Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance
PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
16 December 2025
developed by
Infineon Technologies AG
NXP Semiconductors
STMicroelectronics
Thales
Registered and certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
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Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
Table of contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 5
2 PP-Configurations.............................................................................................. 5
2.1 Identification.............................................................................................................5
2.2 Components Statement...........................................................................................6
2.2.1 PP-Configuration Components........................................................................................ 6
2.2.2 TSF Organization............................................................................................................. 7
2.3 TOE Overview...........................................................................................................8
2.3.1 TOE Type ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.3.2 TOE Usage...................................................................................................................... 8
2.3.3 TOE Major Security Features.......................................................................................... 8
2.3.4 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware.......................................................... 9
2.4 Conformance Claims...............................................................................................9
2.4.1 CC Conformance Claim................................................................................................... 9
2.4.2 Assurance Package claim ............................................................................................... 9
2.4.3 Conformance Statement.................................................................................................. 9
2.5 Consistency Rationale ..........................................................................................10
2.5.1 TOE Type Rationale ...................................................................................................... 10
2.5.2 SPD Rationale ............................................................................................................... 10
2.5.3 Security Objectives Rationale........................................................................................ 10
2.5.4 SFRs Rationale.............................................................................................................. 10
2.6 SAR Statement.......................................................................................................11
2.6.1 Global SARs for the TOE .............................................................................................. 11
2.6.2 SARs for Sub-TSFs ....................................................................................................... 11
2.6.3 Assurance Rationale ..................................................................................................... 11
3 PP-Modules ...................................................................................................... 12
3.1 PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC......................................................12
3.1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 12
3.1.2 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 12
3.1.3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 13
3.1.4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................ 13
3.1.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 13
3.1.6 Consistency Rationale................................................................................................... 14
3.2 PP-Module Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment only).........................14
3.2.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 14
3.2.2 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 15
3.2.3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 15
3.2.4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................ 16
3.2.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 16
3.2.6 Consistency Rationale................................................................................................... 17
3.3 PP-Module Loader 2 (for usage by authorized users only) ...............................17
3.3.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 17
3.3.2 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 18
3.3.3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 18
3.3.4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................ 18
3.3.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 19
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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3.3.6 Consistency Rationale................................................................................................... 19
3.4 PP-Module Address-based Access Control ........................................................20
3.4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 20
3.4.2 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 20
3.4.3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 21
3.4.4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................ 21
3.4.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 21
3.4.6 Consistency Rationale................................................................................................... 22
3.5 PP-Module Limited Test Features ........................................................................22
3.5.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................... 22
3.5.2 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 23
3.5.3 Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 23
3.5.4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................ 24
3.5.5 Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 24
3.5.6 Consistency Rationale................................................................................................... 26
4 Glossary............................................................................................................ 26
5 Abbreviations................................................................................................... 26
6 References........................................................................................................ 27
List of tables
Table 2-1: PP-Configuration with Packages [p] and PP-Modules [m]......................................5
Table 2-2: PP-Configuration components ................................................................................6
Table 3-1: PP-Module Limited Test Features - SFR Dependencies ......................................26
List of Figures
Figure 1: TSF organisation.......................................................................................................7
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
1 Introduction
1 This document defines a set of PP-Modules and a family of multi-assurance PP-
Configurations for the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7], also referred to as PP-
0084-v2 in this document.
2 The PP-Modules address functionality that is already in the scope of the PP-0084-v2
but at a strictly higher assurance level including ADV_SPM.1. These are:
- PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC,
- PP-Module Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment only),
- PP-Module Loader 2 (for usage by authorised users only),
- PP-Module Address-based Access Control,
- PP-Module Limited Test Features.
3 The PP-Configurations consist of the core PP-0084-v21, possibly including some
selected functional packages, and a non-empty subset of PP-Modules.
4 The inclusion (or claim) of functional packages from PP-0084-v2 in the PP-
Configurations defined in this document is constrained as follows:
- Package Cryptographic Services can be included in any PP-Configuration,
- Package Authentication of the Security IC can be included if the PP-Module
Authentication of the Security IC is not included in the PP-Configuration,
- Packages Loader 1, Loader 2, and Address-based Access Control cannot be
included in any PP-Configuration. That is, these can only be included through the
corresponding PP-Modules as they define the minimum formal model scope for
ADV_SPM.1.
5 The combinatory of functional packages and PP-Modules gives rise to a set of multi-
assurance PP-configurations, which are defined altogether in section 2. Each PP-
Configuration is identified with a unique reference, which reflects its components. The
definition of the PP-Configurations is factorized due to their large number.
2 PP-Configurations
2.1 Identification
6 The reference of a PP-Configuration consists of its name and version, where the name
is structured as shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: PP-Configuration with Packages [p] and PP-Modules [m]
Name: Security IC Platform PP-Configuration with Packages [p] and PP-Modules
[m]
where
p is a subset of the functional packages {Authentication of the Security IC,
Cryptographic Services},
1
Core PP-0084-v2 denotes the PP-0084-v2 without any optional functional package.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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m is a non-empty subset of the PP-Modules {Authentication of the Security
IC, Loader 1, Loader 2, Address-based Access Control, Limited Test
Features}, and
p and m do not both include Authentication of the Security IC
Version: 1.0
Date: 16/12/2025
Sponsored by: Infineon Technologies AG, NXP Semiconductors, STMicroelectronics, and
Thales
Technical editor: Internet of Trust, 77 avenue Niel, 75017 Paris, France
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
Assurance type: Multi-assurance
7 For example, the following PP-Configuration names are valid:
- Security IC Platform PP-Configuration with Packages [Cryptographic Services]
and PP-Modules [Authentication of the Security IC, Loader 1, Loader 2, Address-
based Access Control, Limited Test Features],
- Security IC Platform PP-Configuration with Packages [Cryptographic Services]
and PP-Modules [Loader 1],
- Security IC Platform PP-Configuration with Packages [none] and PP-Modules
[Loader 1, Loader 2, Address-based Access Control].
