COMMON CRITERIA PROTECTION PROFILE
for
NEW GENERATION CASH REGISTER FISCAL APPLICATON SOFTWARE
(NGCRFAS PP)
TSE-CCCS/PP-006
Revision No 1.8
Revision Date 18.12.2014
Document Code
File Name NGCRFAS PROTECTION PROFILE
Prepared by Oğuz DEMİROĞLU
Approved by Salih SARI
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Revision History
Revision
No Revision Reason
Date of
Revision
0.1 First Draft 04.05.2012
1.0 SFRs update 17.10.2012
1.1 "Gözlem raporu_1" update 17.12.2012
1.2 "Gözlem raporu_2" update 29.01.2013
1.3 "Gözlem raporu_3" update 01.04.2013
1.4 "Gözlem raporu_4" update 14.06.2013
1.5 "Gözlem raporu_5" update 02.08.2013
1.6 "Gözlem kararı 3" update 27.08.2013
1.7 "Gözlem kararı 3" update 28.08.2013
1.8 Maintanance update 18.12.2014
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CONTENTS
1. PP INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 4
1.1 PP Reference.......................................................................................................................4
1.2 TOE Overview....................................................................................................................5
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................ 11
2.1 CC Conformance Claim.....................................................................................................11
2.2 PP Claim...........................................................................................................................11
2.3 Package Claim...................................................................................................................11
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale............................................................................................11
2.5 Conformance Statement.....................................................................................................11
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION............................................................................ 12
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................12
3.2 Threats..............................................................................................................................15
3.3 OSP..................................................................................................................................18
3.4 Assumptions .....................................................................................................................20
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................. 21
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.........................................................................................21
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ...........................................................21
4.3 Security Objective Rationale ..............................................................................................23
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION................................................................... 28
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS....................................................................................... 29
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE....................................................................29
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ....................................................................55
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale ........................................................................................55
7. ACRONYMS.................................................................................................................... 70
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 72
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1. PP INTRODUCTION
This Protection Profile (PP) describes the following items:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) as a product and its position in production life cycle,
 The security environment of the TOE includes: the assets to be protected, the threats to
be encountered by the TOE , the development environment and production utilization
phases,
 The security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity
and confidentiality of application data and programs,
 Protection of the TOE and associated documentation during the development and
production phases,
 The Information Technology (IT) security requirements which include the TOE
functional requirements and the TOE assurance requirements.
1.1 PP Reference
Title: Common Criteria Protection Profile for New Generation Cash Register Fiscal
Application Software (NGCRFAS PP)
Sponsor: Presidency of Revenue Administration (PRA)
Editor(s):
Prepared by Oğuz DEMİROĞLU
Approved by Salih SARI
CC Version: 3.1 (Revision 4)
Assurance Level: Minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL 2.
General Status: Final
Version Number: 1.8 as of 18th
December 2014
Registration: TSE-CCCS/PP-006
Key words: New Generation Cash Register, EMV, EFT-POS, PRA, Electronic Registration
Unit.
Note: A glossary of terms used in the Protection Profile is given in ACRONYMS section of
the document (Section 7).
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1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE addressed by this Protection Profile (PP) is an application software which is the main
items of a Fiscal Cash Register (FCR). TOE is used to process the transaction amount of
purchases which can be viewed by both seller and buyer. Since transaction amount is used to
determine tax revenues; secure processing, storing and transmission of this data is very
important.
The FCR is mandatory for first-and second-class traders and is not mandatory for sellers who
sell the goods back to their previous seller as completely the same as the purchased good.
In addition to TOE, which is the main item of FCR, FCR may consist of several other hardware
and software components as described in Section 1.2.1, 1.2.2 for full functionality. TOE and
related components are given in Figure 1. Usage and major security features of TOE are
described in section 1.2.3.
1.2.1 General overview of the TOE and related components
Figure 1 shows the general overview of the TOE and its related components as regarded in this
PP. The green part of Figure 1 is the TOE. Yellow parts; that are given as input/output
interface, fiscal memory, daily memory, database, ERU, fiscal certificate memory; are TOE’s
environmental components which are crucial for functionality and security. Connections
between the TOE and its environment are also subject to evaluation since these connections are
made over the interfaces of the TOE.
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Figure 1 TOE and related components
1.2.2 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software
Software and hardware environment of the TOE are described below.
1.2.2.1 Software environment of TOE
TOE runs at the top of an operating system’s kernel, its file-system as in a typical software
environment. This structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Typical software environment of TOE
File System
Operating System Kernel
In addition to TOE, following software components are also necessary for security and
functionality of the FCR:
 Application runs on an operating system which supports following features
o at least 32-bit data processing capacity
o multi-processing
o IPv4 and IPv6
o NTP (Network Time Protocol)
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 Database, which is used to store sales data, has the following features;
i. Database has data recording, organizing, querying, reporting features
ii. Database stores sales records for main product groups (food, clothing, electronics,
glassware etc.) and sub-product groups (milk, cigarette, fruit, trousers etc.) in order
to track detailed statistics
iii. Database has an indexing mechanism
1.2.2.2 Hardware Environment of TOE
In addition to TOE, following hardware components are also necessary for security and
functionality of the FCR:
 Fiscal memory
i. Fiscal memory has following features;
a. Fiscal memory has the capacity to store at least 10 years (3650 days) of data,
b. Fiscal memory keeps data at least 5 years after the capacity specified in (a)
has been reached,
c. Fiscal memory has to be fixed within FCR in a way that it cannot be
removed without damaging the chassis.
d. Fiscal memory is protected by mesh cover,
e. Fiscal memory has the ability to be protected against magnetic and
electronic threats,
When the connection between fiscal memory and main processor is broken,
FCR enters in maintenance mode,
f. The data stored in the fiscal memory is not be lost in case of power off,
g. Fiscal memory accepts only positive amounts from the application and the
peripherals,
h. FCR checks "Z" reports from fiscal memory during device start-up. In case
where there are days for which Z report was not generated, FCR will be able
to run in normal mode only after it generates Z reports for the missing days.
Seasonal firms can take cumulative Z report by specifying date and time
range.
ii. Fiscal Memory includes following data;
a. Fiscal symbol, company code and identification number of the device,
b. Cumulative sum of the total sales and Value Added Tax (VAT) amounts for
all sales receipts, starting from the device activation time (i.e. first use),
c. Date and number of "Z" reports with total sales and VAT per day,
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d. The number of receipts per day.
