JISEC-CC-CRP-C0859-01-2026
Certification Report
SAITO Yutaka, Commissioner
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
Protection Profile (PP)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2025-08-04 (ITC-5919)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0859
PP Name JPKI Applet Protection Profile
PP Version 1.10
PP Developer Digital Agency, Government of Japan
PP Sponsor Digital Agency, Government of Japan
Assurance Package
EAL4 Augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2,
COMP
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above PP has been certified as follows.
2026-02-25
HASHIMOTO Toru, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This PP is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CC:2022 Release 1
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM:2022 Release 1
- Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1) Version 1.1
Evaluation Result: Pass
"JPKI Applet Protection Profile, Version 1.10" has been evaluated based on the standards
required, in accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security
Certification" by Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0859-01-2026
specified assurance requirements.
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0859-01-2026
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Evaluated PP.................................................................................................................... 4
1.1.1 Assurance Package ................................................................................................... 4
1.1.2 Overview of the PP ................................................................................................... 4
1.1.2.1 Security Functions Overview............................................................................ 6
1.1.2.2 Threats and Security Objectives ...................................................................... 6
1.1.3 Disclaimers................................................................................................................ 6
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation ..................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Certification of Evaluation .............................................................................................. 7
2. PP Identification...................................................................................................................... 8
3. Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Security Function Policies............................................................................................... 9
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies.................................................................. 9
3.1.1.1 Threats ............................................................................................................... 9
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats..................................................... 9
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies....................... 10
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies .................................................................... 10
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies for Organisational Security Policies ..................11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Evaluation Scope .......................................................... 12
4.1 Assumptions on Use and Environment........................................................................ 12
5. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results................................................ 13
5.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 13
5.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity ................................................................................... 13
5.4 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 13
5.5 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 14
6. Certification ........................................................................................................................... 15
6.1 Certification Result........................................................................................................ 15
6.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 15
7. Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 16
8. Glossary.................................................................................................................................. 17
9. Bibliography........................................................................................................................... 19
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "JPKI Applet Protection Profile, Version 1.10" (hereinafter referred
to as "the PP [11]") developed by Digital Agency,Government of Japan and the evaluation of
the TOE was completed on 2026-01-30 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
(hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor,
Digital Agency, Government of Japan and provide security information to procurement
entities and consumers who are interested in this PP [11].
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the corresponding PP [11] together
with this report. Especially, details of security functional requirements, assurance
requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of the PP [11] are
described in the PP [11].
This Certification Report assumes developers who develop products conforming to the PP
[11] and product procurement entities to be readers. Note that the Certification Report
presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which the PP [11]
conforms and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.
1.1 Evaluated PP
An overview of the security functions required by the PP [11] is described below. Refer to
Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Assurance Package
Assurance Package of the PP [11] is EAL4 augmented by AVA_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, and
COMP.
In addition, any PP and any Security Target (ST) that claims conformance to the PP [11]
shall claim strict conformance.
1.1.2 Overview of the PP
In the PP [11], the TOE is an embedded secure element (eSE) in a mobile phone.
The TOE operates as a Java Card system that provides a Secure Signature Creation Device
(SSCD) with a key generation function for signature creation and user authentication. The
TOE consists of the JPKI Applet, the Java Card platform, and the Integrated Circuit (IC).
The IC and the platform are certified separately. The JPKI Applet operating on the IC and
Java Card platform is subject to composite certification.
Figure 1-1 shows the configuration of the TOE. The TOE corresponds to the yellow portion
in the figure.
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5
The TOE components are as follows:
 The JPKI Applet constitutes the part of the TOE responsible for generating key pairs
for signature creation and user authentication. It manages access control for use of the
signature creation function and access control for execution of cryptographic operations
for signature creation. The JPKI Applet is installed post-issuance in the operational
environment.
 The Java Card platform manages and executes applets. It provides APIs to develop
APIs in accordance with the Java Card specifications. The Java Card platform includes
a GlobalPlatform package that provides a common interface for managing
communication with the smart card and applications in a secure manner in accordance
with the GlobalPlatform specification [14].
 The IC is the hardware platform of the TOE. The hardware platform provides basic
cryptographic functions and security-related detectors, sensors, and circuits to protect
the TOE.
Non-TOE components are as follows:
 Other Java applets may coexist with the JPKI Applet, but they are independent of each
other.
 The antenna is used to transmit and receive radio waves for communication with a
contactless card reader.
