Protection Profile —
Secure Signature-Creation Device
Type2
Version: 1.04, EAL 4+
Wednesday, 25 July 2001
Prepared By: ESIGN Workshop - Expert Group F
Prepared For: CEN/ISSS
Note: This Protection Profile (PP) has been prepared for the European
Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative EESSI by CEN/ISSS area F on
secure signature-creation devices (SSCDs). In its present form it represents
one of two documents that the CEN/ISSS E-Sign Workshop decided at its
Brussels meeting 21st
November 2000 to forward to the EESSI Steering
Committee—one defining evaluation assurance level EAL 4 augmented and
one defining EAL 4.
The actual PP is EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and AVA_MSU.3, strength
of function high.
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Foreword
This ‘Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device’ is issued by the European
Committee for Standardization, Information Society Standardization System (CEN/ISSS)
Electronic Signatures (E-SIGN) workshop. The document represents Annex A of the CEN/ISSS
workshop agreement (CWA) on secure signature-creation devices.
The document is for use by the European Commission in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 9 of the Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of
13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [1] as generally
recognised standard for electronic-signature products in the Official Journal of the European
Communities.
The document has been prepared as a Protection Profile (PP) following the rules and formats of
ISO 15408, as known as the Common Criteria version 2.1 [2] [3] [4].
The set of algorithms for secure signature-creation devices and parameters for algorithms for
secure signature-creation devices is given in a separate document in [5].
Correspondence and comments to this secure signature-creation device protection profile
(SSCD-PP) should be referred to:
CONTACT ADDRESS
CEC/ISSS Secretariat
Rue de Stassart 36
1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel +32 2 550 0813
Fax +32 2 550 0966
Email isss@cenorm.be
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Revision History
v1.0-draft 22.09.00 submitted to CEN/ISSS WS/E-Sign Workshop
v1.0-final 16.11.00 for ballot by WS/E-Sign at Brussels meeting (11/00)
v1.0-EAL4+ 28.11.00 for submission to European Commission by EESSI
v1.01-EAL4+ 01.02.01 for ballot by WS/E-Sign at Brussels meeting (12/01)
v1.02-EAL4+ 14.02.01 for ballot by WS/E-Sign as decided at Brussels meeting.
V1.03-EAL4+ 15.06.01 Type2 PP extracted from SSCD approved by WS/E-Sign
ballot to comply with the request of the evaluator.
V1.04-EAL4+ 25.07.01 Type2 PP revised to comply with the request of the
evaluator.
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Table Of Contents
Revision History iv
Table Of Contents vi
List of Tables x
Conventions and Terminology 1
Conventions 1
Terminology 1
Document Organisation 3
1 Introduction 4
1.1 Identification 4
1.2 Protection Profile Overview 4
2 TOE Description 5
2.1 Secure Signature Creation Devices 5
2.2 Limits of the TOE 6
3 TOE Security Environment 10
3.1 Assumptions 11
3.2 Threats to Security 11
3.3 Organisational Security Policies 13
4 Security Objectives 14
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 14
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment 15
5 IT Security Requirements 17
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements 17
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS) 17
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) 17
5.1.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) 18
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP) 18
5.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) 18
5.1.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) 19
5.1.2.3 Export of user data without security attributes (FDP_ETC.1) 21
5.1.2.4 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) 22
5.1.2.5 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) 22
5.1.2.6 Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2) 23
5.1.2.7 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1) 23
5.1.2.8 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) 23
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) 24
5.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1) 24
5.1.3.2 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1) 24
5.1.3.3 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1) 24
5.1.3.4 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1) 24
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) 25
5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1) 25
5.1.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) 25
5.1.4.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2) 25
5.1.4.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) 25
5.1.4.5 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) 25
5.1.4.6 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) 25
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 26
5.1.5.1 Abstract machine testing (FPT_AMT.1) 26
5.1.5.2 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1) 26
5.1.5.3 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) 26
5.1.5.4 Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1) 26
5.1.5.5 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3) 27
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5.1.5.6 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1) 27
5.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP) 27
5.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) 27
5.1.6.2 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) 28
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements 29
5.2.1 Configuration management (ACM) 29
5.2.1.1 Partial CM automation (ACM_AUT.1) 29
5.2.1.2 Generation support and acceptance procedures (ACM_CAP.4) 29
5.2.1.3 Problem tracking CM coverage (ACM_SCP.2) 30
5.2.2 Delivery and operation (ADO) 31
5.2.2.1 Detection of modification (ADO_DEL.2) 31
5.2.2.2 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures (ADO_IGS.1) 31
5.2.3 Development (ADV) 31
5.2.3.1 Fully defined external interfaces (ADV_FSP.2) 31
5.2.3.2 Security enforcing high-level design (ADV_HLD.2) 32
5.2.3.3 Implementation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1) 32
5.2.3.4 Descriptive low-level design (ADV_LLD.1) 32
5.2.3.5 Informal correspondence demonstration (ADV_RCR.1) 33
5.2.3.6 Informal TOE security policy model (ADV_SPM.1) 33
5.2.4 Guidance documents (AGD) 34
5.2.4.1 Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM.1) 34
5.2.4.2 User guidance (AGD_USR.1) 34
5.2.5 Life cycle support (ALC) 35
5.2.5.1 Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1) 35
5.2.5.2 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1) 35
5.2.5.3 Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1) 35
5.2.6 Tests (ATE) 36
5.2.6.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2) 36
5.2.6.2 Testing: high-level design (ATE_DPT.1) 36
5.2.6.3 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1) 36
5.2.6.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.2) 37
5.2.7 Vulnerability assessment (AVA) 37
5.2.7.1 Analysis and testing for insecure states (AVA_MSU.3) 37
5.2.7.2 Strength of TOE security function evaluation (AVA_SOF.1) 37
5.2.7.3 Highly resistant (AVA_VLA.4) 38
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment 38
5.3.1 Signature key generation (SSCD Type1) 38
5.3.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) 38
5.3.1.2 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4) 39
5.3.1.3 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) 39
5.3.1.4 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) 39
5.3.1.5 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1) 39
5.3.1.6 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) 39
5.3.2 Certification generation application (CGA) 40
5.3.2.1 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2) 40
5.3.2.2 Cryptographic key access (FCS_CKM.3) 40
5.3.2.3 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) 40
5.3.2.4 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) 41
5.3.3 Signature creation application (SCA) 41
5.3.3.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) 41
5.3.3.2 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1) 41
5.3.3.3 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) 41
5.3.3.4 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1) 42
5.4 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment 42
6 Rationale 43
6.1 Introduction 43
6.2 Security Objectives Rationale 43
6.2.1 Security Objectives Coverage 43
6.2.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency 44
6.2.2.1 Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency 44
6.2.2.2 Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency 44
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6.2.2.3 Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency 46
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale 47
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage 47
6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency 50
6.3.2.1 TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency 50
6.3.2.2 TOE Enviroment Security Requirements Sufficiency 52
6.4 Dependency Rationale 53
6.4.1 Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies 53
6.4.2 Justification of Unsupported Dependencies 55
6.5 Security Requirements Grounding in Objectives 57
6.6 Rationale for Extensions 58
6.6.1 FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation 58
6.7 Rationale for Strength of Function High 59
6.8 Rationale for Assurance Level 4 Augmented 59
References 61
Appendix A - Acronyms 61
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List of Tables
Table 5.1 Assurance Requirements: EAL(4) 29
Table 6.1 : Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping 43
Table 6.2 : Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objective Mapping 47
Table 6.3: IT Environment Functional requirement to Environment Security Objective Mapping 49
Table 6.4 : Assurance Requirement to Security Objective Mapping 49
Table 6.5 Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies 53
Table 6.6: Assurance and Functional Requirement to Security Objective Mapping 57
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Conventions and Terminology
Conventions
The document follows the rules and conventions laid out in Common Criteria 2.1, part 1 [2],
Annex B “Specification of Protection Profiles”. Admissible algorithms and parameters for
algorithms for secure signature-creation devices (SSCD) are given in a separate document [5].
Therefore, the Protection Profile (PP) refers to [5].
Terminology
Administrator means an user that performs TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation, or other
TOE administrative functions.
Advanced electronic signature (defined in the Directive [1], article 2.2) means an electronic
signature which meets the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent
change of the data is detectable.
Authentication data is information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
CEN workshop agreement (CWA) is a consensus-based specification, drawn up in an open
workshop environment of the European Committee for Standardization (CEN). This Protection
Profile (PP) represents Annex A to the CWA that has been developed by the European
Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative (EESSI) CEN/ISSS electronic signature (E-SIGN)
workshop, Area F on secure signature-creation devices (SSCD).
Certificate means an electronic attestation which links the SVD to a person and confirms the
identity of that person. (defined in the Directive [1], article 2.9)
Certification generation application (CGA) means a collection of application elements which
requests the SVD from the SSCD for generation of the qualified certificate. The CGA stipulates
the generation of a correspondent SCD / SVD pair by the SSCD, if the requested SVD has not
been generated by the SSCD yet. The CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD by means of
(a) the SSCD proof of correspondence between SCD and SVD and
(b) checking the sender and integrity of the received SVD.
Certification-service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal or natural person who issues
certificates or provides other services related to electronic signatures. (defined in the Directive
[1], article 2.11)
Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data to be signed (including both
user message and signature attributes).
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Data to be signed representation (DTBS-representation) means the data sent by the SCA to
the TOE for signing and is
(a) a hash-value of the DTBS or
(b) an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS and a remaining part of the
DTBS or
(c) the DTBS.