 Daily memory has following features;
i. Receipt total and total VAT amount for each receipt are to be stored in the daily
memory instantly. This data can be transmitted to PRA information systems (PRA -
IS), instantly or daily depending on demand.
ii. Data in the daily memory which is not already transmitted to fiscal memory, cannot
be modified in an uncontrolled way.
iii. Data transmitted from daily memory to fiscal memory is to be kept in daily memory
for at least 10 days.
iv. Z reports, taken at the end of the day; and X reports, taken within the current day
are produced by using the data in the daily memory.
v. Following values are stored in the daily memory
a. total VAT amount per day,
b. total daily sales values per day grouped by payment type
c. payment type (Cash, credit card etc.)
d. number of receipts.
 FCR supports X.509 formatted digital certificate generated by Authorized Certificate
Authority. This Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) compatible digital certificate is
called fiscal certificate and is used for authentication and secure communication
between PRA-IS and FCR through Trusted Service Manager (TSM). For physical
security, FCR is protected by electronic and mechanic systems called electronic seal.
FCR uses cryptographic library for secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM
 Electronic Record Unit (ERU) is used to keep second copy of the receipt and has
following features;
i. ERU stores information about receipts and reports (X, Z) in a retrievable form.
ii. ERU has at least 1.2 million row capacity. ERU may be included in the sealed part
of the FCR. In this case ERU must have at least 40 million row capacity.
iii. Data stored in ERU cannot be modified
iv. ERU also supports features specified in “Fiscal Cash Register General
Communique Serial Number: 67, Part A” which is about Law No: 3100 except item
(ii) above.
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 FCR devices support at least one of the internal ETHERNET, PSTN or mobile
communication technology (GPRS etc.) interfaces and EFTPOS-integrated FCR
devices support at least two of these interfaces for communication with PRA-IS (for
data transfer) and TSM system (for parameter management and software update).
External ETHERNET may be accepted as internal in case the data is encrypted in fiscal
unit.
 Incoming and outgoing data traffic for FCR passes over a firewall.
 FCR supports the use of EFTPOS.
 FCR has a printer to print sales receipt.
 FCR needs some input/output devices for functionalities listed below;
i. FCR has a keyboard unit. It may optionally use a touch screen additionally
ii. FCR has separate displays for cashier and buyer.
iii. FCR has an internal battery to keep time information.
1.2.3 Major security and functional features
The major functional and security features of the TOE are described below.
1.2.3.1 TOE functional features
The TOE is a part of a FCR which is an electronic device for calculating and recording sales
transactions and for printing receipts. TOE provides the following services;
i. TOE stores sales data in fiscal memory.
ii. TOE stores total receipt and total VAT amount for each receipt in daily memory.
iii. TOE is able to generate reports (X report, Z report etc.).
iv. TOE is able to transmit Z reports, receipt information, sale statistics and other
information determined by PRA to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format.
v. TOE is able to start the communication with PRA-IS and instantly respond to requests
originated from PRA-IS.
vi. TOE stores records of important events as stated in PRA Messaging Protocol
Document [6] and transmits to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format in a secure
way.
vii. TOE is able to be used by users in secure state mode or maintenance mode. Roles and
modes of operation are described in 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 respectively.
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1.2.3.2 TOE major security features
The TOE provides following security features;
i. TOE supports access control.
ii. TOE supports secure communication between main processor and fiscal memory.
However, for the cases where the main processor and the fiscal memory are included
within the same electronic seal secure communication is not mandatory. TOE is able to
detect disconnection between main processor and fiscal memory and enter into the
maintenance mode.
iii. TOE supports usage of ITU X509 v3 formatted certificate and its protected private key
for authentication and secure communication with PRA- IS and TSM.
iv. TOE supports secure communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR–TSM.
v. TOE ensures the integrity of event data, sales data, authentication data, characterization
data and FCR parameters.
vi. TOE records important events defined in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and
send urgent event data immediately to PRA-IS in a secure way.
vii. TOE detects physical attacks to FCR and enters into the maintenance mode in such
cases.
1.2.4 TOE type
TOE is a software application embedded within FCR.
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This protection profile claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[1]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September
2012 [2]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September
2012 [3]
As follows
 Part 2 conformant,
 Part 3 conformant.
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
This PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile.
2.3 Package Claim
The current PP is conformant to the following security requirements package:
 Assurance package EAL2 conformant to CC, part 3.
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
Since this PP does not claim conformance to any protection profile, this section is not
applicable.
2.5 Conformance Statement
This PP requires demonstrable conformance of any ST or PP claiming conformance to this PP.
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 External Entities
PRA-IS
PRA-IS takes sales data and event data from FCR by sending query with parameters to FCR
through TSM.
Trusted Service Manager
TSM is the system which is used to load parameters, update software and manage FCR.
Attacker
Attacker tries to manipulate the TOE in order to change its expected behavior and
functionality. Attacker tries to breach confidentiality, integrity and availability of the FCR.
PRA On-site Auditor
PRA On-site Auditor is an employee of PRA who performs onsite audits onsite to control the
existence of expected FCR functionalities by using the rights of FCR Authorised User.
Certificate storage
The certificate storage holds certificates and private key used for authentication and secure
communication. Certificate storage is protected inside physical and logical tampering system.
Time Information
FCR gets time information from trusted server. Time information is used during receipt, event,
fiscal memory record, daily memory record and ERU record creation and is also used to send
information to PRA-IS according to FCR Parameters.
Audit storage
Audit storage can be any appropriate memory unit in FCR. Audit storage stores important
events according to their criticality level (urgent, high, warning and information). List of events
can be found in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].
Storage unit
Storage units of FCR are database, fiscal memory, daily memory and ERU.
Input interface
Input interfaces provide necessary input data from input devices to the TOE. Input devices for
FCR may be keyboard, barcode reader, QR code (matrix barcode) reader, order tracking device
and global positioning devices.
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External Device
External device is the device which is used to communicate with FCR by using secure channel
according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]
Application Note 1: If the device provides Main Unit communication, the description given
below shall also be included;
Main Unit
Main Unit is an external device which is used for doing following actions;
 Provides visual interface for fiscal transaction,
 Provides input interface for fiscal transaction,
 Provides secure communication with TOE according to External Device
Communication Protocol Document [7]
Output interface
Output interfaces deliver outputs of the TOE to the output devices. Output devices for FCR
may be printer, display etc.
