability and interoperability

### Approved mode of operation

The mode of cryptographic module using approved cryptographic algorithm

### Assignment

The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the CC) or requirement

### Attack potential

Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed as an attacker's expertise, resources and motivation

### Augmentation

Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package

**Authentication Data**

Information used to verify a user's claimed identity

**Authentication token**

Authentication data that authorized end-users use to access the business system

**Authorized Administrator**

Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE

**Authorized User**

The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation

**Automated recovery**

Recovery without the user's intervention

**Business System**

An application server that authorized end-users access through 'SSO'

**Can/could**

The 'can' or 'could' presented in Application notes indicates optional requirements applied to the TOE by ST author's choice

**Class**

Set of CC families that share a common focus

**Client**

Application program that can access the services of SSO server or SSO agent through network

**Client Type**

Virtual Private Network products, Wireless LAN Authentication Products, etc.

- The client is an entity installed on the user's host and serves to request communication with the server on behalf of the user.

**Component**

Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based

**Critical Security Parameters (CSP)**

Information related to security that can erode the security of the encryption module if exposed or changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or Personal Identification Number)

**Database Management System (DBMS)**

A software system composed to configure and apply the database.

**Decryption**

The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key

**Dependency**



Relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending component is included in a PP, ST or package, a requirement based on the component that is depended upon must normally also be included in the PP, ST or package

**Element**

Indivisible statement of a security need

**Encryption**

The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key

**Endpoint**

The point where the TOE components such as agents, clients, etc. are installed and operated without any further sub-interacted entities

**End-user**

Users of the TOE who want to use the business system, not the administrators of the TOE

**Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)**

Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined assurance scale, that form an assurance package

**External Entity**

Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary

**Family**

Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigour

**Identity**

Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. user, process or disk) within the context of the TOE

**Iteration**

Use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements

**Kerberos**

A centralized authentication scheme, described in RFC 1510, that provides user authentication using symmetric cryptographic technique in a distributed computing environment

**Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP)**

A system to validate the security and implementation conformance of cryptographic modules used for the protection of important but not classified information among the data communicated through the information and communication network of the government and public institutions.

**Local access**

Connection established through the console port between the administrator and the TOE

**Management access**

The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, etc to manage the TOE by administrator, remotely

**Management Console**

Application program that provides GUI, CLI, etc. to the administrator and provides system management and configuration

**Manual recovery**

Recovery through an update server, etc. by user execution or user intervention

**Object**

Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information and on which subjects perform operations

**Operation(on a component of the CC)**

Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations on components are assignment, iteration, refinement and selection

**Operation(on a subject)**

Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object

**Private Key**

A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely associated with an entity(the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed

**Protection Profile (PP)**

Implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type

**Public Key**

A cryptographic key which is used in an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is associated with an unique entity(the subject using the public key), it can be disclosed

**Public Key(asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm**

A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private key

**Public Security Parameters (PSP)**

security related public information whose modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module

**Random bit generator (RBG)**

A device or algorithm that outputs a binary sequence that is statistically independent and is not biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit string, and the sequence can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into the deterministic and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of an algorithm that generates bit strings from the initial value called a "seed key," and the non-deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on the unpredictable physical source.

**Recommend/be recommended**

The 'recommend' or 'be recommended' presented in Application notes is not mandatorily recommended, but required to be applied for secure operations of the TOE

**Refinement**

Addition of details to a component

**Remote Authentication Dial-In User Services (RADIUS)**

Service to identify and authenticate users by sending information such as user ID, password and IP address to the authentication server when a remote user requests a connection

**Role**

Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user and the TOE

**Secret Key**

The cryptographic key which is used in symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is associated with one or more entity, it is not allowed to release

**Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)**

This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure confidentiality, integrity and security over a computer network

**Security Policy Document**

Document uploaded to the list of the validated cryptographic module with the module's name and specifying the summary for the cryptographic algorithms and operational environments of the TOE

**Security Target (ST)**

Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE

**Selection**

Specification of one or more items from a list in a component

**Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP)**

critical security parameters (CSP) and public security parameters (PSP)

**Shall/must**

The 'shall' or 'must' presented in Application notes indicates mandatory requirements applied to the TOE

**Subject**

Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects

**Symmetric cryptographic technique**

Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption, also known as secret key cryptographic technique

**Target of Evaluation (TOE)**

Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance

**Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS)**

Authentication protocol that is common for UNIX networks, described in RFC 1492, used by remote access server to send user login passwords to an authentication server

**Threat Agent**

Entity that can adversely act on assets

**TOE Security Functionality (TSF)**

Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

**Transport Layer Security (TLS)**

This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a client and is described in RFC 2246

**TSF Data**

Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies

**User**

Refer to "External entity", authorized administrator and authorized end-user in the TOE

**Validated Cryptographic Module**

A cryptographic module that is validated and given a validation number by validation authority

**Wrapper**

Interfaces for interconnection between the TOE and various types of business systems or authentication systems

## 1.5. PP organization

Chapter 1 introduces to the Protection Profile, providing Protection Profile references and the TOE overview.

Chapter 2 provides the conformance claims to the CC, PP and package; and describes the claim's conformance rationale and PP conformance statement.

Chapter 3 describes the security objectives for the operational environment.

Chapter 4 defines the extended components for the SSO

Chapter 5 describes the security functional and assurance requirements. If required, Application notes are provided to clarify the meaning of requirements and provide an explanation of detailed guidelines to the ST author for correct operations.

Reference describes the references for users who need more information about the background and related information than those described in this PP.

Abbreviated terms are listed to define frequently used terms in the PP.

## 2. Conformance claim

### 2.1. CC conformance claim

|                   |                                       |   |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| CC                |                                       | <p>Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)</li> </ul> |
| Conformance claim | Part 2 Security functional components | Extended : FCS_RBG.1, FIA_IMA.1, FIA_SOS.3, FMT_PWD.1, FPT_LEE.1, FPT_PST.1, FTA_TUD.1  |
|                   | Part 3 Security assurance components  | <i>Conformant</i>   |
|                   | Package                               | Augmented : EAL1 augmented (ATE_FUN.1)  |

### 2.2. PP conformance claim

This Protection Profile does not claim conformance to other PPs.

### 2.3. Package conformance claim

This Protection Profile claims conformance to assurance package EAL1 augmented with ATE\_FUN.1.

### 2.4. Conformance claim rationale

Since this Protection Profile does not claim conformance to other Protection Profiles, it is not necessary to describe the conformance claim rationale.

### 2.5. PP conformance statement

This Protection Profile requires "strict PP conformance" of any ST or PP, which claims conformance to this PP.

## 3. Security objectives

The followings are the security objectives handled by technical and procedural method supported from operational environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.

### 3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment

#### OE.PHYSICAL\_CONTROL

The place where SSO agent and SSO server among the TOE components are installed and operated shall be equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized administrator can access.

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#### OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN

The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with administrator guidances.

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#### OE.LOG\_BACKUP

The authorized administrator shall periodically checks a spare space of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.

---

#### OE.OPERATION\_SYSTEM\_REINFORCEMENT

The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and operated.

---

#### Application notes

- o Depending on the implementation type of the TOE, the TOE components(SSO agent, SSO server) may not use the operating system independently, so care shall be taken that the operating system related settings of other external entities operating in the same operating system do not affect the secure operation of the TOE.

#### OE.SECURE\_DEVELOPMENT

The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and authentication function in the operational environment of the business system shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.

---

#### Application notes

- o This security objective for the operational environment is applied when a Wrapper is used for compatibility between the SSO agent that is the TOE component and business system.

#### OE.AUTHENTICATION\_SYSTEM\_SECURITY

If TOE receives the support of the external authentication system (RADIUS, TACACS, Kerberos, or other authentication server within the organization) regarding the initial end-user identification and authentication function, the external authentication system shall support the function of storing and managing the authentication information of the authorized end-user safely.

#### Application notes

- o This security objective for the operational environment applies only when the initial end-user identification and authentication function is supported by the external authentication system, Therefore, this does not apply to the identification and authentication of the administrator or the token-based end-user authentication.
- o If TOE implements the initial authentication function for the end-user, the security objective for the operational environment 'OE.AUHTENTICATIO\_SYSTEM\_SECURITY' shall be deleted, and the following SFR related to the initial user authentication function shall be satisfied by the TOE.
  - FAU\_GEN.1, FIA\_AFL.1, FIA\_SOS.1, FIA\_UAU.1, FIA\_UAU.4, FIA\_UAU.5, FIA\_UAU.7, FIA\_UID.1, FPT\_LEE.1 (Extened), FPT\_PST.1 (Extened), FTA\_SSL.1, FTA\_SSL.3, FTA\_TSE.1(2)



## 4. Extended components definition


### 4.1. Cryptographic support

#### 4.1.1. Random Bit Generation

Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements for the TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.

Component leveling



FCS\_RBG.1 random bit generation, requires TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.

Management: FCS\_RBG.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FCS\_RBG.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

##### 4.1.1.1. FCS\_RBG.1 Random bit generation

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FCS\_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate an cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets the following [assignment: *list of standards*].


## 4.2. Identification and authentication

### 4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication

Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements for providing mutual authentication between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.

Component leveling



FIA\_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication function between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.

Management: FIA\_IMA.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FIA\_IMA.1

The following actions are recommended to record if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: Success and failure of mutual authentication

#### 4.2.1.1. FIA\_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: *different parts of TOE*] using the [assignment: *authentication protocol*] that meets the following [assignment: *list of standards*].

### 4.2.2. Specification of Secrets

Family Behaviour

This family defines requirements for mechanisms that enforce defined quality metrics on provided secrets and generate secrets to satisfy the defined metric.

## Component leveling



The specification of secrets family in CC Part 2 is composed of 2 components. It is now composed of three components, since this PP adds one more component as below.

※ The description on two components included in CC Part 2 is omitted.

FIA\_SOS.3 Destruction of secrets requires, that the secret information be destroyed according to the specified destruction method, which can be based on the assigned standard.

Management: FIA\_SOS.3

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FIA\_SOS.3

The following actions are recommended to record if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

a) Minimal : Success and failure of the activity

#### 4.2.2.1. FIA\_SOS.3 Destruction of Secrets

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets

FIA\_SOS.3.1 The TSF shall destroy secrets in accordance with a specified secrets destruction method [assignment: *secret destruction method*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

#### Application notes

- o This SFR can be applied to the user's token.

## 4.3. Security Management

### 4.3.1. ID and password

Family Behaviour

This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password management used

in the TOE, and set or modify ID and/or password by authorized users.

Component leveling



FMT\_PWD.1 ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the management function of ID and password.

Management: FMT\_PWD.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.

Audit: FMT\_PWD.1

The following actions are recommended to record if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: All changes of the password

#### 4.3.1.1. FMT\_PWD.1 Management of ID and password

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of management functions  
 FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: *list of functions*] to [assignment: *the authorized identified roles*].

1. [assignment: *password combination rules and/or length*]
2. [assignment: *other management such as management of special characters unusable for password, etc.*]

FMT\_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: *list of functions*] to [assignment: *the authorized identified roles*].

1. [assignment: *ID combination rules and/or length*]
2. [assignment: *other management such as management of special characters unusable for ID, etc.*]

FMT\_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of: *setting ID and password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the ID and password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time*].

Application notes

- o If the TOE does not provide the capability for managing the ID and password combination rules by authorized roles, etc., 'None.' may be specified in assignment operations of FMT\_PWD.1.1, FMT\_PWD.1.2.
- o The ID and password combination rules that can be set by authorized roles may include minimum and maximum length setting, mixing rule setting involving English upper case/lower case/number/special characters, etc.

#### 4.4. Protection of the TSF

##### 4.4.1. Linkable external entities

Family Behaviour

This family (FPT\_LEE, Linkable external entities) defines the requirement for the TSF to perform security functions with the support of external entities. In this family, external entities refer to software or hardware, but users are not counted as external entities.

Component leveling



FPT\_LEE.1 Linkable external entities requires that the TSF provide security functions in connection with external entities.

Management: FPT\_LEE.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT\_LEE.1

It is recommended to record the following actions for audit if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation family is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: Result of the execution of the security function provided by linking with external entities

##### 4.4.1.1. FPT\_LEE.1 Linkable external entities

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_LEE.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: *list of actions*] and provide [assignment: *list of functions*] in connection with external entities.

Application notes

- o In FPT\_LEE.1.1, [assignment: *List of actions*] means the way the TSF is linked with external entities, such as API function call.
- o In FPT\_LEE.1.1, [assignment: *List of functions*] shall specify the security functions (e.g. verification of secrets, protection of authentication feedback, etc.) provided by the TSF in linkage with external entities

**4.4.2. Protection of stored TSF data**

Family Behaviour

This family defines rules to protect TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized modification or disclosure.

Component leveling



FPT\_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data, requires the protection of TSF data stored in containers controlled by the TSF.