The SCA indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS-representation, unless implicitly indicated. The
hash-value in case (a) or the intermediate hash-value in case (b) is calculated by the SCA. The
final hash-value in case (b) or the hash-value in case (c) is calculated by the TOE.
Directive The Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of
13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [1] is also referred to
as the ‘Directive’ in the remainder of the PP.
Qualified certificate means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of
the Directive [1] and is provided by a CSP who fulfils the requirements laid down in Annex II of
the Directive [1]. (defined in the Directive [1], article 2.10)
Qualified electronic signature means an advanced signature which is based on a qualified
certificate and which is created by a SSCD according to the Directive [1], article 5, paragraph 1.
Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently stored by the TOE for
verification of the authentication attempt as authorised user.
Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured software or hardware which is
used to implement the SCD and which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III of the
Directive [1]. (SSCD is defined in the Directive [1], article 2.5 and 2.6).
Signatory means a person who holds a SSCD and acts either on his own behalf or on behalf of
the natural or legal person or entity he represents. (defined in the Directive [1], article 2.3)
Signature attributes means additional information that is signed together with the user
message.
Signature-creation application (SCA) means the application used to create an electronic
signature, excluding the SSCD. I.e., the SCA is a collection of application elements
(a) to perform the presentation of the DTBS to the signatory prior to the signature
process according to the signatory's decision,
(b) to send a DTBS-representation to the TOE, if the signatory indicates by specific non-
misinterpretable input or action the intend to sign,
(c) to attach the qualified electronic signature generated by the TOE to the data or
provides the qualified electronic signature as separate data.
Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic
keys, which are used by the signatory to create an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive
[1], article 2.4)
Signature-creation system (SCS) means the overall system that creates an electronic
signature. The signature-creation system consists of the SCA and the SSCD.
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Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes or public cryptographic keys,
which are used for the purpose of verifying an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive [1],
article 2.7)
Signed data object (SDO) means the electronic data to which the electronic signature has
been attached to or logically associated with as a method of authentication.
SSCD provision service means a service that prepares and provides a SSCD to subscribers.
User means any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication data provided as input by
knowledge or authentication data derived from user’s biometric characteristics.
Document Organisation
Section 1 provides the introductory material for the Protection Profile.
Section 2 provides general purpose and TOE description.
Section 3 provides a discussion of the expected environment for the TOE. This section also
defines the set of threats that are to be addressed by either the technical countermeasures
implemented in the TOE hardware, the TOE software, or through the environmental controls.
Section 4 defines the security objectives for both the TOE and the TOE environment.
Section 5 contains the functional requirements and assurance requirements derived from the
Common Criteria (CC), Part 2 [3] and Part 3 [4], that must be satisfied by the TOE.
Section 6 provides a rationale to explicitly demonstrate that the information technology security
objectives satisfy the policies and threats. Arguments are provided for the coverage of each
policy and threat. The section then explains how the set of requirements are complete relative
to the objectives, and that each security objective is addressed by one or more component
requirements. Arguments are provided for the coverage of each objective. Next section 6
provides a set of arguments that address dependency analysis, strength of function issues, and
the internal consistency and mutual supportiveness of the protection profile requirements
A reference section is provided to identify background material.
An acronym list is provided to define frequently used acronyms.
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1 Introduction
This section provides document management and overview information that is required to carry
out protection profile registry. Therefore, section 1.1 “Identification” gives labelling and
descriptive information necessary for registering the Protection Profile (PP). Section 1.2
“Protection Profile Overview” summarises the PP in narrative form. As such, the section gives
an overview to the potential user to decide whether the PP is of interest. It is usable as
stand-alone abstract in PP catalogues and registers.
1.1 Identification
Title: Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type2
Authors: Wolfgang Killmann, Herbert Leitold, Reinhard Posch, Patrick Sallé, Bruno
Baronnet
Vetting Status:
CC Version: 2.1 Final
General Status: Final Ballot Draft
Version Number: 1.04
Registration:
Keywords: secure signature-creation device, electronic signature
1.2 Protection Profile Overview
This Protection Profile (PP) is established by CEN/ISSS for use by the European Commission in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 9 of the Directive 1999/93/ec of the
European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures [1], also referred to as the ‘Directive’ in the remainder of the PP, as
generally recognised standard for electronic-signature products in the Official Journal of the
European Communities.
The intent of this Protection Profile is to specify functional and assurance requirements defined
in the Directive [1], Annex III for secure signature-creation devices (SSCD) which is the target of
evaluation (TOE). Member States shall presume that there is compliance with the requirements
laid down in Annex III of the Directive [1] when an electronic signature product is evaluated to a
Security Target (ST) that is compliant with this Protection Profile.
The Protection Profile defines the security requirements of a SSCD for the generation of
signature-creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic signatures. The TOE may
implement additional functions and security requirements e.g. for editing and displaying the data
to be signed (DTBS), but these additional functions and security requirements are not subject of
this Protection Profile.
The assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented. The minimum strength level for the TOE
security functions is 'SOF high' (Strength of Functions High).
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2 TOE Description
2.1 Secure Signature Creation Devices
The present document assumes a well defined process signature-creation to take place. The
present chapter defines three possible SSCD implementations, referred to as ‘SSCD types’, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
The left part of Figure 1 shows two SSCD components: A SSCD of Type 1 representing the
SCD/SVD generation component, and a SSCD of Type 2 representing the SCD storage and
signature-creation component. The SCD generated on a SSCD Type 1 shall be exported to a
SSCD Type 2 over a trusted channel. The right part of Figure 1 shows a SSCD Type 3 which is
analogous to a combination of Type 1 and Type 2, but no transfer of the SCD between two
devices is provided.
If the SSCD holds the SVD and exports the SVD to a CGA for certification, a trusted channel is
to be provided. The CGA initiates SCD/SVD generation (“Init.”) and the SSCD exports the SVD
for generation of the corresponding certificate (“SVD into cert.”).
The signatory must be authenticated to create signatures that he sends his authentication data
(e.g., a PIN) to the SSCD Type 2 or Type 3 (e.g., a smart card). If the human interface (HI) for
such signatory authentication is not provided by the SSCD, a trusted path (e.g., a encrypted
channel) between the SSCD and the SCA implementing to HI is to be provided. The data to be
signed (DTBS) representation (i.e., the DTBS itself, a hash value of the DTBS, or a pre-hashed
value of the DTBS) shall be transferred by the SCA to the SSCD only over a trusted channel.
The same shall apply to the signed data object (SDO) returned from a SSCD to the SCA.
SSCD Type 1 is not a personalized component in the sense that it may be used by a specific
user only, but the SCD/SVD generation and export shall be initiated by authorized persons only
(e.g., system administrator).
SSCD Type 2 and Type 3 are personalized components which means that they can be used for
signature creation by one specific user – the signatory - only.
Type 2 and Type 3 are not necessarily to be considered mutually exclusive.
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HI
Authentication data
User
Authentication
SCD Import
Personalisation
Signature-Creation
SSCD Type 2
SCD Export
SVD Export
SCD/SVD Generation
SSCD Type 1
Trusted
channel
Trusted
channel **
Trusted
channel
CGA
Init. / SVD into cert.
CGA **
SVD into cert.
HI
A
uthentication data
SCA
DTBS-representation
SDO
SCA
DTBS-representation
SDO
CGA
Init. / SVD into cert.
User
Authentication
Personalisation
Signature-Creation
SSCD Type 3
SVD Export
SCD/SVD Generation
Trusted
channel
Trusted
channel
Trusted
Path*
Trusted
Channel
Trusted
Path*
* The trusted path for user authentication will be required if the HI is not provided by the TOE itself
(e. g., it is provided by a SCA outside the SSCD)
** The trusted channel between the SSCD Type 2 and the CGA is required for cases where
the SSCD type 2 holds the SVD and export of the SVD to the CGA for certification is provided.
Figure 1: SSCD types and modes of operation
2.2 Limits of the TOE
The TOE is a secure signature-creation device (SSCD Type2) according to Directive
1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures [1]. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory
before the TOE loads a new pair SCD/SVD.
A SSCD is configured software or hardware used to implement the signature-creation data
(SCD).
The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in creating qualified
electronic signatures:
(a) after allowing for the data to be signed (DTBS) to be displayed correctly where
the display function may either be provided by the TOE itself or by appropriate
environment
(b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [5], agreed as suitable
for qualified electronic signatures
(c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE.
(d) using appropriate cryptographic signature function that employ appropriate
cryptographic parameters agreed as suitable according to [5].
The generation of the SCD/SVD pair by means of a SSCD Type 1 requires the export the SCD
into the TOE (Type 2). Vice versa, signature generation by means of the TOE (Type2) requires
that the SCD/SVD pair has been generated by and imported from a SSCD Type 1.
Consequently, there is an interdependence where a SSCD Type 1 constitutes the environment
of the TOE,
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The TOE implements all IT security functionality which are necessary to ensure the secrecy of
the SCD. To prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD the TOE provides user authentication
and access control. The TOE may provide an interface for user authentication by its own or
implements IT measures to support a trusted path to a trusted human interface device.
In addition to the functions of the SSCD, the TOE may implement the signature-creation
application (SCA). The SCA presents the data to be signed (DTBS) to the signatory and
prepares the DTBS-representation the signatory wishes to sign for performing the cryptographic
function of the signature. But this PP assumes the SCA as environment of the TOE because the
PP describes the SCD-related security objectives and requirements, whereas the SCA does not
implement the SCD. If a SSCD implements a SCA than it will fulfil the security objective and
requirements for the TOE, as well as for the SCA as specific TOE environment in the actual PP.