3.1.2 Roles
FCR Authorised User
FCR Authorised User is the user who uses the functions of FCR and operates FCR by
accessing the device over an authentication mechanism.
Authorised Manufacturer User
Authorised Manufacturer User works for FCR manufacturer and conducts maintenance works
on FCR.
Application Note 2: If TOE provides FCR User (Cashier) as a role the below description shall
also be added to Roles.
FCR User (Cashier)
FCR user is the user who uses the sale functionality of FCR by using his/her identity
3.1.3 Modes of FCR
Maintenance Mode: Maintenance Mode is the mode that allows only Authorised
Manufacturer User to fix FCR in case of any technical problem, to change date and time
information; to review event data and to start update operation of TOE.FCR does not allow any
fiscal transaction in maintenance mode. FCR enters this mode when the following occur;
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 FCR Certificate check fails,
 Mesh cover monitoring check fails,
 A disconnection between fiscal memory and main processor occurs,
 Electronic seal is opened, or forced by unauthorised persons,
 A technical problem is determined by FCR Manufacturer.
Secure State Mode: Secure State Mode is the mode that allows;
 FCR Authorised User;
 to configure FCR,
 to take fiscal and FCR reports
Application Note 3: If TOE provide FCR User (Cashier) as a role the below description shall
be added to modes of FCR. Extra proper functionalities may also be defined for FCR user.
 FCR User;
 to do fiscal sales
3.1.4 Assets
Sensitive data
Sensitive data is used for secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM. Confidentiality and
integrity of this asset needs to be protected.
Application Note 4: Sensitive data may consist of symmetric keys.
Event data
Event data is used to obtain information about important events saved in audit storage. The
integrity of this asset is crucial while stored in FCR and both integrity and confidentiality of
this asset are important while it is transferred from TOE to PRA-IS. Event data is categorized
in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].
Sales data
Sales data is stored in storage unit. Sales data is required by PRA-IS to calculate tax amount
and to provide detailed statistics about sales. The integrity of this asset has to be protected
while stored in FCR; and both integrity and confidentiality have to be protected while it is
transferred from TOE to PRA-IS.
Characterization data (Identification data for devices)
Characterization data is a unique number assigned to each FCR given by the manufacturer.
PRA-IS uses characterization data for system calls to acquire sales data or event data of an
FCR. Integrity of this asset has to be protected.
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Authentication data
Authentication data contains authentication information which is required for FCR Authorised
User and Authorised Manufacturer User to gain access to FCR functionalities. Both integrity
and confidentiality of this asset have to be protected.
Time Information
Time information is stored in FCR and synchronized with trusted server. Time information is
important when logging important events and sending reports to the PRA-IS. The integrity of
this asset has to be protected.
FCR Parameters
FCR parameters stored in FCR are updated by TSM after Z report is printed.
FCR parameters set;
 Sales and event data transferring time
 Criticality level of event data sent to the PRA-IS
 Maximum number of days that FCR will work without communicating with PRA-IS
3.2 Threats
Threats averted by TOE and its environment are described in this section. Threats described
below results from assets which are protected or stored by TOE or from usage of TOE with its
environment.
T.AccessControl
Adverse action: Authenticated users could try to use functions which are not allowed.
(e.g. FCR Users gaining access to FCR Authorised User management functions)
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to
FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, time information.
T.Authentication
Adverse action: Unauthorized users could try to use FCR functions.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has logical and physical access to the
FCR
Asset: Sales data, event data, time information
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T.MDData - Manipulation and disclosure of data
Adverse action: This threat deals with four types of data: event data, sales data,
characterization data and FCR parameters.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the event data to hide its actions and unauthorised
access to the FCR, failure reports, and deletion of logs. An attacker also could try to
disclose important events while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR.
 An attacker could try to manipulate or delete the sales data generated by TOE which may
result in tax fraud. In addition, an attacker also could try to disclose sales data while
transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR. Manipulation and deletion of sales data may be
caused by magnetic and electronic reasons.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the characterization data to cover information
about tax fraud; to masquerade the user identity.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the FCR parameters to use FCR in undesired
condition.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, characterization data, FCR parameters.
T.Eavesdrop - Eavesdropping on event data, sales data and characterization data
Adverse action: An attacker could try to eavesdrop event data, sales data and characterization
data transmitted between the TOE and the PRA-IS and also between the TOE and the
distributed memory units (Fiscal memory, Database, Daily memory, ERU).
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Characterization data, sales data, and event data.
T.Skimming - Skimming the event data, sales data and characterization data
Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate PRA-IS to receive information from FCR and
to imitate TSM to set parameters to FCR via the communication channel.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset : Sales data, and event data, FCR parameters.
T.Counterfeit - FCR counterfeiting
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Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate FCR by using sensitive(session keys) data
while communicating with PRA-IS and TSM to cover information about tax fraud.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access
to the FCR.
Asset: Sensitive data (session keys).
T.Malfunction - Cause malfunction in FCR
Adverse action: An attacker may try to use FCR out of its normal operational conditions to
cause malfunction without the knowledge of TOE.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical access to the FCR.
Asset: Sales data, event data.
T.ChangingTime
Adverse action: An attacker may try to change time to invalidate the information about logged
events and reports in FCR.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Time Information.
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3.3 OSP
This section describes organizational security policies that must be satisfied.
P.Certificate
It has to be assured that certificates which are installed at initialization step, are compatible
with ITU X.509 v3 format. FCR contains FCR certificate, Certification Authority root
certificate, Certification Authority sub-root (subordinate) certificate and UpdateControl
certificate. UpdateControl certificate is used to verify the signature of the TOE.
P.Comm_EXT - Communication between TOE and External Device
It has to be assured that communication between TOE and external devices is used to
encrypted using AES algorithm with 256 bits according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document [7]
P.InformationLeakage - Information leakage from FCR
It has to be assured that TOE’s environment provides a secure mechanism which prevents
attacker to obtain sensitive information (secret key) when FCR performs encryption
operation; i.e by side channel attacks like SPA (Simple Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple
Electromagnetic Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), DEMA (Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis).
