National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security
Management Policy Management, Version 1.4, May
23rd
, 2012
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-PP-0010
Dated: 31 July 2015
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Policy Management Validation Report, 31
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Base and Additional Requirements
Computer Sciences Corporation
Hanover, Maryland
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary..................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification................................................................................................................ 1
3 ESMACPP Description ............................................................................................... 2
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives............................................................. 3
4.1 Assumptions......................................................................................................... 3
4.2 Threats.................................................................................................................. 3
4.3 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................... 4
4.4 Security Objectives .............................................................................................. 4
5 Requirements............................................................................................................... 5
6 Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................. 7
7 Results of the evaluation.............................................................................................. 7
8 Glossary....................................................................................................................... 7
9 Bibliography................................................................................................................ 8
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of the Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise
Security Management Policy Management, Version 1.4 (ESMPMPP14). It presents a summary
of the ESMPMPP14 and the evaluation results.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the ESMPMPP14 was
performed concurrent with the first product evaluation against the PP’s requirements. In this
case the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this first product was the CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway, version 8.0. The evaluation was performed by the Computer Sciences Corporation
(CSC) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Hanover, Maryland, United States of
America, and was completed in May 2014. This evaluation addressed the base requirements of
the ESMPMPP.
The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR),
written by the CSC CCTL.
The evaluation determined that the ESMPMPP14 is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant. The PP identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). The ST contains material drawn directly from the
ESMPMPP14 as well as the Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management
Policy Management. Performance of the majority of the ASE work units serves to satisfy the
APE work units as well for both of these claimed PPs. Where this is not the case, the lab
performed the outlying APE work units as part of this evaluation.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the ESMPMPP14 meets the
requirements of the APE components. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
assurance activity report are consistent with the evidence produced.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products
against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretations of CEM
work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
In order to promote thoroughness and efficiency, the evaluation of the ESMPMPP14 was
performed concurrent with the first product evaluation against the PP. In this case the TOE for
this first product was the CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA Gateway, Version 8.0, developed by
CA, Inc. The evaluation was performed by the Computer Sciences Corporation Common
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Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Hanover, Maryland, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2014.
The ESMPMPP14 contains a set of “base” requirements that all conformant STs must include
and “additional” requirements that may or may not apply to a conformant TOE depending on
its architecture and intended usage.
Because these optional requirements may not be included in a particular ST, the initial use of
the PP will address (in terms of the PP evaluation) the base requirements as well as any
additional requirements that are incorporated into that initial ST. Subsequently, TOEs that are
evaluated against the ESMPMPP14 that incorporate additional requirements that have not been
included in any ST prior to that will be used to evaluate those requirements (APE_REQ), and
any appropriate updates to this validation report will be made.
The following identifies the PP subject to the evaluation/validation, as well as the supporting
information from the base evaluation performed against this PP, as well as subsequent
evaluations that address additional optional requirements in the ESMPMPP14.
Protection Profile Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Policy
Management,, Version 1.4
ST (Base) CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA Gateway v8.0 Security Target, May 2014
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
CCTL (base) Computer Sciences Corporation, Hanover, MD USA
CCEVS Validators
(base)
Daniel Faigin, Aerospace Corporation
Jerome Myers, Aerospace Corporation
3 ESMPMPP Description
This Protection Profile focuses on access control policy definition and management. ESM
Policy Management products (PMs) will allow ESM Policy Administrators to configure
and manage Access Control products in order to determine how objects should be protected
throughout the enterprise. The output of this administrative action will be the production
and distribution of policies to Access Control products. PMs should also be able to control
the basic behavior of these products such as what events they audit, where they store
audited event data, and how they should operate in the event of a loss of communications
with the PM. A TOE that is compliant with the ESMPMPP is expected to exhibit the
following behavior:
• Establish a trusted channel between itself and other Enterprise Security
Management products
• Provide evidence of its identity to other Enterprise Security Management products
• Utilize organizational subject and attribute data to validate the identities and
determine the authorities of Policy Administrators
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• Provide a trusted remote or local interface for Policy Administrators to create and
distribute policies
• Deconflict a policy that may contain contradictory data such as rules that both
authorize and deny the same activity
• Provide the ability to configure the policy enforcement behavior of Access Control
products
• Generate an audit trail of administrative behavior
In general, the ESM Policy Management PP exists to provide administrators with the ability to
configure the behavior of products that claim conformance with the ESM Access Control PP,
whether they are separate products or part of a composed solution.
4 Security Problem Description and Objectives
4.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
Operational Environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the
development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on
the use of the TOE.
Table 1: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Name Assumption Definition
A.ESM The TOE will be able to establish connectivity to other ESM products
in order to share security data.
A.MANAGE The TOE will receive identity data from the Operational
Environment.
A.USERID There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to install,
configure, and operate the TOE.
4.2 Threats
Table 2: Threats
Threat Name Threat Definition
T.ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may unintentionally install or configure the TOE
incorrectly, resulting in ineffective security mechanisms.
T.CONDTRADICT A careless administrator may create a policy that contains
contradictory rules for access control enforcement.
T.EAVES A malicious user could eavesdrop on network traffic to gain
unauthorized access to TOE data.
T.FORGE A malicious user may exploit a weak or nonexistent ability for the
TOE to provide proof of its own identity in order to send forged
policies to an Access Control product.
T.UNAUTH A malicious user could bypass the TOE’s identification,
authentication, or authorization mechanisms in order to illicitly
utilize the TOE’s management functions.
T.WEAKIA A Policy Administrator may be incapable of using the TOE to define
policies in sufficient detail to facilitate robust access control,
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Threat Name Threat Definition
causing an Access Control product to behave in a manner that
allows illegitimate activity or prohibits legitimate activity.