The SSCD protects the SCD during the whole life cycle as to be solely used in the signature-
creation process by the legitimate signatory. The SSCD of Type 1 generates signatory's SCD
and exports it into a TOE of Type 2 in a secure manner. The TOE of Type 2 will be initialised for
the signatory's use by
(1) import of the SCD
(2) personalisation for the signatory by means of the signatory’s verification
authentication data (VAD).
The SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD will be included in the certificate of the signatory
by the certificate-service-provider (CSP). The TOE will destroy the SCD if the SCD is no longer
used for signature generation.
The TOE allows to implement a human interface for user authentication:
(i) by the TOE itself or
(ii) by a trusted human interface device connected via a trusted channel with the TOE.
The human interface device is used for the input of VAD for authentication by knowledge or for
the generation of VAD for authentication by biometric characteristics. The TOE holds RAD to
check the provided VAD. The human interface implies appropriate hardware. The second
approach allows to reduce the TOE hardware to a minimum e. g. a smart card.
Figure 2 shows the PP scope from the structural perspective. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE,
comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the SCD/SVD generation, SCD
storage and use, and signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the CGA (and possibly
other applications) are part of the immediate environment of the TOE. They shall communicate
with the TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted path for the human interface provided by the
SCA, respectively.
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Other
applications
CGA
SSCD
Hardware
SCD storage
and use
SCD/SVD
generation
Signature
creation
Operating system
Immediate
environment
Network
interface
Human interface I/O
Trusted
Channel
SCA
Trusted
Channel
Trusted
path
Figure 2: Scope of the SSCD, structural view
The TOE life cycle is shown in Figure 3. Basically, it consists of a development phase and the
operational phase. This document refers to the operational phase which starts with
personalisation including SCD import. This phase represents installation, generation, and start-
up in the CC terminology. The main functionality in the usage phase is signature-creation
including all supporting functionality (e.g., SCD storage and SCD use). The life cycle ends with
the destruction of the SSCD.
Application
design
OS design
HW design
SSCD destruction
Signature-creation
SCD import
HW fabrication
OS and application implementation
Loading of general application data
Design
Fabrication
Initialisation
Personalisation
Usage
Destruction
Development
phase
Operational
phase
Figure 3. SSCD life cycle
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Application note: Scope of SSCD PP application
This SSCD PP refers to qualified certificates as electronic attestation of the SVD corresponding
to the signatory's SCD that is implemented by the TOE.
While the main application scenario of a SSCD will assume a qualified certificate to be used in
combination with a SSCD, there still is a large benefit in the security when such SSCD is
applied in other areas and such application is encouraged. The SSCD PP may as well be
applied to environments where the certificates expressed as 'qualified certificates' in the SSCD
PP do not fulfil the requirements laid down in Annex I and Annex II of the Directive [1].
With this respect the notion of qualified certificates in the PP refers to the fact that when an
instance of a SSCD is used with a qualified certificate, such use is from the technical point of
view eligible for an electronic signature as referred to in Directive [1], article 5, paragraph 1. As
a consequence, this standard does not prevent a device itself from being regarded as a SSCD,
even when used together with a non-qualified certificate.
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3 TOE Security Environment
Assets:
1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation(confidentiality of the
SCD must be maintained).
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform an electronic signature
verification(integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained).
3. DTBS and DTBS-representation: set of data, or its representation which is intended to
be signed (Their integrity must be maintained).
4. VAD: PIN code or biometrics data entered by the End User to perform a signature
operation (confidentiality and authenticity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed)
5. RAD: Reference PIN code or biometrics authentication reference used to identify and
authenticate the End User (integrity and confidentiality of RAD must be maintained)
6. Signature-creation function of the SSCD using the SCD: (The quality of the function
must be maintained so that it can participate to the legal validity of electronic signatures)
7. Electronic signature: (Unforgeabilty of electronic signatures must be assured).
Subjects
Subject
Definition
S.User
End user of the TOE which can be identified as S.Admin or S.Signatory
S.Admin
User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or
other TOE administrative functions.
S.Signatory
User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf of the
natural or legal person or entity he represents.
Threat agents
S.OFFCARD
Attacker. A human or a process acting on his behalf being located outside the
TOE. The main goal of the S.OFFCARD attacker is to access Application sensitive
information. The attacker has a high level potential attack and knows no secret.
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3.1 Assumptions
A.CGA Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified
certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP.
A.SCA Trustworthy signature-creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the
DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by
the TOE.
A.SCD_Generate Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation
If a party other than the signatory generates the SCD/SVD-pair of a signatory, then
(a) this party will use a SSCD for SCD/SVD-generation,
(b) confidentiality of the SCD will be guaranteed until the SCD is under the sole control of the
signatory and
(c) the SCD will not be used for signature-creation until the SCD is under the sole control of the
signatory.
(d) The generation of the SCD/SVD is invoked by authorised users only
(e) The SSCD Type1 ensures the authenticity of the SVD it has created an exported
3.2 Threats to Security
T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary
security compromises. This threat addresses all the assets.
T.SCD_Divulg Storing ,copying, and releasing of the signature-creation
data
An attacker can store, copy the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can release the SCD during
generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature-creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or
signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data communicated outside the TOE,
which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
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T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature created
by the TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the
signatory or by third parties. The signature generated by the TOE is subject to deliberate
attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security
principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
T.Sig_Repud Repudiation of signatures
If an attacker can successfully threaten any of the assets, then the non repudation of the
electronic signature is compromised.
The signatory is able to deny having signed data using the SCD in the TOE under his control
even if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his un-revoked
certificate.
T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature-verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the TOE. This result in loss of SVD integrity in the
certificate of the signatory.
T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS-representation
An attacker modifies the DTBS-representation sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS-representation
used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intends to sign.
T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the
signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts
employed by the TOE.
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3.3 Organisational Security Policies
P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by
the SSCD. The qualified certificates contains at least the elements defined in Annex I of the
Directive, i.e., inter alia the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented
in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE is
evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information.
P.QSign Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with qualified electronic signatures.
The DTBS are presented to the signatory by the SCA. The qualified electronic signature is
based on a qualified certificate and is created by a SSCD.
P.Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature-creation device
The TOE stores the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory . The
SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once.
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4 Security Objectives
This section identifies and defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment.
Security objectives reflect the stated intent and counter the identified threats, as well as comply
with the identified organisational security policies and assumptions.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
Design and build the TOE in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations
within specified limits.
OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The
TOE shall provide safe destruction techniques for the SCD in case of re-import.
OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature-creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) is reasonably assured against attacks
with a high attack potential.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The TOE shall
verify on demand the correspondence between the SCD stored in the TOE and the SVD if it has
been sent to the TOE.
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD
The TOE provides means to enable the CGA to verify the authenticity SVD that has been
exported by that TOE.
OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
The TOE provides system features that detect physical tampering of a system component, and
use those features to limit security breaches.
OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
The TOE prevents or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
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OT.SCD_Transfer Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD
The TOE shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred between SSCDs.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity
The TOE shall verify that the DTBS-representation received from the SCA has not been altered
in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE itself shall ensure that the DTBS-
representation is not altered by the TOE as well. Note, that this does not conflict with the
signature-creation process where the DTBS itself could be hashed by the TOE.
OT.Sigy_SigF Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory
only
The TOE provides the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only and
protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack
potential.
OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE generates electronic signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD
through robust encryption techniques. The SCD cannot be reconstructed using the electronic
signatures. The electronic signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when
executed with a high attack potential.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The SSVD
Type1 shall verify the correspondence between the SCD sent to the TOE and the SVD sent to
the CGA or TOE.
OE.SCD_Transfer Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred to the TOE. The SSCD
Type1 shall prevent the export of a SCD that already has been used for signature generation by
the SSCD Type2. The SCD shall be deleted from the SSCD Type1 whenever it is exported into
the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified
electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and
cannot be reconstructed from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the
probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.
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OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA generates qualified certificates which include inter alia
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the
signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD
The CGA verifies that the SSCD is the sender of the received SVD and the integrity of the
received SVD. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the
signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
OE.HI_VAD Protection of the VAD
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device will
ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method
employed.
OE.SCA_Data_Intend Data intended to be signed
The SCA
(a) generates the DTBS-representation of the data that has been presented as DTBS
and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by
the TOE,
(b) sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of
the DTBS-representation by the TOE
(c) attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
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5 IT Security Requirements
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance
requirements for the TOE and the environment.
Security functional requirements components given in section 5.1 “TOE security functional
requirements”, excepting FPT_EMSEC.1 which is explicitly stated, are drawn from Common
Criteria part 2 [3]. Some security functional requirements represent extensions to [3].
Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made. Operations not
performed in this PP are identified in order to enable instantiation of the PP to a Security Target
(ST).
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 5.2 “TOE Security
Assurance Requirement” is drawn from the security assurance components from Common
Criteria part 3 [4].
Section 5.3 identifies the IT security requirements that are to be met by the IT environment of
the TOE.
The non-IT environment is described in section 5.4.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of re-importation of
the SCD in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that
meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
Application notes:
The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed on demand of the Signatory or Administrator.
The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD is re-imported into the TOE.
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5.1.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1/
CORRESP
The TSF shall perform SCD / SVD correspondence verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIGNING
The TSF shall perform digital signature-generation in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: List of approved algorithms and
parameters.