Management: FPT\_PST.1

There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT\_PST.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**4.4.2.1. FPT\_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data**

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: *TSF data*] stored in containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized [selection: *disclosure, modification*].

#### Application notes


- o Containers controlled by the TSF mean storage in the TOE or external entities (DBMS, etc.) that interact with the TOE.
- o Examples of TSF data to be protected as follows:
  - User password, cryptographic key (pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key, etc), TOE configuration values (security policy, environment setting, configuration parameters), audit data, etc.
- o The TSF data can be encrypted and stored to be protected from the unauthorized disclosure or modification.

### 4.4.3. TSF update

Family Behaviour

This family defines TOE firmware/software update requirements.

Component leveling



FPT\_TUD.1 TSF security patch update, requires trusted update of the TOE firmware/software including the capability to verify the validity on the update file before installing updates.

Management: FPT\_TUD.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- a) Management of update file verification mechanism

Audit: FPT\_TUD.1

The following actions are recommended to record if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Minimal: Update file verification result (success, failure)

#### 4.4.3.1. FPT\_TUD.1 TSF security patch update

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_TUD.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to view the TOE versions to [assignment: *the authorized identified roles*].

FPT\_TUD.1.2 The TSF shall verify validity of the update files using [selection: *hash value comparison, digital signature verification*] before installing updates.

#### Application notes

- o The TSF shall provide the capability to check the current version of the TOE that most recently installed and executed by authorized roles.
- o The latest updates and security patches are essential to remove security vulnerabilities. The validity verification on the update files is required since the installation of update files without any verification can result in system malfunction, or service failures, etc.



## 5. Security requirements

The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE that claims conformance to this PP.

The security functional requirements included in this PP are derived from CC Part 2 and Chapter 4 Extended Components Definition.

In addition, the security functional requirements are classified into mandatory SFRs and conditional mandatory SFRs, optional SFRs, as follows.

- Mandatory SFRs: are required to be mandatorily implemented in the 'Single Sign On'
- Conditional mandatory SFRs: are required to be mandatorily implemented, if the stated conditions are met.
- Optional SFRs: are not required to be mandatorily implemented in 'Single Sign On'. However, when the TOE additionally provides related capabilities, the ST author must include the corresponding SFRs.

The following table summarizes the security functional requirements used in the PP.

| Security functional class | Security functional component |  | Remarks                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| FAU                       | FAU_ARP.1                     | Security alarms                            | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FAU_GEN.1                     | Audit data generation                      | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FAU_SAA.1                     | Potential violation analysis               | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FAU_SAR.1                     | Audit review                               | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FAU_SAR.3                     | Selectable audit review                    | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FAU_STG.1                     | Protected audit trail storage              | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FAU_STG.3                     | Action in case of possible audit data loss | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FAU_STG.4                     | Prevention of audit data loss              | Conditional mandatory SFR |
| FCS                       | FCS_CKM.1                     | Cryptographic key generation               | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FCS_CKM.2                     | Cryptographic key distribution             | Optional SFR              |
|                           | FCS_CKM.4                     | Cryptographic key destruction              | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FCS_COP.1                     | Cryptographic operation                    | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FCS_RBG.1(Extended)           | Random bit generation                      | Mandatory SFR             |
| FIA                       | FIA_AFL.1                     | Authentication failure handling            | Mandatory SFR             |

| Security functional class | Security functional component |   | Remarks                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
|                           | FIA_IMA.1(Extended)           | TOE Internal mutual authentication                            | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_SOS.1                     | Verification of secrets                                       | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_SOS.2                     | Generation of secrets   | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_SOS.3(Extended)           | Destruction of secrets  | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_UAU.1                     | Timing of authentication                                      | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_UAU.4                     | Single-use authentication mechanisms                          | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_UAU.5                     | Multiple authentication mechanisms                            | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FIA_UAU.7                     | Protected authentication feedback                             | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FIA_UID.1                     | Timing of identification                                      | Mandatory SFR             |
| FMT                       | FMT_MOF.1                     | Management of security functions behaviour                    | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FMT_MTD.1                     | Management of TSF data  | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FMT_PWD.1(Extended)           | Management of ID and password                                 | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FMT_SMF.1                     | Specification of management functions                         | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FMT_SMR.1                     | Security roles  | Mandatory SFR             |
| FPT                       | FPT_ITT.1                     | Basic internal TSF data transfer protection                   | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FPT_LEE.1(Extended)           | Linkable external entities – authentication                   | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FPT_PST.1(Extended)           | Basic protection of stored TSF data                           | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FPT_RCV.1                     | Manual recovery   | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FPT_RCV.2                     | Automated recovery  | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FPT_STM.1                     | Reliable time stamps  | Optional SFR              |
|                           | FPT_TST.1                     | TSF testing   | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FPT_TUD.1(Extended)           | TSF security patch update                                     | Conditional mandatory SFR |
| FTA                       | FTA_MCS.2                     | Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FTA_SSL.1                     | TSF-initiated session locking                                 | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FTA_SSL.3                     | TSF-initiated termination                                     | Conditional mandatory SFR |
|                           | FTA_TSE.1(1)                  | TOE session establishment                                     | Mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FTA_TSE.1(2)                  | TOE session establishment                                     | Conditional mandatory SFR |
| FTP                       | FTP_ITC.1                     | Inter-TSF trusted channel                                     | Conditional               |

| Security functional class | Security functional component |              | Remarks                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
|                           |                               |              | mandatory SFR             |
|                           | FTP_TRP.1                     | Trusted path | Conditional mandatory SFR |

[Table 3] Security functional requirements

### 5.1. Security functional requirements (Mandatory SFRs)

The 'Single Sign On' that claims conformance to this PP must meet the following 'Mandatory SFRs'.

| Security functional class | Security functional component |  |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| FAU                       | FAU_ARP.1                     | Security alarms                            |
|                           | FAU_GEN.1                     | Audit data generation                      |
|                           | FAU_SAA.1                     | Potential violation analysis               |
|                           | FAU_SAR.1                     | Audit review                               |
|                           | FAU_SAR.3                     | Selectable audit review                    |
| FCS                       | FCS_CKM.1                     | Cryptographic key generation               |
|                           | FCS_CKM.4                     | Cryptographic key destruction              |
|                           | FCS_COP.1                     | Cryptographic operation                    |
|                           | FCS_RBG.1(Extended)           | Random bit generation                      |
| FIA                       | FIA_AFL.1                     | Authentication failure handling            |
|                           | FIA_IMA.1(Extended)           | TOE Internal mutual authentication         |
|                           | FIA_SOS.2                     | TSF Generation of secrets                  |
|                           | FIA_SOS.3(Extended)           | Destruction of secrets                     |
|                           | FIA_UAU.1                     | Timing of authentication                   |
|                           | FIA_UAU.4                     | Single-use authentication mechanisms       |
|                           | FIA_UAU.7                     | Protected authentication feedback          |
|                           | FIA_UID.1                     | Timing of identification                   |
| FMT                       | FMT_MOF.1                     | Management of security functions behaviour |
|                           | FMT_MTD.1                     | Management of TSF data                     |
|                           | FMT_PWD.1(Extended)           | Management of ID and password              |
|                           | FMT_SMF.1                     | Specification of management functions      |
|                           | FMT_SMR.1                     | Security roles                             |

| Security functional class | Security functional component |   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| FPT                       | FPT_ITT.1                     | Basic internal TSF data transfer protection                   |
|                           | FPT_PST.1(Extended)           | Basic protection of stored TSF data                           |
|                           | FPT_TST.1                     | TSF testing   |
| FTA                       | FTA_MCS.2                     | Per user attribute Limitation on multiple concurrent sessions |
|                           | FTA_TSE.1(1)                  | TOE session establishment                                     |

[Table 4] Mandatory security functional requirements

### 5.1.1. Security audit (FAU)

#### 5.1.1.1. FAU\_ARP.1 Security alarms

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FAU\_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis.

FAU\_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: *list of actions*] upon detection of a potential security violation.

#### Application notes

- o If the TOE self-test result is a failure, response functions shall be performed.
  - Examples of response functions to be performed when the self-test result is a failure are as follows:
    - *Termination of the program, warning message screen display, process restart, etc.*
- o If the TOE integrity verification result is a failure, response functions shall be performed.
  - Examples of response functions to be performed when the integrity verification result is a failure are as follows:
    - *Termination of the program, warning message screen display, etc.*
- o Agents or clients shall verify integrity periodically or upon the authorized administrator's request and provide the administrator with a result notification function.
  - △ In case of abnormality in the integrity verification result, △ integrity verification result by the administrator shall be notified to the administrator.

#### 5.1.1.2. FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

FAU\_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:  
 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;  
 b) All auditable events for the *not specified* level of audit; and  
 c) [assignment: *other specifically defined auditable events*]

FAU\_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:  
 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and  
 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: *other audit relevant information*].

Application notes

**1. Generation of audit records related to Single Sign On**

| Security Functional Components | Audit events   | Additional audit information |
|--------------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| FIA_SOS.2                      | Rejection by the TSF of any tested secret  |                              |
| FIA_SOS.3 (Extended)           | Success and failure of the activity(applicable to the destruction of SSO token only) |                              |

**2. Generation of other audit records**

- o The TOE shall generate audit records for major audit events.
- [Table 5] below shows the audit events for which audit records must be generated.

| Sub-category                      | Audit events  | Additional audit information    |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Identification and authentication | User login and logout   |                                 |
|                                   | User registration, change and deletion  |                                 |
|                                   | The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful user authentication attempts and the actions taken   |                                 |
|                                   | All changes of the password   |                                 |
| Security management               | IP registration, deletion and change of administrative terminals  |                                 |
|                                   | [Table 11] Execution of security management function that the TOE must implement, and any changes and deletions of security attribute values.<br><br>** However, among the security management functions, | Changed security attribute data |

|                              |  |  |
|------------------------------|--|--|
|                              | 'Audit record inquiry' and 'TOE version information inquiry' functions are excluded. |  |
|                              | Default account(ID)/Password change  |  |
|                              | Management terminal access IP blocking   |  |
| Trusted session management   | User's session locking or termination  |  |
|                              | Response actions when duplicate login attempts of the same account are detected      |  |
|                              | Denial of new sessions based on the limit on the number of concurrent sessions       |  |
| Cryptographic key generation | Cryptographic key generation failure   |  |
| Cryptographic operation      | Cryptographic operation failure (including cryptographic operation type)             |  |
| Audit record                 | Start-up and shutdown of the TOE audit functions in the form of H/W appliance        |  |

[Table 5] Major mandatory audit events to be recorded

- [Table 6] below shows the audit events for which audit records must be generated when providing a function.

| Sub-category        | Audit events  | Additional audit information                  |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Self-protection     | Execution of self-test  | Failed security function                      |
|                     | Execution of integrity verification of the TOE itself                   | Components with failed integrity verification |
| Update protection   | Updated files validity verification by the administrator                |   |
|                     | Performance of update file validity verification                        |   |
| Audit records       | Start-up and shutdown of the TOE audit function in the form of software |   |
|                     | Response actions when audit record fails to be stored                   |   |
| Security management | Changes in agent registration status                                    |   |

[Table 6] Audit events that must be recorded when providing a function

- o If the TOE detects an attempt to reuse authentication information that is prohibited for reuse, authentication shall fail and an audit record of the authentication failure event shall be generated.
- o Audit records shall be generated for self-test results.
- o Integrity verification contents and results shall be confirmed through *screen display, audit records*.
- o Audit records shall be generated for integrity verification results.

- o Update file validation results(success•failure) shall be recorded in audit records.
- o Audit records shall be generated for the update installation results and the reason for failure.
- o Audit records shall be generated when the session locking or termination function is activated.
- o Audit records shall be generated when blocking duplicate access.
- o Audit records shall not contain more information than necessary.
- Items that shall be included at least in audit records are as follows.
  - The date and time of the event, the type of event, the identity of the subject that caused the event (e.g., account, process, IP, etc.), and the outcome of the event (success•failure)
  - Information such as authentication information (e.g., password, etc.) and encryption key shall not be stored in the audit records.
- o Sensitive data (e.g., password, resident registration number, etc.) shall not be recorded, or shall be generated by processing with masking if record is inevitable.
- o Each component of the TOE shall generate audit records using trusted time information.
  - Trusted time information should use the time information provided by the NTP server or the operating system.
- o If the WAS(Tomcat, Jesus, etc.) is included in the TOE package, the TOE shall be implemented so that important information is not included in the WAS log.
  - It can be implemented so that the log may be left only in the TOE's audit record storage without leaving the WAS log.
  - Important information such as passwords and encryption keys shall not be left in plain text in the WAS log.
- o Clients and agents shall generate audit records listed in the following [Table 7].

| Security function   | Audit event   | Additional audit information    |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Self-protection     | Execution of integrity verification and its results   |                                 |
| Security management | When providing security management functions, execution of security management functions and any changes of security attribute values.                  | Changed security attribute data |
| Audit record        | Agent start   |                                 |
|                     | When end users can request the audit record to be transmitted to the server through security management, execution of transmission of the audit record. |                                 |

|                                   |  |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| Safe update and file distribution | (When providing online update function) Performance of digital signature verification of files received from the server and external update server and its results | Files that has failed digital signature verification |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|

[Table 7] Major audit events to be generated

- The applicant shall describe the audit list for major events provided by agents or clients in the guidance documents.
- The integrity verification results shall be generated as audit records.
  - o The audit records of clients and agents shall include key information for each event.
- The date and time, event type, identity of the subject who caused the event, and the outcome of the event shall be included.
  - o If there is a server, the function to transmit the major audit records generated by agents or clients to the server shall be provided.
- [Table 7] The server transmission function of the audit records described in the major audit events to be generated shall be implemented.
- After disconnection from the server, the audit records loaded after the disconnection shall be all transmitted to the server when it is recovered.
- Protection of audit records transmitted to the server shall satisfy the requirements of FPT\_ITT.1.
  - o The update file digital signature verification result (success or failure) shall be audited and recorded.

