Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Certification Report
BSI-PP-0019-2006
Protection Profile
for
Secure Module Card (SMC) – Sicherheitsmodul-
Karte, Version 1.0
developed on behalf of the
Federal Ministry of Health, Germany
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Certificate BSI-PP-0019-2006
Protection Profile
for
Secure Module Card (SMC) –
Sicherheitsmodul-Karte, Version 1.0
developed on behalf of the
Federal Ministry of Health, Germany
Assurance Package: EAL 4 augmented with
ADV_IMP.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria Arrangement
Bonn, February 15th, 2006 The President of the Federal
Office for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The Protection Profile mentioned above was evaluated at an accredited and licenced/approved evaluation facility on the basis of the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408) applying the Common
Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction with the complete Certification
Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the Federal Office for Information
Security. The conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
This page is intentionally left blank.
BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products as
well as for Protection Profiles (PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for
a category of TOEs which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT
security. The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an
existent one gives consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs
without referring to a special product. Product or system certifications can be
based on Protection Profiles. For products which have been certified based on
a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be issued.
Certification of a Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the author,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the
Protection Profile according to Common Criteria [1].
The evaluation is carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or
by the BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Annex: Protection Profile
VI
BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011
• BSI Certification - Description of the Procedure (BSI 7125)
• Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Bundesamtes für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamtes für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July
1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different
countries a mutual recognition of Protection Profile certificates under certain
conditions was agreed.
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005 and India in April 2005.
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The Protection Profile for Secure Module Card (SMC) – Sicherheitsmodul-
Karte, Version 1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at the BSI.
The evaluation of the Protection Profile for Secure Module Card (SMC) –
Sicherheitsmodul-Karte, Version 1.0 was conducted by ‘SRC Security Research
& Consulting GmbH‘. The evaluation facility of ‘SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH‘ is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
Developer is the T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit on behalf of the
‘Federal Ministry of Health, Germany’.
The certification was concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the preparation of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on February 15th, 2006.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-10.
The Protection Profile for Secure Module Card (SMC) – Sicherheitsmodul-
Karte, Version 1.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified and registered
Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained via the BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report may be ordered from the BSI7
. The
Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
Content of the Certification Results
1 PP Overview................................................................................................ 2
2 Security Functional Requirements............................................................... 4
3 Assurance Package .................................................................................... 6
4 Strength of Functions .................................................................................. 6
5 Results of the Evaluation............................................................................. 7
6 Obligation for ST writer................................................................................ 7
7 Definitions.................................................................................................... 8
8 Bibliography................................................................................................. 9
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
1 PP Overview
The Protection Profile (PP) [6] defines the security objectives and requirements
for the Secure Module Card (German: “Sicherheitsmodul-Karte”) based on the
regulations for the German health care system. It addresses the security
services provided by this card, mainly:
• Mutual Authentication between the Security Module Card (SMC) and a
Health Professional Card (HPC) with and without establishment of a trusted
channel.
• Mutual Authentication between the Security Module Card (SMC) and an
electronic Health Card (eHC) with and without establishment of a trusted
channel.
• Authentication of the card holder by use of a PIN.
• Document key decipherment for an external application.
• Client-server authentication for a client.
• Creation of advanced electronic signature for the card holder.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) defined in the PP is a smart card, the Secure
Module Card (SMC) Type B, which is conformant to the specification
documents [7] -[9]. The physical characteristics shall comply with ISO/IEC
7816-1 and related standards.
The TOE comprises the following parts:
• TOE_IC, consisting of :
- the circuitry of the SMC’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) and
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and
IC Dedicated Support Software
• TOE_ES
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system)
• TOE_APP
- the SMC applications (data structures and their content)
• TOE_GD
- guidance documentation delivered together with the TOE
The TOE is used by an institution which is under control of an individual acting
as accredited health profession in a health care environment:
• to support medical assistants, pharmaceutical staff and other persons under
control of a health professional using HPC to get access to data eHC
• to support trusted channel in interaction with SMC or a server
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
• to provide PKI services as creation of digital signatures, decryption and
client-server authentication for the health institution
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of seven life cycle phases: Phase 1
“Smart Card Embedded Software Development”, Phase 2 “IC Development”,
Phase 3 “IC Manufacturing and Testing”, Phase 4 “IC Packaging and Testing“,
Phase 5 “Smart Card Product Finishing Process”, Phase 6 “Smart Card
Personalization” and Phase 7 “Smart Card End-usage”. For the evaluation of
the SMC the phases 1 up to 4 are part of the TOE development in the sense of
the CC. The phases 6 and 7 are part of the operational use in the sense of the
CC. The phase 5 may be part of one of these CC phases or may be split
between them depending on the specific model used by the TOE developer.
The writer of the ST shall define the exact boundary.
