UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ
CCCS-PP-006-CR
COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device version 4.0, 19 July 2019
27 May 2021
CCCS-PP-006-CR
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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Protection Profile identified in this certification report has been evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established
under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS). This certification report applies only to the identified version and
release of the Protection Profile. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC
Scheme, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report and would like more detailed information, please
contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
This certification report is posted to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria
Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................... 5
1 Identification ........................................................................................................................................... 6
2 PP Description......................................................................................................................................... 7
3 Security Problem Description and Objectives................................................................................................. 8
3.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Threats ............................................................................................................................................................. 8
3.3 Organizational Security Policies......................................................................................................................... 9
3.4 Security Objectives............................................................................................................................................ 9
4 Security Requirements .............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Security Functional Requirements .....................................................................................................................12
4.2 Security Assurance Requirements .....................................................................................................................14
5 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
6 References.............................................................................................................................................16
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the results of the evaluation of the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, version 4.0
(PP_PSD_v4.0). It presents a summary of the PP_PSD_v4.0 and the evaluation results. It presents a summary of the
PP_PSD_v4.0 together with the evaluation results.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the PP_PSD_v4.0 was performed concurrent with the first
product evaluation against the PP’s requirements. In this case the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this first product was the
Belkin F1DN104KVM-UN-4, F1DN204KVM-UN-4, F1DN102KVM-UN-4, F1DN202KVM-UN-4, F1DN108KVM-UN-4, F1DN208KVM-
UN-4, F1DN116KVM-UN-4 Firmware Version 44444-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices (hereafter referred to as “Belkin KVM
Devices”). The evaluation was performed by the EWA-Canada Common Criteria Testing Laboratory and was completed in
April 2021. This evaluation addressed the base requirements of PP_PSD_v4.0, as well as the requirements contained in
Appendices A and B.
An additional evaluation of the PP was performed by the EWA-Canada Common Criteria Testing Laboratory to confirm that it
meets the claimed APE assurance requirements.
The evaluations determined that the PP_PSD_v4.0 is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant. The
Security Target contains material drawn directly from the PP_PSD_v4.0 as well as the following: PP-Module for Analog Audio
Output Devices version 1.0; PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices version 1.0; PP-Module for User Authentication Devices
version 1.0; and PP-Module for Video/Display Devices version 1.0. Evaluation of the ST materials that relate to PP_PSD_v4.0
as part of completing the ASE work units serves to satisfy the APE work units as well.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, found that the evaluations demonstrated that the
PP_PSD_v4.0 meets the requirements of the APE components. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Assurance
Activity Report (AAR) are consistent with the evidence produced.
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1 IDENTIFICATION
The evaluation of the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, version 4.0 (PP_PSD_v4.0) was performed
concurrently with the first product evaluation against the PP. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) was the Belkin F1DN104KVM-
UN-4, F1DN204KVM-UN-4, F1DN102KVM-UN-4, F1DN202KVM-UN-4, F1DN108KVM-UN-4, F1DN208KVM-UN-4, F1DN116KVM-
UN-4 Firmware Version 44444-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices (hereafter referred to as “Belkin KVM Devices”) which was
evaluated for conformance to the PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, User Authentication Devices, and Video/Display Devices, version 1.0 (PP-Config. for PSD-AO-KM-
UA-VI_v1.0). The evaluation was performed by the EWA-Canada Common Criteria Testing Laboratory and was completed in
April 2021.
The PP_PSD_v4.0 contains a set of “base” requirements that all conformant STs must include, and additionally contains
“Optional” and “Selection-based” requirements. The PP contains Implementation-Dependent Optional Requirements that are
dependent on the TOE implementing a particular function. The Selection-based requirements are additional requirements
based on selections made within the body of the PP; if certain selections are made, then additional requirements will need to
be included.
The following identifies the PP that was the subject of the evaluation and certification, together with supporting information
from the base evaluation performed against this PP.