2.2 Components Statement
2.2.1 PP-Configuration Components
8 The components of a PP-Configuration consist of the core PP-0084-v2 with selected
functional packages, and a non-empty set of PP-Modules, as shown in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2: PP-Configuration components
Component name and version Is a component?
PP Core PP-0084-v2, optionally including
Package Authentication of the Security IC and/or
Package Cryptographic Services, v2.0
Yes*
PP-Modules PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC, v1.0 Optionally**
PP-Module Loader 1, v1.0 Optionally**
PP-Module Loader 2, v1.0 Optionally**
PP-Module Address-based Access Control, v1.0 Optionally**
PP-Module Limited Test Features, v1.0 Optionally**
* If the PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC is a component of the PP-Configuration,
then the Package Authentication of the Security IC is not included.
** At least one PP-Module is included as a component.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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9 Since the selectable PP-Modules have PP-0084-v2 as base PP, the set of components
is well-defined.
2.2.2 TSF Organization
2.2.2.1 Overview
10 The TSF of a Security IC Platform Multi-Assurance PP-Configuration consists of the
union of its components’ sub-TSFs. Figure 1 shows the dependency graph between
the sub-TSFs, which is straightforward: all the selectable PP-Modules depend on the
core PP-0084-v2, i.e. there is no dependency on the optional functional packages and
there is no inter-dependency between the PP-Modules. The Package Authentication of
the Security IC can only be included if the corresponding PP-Module is not. All the
selectable PP-Modules include higher assurance requirements than PP-0084-v2, i.e.
they include ADV_SPM.1.
Figure 1: TSF organisation
2.2.2.2 Sub-TSF for PP-0884-v2
11 The sub-TSF defined by the core PP-0084-v2 provides protection of user data
confidentiality, integrity, and ensures secure internal data transfer. The TSF protects
data stored within protected memory areas and ensures confidentiality and integrity
during internal transfer. It provides strong resistance against physical attacks including
physical probing, manipulation, forced information leakage, inherent information
leakage, and malfunctions induced by environmental stress. Additionally, the TSF
implements limited test capabilities and availability after TOE delivery, preventing
abuse. It also provides secure random numbers generation.
12 This sub-TSF may also provide cryptographic services and authentication mechanisms
to the external entities through the optional functional packages.
2.2.2.3 Sub-TSF Authentication of the Security IC
13 The sub-TSF Authentication of the Security IC provides functionality that enables the
TOE to securely authenticate itself to external entities during operational usage. This
authentication mechanism ensures that the TOE can unambiguously demonstrate its
authenticity by verifying a unique TOE identity.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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2.2.2.4 Sub-TSF Loader 1
14 The sub-TSF Loader 1 implements a loading mechanism restricted to usage within
secure environments. It provides loading capabilities with limited functionalities,
enforced by mechanisms that irreversibly terminate the loader's operation after the
necessary loading processes are complete.
2.2.2.5 Sub-TSF Loader 2
15 The sub-TSF Loader 2 provides functionality specifically designed for secure loading
operations performed by explicitly authorized users during the operational usage phase
of the TOE. It enforces authentication and access controls, ensuring that only
authenticated and authorized entities can conduct loading operations post-TOE
delivery.
2.2.2.6 Sub-TSF Address-based Access Control
16 The Sub-TSF Address-based Access Control provides security functionality enforcing
controlled access to specified addressable areas based on defined security attributes.
It ensures that operations on those areas are strictly limited to explicitly authorized
subjects.
2.2.2.7 Sub-TSF Limited Test Features
17 The Sub-TSF Limited Test Features provides availability and capability control over the
test features after TOE delivery. This sub-TSF is also present in the core part of the
PP-0084-v2 sub-TSF.
2.3 TOE Overview
2.3.1 TOE Type
18 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Security IC comprising hardware and IC Dedicated
Software as defined in PP-0084-v2.
2.3.2 TOE Usage
19 The TOE is primarily intended as a secure hardware platform for applications requiring
high levels of security, such as smart cards and secure elements for payment,
identification or electronic signature.
2.3.3 TOE Major Security Features
20 The TOE implements physical protection of its assets and the assets of the Security IC
Embedded Software against probing, forced and inherent information leakage,
manipulation, and malfunctions induced by environmental stress. The TOE implements
secure random number generation and a strict limitation of the test features after
delivery.
21 The TOE also implements the additional major security features related to the selected
functional packages and the component PP-Modules which are included in the PP-
Configuration.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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- A TOE that implements cryptographic services for the Security IC Embedded
Software and claims the corresponding functional package provides secure
cryptographic algorithms to support data confidentiality, integrity, and secure
communications.
