BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024
for
Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-
political Elections, Version 1.0
developed by
Federal Office for Information Security
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Postfach 20 03 63, 53133 Bonn, Germany
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-PP-414 V3.65
BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections
Version 1.0
developed by Federal Office for Information Security
Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
valid until 19 February 2034
The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version CC:2022 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version CC:2022. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 February 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1 Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2 Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3 Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
3.1 European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)...................................7
3.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA).........................................7
4 Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5 Validity of the certification result...................................................................................8
6 Publication...................................................................................................................8
B Certification Results........................................................................................................9
1 Protection Profile Overview........................................................................................10
2 Security Functional Requirements.............................................................................11
3 Assurance Requirements...........................................................................................11
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation.....................................................................................11
5 Obligations and notes for the usage..........................................................................12
6 Protection Profile Document......................................................................................12
7 Definitions..................................................................................................................12
7.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................12
7.2 Glossary..............................................................................................................13
8 Bibliography...............................................................................................................14
C Annexes........................................................................................................................16
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024
A Certification
1 Preliminary Remarks
Under the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG), the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology
products as well as for Protection Profiles (PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a category
of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security. A PP
claimed by a user, consumer or stakeholder for IT gives them the possibility to express
their IT security needs without referring to a specific product. Product certifications can be
based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on a
Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued but the results from a PP
certification can be re-used for the Security Target evaluation within a product evaluation
when conformance to the PP has been claimed.
Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI or a
sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection
Profile according to Common Criteria [1]. The evaluation is usually carried out by an
evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification
procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the
certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.
2 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG)1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3], including PP Certification
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
Current version see website: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bsig_2009/index.html
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
Current version see website: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bsizertv_2014/index.html
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
Current version see website: https://www.bsi.bund.de/Gebuehrenverordnung
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BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC)4
[1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Internal procedure for the issuance of a PP certificate
3 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a
mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on CC -
under certain conditions was agreed. Therefore, the results of this evaluation and
certification procedure can be re-used by the product certificate issuing scheme in the
evaluation of a Security Target within a subsequent product evaluation and certification
procedure.
3.1 European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level up to and including Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 4, and
in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains
only. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are
part of the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
Details on recognition, the signatory nations, technical domains and the agreement itself
can be found at https://www.sogis.eu.
3.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) became effective in
September 2014 in its current version. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-
products based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates
based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw
Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative
Protection Profiles (cPP).
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
Details on recognition, the signatory nations and the agreement itself can be found at
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
4
CC:2022: Proclamation of the Federal Office for Information Security of 14 April 2023 on
https://www.bsi.bund.de
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0121-2024
4 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections,
Version 1.0 was conducted by the ITSEF Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (Bonn). The
evaluation was completed on 19 January 2024. The ITSEF Deutsche Telekom Security
GmbH (Bonn) is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Federal Office for Information
Security.
The Protection Profile was developed by the Federal Office for Information Security with
support of the company Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (Bonn).
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as indicated.
In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity can be
extended to new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance
continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified Protection Profile, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the CC concepts and terms please refer to CC [1] Part 1 through 5.
The validity of this certificate ends as outlined on the certificate. The applicant and the
sponsor of this certificate are recommended to review the technical content of the
Protection Profile certified according to the evolvement of the technology and of the
intended operational environment of the type of product concerned as well as according to
the evolvement of the evaluation criteria. Such review should result in an update and a re-
certification of the Protection Profile accordingly. Typically, technical standards are
reviewed on a five years basis.
The limitation of validity of this PP certificate does not necessarily impact the validity
period of a product certificate referring to this Protection Profile, but the certification body
issuing a product certificate based on this Protection Profile should take it into its
consideration on validity.
6 Publication
The Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0 has
been included in the BSI list of the certified Protection Profiles, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
The Certification Report may be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated
above.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the certified Protection Profile,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Protection Profile Overview
The Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0 [6] is
established by the Federal Office for Information Security as a basis for the development
of Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product, the Target of
Evaluation (TOE).
The Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0 from 1
December 2023, describes as a TOE type a server software for conducting secret non-
political E-votings, which implements the process of conducting the election. The
Protection Profile defines a basic set of security requirements to be fulfilled by a product
for E-Voting in order to perform elections in a secure way. It addresses non-political
elections such as for example elections within committees or election of an equal
opportunities officer. The PP utilizes a modular structure and specifies a base PP and one
additional functional package. The base PP describes as a TOE type a server software
consisting of one single server component. The functional package “Multi-component
Server Architecture Package”, Version 1.0 from 1 December 2023, describes as a TOE
type a server software which consist of more than one server components.
The TOE shall implement specific functionalities for conducting e-votings related to the
different electoral phases. In the preparation phase, the election data is created, corrected
if necessary, and approved by the election board. The installation and configuration of the
TOE are performed by the administrator at the beginning of the preparation phase and
have been completed successfully before the election execution starts. Once the election
period start time is reached, the TOE starts the execution phase. The election actions of a
voter occur only during the election execution. Votes can only be cast and finally stored in
the ballot box from authorized voters. The TOE provides the voter, or the remote endpoints
on behalf of the voter a required means to encrypt their votes. The votes are only
processed in encrypted form by the TOE until they are stored in a ballot box. During the
evaluation phase, the TOE provides the accumulated audit records to the election board,
who has to check them for irregularities and afterwards has to initiate the vote count.