P.SecureEnvironment
It has to be assured that environment of TOE senses disconnection between fiscal memory and
main processor. Then TOE enters into the maintenance mode and logs urgent event. Moreover,
it has to be assured that fiscal memory doesn't accept transactions with negative amounts which
results in a decrease of total tax value. Also it has to be assured that environment of TOE
provides a mechanism that sales data in daily memory which is not reflected to the fiscal
memory cannot be deleted and modified in an uncontrolled way. In addition to this, it has to be
assured that sales data in ERU cannot be deleted and modified.
P.PhysicalTamper
It has to be assured that TOE environment and TOE provide a tamper respondent system which
is formed by electromechanical seals. It has to be assured that physical tampering protection
system protects the keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), the certificates, event data,
characterization data, FCR parameters and sales data in FCR. It has to be assured that TOE
logs this type of events and enters into the maintenance mode when physical tampering
protection system detect unauthorised access. On the other hand it has to be assured that
authorised access such as maintenance work or service works are logged.
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It has to be also assured that physical tampering protection system (mesh cover) protects fiscal
memory.
P.PKI - Public key infrastructure
It has to be assured that IT environment of the TOE provides public key infrastructure for
encryption, signing and key agreement.
P.UpdateControl
TOE is allowed to be updated by only TSM or Authorised Manufacturer User to avoid possible
threats during this operation, FCR shall verify the signature of the new version of TOE to
ensure that the TOE to be updated is signed by the correct organisation. Thus, the TOE to be
updated is ensured to be the correct certified version because only the certified versions will be
signed. In addition, FCR shall check version of TOE to ensure that it is the latest version.
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3.4 Assumptions
This section describes assumptions that must be satisfied by the TOE's operational
environment.
A. TrustedManufacturer
It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. They process manufacturing
step in a manner which maintains IT security.
A.Control
It is assumed that PRA-IS personnel performs random controls on FCR. During these controls
PRA-IS personnel should check that if tax amount and total amount printed values on receipt
and sent to PRA-IS are the same. In addition to this, a similar check should be made for events
as well.
A.Initialisation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is
consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data. Moreover, it is
assumed that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificate to the FCR in
initialization phase. Before certificate installation it is assumed that asymmetric key pair
generated in a manner which maintains security posture.
A. TrustedUser
User is assumed to be trusted. It is assumed that for each sale a sales receipt is provided to the
buyer.
A.Activation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure activation steps at the beginning of the
TOE operation phase and after each maintenance process.
A. AuthorisedService
It is assumed that repairing is done by trusted authorised services. The repairing step is
processed in a manner which maintains legal limits.
A.Ext_Key
It is assumed that External Device (EFT-POS, Main Unit) generates strong key for
communicating with TOE.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This part describes security objectives provided by the TOE.
O.AccessControl
TOE must control authenticated user’s access to functions and data by using authorization
mechanism.
O.Event
TOE must record important events stated as in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].
O.Integrity
TOE must provide integrity for sales data, event data, characterization data, authentication
data, sensitive data (session keys) and FCR parameters.
O.Authentication
TOE must run authentication mechanism for users and systems.
O.Function
TOE must ensure that processing of inputs to derive sales data and event data is accurate.
TOE must ensure that time information is accurate by doing anomaly detection.
TOE must enter a maintenance mode when maintenance mode events occur in section 3.1.3
O.Transfer
TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for sales data, event data,
characterization data transferred to the PRA-IS and FCR parameters transferred from
TSM.TOE also provides integrity for sales data and event data transferred from memories to
other memories. TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for information
send/received during external device communication.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This part describes security objectives provided by the operational environment.
OE.Manufacturing
Manufacturer should ensure that FCR is protected against physical attacks during
manufacturing.
OE.Delivery
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Authorised Manufacturer User must ensure that delivery and activation of the TOE done by a
secure way.
OE.KeyGeneration
Asymmetric key generation mechanism shall be accessible only by trusted persons.
OE.SecureStorage
Asymmetric private key shall be stored within smartcard or Secure-IC’s.
Keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), certificates, event data, characterization data and sales
data shall be stored within secure environment protected by electronic seal.
OE.KeyTransportation
Transportation and installation of asymmetric private key and certificates to the FCR must be
done by protecting its confidentiality and integrity.
OE.TestEnvironment
Before FCR activation; test interfaces (functions, parameters) inserted in TOE shall be disabled
or removed.
OE.StrongAlgorithm
Environment of TOE shall use asymmetric private keys for signature operation by using
libraries of smartcard and Secure-IC’s. These libraries used in FCR shall be strong. They
should also have protection against side channel analysis (SPA, DPA, SEMA, DEMA, and
DFA).
OE.UpgradeSoftware
FCR software updates should be get passed verdict from Common Criteria maintenance or
reevaluation procedures (according to update type) before installed to the FCR. This will be
validated by the FCR, using the cryptographic signature control methods.
OE.TrustedUser
Users shall act responsibly.
OE.Control
PRA Onsite Auditor must check FCR functionality by controlling tax amount on the receipt
and tax amount sent to the PRA-IS.
OE.External Device
External Device should generate strong key for communicating with TOE.
OE.SecureEnvironment
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Fiscal memory shall not accept transactions with negative amounts which results in a decrease
of total tax value.
Tampering protection system shall protect fiscal memory with mesh cover.
Environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is consist of secure
boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data.
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
Table-2 provides security problem definition covered by security objectives. Threats and OSPs
are addressed by security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. Assumptions
are addressed by only security objectives for the operational environment.
Table 2 Security Objective Rationale
Threats OSPs Assumptions
T.AccessControl
T.
Authentication
T.MDData
T.Eavesdropping
T.Skimming
T.Counterfeit
T.Malfunction
T.ChangingTime
P.Certificate
P.SecureEnvironment
P.PhysicalTamper
P.PKI
P.InformationLeakage
P.Comm_EXT
P.UpdateControl
A.Ext_Key
A.TrustedManufacturer
A.Control
A.
AuthorisedService
A.Initialisation
A.Activation
A.TrustedUser
O.AccessControl X X X
O.Event X X X X X X X X X
O.Integrity X X X X X
O.Authentication X X X X
O.Function X X X
O.Transfer X X X
OE.External Device X
OE.Manufacturing X
OE.Delivery X X
25
OE.KeyGeneration X X
OE.SecureStorage X
OE.KeyTransportation X X
OE.TestEnvironment X
OE.StrongAlgorithm X
OE.UpgradeSoftware X
OE.TrustedUser X X
OE.Control X
OE.SecureEnvironme
nt
X X X X X X
26
Justification about Table 2 is given below;
T.AccessControl is addressed by O.AccessControl to control user access to functions and
data; O.Authentication to provide authentication mechanism for users; O.Event to log all
access attempts.