5.1.1.3. FAU\_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU\_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.

FAU\_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:  
 a) Accumulation or combination of [assignment: *subset of defined auditable events*] known to indicate a potential security violation  
 b) [assignment: *any other rules*]

Application notes



- o If the result of the TOE's self-test is failure, the response function shall be performed.
  - o The TOE shall perform the response function if the integrity verification fails.
  - o The TOE agents or clients shall verify the integrity periodically or upon the authorized administrator's request and provide the administrator with a result notification function.
- △In case of abnormality in the integrity verification results △Integrity verification results by the administrator shall be notified to the administrator.

#### 5.1.1.4. FAU\_SAR.1 Audit review

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU\_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrator] with the capability to read [all the audit data] from the audit records.

FAU\_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the **authorized administrator** to interpret the information.

##### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function for the authorized administrator to inquire the audit record.
- The audit record shall be inquired only through the security function provided by the TOE.
- The TOE shall provide audit records for the authorized administrator to properly interpret the information.

#### 5.1.1.5. FAU\_SAR.3 Selectable audit review

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FAU\_SAR.1 Audit review

FAU\_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to apply [assignment: *methods of selection and/or ordering*] of audit data based on [assignment: *criteria with logical relations*].

##### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function for the administrator to select a logical condition when inquiring audit records, and to search or sort the records according to various conditions.

### 5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)

#### 5.1.2.1. FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or

FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]

FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: *cryptographic key generation algorithm*] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

#### Application Notes

### 1. Authentication token-related cryptographic key generation

- o The TOE shall use the validated cryptographic module when generating a cryptographic key required for cryptographic operation to generate the authentication token.
  - When using random bits for generating a cryptographic key, the random bit generator of the validated cryptographic module shall be used, and the entropy of the random bit generator SEED value shall be  $2^{112}$  or higher.
  - When generating a key encryption key(KEK), it is also allowed to derive a cryptographic key from the password.
    - A key encryption key(KEK) can be derived from the password entered by the user.
    - When deriving a key encryption key(KEK) from the password, a secure method shall be applied suggested in TTAk.KO-12.0334-Part1~Part4.
  - Cryptographic keys generated by using the password is limited to the generation of a key encryption key(KEK).

### 2. Other cryptographic key generation

- o The TOE shall generate cryptographic keys in a secure method.
  - Examples of secure cryptographic key generation methods are as follows:
    - Password-based key derivation(PKCS#5 v2.1(RFC 8018), NIST SP 800-132, etc.)
    - Key derivation with pre-shared keys(TTAk.KO-12.0272)
    - Key generation using random bit generator(CTR DRBG, HASH DRBG, HMAC DRBG, etc.)
  - The random bit generator shall be implemented in compliance with domestic and foreign standards.
  - It is possible to generate asymmetric key pairs (public keys/private keys) or symmetric keys using random bits generated by the random bit generator.
  - The password-based key derivation function shall only be used to generate a Key Encryption Key.
    - The initial key encryption key shall be generated differently for each TOE.

- Initial data required to generate a key encryption key(e.g., *password, etc.*) can be directly entered or injected from stored values in storage media such as smart cards, security USBs, security tokens(HSM: Hardware Security Module).
- It is recommended to use products that have obtained security function test report or domestic/foreign CC certificates for the storage media.
- For details, refer to the Encryption Key Generation of the 'Encryption Key Management Guide' (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2014).
- If a password is used as the initial data for generating a key encryption key(KEK), the value entered at the time of the initial installation of the product can be stored and used, and the stored data shall be protected from unauthorized exposure attempts.

#### 5.1.2.2. FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: *cryptographic key destruction method*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

#### Application notes

### 1. Destruction of authentication token-related cryptographic keys and critical security parameters

- o The TOE shall delete the used key encryption key(KEK).
- o When terminating execution, all cryptographic keys and critical security parameters loaded in the memory shall be deleted.
- When destroying cryptographic keys and critical security parameters, a method of overwriting at least 3 times with 0 or 1 can be used.

### 2. Destruction of other cryptographic keys

- o The TOE shall securely destroy the cryptographic keys generated or used in the TOE.
  - △When terminating execution of the TOE, △When calling cryptographic key deletion function, △When terminating cryptographic communication, etc., all cryptographic keys and information related to cryptographic key that have expired shall be destroyed.
  - When destroying cryptographic keys, a method of overwriting at least 3 times with values of 0 or 1 can be used.
  - For details, refer to the cryptographic key destruction method of the 'Encryption Key Management Guide' (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2014).

## 5.1.2.3. FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: *list of cryptographic operations*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

## Application notes

### 1. Authentication token-related cryptographic operation

- o The TOE shall use the cryptographic algorithm of the validated cryptographic module to perform cryptographic operations to generate the authentication token.
  - The TOE cannot use the ECB mode if the plain text size is larger than the encryption block when using block cipher algorithm, nor use fixed IV when using CFB or OFB mode.
  - Refer to the list of product types subject to installation of validated cryptographic modules and validated cryptographic modules posted on the website of the National Intelligence Service.

### 2. Other cryptographic operation related to TSF data transfer and storage

- o The TOE shall use the recommended cryptographic algorithm when transmitting and storing important information.
- o The recommended cryptographic algorithm is a standard algorithm with a security strength of 112 bits or more. Refer to the [Attachment] to the auxiliary document. Examples are as follows:
  - *Hash: SHA-224 or higher*
  - *Symmetric key encryption: Key length 128 bits or higher*
  - *Public key encryption: RSA 2048 or higher, DSA(2018, 224) or higher*
  - *Digital signature: RSA-PSS 2018 or higher, KCDSA(2018, 224) or higher, ECDSA/EC-KCDSA (B-233, B-283, K-223, K-283, P-224, P-256)*
- o However, the use of TDES( including 2 keys and 3 keys) is not permitted.
- o When using block cipher, ECB mode shall not be used if the plain text size is larger than the encryption block size.

- o When using block cipher, fixed IV shall not be used in CFB or OFB mode.
- o Domestic/foreign standard cryptographic algorithms shall be used, and the use of the national cryptographic algorithm is recommended.
- o For details of cryptographic algorithm with a security strength of 112 bits or higher, refer to 'Guide to Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Length' (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2018), 'Software Cryptographic Module Validation Standard' and 'NIST SP 800-131Ar2'.

#### 5.1.2.4. FCS\_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FCS\_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate an cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets the following [assignment: *list of standards*].

#### Application notes

### 1. Random bit generation related to authentication token

- o The TOE shall use the random bit generator of the validated cryptographic module when generating cryptographic key, and the entropy of the random bit generator SEED value shall be  $2^{112}$  or higher.

### 2. Other random bit generation related to TSF data

- o Examples of secure cryptographic key generation methods are as follows:
  - Password-based key derivation(PKCS#5 v2.1(RFC 8018), NIST SP 800-132, etc.)
  - Key derivation with pre-shared keys(TTAK.KO-12.0272)
  - Key generation using random bit generator(CTR\_DRBG, HASH\_DRBG, HMAC\_DRBG, etc.)
- o The random bit generator shall be implemented in compliance with domestic and foreign standards.
- o It is possible to generate asymmetric key pairs (public keys/private keys) or symmetric keys using random bits generated by the random bit generator.
- o User password used by the TOE for user identification and authentication shall be stored using a one-way encryption(Hash) to prevent decryption.
  - When performing a one-way encryption, it is necessary to add and apply a randomly generated value called salt to the password.
  - The salt value does not need to be confidential. It shall be generated using random bit generator and the size must be at least 48 bits.
  - The iteration count shall be applied as large as possible. (at least 1000 times)

### 5.1.3. Identification and authentication (FIA)

#### 5.1.3.1. FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: *positive integer number*], *an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]*] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: *list of authentication events*].

FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been *met*, the TSF shall [assignment: *list of actions*].

#### Application notes

- o If user authentication fails consecutively as many times as the set number in the TOE, the identification and authentication functions shall be deactivated.
  - Examples of how to activate after deactivating the identification and authentication functions are as follows:
    - Activation in a specified period of time after account lock-out
    - Provision of other identification and authentication means for activation after account lock-out
  - Additional identification and authentication means specified in FIA\_UAU.1 may be provided. In case of authentication failure with additional identification and authentication means, it shall be included in the number of user authentication failures.
  - The number of consecutive authentication failures in which identification and authentication are deactivated shall be fixed or settable at a value of 5 or less.
  - When implementing to deactivate the authentication function for a certain period of time, the time required for re-activation shall be fixed or settable at a value of 5 minutes or more.
- o If administrator authentication fails consecutively as many times as the set number, the TOE shall notify the administrator through means that can be immediately checked.
  - Notification shall be made through at least one of alarm, text messaging, e-mail, etc.

#### 5.1.3.2. FIA\_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication (Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencie No dependencies.

FIA\_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment: *different parts of TOE*] in accordance with a specified [assignment: *authentication protocol*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

Application notes

- o This SFR must be applied among the TOE components that are physically separated.
- o If the TOE components include the server and the agent that receives the security policy from it, the agent shall perform identification and authentication for the server.
  - Agents shall perform identification and authentication to confirm the legitimacy of the server.
  - One of the server IP address and domain name must be included in the server identification information, and additional identification information can be used.
  - The authentication method for the server includes a *certificate-based authentication method, etc.*
  - When using a certificate, verification of the validity of the certificate(within 1 year of validity) shall be performed.

5.1.3.3. FIA\_SOS.1 Verification of secrets

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

Application notes

- o If ID/password is the only means of user identification and authentication, the TOE shall meet the security criteria of [Table 6] Password Security Criteria Type(1) when registering and changing passwords.

| Description | Contents  | Remarks                          |
|-------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Compliance  | Secure the length of more than 9 digits   | Mandatory                        |
|             | Contains at least one number, uppercase letter(english), lowercase letter(english), and special character | Mandatory                        |
| Prohibition | Do not set the same password as the user account (ID)   | Mandatory                        |
|             | Prohibition of consecutive repeated input of the same letter/number                                       | Mandatory                        |
|             | Prohibit sequential input of consecutive letters or numbers on the keyboard                               | Mandatory                        |
|             | Prohibition of reuse of the password used immediately before  | Implement either one of the two. |
|             | Prohibition of reuse of the password used within the past 3 months  |                                  |

[Table 8] Password Security Criteria Type(1)

- o If ID/password input and additional identification and authentication functions are

performed concurrently, the TOE shall meet the security criteria of [Table 7] Password Security criteria Type(2) when registering and changing passwords.

| Description | Contents  | Remarks   |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| Compliance  | Secure the length of more than 9 digits   | Mandatory |
|             | Contains at least one number, uppercase letter(english), lowercase letter(english), and special character | Optional  |
| Prohibition | Do not set the same password as the user account (ID)   | Mandatory |
|             | Prohibition of consecutive repeated input of the same letter/number                                       | Optional  |
|             | Prohibit sequential input of consecutive letters or numbers on the keyboard                               | Optional  |
|             | Prohibition of reuse of the password used immediately before  | Optional  |
|             | Prohibition of reuse of the password used within the past 3 months  | Optional  |

[Table 9] Password Security Criteria Type(2)

5.1.3.4. FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_SOS.2.1 TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate **an authentication token** that meet [assignment: *a defined quality metric*].

FIA\_SOS.2.1 TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF-generated **authentication token** for [assignment: *list of TSF functions*].

Application notes

o The TOE shall generate the authentication token for user single sign on.

- When generating the authentication token, the TOE shall configure the authentication token to ensure uniqueness for each authentication token. 'One-time authentication data' can be used as a way to ensure uniqueness, and examples of 'one-time authentication data' are as follows.

- One Time Password
- Encrypted time stamps and/or random numbers from a secret lookup table, etc.