Before starting the counting of votes, all votes in the intermediate ballot box are transferred
to the ballot box. By counting all valid votes, and taking into account the set of election
rules for cast votes, the distribution of votes for the individual candidates shall be
determined. With the determination of the result of the vote count, the election execution
data and the election result are made available by the TOE in such a way that they can be
stored in a manner protected from subsequent manipulation. In addition, the stored data
enables users outside the TOE to perform end-to-end verifiability, that is cast as intended,
recorded as cast, counted as recorded, individual verifiability and universal verifiability.
After the evaluation phase ends, the post-processing phase begins where the TOE can
export the prepared election execution data.
When the TOE is implemented as a server software consisting of several server
components, the TOE shall provide in addition a trusted channel for secure communication
between the TOE components.
The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are defined in the
Protection Profile [6], chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the security problem definition
is defined in terms of assumptions, threats and organisational security policies. This is
outlined in the Protection Profile [6], in the chapters 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Due to the modular
structure of the PP, the security problem definition can be changed in case the functional
package “Multi-component Server Architecture Package” is used. The functional package
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defines an additional threat which shall be considered when the software system consist of
more than one server component. This is defined in chapter 7.3.1 of the PP.
These assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are split into security
objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP and security objectives
to be fulfilled by the operational environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP.
The objectives for the base PP are outlined in the PP [6], chapter 4. One additional
security objective is defined in scope of the functional package and this can be found in
chapter 7.4.1 of the PP.
The Protection Profile [6] requires a Security Target based on this PP or another PP
claiming this PP to fulfil the CC requirements for strict conformance.
2 Security Functional Requirements
Based on the security objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP
the security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements (SFR) to be
implemented by a TOE. It covers the following issues: user identification and
authentication, access control, user data import and export, secure communication, voting
and verification, electoral evaluation according to rule sets, audit, archiving, reaching and
preserving secure states and resuming the process, management of security attributes
and management of security functions. The functional package introduces additional SFRs
related to establishment of a trusted channel that use cryptographic mechanisms for
communication between the TOE server components.
The TOE security functional requirements for the base PP are outlined in the PP [6],
chapter 6.1. For the functional package, additional SFRs are defined and they are outlined
in chapter 7.5.1. The SFRs are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one of them is
newly defined. Thus the SFR claim is called:
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
3 Assurance Requirements
The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based entirely on
the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria. Thus, this assurance
package is called:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see [1], part 3 for
details).
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
of the class APE (Protection Profile evaluation).
The following assurance components were used:
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APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as defined in
chapter 1.
5 Obligations and notes for the usage
The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the Protection Profile:
● The Protection Profile contains application notes, the author of a product specific
Security Target needs to consider when creating a Security Target and implementing a
TOE that claims conformance to this PP.
6 Protection Profile Document
The Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0 [6] is
being provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
7 Definitions
7.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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7.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Ballot Box - Storage of the cast votes, where the cast votes cannot be changed. The
ballot box is part of the TOE.
Election Action - Includes identification and authentication with voting eligibility
verification, ballot filling, correction and initiation of voting, display of the vote, casting or
recasting of the vote, and feedback to the voter.
Election Board - This includes both the persons who have organizational responsibility for
and manage the e-voting, as well as all "vicarious agents" (e.g. employees of an e-voting
service provider commissioned with the processing) who, on behalf of and under the
control of senior personell of the election board, carry out the administration of the e-voting
servers, initiate a resumption, end the election process, start the post-processing phase
and start the counting of votes with determination of the election result.
Election Data - Data created outside the TOE that is imported in the preparation phase
containing data needed to define election parameters.
Election Execution Data - Data used and generated in the electoral phases, required to
be exported in the post-processing phase and stored in a tamper-proof manner after the
election.
Evaluation Phase - During the evaluation phase the TOE counts the cast votes and
determines the election result according to the set of election rules.
Execution Phase - During the execution phase, voters can perform their individual
election action. The election board can start and stop the election execution during the
election period.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Intermediate Ballot Box - Storage of the cast votes in an encrypted form with the
possibility of modification, upstream of the ballot box. Unlike the ballot box, the
intermediate ballot box allows to have a vote linked to the voter to allow re-voting. A
technically conditioned intermediate storage during the transmission does not belong to it.
The intermediate ballot box is part of the TOE.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Post-processing Phase - During the post-processing phase the TOE can export election
execution data to enable end-to-end verifiability after the election.
Preparation Phase - During the preparation phase election board members can import
election data into the TOE and set parameters used in following electoral phases.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
8 Bibliography
[1] ISO-Version:
ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
CCRA-Version:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/index.cfm
[2] ISO-Version:
ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT
security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
CCRA-Version:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/index.cfm
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE6
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website
6
specially
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[6] Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0,
2023-12-1, Federal Office for Information Security
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 2024-01-10, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH (confidential document)
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C Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Protection Profile for E-Voting Systems for non-political Elections, Version 1.0
[6] provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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