- A TOE that implements a service for the authentication of the Security IC and
claims the corresponding functional package or PP-Module ensures secure and
unique identity authentication to external entities.
- A TOE that implements Loader 1 functionality and claims the corresponding PP-
Module ensures strictly limited code loading functionalities in controlled
environments.
- A TOE that implements Loader 2 functionality and claims the corresponding PP-
Module ensures loading is accessible only to authenticated and authorized
entities post-delivery.
- A TOE that implements Address-based Access Control and claims the
corresponding PP-Module enforces access control on memory regions and
possibly other address-based locations/peripherals to prevent unauthorized
disclosure, modification, or manipulation of sensitive data.
22 A TOE that claims the PP-Module Limited Test Features does not add functionality to
the core functionality expressed in the PP-0084-v2 as this is already included.
2.3.4 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
23 None.
2.4 Conformance Claims
2.4.1 CC Conformance Claim
24 The PP-Configurations claim conformance to CC:2022 Revision 12 as follows:
- CC Part 2-extended,
- CC Part 3-conformant.
25 The conformance claim CC Part 2-extended originates in the PP-Configuration
component PP-0084-v2.
26 The CC conformance claim is consistent with the PP-Configurations components,
which also claim CC:2022.
2.4.2 Assurance Package claim
27 The PP-Configurations claim conformance to a multi-assurance evaluation level built
on top of EAL4-augmented. See 2.6.
2.4.3 Conformance Statement
28 The PP-Configurations require strict conformance of an ST claiming conformance to it.
2
CC:2022 Revision 1 consists of Parts 1 to 5, cf. [1] to [5].
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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2.5 Consistency Rationale
2.5.1 TOE Type Rationale
29 The TOE type defined in the PP-Configurations, a Security IC platform is the same as
the TOE types specified in PP-0084-v2 and PP-Modules. More specifically:
- the core PP-0084-v2 defines the TOE as a Security IC Platform, including IC
hardware and dedicated software for secure storage, secure internal data
transfer, and robust physical protection,
- the PP-Modules for Authentication, Loaders, and Address-based Access Control
define extensions for Security IC platforms with specific functionalities for robust
authentication mechanism, secured loading operations, and rigorous access
control to memory and selected address-based locations,
- the PP-Module Limited Test Features covers functionality that is already included
in the core PP-0084-v2.
30 Consequently, the TOE type in the PP-Configurations is consistent with the TOE types
of its components.
2.5.2 SPD Rationale
31 The SPD of a PP-Configuration is the union of the SPDs of its components. The core
SPD from PP-0084-v2 covers generic threats and the RNG service threat, to which
each of the PP-Modules included in the PP-Configuration adds specific threats and/or
OSPs without contradicting or weakening the core SPD or the SPD of the other PP-
Modules. Note that the threats T.Abuse-Loader1 (from PP-Module Loader 13) and
T.Abuse-Test (from PP-Module Limited Test Features4) are included in the threat
T.Abuse-Func defined in the core PP-0084-v2. PP-Modules do not introduce
assumptions, thus avoiding any potential conflict with those of the core PP-0084-v2.
The SPDs of the PP-Configurations are internally consistent.
2.5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
32 The set of security objectives of a PP-Configuration is the union of the objectives for
the TOE and its environment defined in its components, which is internally consistent.
The core objectives from PP-0084-v2 cover the generic security properties and the
RNG service, to which the each of the PP-Modules included in the PP-Configuration
adds some specific objectives without contradicting or weakening the core objectives or
the objectives of the other PP-Modules. Note that the objective O.Abuse-Test defined
in the PP-Module Limited Test Features is included in the objective O.Abuse-Func
defined in the core PP-0084-v2. The sets of security objectives of the PP-
Configurations are internally consistent.
2.5.4 SFRs Rationale
33 The set of SFRs of a PP-Configuration is the union of the SFRs of its components. The
3
The threat T.Abuse-Loader1 is defined in Package Loader 1 and included in PP-Module Loader1.
4
The threat T.Abuse-Test is defined in PP-Module Limited Test Features.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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core SFRs from PP-0084-v2 cover the generic security functionality and the RNG
service, to which the each of the PP-Modules included in the PP-Configuration adds
specific SFRs without contradicting or weakening the core SFRs or the SFRs of the
other PP-Modules. Note that the SFRs defined in the PP-Module Limited Test Features
are already included in the core PP-0084-v2. The sets of SFRs of the PP-
Configurations are internally consistent.
2.6 SAR Statement
2.6.1 Global SARs for the TOE
34 The global set of Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for the TOE corresponds to
the predefined package EAL4, augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and
AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements defined in PP-0084-v2.
35 Remark: A multi-assurance ST conformant with a PP-Configuration defined in this
document can augment the global set of SARs, which is inherited by the SARs of the
sub-TSFs.
2.6.2 SARs for Sub-TSFs
36 For the PP-0084-v2 sub-TSF, the set of SARs is identical to the global set of SARs.
37 For the sub-TSFs defined in the PP-Modules, the sets of SARs are EAL4 augmented
with ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the
refinements defined in PP-0084-v2.
38 Remark: A multi-assurance ST conformant with a PP-Configuration defined in this
document can augment the set of SARs of any sub-TSF. The augmentation can be
uniform or not. An augmentation to the global set of SARs leads to the uniform
augmentation of the sets of SARs of all the sub-TSFs.