 The CLF (Contactless Front-end) manages routing between the antenna and the Host
Controller, controls transmission of the carrier wave of the antenna, and, as a card
function, performs anti-collision and card selection.
 The TOE is assumed to operate on a mobile phone. Therefore, the above non-TOE
components are also part of the mobile phone.
Figure 1-1 TOE Physical Scope
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1.1.2.1 Security Functions Overview
In the PP [11], the TOE is required to provide the security functions required for an eSE
that hosts the JPKI Applet, and the functions typically required for an IC. The main
functions are as follows:
1. Protection of communication data
Secure messaging is applied to communications between the TOE and the Certificate
Generation Application (CGA) to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
communication data.
2. User authentication and access control
To provide functions according to user roles, the TOE performs user identification and
authentication and enforces access control.
3. Cryptographic operations
The TOE provides cryptographic functions for hash functions, generation of Secret
Keys (SKs) / Public Keys (PKs), and signature generation/verification.
4. Countermeasures against physical attacks
The security functions of the TOE also counter physical attacks against its own
hardware components. The assumed attacks are the same as those for general ICs.
1.1.2.2 Threats and Security Objectives
A TOE conforming to the PP [11] counters threats by means of security functions as
described below.
An attacker may attempt unauthorized access to disclose or modify data inside the TOE, or
to use TOE functions illegally. Therefore, after identifying and authenticating a user, the
TOE permits logical access to internal TOE resources only within the privileges
corresponding to the user’s role.
In addition, in communications between the TOE and an external terminal, there is a
threat that an attacker eavesdrops and records the communication contents corresponding
to external authentication and then reuses the recorded contents to impersonate a
legitimate external terminal. To counter this threat, it is required that the authentication
data used for external authentication (which is generated by the TOE) not be reused and
that different data be used each time.
Due to the physical characteristics of IC chips, information being processed internally may
leak via power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. It is also necessary to consider
exposure of internal information by physical probing, physical tampering with circuits on
the IC chip, and malfunction induced by applying environmental stress. Therefore,
functions are required to protect the TSF from such physical attacks.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
None.
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in
2026-01, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE
according to the publicised documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
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1.3 Certification of Evaluation
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [12] and the Observation
Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation and
confirmed that the PP [11] evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the
certification process.
The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns pointed out by the Certification Body
were fully resolved, and that the PP [11] evaluation had been appropriately conducted in
accordance with the CC ([4][5][6][7][8]) and the CEM ([9]) and Errata and Interpretation
([10]).
The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation
Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.
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2. PP Identification
The PP [11] is identified as follows:
PP Name: JPKI Applet Protection Profile
PP Version: 1.10
Developer: Digital Agency, Government of Japan
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3. Security Policy
This chapter describes security function policies that the TOE adopts to counter threats,
and organisational security policies.
In the PP [11], the TOE is required to provide security functions required for the services
provided by the JPKI Applet and the security functions typically required of an IC. The
security functions required of the TOE are broadly the following four:
 Protection of communication data
 User authentication and access control
 Cryptographic operations
 Resistance to physical attacks
3.1 Security Function Policies
The PP [11] possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Section 3.1.1.1
and to satisfy the organisational security policies shown in Section 3.1.2.1.
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies
3.1.1.1 Threats
The PP [11] presumes the threats shown in Table 3-1 and provides TOE the security
functions to counter them.
Table 3-1 Threats
Identifier Threat
T.Illegal_Attack An unauthorised user accesses the TOE via external
interfaces to disclose or modify internal data of the TOE,
or to use processing function of the TOE. “An
unauthorised user” is the entity that does not have the
authentication data needed to access the assets of the
TOE.
T.Replay An attacker masquerades a legitimate external terminal
by monitoring, recording and replaying the
authentication procedure between the TOE and the
external terminal in order to be authenticated by the
TOE. The attack causes disclosure or modification of
user data of the TOE, or illegal use of processing
function of the TOE.
T.Phys_Attack An attacker attacks components of the TOE − hardware,
firmware or software − with physical means. The attack
causes disclosure or modification of user data of the
TOE, or unauthorised use of processing function of the
TOE.
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats
The TOE counters the threats shown in Table 3-1 by the following security function policies.
1. Countermeasures against threat “T.Illegal_Attack“ and “T.Replay”
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The threat “T.Illegal_Attack” assumes unauthorized access to internal TOE data and
functions via the TOE interface. “T.Replay” assumes unauthorized access to the TOE by
reusing an authentication procedure in communications with an external terminal.
To counter these threats, the TOE identifies and authenticates users and, upon successful
authentication, permits operations according to the user’s role. The TOE also provides a
function to prevent reuse of authentication data.