T.Authentication is addressed by O.Authentication to ensure that if user is authenticated
to the FCR; O.Event to log successful/unsuccessful authentication attempts.
T.MDData is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure integrity of sales data, event data,
characterization data and FCR parameters in FCR with logical and physical security features;
O.Transfer to ensure integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of sales data, event data and
characterization data during transferring to PRA-IS and parameters during transfering from
TSM to FCR ; O.Event to log unexpected behavior of these memories and unexpected
behavior in transferring data; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Eavesdropping is addressed by O.Transfer to ensure confidentiality of sales data, event data
and characterization data during communication with PRA-IS; O.Integrity to ensure the
integrity of event data, sales data and characterization data; O.Event to log physical tamper; by
OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Skimming is addressed by O.Authentication to establish communication only with
permitted systems.
T.Counterfeit is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure the integrity of sensitive data (session
keys); O.Event to log physical tamper; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Malfunction is addressed by O.Function to ensure functions processing accurately; O.Event
to log unexpected behavior of functions.
T.ChangingTime is addressed by O.Event to log unexpected changes in time information; by
O.Access Control to control user access to time information; by O.Function to ensure
accuracy of time information.
P.Certificate is fulfilled by OE.KeyGeneration.
P.SecureEnvironment is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.Event, O.Integrity and
O.Function.
27
P.PhysicalTamper is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.AccessControl, O.Event,
O.Integrity and OE.SecureStorage
P.PKI is fulfilled by OE.Delivery and OE.KeyTransportation
P.InformationLeakage is fulfilled by OE.StrongAlgorithm to ensure that cryptographic
algorithms used by FCR have side channel protection.
P.Comm_EXT is fulfilled by O.Transfer.
P. UpdateControl is upheld by OE.UpgradeSoftware and O.Authentication.
A.Ext_Key is upheld OE.External Device.
A. TrustedManufacturer is upheld by OE.Manufacturing and OE.TestEnvironment.
A.Control is upheld by OE.Control.
A. AuthorisedService is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.
A.Initialisation is upheld by OE.KeyGeneration, OE.SecureEnvironment and
OE.KeyTransportation.
A.Activation is upheld by OE.Delivery.
A. TrustedUser is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.
28
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This protection profile does not use any components defined as extensions to CC part 2.
29
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which have to be
fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from CC part 2 and
the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 from CC part 3.
The following notations are used:
Refinement operation (denoted in such a way that added words are in bold text and changed
words are crossedout): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement.
Selection operation (denoted by italicised bold text and placed in square bracket): is used to
select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement.
Assignment operation (denoted by underlined text and placed in square bracket): is used to
assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing
the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
Iteration operation are identified with a slash (e.g. “(/)”)
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This chapter defines the security functional requirements for the TOE according to the
functional requirements components drawn from the CC part 2 version 3.1 revision 4.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [the auditable events specified in PRA Messaging Protocol
Document[6]].
30
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].
6.1.1.2 FAU_SAR Security audit review
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation.
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Authorised Manufacturer User] with the
capability to read [all event data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
user to interpret the information.
6.1.1.3 FAU_STG Security audit event storage
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [none] if
the audit trail is full.
31
6.1.2 Class FCO Communication
6.1.2.1 FCO_NRO Non-repudiation of origin
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin
Hierarchical to: FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FCO_NRO.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for
transmitted [sales data and event data] at all times.
FCO_NRO.2.2 The TSF shall be able to relate the [originator identity, time of origin]
of the originator of the information, and the [body of the message] of
the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRO.2.3 The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of
information to [recipient] given [immediately].
6.1.3 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
6.1.3.1 FCS_CKM Cryptographic key management
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [AES:128
bits and/or AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits ]
that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
32
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes [2048
bits ] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits ]
that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KENC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [RFC
5246].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
33
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic keydestruction method] that
meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
6.1.3.2 FCS_COP/ ENC - DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES ] and cryptographic key sizes [AES:128 bits and
AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
Application Note 5: TOE shall use one of the AES mode of operation listed below
 CBC mode according to NIST SP800-38A standart,
 GCM mode according to NIST SP 800-38D standart.
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [authentication and integrity protection] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA256] and cryptographic key sizes [256
bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1 and NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/HASHING Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
34
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [hashing] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA2] and cryptographic key sizes [none]
that meet the following: [NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [key agreement] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [DHE] and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits]
that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-56A].
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KENC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES with CBC] and cryptographic
key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following:[NIST SP800-38A
(CBC.AES256)].
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption for integrity protection] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA256] and cryptographic key
sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1 and NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
35
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.1.4.1 FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] on
[Subjects: FCR Authorised User and Authorized Manufacturer User
Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information
Operations: Secure state mode and maintenance mode actions],
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects
and objects covered by the SFP].
Application Note 6: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction,
you shall add list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by
the SFP to above SFR for FCR User (Cashier).
6.1.4.2 FDP_ACF Access control functions
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to
objects based on the following [Subjects: FCR Authorised User and
Authorized Manufacturer User
Subject Attributes: User Identity,Privileges
Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information
Object Attributes: Access Control List (Secure State Mode and
maintenance mode access rights)
Operations: Secure State Mode and Maintenance Mode actions describe
in 3.1.3], [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the
indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or
named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
36
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [verify the
operator’s user identity and privileges].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [none].
Application Note 7: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction,
you shall add “list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each,
the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes” by
the SFP to above SFR for FCR User (Cashier).
6.1.4.3 FDP_ETC Export from the TOE
FDP_ETC.2/TSM Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside
of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated
security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported
from the TOE: [secure communication with SSL CA ].
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-
POS Device] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s),
outside of the TOE.
37
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated
security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported
from the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
Application Note 8: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR
described below;
FDP_ETC.2 / MAIN UNIT Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] when exporting user data, controlled
under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's
associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when
exported outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated
with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data
is exported from the TOE: [Communication with secure
messaging according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document [7]].
6.1.4.4 FDP_IFC Information flow control policy
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
38
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM
and PRA- IS] on [subjects (TSM and PRA-IS) and objects (sales
data, event data reports, FCR parameters) as specified in PRA
Messaging Protocol Document [6]].