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SVD Transfer SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on import and on export
of SVD by User.
Application note:
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE is to import the SVD from a
SSCD Type1 so it will be exported to the CGA for certification.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD Import SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP on import of SCD by User.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Personalisation SFP on creation of RAD by
Administrator.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
Signature-creation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP on
1. sending of DTBS-representation by SCA,
2. signing of DTBS-representation by Signatory.
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5.1.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The security attributes for the user, TOE components and related status are
User, subject or object the
attribute is associated with
Attribute Status
General attribute
User Role Administrator, Signatory
Initialisation attribute group
User SCD / SVD management authorised, not authorised
SCD secure SCD import allowed no, yes
Signature-creation attribute group
SCD SCD operational no, yes
DTBS sent by an authorised SCA no, yes
SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SVD Transfer SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on
General attribute.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SVD Transfer SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or to
“Signatory” is allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SVD Transfer SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SVD Transfer SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: none.
Application note:
FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE holds the SVD and the SVD is
exported to the CGA for certification.
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SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
SCD Import SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on
General attribute and Initialisation attribute group.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
SCD Import SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or to
“Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management”
set to “authorised” is allowed to import SCD if the security attribute
“secure SCD import allowed” is set to “yes”.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
SCD Import SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
SCD Import SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
(a) The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or
to “Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to import SCD
if the security attribute “secure SCD import allowed” is set to “yes”.
(b) The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or
to “Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
management” set to “authorised” is not allowed to import SCD if
the security attribute “secure SCD import allowed” is set to “no”.
Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Personalisation SFP to objects based on
General attribute.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” is allowed
to create the RAD.
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FDP_ACF.1.3/
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: none.
Signature-creation SFP
FDP_ACF.1.1/
Signature-creation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to objects based on
General attribute and Signature-creation attribute group.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
Signature-creation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is allowed to
create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by an authorised SCA with
SCD by the Signatory which security attribute “SCD operational” is set
to “yes”.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
Signature-creation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
Signature-creation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
(a) User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is not
allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS which is not sent
by an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security
attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”.
(b) User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is not
allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by an
authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security attribute
“SCD operational” is set to “no”.
5.1.2.3 Export of user data without security attributes (FDP_ETC.1)
FDP_ETC.1.1/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP when exporting user
data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TSC.
FDP_ETC.1.2/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall export the user data without the user data's
associated security attributes.
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Application note:
FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE holds the SVD and the SVD is
exported to the CGA for certification.
5.1.2.4 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
FDP_ITC.1.1/SCD The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2/SCD The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user
data when imported from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3/SCD The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: SCD shall be sent by
an authorised SSCD.
Application note:
A SSCD of Type 1 is authorised to send SCD to a SSCD of Type 2, if it is designated to
generate the SCD for this SSCD of Type 2 and to export the SCD for import into this SSCD of
Type 2. Authorised SSCD of Type 1 are able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD of
Type 2 for SCD transfer as required by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD export.
FDP_ITC.1.1/DTBS The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP when importing
user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2/DTBS The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user
data when imported from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3/DTBS The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: DTBS-representation
shall be sent by an authorised SCA.
Application note:
A SCA is authorised to send the DTBS-representation if it is actually used by the Signatory to
create an electronic signature and able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD as required
by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCA DTBS.
5.1.2.5 Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource
from the following objects: SCD, VAD, RAD.
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5.1.2.6 Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity checked
persistent stored data":
1. SCD
2. RAD
3. SVD (if persistent stored by TOE).
FDP_SDI.2.1/
Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for integrity
error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
persistent stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/
Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the Signatory about integrity error.
The DTBS-representation temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity
checked stored data":
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for integrity
error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked
stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the Signatory about integrity error.
5.1.2.7 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1.1/ Receiver The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to be able to receive
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
5.1.2.8 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
SVD Transfer SFP will be required only if the TOE holds the SVD and the SVD is exported to
the CGA for certification.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to be able to transmit
user data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification and insertion has occurred.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
TOE DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to be able to
receive the DTBS-representation in a manner protected from
modification, deletion and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
TOE DTBS
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion and insertion has occurred.
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5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [assignment: number] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed
authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met or surpassed, the TSF shall block RAD.
5.1.3.2 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: RAD.
5.1.3.3 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [
1. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
2. Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD of
Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD import.
3. Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
4. Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import.]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
“Local user” mentioned in component FIA_UAU.1.1 is the user using the trusted path provided
between the SGA in the TOE environment and the TOE as indicated by FTP_TRP.1/SCA and
FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
5.1.3.4 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD of
Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD import.
2. Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
3. Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import.]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
5.1.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the signature-creation
function to Signatory.
5.1.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Administrator
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to restrict the ability to
modify [assignment: other operations] the security attributes SCD /
SVD management, and secure SCD import allowed to Administrator.
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Signatory
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the ability
to modify the security attributes SCD operational to Signatory.
5.1.4.3 Secure security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
security attributes.
5.1.4.4 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP and Signature-creation
SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are
used to enforce the SFP.
Refinement
The security attribute of the SCD “SCD operational” is set to “no” after import of the SCD.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the Administrator to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
5.1.4.5 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [assignment: other
operations] the RAD to Signatory.
5.1.4.6 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles Administrator and Signatory.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.5.1 Abstract machine testing (FPT_AMT.1)
FPT_AMT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of an authorised
user, other conditions] to demonstrate the correct operation of the
security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies
the TSF.
5.1.5.2 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to RAD and SCD.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access
to RAD and SCD.
Application note:
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based
on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the
interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin by an
attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of
measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the
TOE. Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the power consumption, the timing
of transitions of internal states, electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio
emission.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations,
evaluation against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE
is assumed. Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc.
5.1.5.3 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].
5.1.5.4 Passive detection of physical attack (FPT_PHP.1)
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
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5.1.5.5 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding
automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
5.1.5.6 TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial
start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of
the authorised user, at the conditions ][assignment: conditions
under which self test should occur] to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
5.1.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SCD Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SCD Import
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT
product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SCD Import
The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via
the trusted channel for SCD import.
Refinement: The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD of type 1.
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SVD Transfer
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT
product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SVD Transfer
The TSF or the trusted IT shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for transfer of SVD.
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Refinement: The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD of type 1.for SVD import and
the CGA for the SVD export.
Application note:
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer will be required only, if the TOE is to import the SVD from a SSCD
Type1 so it will be exported to the CGA for certification.
FTP_ITC.1.1/
DTBS Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
DTBS Import
The TSF shall permit SCA to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
DTBS Import
The TSF or the SCA shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for signing DTBS-representation.
5.1.6.2 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1)
The trusted path between the TOE and the SCA will be required only if the human interface for
user authentication is not provided by the TOE itself but by the SCA.
FTP_TRP.1.1/
TOE
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and
local users that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2/
TOE
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/
TOE
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection:
initial user authentication] [assignment: other services for which
trusted path is required].
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5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Table 5.1 Assurance Requirements: EAL(4)
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ACM ACM_AUT.1 ACM_CAP.4 ACM_SCP.2
ADO ADO_DEL.2 ADO_IGS.1
ADV
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_HLD.2 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_LLD.1 ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1
AGD AGD_ADM.1 AGD_USR.1
ALC ALC_DVS.1 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_MSU.3 AVA_SOF.1 AVA_VLA.4
5.2.1 Configuration management (ACM)
5.2.1.1 Partial CM automation (ACM_AUT.1)
ACM_AUT.1.1D The developer shall use a CM system.
ACM_AUT.1.2D The developer shall provide a CM plan.
ACM_AUT.1.1C The CM system shall provide an automated means by which only
authorised changes are made to the TOE implementation
representation.
ACM_AUT.1.2C The CM system shall provide an automated means to support the
generation of the TOE.
ACM_AUT.1.3C The CM plan shall describe the automated tools used in the CM
system.
ACM_AUT.1.4C The CM plan shall describe how the automated tools are used in
the CM system.
5.2.1.2 Generation support and acceptance procedures (ACM_CAP.4)
ACM_CAP.4.1D The developer shall provide a reference for the TOE.
ACM_CAP.4.2D The developer shall use a CM system.
ACM_CAP.4.3D The developer shall provide CM documentation.
ACM_CAP.4.1C The reference for the TOE shall be unique to each version of the
TOE.
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ACM_CAP.4.2C The TOE shall be labelled with its reference.
ACM_CAP.4.3C The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a CM
plan, and an acceptance plan.
ACM_CAP.4.4C The configuration list shall describe the configuration items that
comprise the TOE.
ACM_CAP.4.5C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to
uniquely identify the configuration items.
ACM_CAP.4.6C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ACM_CAP.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used.
ACM_CAP.4.8C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is operating
in accordance with the CM plan.
ACM_CAP.4.9C The CM documentation shall provide evidence that all
configuration items have been and are being effectively
maintained under the CM system.
ACM_CAP.4.10C The CM system shall provide measures such that only authorised
changes are made to the configuration items.
ACM_CAP.4.11C The CM system shall support the generation of the TOE.
ACM_CAP.4.12C The acceptance plan shall describe the procedures used to
accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of
the TOE.
5.2.1.3 Problem tracking CM coverage (ACM_SCP.2)
ACM_SCP.2.1D The developer shall provide CM documentation.
ACM_SCP.2.1C The CM documentation shall show that the CM system, as a
minimum, tracks the following: the TOE implementation
representation, design documentation, test documentation, user
documentation, administrator documentation, CM documentation,
and security flaws.