2. Countermeasures against threat “T.Phys_Attack“
The threat “T.Phys_Attack” assumes that, due to the physical form factor of an IC, it is
exposed to physical tampering (observation, analysis, or modification). The TOE behavior
is also affected by operating conditions such as voltage, frequency, and temperature.
To counter this threat, the TOE provides protection functions for the TSF to withstand
attacks described in the mandatory technical document on smartcards and similar
devices [13].
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies
Organisational security policies required in use of the PP [11] are shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2 Organisational Security Policies
Identifier Organisational Security Policy
P.Multiple_authentication The TOE provides multiple authentication methods for
user authentication. In addition to password
authentication, the user can also select
cryptographic-key-based authentication.
P.Secure_messaging Secure messaging is applied to communications between
the TOE and the CGA.
P.Cryptography The TOE provides cryptographic functions used for data
hashing, data protection, SK/PK generation, signature
generation, and authentication.
P.RND The TSF generates random numbers used for the TSF
itself. The random numbers have sufficient quality to
prevent prediction by attackers.
Table 3-3 Cryptographic Functional Policy
Function Key length, specifications, etc.
Key pair generation RSA 2048 bits or more [to be specified by the ST author
at TOE certification] (this function is used to generate
signatures over DTBS).
Signature generation RSA 2048 bits or more [to be specified by the ST author
at TOE certification] (this function is used to generate
signatures over DTBS).
Signature verification RSA 2048 bits or more [RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, PKCS
#1] (this function is used for external authentication
using PK-EA).
Hash SHA-256 [FIPS 180-4].
Random number
generation
Physical, hybrid-physical, or hybrid-deterministic
random number generator.
Random number
generation
Destroy the SK/PK pair and PK-EA when they are no
longer needed.
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3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies for Organisational Security Policies
The PP [11] provides the security functions to satisfy the organisational security policies
shown in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3.
1. Means for organisational security policy “P.Multiple_authentication”
The TOE provides the authentication mechanisms listed in Table 3-4.
Table 3-4 Multiple authentication mechanism
Authentication mechanism Rules
Mutual authentication described in
GlobalPlatform Card Specification –
Amendment D [15]
This mutual authentication is used to
authenticate the user as an administrator.
Password authentication Password authentication is used as default
authentication mechanism for
authentication of Signatory.
External authentication using PK-EA External authentication is used as
alternative authentication mechanism for
authenticating user as Signatory. To
activate the method, the PK-EA
corresponding to the individual Signatory
needs to be registered.
2. Means for organisational security policy “P.Secure_messaging”
This is addressed by the TOE providing an inter-TSF trusted channel.
3. Means for organisational security policy “P.Cryptography” and “P.RND”
This is addressed by the TOE providing the cryptographic functions listed in Table 3-3.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Evaluation Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate a TOE
as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use of a TOE
conforming to the PP [11].
4.1 Assumptions on Use and Environment
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE conforming to the the PP [11].
The effective performances of the TOE conforming to the PP [11] of security functions are
not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Identifier Assumptions
A.PKI For the effective operation of the TSF, it is assumed that
the PKI environment, where the keys for public key
cryptosystem (a pair of public and private keys) of the
TOE are assured to be effective, is provided.
A.Administrator The administrator, who creates, changes or deletes data
on the TOE, is assumed to be a trusted user and to
operate the TOE properly based on the privileges.
A.Protect_VAD The confidentiality and integrity of VAD is assumed to
be guaranteed when VAD is imported from an external
device to the TOE.
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5. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
5.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National
Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual
Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It
is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the
appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of
evaluation.
5.2 Evaluation Approach
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in
accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC Part 3.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report.
The Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the PP [11] as well as the content
of the evaluation and the verdict of each work unit in the CEM.
5.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation started in 2025-08 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2026-01.
The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for
evaluation provided by the developer and examined the evidence in relation to a series of
evaluation conducted.
Concerns found in evaluation activities were issued as the Observation Reports and
reported to the developer.
The concerns were reviewed by the developer, and all of them were solved eventually.
Concerns that the Certification Body found in the evaluation process were described as the
certification oversight reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility. After the
Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, those concerns were reflected in the
Evaluation Technical Report.
5.4 Evaluation Results
The evaluators had concluded that the PP [11] satisfies all work units prescribed in the
CEM as per the Evaluation Technical Report.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components.