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] on [subjects (EFT-POS) and objects (amount information in
sales data) as specified in External Device Communication Protocol
Document [7]].
Application Note 9: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR
described below;
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] on [subjects (Main Unit) and objects
(department information of purchased good, amount of
purchased good, unit price of purchased good ) as
specified in External Device Communication Protocol
Document [7]].
6.1.4.5 FDP_IFF Information flow control functions
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
39
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM
and PRA-IS] based on the following types of subject and information
security attributes: [TOE has ability to send reports related to sales
data and event data reports to PRA-IS by using subject
identifier(IP/Port information) and object identifier (file name); TOE
has ability to receive FCR parameters from TSM by using subject
identifier (IP/Port information) and object identifier (information label)
according to PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6]].
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following
rules hold: [secure communication with SSL CA].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-POSCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] based on the following types of subject and information security
attributes: [TOE has ability to send amount information to EFT-POS
Device by using subject identifier (EFT-POS label and source port). TOE
has ability to receive outcome of the operation conducted by the EFT-
POS Device by using subject identifier (source port)].
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject
and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following
rules hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
40
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [none].
Application Note 10: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR
described below;
FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] based on the following types of subject
and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to
receive department information of purchased good, amount
of purchased good and unit price of purchased good by
using subject identifier (source port) and object identifier
(information label)]
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a
controlled operation if the following rules hold:
[Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow
based on the following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based
on the following rules: [none].
6.1.4.6 FDP_ITC Import from the outside of the TOE
FDP_ITC.2/TSM Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
41
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM
and PRA-IS] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from
outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported
user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the
unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user
data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the
imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [secure
communication with SSL CA].
Application Note 11: User data (FCR parameters) is imported from TSM
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from
outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported
user data
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the
unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user
data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the
imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
42
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: [Communication with
secure messaging according to External Device Communication Protocol
Document [7]].
Application Note 12: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR
described below;
FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] when importing user data, controlled
under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with
the imported user data
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for
the unambiguous association between the security
attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security
attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the
source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing
user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE:
[Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
6.1.4.7 FDP_SDI Stored data integrity
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
43
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data sales data stored in fiscal memory
and ERU; event data, authentication data and characterization
data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on
all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data
attributes].
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an
audit event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA Messaging
Protocol Document [6] and then enter into the maintenance mode].
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data sales data stored in containers daily
memory and FCR parameters stored in containers controlled by the
TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following
attributes: [assignment: user data attributes].
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an
audit event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA Messaging
Protocol Document [6] and print Z report automatically].
6.1.5 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
6.1.5.1 FIA_AFL Authentication failures
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer
number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [Authorized Manufacturer User
authentication].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [met], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED Authentication failure handling
44
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer
number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [FCR Authorised User].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [met], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
6.1.5.2 FIA_UAU User authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales, to get X report] on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note 13: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction,
you shall use FIA_UAU.2 (hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1) described below in spite of using
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [the
authentication mechanism employed to authenticate Authorized
Manufacturer User].
45
6.1.5.3 FIA_UID User Identification
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales, to get X report] on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note 14: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction,
you shall use FIA_UID.2 (hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) described below in spite of using
FIA_UID.1.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management
6.1.6.1 FMT_MOF Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the
functions [new generation cash register fiscal application software
normal operation functions] to [assignment: the authorised identified
roles] nobody.
Application Note 15: No auhtorised user makes the changes on the behaviour of the functions.
The TSF itself makes the behavioral changes according to the FCR parameters received from
TSM.
46
Application Note 16: Ability to Modification of behaviour shall be used according to PRA
directives. Normal operation functions includes all FCR parameters that are sent to FCR by
TSM.
6.1.6.2 FMT_MSA Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [User Identity] to
[FCR Authorised User].
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [Privileges] to
[none].
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [IP:Port
Information] to [Authorised Manufacturer User].
47
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [file
name and information label] to [none].
Application Note 17: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFRs
described below;
FMT_MSA.1/ INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] to restrict the ability to [modify] the
security attributes [information label] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT SOURCE PORT INFO Management of
security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] to restrict the ability to [modify] the
security attributes [Source Port] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
48
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with
EFT_POS Device] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security
attributes [Source Port] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with
EFT_POS Device] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security
attributes [EFT-POS Label] to [none].
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP,
Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] to provide
[restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce
the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
49
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] to provide [permissive] default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Application Note 18: If your device provides Main Unit communication you shall include SFR
described below;
FMT_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP
with Main Unit] to provide [permissive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object
or information is created.
6.1.6.3 FMT_MTD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORİSED USER Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [FCR
Authorised User’s authentication data ] to [assignment: the authorised
identified roles].
FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORİZED MANUFACTURER USER Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
50
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [create] the [Authorized
Manufacturer User’s authentication data ] to [assignment: the authorised
identified roles] [nobody].
Application Note 19: No authorised identified roles make the changes on Authorized
Manufacturer User’s authentication data but TSM creates it.
Application Note 20: If TOE does not provide Main Unit communication for fiscal transaction,
you shall add FMT_MTD.1/ FCR USER SFR described below.
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR USER Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [FCR
User’s authentication data] to [FCR Authorised User].
6.1.6.4 FMT_SMF Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [Authorised Manufacturer User modifies IP: Port Information,
FCR Authorised User modifies User Identity], [assignment: list of
management functions to be provided by the TSF]
6.1.6.5 FMT_SMR Security management roles
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
Hierarchical to: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [FCR Authorised User, Authorised
Manufacturer User], [assignment: authorised identified roles]
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [Authorised Manufacturer
User shall take action in maintenance works and FCR Authorised User
51
take action in secure state works], [assignment: conditions for the
different roles] are satisfied.
6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the TSF
6.1.7.1 FPT_FLS Fail secure
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:[except maintenance mode events that specified in
section 3.1.3]
6.1.7.2 FPT_PHP TSF physical protection
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
Hierarchical to: FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Dependencies: FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FPT_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.2.3 For [the devices/elements for which active detection is required in
Technical Guidance Document [5]], the TSF shall monitor the devices
and elements and notify [FCR Authorised User], [assignment: a
designated user or role] when physical tampering with the TSF's
devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.1.7.3 FPT_RCV Trusted recovery
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
52
FPT_RCV.1.1 After [maintenance mode events which expressed in section 3.1.3
occur] the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability
to return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_RCV.4.1 The TSF shall ensure that [except maintenance mode events that
specified in section 3.1.3] have the property that the function either
completes successfully, or for the indicated failure scenarios, recovers
to a consistent and secure state.
