National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management,
Version 1.1, March 7th
, 2014
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-PP-0015
Dated: 27 October 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Base and Additional Requirements
Gossamer Security Solutions Inc.
Catonsville, Maryland
ii
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 MDMPP Description .................................................................................................. 2
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives ............................................................ 3
Assumptions.................................................................................................................... 3
Threats............................................................................................................................. 3
Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 4
Security Objectives ......................................................................................................... 4
5 Requirements .............................................................................................................. 5
TOE Security Functional Requirements ......................................................................... 5
MDM Server or Platform Security Functional Requirements ........................................ 6
MDM Agent or Platform Security Functional Requirements......................................... 6
Additional Requirements ................................................................................................ 7
5.1.1 Optional Requirements ................................................................................. 7
5.1.2 Selection Based Requirements...................................................................... 7
5.1.3 Objective TSF Requirements........................................................................ 8
6 Assurance Requirements............................................................................................. 8
7 Results of the evaluation............................................................................................. 9
8 Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 9
9 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 10
List of Tables
Table 1: TOE Assumptions................................................................................................. 3
Table 2: Threats .................................................................................................................. 3
Table 3: Organizational Security Policies........................................................................... 4
Table 4: Security Objectives for the TOE........................................................................... 4
Table 5: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.......................................... 5
Table 6: TOE Security Requirements................................................................................. 5
Table 7: MDM Server or Platform Security Functional Requirements.............................. 6
Table 8: MDM Agent or Platform Security Functional Requirements............................... 7
Table 9: Optional TSF Requirements ................................................................................. 7
Table 10: Selection Based Requirements ........................................................................... 7
Table 11: Objective TSF Requirements.............................................................................. 8
Table 12: Security Assurance Requirements ...................................................................... 8
iii
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Protection Profile for Mobile Device
Management, Version 1.1 (MDMPP11). It presents a summary of the MDMPP11 and the
evaluation results.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the MDMPP11 was
performed concurrent with the first product evaluation against the PP’s requirements. In this
case the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this first product was the Samsung SDS Co., LTD
Samsung SDS CellWe EMM version 1.1. The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer
Security Solutions Inc. Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, Maryland,
United States of America, and was completed in May 2015. This evaluation addressed the base
requirements of the MDMPP.
The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR),
written by the Gossamer Security Solutions Inc. CCTL.
The evaluation determined that the MDMPP11 is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and
Part 3 Conformant. The PP identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). The ST contains material drawn directly from the
MDMPP11.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the MDMPP11 meets the
requirements of the APE components. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products
against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of CEM
work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the MDMPP11 was
performed concurrent with the first product evaluation against the PP. In this case the TOE for
this first product was the Samsung SDS Co., Samsung SDS CellWe EMM version 1.1.,
developed by Samsung SDS Co., LTD. The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer
Security Solutions Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, Maryland,
United States of America, and was completed in May 2015.
1
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
The MDMPP11 contains a set of “base” requirements that all conformant STs must include and
“additional” requirements that may or may not apply to a conformant TOE depending on its
architecture and intended usage.
Because these optional requirements may not be included in a particular ST, the initial use of
the PP will address (in terms of the PP evaluation) the base requirements as well as any
additional requirements that are incorporated into that initial ST. Subsequently, TOEs that are
evaluated against the MDMPP11 that incorporate additional requirements that have not been
included in any ST prior to that will be used to evaluate those requirements (APE_REQ), and
any appropriate updates to this validation report will be made.
The following identifies the PP subject to the evaluation/validation, as well as the supporting
information from the base evaluation performed against this PP, as well as subsequent
evaluations that address additional optional requirements in the MDMPP11.
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management,, Version 1.1
ST (Base) Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11) Security
Target, May 2015
Evaluation Technical
Report (Base)
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung SDS Co. Ltd EMM Suite (MDMPP11),
Version 1.3, April 18, 2015
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
CCTL (base) Gossamer Security Solutions, Catonsville, MD USA
CCEVS Validators
(base)
Kenneth Elliott, Aerospace Corporation
Jerome Myers, Aerospace Corporation
Ken Stutterheim, Aerospace Corporation
Sheldon Durrant, Mitre Corporation
3 MDMPP Description
Mobile device management (MDM) products allow enterprises to apply security policies to
mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets. The purpose of these policies is to
establish a security posture adequate to permit mobile devices to process enterprise data
and connect to enterprise network resources.
This document provides a baseline set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for an
MDM system, which is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The MDM system is only one
component of an enterprise deployment of mobile devices. Other components, such as the
mobile device platforms which enforce the security policies, and servers which host mobile
application repositories, are out of scope.
2
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives
Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the
TOE’s Operational Environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the
development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions
on the use of the TOE.
Table 1: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
A.CONNECTIVITY The TOE relies on network connectivity to carry out its management
activities. The TOE will robustly handle instances when connectivity
is unavailable or unreliable.
A.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM The MDM Agent relies upon an evaluated Mobile platform and
hardware to provide policy enforcement as well as cryptographic
services and data protection.