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device version 4.0
Security Target Belkin F1DN104KVM-UN-4, F1DN204KVM-UN-4, F1DN102KVM-UN-4, F1DN202KVM-UN-4,
F1DN108KVM-UN-4, F1DN208KVM-UN-4, F1DN116KVM-UN-4 Firmware Version 44444-E7E7
Peripheral Sharing Devices Security Target, Version 1.4B, 19 February 2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Conformant
CC Testing Lab EWA-Canada
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2 PP DESCRIPTION
The PP_PSD_v4.0 describes common security requirements for Peripheral Sharing Devices (PSDs). In the context of this PP,
a PSD is an IT product for securely connecting one or more peripheral devices to one or more computers such that data
cannot flow between computers by way of the peripherals or the PSD. Examples of PSDs that can claim compliance to this
PP include Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) switches; Keyboard, Mouse (KM) switches; and Isolators.
A PSD may be composed of one or more hardware components or platforms, and its software or firmware. It may include
cables and accessories. PSDs that support more than one computer include a user interface that includes a visible
indication of the selected computer interface and a mechanism for changing the selected computer interface. The user
interface can be implemented on the chassis of the PSD using, for example, a touch screen or lights and buttons, or as part
of a wired remote control.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS
The specific conditions listed here are assumed to exist in the TOE’s Operational Environment. These assumptions include
both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on
the use of the TOE.
Table 1: Assumptions
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
A.NO_TEMPEST Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
A.PHYSICAL The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it processes and contains.
A.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
A.USER_ALLOWED_ACCESS All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of the PSD to
prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers or their connected
network shall have the required means to authenticate the user and to control access to their
various resources.
3.2 THREATS
TOEs conforming to the PP_PSD_v4.0 counter the following threats.
Table 2: Threats
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.DATA_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data flow
through the PSD or its connected peripherals.
T.SIGNAL_LEAK A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data flow
through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
T.RESIDUAL_LEAK A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected computer
and another unintended connected computer.
T.UNINTENDED_USE A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than the one to which the user intended to
connect.
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Threat Name Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DEVICES The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSD peripheral port may allow
unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSD or its
connected computers.
T.LOGICAL_TAMPER An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the control of a
malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or data stored in the PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile
memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
T.PHYSICAL_TAMPER A malicious user or human agent could physically modify the PSD to allow unauthorized
information flows.
T.REPLACEMENT A malicious human agent could replace the PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an alternate
device that does not enforce the PSD security policies.
T.FAILED Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an unauthorized information flow or weakening of PSD
security functions.
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
No organizational security policies have been identified that are specific to Peripheral Sharing Devices.
3.4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
The following table contains security objectives for the TOE.
Table 3: TOE Security Objectives
TOE Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION
The PSD shall prevent unauthorized data flow to ensure that the PSD and its connected
peripheral devices cannot be exploited in an attempt to leak data. The TOE‐Computer interface
shall be isolated from all other PSD‐Computer interfaces while TOE is powered. (Addressed
by: FDP_APC_EXT.1)
O.COMPUTER_INTERFACE
_ISOLATION_TOE_UNPOWERED
The PSD shall not allow data to transit a PSD‐Computer interface while the PSD is unpowered.
(Addressed by: FDP_APC_EXT.1)
O.USER_DATA_ISOLATION The PSD shall route user data, such as keyboard entries, only to the computer selected by the
user. The PSD shall provide isolation between the data flowing from the peripheral device to the
selected computer and any non‐selected computer. (Addressed by: FDP_APC_EXT.1)
O.NO_USER_DATA_RETENTION The PSD shall not retain user data in non‐volatile memory after power up or, if supported,
factory reset. (Addressed by: FDP_RIP_EXT.1, FDP_RIP_EXT.2 (optional))
O.NO_OTHER_EXTERNAL
_INTERFACES
The PSD shall not have any external interfaces other than those implemented by the TSF.