2.6.3 Assurance Rationale
39 The SARs defined for the sub-TSFs of the PP-Configuration are identical to those
defined in the corresponding components (PP-0084-v2 and PP-Modules). Therefore,
consistency is ensured.
40 The global set of SARs is consistent with the threats as defined in the SPDs of the PP-
Configuration components, per PP-0084-v2.
41 Sub-TSF SARs are a superset over the global set targeting formal modelling and proof
obligations for the sub-TSF. This keeps a single global assurance baseline while
achieving strictly higher assurance where functionality to model is selected through PP-
Modules. There is no assurance gap or contradiction between the global set of SARs
and the per-PP-Module SARs.
42 Remark: Unlike other PP-Modules, the PP-Module Limited Test Features covers
functionality that is part of the core PP-0084-v2. Since the set of SARs of the PP-
Module Limited Test Features is a superset of the SARs of PP-0084-v2, in a TOE
evaluation the functionality can be evaluated once. If the set of SARs of the PP-0084-
v2 is augmented in a multi-assurance ST (without including ADV_SPM.1), then the set
of SARs of the PP-Module Limited Test Features should be augmented identically for
clarity (in practice the functionality will always be evaluated against all the assurance
components that apply to it).
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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3 PP-Modules
3.1 PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC
3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.1.1 PP-Module Identification
43 The reference of this PP-Module consists of the name and version.
Name: PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC
Version: 1.0
Date: 16/12/2025
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
44 This PP-Module is functionally identical to the Package Authentication of the Security
IC from PP-0084-v2.
45 From the assurance point of view, it includes a specific set of SARs, which is strictly
higher than the one defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.1.1.2 PP-Module Base
46 The PP-Module Base consists of PP-0084-v2 [7].
3.1.1.3 TOE Overview
47 TOE Type: Security IC platform comprising hardware and IC Dedicated Software as
defined in PP-0084-v2.
48 TOE Usage: as defined in PP-0084-v2.
49 TOE Major Security Features: authentication of the TOE by external entities.
50 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware: None.
3.1.2 Conformance Claims
3.1.2.1 CC Conformance Claim
51 This PP-Module claims conformance to the CC:2022 Revision 1 as follows:
- CC Part 2-conformant,
- CC Part 3-conformant.
3.1.2.2 Package Claim
3.1.2.2.1 Functional Package Claim
52 This PP-Module claims conformance to functional packages as follows:
- Package-conformant to Package Authentication of the Security IC from PP-0084-
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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v2.
3.1.2.2.2 Assurance Package Claim
53 This PP-Module claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements
defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.1.2.3 Conformance Statement
54 This PP-Module requires strict conformance of a ST or PP claiming conformance to a
PP-Configuration that includes it.
3.1.3 Security Problem Definition
55 The asset of this PP-Module is the TOE authentication security service. The SPD is the
one defined in the Package Authentication of the Security IC, see PP-0084-v2, section
7.1.3.
3.1.4 Security Objectives
56 The security objectives of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package
Authentication of the Security IC, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.1.3.
3.1.4.1 Security Objectives Rationale
57 The rationale for the security objectives of this PP-Module is the one defined in the
Package Authentication of the Security IC, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.1.3.
3.1.5 Security Requirements
3.1.5.1 Security Functional Requirements
58 The SFRs of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Authentication of the
Security IC, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.1.4.
3.1.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
59 The SARs for this PP-Module are those defined in 3.1.2.2.2.
3.1.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
3.1.5.3.1 SFR Rationale
60 The rationale for the SFRs of this PP-Module, i.e. coverage of the security objectives
for the TOE by the SFRs and dependencies analysis, is identical to that provided in the
Package Authentication of the Security IC, see PP-0084-v2 section 7.1.4.
3.1.5.3.2 SAR Rationale
61 The SARs of this PP-Module constitute an augmentation of the SARs that apply to the
Package Authentication of the Security IC with ADV_SPM.1. This assurance
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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component requires the formal model of the sub-TSF (the set of SFRs defined in the
PP-Module), the proof of the security objectives for the TOE defined in the PP-Module
and the relationship between the model and the FSP for that sub-TSF.
62 The augmentation by ADV_SPM.1 has been chosen for higher assurance in the
internal consistency of the Security Target and inter-consistency with the FSP.
3.1.5.4 SFR Dependencies
63 The dependencies for this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Authentication
of the Security IC, see PP-0084-v2 section 7.1.4.
3.1.6 Consistency Rationale
64 The PP-Module Authentication of the Security IC is consistent with the PP-0084-v2:
- The TOE type defined in the PP-Module is the same as in the PP-0084-v2.
- The asset of this PP-Module is a security service, and as such is included in PP-
0084-v2. The threat T.Masquerade-TOE included in this PP-Module extends the
threats defined in the core PP-0084-v2. The extension focuses on the risk of
claiming genuineness. This PP-Module does not add OSPs or assumptions.
- The additional objective for the TOE O.Authentication ensures that the Security IC
can authenticate itself to external entities using Initialisation Data. Additionally, the
objective for the environment OE.TOE-Auth requires those external entities to
support the verification mechanism and hold the reference data. The objectives
introduced in this PP-Module do not contradict or invalidate the objectives of the
PP-0084-v2.