ACM_SCP.2.2C The CM documentation shall describe how configuration items
are tracked by the CM system.
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5.2.2 Delivery and operation (ADO)
5.2.2.1 Detection of modification (ADO_DEL.2)
ADO_DEL.2.1D The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE
or parts of it to the user.
ADO_DEL.2.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ADO_DEL.2.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are
necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the
TOE to a user's site.
ADO_DEL.2.2C The delivery documentation shall describe how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of
modifications, or any discrepancy between the developer's
master copy and the version received at the user site.
ADO_DEL.2.3C The delivery documentation shall describe how the various
procedures allow detection of attempts to masquerade as the
developer, even in cases in which the developer has sent nothing
to the user's site.
5.2.2.2 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures (ADO_IGS.1)
ADO_IGS.1.1C The documentation shall describe the steps necessary for secure
installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.
ADO_IGS.1.1D The developer shall document procedures necessary for the
secure installation, generation, and start-up of the TOE.
5.2.3 Development (ADV)
5.2.3.1 Fully defined external interfaces (ADV_FSP.2)
ADV_FSP.2.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.2.1C The functional specification shall describe the TSF and its external
interfaces using an informal style.
ADV_FSP.2.2C The functional specification shall be internally consistent.
ADV_FSP.2.3C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method
of use of all external TSF interfaces, providing complete details of
all effects, exceptions and error messages.
ADV_FSP.2.4C The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.2.5C The functional specification shall include rationale that the TSF is
completely represented.
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5.2.3.2 Security enforcing high-level design (ADV_HLD.2)
ADV_HLD.2.1D The developer shall provide the high-level design of the TSF.
ADV_HLD.2.1C The presentation of the high-level design shall be informal.
ADV_HLD.2.2C The high-level design shall be internally consistent.
ADV_HLD.2.3C The high-level design shall describe the structure of the TSF in
terms of subsystems.
ADV_HLD.2.4C The high-level design shall describe the security functionality
provided by each subsystem of the TSF.
ADV_HLD.2.5C The high-level design shall identify any underlying hardware,
firmware, and/or software required by the TSF with a presentation
of the functions provided by the supporting protection mechanisms
implemented in that hardware, firmware, or software.
ADV_HLD.2.6C The high-level design shall identify all interfaces to the subsystems
of the TSF.
ADV_HLD.2.7C The high-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the
subsystems of the TSF are externally visible.
ADV_HLD.2.8C The high-level design shall describe the purpose and method of
use of all interfaces to the subsystems of the TSF, providing
details of effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.
ADV_HLD.2.9C The high-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into
TSP-enforcing and other subsystems.
5.2.3.3 Implementation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1)
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall provide the implementation representation for
a selected subset of the TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.1C The implementation representation shall unambiguously define the
TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can be generated without
further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2C The implementation representation shall be internally consistent.
5.2.3.4 Descriptive low-level design (ADV_LLD.1)
ADV_LLD.1.1D The developer shall provide the low-level design of the TSF.
ADV_LLD.1.1C The presentation of the low-level design shall be informal.
ADV_LLD.1.2C The low-level design shall be internally consistent.
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ADV_LLD.1.3C The low-level design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules.
ADV_LLD.1.4C The low-level design shall describe the purpose of each module.
ADV_LLD.1.5C The low-level design shall define the interrelationships between
the modules in terms of provided security functionality and
dependencies on other modules.
ADV_LLD.1.6C The low-level design shall describe how each TSP-enforcing
function is provided.
ADV_LLD.1.7C The low-level design shall identify all interfaces to the modules of
the TSF.
ADV_LLD.1.8C The low-level design shall identify which of the interfaces to the
modules of the TSF are externally visible.
ADV_LLD.1.9C The low-level design shall describe the purpose and method of use
of all interfaces to the modules of the TSF, providing details of
effects, exceptions and error messages, as appropriate.
ADV_LLD.1.10C The low-level design shall describe the separation of the TOE into
TSP-enforcing and other modules.
5.2.3.5 Informal correspondence demonstration (ADV_RCR.1)
ADV_RCR.1.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of correspondence
between all adjacent pairs of TSF representations that are
provided.
ADV_RCR.1.1C For each adjacent pair of provided TSF representations, the
analysis shall demonstrate that all relevant security functionality of
the more abstract TSF representation is correctly and completely
refined in the less abstract TSF representation.
5.2.3.6 Informal TOE security policy model (ADV_SPM.1)
ADV_SPM.1.1D The developer shall provide a TSP model.
ADV_SPM.1.1C The TSP model shall be informal.
ADV_SPM.1.2C The TSP model shall describe the rules and characteristics of all
policies of the TSP that can be modeled.
ADV_SPM.1.2D The developer shall demonstrate correspondence between the
functional specification and the TSP model.
ADV_SPM.1.3C The TSP model shall include a rationale that demonstrates that it
is consistent and complete with respect to all policies of the TSP
that can be modeled.
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ADV_SPM.1.4C The demonstration of correspondence between the TSP model
and the functional specification shall show that all of the security
functions in the functional specification are consistent and
complete with respect to the TSP model.
5.2.4 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.4.1 Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM.1)
AGD_ADM.1.1D The developer shall provide administrator guidance addressed to
system administrative personnel.
AGD_ADM.1.1C The administrator guidance shall describe the administrative
functions and interfaces available to the administrator of the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.2C The administrator guidance shall describe how to administer the
TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_ADM.1.3C The administrator guidance shall contain warnings about functions
and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing
environment.
AGD_ADM.1.4C The administrator guidance shall describe all assumptions
regarding user behaviour that are relevant to secure operation of
the TOE.
AGD_ADM.1.5C The administrator guidance shall describe all security parameters
under the control of the administrator, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
AGD_ADM.1.6C The administrator guidance shall describe each type of security-
relevant event relative to the administrative functions that need to
be performed, including changing the security characteristics of
entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_ADM.1.7C The administrator guidance shall be consistent with all other
documentation supplied for evaluation.
AGD_ADM.1.8C The administrator guidance shall describe all security requirements
for the IT environment that are relevant to the administrator.
5.2.4.2 User guidance (AGD_USR.1)
AGD_USR.1.1D The developer shall provide user guidance.
AGD_USR.1.1C The user guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces
available to the non-administrative users of the TOE.
AGD_USR.1.2C The user guidance shall describe the use of user-accessible
security functions provided by the TOE.
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AGD_USR.1.3C The user guidance shall contain warnings about user-accessible
functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment.
AGD_USR.1.4C The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities
necessary for secure operation of the TOE, including those related
to assumptions regarding user behaviour found in the statement of
TOE security environment.
AGD_USR.1.5C The user guidance shall be consistent with all other documentation
supplied for evaluation.
AGD_USR.1.6C The user guidance shall describe all security requirements for the
IT environment that are relevant to the user.
5.2.5 Life cycle support (ALC)
5.2.5.1 Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1)
ALC_DVS.1.1D The developer shall produce development security documentation.
ALC_DVS.1.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the
physical, procedural, personnel, and other security measures that
are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
design and implementation in its development environment.
ALC_DVS.1.2C The development security documentation shall provide evidence
that these security measures are followed during the development
and maintenance of the TOE.
5.2.5.2 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model
used to develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over
the development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
5.2.5.3 Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1)
ALC_TAT.1.1C All development tools used for implementation shall be well-
defined.
ALC_TAT.1.1D The developer shall identify the development tools being used for
the TOE.
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ALC_TAT.1.2C The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously
define the meaning of all statements used in the implementation.
ALC_TAT.1.2D The developer shall document the selected implementation-
dependent options of the development tools.
ALC_TAT.1.3C The documentation of the development tools shall unambiguously
define the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
5.2.6 Tests (ATE)
5.2.6.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2)
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the
correspondence between the tests identified in the test
documentation and the TSF as described in the functional
specification.
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that the
correspondence between the TSF as described in the functional
specification and the tests identified in the test documentation is
complete.
5.2.6.2 Testing: high-level design (ATE_DPT.1)
ATE_DPT.1.1C The depth analysis shall demonstrate that the tests identified in the
test documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF
operates in accordance with its high-level design.
ATE_DPT.1.1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
5.2.6.3 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1)
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, test procedure
descriptions, expected test results and actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the security functions to be tested and
describe the goal of the tests to be performed.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The test procedure descriptions shall identify the tests to be
performed and describe the scenarios for testing each security
function. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies
on the results of other tests.
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ATE_FUN.1.4C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.5C The test results from the developer execution of the tests shall
demonstrate that each tested security function behaved as
specified.
5.2.6.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.2)
ATE_IND.2.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to
those that were used in the developer's functional testing of the
TSF.
5.2.7 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.7.1 Analysis and testing for insecure states (AVA_MSU.3)
AVA_MSU.3.1D The developer shall provide guidance documentation.
AVA_MSU.3.2D The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance
documentation.
AVA_MSU.3.1C The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes of
operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or
operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AVA_MSU.3.2C The guidance documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent
and reasonable.
AVA_MSU.3.3C The guidance documentation shall list all assumptions about the
intended environment.
AVA_MSU.3.4C The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for external
security measures (including external procedural, physical and
personnel controls).
AVA_MSU.3.5C The analysis documentation shall demonstrate that the guidance
documentation is complete.
5.2.7.2 Strength of TOE security function evaluation (AVA_SOF.1)
AVA_SOF.1.1D The developer shall perform a strength of TOE security function
analysis for each mechanism identified in the ST as having a
strength of TOE security function claim.