(Addressed by: FDP_PDC_EXT.1)
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TOE Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.LEAK_PREVENTION_SWITCHING The PSD shall ensure that there are no switching mechanisms that allow signal data leakage
between connected computers. (Addressed by: FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2 (selection‐
based))
O.AUTHORIZED_USAGE The TOE shall explicitly prohibit or ignore unauthorized switching mechanisms, either because it
supports only one connected computer or because it allows only authorized mechanisms to
switch between connected computers. Authorized switching mechanisms shall require express
user action restricted to console buttons, console switches, console touch screen, wired remote
control, and peripheral devices using a guard. Unauthorized switching mechanisms include
keyboard shortcuts, also known as “hotkeys,” automatic port scanning, control through a
connected computer, and control through keyboard shortcuts. Where applicable, the results of
the switching activity shall be indicated by the TSF so that it is clear to the user that the
switching mechanism was engaged as intended. A conformant TOE may also provide a
management function to configure some aspects of the TSF. If the TOE provides this
functionality, it shall ensure that whatever management functions it provides can only be
performed by authorized administrators and that an audit trail of management activities is
generated. (Addressed by: FAU_GEN.1 (optional), FDP_SWI_EXT.1, FDP_SWI_EXT.2 (selection‐
based), FIA_UAU.2 (optional), FIA_UID.2 (optional), FMT_MOF.1 (optional), FMT_SMF.1
(optional), FMT_SMR.1 (optional), FPT_STM.1 (optional), FTA_CIN_EXT.1 (selection‐based))
O.PERIPHERAL_PORTS_ISOLATION The PSD shall ensure that data does not flow between peripheral devices connected to different
PSD interfaces. (Addressed by: FDP_APC_EXT.1)
O.REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED
_PERIPHERAL
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral device types and protocols. (Addressed by:
FDP_PDC_EXT.1)
O.REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED
_ENDPOINTS
The PSD shall reject unauthorized peripheral devices connected via a Universal Serial Bus (USB)
hub. (Addressed by: FDP_PDC_EXT.1)
O.NO_TOE_ACCESS The PSD firmware, software, and memory shall not be accessible via its external ports.
(Addressed by: FPT_NTA_EXT.1)
O.TAMPER_EVIDENT_LABEL The PSD shall be identifiable as authentic by the user and the user must be made aware of any
procedures or other such information to accomplish authentication. This feature must be
available upon receipt of the PSD and continue to be available during the PSD deployment. The
PSD shall be labeled with at least one visible unique identifying tamper‐evident marking that can
be used to authenticate the device. The PSD manufacturer must maintain a complete list of
manufactured PSD articles and their respective identification markings’ unique identifiers.
(Addressed by: FPT_PHP.1)
O.ANTI_TAMPERING The PSD shall be physically enclosed so that any attempts to open or otherwise access the
internals or modify the connections of the PSD would be evident, and optionally thwarted
through disablement of the TOE. Note: This applies to a wired remote control as well as the
main chassis of the PSD. (Addressed by: FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3 (optional))
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TOE Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.SELF_TEST The PSD shall perform self‐tests following power up or powered reset. (Addressed by:
FPT_TST.1)
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_TOE_DISABLE The PSD shall enter a secure state upon detection of a critical failure. (Addressed by:
FPT_FLS_EXT.1, FPT_TST_EXT.1)
O.SELF_TEST_FAIL_INDICATION The PSD shall provide clear and visible user indications in the case of a self‐test failure.
(Addressed by: FPT_TST_EXT.1)
The following table contains security objectives for the Operational Environment.
Table 4: Environmental Security Objectives
Environmental Security Obj. Environmental Security Objective Definition
OE.NO_TEMPEST The operational environment will not use TEMPEST approved equipment
OE.PHYSICAL The operational environment will provide physical security, commensurate with the value of the
PSD and the data that transits it.