- When generating the authentication token, important information(e.g., random number used for authentication information) included in the authentication token shall be protected by providing confidentiality and integrity, and the reuse of authentication tokens shall be prevented.

- The cryptographic function for generating the token must use the approved cryptographic algorithms of the validated cryptographic module whose security and implementation



conformance are validated by the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP) and the validated cryptographic module must run in approved mode of operation when performing cryptographic operation.

- The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing cryptographic key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o The TOE shall perform user Single Sign On using the authentication token.
- o The TOE shall perform cryptographic operations to generate authentication tokens using the cryptographic algorithm of the validated cryptographic module.

#### 5.1.3.5. FIA\_SOS.3 Destruction of secrets (Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of secrets

FIA\_SOS.3.1 The TSF shall destroy **authentication tokens** in accordance with a specified **authentication token** destruction method [assignment: *secrets destruction method*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

##### Application notes

- o The TOE shall safely destroy the authentication tokens.
  - The authentication token can only be used until the user session is terminated, and it shall be safely destroyed when a session is terminated.
    - When a session is terminated, or the TOE execution is finished, all tokens loaded onto the memory shall be destroyed.
    - When destroying the authentication tokens, a method of overwriting at least 3 times with 0 or 1 can be used.

#### 5.1.3.6. FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA\_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: *list of TSF mediated actions*] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA\_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user, except for the actions specified in FIA\_UAU.1.1.

##### Application notes

#### 1. TOE user(administrators, end users, external IT entity) authentication

- o The TOE shall provide user account/password-based identification and authentication functions to verify the identity of the user.
  - Identification and authentication must be performed to confirm that the user is a legitimate user of the TOE.
  - If it is required to identify and authenticate users who exist in the agents or clients constituting the TOE, the identification value shall be a unique value that is not registered in duplicate.
    - When authenticating the user, the additional attributes of the registered agents or clients shall also be authenticated.
    - Additional attributes: IP address is mandatory, and at least one of the MAC address, Serial Number, and information that can uniquely identify the agent itself shall be additionally used.
- o In case of the TOE supports additional identification and authentication methods, for user identification and authentication, the TOE must provide additional identification and authentication functions on its own or by interacting with external IT entities in parallel with user account and password-based identification and authentication.
  - In order to provide additional identification and authentication functions,  $\Delta$ 2FA support device complying with FIDO standards,  $\Delta$ certificates,  $\Delta$ one-time password generator(OTP), etc. can be used.
    - If it is supported in the TOE operating environment, '2FA support device complying with FIDO standards' is recommended.
  - If additional identification and authentication functions are provided by the TOE, the functions can be provided by receiving the authentication results from the inside of the TOE or from interaction with the external IT entities.
    - If the TOE provides a certification utilization method, certification validation shall be performed.
    - The authentication information used by external IT entities to perform additional identification and authentication methods shall be securely managed by the external IT entities. If the TOE stores authentication information use to perform additional identification and authentication methods, the requirements of FPT\_PST.1 shall be applied.
- o If the TOE authenticates external IT entities, the TOE shall authenticate the interacted external IT entities.

## 2. End user Single Sign On

- o The TOE shall generate the authentication token for user Single Sign On.
- o The TOE shall perform user Single Sign On using the authentication token.
  - The TOE shall use the authentication token generated according to FIA\_SOS.2.

- After issuing the authentication token, the TOE shall verify the validity of the authentication token when the user accesses the business system.
- o The TOE shall safely destroy the authentication token.

#### 5.1.3.7. FIA\_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [assignment: *identified authentication mechanism(s)*].

##### Application notes

- o The TOE shall prevent reuse of user's authentication information(*using timestamp, encrypting session ID, etc.*)
  - It is mandatory to apply to authentication information to be used for user account/password-based identification and authentication specified in FIA\_UAU.1.
  - If the TOE receives authentication information from the user to provide additional identification and authentication methods specified in FIA\_UAU.1, it is mandatory to apply to the corresponding authentication information.
  - It can be prevented by encrypting the session ID or guaranteeing the uniqueness of the session ID(*including timestamp and random bit values, setting session expiration time, etc.*)
  - If the TOE detects an attempt to reuse authentication information that is prohibited from being reused, authentication shall fail and an audit record shall be generated for the authentication failure event.
- o When generating the authentication token, the TOE shall configure the authentication token to ensure uniqueness for each authentication token. 'One-time authentication data' can be used as a way to ensure uniqueness, and examples of 'one-time authentication data' are as follows.
  - One Time Password
  - Encrypted time stamps and/or random numbers from secret information search tables, etc.

#### 5.1.3.8. FIA\_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

FIA\_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: *list of feedback*] to the user while the authentication is in progress.

##### Application notes

- o The TOE shall not display the contents when displaying the information used for authentication on the output device.

- It shall be applied when the authentication information specified in FIA\_UAU.1 is displayed on the output device.
  - The information used for authentication shall be output in the form of *no-display of input contents, display of "\*\*\*\*" instead of input characters, etc.*
  - When users log in, the authentication information shall not be exposed with plain text in the memory area.
- o In case of identification and authentication failures, the TOE shall not provide the feedback for the cause of failure (*e.g. non-existent account(ID), password error, etc.*).

#### 5.1.3.9. FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: *list of TSF-mediated actions*] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the user, except for the actions specified in FIA\_UAU.1.1.

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide user account/password-based identification and authentication functions to verify the identity of the user.
- Identification and authentication must be performed to confirm that the user is a legitimate user of the TOE.
- o When supporting additional identification and authentication methods, the TOE shall provide additional identification and authentication functions on its own or in conjunction with external IT entities, in parallel with user account/password-based identification and authentication.
- o If the TOE authenticates external IT entities, the TOE shall authenticate the interacted external IT entities.

### 5.1.4. Security management (FMT)

#### 5.1.4.1. FMT\_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to ***conduct management actions of*** the

functions [assignment: *list of functions*] to [*the authorized administrator*].

Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide the authorized administrator with the security management functions to set and manage security functions, security policies, important data, etc.
- The security management functions include the followings:
  - A function to add, delete or change conditions or rules that can determine the operation of the security function.
  - A function to add, remove or change the actions to be performed by the TOE in accordance with the conditions or rules.
  - A function to select or change TOE settings
- The security management functions to be implemented by the TOE are shown in [Table 10] below.

| Sub-category  | Security management  | Remarks  |
|---|--|--|
| Identification and authentication   | User registration, deletion and change, grant privileges   | Not applicable, if the user registered in the TOE is the only one. |
|   | Setting user's password combination/length policy  | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Setting the allowed number of user's authentication failures                                     | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Setting the response methods to user's authentication failures                                   | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Setting the time from deactivation of user's authentication function to re-activation            | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Setting the authentication information of external IT entities that is authenticated by the TOE. | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Security management  | IP registration, deletion and change of management terminals       |
| Backup of important data, configuration information, audit records, etc.      |  | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
| Recovery of of important data, configuration information, audit records, etc. |  | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
| Security management   | Enabling and disabling management access service   | Mandatory when providing the function                              |
|   | Agent inquiry - status, version, and applied security policy                                     | Mandatory when including agents                                    |
|   | Agent security policy management - policy settings, policy transmission                          | Mandatory when including agents                                    |
|   | Setting the authentication information for access  | Mandatory when   |

|                         |  |                                       |
|-------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
|                         | to external IT entities  | providing the function                |
| Self-protection         | Performing self-test for TOE's security function by administrator's request                                      | Mandatory when providing the function |
|                         | Setting response actions when self-test fails  | Mandatory when providing the function |
|                         | Performing an integrity verification of the TOE setting values and the TOE itself by the administrator's request |                                       |
|                         | Setting response actions when integrity verification fails   | Mandatory when providing the function |
| Update protection       | Manual validation of update files by administrator   | Mandatory when providing the function |
|                         | Manual recovery of failed installation of update files by administrator  | Mandatory when providing the function |
|                         | Inquiry of TOE version information   |                                       |
| Safe session management | User session locking time, user session timeout time setting   | Mandatory when providing the function |
|                         | (In case session locking) Administrator or individual user authentication when unlocking sessions                |                                       |
|                         | Setting the number of concurrent user access sessions  | Mandatory when providing the function |
| Audit records           | Inquiry of audit records   |                                       |
|                         | Response-related settings for loss of audit records  | Mandatory when providing the function |

[Table 10] Security management functions to be implemented by TOE

- o The TOE shall provide enable/disable functions for all management access.
- o If the agent itself has a security management function, the server shall be able to enable/disable the agent setting function.
- o The communication service that does not support encrypted communication channels shall be able to be disabled.
- o During TOE operation, it shall support the self-test execution periodically or by administrator's request.
- o To ensure correct operation, the TOE shall perform the response function implemented on its own or the response function set by the administrator when the self-test fails.
- o The TOE shall provide the administrator with the function to perform integrity verification.
- o The TOE shall perform the response function implemented on its own or the response function set by the administrator when the integrity verification fails.
- o If the TOE provides online update or manual update function, only the update files that have succeeded in validation shall be installed or applied.
- o If the TOE does not provide the function of automatically maintaining the existing version

- when the update installation fails, manual recovery by the administrator shall be supported.
- o Locked sessions shall be unlocked by the administrator or through the user authentication function for each session, after the locking time has elapsed.
- o Additionally, the TOE may provide a function to send audit records to external log servers by administrator.
  - If syslog is supported, it shall support encrypted transmission through syslog over TLS(RFC 5424), or syslog over DTLS(RFC 6012).
  - The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall meet the requirements of 'Protection when storing cryptographic key' of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o When agents or clients provide a management function, agents or clients shall provide a security management function that allows users to set and manage their own security functions, security policies and important data.
  - If the TOE component includes a server and an agent, the agent must be able to enforce the security policy sent by the server as the agent's setting.
  - Guidance documents that identify and describe all the security management functions provided by agents or clients shall be submitted.
- o TOE agents or clients shall verify the integrity periodically or upon the authorized administrator's request, and provide the administrator with the result notification function.

#### 5.1.4.2. FMT\_MTD.1 FMT\_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to **manage** [assignment: list of *TSF data*] to [assignment: *the authorized roles*].

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide the authorized administrator with the security management functions to set and manage security functions, security policies, important data, etc.
  - The security management functions include the followings:
    - A function to add, delete or change conditions or rules that can determine the operation of the security function.
    - A function to add, remove or change the actions to be performed by the TOE in accordance with the conditions or rules.
    - A function to select or change TOE settings
  - The security management functions to be implemented by the TOE are shown in [Table 10].

- o The administrator shall be able to grant privileges each user or each group.
- o The user account(ID) is a unique value and shall not be registered in duplicate.
- o The number of consecutive authentication failures in which identification and authentication are deactivated shall be fixed or settable at a value of 5 or less.
- o When implementing to deactivate the authentication function for a certain period of time, the time required for re-activation shall be fixed or settable at a value of 5 minutes or more.
- o If ID/password is the only means of user identification and authentication, the TOE shall meet the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type(1)> of FIA\_SOS.1 when registering and changing passwords.
- o If ID/password input and additional identification and authentication functions are performed concurrently, the TOE shall meet the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type(2)> of FIA\_SOS.1 when registering and changing passwords.
- o If authentication information necessary for external IT entity authentication is required to be set, the TOE shall provide the function to set the information necessary for external IT entity authentication.
  - The application target may be a pre-shared key for the authentication server connection, an SNMP authentication/encryption password, etc.
  - When passwords are used for external IT entity authentication, the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type(1)> or <Password Security Criteria Type(2)> of FIA\_SOS.1 shall be complied with.
- o The TOE shall provide a function to limit the IP of the accessible management terminals.
  - The IP address of the management terminals shall be able to be registered, deleted or changed.
  - Management terminals that can be accessed by administrators who have only read permission instead of for management purpose (e.g., *monitoring administrators, etc.*) can be additionally registered and operated.
  - Only one single host IP address can be added per time for accessible management terminals.
  - A method of specifying an IP address range, such as 192.168.10.2~253, or registration using 0.0.0.0, 192.168.10.\*, any, etc. which means the the entire network range is not allowed.
- o When providing a function that requires a password to access internal components of the TOE or external IT entities, the TOE shall provide the default password change function used to access internal components or external IT entities.
  - Examples of default passwords include DBMS passwords and web server/WAS server passwords.
  - If the TOE stores the default password to access the DBMS, the TOE shall provide a function to change the default password.



