BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
for
IEEE Standard Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008
Operational Environment B,
IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009
from
IEEE Computer Society,
Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Postfach 20 03 63, 53133 Bonn, Germany
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-414 V1.44
BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
Common Criteria Protection Profile
IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in
IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008 Operational Environment B,
IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009
developed by IEEE Computer Society,
Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee
Assurance Package claimed in the Protection Profile:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The Protection Profile identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the Protection Profile and in conjunction
with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the Protection Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the Protection
Profile by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect
to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 July 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products as well as for Protection Profiles
(PP).
A PP defines an implementation-independent set of IT security requirements for a
category of products which are intended to meet common consumer needs for IT security.
The development and certification of a PP or the reference to an existent one gives
consumers the possibility to express their IT security needs without referring to a special
product. Product or system certifications can be based on Protection Profiles. For products
which have been certified based on a Protection Profile an individual certificate will be
issued.
Certification of the Protection Profile is carried out on the instigation of the BSI or a
sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the Protection Profile
according to Common Criteria [1].
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Protection Profile Overview..........................................................................................12
2 Security Functional Requirements...............................................................................14
3 Security Assurance Requirements...............................................................................14
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation........................................................................................14
5 Obligations and notes for the usage............................................................................15
6 Protection Profile Document.........................................................................................15
7 Definitions.....................................................................................................................15
7.1 Acronyms...............................................................................................................15
7.2 Glossary.................................................................................................................16
8 Bibliography..................................................................................................................17
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................19
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................29
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [7]
● Procedure for the Issuance of a PP certificate by the BSI
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same Protection Profile in different countries a
mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on CC -
under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the the United Kingdom.
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States of America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification
schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008
Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std
2600TM
-2008 Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 was conducted by the
ITSEF atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21 June 2010.
The ITSEF atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IEEE Computer Society,
Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee
The PP was developed by: IEEE P2600 Working Group
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the Protection Profile as indicated.
In case of changes to the certified version of the Protection Profile, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance
continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified Protection Profile, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
5 Publication
The IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM7
-2008
Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified Protection Profiles, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [4]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer and
sponsor8
of the Protection Profile. The Certification Report may also be obtained in
electronic form at the internet address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
IEEE 2600 and IEEE 2600.2 are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Incorporated
8
IEEE Computer Society, Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the certified Protection Profile,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010
1 Protection Profile Overview
The IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008
Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 [6] is established by the IEEE
Computer Society, Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee as a basis for the
development of Security Targets in order to perform a certification of an IT-product, the
Target of Evaluation (TOE).
The Hardcopy Devices (HCDs) considered in this Protection Profile are used for the
purpose of converting hardcopy documents into digital form (scanning), converting digital
documents into hardcopy form (printing), transmitting hardcopy documents over telephone
lines (faxing), or duplicating hardcopy documents (copying). Hardcopy documents are
commonly in paper form, but they can also take other forms such as positive or negative
transparencies or film.
HCDs can be implemented in many different configurations, depending on their intended
purpose or purposes. Simple devices have a single purpose implemented by a single
function, such as a printer, scanner, copier, or fax machine. Other devices augment a
single primary purpose with additional secondary functions, such as a fax machine that
can also be used to make copies, or a copier that can also be used as a printer. Complex
multifunction devices fulfil multiple purposes by using multiple functions in different
combinations to perform the operations of several single-function devices.
Some HCDs have additional functions that enhance their capabilities, such as hard disk
drives or other non-volatile storage systems, document server functions, or mechanisms
for manually or automatically updating the HCD’s operating software. All HCDs considered
in this Protection Profile are assumed to provide the capability for appropriately authorized
users to manage the security features of the HCD.
To facilitate the creation of Security Targets or Protection Profiles that can be used for
many types and configurations of HCDs, this standard is composed of a Protection Profile
that describes the generic security problem definition, security objectives, and security
functional requirements of all HCDs, and a set of named SFR packages whose application
depend upon the functions that are performed by a particular conforming Target of
Evaluation. Those functions are:
● Printing - producing a hardcopy document from its electronic form
● Scanning - producing an electronic document from its hardcopy form
● Copying - duplicating a hardcopy document
● Faxing - scanning documents in hardcopy form and transmitting them in electronic form
over telephone lines, and receiving documents in electronic form over telephone lines
and printing them in hardcopy form
● Document storage and retrieval - storing an electronic document during one document
processing job for access during one or more subsequent document processing jobs,
and retrieving an electronic document that was stored during a previous document
processing job
● Non-volatile storage - persistent or temporary storage of User Data or TSF Data on a
non-volatile storage device that is part of the evaluated TOE but is designed to be
removed from the TOE by authorized personnel
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● Shared-medium Interfaces - transmitting or receiving User Data or TSF Data between
the HCD and external devices over communications media which, in conventional
practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users
These functions can be combined to represent a wide variety of complete Hardcopy
Devices.