- APE_INT.1, APE_CCL.1, APE_SPD.1, APE_OBJ.2, APE_ECD.1 and APE_REQ.2
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5.5 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0859-01-2026
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6. Certification
Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process,
the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following
requirements are satisfied:
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the
related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluators presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and those were sent to the Evaluation Facility.
The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight
reviews were solved in the PP [11] and the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this
Certification Report.
6.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Reports and
related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification
Body determined that the PP [11] evaluation satisfies all assurance requirements for
APE_INT.1, APE_CCL.1, APE_SPD.1, APE_OBJ.2, APE_ECD.1 and APE_REQ.2 in the CC
Part 3.
6.2 Recommendations
When conducting TOE evaluations, it is necessary to evaluate resistance not only against the
threats specified in the PP [11] but also against threats described in the mandatory technical
document on smartcards and similar devices [13]. This document covers attack potentials to
smartcards and similar devices, including those specific to Java Card systems, because the
TOE conformant to the PP [11] is hardware implementing Java Card systems. Authors of ST
conformant to the PP [11] should note that definitions of security problems, security objectives,
and security functional requirements addressing those threats are required, for example, by
also conforming to a PP for Java Card systems.
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7. Annexes
There is no annex.
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8. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
COMP Composite Product Package
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Definitions and abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
Certificate generation
application (CGA)
collection of application components that receive the
PK from the SSCD to generate a certificate obtaining
data to be included in the certificate and to create a
digital signature of the certificate
Data to be signed
(DTBS)
all electronic data to be signed including a user
message and additional information that is signed
together with a user message
Data to be signed or its
unique representation
(DTBS/R)
data received by a SSCD as input in a single signature
creation operation
Japanese Public Key
Infrastructure (JPKI)
a safe and secure identity verification service that
uses electronic certification installed in My Number
Card's IC chips (My Number is not used) to officially
authenticate users and confirm that documents such
as contracts have not been tampered with online.
JPKI Applet a java Card applet that is responsible for generating a
key pair for digital signature and for user certification
JPKI Application a mobile phone application responsible for CGA and
Signature Creation Application (SCA).
Public Key (PK) public cryptographic key that can be used to verify a
digital signature.
JPKI Applet has two PKs, which are “the public key
for digital signature” and “the public key for user
certification”.
PK-EA Public key for external authentication
Secure Signature
Creation Device
(SSCD)
hardware or software that is used in creating a digital
signature
Secure Element Issuer
Trusted Service
Manager (SEI-TSM)
responsible for managing the end-to-end security of
the SE, including the deployment of applications and
services.
Service Provide
Trusted Service
Manager (SP-TSM)
entity that issues certificates or provides other
services related to digital signatures
Signature creation application complementing a SSCD with a user
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application (SCA) interface with the purpose to create a digital signature
Secret Key (SK) secret cryptographic key stored in the SSCD under
exclusive control by the signatory to create a digital
signature.
JPKI Applet has two SKs, which are “the secret key
for digital signature” and “the private key for user
certification”.
Verification
authentication data
(VAD)
data provided as input to a SSCD for authentication
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9. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, September 2025,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, December 2023, Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2021,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction
and general model CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022, CCMB-2022-11-001(Japanese
Version 1.0, September 2023)
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022,
CCMB-2022-11-002(Japanese Version 1.0, September 2023)
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022,
CCMB-2022-11-003(Japanese Version 1.0, September 2023)
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 4: Framework for
the specification of evaluation methods and activities CC:2022 Revision 1, November
2022, CCMB-2022-11-004(Japanese Version 1.0, September 2023)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 5: Pre-defined
packages of security requirements CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022,
CCMB-2022-11-005(Japanese Version 1.0, September 2023)
[9] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation
methodology, CEM:2022 Revision 1, November 2022, CCMB-2022-11-006 (Japanese
Version 1.0, September 2023)
[10] Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.1,
July 2024, CCMB-2024-07-22 (Japanese Version 1.0, December 2024)
[11] JPKI Applet Protection Profile, Version 1.10, (January 2026), Digital Agency,
Government of Japan
[12] Evaluation Technical Report, JPU-ETRPP-0001-05, Version 1.5, January 30, 2026,
ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
[13] Joint Interpretation Library - Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar
Devices, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[14] GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3.1
[15] GlobalPlatform Card Specification – Amendment D v1.2, Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’
[16] Observation report JPU-EOR-0001-00, (September 17, 2025), ECSEC Laboratory Inc.
Evaluation Center
[17] Observation report JPU-EOR-0002-00, (October 3, 2025), ECSEC Laboratory Inc.
Evaluation Center