T.WEAKPOL A malicious user could be illicitly authenticated by the TSF through
brute-force guessing of authentication credentials.
4.3 Organizational Security Policies
Table 3: Threats
OSP Name OSP Definition
P.BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use,
legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which
users consent by accessing the system.
4.4 Security Objectives
The following table contains security objectives for the TOE.
Table 4: Security Objectives for the TOE
TOE Security Obj. TOE Security Objective Definition
O.ACCESSID The TOE will contain the ability to validate the identity of
other ESM products prior to distributing data to them.
O.AUDIT The TOE will provide measures for generating security
relevant events that will detect access attempts to TOE-
protected resources by users.
O.AUTH The TOE will provide a mechanism to examine human and IT
entity user identity data received from the Operational
Environment and determine the extent to which the claimed
identity should be able to perform TSF management
functions.
O.BANNER The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the
TOE.
O.CONSISTENT The TSF will provide a mechanism to identify and rectify
contradictory policy data.
O.DISTRIB The TOE will provide the ability to distribute policies to
trusted IT products using secure channels.
O.MANAGE The TOE will provide the ability to manage the behavior of
trusted IT products using secure channels.
O.EAVES The TOE will either leverage a third-party cryptographic suite
or contain the ability to utilize cryptographic algorithms to
secure the communication channels to and from itself.
O.INTEGRITY The TOE will contain the ability to assert the integrity of
policy data.
O.POLICY The TOE will provide the ability to generate policies that are
sufficiently detailed to satisfy the Data Protection
requirements for one or more technology types in the
Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security
Management Access Control.
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TOE Security Obj. TOE Security Objective Definition
O.ROBUST The TOE will provide mechanisms to reduce the ability for an
attacker to impersonate a legitimate user during
authentication.
O.SELFID The TOE will be able to confirm its identity to the ESM
deployment upon sending data to other processes within the
ESM deployment.
The following table contains objectives for the Operational Environment.
Table 5: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Environmental Security Obj. TOE Security Objective Definition
OE.ADMIN There will be one or more administrators of the
Operational Environment that will be responsible for
providing subject identity to attribute mappings within the
TOE.
OE.AUDIT The Operational Environment will provide a remote
location for storage of audit data
OE.INSTAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is
delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a secure
manner.
OE.PERSON Personnel working as TOE administrators shall be
carefully selected and trained for proper operation of the
TOE.
OE.PROTECT One or more ESM Access Control products will be deployed
in the Operational Environment to protect organizational
assets.
OE.USERID The Operational Environment must be able to identify a user
requesting access to the TOE.
5 Requirements
As indicated above, requirements in the ESMPMPP14 are comprised of the “base”
requirements and additional requirements that are conditionally or strictly optional. The
following are table contains the “base” requirements that were validated as part of the CA
evaluation activity referenced above.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ESM: Enterprise Security
Management
ESM_ACD.1: Access Control Policy Definition
ESM_ACT.1: Access Control Policy Transmission
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
FAU_SEL_EXT.1: External Selective Audit
FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage
FCO: Communications FCS_NRR.2: Enforced Proof of Receipt
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Handling
FIA_SOS.1: Verification of Secrets
FIA_UAU.2: User Authentication Before Any Action
FIA_UID.2: User Identification Before Any Action
FIA_USB.1: User-Subject Binding
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF_EXT.1: External Management of Functions Behavior
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3: Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA_EXT.5: Consistent Security Attributes
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1: Security Management Roles
FTA: TOE Access FTA_TAB.1: TOE Access Banner
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1(1): Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1(2): Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path
The following table contains the optional requirements contained in Appendix C, and an
indication of what evaluation those requirements were verified in (from the list in the
Identification section above). Requirements that do not have an associated evaluation indicator
have not yet been evaluated. These requirements are included in an ST if associated selections
are made by the ST authors in requirements that are levied on the TOE by the ST.
Requirement Class Requirement Component Verified By
ESM: Enterprise Security
Management
ESM_ATD.1: Object Attribute Definition CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway Security Target, May
2014
ESM_ATD.2: Subject Attribute Definition CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway Security Target, May
2014
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key
Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key
Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Cryptographic
Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway Security Target, May
2014
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-Initiated Session
Locking and Termination
CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway Security Target, May
2014
FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA
Gateway Security Target, May
2014
FTA_TSE.1: TOE Session Establishment
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6 Assurance Requirements
The following are the assurance requirements contained in the ESMPMPP14:
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative Procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM Coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent Testing - Sample
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability Survey
7 Results of the evaluation
The CCTL produced an ETR that contained the following results. Note that for APE elements
and work units that are identical to APE elements and work units, the lab performed the APE
work units concurrent to the ASE work units.
APE Requirement Evaluation Verdict
APE_CCL.1 Pass
APE_ECD.1 Pass
APE_INT.1 Pass
APE_OBJ.2 Pass
APE_REQ.1 Pass
8 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology as interpreted by the supplemental guidance in
the ESMACPP Assurance Activities to determine whether or not the claims made are
justified.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
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• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
9 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1,
Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security Functional Requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, Version
3.1, Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations. Common Evaluation Methodology
for Information Technology Security – Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1,
Revision 2, dated: September 2007.
[5] Common Criteria, Evaluation and Validation Scheme for Information Technology
Security, Guidance to Validators of IT Security Evaluations, Scheme Publication #3,
Version 1.0, January 2002.
[6] Computer Sciences Corporation, CA Layer 7 SecureSpan SOA Gateway v8.0 Security
Target, Version Unspecified. May, 2014.
[7] Standard Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management Policy Management,
Version 1.4, May 23, 2012.