The PP defines the following Security Objectives for the TOE:
Identifier for Sec.Objective Issue addressed by the Security Objective
OT.AC_Pers Access control for personalisation and management
OT.Data_Confident Confidentiality of internal data
OT.Data_Integrity Integrity of internal data
OT.Trusted_Channel Trusted Channel
OT.AC_Serv Access Control for TOE Security Services
OT.Prot_Abuse_Func Protection against abuse of functionality
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against information leakage
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against physical tampering
Table 1: Security Objectives for the TOE
The PP defines the Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE divided
into the two categories “Security Objectives for the Development and
Manufacturing Environment” and “Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment”:
Identifier for Sec.Objective Issue addressed by the Security Objective
Security Objectives for the Development
and Manufacturing Environment
OD.Assurance Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment
OD.Material Control over Smart Card Material
Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
OE.Perso Secure personalization and management
OE.Users Adequate Usage of TOE and IT-Systems
Table 2: Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
For details and application notes refer to the PP [6] chapter 4. Security
Functional Requirements for the TOE and for the IT-Environment are derived
from these Security Objectives as outlined in the following chapter.
2 Security Functional Requirements
This section contains the functional requirements that must be satisfied by a
TOE which is compliant to the Protection Profile. The TOE Security Functional
Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part
2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation - Asymmetric
card-to-card authentication with key
agreement
FCS_CKM.1/SYM Cryptographic key generation - Symmetric
card-to-card authentication with key
agreement
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash Algorithm
FCS_COP.1/CCA_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-
Creation for Card-to-Card Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CCA_VERIF Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-
Verification for Card-to-Card Authentication
FCS_COP.1/CSA Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-
Creation for Client-Server Authentication
FCS_COP.1/RSA_DEC Cryptographic operation – RSA Decryption
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES Encryption
/ Decryption
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIGN_AS Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature-
Creation for Advanced Electronic Signatures
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UID.1 Time of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FDP Access Control
FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1 Residual Information Protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data Integrity
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FTP Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FMT Security Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/RAD_WR Management of TSF data – Writing of
Authentication Reference Data
FMT_MTD.1/RAD_MOD Management of TSF data – Modification of
Authentication Reference Data
FMT_MTD.1/PIN Management of TSF data – Management of
the Human User Authentication Data
FMT_MTD.1/RAD_CH Management of TSF data – Protection of
Human User Authentication Data
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
Security Functional Requirement Identifier and addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the PP [6] chapter 6.
3 Assurance Package
The security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. The assurance
requirements comply with assurance level EAL 4 augmented (Evaluation
Assurance Level 4 augmented).
The following table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested and
reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
+: AVA_MSU.3 Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant
Table 5: Augmented assurance components
4 Strength of Functions
The minimum strength of function level is claimed SOF-high. This protection
profile does not contain any security functional requirement for which an explicit
strength of function claim is required.
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
5 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [5] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The verdict for the CC, Part 3 assurance component (according the class APE
for the Protection Profile evaluation) is summarised in the following table.
CC Aspect Result
CC Class APE PASS
APE_DES.1 PASS
APE_ENV.1 PASS
APE_INT.1 PASS
APE_OBJ.1 PASS
APE_REQ.1 PASS
APE_SRE.1 PASS
Table 6: Verdict for assurance class
The Protection Profile for Secure Module Card (SMC) – Sicherheitsmodul-
Karte, Version 1.0 meets the requirements for Protection Profiles as specified in
class APE of the CC.
6 Obligation for ST writer
In case that phase 5 “Smart Card Product Finishing Process“ of the PP is not
part of the CC phase “TOE Development“ (see PP [6], chapter 2.3) the ST
writer has to add an assumption for a secure Smart Card Product Finishing
environment (see PP [6], table 1) and an according objective for the
environment.
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
7 Definitions
7.1 Acronyms
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eHC electronic Health Card
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
HPC Health Professional Card
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SMC Security Module Card
SOF Strength of Function
SSCD-PP Protection Profile Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
7.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in Part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 of
the CC.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
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BSI-PP-0019-2006 Certification Report
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE secu-
rity by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or inten-
tional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack poten-
tial.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack poten-
tial.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evalua-
tion.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firm-
ware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Evaluation Technical Report for a PP evaluation, Version 1.0, February
13th
, 2006, Common Criteria Protection Profile Secure Module Card
(SMC) – Sicherheitsmodul-Karte, of ‘SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[6] Common Criteria Protection Profile Secure Module Card (SMC) –
Sicherheitsmodul-Karte , BSI-PP-0019, Version 1.0, February 15th
, 2006,
BSI
[7] Specification German Health Professional Card and Security Module
Card - Pharmacist & Physician – Part 1: Commands, Algorithms and
Functions of the COS Platform, Version 2.1, 07.11.2005, BMGS
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Certification Report BSI-PP-0019-2006
[8] Specification German Health Professional Card and Security Module
Card - Pharmacist & Physician – Part 2: HPC Applications and
Functions, Version 2.1 draft, 19.11.2005, BMGS
[9] Specification German Health Professional Card and Security Module
Card - Pharmacist & Physician – Part 3: SMC Applications and
Functions, Version 2.1 draft, 19.11.2005, BMGS
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BSI-PP-0020-2005 Certification Report
C Annex: Protection Profile
The Protection Profile (PP) [6] is provided within a separate document.
C-1