- This PP-Module introduces an SFR that completes the SFRs from the core PP-
0084-v2. This SFR requires that the TOE provides an authentication mechanism
to prove its identity. The SFR introduced in this PP-Module does not contradict or
invalidate the SFRs of the PP-0084-v2.
- This PP-Module defines a specific set of SARs, which adds ADV_SPM.1 to the
SARs defined in the base PP-0084-v2. All the dependencies of ADV_SPM.1 are
included in the set of SARs which is included in PP-0084-v2.
3.2 PP-Module Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment only)
3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.1.1 PP-Module Identification
65 The reference of the PP-Module consists of the name and version.
Name: PP-Module Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment only)
Version: 1.0
Date: 4/12/2025
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
66 This PP-Module is functionally identical to the Package Loader 1 (for usage in secured
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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environment only) from PP-0084-v2.
67 From the assurance point of view, it includes a specific set of SARs, which is strictly
higher than the one defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.2.1.2 PP-Module Base
68 The PP-Module Base consists of PP-0084-v2 [7].
3.2.1.3 TOE Overview
69 TOE Type: Security IC platform comprising hardware and IC Dedicated Software as
defined in PP-0084-v2.
70 TOE Usage: as defined in PP-0084-v2.
71 TOE Major Security Features: Loading capabilities, to be used in controlled operational
environments prior to the end-usage. Its purpose is to load Security IC Embedded
Software, user data of the Composite Product, or IC Dedicated Support Software and
then have its capability and availability limited so stored data cannot later be disclosed
or manipulated.
72 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware: None.
3.2.2 Conformance Claims
3.2.2.1 CC Conformance Claim
73 This PP-Module claims conformance to CC:2022 Revision 1 as follows:
- CC Part 2-conformant
- CC Part 3-conformant.
3.2.2.2 Package Claim
3.2.2.2.1 Functional Package Claim
74 This PP-Module claims conformance to functional packages as follows:
- Package-conformant to Package Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment
only) from PP-0084-v2.
3.2.2.2.2 Assurance Package Claim
75 This PP-Module claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements
defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.2.2.3 Conformance Statement
76 This PP-Module requires strict conformance of a ST or PP claiming conformance to a
PP-Configuration that includes it.
3.2.3 Security Problem Definition
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
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77 The asset of this PP-Module is the user data (Security IC Embedded Software and
user data of the Composite TOE). The SPD is the one defined in Package Loader 1,
see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.1.3.
3.2.4 Security Objectives
78 The security objectives of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 1,
see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.1.3.
3.2.4.1 Security Objectives Rationale
79 The rationale for the security objectives of this PP-Module is the one defined in the
Package Loader 1, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.1.3.
3.2.5 Security Requirements
3.2.5.1 Security Functional Requirements
80 The SFRs of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 1, see PP-
0084-v2, section 7.2.1.4.
3.2.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
81 The SARs for this PP-Module are those defined in 3.2.2.2.2.
3.2.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
3.2.5.3.1 SFR Rationale
82 The rationale for the SFRs of this PP-Module, i.e. coverage of the security objectives
for the TOE by the SFRs and dependencies analysis, is identical to that provided in
the Package Loader 1, see PP-0084-v2 section 7.2.1.4
3.2.5.3.2 SAR Rationale
83 The SARs of this PP-Module constitute an augmentation of the SARs that apply to
the Package Loader 1 with ADV_SPM.1. This assurance component requires the
formal model of the sub-TSF (the set of SFRs defined in the PP-Module), the proof of
the security objectives for the TOE defined in the PP-Module and the relationship
between the model and the FSP for that sub-TSF.
84 The augmentation by ADV_SPM.1 has been chosen for higher assurance in the
internal consistency of the Security Target and inter-consistency with the FSP.
3.2.5.4 SFR Dependencies
85 The dependencies for this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 1,
see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.1.4.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
3.2.6 Consistency Rationale
86 The PP-Module Loader 1 (for usage in secured environment only) is consistent with the
PP-0084-v2:
- The TOE type defined in the PP Module is the same as in the PP-0084-v2.
- The asset of this PP-Module is an asset of PP-0084-v2. The threat T.Abuse-
Loader1 and the OSP P.Lim-Block-Loader1 included in this PP-Module extend the
SPD defined in the PP-0084-v2. The extension focuses on the secure loading of
user data or IC Dedicated Support Software in secured environments. The OSP
requires that the Loader capability be limited and then blocked after the intended
use. This PP-Module does not add assumptions.
- The additional objective for the TOE O.Cap-Avail-Loader1 provides limited Loader
capability and irreversible termination to protect stored user data. Additionally, the
objective for the environment OE.Lim-Block-Loader1 is added mandating that the
manufacturer protects the Loader, limits its capability and blocks it the after its
intended use. The objectives introduced in this PP-Module do not contradict or
invalidate the objectives of the PP-0084-v2.
- This PP-Module introduces a set of SFRs that complete the SFRs from the core
PP-0084-v2. The SFRs defined in this PP-Module ensures that loading activities
are strictly controlled in secure environment.
- This PP-Module defines a specific set of SARs, which adds ADV_SPM.1 to those
defined in the base PP-0084-v2. All the dependencies of ADV_SPM.1 are
included in the set of SARs which is included in PP-0084-v2.