According to the conformance claim in the PP a TOE shall provide the security
functionality defined by the common security functional requirements (SFR) listed in the
PP [6], chapter 10 and perform at least one of the functions printing, scanning, copying,
and faxing, as defined in the PP [6], chapter 12.3, and for any and all functions defined in
chapter 12.2 that are performed by the TOE, claim compliance with the SFR package(s) in
chapter 12.3 associated with those function(s).
HCDs can be used in a wide variety of environments, such as:
● Home use by consumers
● Home or office use by small businesses
● Office use by medium or large organizations
● Self-service use by the public in retail copy shops, libraries, business centres, or
educational institutions
● Production use by commercial service providers
HCDs may contain or process valuable or sensitive assets that need to be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and alteration. The utility of the device itself may be considered a
valuable asset which also needs to be protected. There is also a need to ensure that the
HCD cannot be misused in such a way that it causes harm to devices with which it shares
network connections.
However, each environment may place a different value on those assets, make different
assumptions about security-relevant factors such as physical security and administrator
skill, face threats of differing approach and sophistication, and be subject to different
external legal, regulatory, or policy requirements. It is not practical to fulfil one set of
Security Objectives for all environments, and therefore, IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008 has defined
several environments that form the basis for several Protection Profile standards in the
IEEE Std 2600TM
series. A complete description of those environments can be found in
IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008.
This Protection Profile and associated SFR Packages address the requirements of
Operational Environment B. Operational Environment B is generally characterized as a
commercial information processing environment in which a moderate level of document
security, network security, and security assurance are required. Typically, this environment
will handle the day-to-day proprietary and non-proprietary information needed to operate
an enterprise.
The assets to be protected by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP are defined in the
Protection Profile [6], chapter 5.3.2. Based on these assets the security problem definition
is defined in terms of assumptions, threats and organisational security policies. This is
outlined in the Protection Profile [6], chapter 7.2 – 7.4.
These assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are split into security
objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP and security objectives
to be fulfilled by the operational environment of a TOE claiming conformance to this PP.
These objectives are outlined in the PP [6], chapter 8.1 – 8.3.
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The Protection Profile [6] requires a Security Target based on this PP or another PP
claiming this PP, to fulfil the CC requirements for demonstrable conformance.
2 Security Functional Requirements
Based on the security objectives to be fulfilled by a TOE claiming conformance to this PP
the security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements to be
implemented by a TOE. It covers the following issues: Auditing, user document data
protection, user function data protection, TSF data protection, user identification and
authentication, management the operation of external interfaces, and self-verification of
executable code in the TSF.
These TOE security functional requirements (SFR) are outlined in the PP [6], chapter 10
(common SFRs) and chapters 13 – 19 (additional SFR packages). They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the SFR claim is
called:
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
3 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE security assurance package claimed in the Protection Profile is based entirely on
the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria. Thus, this assurance
package is called:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2
(for the definition and scope of assurance packages according to CC see part C or [1], part
3 for details).
4 Results of the PP-Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [5] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [7] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
of the class APE.
The following assurance components were used:
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Protection Profile as defined in
chapter 1.
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
5 Obligations and notes for the usage
The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the Protection Profile:
● According to the conformance claim in the PP a TOE shall provide the security
functionality defined by the common security functional requirements (SFR) listed in the
PP [6], chapter 10 and perform at least one of the functions printing, scanning, copying,
and faxing, as defined in the PP [6], chapter 12.3, and for any and all functions defined in
chapter 12.2 that are performed by the TOE, claim compliance with the SFR package(s) in
chapter 12.3 associated with those function(s).
6 Protection Profile Document
The IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008
Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 [6] is being provided within a
separate document as Annex A of this report.
7 Definitions
7.1 Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HCD Hardcopy Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOGIS-MRASenior Officials Group Information Systems Security Mutual Recognition
Agreement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
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7.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - The combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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8 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[5] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 11 March 2010, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
[6] Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010, „IEEE Standard Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-2008 Operational Environment B,
IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009“, Version 1.0, 26 February 2010, IEEE Computer Society
Information Assurance (C/IA) Committee
[7] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
.
9
specially
• AIS 32, Version 5, 17 May 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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BSI-CC-PP-0058-2010 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extend-ed - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Documents AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
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Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600TM
-
2008 Operational Environment B, IEEE Std 2600.2TM
-2009 [6] provided within
a separate document.
The Protection Profile can be downloaded from the following internet adress:
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee/2600/
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