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AVA_SOF.1.1C For each mechanism with a strength of TOE security function
claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall show that
it meets or exceeds the minimum strength level defined in the
PP/ST.
AVA_SOF.1.2C For each mechanism with a specific strength of TOE security
function claim the strength of TOE security function analysis shall
show that it meets or exceeds the specific strength of function
metric defined in the PP/ST.
5.2.7.3 Highly resistant (AVA_VLA.4)
AVA_VLA.4.1D The developer shall perform and document an analysis of the TOE
deliverables searching for ways in which a user can violate the
TSP.
AVA_VLA.4.2D The developer shall document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities.
AVA_VLA.4.1C The documentation shall show, for all identified vulnerabilities, that
the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment
for the TOE.
AVA_VLA.4.2C The documentation shall justify that the TOE, with the identified
vulnerabilities, is resistant to obvious penetration attacks.
AVA_VLA.4.3C The evidence shall show that the search for vulnerabilities is
systematic.
AVA_VLA.4.4C The analysis documentation shall provide a justification that the
analysis completely addresses the TOE deliverables.
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
5.3.1 Signature key generation (SSCD Type1)
5.3.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that
meet the following: List of approved algorithms and parameters.
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5.3.1.2 Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4.1/Type1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:
cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the following:
[assignment: list of standards].
Application notes:
The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed automatically after export .
5.3.1.3 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1/
CORRESP
The TSF shall perform SCD / SVD correspondence verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
5.3.1.4 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SCD Export SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Export SFP on export of SCD by
Administrator.
5.3.1.5 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1.1/ Sender The TSF shall enforce the SCD Export SFP to be able to transmit
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
5.3.1.6 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SCD Export
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SCD Export
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT
product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SCD Export
The TSF or the SSCD Type2 shall initiate communication via the
trusted channel for SCD export.
Refinement: The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD Type2
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Application note:
If the TOE exports the SVD to a SSCD Type2 and the SSCD Type 2 holds the SVD then the
trusted channel between the TOE and the SSCD type 2 will be required .
5.3.2 Certification generation application (CGA)
5.3.2.1 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2)
FCS_CKM.2.1/ CGA The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key distribution method qualified certificate
that meets the following: List of approved algorithms and
parameters.
5.3.2.2 Cryptographic key access (FCS_CKM.3)
FCS_CKM.3.1/ CGA The TSF shall perform import the SVD in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key access method import through a secure channel
that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.3.2.3 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
FDP_UIT.1.1/
SVD Import
The TSF shall enforce the SVD import SFP to be able to receive user
data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
SVD Import
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification and insertion has occurred.
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5.3.2.4 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SVD Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SVD Import
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT
product] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SVD Import
The TSF or the remote trusted IT product shall initiate
communication via the trusted channel for import SVD.
5.3.3 Signature creation application (SCA)
5.3.3.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1.1/
SCA Hash
The TSF shall perform hashing the DTBS in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following:
List of approved algorithms and parameters.
5.3.3.2 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
FDP_UIT.1.1/
SCA DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to be able to
transmit user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion
and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
SCA DTBS
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion and insertion has occurred.
5.3.3.3 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1/
SCA DTBS
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
SCA DTBS
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
SCA DTBS
The TSF or the remote trusted IT product shall initiate
communication via the trusted channel for signing
DTBS-representation by means of the SSCD.
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5.3.3.4 Trusted path (FTP_TRP.1)
The trusted path between the TOE and the SCA will be required only if the human interface for
user authentication is not provided by the TOE itself but by the SCA.
FTP_TRP.1.1/ SCA The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and
local users that is logically distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2/ SCA The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/ SCA The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection:
initial user authentication] [assignment: other services for which
trusted path is required].
5.4 Security Requirements for the Non-IT Environment
R.Administrator_Guide Application of Administrator Guidance
The implementation of the requirements of the Directive, ANNEX II “Requirements for
certification-service-providers issuing qualified certificates”, literal (e), stipulates employees of
the CSP or other relevant entities to follow the administrator guidance provided for the TOE.
Appropriate supervision of the CSP or other relevant entities shall ensures the ongoing
compliance.
R.Sigy_Guide Application of User Guidance
The SCP implementation of the requirements of the Directive, ANNEX II “Requirements for
certification-service-providers issuing qualified certificates”, literal (k), stipulates the signatory to
follow the user guidance provided for the TOE.
R.Sigy_Name Signatory’s name in the Qualified Certificate
The CSP shall verify the identity of the person to which a qualified certificate is issued according
to the Directive [1], ANNEX II “Requirements for certification-service-providers issuing qualified
certificates”, literal (d). The CSP shall verify that this person holds the SSCD which stores the
SCD corresponding to the SVD to be included in the qualified certificate.
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6 Rationale
6.1 Introduction
The tables in sub-sections 6.2.1 “Security Objectives Coverage” and 6.3.1 “Security
Requirement Coverage” provide the mapping of the security objectives and security
requirements for the TOE.
6.2 Security Objectives Rationale
6.2.1 Security Objectives Coverage
Table 6.1 : Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
Threats – Assumptions
- Policies / Security
objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.SCD_Transfer
OE_SCD_Unique
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
OE.HI_VAD
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
T.Hack_Phys x x x x
T.SCD_Divulg x x X
T.SCD_Derive x x
T.SVD_Forgery x x
T.DTBS_Forgery x x
T.SigF_Misuse x x x x
T.Sig_Forgery x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
T.Sig_Repud x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
A.SCD_Generate x x x
A.CGA x x
A.SCA x
P.CSP_Qcert x x x
P.Qsign x x x x
P.Sigy_SSCD x x
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6.2.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency
6.2.2.1 Policies and Security Objective Sufficiency
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the qualified certificate for
the signatory and provides that the SVD matches the SCD that is implemented in the SSCD
under sole control of this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by the TOE by
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp and OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp concerning the correspondence between
the SVD and the SCD, in the TOE IT environment, by OE.CGA_QCert for generation of
qualified certificates by the CGA, respectively.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be
employed to sign data with qualified electronic signatures, as defined by the Directive [1],
article 5, paragraph 1. Directive [1], recital (15) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of
advanced signatures. The requirement of qualified electronic signatures being based on
qualified certificates is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the
SCA presents the DTBS to the signatory and sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE.
OT.Sig_Secure and OT.Sigy_SigF address the generation of advanced signatures by the TOE.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature-creation device) establishes the TOE as secure
signature-creation device of the signatory with practically unique SCD. This is addressed by
OT.Sigy_SigF ensuring that the SCD is under sole control of the signatory and OE.SCD_Unique
ensuring the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic signature.
6.2.2.2 Threats and Security Objective Sufficiency
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting
physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD.
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces or observation of TOE emanations are countered
by OT.EMSEC_Design. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat
T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tamper attacks.
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing and copying and releasing of the signature-creation data)
addresses the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying
of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in the Directive [1], recital (18). This threat is countered
by OT.SCD_Secrecy which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature generation.
OT.SCD_Transfer and OE.SCD_Transfer ensures ensures the confidentiality of the SCD
transferred between SSCDs.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature-creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public
known data produced by the TOE. This threat is countered by OE.SCD_Unique that provides
cryptographic secure generation of the SCD/SVD-pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographic
secure electronic signatures.
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T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS-representation) addresses the threat arising from
modifications of the DTBS-representation sent to the TOE for signing which then does not
correspond to the DTBS-representation corresponding to the DTBS the signatory intends to
sign. The TOE counters this threat by the means of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by verifying the
integrity of the DTBS-representation. The TOE IT environment addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by
the means of OE.SCA_Data_Indent.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat
of misuse of the TOE signature-creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to
create SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign, as required by the Directive [1],
Annex III, paragraph 1, literal (c). This threat is addressed by the OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature
generation function for the legitimate signatory only), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to
be signed), OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity), and
OE.HI_VAD (Protection of the VAD) as follows: OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that the TOE provides
the signature-generation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.SCA_Data_Intend
ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS-representation only for data the signatory intends to
sign. The combination of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE and OE.SCA_Data_Intend counters the
misuse of the signature generation function by means of manipulation of the channel between
the SCA and the TOE. If the SCA provides the human interface for the user authentication,
OE.HI_VAD provides confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the
electronic signature. This threat is in general addressed by OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic
security of the electronic signature), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (SCA sends representation of data
intended to be signed), OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates),
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD), OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE
ensures authenticity of the SVD), OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the
SVD), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the signature-creation data), OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure
transfer of SCD between SSCD), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security),
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection), OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) and
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), as follows:
OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust encryption techniques that the signed data and the
electronic signature are securely linked together. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the
methods used by the SCA (and therefore by the verifier) for the generation of the
DTBS-representation is appropriate for the cryptographic methods employed to generate the
electronic signature. The combination of OE.CGA_QCert, OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE, and OE.SVD_Auth_CGA provides the integrity and authenticity of the SVD
that is used by the signature verification process. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Secrecy,
OT.SCD_Transfer, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, and
OT.Lifecycle_Security ensure the confidentiality of the SCD implemented in the signatory's
SSCD and thus prevent forgery of the electronic signature by means of knowledge of the SCD.