3.3 PP-Module Loader 2 (for usage by authorized users only)
3.3.1 Introduction
3.3.1.1 PP-Module Identification
87 The reference of the PP-Module consists of the name and version.
Name: PP-Module Loader 2 (for usage by authorized users only)
Version: 1.0
Date: 16/12/2025
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
88 This PP-Module is functionally identical to the Package Loader 2 (for usage by
authorized users only) from PP-0084-v2.
89 From the assurance point of view, it includes a specific set of SARs, which is strictly
higher than the one defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.3.1.2 PP-Module Base
90 The PP-Module Base consists of PP-0084-v2 [7].
3.3.1.3 TOE Overview
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
91 TOE Type: Security IC platform comprising hardware and IC Dedicated Software as
defined in PP-0084-v2.
92 TOE Usage: as defined in PP-0084-v2.
93 TOE Major Security Features: Loader functionality designed for use by authorised
entities beyond the manufacturing phases.
94 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware: None.
3.3.2 Conformance Claims
3.3.2.1 CC Conformance Claim
95 This PP-Module claims conformance to CC:2022 Revision 1 as follows:
- CC Part 2-conformant
- CC Part 3-conformant.
3.3.2.2 Package Claim
3.3.2.2.1 Functional Package Claim
96 This PP-Module claims conformance to functional packages as follows:
- Package-conformant to Package Loader 2 (for usage by authorized users only)
from PP-0084-v2.
3.3.2.2.2 Assurance Package Claim
97 This PP-Module claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements
defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.3.2.3 Conformance Statement
98 This PP-Module requires strict conformance of a ST or PP claiming conformance to a
PP-Configuration that includes it.
3.3.3 Security Problem Definition
99 The asset of this PP-Module is the user data (Security IC Embedded Software and
user data of the Composite TOE). The SPD is the one defined in the Package Loader
2, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.2.3.
3.3.4 Security Objectives
100 The security objectives of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 2,
see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.2.3.
3.3.4.1 Security Objectives Rationale
101 The rationale for the security objectives of this PP-Module is the one defined in the
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
Package Loader 2, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.2.3.
3.3.5 Security Requirements
3.3.5.1 Security Functional Requirements
102 The SFRs of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 2, see PP-0084-
v2, section 7.2.2.4.
3.3.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
103 The SARs for this PP-Module are those defined in 3.3.2.2.2.
3.3.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
3.3.5.3.1 SFR Rationale
104 The rationale for the SFRs of this PP-Module, i.e. coverage of the security objectives
for the TOE by the SFRs and dependencies analysis, is identical to that provided in
the Package Loader 2, see PP-0084-v2 section 7.2.2.4.
3.3.5.3.2 SAR Rationale
105 The SARs of this PP-Module constitute an augmentation of the SARs that apply to
the Package Loader 2 with ADV_SPM.1. This assurance component requires the
formal model of the sub-TSF (the set of SFRs defined in the PP-Module), the proof of
the security objectives for the TOE defined in the PP-Module and the relationship
between the model and the FSP for that sub-TSF.
106 The augmentation by ADV_SPM.1 has been chosen for higher assurance in the
internal consistency of the Security Target and inter-consistency with the FSP.
3.3.5.4 SFR Dependencies
107 The dependencies for this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Loader 2,
see PP-0084-v2, section 7.2.2.4.
3.3.6 Consistency Rationale
108 The PP-Module Loader 2 (for usage by authorized users only) is consistent with the
PP-0084-v2:
- The TOE type defined in the PP Module is as defined in the PP-0084-v2.
- The asset of this PP-Module is an asset of PP-0084-v2. The OSP P.Ctlr-Loader2
included in this PP-Module extends the SPD defined in the PP-0084-v2. The
extension requires authorised control of Loader use to protect stored and loaded
user data. This PP-Module does not add threats or assumptions.
- The additional objective for the TOE O.Ctrl-Auth-Loader2 provides a trusted
communication channel, confidentiality and integrity protection of loaded data, and
access control for loader usage. Additionally, the objective for the environment
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
OE.Loader-Usage2 is added requiring the authorised user to support that trusted
channel, provide confidentiality/authenticity of the load data, and meet Loader
access conditions. The objectives introduced in this PP-Module do not contradict
or invalidate the objectives of the PP-0084-v2.
- This PP-Module introduces a set of SFRs that completes the SFRs from the core
PP-0084-v2. The SFRs defined in this PP-Module ensures secure in-field loading
operation scenarios.
- This PP-Module defines a specific set of SARs, which adds ADV_SPM.1 to those
defined in the base PP-0084-v2. All the dependencies of ADV_SPM.1 are
included in the set of SARs which is included in PP-0084-v2.
3.4 PP-Module Address-based Access Control
3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.1.1 PP-Module Identification
109 The reference of the PP-Module consists of the name and version.
Name: PP-Module Address-based Access Control
Version: 1.0
Date: 16/12/2025
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
110 This PP-Module is functionally identical to the Package Address-based Access Control,
from PP-0084-v2.
111 From the assurance point of view, it includes a specific set of SARs, which is strictly
higher than the one defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.4.1.2 PP-Module Base
112 The PP-Module Base consists of PP-0084-v2 [7].
3.4.1.3 TOE Overview
113 TOE Type: Security IC platform comprising hardware and IC Dedicated Software as
defined in PP-0084-v2.