- Examples of authentication information include the password used to authenticate the TOE in the SMTP server.
- Depending on whether additional identification and authentication functions are concurrently used when generating a password, the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type(1)> or <Password Security Criteria Type(2)> of FIA\_SOS.1 shall be complied with.
- If a default account(ID) exists in the TOE to access DBMS/Web Server/WAS Server, a function to change it may be provided.
- o If an external IT entity interacted with the TOE requests authentication information for TOE authentication, the TOE shall provide a function to set the authentication information required to be authenticated by the external IT entity.
- Examples of authentication information include the password used to authenticate the TOE in the SMTP server.
- It is recommended that passwords should comply with the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type (2)> of FIA\_SOS.1.
  - However, even the characters included in the password security criteria may not include characters that are not permitted to be entered by the interacted external IT entity.
- o If the TOE includes agents, the TOE shall provide a function to inquire information about the agent.
- The essential inquiry information for the agent is as follows.
  - Agent version, security policy applied to the agent, agent operation status (enabled/disabled), agent integrity verification result (success/failure)
- Additional information about the agent is as follows.
  - Additional agent attributes, others (operating system information of the managed system where the agent is installed, IP information, other information, etc.), etc.
- o If the TOE includes agents, the TOE shall centrally manage the security policy and provide a function to enforce the server's security policy to the agent.
- If the TOE includes agents, the server must centrally manage the policy and shall be able to enforce the server's security policy regardless of the agent's own security management function.
- o The TOE shall provide an interface that allows only authorized administrators to access the TOE settings, and other persons than authorized administrators shall not be able to access the TOE settings.
- Access means operations such as read, change, and delete, etc.
- o When providing the function to backup the TOE settings in the form of external file, an encryption function shall be provided.
- o For encryption, the encryption algorithm used, encryption key security, and encryption key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.

- o The TOE shall provide a function for the administrator to check the contents and results of integrity verification.
  - The contents and results of integrity verification shall be confirmed through screen display, audit records.
- o The TOE shall provide a function for users to check 'the unique identification information of the TOE'.
  - The TOE identification information must be unique, can be checked by the user through the interface, and cannot be modified or changed. It shall include the following:
    - TOE name, TOE version, TOE release or build number
  - If the TOE includes multiple components that are physically separated, the identification information of each component shall be unique, can be checked, and cannot be modified or changed by users. It shall include the following:
    - The name and version of the TOE including the component, the component name, the component version, and the component release or build number
  - A version management system shall be applied to check the patch of the TOE/components and whether functions are improved.

(e.g., In case of patch and function improvement, a system for changing the major version, minor version, release number, and build number for each case is established to track the reason for the change of TOE/components with version information)

  - In case of hardware appliance, users shall be able to view the unique identification information of the firmware in addition to TOE identification information through TOE interface.
- o A certain amount of time, which is the cumulative amount of time after connection that triggers user session locking or session time-out, the administrator can fix the accumulated amount of time from a value of 10 minutes or less, or set it in proportion to the number of authentication failures.
- o Audit records shall be inquired only through the security function provided by the TOE.
- o The relevant user interface(UI) and CLI commands shall not be provided so that even an authorized administrator cannot delete or change audit records.
- o Examples of conditions to notify administrators related to audit record loss response are as follows.
  - 90% or more of the setup disk capacity, 100 MB or more, etc.
- o When an agent or a client provides a management function, the agent or client shall provide a security management function that allows users to set and manage their own security functions, security policies, and important data, etc.
  - If the TOE component includes a server and an agent, the agent must be able to enforce the security policy sent by the server as the agent's setting.
  - A document that identifies and describes all security management functions provided by the

agent or client shall be submitted.

#### 5.1.4.3. FMT\_PWD.1 Management of ID and password(Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of [assignment: *list of functions*] to [the authorized administrator].

1. [assignment: *password combination rules and/or length*]
2. [assignment: *other management such as management of special characters unusable for password, etc.*]

FMT\_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: *list of functions*] to [the authorized administrator].

1. [assignment: *ID combination rules and/or length*]
2. [assignment: *other management such as management of special characters unusable for ID, etc.*]

FMT\_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection: *setting ID and password when installing, setting password when installing, changing the ID and password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time, changing the password when the authorized administrator accesses for the first time*].

#### Application notes

- o The user account(ID) is a unique value and shall not be registered in duplicate.
- o The TOE shall provide a function to forcibly change/generate the administrator default password during the initial access (management access, local access) to the TOE.
  - If there is a default password, the function to change the default password shall be provided during the initial access to the TOE, and then management and local access to the TOE shall be possible.
  - If there is no default password, a new password shall be created, and then management and local access to the TOE shall be possible.
    - Passwords shall comply with the security criteria, <Password Security Criteria Type (1)> or <Password Security Criteria Type (2)> of FIA\_SOS.1.
  - If there is no default account(ID), a new account(ID) shall be created, and then management and local access to the TOE shall be possible.

#### 5.1.4.4. FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

Hierarchical to No other components

|                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| Dependencies       | No dependencies.   |
| FMT_SMF.1.1        | The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: <i>list of management functions to be provided by the TSF</i> ]. |
| 5.1.4.5. FMT_SMR.1 | Security roles   |
| Hierarchical to    | No other components.   |
| Dependencies       | FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification   |
| FMT_SMR.1.1        | The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: <i>the authorized identified roles</i> ].  |
| FMT_SMR.1.2        | TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles <b>defined in FMT_SMR.1.1</b> .   |

### 5.1.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 5.1.5.1. Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| Hierarchical to | No other components  |
| Dependencies    | No dependencies.   |
| FPT_ITT.1.1     | The TSF shall protect the TSF data from <i>disclosure and modification</i> when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE. |

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall transmit using an encrypted channel to protect data transmitted among TOE components (e.g., security policies, control commands, audit records, etc.)
- For secure encrypted communication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided using standard protocols.
  - Secure cryptographic communication protocols include *HTTPS (implemented using TLS), TLS (TLS 1.2-RFC5246 or higher), SSH (SSH V2-RFC 4251, 4254), etc.*
- Use of its own protocol is not allowed.
- The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy the requirements of 'protection when storing cryptographic key' of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.

#### 5.1.5.2. FPT\_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: *TSF data*] stored in containers controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized disclosure, modification.

#### Application notes

### 1. Protection when storing TSF data (important information)

- o The TOE shall store important information in a secure way when storing it inside the TOE.
  - At least when the TOE stores the following important information, it shall be encrypted and stored.
    - Password used by the TOE for user identification and authentication
    - Authentication information used by the TOE for additional identification and authentication
    - Data Encryption Key(DEK)
  - The data encryption key(DEK) shall be encrypted and stored using the key encryption key(KEK).
  - Requirements related to generation and storage of key encryption key(KEK) shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS\_CKM.1(1), FCS\_CKM.1(2) and FPT\_PST.1.
  - When the TOE stores the following information, it must be stored using encryption, access control, etc.
    - Information used for mutual authentication when the TOE and external IT entities are interacted
    - DBMS/web server/WAS server's administrator password required for the TOE to access DBMS/web server/WAS server that exist inside or outside the TOE.
    - Encryption key (pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key)
  - The user password used by the TOE for user identification and authentication shall be stored using one-way encryption(hash) to prevent decryption.
    - When performing one-way encryption, it is necessary to add and apply a randomly generated value called salt to the password.
    - The salt value does not need to be confidential. It shall be generated using a random bit generator and the size must be at least 48 bits.
    - The iteration count shall be applied as large as possible (at least 1000 times).
  - DBMS/Web server/WAS server's administrator password, etc. required for TOE operation can be stored after being encrypted by applying the public key/symmetric key encryption algorithm.
  - Encryption key means pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key, etc., and covers all keys

used for TOE management access/local access, and interaction settings among TOE components.

- Passwords and encryption keys included in the minimum important information that shall be encrypted shall not be stored in the TOE by hard-coding.
- The encryption algorithm used, encryption key security, and encryption key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.

## 2. Protection when storing TSF data (settings, audit records)

- o The TOE shall provide a function to protect the stored TOE setting values (security policies, environment setting parameters, etc.) so that only authorized administrators can access.
  - For hardware appliance-type TOE, the TOE settings stored inside shall be protected, and for software-type TOE, the TOE settings stored in the store controlled by the TOE after installation.
  - The TOE shall provide an interface that allows only authorized administrators to access TOE settings, and other persons than authorized administrators shall not be able to access TOE settings
    - Access means operations such as read, change, delete, etc.
  - When providing the function to backup the TOE settings in the form of external files, an encryption function shall be provided.
  - During encryption, the encryption algorithm used, encryption key security, and encryption key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o If WAS(*Tomcat, Jesus, etc.*) is included in the TOE package, the TOE shall implement not to include important information in the WAS log.
  - Important information such as passwords and encryption keys shall not be left in plain text in the WAS log.
- o The TOE may safely encrypt and store audit records when they are stored inside the TOE.
  - The encryption algorithm used, encryption key security, and encryption key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.

## 3. Protection when storing cryptographic key

- o The TOE shall store the cryptographic key in a secure way.
  - Data encryption key(DEK) can be stored by using key encryption key(KEK).
  - Key Encryption Key(KEK) can be generated through multiple stages of key chain, among which the final key encryption key(KEK) can be encrypted and stored using the key

encryption key(KEK) of the previous stage.

- The key encryption key(KEK) except the final key encryption key(KEK) in the key chain cannot be stored.
- When the cryptographic key is stored outside the TOE, it is recommended to use storage media that have been verified for safety such as smart cards, security USBs, and security tokens(HSM).
  - It is recommended to use a product that has obtained a security function test report or a domestic/foreign CC certificate for the storage media.
- Hard-coding and storing the encryption key in the TOE are not permitted.
- As shown in the [Table 11] below, the applicant shall identify all cryptographic keys used for storage and transmission in the TOE, and prove security by submitting a list and explanatory materials for key storage and destruction methods.

| Cryptographic key type                 | How to store and destroy keys  |
|--|--|
| TLS private key                        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Type: RSA Private Key</li> <li>- Generator: Generated by TOE</li> <li>- Storage/Protection: Store in the TOE/Block unauthorized access to TOE storage area</li> <li>- Destruction: Overwrite 3 times with 0 and 1 when executing key destruction command</li> </ul> |
| TLS session encryption key             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Type: ARIA Key</li> <li>- Generator: Generated by TOE</li> <li>- Storage/Protection: Store only in memory(RAM)</li> <li>- Destruction: Overwrite 3 times with 0 and 1 when at the end of the session</li> </ul>   |
| TLS session integrity verification key | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Type: HMAC Key</li> <li>- Generator: Generated by TOE</li> <li>- Storage/Protection: Store only in memory(RAM)</li> <li>- Destruction: Overwrite 3 times with 0 and 1 when at the end of the session</li> </ul>   |

[Table 11] How to store and destroy cryptographic keys

- When the TOE stores cryptographic keys (pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key, etc.) used for local/administrative access for TOE management and for interacted setting with separate equipment, it shall be protected and stored in a way such as encryption, access control, etc.

**4. Protection when storing agent or client or management console TSF data (important information)**

- o When the TOE agent or client stores important information in the file system or registry, the agent or client stores important information in the file system or registry, it shall be encrypted and stored.
- At least when the TOE stores the following important information, it shall be encrypted and stored.
  - User password
  - Encryption key (pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key)
- User password includes agent deletion key, and password shall be stored using one-way encryption(hash) not to be generally decrypted.
  - When performing one-way encryption, it is necessary to add a randomly generated salt to the password.
  - The salt value does not need to be confidential. It shall be generated using a random bit generator and it is the size of at least 48 bits.
  - The iteration count shall be applied as large as possible. (at least 1000 times)
- Encryption key means pre-shared key, symmetric key, private key, etc., and covers all keys used for TOE management access/local access, and interacting settings among TOE components.
- Passwords and encryption keys included in the minimum important information that shall be encrypted shall not be stored in the TOE by hard-coding.
- The encryption algorithm used, encryption key security, and encryption key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- Even if encryption is provided, it is recommended to protect in a way to additional file hiding, access control, etc.

## **5. Protection when storing agent or client or management console TSF data (setting values, audit data)**

- o When storing TOE settings and audit data in the file system or registry, a function to protect against unauthorized access may be provided.
- The relevant user interface(UI) and CLI commands shall not be provided to prevent deletion or modification of audit data even by agent users.
- Even agent users shall not be able to access the stored TOE settings.
  - Access means operations such as read, change, and delete.
- If the TOE security function cannot be fully implemented, it can be supported to protect the TOE settings storage in the TOE operating environment.
- When providing the function to backup the TOE settings in the form of external file, an



encryption function shall be provided.

## 6. Protection when storing TSF data related to the authentication token (cryptographic key, critical security parameters)

- o When the TOE stores the cryptographic key or critical security parameters, it shall be encrypted with the key encryption key(KEK) through the encryption algorithm of the validated cryptographic module to store safely.
- The stored encryption key or critical security parameters shall be stored by using the key encryption key(KEK) generated in accordance with the FCS\_CKM.1 'authentication token-related cryptographic key generation' requirements.

### 5.1.5.3. FPT\_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

FPT\_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [*selection: at the initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, upon the request of authorized user, at the conditions* [*assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur*] to demonstrate the correct operation of [*selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF*].