A.MDM_SERVER_PLATFORM The MDM Server relies upon a trustworthy platform and local
network from which it provides administrative capabilities. The
MDM Server relies on this platform to provide logon services via a
local or network directory service, and to provide basic audit log
management functions. The platform is expected to be configured
specifically to provide MDM services, employing features such as a
host-based firewall which limits its network role to providing MDM
functionality.
A.PROPER_ADMIN One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless,
willfully negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the TOE
Administrators, and do so using and abiding by guidance
documentation.
A.PROPER_USER Mobile device users are not willfully negligent or hostile, and use the
device within compliance of a reasonable Enterprise security policy.
Threats
The following threats should be integrated into the threats that are specific to the
technology by the ST authors when including the requirements described in this document.
Modifications, omissions, and additions to the requirements may impact this list, so the ST
author should modify or delete these threats as appropriate.
Table 2: Threats
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.MALICIOUS_APPS An administrator of the MDM or mobile device user may
inadvertently import malicious code, or an attacker may insert
malicious code into the TOE or OE, resulting in the compromise of
TOE or TOE data.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker may masquerade as MDM Server and attempt to
compromise the integrity of the mobile device by sending malicious
management commands. An attacker may masquerade as MDM
Agent and attempt to compromise the integrity of the MDM by
sending malicious records.
3
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP Unauthorized entities may intercept communications between the
MDM and mobile devices to monitor, gain access to, disclose, or
alter remote management commands. Unauthorized entities may
intercept unprotected wireless communications between the
mobile device and the Enterprise to monitor, gain access to,
disclose, or alter TOE data.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS The mobile device may be lost or stolen, and an unauthorized
individual may attempt to access OE data.
Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. The following OSPs must be enforced by the
TOE or its operational environment.
Table 3: Organizational Security Policies
OSP Name OSP Definition
P.ADMIN The configuration of the mobile device security functions must
adhere to the Enterprise security policy.
P.DEVICE_ENROLL A mobile device must be enrolled for a specific user by the
administrator 84 of the MDM prior to being used in the Enterprise
network by the user.
P.NOTIFY The mobile user must immediately notify the administrator if
mobile device is lost or stolen.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY Personnel operating the TOE shall be accountable for their actions
within the TOE.
Security Objectives
The following table contains security objectives for the TOE.
Table 4: Security Objectives for the TOE
TOE Security Obj. TOE Security Objective Definition
O.APPLY_POLICY The TOE must facilitate configuration and enforcement of
enterprise security policies on mobile devices via interaction
with the mobile OS. This will include the initial enrollment of
the device into management, through its lifecycle including
policy updates and through its possible unenrollment from
management services.
O.ACCOUNTABILITY The TOE must provide logging facilities which record
management actions undertaken by its administrators
O.DATA_PROTECTION_TRANSIT Data exchanged between and from elements of the TOE and
its operating environment must be protected from being
monitored, accessed and altered.
O.MANAGEMENT The TOE provides access controls around its management
functionality.
4
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
The following table contains objectives for the Operational Environment.
Table 5: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Environmental Security Obj. TOE Security Objective Definition
OE.IT_ENTERPRISE The Enterprise IT infrastructure provides security for a
network that is available to the TOE and mobile devices that
prevents unauthorized access.
OE.MOBILE_DEVICE_PLATFORM The MDM Agent relies upon the trustworthy Mobile platform
and hardware to provide policy enforcement as well as 85
cryptographic services and data protection.
OE.MDM_SERVER_PLATFORM The MDM Server relies upon a trustworthy platform and
local network from which it provides administrative
capabilities.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
OE.PROPER_USER Users of the mobile device are trained to securely use the
mobile device and apply all guidance in a trusted manner.
OE.WIRELESS_NETWORK A wireless network will be available to the mobile devices.
OE.TIMESTAMP Reliable timestamp is provided by the operational
environment for the TOE.
5 Requirements
As indicated above, requirements in the MDMPP11 are comprised of the “base” requirements
and additional requirements that are conditionally or strictly optional. The following are table
contains the “base” requirements that were validated as part of the CA evaluation activity
referenced above.
TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the SFRs for the TOE.
Table 6: TOE Security Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_ALT_EXT.1: Agent Alerts
FAU_ALT_EXT.2: Server Alerts
FAU_GEN.1(1): Audit Data Generation (MDM Server
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_ENR_EXT.1: Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management
FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1(1): Management of functions in MDM Server
FMT_MOF.1(2): Management of Enrollment Function
FMT_POL_EXT.1 Trusted Policy Update (MDM Agent)
FMT_SMF.1(1): Specification of management functions (Server
configuration of Agent)
FMT_SMF.1(2): Specification of management functions (Agent
configuration of platform)
FMT_SMF.1(3): Specification of management functions (Server
Configuration of Server)
5
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FMT_SMR.1: Security Management Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_ITT.1: Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1): Trusted Update (MDM Server)
FTA: TOE Access FTA_TAB.1: TOE Access Banner
FTP: Trusted Path/Channels FTP_ITC.1(1): Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1(2): Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path
MDM Server or Platform Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the SFRs that must be performed by the MDM Server or by the MDM
Server’s platform. Each requirement includes a selection for the ST author to indicate whether
the MDM Server or the MDM Server’s platform performs the functionality in the requirement.