6.1.7.4 FPT_STM Time stamps
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.1.7.5 FPT_TDC Inter-TSF TSF data consistency
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret
[CheckSum] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT
product.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [SSL client authentication] when interpreting the TSF
data from another trusted IT product.
6.1.7.6 FPT_TEE Testing of external entities
FPT_TEE.1/EXT Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
53
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during initial start-up and during
fiscal transactions] to check the fulfillment of [proper working of
external entities].
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [generate an audit event according to
Technical Guidance Document [5]].
Application Note 21: External entities are ERU,fiscal memory,daily memory, mesh cover and
electronic seal.
FPT_TEE.1/TIME Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during time synchronization with
NTP] to check the fulfillment of [accuracy of time information].
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [assignment: action(s)].
6.1.7.7 FPT_TST TSF self test
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [during initial start-up and
periodically during normal operation] to demonstrate the correct
operation of [assignment:parts of TSF].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [assignment: parts of TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [assignment: parts of TSF].
6.1.8 Class FTP Trusted Patch/Channels
6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
54
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[sending user data (sales and event data) to PRA-IS and receiveing user
data (FCR parameters and exchange rates) from TSM].
55
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and for its development and
operating environment are chosen as the predefined assurance package EAL2.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Table 3 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage and also giving an
evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen.
Table 3 Coverage of security objectives by SFRs for TOE
O.AccessControl
O.Event
O.Integrity
O.Authenticatio
n
O.Function
O.Transfer
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation X
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review X
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail
storage
X
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data
loss
X
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin X
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KENC
Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC
Cryptographic key
generation
X
56
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
X
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/HASHING Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KENC
Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KHMAC
Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE
Cryptographic operation X
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control X
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
X
FDP_ETC.2/TSM Export of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS Export of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION
Subset information flow
control
X
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION
Subset information flow
control
X
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUN
ICATION
Simple security attributes X
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-
POSCOMMUNICATION
Simple security attributes X
FDP_ITC.2/TSM Import of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS Import of user data with X
57
security attributes
FDP_SDI.2/ MEMORY Stored data integrity
monitoring and action
X
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and
PRMTR
Stored data integrity
monitoring and action
X
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTU
RER
Authentication failure
handling
X
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED Authentication failure
handling
X
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication X
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication
mechanisms
X
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification X
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security
functions behaviour
X
FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT
INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME
and INFO-LABEL
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS
SOURCE PORT INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/EFT-POS
LABEL INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS
Static attribute
initialisation
X X
58
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS Static attribute
initialisation
X
FMT_MTD.1/FCR
AUTHORİSED USER
Management of TSF data X X
FMT_MTD.1/
AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER USER
Management of TSF data X
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
X
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security
roles
X
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation
of secure state
X
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical
attack
X X
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery X
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery X
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps X
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data
consistency
X
FPT_TEE.1/EXT Testing of external entities X
FPT_TEE.1/TIME Testing of external entities X
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing X X
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel X
59
A detailed justification of required for suitability of the security functional requirements to
achieve the security objectives is given in Table 4
Table 4 Suitability of the SFRs
Security
Objective
Security Functional Requirement
O.AccessControl
FDP_ACC.1
Provides security
functional policy for
functions and data
FDP_ACF.1
Defines security attributes
for functions and data
FAU_SAR.1
Allows users to read audit
records
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(User Identity) to
FCR Authorised User
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attributes (privileges) to
nobody.
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS
Provides the functions to
provide restrictive default
values for security
attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created.
FMT_SMF.1
Descripe the specification
of management functions
being allowed to use in
maintenance mode and
secure state mode.
FMT_SMR.2
Maintains the roles with
restrictions
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORİSED
USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Authorised User’s
authentication data
60
FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Manufacturer User’s
authentication data
O.Event
FAU_GEN.1
Generates correct audit
events
FPT_STM.1
Provides accurate time for
logging events
O.Integrity
FAU_STG.1
Protects stored audit
data integrity from
unauthorised deletion
FAU_STG.4
Prevents loss of audit data
loss
FPT_PHP.2
Generation of audit event
detection of physical
tampering
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY
Monitors user data stored
for integrity errors
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR
Monitors user data stored
for integrity errors
FPT_TST.1
Ensures accuracy of its
functions working by
conducting self test
FPT_TDC.1
Provides the capability to
consistently interpret TSF
data (checksum)
O.Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER
Detects and records
authentication failure
events for Autharised
Manufacturer User
FIA_AFL.1/ AUTHORISED
Detects and records
authentication failure
events for FCR
Authorised User
FIA_UAU.1
Defines user
authentication before
allowing to do fiscal sales
FIA_UAU.4
Provides single use
authentication
mechanism for
Autharised Manufacturer
User
FIA_UID.1
Defines user
identification before
allowing to do fiscal sales
61
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORİSED
USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Authorised User’s
authentication data
FCS_COP.1/HASHING
Provides authentication
operation for PRA-IS and
TSM
O.Function
FMT_MOF.1
Restricts the ability to
enable the functions to
nobody and, thus,
prevents an unintended
access to data in the
operational phase.
FPT_FLS.1
Failure types which
makes new generation
cash
register fiscal application
software continue
working in secure state
FPT_RCV.1
Provides new generation
cash register fiscal
application software start
working in maintenance
mode in failure. (has
ability to switch to the
secure state manually)
FPT_RCV.4
Provides new generation
cash register
fiscal application
software start working
in maintenance mode in
failure. (has
ability to switch to the
secure state
automatically with
functions)
FPT_TEE.1/EXT
Provides test for IT
environment
for functioning accurately
FPT_TEE.1/TIME
Provides test for time
information for accuracy
FPT_TST.1
Ensures accuracy of its
functions working by
conducting self test
62
O.Transfer
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES
Generates session keys
for communication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC
Generates session keys
for communication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(EFT-POS label)
to nobody
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-
LABEL
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(file name) to
nobody
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(IP/Port)to
Authorized Manufacturer
User
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT
INFO
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(EFT-POS source
port) to nobody
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS
Provides the functions to
provide restrictive default
values for security
attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS
Provides the functions to
provide permissive
default values for security
attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
63
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created
FCS_CKM.4
Destroys cryptographic
keys in the TOE
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC
Provides the
cryptographic operation
for secure communication
between PRA-IS and new
generation cash register
fiscal application
software, and between
TSM and new generation
cash register fiscal
application software
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH
Provides authentication
and integrity protection
for comminication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FPT_PHP.2
Generation of audit event
detection of physical
tampering
FCO_NRO.2
Generates evidence of
origin of the data to be
transferred to the PRA-IS
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY
Generates private key for
DHE key agreement
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KENC
Provides symmetric
encryption in order to
establish secure
communication with
External Devices.