FPT\_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [*selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data*].

FPT\_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [*selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data*].

#### Application notes

### 1. TOE server self-test, response function, and audit record generation

o The TOE shall perform self-test during initial start-up(or execution)/operation periodically or at the request of the administrator.

- When initial start-up(or execution) the TOE, it is mandatory to perform self-test, and during operation, it shall support the perform self-test periodically or at the request of the administrator.
- The self-test target means the main process of the TOE, and shall check whether the process is running normally.
- The subject of self-test can be selected by the applicant, but if the entity's abnormal state(*e.g., error, stop, etc.*) affects the security function of the TOE, the corresponding entity

shall be included as the subject of self-test.

- The history of self-testing shall be confirmed through screen output, audit records.
  - The hardware appliance-type TOE shall satisfy the following requirements.
    - A self-test shall be performed to detect errors in hardware(e.g., memory, flash, NIC, etc.) and software(e.g., process, etc.) included in the scope of the TOE at the start-up and during operation of the TOE.
  - If physically separated TOE components exist, self-test shall be performed by selecting the subjects to include all components.
  - The sponsors shall describe the self-test function in detail in the submission document.
- o If the TOE self-test result is a failure, it shall perform the response function.
- The TOE shall perform the implemented response function or the response function set by the administrator to ensure correct operation.
  - Audit records shall be generated for self-test results.
  - Examples of response functions performed when the self-test result is a failure are as follows.
    - Termination of program, warning message screen display, restart process, etc.
  - A security management function may be provided for the administrator to set the response function.

## **2. TOE server integrity verification, response function, and audit record generation**

- o The TOE shall provide a function to verify the integrity of itself and its setting values.
- Integrity verification covers the TOE setting values(configuration files, etc.) and the TOE itself(processes, libraries, executable files, etc.).
  - Integrity verification shall be performed when the TOE is initial executed(or start-up), and periodic integrity verification can be performed additionally.
  - The subject of integrity verification can be selected by the sponsor, but if the entity's abnormal state(e.g., error, stop, etc.) affects the security function of the TOE, the corresponding entity shall be included as the subject of integrity verification.
  - If physically separated TOE components exist, integrity verification shall be performed by selecting the subjects to include all components.
  - A function for the administrator to perform integrity verification shall be provided.
  - The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy 'protection when storing cryptographic key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o If the operating system kernel or kernel level module is included in the scope of the TOE,

the TOE shall provide a function to verify the integrity of the operating system kernel or kernel level module.

- When verifying integrity by hash value comparison method, the cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy 'protection when storing cryptographic key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o The TOE shall provide a function for the administrator to check the contents and results of the integrity verification.
  - The contents and results of the integrity verification shall be checked through screen display and audit records.
- o The TOE shall perform response function if integrity verification fails.
  - The TOE shall perform its own implemented response function or the response function set by the administrator.
  - Audit records shall be generated for integrity verification results.
  - Examples of response functions performed when the integrity verification result is a failure are as follows.
    - Interrupt program execution, warning message screen display, etc.
  - A security management function may be provided for the administrator to set the response function.

### **3. TOE agents, clients, management consoles integrity verification, response function, and audit record generation**

- o The agent or client shall provide the function to verify the integrity of the TOE setting values and its own at the initialization phase and periodically or at the request of authorized administrators.
  - Integrity verification covers agent or client setting values(policies, environment settings, etc.) and the TOE itself (executable files, filter drivers, etc.).
  - In the case of a TOE running on a Windows® operating system, the modification shall be detected during normal booting of the operating system, if integrity is compromised in the safe mode of the operating system.
  - In the case that integrity verification is performed periodically or at the request of authorized administrators, △when an abnormality occurs in the integrity verification result, △the integrity verification result by the administrator shall be notified to the administrator.
  - Audit records shall be generated for integrity verification results.
  - Cryptographic-related parts shall satisfy the 'protection when storing encryption keys' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- o The agent or client shall provide a function to can recover modified information(setting values, executable files, filter drivers, etc.).

- 'Modified information' shall identify and include all files that affect the normal operation and of security functions of the TOE.
- 'Agent Type 1' shall provide an automatic recovery function, and  $\Delta$ Agent Type 2  $\Delta$ Agent Type 3 and  $\Delta$ Client Type may provide a manual recovery function.
- o In the case of an agent or client installed on the endpoint in Windows® environment, the agent or client shall provide an integrity verification function for the server/update server address.
- o If there are two or more servers or update servers on the file transfer path, the receiving server shall perform integrity verification for the address of the sending server.

### 5.1.6. TOE access (FTA)

#### 5.1.6.1. FTA\_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions

Hierarchical to FTA\_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions  
 Dependencies FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FTA\_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions belonging to the same user according to the rules [limiting the maximum number of concurrent sessions to 1 for users who have the same privilege and the same user, rules on the maximum number of concurrent sessions {determined by the ST author}].

FTA\_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce a limit of [1] session per user by default.

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall not allow duplicate access to the TOE with the same user account or the same privilege.
- If a user logs in with the same account on another terminal after logging in, it is required to block a new access or terminate the previous access.
- Duplicate logins with the same privilege shall not be allowed.
- An audit record should be generated when duplicate access is blocked.

#### 5.1.6.2. FTA\_TSE.1(1) TOE session establishment

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies No dependencies.

FTA\_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny **the administrator's management access session** establishment based on [access IP, [selection: [assignment: *important management function attributes*], *none*]].

## Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function to restrict the IP of the accessible management terminals.
  - It shall be possible to register, delete, and change the IP address of the management terminals.
  - Management terminals accessible to administrators who only have read access instead of for management purposes(e.g., *monitoring administrators*) can be additionally registered for operation.
  - The IP of accessible management terminals can be added one by one at a time as a host IP.
  - It is not allowed to register by designating an IP address range such as 192.168.10.2~253, or by using 0.0.0.0, 192.168.10.\*, any, which means the entire network range.

## 5.2. Security functional requirements (Conditional mandatory SFRs)

'Optional SFRs' in this PP are as follows. Conditional mandatory SFRs' mandatorily require to be included in the ST, if they meet 'the additional conditions for the ST' in the table below.

| Security functional class | Security functional component |  | SFR additional conditions   | Remark                             |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|
| FAU                       | FAU_STG.1                     | Protected audit trail storage                          | In case of the TOE server stores audit records in local storage   |                                    |
|                           | FAU_STG.3                     | Action in case of possible audit data loss             | In case of the TOE server stores audit records in local storage   |                                    |
|                           | FAU_STG.4                     | Prevention of audit data loss                          | In case of the TOE server stores audit records in local storage   |                                    |
| FIA                       | FIA_UAU.5                     | Multiple authentication mechanisms                     | In case of the TOE server supports additional identification and authentication functions by itself in addition to the ID/password-based authentication method                                |                                    |
| FPT                       | FPT_LEE.1                     | Linkable external entities (Extended) - authentication | In case of the TOE server supports additional identification and authentication functions by interacting with external IT entities in addition to the ID/password-based authentication method |                                    |
|                           | FPT_RCV.1                     | Manual recovery  | In case of TOE components include agents or clients   |                                    |
|                           | FPT_RCV.2                     | Automated recovery                                     | In case of TOE server update function is provided   |                                    |
|                           | FPT_TUD.1                     | TSF security patch update (Extended)                   | In case of TOE update function is provided  |                                    |
| FTA                       | FTA_SSL.1                     | TSF-initiated session locking                          | In case of TOE provides session locking function  | One of the two must be implemented |
|                           | FTA_SSL.3                     | TSF-initiated termination                              | In case of TOE provides session termination function  |                                    |
|                           | FTA_TSE.1(2)                  | TOE session establishment                              | In case of it is necessary to identify and authenticate users existing in the agent, management console, or client constituting the TOE   |                                    |
| FTP                       | FTP_ITC.1                     | Inter-TSF trusted channel                              | In case of interacting with external IT entities is supported   |                                    |
|                           |                               |  | In case of audit records are transmitted and stored to external IT entities in real time  |                                    |
|                           |                               |  | In case of providing the online update function through the developer update server.  |                                    |
|                           | FTP_TRP.1                     | Trusted path   | In case of authorized administrators and general users directly access the management server through web browsers or terminal access programs, etc.   |                                    |

[Table 12] Conditional mandatory SFRs

## 5.2.1. Security audit (FAU)

### 5.2.1.1. FAU\_STG.1 Protected of audit trail storage

Hierarchical to No other components  
 Dependencies FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU\_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

FAU\_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to *prevent* unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

#### Application notes

o The TOE shall protect the audit records from being deleted or changed.

- A function shall be implemented to store audit records in a local storage or to transmit and store audit records to an external IT entity in real time.
- Relevant user interface(UI) and CLI commands shall not be provided so that even authorized administrators cannot delete or change audit records.
- Unauthorized person's access shall be controlled to protect the stored audit records.
- If the TOE security function cannot be fully implemented, the TOE operational environment can support the protected audit trail storage.
  - Example: When audit records are stored in the DBMS installed on the same operating system as the TOE, the DBMS' identification and authentication functions can be used to protect deletion or modification by unauthorized users.
- If audit records are stored in the log server outside the TOE, encrypted communication shall be performed.
  - If syslog is supported, encrypted transmission shall be supported through *syslog over DTLS(RFC 5424), syslog over DTLS(RFC 6012), etc.*

### 5.2.1.2. FAU\_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Hierarchical to No other components  
 Dependencies FAU\_STG.1 Protected of audit trail storage

FAU\_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [Notification to the authorized administrator, [assignment: *actions to be taken in case of possible audit storage failure*]] if the audit trail exceeds [assignment: *pre-defined limit*].

#### Application notes

o In case of the size of the audit record reaches the predefined capacity, the TOE shall take response actions such as *notifying the administrator*.

- A function shall be implemented to store audit records in the local storage or to transmit

and store audit records to an external IT entity in real time.

- A function to notify the administrator shall be provided. Examples of the function are as follows.
  - *Screen alarm, sending email to the administrator, etc.*
- Examples of conditions for notifying the administrator in response to audit record loss are as follows.
  - *90% or more of the setup disk capacity, 100MB or more, etc.*
- In addition, a function for the administrator to send audit records to an external log server may be provided.
  - If syslog is supported, encrypted transmission shall be supported through *syslog over DTLS(RFC 5424), syslog over DTLS(RFC 6012), etc.*
  - The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy the 'protection when storing cryptographic key' requirements of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.

#### 5.2.1.3. FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss

Hierarchical to FAU\_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss

Dependencies FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU\_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: *"ignore audited events"*, *"prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights"*, *"overwrite the oldest stored audit records"*] and [assignment: *other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure*] if the audit trail is full.

#### Application notes

- In case of the audit record storage capacity is full, the TOE shall respond to failure to save in an appropriate way.
- A function shall be implemented to store audit records in a local storage or to transmit and store audit records to an external IT entity in real time.
- Examples of response functions in case of failure to save are as follows.
  - *Overwriting the oldest audit records, save audit records compression, etc.*

## 5.2.2. Identification and authentication (FIA)

### 5.2.2.1. FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.



|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| FIA_UAU.5.1 | The TSF shall provide [password authentication mechanism, [assignment: <i>list of additional authentication mechanism</i> ]] to support user authentication.                      |
| FIA_UAU.5.2 | The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [assignment: <i>rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication</i> ]. |

#### Application notes

- o In case of the TOE supports additional identification and authentication methods, the TOE shall provide additional identification and authentication functions on its own or by interacting with external IT entities, in parallel with user account/password-based identification and authentication.
  - In order to provide additional identification and authentication functions, *△2FA support device complying with FIDO standards, △certificates, △one-time password generator(OTP), etc.* can be used.
    - If it is supported in the TOE operational environment, '2FA support device complying with FIDO standards' is recommended.
  - If additional identification and authentication functions are provided in the TOE, the functions can be provided by receiving the authentication results from the inside of the TOE or from the interacted external IT entities.
    - If the TOE provides a certification utilization method, certificate validation shall be performed.
    - The authentication information used by external IT entities to perform additional identification and authentication methods shall be securely managed by the external IT entities. If the TOE stores authentication information use to perform additional identification and authentication methods, the requirements of FPT\_PST.1 shall be applied.

### 5.2.3. Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 5.2.3.1. FPT\_LEE.1 Linkable external entities (Extended) - authentication

|                 |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| Hierarchical to | No other components. |
| Dependencies    | No dependencies.     |

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| FPT_LEE.1.1 | The TSF shall perform [assignment: <i>list of actions</i> ] and provide [assignment: <i>list of functions</i> ] by linking with external entities. |
|-------------|--|

#### Application notes

- o In case of the TOE supports additional identification and authentication methods, the TOE shall provide additional identification and authentication functions on its own or by interacting with external IT entities, in parallel with user account/password-based identification and authentication.