T.Sig_Repud (Repudiation of electronic signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed
data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD
contained in his un-revoked certificate. This threat is in general addressed by OE.CGA_QCert
(Generation of qualified certificates), OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the
SVD), OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD), OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
(Correspondence between SVD and SCD), OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-
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creation data), OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD), OT.SCD_Secrecy
(Secrecy of the signature-creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations
security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection), OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance),
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function for the
legitimate signatory only), OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature),
OE.SCA_Data_Intend (SCA sends representation of data intended to be signed) and
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity).
OE.CGA_QCert ensures qualified certificates which allow to identify the signatory and thus to
extract the SVD of the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert, OT.SVD_Auth_TOE and
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA ensure the integrity of the SVD. OE.CGA_QCert and
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensure that the SVD in the certificate correspond to the SCD that is
implemented by the SSCD of the signatory. OT.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD
can practically occur just once. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Transfer, OT.SCD_Secrecy,
OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, OT.EMSEC_Design, and OT.Lifecycle_Security
ensure the confidentiality of the SCD implemented in the signatory's SSCD. OT.Sigy_SigF
provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature generation. OT.Sig_Secure
ensures by means of robust cryptographic techniques that valid electronic signatures may only
be generated by employing the SCD corresponding to the SVD that is used for signature
verification and only for the signed data. OE.SCA_Data_Intend and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
ensure that the TOE generates electronic signatures only for DTBS-representations which the
signatory has decided to sign as DTBS.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature-verification data) deals with the forgery of the
SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is
addressed by OT.SVD_Auth_TOE which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable
form to the CGA, as well as by OE.SVD_Auth_CGA which provides verification of SVD
authenticity by the CGA.
6.2.2.3 Assumptions and Security Objective Sufficiency
A.SCD_Generate Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation establishes a trustworthy
SCD/SVD pair. This that the SCD must be unique, objective met by OE.SCD_Unique, that the
SCD and the SVD must correspond, objective met by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp. The secrecy of
the SCD must be maintained while it is transferred to the TOE before being deleted,
OE.SCD_Transfer.
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature-creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the
SCA according to the generation of DTBS-representation. This is addressed by
OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed) which ensures that the SCA generates the
DTBS-representation of the data that has been presented to the signatory as DTBS and which
the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE
A.CGA (Trustworthy certification-generation application) establishes the protection of the
authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced
signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert (Generation
of qualified certificates) which ensures the generation of qualified certificates and by
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD) which ensures the verification of
the integrity of the received SVD and the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is
implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage
Table 6.2 : Functional Requirement to TOE Security Objective Mapping
TOE Security Functional
Requirement / TOE Security
objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
FCS_CKM.4 x x x
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP x
FCS_COP.1/SIGNING x
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP x
FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP x
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP x
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation SFP x x
FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP x
FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP x
FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP x
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation SFP x x
FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer x
FDP_ITC.1/SCD x
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS x
FDP_RIP.1 x x
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS x
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent x x x x
FDP_UCT.1/Receiver x
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer x
FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS x
FIA_AFL.1 x
FIA_ATD.1 x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UID.1 x
FMT_MOF.1 x x
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator x
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory x
FMT_MSA.2 x x
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TOE Security Functional
Requirement / TOE Security
objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
FMT_MSA.3 x x x
FMT_MTD.1 x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FPT_AMT.1 x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_PHP.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import x
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer x
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import x
FTP_TRP.1/TOE x
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Table 6.3: IT Environment Functional requirement to Environment Security Objective Mapping
Environment Security
Requirement / Environment
Security objectives
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.SCD_Transfer
OE.SCD_Unique
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.HI_VAD
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
FCS_CKM.1 x x
FCS_CKM.4/Type1 x
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP x
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Export SFP X
FDP_UCT.1/Sender X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Export X
FCS_CKM.2/CGA x
FCS_CKM.3/CGA x
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Import x
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Import x
FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH x
FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS x
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS x
FTP_TRP.1/SCA x
R.Sigy_Name x
Table 6.4 : Assurance Requirement to Security Objective Mapping
Objectives Requirement
Security Assurance Requirements
OT.Lifecycle_Security ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1,ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1
OT.SCD_Secrecy ADV_IMP.1, AVA_SOF.1, AVA_VLA.4
OT.Sig_Secure AVA_VLA.4
OT.Sigy_SigF AVA_MSU.3, AVA_SOF.1, AVA.VLA.4
Security Objectives
ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2, ADO_DEL.2,
ADO_IGS.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_LLD.1,
ADV_RCR.1, ADV_SPM.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1,
ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
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6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency
6.3.2.1 TOE Security Requirements Sufficiency
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible
information is emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMSEC.1
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the security assurance
requirements ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1,ADO_DEL.2, and ADO_IGS.1 that ensure
the lifecycle security during the development, configuration and delivery phases of the TOE.
The test functions FPT_TST.1 and FPT_AMT.1 provide failure detection throughout the
lifecycle. FCS_CKM.4 provides secure destruction of the SCD to conclude the operational
usage of the TOE as SSCD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature-creation data) counters that, with reference to
recital (18) of the Directive, storage or copying of SCD causes a threat to the legal validity of
electronic signatures. The authentication and access management functions specified by
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.3, and FMT_SMR.1 ensure that only the
signatory can use the SCD and thus avoid that an attacker may gain information on it.
The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual
information on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that
destruction of SCD leaves no residual information. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall
prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified
which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the SCD.
FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_FLS.1 test the working conditions of the TOE and guarantee a secure
state when integrity is violated and thus assure that the specified security functions are
operational. An example where compromising error conditions are countered by FPT_FLS is
differential fault analysis (DFA).
The assurance requirements ADV_IMP.1 by requesting evaluation of the TOE implementation,
AVA_SOF HIGH by requesting strength of function high for security functions, and AVA_VLA.4
by requesting that the TOE resists attacks with a high attack potential assure that the security
functions are efficient.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. The security functions specified by
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain the correspondence.
Cryptographic correspondence is provided by FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
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OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD) is provided by FDP_ITC.1/SCD
Import and FDP_UCT.1/Receiver that ensure that a trusted channel is provided and that
confidentiality is maintained.
Security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_SMR.1, and FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP ensure that transfer of SCDs is restricted to
administrators. This supports the confidentiality-oriented functions.
Security function FCS_CKM.4 destroys the SCD before a SCD is re-imported into the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of DTBS-representation integrity) covers that
integrity of the DTBS-representation to be signed is to be verified, as well as the
DTBS-representation is not altered by the TOE. This is provided by the trusted channel integrity
verification mechanisms of FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import, and by
FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS. The verification that the DTBS-representation has not been altered by
the TOE is done by integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS. The access control
requirements of FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation SFP and FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation SFP
keeps unauthorised parties off from altering the DTBS-representation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided
by FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 that ensure that no signature generation function can be invoked
before the signatory is identified and authenticated.
The security functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP, FDP_ACC.1/Signature-
creation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation SFP,
FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_SMR.1 ensure that the signature process is restricted to the signatory.
The security functions specified by FIA_ATD.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.2, and MSA.3 ensure
that the access to the signature generation functions remain under the sole control of the
signatory, as well as FMT_MSA.1/Signatory provides that the control of corresponding security
attributes is under signatory’s control.
The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Perssistent and FPT_TRP.1/TOE ensure the
integrity of stored data both during communication and while stored.
The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FIA_AFL.1 provide protection against a
number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force
attacks against authentication.
The assurance measures specified by AVA_MSU.3 by requesting analysis of misuse of the
TOE implementation, AVA_SOF.1 by requesting high strength level for security functions, and
AVA_VLA.4 by requesting that the TOE resists attacks with a high attack potential assure that
the security functions are efficient.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the
cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1/SIGNING which ensures the cryptographic
robustness of the signature algorithms. The security functions specified by FPT_AMT.1 and
FPT_TST.1 ensure that the security functions are performing correctly. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE.
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OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD) is provided by a trusted channel
guaranteeing SVD origin and integrity by means of FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer and
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer. The cryptographic algorithms specified by
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP, FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP and FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer
ensure that only authorised user can Import the SVD from a SSCD Type1 and Export the SVD
to the CGA.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive
detection of physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical
attacks.
6.3.2.2 TOE Enviroment Security Requirements Sufficiency
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified
by FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. Cryptographic correspondence is
provided by FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
OE.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD) is provided by
FDP_UCT.1/Sender, that ensure that a trusted channel is provided and that confidentiality is
maintained.
Security functions complying with FDP_ACC.1/Export SFP and FTP_ITC.1/ SCD Export ensure
that only TOE may export the SCD. Security function specified by FCS_CKM.4/Type1 destroy
the SCD, once exported from the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) stores the requirement of
practically unique SCD as laid down in the Directive [1], Annex III, article 1(a), which is provided
by the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates) addresses the requirement of qualified
certificates. The functions specified by FCS_CKM.2/CGA provide the cryptographic key
distribution method. The functions specified by FCS_CKM.3/CGA ensure that the CGA imports
the SVD using a secure channel and a secure key access method.
OE.HI_VAD (Protection of the VAD) covers confidentiality and integrity of the VAD which is
provided by the trusted path FTP_TRP.1/SCA.
OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed) is provided by the functions specified by
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS and FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS that ensure that the DTBS can be checked
by the TOE, and FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH that provides that the hashing function corresponds
to the approved algorithms.
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD) is provided by
FTP_ITC.1/SVD.Import which assures identification of the sender and by FDP_UIT.1/ SVD
Import. which guarantees it’s integrity
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6.4 Dependency Rationale
6.4.1 Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies
The functional and assurance requirements dependencies for the TOE are completely fulfilled.