The assurance activity for those requirements for which the platform has been selected is to
verify that the platforms identified by the ST author are Common Criteria validated and to
ensure that the ST for the platform includes the functionality in the requirement.
Table 7: MDM Server or Platform Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1(1): Audit Data Generation (MDM Server)
FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage
FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1(1): Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2(1): Cryptographic Key Storage (MDM Server)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(1): Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation (Digital Signature)
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication)
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation (Encryption and
Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1): Random Bit Generation
FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_UAU.1: Timing of Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1(1): X509 Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1): X509 Authentication
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_TST_EXT.1(1): TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1(1): Trusted Update (MDM Server)
FTP: Trusted Path/Channels FTP_TRP.1: Trusted path for Remote Administration
FTP_TRP.2: Trusted path for Enrollment
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_TSE.1: TOE Session Establishment
MDM Agent or Platform Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the SFRs that must be performed by the MDM Agent or by the MDM
Agent’s platform. Each requirement includes a selection for the ST author to indicate whether
the MDM Agent or the MDM Agent’s platform performs the functionality in the requirement.
The assurance activity for those requirements for which the platform has been selected is to
verify that the platforms identified by the ST author are Common Criteria validated and to
ensure that the ST for the platform includes the functionality in the requirement.
6
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
Table 8: MDM Agent or Platform Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1(3): Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2(2): Cryptographic Key Storage (MDM Agent)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4(2): Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1(5): Cryptographic Operation (Digital
Signature)
FCS_COP.1(6): Cryptographic Operation (Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication)
FCS_COP.1(7): Cryptographic Operation (Encryption and
Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(8): Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(2): Random Bit Generation
FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_X509_EXT.1(2): X509 Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2): X509 Authentication
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_TST_EXT.1(2): TSF Testing
Additional Requirements
The following table contains the optional requirements contained in the appendices of the
MDMPP11, and an indication of what evaluation those requirements were verified in (from the
list in the Identification section above). Requirements that do not have an associated
evaluation indicator have not yet been evaluated. These requirements are included in an ST if
associated selections are made by the ST authors in requirements that are levied on the TOE by
the ST.
5.1.1 Optional Requirements
Table 9: Optional TSF Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FAU: Security Audit FAU_SEL.1(1): Security Audit Event
Selection (MDM Server)
FAU_SAR.1: Audit Review (MDM Server) Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FAU_STG_EXT.2: Audit Event Storage Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
5.1.2 Selection Based Requirements
Table 10: Selection Based Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_IV_EXT.1(1): Initialization Vector
Generation
Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Encrypted
Cryptographic Key Storage (MDM
Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
7
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
Server) Security Target, May 2015
FCS_DTLS_EXT.1: DTLS Implementation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS
Implementation
Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) Communications
FCS_SSH_EXT.1: SSH Implementation
FCS_TLS_EXT.1: TLS Implementation Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1): X509 Authentication Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2): X509 Authentication Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
5.1.3 Objective TSF Requirements
Table 11: Objective TSF Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1(2) Audit Data Generation
(MDM Agent)
FAU_SEL.1(2) Security Audit Event
Selection (MDM Agent)
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1(4): Cryptographic Key
Generation
Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_POL_EXT.1: Trusted Policy Update Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2): X509 Authentication Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
FTA: TOE Access FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung
SDS CellWe EMM (MDMPP11)
Security Target, May 2015
6 Assurance Requirements
The following are the assurance requirements contained in the MDMPP11:
Table 12: Security Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ASE: Security Target ASE_INT.1: ST Introduction
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance Claims
8
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
ASE_OBJ.1: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
ASE_ECD.1: Extended Components Definition
ASE_REQ.1: Stated Security Requirements
ASE_TSS.1: TOE Summary Specification
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Sample
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
7 Results of the evaluation
The CCTL produced an ETR that contained the following results.
APE Requirement Evaluation Verdict
APE_CCL.1 Pass
APE _ECD.1 Pass
APE _INT.1 Pass
APE _OBJ.2 Pass
APE _REQ.1 Pass
8 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology as interpreted by the supplemental guidance in
the ESMACPP Assurance Activities to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
9
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management Validation Report, 27 October 2015
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
9 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1,
Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology
for Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1,
Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[5] Common Criteria, Evaluation and Validation Scheme for Information Technology
Security, Guidance to Validators of IT Security Evaluations, Scheme Publication #3,
Version 1.0, January 2002.
[6] Gossamer Security Solutions Inc., Samsung SDS Co., LTD Samsung SDS CellWe EMM
(MDMPP11) Security Target, Version 0.6, May 2015.
[7] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management, Version 1.1, March 7, 2014.
[8] Gossamer Security Solutions Inc., Validation Report Samsung SDS Co, Ltd. Samsung
SDS Co., LTD Samsung SDS CellWe EMM Suite, Version 0.5, May 8th,
2015
10