- In order to provide additional identification and authentication functions, △2FA support device complying with FIDO standards, △certificates, △one-time password generator(OTP), etc. can be used.
- If it is supported in the TOE operational environment, '2FA support device complying with FIDO standards' is recommended.
- If additional identification and authentication functions are provided in the TOE, the functions can be provided by receiving the authentication results from the inside of the TOE or from the interacted external IT entities.
- If the TOE provides a certification utilization method, certificate validation shall be performed.
- The authentication information used by external IT entities to perform additional identification and authentication methods shall be securely managed by the external IT entities. If the TOE stores authentication information use to perform additional identification and authentication methods, the requirements of FPT\_PST.1 shall be applied.

#### 5.2.3.2. FPT\_RCV.1 Manual recovery

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

FPT\_RCV.1.1 After [assignment: *list of failures/service discontinuities*] the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided..

#### Application notes

- The agent or client shall provide a function to can recover modified information(setting values, executable files, filter drivers, etc.).
- 'Modified information' shall identify and include all files that affect the normal operation and of security functions of the TOE.
- 'Agent Type1' shall provide an automatic recovery function, and △Agent Type2 △Agent Type3 and △Client Type may provide a manual recovery function.

#### 5.2.3.3. FPT\_RCV.2 Automated recovery

Hierarchical to FRP\_RCV.1 Manual recovery  
 Dependencies AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

FPT\_RCV.2.1 When automated recovery from [assignment: *list of failures/service discontinuities*] is not possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.

FPT\_RCV.2.2 For [assignment: *list of failures/service discontinuities*], the TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.

## Application notes

- o If the update function is provided, the TOE shall provide a function to automatically maintain the existing version when the update installation fails.
  - If it is not supported by the TOE, manual recovery by the administrator shall be supported.
  - The sponsor shall describe the manual recovery procedure by the administrator in detail in the deliverables.

## 5.2.3.4. FPT\_TUD.1 TSF security patch update (Extended)

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies.

## FPT\_TUD.1.1

The TSF shall provide the capability to view the **unique identification** to [assignment: *the authorized identified roles*].

FPT\_TUD.1.2 The TSF shall verify validity of the update files using [selection: *hash value comparison, digital signature verification, [assignment: **other secure validation mechanism**]*] before installing updates.

## Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function for users to check the 'unique identification information of the TOE'.
  - The TOE identification information shall be unique, can be checked by users through the interface, and cannot be modified or changed. It shall include the following.
    - TOE name, TOE version, TOE release or build number
  - If the TOE includes multiple components that are physically separated, the identification information of each component shall be unique, can be checked, and cannot be modified or changed by users. It shall include the following:
    - The name and version of the TOE including the component, The component name, The component version, The component release or build number.
  - A version management system that can check whether the TOE and TOE components are patched and functionally improved should be applied.
 

(e.g., In case of patch and function improvement, a system for changing the major version, minor version, release number, and build number for each case is established to track the reason for the change of TOE/TOE components with version information)
  - In case of hardware appliances, users shall be able to view the unique identification information of the firmware in addition to TOE identification information through TOE interface.
- o In case of providing the update function, the TOE shall verify the validity of the TOE update files before installing or applying the update files.

- If the TOE provides online update or manual update function, only the update files that have succeeded in verification of the validity shall be installed or applied.
  - Integrity verification is mandatory when verify the validity of the update files, and shall be implemented using *digital signature verification, public hash value verification, etc.*
  - When verifying the digital signature, verification of the validity of the certificate (within 1 year of validity) shall be performed.
  - Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key security shall satisfy FCS class requirements.
  - Update file validation results (success • failure) shall be audited and recorded.
- o If the update function is provided, the TOE shall provide a function to automatically maintain the existing version when the update installation fails.
- An audit record shall be generated for the update installation result and the reason for failure.
  - If it is not supported by the TOE, manual recovery by the administrator shall be supported.
  - The developer shall describe the manual recovery procedure by the administrator in detail in the deliverables.
- o In the case of an agent or client installed on the endpoint in Windows® environment, the agent or client shall perform the digital signature verification on the subject of file generation of the update target files received from the server or update server.
- It shall be applied to the agent or client existing on the endpoint where Windows® operating system is installed.
  - All files that are irrelevant to TOE configuration without being included in installation files and policy files(e.g., patch files, general executable files, etc.) are not allowed to be distributed to agents and clients.
  - In case of verifying the digital signature, verification of the validity of the certificate(within 1 year of validity) shall be performed.
  - The update file digital signature verification result(success, failure) shall be recorded in the audit record.
  - The cryptographic-related part shall satisfy the FCS class requirements.
  - Developers or administrators (who perform digital signatures on update files) shall perform digital signatures on the separate offline server that is disconnected from the Internet.
- o In the case of an agent or client installed on the endpoint in Windows® environment, the agent or client shall provide an integrity verification function for the server/update server address.
- o If there are two or more servers or update servers on the file transfer path, the receiving server shall perform integrity verification for the address of the sending server.

#### 5.2.4. TOE access(FTA)

|                    |                                    |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 5.2.4.1. FTA_SSL.1 | TSF-initiated session locking      |
| Hierarchical to    | No other components.               |
| Dependencies       | FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication |

FTA\_SSL.1.1 The TSF shall lock the interactive session after [assignment: *time interval of user inactivity*] by:

- a) clearing or overwriting display devices, making the current contents unreadable;
- b) disabling any activity of the user's data access/display devices other than unlocking the session.

FTA\_SSL.1.2 The TSF shall require the following events to occur prior to unlocking the session: [ *selection: unlocking session by the administrator, user re-authentication before unlocking session* ].

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function to lock or terminate the session if it is not used for a certain period of time after the user session is connected.
  - The time information used shall be applied based on the server time.
  - A certain period of time refers to the amount of time accumulated after a connection that triggers session locking or termination.
    - A certain period of time can be fixed by the administrator among 10 minutes or less or set in proportion to the number of authentication failures.
  - After the lock time has elapsed, a locked session shall be unlocked by the administrator or through the user authentication function for each session.
  - An audit record shall be generated when the session lock or termination function is activated.
  - It shall be applied to all management and local access included in the TOE.

|                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| 5.2.4.2. FTA_SSL.3 | TSF-initiated termination |
| Hierarchical to    | No other components.      |
| Dependencies       | No dependencies.          |

FTA\_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: *time interval of user inactivity*].

#### Application notes

- o The TOE shall provide a function to lock or terminate the session if it is not used for a certain period of time after the user session is connected.
  - The time information used shall be applied based on the server time.
  - A certain period of time refers to the amount of time accumulated after a connection that

triggers session locking or termination.

- A certain period of time can be fixed by the administrator among 10 minutes or less or set in proportion to the number of authentication failures.
- After the lock time has elapsed, a locked session shall be unlocked by the administrator or through the user authentication function for each session.
- An audit record shall be generated when the session lock or termination function is activated.
- It shall be applied to all management and local access included in the TOE.

#### 5.2.4.3. FTA\_TSE.1(2) TOE session establishment

Hierarchical to No other components.  
Dependencies No dependencies.

FTA\_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [assignment: ***list of additional attributes of agent or client***]

##### Application notes

- o In case of it is necessary to identify and authenticate a user existing in the agent or client constituting the TOE, the identification value shall be a unique value that is not registered in duplicate.
- During user authentication, additional attributes of the registered agent or client shall also be authenticated.
- Additional attributes: IP address is mandatory, and at least one of *MAC address, serial number, and information that can uniquely identify the agent itself* shall be additionally used.

### 5.2.5. Trusted path/channels(FTP)

#### 5.2.5.1. FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

Hierarchical to No other components.  
Dependencies No dependencies.

FTP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: *the TSF, another trusted IT product*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: *list of functions for which a trusted channel is required*].

##### Application notes

- In case of interacting with external IT entities is supported, the TOE shall transmit data using an encrypted communication channel to protect the transmitted data when interacting with external IT entities.
  - For secure cryptographic communication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided using standard protocols.
    - Secure cryptographic communication protocols include HTTPS (implemented using TLS), TLS (TLS 1.2-RFC5246 or higher), SSH (SSH V2-RFC 4251, 4254), etc.
  - Use of its own protocol is not allowed.
  - The cryptographic communication channel can be implemented directly in the TOE or to be provided by the TOE using the operating environment.
  - This requirement shall be applied when the TOE provides a function that interacting with external IT entities to provide a security function.
  - If transmission data is not protected using an cryptographic communication channel when interacting with external IT entities, the needlessness to protect the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data shall be proven.
  - Communication services that do not support cryptographic communication channels shall be able to be disabled.
  - The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy the requirements of 'protection when storing cryptographic key' of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.
- In case of audit records are stored in a log server outside the TOE, cryptographic communication shall be performed.
  - If syslog is supported, encrypted transmission shall be supported through syslog over DTLS(RFC 5424), syslog over DTLS(RFC 6012), etc.

#### 5.2.5.2. FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted path

Hierarchical to Dependencies      No other components.  
 No dependencies.

- FTP\_TRP.1.1      The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: *remote, local*] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation].
- FTP\_TRP.1.2      The TSF shall permit [selection: *the TSF, local users, remote users*] to initiate communication via the trusted path.
- FTP\_TRP.1.3      The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: **the authentication of management access administrator**, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required] ].

## Application notes

- During management access, the TOE shall transmit data using an cryptographic communication channel to protect the transmitted data.
  - For secure cryptographic communication, confidentiality and integrity shall be provided using standard protocols.
    - Secure cryptographic communication protocols include *HTTPS (implemented using TLS), TLS (TLS 1.2-RFC5246 or higher), SSH (SSH V2-RFC 4251, 4254), etc.*
  - Use of its own protocol is not allowed. (3.1.1-R2)
  - The cryptographic communication channel can be implemented directly in the TOE or to be provided by the TOE using the operational environment.
  - The cryptographic algorithm used, cryptographic key security, and cryptographic key storage method shall satisfy the requirements of 'protection when storing cryptographic key' of FCS class and FPT\_PST.1.



### 5.3. Security function requirements(optional SFRs)

The 'optional SFRs' in this PP are as follows. The 'optional SFRs' are not required to be implemented mandatorily, but if the TOE provides relevant functions additionally, the ST author shall include the relevant SFRs in the ST.

| Security function class     | Security assurance component |                                |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Cryptographic support (FCS) | FCS_CKM.2                    | Cryptographic key distribution |
| Protection of the TSF (FPT) | FPT_STM.1                    | Reliable timestamp             |

[Table 13] Optional SFRs

#### 5.3.1. Cryptographic support(FCS)

##### 5.3.1.1. FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution

Hierarchical to No other components.

Dependencies [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

FCS\_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: *cryptographic key distribution method*] that meets the following: [assignment: *list of standards*].

##### Application notes

- o FCS\_CKM.2 cryptographic key distribution is a selectively implementable functional requirement('optional SFRs'), and if the TOE additionally provides the above function, the ST author shall include this requirement in the SFR.
- o If the ST author includes this SFR, security problem definition and security objectives shall be derived additionally, if necessary.
- o The key used in the cryptographic key establishment method defined in FCS\_CKM.2.1 shall be related to the key generated in FCS\_CKM.1.1 of FCS\_CKM.1.

#### 5.3.2. Protection of the TSF

##### 5.3.2.1. FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to No other components.  
 Dependencies No dependencies.  
 FTP\_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide the reliable timestamp.

Application notes

- o Each component of the TOE shall generate audit records using trusted time information.
- o Trusted time information shall use the time information provided by the NTP server or operating system.

### 5.4. Security assurance requirements

Assurance requirements of this Protection Profile are comprised of assurance components in CC part 3, and the evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table summarizes assurance components.

| Security assurance class   | Security assurance component |   |
|----------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| Security Target evaluation | ASE_INT.1                    | ST introduction                                     |
|                            | ASE_CCL.1                    | Conformance claims                                  |
|                            | ASE_OBJ.1                    | Security objectives for the operational environment |
|                            | ASE_ECD.1                    | Extended components definition                      |
|                            | ASE_REQ.1                    | Stated security requirements                        |
|                            | ASE_TSS.1                    | TOE summary specification                           |
| Development                | ADV_FSP.1                    | Basic functional specification                      |
| Guidance documents         | AGD_OPE.1                    | Operational user guidance                           |
|                            | AGD_PRE.1                    | Preparative procedures                              |
| Life-cycle support         | ALC_CMC.1                    | Labelling of the TOE                                |
|                            | ALC_CMS.1                    | TOE CM coverage                                     |
| Tests                      | ATE_FUN.1                    | Functional testing                                  |
|                            | ATE_IND.1                    | Independent testing - conformance                   |
| Vulnerability assessment   | AVA_VAN.1                    | Vulnerability survey                                |

[Table 14] Security assurance requirements

#### 5.4.1. Security Target evaluation

##### 5.4.1.1. ASE\_INT.1 ST introduction

Dependencies No dependencies.