114 TOE Usage: as defined in PP-0084-v2.
115 TOE Major Security Features: The Address-Based Access Control functionality lets the
Security IC Embedded Software define restricted address areas, including memories
and memory-mapped peripherals, and enforces their partitioning so that only permitted
operations can be performed on authorised areas.
116 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware: None.
3.4.2 Conformance Claims
3.4.2.1 CC Conformance Claim
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
117 This PP-Module claims conformance to CC:2022 Revision 1 as follows:
- CC Part 2-conformant,
- CC Part 3-conformant.
3.4.2.2 Package Claim
3.4.2.2.1 Functional Package Claim
118 This PP-Module claims conformance to functional packages as follows:
- Package-conformant to Package Address-based Access Control from PP-0084-
v2.
3.4.2.2.2 Assurance Package Claim
119 This PP-Module claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements
defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.4.2.3 Conformance Statement
120 This PP-Module requires strict conformance of a ST claiming conformance to a PP-
Configuration that includes it.
3.4.3 Security Problem Definition
121 The asset of this PP-Module is the code and data stored in controlled areas. The SPD
is the one defined in the Package Address-based Access Control, see PP-0084-v2,
section 7.4.3.
3.4.4 Security Objectives
122 The security objectives of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Address-
based Access Control, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.4.3.
3.4.4.1 Security Objectives Rationale
123 The rationale for the security objectives of this PP-Module is the one defined in the
Package Address-based Access Control, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.4.3.
3.4.5 Security Requirements
3.4.5.1 Security Functional Requirements
124 The SFRs of this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Address-based Access
Control, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.4.4.
3.4.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
125 The SARs for this PP-Module are those defined in 3.4.2.2.2.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
3.4.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
3.4.5.3.1 SFR Rationale
126 The rationale for the SFRs of this PP-Module, i.e. coverage of the security objectives
for the TOE by the SFRs and dependencies analysis, is identical to that provided in the
Package Address-based Access Control, see PP-0084-v2 section 7.4.4.
3.4.5.3.2 SAR Rationale
127 The SARs of this PP-Module constitute an augmentation of the SARs that apply to the
Package Address-based Access Control with ADV_SPM.1. This assurance component
requires the formal model of the sub-TSF (the set of SFRs defined in the PP-Module),
the proof of the security objectives for the TOE defined in the PP-Module and the
relationship between the model and the FSP for that sub-TSF.
128 The augmentation by ADV_SPM.1 has been chosen for higher assurance in the
internal consistency of the Security Target and inter-consistency with the FSP.
3.4.5.4 SFR Dependencies
129 The dependencies for this PP-Module are those defined in the Package Address-based
Access Control, see PP-0084-v2, section 7.4.4.
3.4.6 Consistency Rationale
130 The PP-Module Address-based Access Control is consistent with the PP-0084-v2:
- The TOE type defined in the PP-Module is as in the PP-0084-v2.
- The assets of this PP-Module are included in the PP-0084-v2.The threat T.Addr-
Access defined in this PP-Module extends the threats defined in the PP-0084-v2.
The extension focuses on unauthorized accesses to restricted memory or
addressable objects. This PP-Module does not add OSPs or assumptions.
- The additional objective for the TOE O.Addr-Access aims to restrict access to
defined addressable areas. The objective introduced in this PP-Module does not
contradict or invalidate the objectives of the PP-0084-v2.
- This PP-Module introduces a set of SFRs that completes the SFRs from the core
PP-0084-v2. These SFRs limit the access to addressable areas based on
predefined security attributes preventing accidental or deliberate access
violations.
- This PP-Module defines a specific set of SARs, which adds ADV_SPM.1 to those
defined in the base PP-0084-v2. All the dependencies of ADV_SPM.1 are
included in the set of SARs which is included in PP-0084-v2.
3.5 PP-Module Limited Test Features
3.5.1 Introduction
3.5.1.1 PP-Module Identification
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
131 The reference of the PP-Module consists of the name and version.
Name: PP-Module Limited Test Features
Version: 1.0
Date: 16/12/2025
CC edition: CC:2022 Revision 1
132 This PP-Module covers functionality that is included in PP-0084-v2. Nevertheless, this
PP-Module includes a specific set of SARs that is strictly higher than the one defined in
PP-0084-v2.
3.5.1.2 PP-Module Base
133 The PP-Module Base consists of PP-0084-v2 [7].
3.5.1.3 TOE Overview
134 TOE Type: Security IC platform comprising hardware and IC Dedicated Software as
defined in PP-0084-v2.
135 TOE Usage: as defined in PP-0084-v2.
136 TOE Major Security Features: Limitation of the availability and capabilities of test
features after TOE delivery.
137 Available Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware: None.
3.5.2 Conformance Claims
3.5.2.1 CC Conformance Claim
138 This PP-Module claims conformance to CC:2022 Revision 1as follows:
- CC Part 2-conformant,
- CC Part 3-conformant.
3.5.2.2 Package Claim
3.5.2.2.1 Assurance Package Claim
139 This PP-Module claims conformance to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with
ADV_SPM.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5, including the refinements
defined in PP-0084-v2.
3.5.2.3 Conformance Statement
140 This PP-Module requires strict conformance of a ST or PP claiming conformance to a
PP-Configuration that includes it.
3.5.3 Security Problem Definition
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
141 The assets of this PP-Module are of those defined in PP-0084-v2 (user data of the
Composite TOE, Security IC Embedded Software, and TOE security services).