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC
Provides authentication
and integrity protection
for comminication with
External Devices.
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KENC
Generates keys for
communication between
TOE and External
Devices
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC
Generates keys for
communication between
TOE and External
Devices
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV Provides agreement
64
KEYEXCHANGE operation with External
Devices
FDP_ETC.2/TSM
Provides export of sales
data and event data from
the TOE to the PRA-IS
using the information
flow control SFP with
TSM and PRA-IS
FDP_ETC.2/EFTPOS
Provides export of
amount information in
sales data from the TOE
to the EFT-POS using the
information flow control
SFP with EFT-POS
Devices
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy for
TSM and PRA-IS
communication
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy for
EFT-POS communication
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy rules
for TSM and PRA-IS
communication
FDP_IFF.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy rules
for EFT-POS
communication
FDT_ITC.2/TSM
Provides protection of
FCR Parameters
confidentiality and
integrity during import
from TSM
FDT_ITC.2/EFTPOS
Provides protection of
confidentiality and
integrity of outcome of
the operation conducted
by the EFT-POS device
and AES keys (KENC and
KHMAC) during import
from EFT-POS device
FTP_ITC.1
Provides protection of
sales data and event data
(confidentiality+integrity)
during communication
with PRA-IS by the help
65
of secure channel
6.3.2 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements dependencies
Selected security functional requirements include related dependencies. Table 5 below
provides a summary of the security functional requirements dependency analysis.
Table 5 Security Functional Requirements dependencies
Dependencies: Included / not included
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 included
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 included
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 included
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 included
FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 included
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMA
C
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KENC
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KENC
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
.
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1(FCS_CKM.1/
EXT-DEV KENC,
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC,
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC,
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES and
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE) included
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES and
FCS_CKM.4 included
66
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/HASHING FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
No need to include any
dependencies because there is
no need to use any key for
HASHING
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KENC
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KENC ;
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC;
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 included
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1;
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS included
FDP_ETC.2/TSM FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1;
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION included
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1;
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM
UNICATION included
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMM
UNICATION
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION included
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCO
MMUNICATION
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/EFT-
POSCOMMUNICATION
included
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMM
UNICATION
FDP_IFC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION;
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS included
FDP_IFF.1/EFT- FDP_IFC.1; FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM
67
POSCOMMUNICATIO
N
FMT_MSA.3 UNICATION;
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS
included
FDP_ITC.2/TSM FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1 ;
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1 ;
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION; FTP_ITC.1;
FPT_TDC.1 included
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1 ;
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1 ;
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM
UNICATION; FTP_ITC.1;
FPT_TDC.1 included
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY No dependencies. -
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and
PRMTR
No dependencies. -
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFAC
TURER
FIA_UAU.1 included
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORIS
ED
FIA_UAU.1 included
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 included
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies -
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical
to FMT_SMR.1;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILE
GES
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT
INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION included
FMT_MSA.1/FILE
NAME and INFO-
LABEL
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNI
CATION included
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS
SOURCE PORT INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM
UNICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS
LABEL INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMM
UNICATION included
FMT_MSA.3/USERS FMT_MSA.1 ; FMT_MSA.1
68
and SYSTEMS FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY,
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES,
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT
INFO and
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME
and INFO-LABEL) ;
FMT_SMR.1 is hierarchical
to FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS FMT_MSA.1 ;
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS
LABEL INFO ) ;
FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical
to FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR
AUTHORİSED USER
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical
to FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/
AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER
USER
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 is hierarchical
to FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. -
FMT_SMR.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 included
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.2 FMT_MOF.1 included
FPT_RCV.1 AGD_OPE.1 included (assurance
component)
FPT_RCV.4 No dependencies -
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies -
FPT_TDC.1 No dependencies -
FPT_TEE.1/EXT No dependencies -
FPT_TEE.1/TIME No dependencies -
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies -
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The current assurance package was chosen based on the pre-defined assurance packet EAL2.
EAL2 is chosen because the threats that were chosen are consistent with an attacker of basic
attack potential.
69
6.3.4 Security Requirements - Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms an internally consistent whole.
The dependency analysis in Table 5 shows that the basis for internal consistency between all
defined functional requirements is satisfied.
The assurance package EAL2 is a pre-defined set of internally consistent assurance
requirements. The assurance requirements are internally consistent as all (additional)
dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise, if there are
functional-assurance dependencies being not met. So, there are no inconsistencies between the
goals of these two groups of security requirements.
70
7. ACRONYMS
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
CC : Common Criteria
CCMB : Common Criteria Management Board
DEMA : Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES : Data Encryption Standard
DFA : Differential Fault Analysis
DPA : Differential Power Analysis
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level (defined in CC)
EFTPOS : Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale
EMV : Europay, MasterCard and Visa
ERU : Electronic Recording Unit
FCR : Fiscal Cash Register
GPRS : General Packet Radio Service
GPS : Global Positioning System
IT : Information Technology
ITU : International Telecommunication Union
OSP : Organizational Security Policy
PP : Protection Profile
PKI : Public Key Infrastructure
PRA : Presidency of Revenue Administration
PRA-IS : Presidency of Revenue Administration Information Systems
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SEMA : Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
SHA : Secure Hash Algorithm
71
SPA : Simple Power Analysis
SSL - CA : Secure Sockets Layer - Client Authentication
TOE : Target of Evaluation
TSF : TOE Security Functionality (defined in CC)
TSE : Turkish Standards Institute
TSM : Trusted Service Manager
VAT : Value Added Tax
72
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
New Generation Cash Register Directives
[5] Technical Guidance Document, version 2.0
[6] PRA Messaging Protocol Document, version 2.02
[7] External Device Communication Protocol Document, version 1.0