Developer action  
elements

ASE\_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ASE\_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview and a TOE description.

ASE\_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.

ASE\_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.

ASE\_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.

ASE\_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.

ASE\_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.

ASE\_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.

ASE\_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE\_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE description are consistent with each other.

---

## 5.4.1.2. ASE\_CCL.1 Conformance claims

Dependencies ASE\_INT.1 ST introduction  
ASE\_ECD.1 Extended components definition  
ASE\_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

Developer action  
elements

ASE\_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.

ASE\_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| ASE_CCL.1.1C              | The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.  |
| ASE_CCL.1.2C              | The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.   |
| ASE_CCL.1.3C              | The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.   |
| ASE_CCL.1.4C              | The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition.  |
| ASE_CCL.1.5C              | The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance.   |
| ASE_CCL.1.6C              | The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.   |
| ASE_CCL.1.7C              | The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.   |
| ASE_CCL.1.8C              | The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed. |
| ASE_CCL.1.9C              | The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.                         |
| ASE_CCL.1.10C             | The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.                     |
| Evaluator action elements |  |
| ASE_CCL.1.1E              | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.   |

---

#### 5.4.1.3. ASE\_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment

Dependencies      No dependencies.

Developer action elements

ASE\_OBJ.1.1D      The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.

Content and presentation elements

ASE\_OBJ.1.1C      The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for

the operational environment.

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

---

#### 5.4.1.4. ASE\_ECD.1 Extended components definition

Dependencies No dependencies.

Developer action  
elements

ASE\_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.

ASE\_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ASE\_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.

ASE\_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security requirement.

ASE\_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.

ASE\_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.

ASE\_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE\_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed using existing components.

---

#### 5.4.1.5. ASE\_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

Dependencies ASE\_ECD.1 Extended components definition

Developer action  
elements

ASE\_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.

ASE\_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ASE\_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.

ASE\_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.

ASE\_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.

ASE\_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.

ASE\_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.

ASE\_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

---

#### 5.4.1.6. ASE\_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

Dependencies ASE\_INT.1 ST introduction  
ASE\_REQ.1 Stated security requirements  
ADV\_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

Developer action  
elements

ASE\_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR.

Evaluator action  
elements

ASE\_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ASE\_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.

---

## 5.4.2. Development

### 5.4.2.1. ADV\_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

Dependencies            No dependencies.

Developer action  
elements

ADV\_FSP.1.1D            The developer shall provide a functional specification.

ADV\_FSP.1.2D            The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ADV\_FSP.1.1C            The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.2C            The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.3C            The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV\_FSP.1.4C            The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

Evaluator action  
elements

ADV\_FSP.1.1E            The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV\_FSP.1.2E            The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

---

## 5.4.3. Guidance documents

### 5.4.3.1. AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

Dependencies            ADV\_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

Developer action  
elements

AGD\_OPE.1.1D            The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| AGD_OPE.1.1C              | The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that shall be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.  |
| AGD_OPE.1.2C              | The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.  |
| AGD_OPE.1.3C              | The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.  |
| AGD_OPE.1.4C              | The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF. |
| AGD_OPE.1.5C              | The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.  |
| AGD_OPE.1.6C              | The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.  |
| AGD_OPE.1.7C              | The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.   |
| Evaluator action elements |  |
| AGD_OPE.1.1E              | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.   |

---

#### 5.4.3.2. AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

|                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Dependencies                      | No dependencies.  |
| Developer action elements         |   |
| AGD_PRE.1.1D                      | The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.   |
| Content and presentation elements |   |
| AGD_PRE1.1C                       | The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.  |
| AGD_PRE1.2C                       | The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST. |



Evaluator action  
elements

AGD\_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD\_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.

---

#### 5.4.4. Life-cycle support

##### 5.4.4.1. ALC\_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE

Dependencies ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

Developer action  
elements

ALC\_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ALC\_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.

Evaluator action  
elements

ALC\_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meet requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

---

##### 5.4.4.2. ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

Dependencies No dependencies.

Developer action  
elements

ALC\_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ALC\_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC\_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

Evaluator action  
elements

ALC\_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

---

## 5.4.5. Tests

### 5.4.5.1. ATE\_FUN.1 Functional testing

Dependencies            ATE\_COV.1 Evidence of coverage

Developer action  
elements

ATE\_FUN.1.1D            The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.

ATE\_FUN.1.2D            The developer shall provide test documentation.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ATE\_FUN.1.1C            The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual test results.

ATE\_FUN.1.2C            The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.

ATE\_FUN.1.3C            The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests.

ATE\_FUN.1.4C            The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.

Evaluator action  
elements

ATE\_FUN.1.1E            The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

---

### 5.4.5.2. ATE\_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance

Dependencies            ADV\_FSP.1 Basic functional specification  
AGD\_OPE.1 Operational user guidance  
AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

Developer action  
elements

ATE\_IND.1.1D            The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.

Content and  
presentation  
elements

ATE\_IND.1.1C            The TOE shall be suitable for testing.

Evaluator action  
elements

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| ATE_IND.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ATE_IND.1.2E | The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.                                |

---

### 5.4.6. Vulnerability assessment

#### 5.4.6.1. AVA\_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| Dependencies | ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification<br>AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance<br>AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures |
|--------------|---|

Developer action  
elements

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| AVA_VAN.1.1D | The developer shall provide the TOE for testing |
|--------------|---|

Content and  
presentation  
elements

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| AVA_VAN.1.1C | The TOE shall be suitable for testing. |
|--------------|--|

Evaluator action  
elements

|              |   |
|--------------|---|
| AVA_VAN.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.  |
| AVA_VAN.1.2E | The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.   |
| AVA_VAN.1.3E | The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential. |

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## 5.5. Security requirements rationale

### 5.5.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements

The following table shows dependency of security functional requirements.

| No. | Security functional requirements | Dependency | Reference No. | SFR type |
|-----|----------------------------------|------------|---------------|----------|
|-----|----------------------------------|------------|---------------|----------|

| No. | Security functional requirements | Dependency                            | Reference No. | SFR type              |
|-----|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1   | FAU_ARP.1                        | FAU_SAA.1                             | 3             |                       |
| 2   | FAU_GEN.1                        | FPT.STM.1                             | Rationale(1)  | Mandatory             |
| 3   | FAU_SAA.1                        | FAU_GEN.1                             | 2             | Mandatory             |
| 4   | FAU_SAR.1                        | FAU_GEN.1                             | 2             | Mandatory             |
| 5   | FAU_SAR.3                        | FAU_SAR.1                             | 4             | Mandatory             |
| 6   | FAU_STG.1                        | FAU_GEN.1                             | 2             | Conditional mandatory |
| 7   | FAU_STG.3                        | FAU_STG.1                             | Rationale(2)  | Conditional mandatory |
| 8   | FAU_STG.4                        | FAU_STG.1                             | Rationale(2)  | Conditional mandatory |
| 9   | FCS_CKM.1                        | [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1]              | 10, 11        | Mandatory             |
|     |                                  | FCS_CKM.4                             | 11            |                       |
| 10  | FCS_CKM.2                        | [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] | 9             | Optional              |
|     |                                  | FCS_CKM.4                             | 11            |                       |
| 11  | FCS_CKM.4                        | [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] | 9             | Mandatory             |
| 12  | FCS_COP.1                        | [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] | 9             | Mandatory             |
|     |                                  | FCS_CKM.4                             | 11            |                       |
| 13  | FCS_RBG.1                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 14  | FIA_AFL.1                        | FIA_UAU.1                             | 20            | Mandatory             |
| 15  | FIA_IMA.1                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 16  | FIA_SOS.1                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 17  | FIA_SOS.2                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 18  | FIA_SOS.3                        | FIA_SOS.2                             | 18            | Mandatory             |
| 19  | FIA_UAU.1                        | FIA_UID.1                             | 24            | Mandatory             |
| 20  | FIA_UAU.4                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 21  | FIA_UAU.5                        | -                                     | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 22  | FIA_UAU.7                        | FIA_UAU.1                             | 20            | Mandatory             |
| 23  | FIA_UID.1                        | -                                     | -             | Mandatory             |
| 24  | FMT_MOF.1                        | FMT_SMF.1                             | 28            | Mandatory             |
|     |                                  | FMT_SMR.1                             | 29            |                       |

| No. | Security functional requirements | Dependency | Reference No. | SFR type              |
|-----|----------------------------------|------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 25  | FMT_MTD.1                        | FMT_SMF.1  | 28            | Mandatory             |
|     |                                  | FMT_SMR.1  | 29            |                       |
| 26  | FMT_PWD.1                        | FMT_SMF.1  | 28            | Mandatory             |
|     |                                  | FMT_SMR.1  | 29            | Mandatory             |
| 27  | FMT_SMF.1                        | -          | -             | Mandatory             |
| 28  | FMT_SMR.1                        | FIA_UID.1  | 24            | Mandatory             |
| 29  | FPT_ITT.1                        | -          | -             | Mandatory             |
| 30  | FPT_LEE.1                        | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 31  | FPT_PST.1                        | -          | -             | Mandatory             |
| 32  | FPT_RCV.1                        | AGD_OPE.1  | -             | Conditional Mandatory |
| 33  | FPT_RCV.2                        | AGD_OPE.1  | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 34  | FPT_STM.1                        | -          | -             | Optional              |
| 35  | FPT_TST.1                        | -          | -             | Mandatory             |
| 36  | FPT_TUD.1                        | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 37  | FTA_MCS.2                        | FIA_UID.1  | 23            | Mandatory             |
| 38  | FTA_SSL.1                        | FIA_UAU.1  | 19            | Conditional mandatory |
| 39  | FTA_SSL.3                        | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 40  | FTA_TSE.1(1)                     | -          | -             | Mandatory             |
| 41  | FTA_TSE.1(2)                     | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 42  | FTP_ITC.1                        | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |
| 43  | FTA_TRP.1                        | -          | -             | Conditional mandatory |

[Table 15] Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements

The ST author refers to the table above and prepares a dependency relationship rationale table for the SFRs included in the ST.

Rationale(1) : FAU\_GEN.1 has the dependency on FAU\_STG.1. However, if the pertinent function is implemented by the TOE, the ST author needs to identify the optional SFR (FAU\_STM.1) as the SFR of the ST and describe the pertinent reference number. In addition, if FAU\_STM.1 is supported by the operational environment, the author shall add the security objectives for the operational

environment and provide justification that a subordinate relationship is satisfied.

Rationale(2) : FAU\_STG.3 and FAU\_STG.4 have the dependency on FAU\_STG.1. However, if the pertinent function is implemented by the TOE, the ST author needs to identify the optional SFR (FAU\_STG.1) as the SFR of the ST and describe the pertinent reference number. In addition, if FAU\_STG.1 is supported by the operational environment (e.g., DBMS), the author shall add the security objectives for the operational environment and provide justification that a subordinate relationship is satisfied.

### **5.5.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements**

The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale is omitted.

The augmented ATE\_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE\_COV.1. but, ATE\_FUN.1 is augmented to require developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation, ATE\_COV.1 is not included in this PP since it is not necessarily required to show the correspondence between the tests and the TSFIs.

## References

| Title   | Author  | Remark              |
|---|---|---------------------|
| Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001)</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002)</li> <li>• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003)</li> </ul> | CCMB  | 2017. 4             |
| Security Requirements for Government V3.0 for the Information Security Systems and Network Devices<br>- Part 2, Common Security Requirements  | National<br>Cybersecurity<br>Center,<br><br>IT Security<br>Certification Center | 2021. 4,<br>2021. 9 |
| Single Sign On Product Testing Criteria   |   | 2022. 3             |

## Abbreviated terms

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| CBC   | Cipher Block Chaining                                |
| CC    | Common Criteria                                      |
| CCMB  | Common Criteria Maintenance Board                    |
| CFB   | Cipher Feedback                                      |
| CTR   | Counter Mode   |
| ECB   | Electronic Codebook                                  |
| DEK   | Data Encryption Key                                  |
| EAL   | Evaluation Assurance Level                           |
| HMAC  | Hash-based Message Authentication Code               |
| HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Socket Layer |
| IP    | Internet Protocol                                    |
| IT    | Information Technology                               |
| IV    | Initial Vector                                       |
| KEK   | Key Encryption Key                                   |
| NTP   | Network Time Protocol                                |
| OFB   | Output Feedback                                      |
| OTP   | One Time Password                                    |
| SFP   | Security Function Policy                             |
| SFR   | Security Functional Requirement                      |
| SHA   | Secure Hash Algorithm                                |
| SMS   | Short Message Service                                |
| SSH   | Secure Shell   |
| SSL   | Secure Socket Layer                                  |
| ST    | Security Target                                      |
| TLS   | Transport Layer Security                             |
| TOE   | Target of Evaluation                                 |
| TSF   | TOE Security Functionality                           |