142 The TOE shall avert the threat “Abuse of test functionality (T.Abuse-Test)” as specified
below.
T.Abuse-Test Abuse of Test Functionality
An attacker may use test features of the TOE which may not be used
after TOE Delivery in order to (i) disclose or manipulate user data of
the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or
change) security services of the TOE or (iii) manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) functions of the Security IC Embedded
Software or (iv) enable an attack disclosing or manipulating the user
data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.
143 The threat T.Abuse-Test is included in the threat T.Abuse-Func defined in the base PP-
0084-v2.
3.5.4 Security Objectives
144 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Abuse of Test Functionality (O.Abuse-Test)”
as specified below.
O.Abuse-Test Protection against Abuse of Test Functionality
The TOE shall prevent that test features of the TOE which may not be
used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order to (i) disclose critical
user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate critical user data of the
Composite TOE, (iii) manipulate Security IC Embedded Software or (iv)
bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or security
services of the TOE.
145 The security objective for the TOE O.Abuse-Test is a specialization of O.Abuse-Func
defined in the base PP-0084-v2.
3.5.4.1 Security Objectives Rationale
146 The threat T.Abuse-Test is directly covered by the objective O.Abuse-Test.
3.5.5 Security Requirements
3.5.5.1 Security Functional Requirements
147 This PP-Module uses the following typographic conventions to indicate operations
performed on the functional components:
- assignments are denoted by underlined text,
- iterations are indicated by a suffix preceded by the / symbol, following the
component identifier.
148 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Test)”. This
requirement is replicated from PP-0084-v2.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
FMT_LIM.1/Test Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1/Test The TSF shall limit its capabilities so that in conjunction with
“Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2/Test)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not
allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software
to be reconstructed and no substantial information about
construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks5.
149 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2/Test)”. This
requirement is replicated from PP-0084-v2.
FMT_LIM.2/Test Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1/Test The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1/Test)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of
the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data
to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed
and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks6.
3.5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements
150 The SARs for this PP-Module are those defined in 3.5.2.2.1.
3.5.5.3 Security Requirements Rationale
3.5.5.3.1 SFR Rationale
151 The objective O.Abuse-Test states that abuse of test functionality shall not be
possible in Phase 7 of the life cycle5 by (i) limiting their capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Test)
or (ii) limiting their availability is limited (FMT_LIM.2/Test). Since these requirements
are combined to enforce the policy, both security functional requirements together are
suitable to meet the objective.
3.5.5.3.2 SAR Rationale
5
The life cycle is defined in the base PP-0084-v2.
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
152 The SARs of this PP-Module augment the PP-0084-v2 baseline with ADV_SPM.1 for
the sub-TSF. This assurance component requires the formal model of the sub-TSF (the
set of SFRs defined in the PP-Module), the proof of the security objectives for the TOE
defined in the PP-Module and the relationship between the model and the FSP for that
sub-TSF.
153 The augmentation by ADV_SPM.1 has been chosen for higher assurance in the
internal consistency of the Security Target and inter-consistency with the FSP.
3.5.5.4 SFR Dependencies
154 The SFR dependencies are satisfied as shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: PP-Module Limited Test Features - SFR Dependencies
Security Functional Requirement Dependency Fulfilled by
FMT_LIM.1/Test FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2/Test
FMT_LIM.2/Test FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1/Test
3.5.6 Consistency Rationale
155 The PP-Module Limited Test Features is consistent with the PP-0084-v2:
- The TOE type defined in the PP-Module is as in the PP-0084-v2.
- The assets of this PP-Module are those of PP-0084-v2. The threat T.Abuse-Test
defined in this PP-Module, which focuses on the abuse of Test features in Phase
7 of the life cycle, is included in PP-0084-v2 as part of the more general threat
about the abuse of functionalities (T.Abuse-Func). This PP-Module does not add
OSPs or assumptions.
- The additional objective for the TOE O.Abuse-Test aims to prevent the abuse of
test functionality. This objective does not contradict or invalidate the objectives of
PP-0084-v2 (it is included in the objective O.Abuse-Func).
- This PP-Module includes two SFRs from PP-0084-v2, i.e. FMT_LIM.1/Test and
FMT_LIM.2/Test, to control the test functionality.
- This PP-Module defines a specific set of SARs, which adds ADV_SPM.1 to those
defined in the base PP-0084-v2. All the dependencies of ADV_SPM.1 are
included in the set of SARs which is included in PP-0084-v2.
4 Glossary
The terms defined in PP-0084-v2 [7] apply to this document.
5 Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
Security IC Platform Multi-assurance PP-Configurations
Version 1.0
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPD Security Problem Definition
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
6 References
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; November 2022, Version CC:2022, Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-
001.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; November 2022, Version CC:2022, Revision 1, CCMB-
2022-11-002
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; November 2022, Version CC:2022, Revision 1, CCMB-
2022-11-003.
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework
for the specification of evaluation methods and activities; November 2022, Version
CC:2022, Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-004.
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined
packages of security requirements; November 2022, Version CC:2022, Revision 1,
CCMB-2022-11-005.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology; Version CC:2022, Revision 1, CCMB-2022-11-006.
[7] Eurosmart, Security IC Platform Protection Profile including Functional Packages,
Version 2.0, December 2025.