OE.NO_WIRELESS_DEVICES The operational environment will not include wireless keyboards, mice, audio, user
authentication, or video devices.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN The operational environment will ensure that trusted PSD Administrators and users are
appropriately trained.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG The operational environment will ensure that administrators configuring the PSD and its
operational environment follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
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4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
4.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
As indicated above, requirements in the PP_PSD_v4.0 are comprised of the “base” requirements and additional requirements
that are conditionally optional. The following table contains the “base” requirements that were certified as part of the Belkin
KVM Devices evaluation activity referenced above.
Table 5: “Base” Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_APC_EXT.1: Active PSD Connections ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FDP_PDC_EXT.1: Peripheral Device Connection ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FDP_RIP_EXT.1: Residual Information Protection ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FDP_SWI_EXT.1: PSD Switching ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_FLS_EXT.1: Failure with Preservation of
Secure State
ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT_NTA_EXT.1: No Access to TOE ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT_PHP.1: Passive Detection of Physical Attack ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT_TST.1: TSF Testing ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
The following table contains the “Optional” requirements contained in Appendix A, and an indication of which evaluation
those requirements were verified in. These requirements were certified as part of the Belkin KVM Devices evaluation activity
referenced above.
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Table 6: “Optional” Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_RIP_EXT.2: Purge of Residual Information ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.2: User Authentication Before Any Action ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FIA_UID.2: User Identification Before Any Action ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1: Management of Security Functions
Behaviour
ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management
Functions
ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FMT_SMR.1: Security Roles ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to Physical Attack ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
The following table contains the “Selection-Based” requirements contained in Appendix B, and an indication of which
evaluation those requirements were verified in. These requirements were certified as part of the Belkin KVM Devices
evaluation activity referenced above.
Table 7: “Selection-Based” Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_SWI_EXT.2: PSD Switching Methods ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
For PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
FTA: TOE Access FTA_CIN_EXT.1 : Continuous Indications ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
For PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
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4.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The following are the assurance requirements contained in the PP_PSD_v4.0:
Table 8: Security Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
ASE: Security Target ASE_CCL.1: Conformance Claims ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_ECD.1: Extended Components Definition ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_INT.1: ST Introduction ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_OBJ.2: Security Objectives ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_REQ.2: Derived Security Requirements ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_SPD.1: Security Problem Definition ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ASE_TSS.1: TOE Summary Specification ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic Functional Specification ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
AGD: Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ALC: Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1: Labeling of the TOE ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing – Conformance ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
AVA: Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config.
for PSD-AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
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5 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
Note that for APE elements and work units that are identical to ASE elements and work units, the testing laboratory
performed the APE work units concurrent to the ASE work units. In addition, the testing laboratory performed a separate APE
evaluation of the PP_PSD_v4.0 that was independent of the product evaluation.
Table 9: Evaluation Results
APE Requirement Evaluation Verdict Verified By
APE_CCL.1: Conformance Claims Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
APE_ECD.1: Extended Components Definition Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
APE_INT.1: PP Introduction Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
APE_OBJ.2: Security Objectives Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
APE_REQ.2: Derived Security Requirements Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
APE_SPD.1: Security Problem Definition Pass • ST: Belkin KVM Devices (PP-Config. for PSD-
AO-KM-UA-VI_v1.0)
• APE Evaluation
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6 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July 2019.
Belkin F1DN104KVM-UN-4, F1DN204KVM-UN-4, F1DN102KVM-UN-4, F1DN202KVM-UN-4, F1DN108KVM-UN-4,
F1DN208KVM-UN-4, F1DN116KVM-UN-4 Firmware Version 44444-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing Devices Security
Target, Version 1.4B, 19 February 2021.
Assurance Activity Report Belkin F1DN104KVM-UN-4, F1DN204KVM-UN-4, F1DN102KVM-UN-4, F1DN202KVM-UN-
4, F1DN108KVM-UN-4, F1DN208KVM-UN-4, F1DN116KVM-UN-4 Firmware Version 44444-E7E7 Peripheral Sharing
Devices, Version 1.1, 29 April 2021.