The functional requirements dependencies for the TOE environment are not completely fulfilled
(see section 6.4.2 for justification).
Table 6.5 Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies
Requirement Dependencies
Functional Requirements
FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1/SCD, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_COP.1/
CORRESP
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_COP.1/
SIGNING
FDP_ITC.1/SCD, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FDP_ACC.1/
PERSONALISATION
SFP
FDP_ACF.1/PERSONALISATION SFP
FDP_ACC.1/
SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SCD IMPORT SFP
FDP_ACC.1/
SIGNATURE-
CREATION SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SIGNATURE CREATION SFP
FDP_ACC.1/
SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/
PERSONALISATION
SFP
FDP_ACC.1/PERSONALISATION SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/
SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/
SIGNATURE-
CREATION SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SIGNATURE-CREATION SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/
SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ETC.1/
SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ITC.1/SCD FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS FDP_ACC.1/ SIGNATURE-CREATION SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_UCT.1/
RECEIVER
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import, FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP
FDP_UIT.1/
SVD Transfer
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer, FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_UIT.1/
TOE DTBS
FDP_ACC.1/SIGNATURE_CREATION SFP, FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
Import
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1
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Requirement Dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/
Administrator
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import SFP, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/
Signatory
FDP_ACC.1/SIGNATURE_CREATION SFP, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.2
ADV_SPM.1, FDP_ACC.1/PERSONALISATION SFP,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_FLS.1 ADV_SPM.1
FPT_PHP.1 FMT_MOF.1
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1
Assurance Requirements
ACM_AUT.1 ACM_CAP.3
ACM_CAP.4 ACM_SCP.1, ALC_DVS.1
ACM_SCP.2 ACM_CAP.3
ADO_DEL.2 ACM_CAP.3
ADO_IGS.1 AGD_ADM.1
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_RCR.1
ADV_HLD.2 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_RCR.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_LLD.1, ADV_RCR.1, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_LLD.1 ADV_HLD.2, ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1 ADV_FSP.1
AGD_ADM.1 ADV_FSP.1
AGD_USR.1 ADV_FSP.1
ALC_TAT.1 ADV_IMP.1
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.1, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.1 ADV_HLD.1, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1, ATE_FUN.1
AVA_MSU.3 ADO_IGS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_ADM.1, AGD_USR.1
AVA_SOF.1 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.1
AVA_VLA.4
ADV_FSP.1, ADV_HLD.2, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_LLD.1, AGD_ADM.1,
AGD_USR.1
Functional Requirement for SSCD Type1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4/Type1, FCS_COP.1/CORRESP, unsupported
dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
FCS_CKM.1, unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2
for justification
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4/Type1, unsupported dependencies, see
sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FDP/ACC.1/
SCD Export SFP
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FDP_UCT.1/
Sender
FDP/ACC.1/SCD Export, FTP_ITC.1/SCD Export
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Requirement Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/
SCD Export
None
Functional Requirements for Certification generation application (GGA)
FCS_CKM.2/CGA unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FCS_CKM.3/CGA unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FDP_UIT.1/
SVD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Import, unsupported dependencies, see sub-
section 6.4.2 for justification
FTP_ITC.1/
SVD Import
None
Functional Requirements for Signature creation application (SCA)
FCS_COP.1/
SCA HASH
Unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FDP_UIT.1/
SCA DTBS
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS, unsupported dependencies on FDP_ACC.1,
see sub-section 6.4.2 for justification
FTP_ITC.1/
SCA DTBS
None
FTP_TRP.1/
SCA
None
6.4.2 Justification of Unsupported Dependencies
The security functional dependencies for the TOE environment SSCD Type1, CGA and SCA
are not completely supported by security functional requirements in section 5.3.
FCS_CKM.1
The SSCD Type1 generates the SCD/SVD pair. The dependency for
cryptographic secure key generation is supported by
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP, proof of SCD/SVD correspondence, and
the key destruction by FCS_CKM.4/Type1. The Secure security
attribute SFR, FMT_MSA.2 is outside the scope of this PP.
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
The SSCD Type1 destroys the SCD once it has been exported. The
dependency for key generation is supported by FCS_CKM.1. The
Secure security attribute SFR, FMT_MSA.2 is outside the scope of
this PP.
FCS_COP.1/
CORRESP
The SSCD Type1 does a cryptographic operation when creating the
SCD/SVD pair, FCS_CKM.1 and when destroying it,
FCS_CKM.4/Type1. The Secure security attribute SFR, FMT_MSA.2
is outside the scope of this PP.
FDP/ACC.1/
SCD Export SFP
The SSCD Type1 will follow the SCD export SFP when exporting the
SCD. The access control required by this SFP, FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access control, is outside the scope of this PP.
FCS_CKM.2/ CGA
The CGA generates qualified electronic signatures including the SVD
imported from the TOE. The FCS_CKM.1 is not necessary because
the CGA does not generate the SVD. There is no need to destroy the
public SVD and therefore FCS_CKM.4 is not required for the CGA.
The security management for the CGA by FMT_MSA.2 is outside of
the scope of this PP.
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FCS_CKM.3/ CGA
The CGA imports SVD via trusted cannel implemented by
FTP_ITC.1/ SVD import. The FCS_CKM.1 is not necessary because
the CGA does not generate the SVD. There is no need to destroy the
public SVD and therefore FCS_CKM.4 is not required for the CGA.
The security management for the CGA by FMT_MSA.2 is outside of
the scope of this PP.
FDP_UIT.1/
SVD Import (CGA)
The access control (FDP_ACC.1) for the CGA is outside the scope of
this PP.
FCS_COP.1/
SCA HASH
The hash algorithm implemented by FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH does
not require any key or security management. Therefore FDP_ITC.1,
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FMT_MSA.2 are not required for
FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH in the SCA.
FDP_UIT.1/
SCA DTBS
Access control (FDP_ACC.1.1) for the SCA are outside of the scope
of this PP.
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6.5 Security Requirements Grounding in Objectives
This chapter covers the grounding that have not been done in the precedent chapter.
Table 6.6: Assurance and Functional Requirement to Security Objective Mapping
Requirement Security Objectives
Security Assurance Requirements
ACM_AUT.1 EAL 4
ACM_CAP.4 EAL 4
ACM_SCP.2 EAL 4
ADO_DEL.2 EAL 4
ADO_IGS.1 EAL 4
ADV_FSP.2 EAL 4
ADV_HLD.2 EAL 4
ADV_IMP.1 EAL 4
ADV_LLD.1 EAL 4
ADV_RCR.1 EAL 4
ADV_SPM.1 EAL 4
AGD_ADM.1 EAL 4
AGD_USR.1 EAL 4
ALC_DVS.1 EAL4, OT.Lifecycle_Security
ALC_LCD.1 EAL4, OT.Lifecycle_Security
ALC_TAT.1 EAL4, OT.Lifecycle_Security
ATE_COV.2 EAL 4
ATE_DPT.1 EAL 4
ATE_FUN.1 EAL 4
ATE_IND.2 EAL 4
AVA_MSU.3 OT.Sigy_SigF
AVA_SOF.1 EAL 4, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF
AVA_VLA.4 OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sig_Secure,
Security Objectives for the Environment
R.Administrator_Guide AGD_ADM.1
R.Sigy_Guide AGD_USR.1
R.Sigy_Name OE.CGA_QCert
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6.6 Rationale for Extensions
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF)
is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of
intelligible emanations.
6.6.1 FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
• FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
• FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions identified that should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data
generation is included in the PP/ST.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access
to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation 1
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6.7 Rationale for Strength of Function High
The TOE shall demonstrate to be highly resistant against penetration attacks in order to meet
the security objectives OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF and OT.Sig_Secure. The protection
against attacks with a high attack potential dictates a strength of function high rating for
functions in the TOE that are realised by probabilistic or permutational mechanisms.
6.8 Rationale for Assurance Level 4 Augmented
The assurance level for this protection profile is EAL4 augmented.EAL4 allows a developer to
attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need for highly specialized processes and
practices. It is considered to be the highest level that could be applied to an existing product line
without undue expense and complexity. As such, EAL4 is appropriate for commercial products
that can be applied to moderate to high security functions. The TOE described in this protection
profile is just such a product. Augmentation results from the selection of:
AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability Assessment - Misuse - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability Assessment - Vulnerability Analysis – Highly resistant
The TOE is intended to function in a variety of signature generation systems for qualified
electronic signatures. Due to the nature of its intended application, i.e., the TOE may be issued
to users and may not be directly under the control of trained and dedicated administrators. As a
result, it is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the
guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been
addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect.
In AVA_MSU.3, an analysis of the guidance documentation by the developer is required to
provide additional assurance that the objective has been met, and this analysis is validated and
confirmed through testing by the evaluator. AVA_MSU.3 has the following dependencies:
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
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AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability Assessment - Vulnerability Analysis – Highly resistant
The TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security
objectives OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF and OT.Sig_Secure. AVA_VLA.4 has the following
dependencies:
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
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References
[1] DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[2] International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 15408-1:1999 Information
technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1:
Introduction and general model, 1999.
[3] International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 15408-2:1999 Information
technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2:
Security functional requirements, 1999.
[4] International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 15408-3:1999 Information
technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 3:
Security assurance requirements, 1999.
[5] Algorithms and parameters for algorithms, list of algorithms and parameters eligible for
electronic signatures, procedures as defined in the directive 1999/93/EC, article 9 on
the ‘Electronic Signature Committee’ in the Directive.
Appendix A - Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
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