Copyright © 2022 Keysight Technologies
This non-proprietary Security Policy document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
Keysight Technologies
Cryptographic Module for Network Visibility
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.0
May 26, 2022
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Keysight Technologies
8310 N Capital of Texas Hwy
Austin, TX 78731
keysight.com
KeyPair Consulting Inc.
987 Osos Street
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401
keypair.us
+1 805.316.5024
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Keysight Technologies Cryptographic Module for Network Visibility
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 4
1.1 Logical and Physical Cryptographic Boundaries ...................................................................................... 6
1.1.1 Logical Cryptographic Boundary..................................................................................................................6
1.1.2 Physical Boundary ........................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Modes of Operation................................................................................................................................ 8
1.3 Module Configuration............................................................................................................................. 8
2 Cryptographic Functionality ................................................................................................................. 9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters .................................................................................................................. 13
2.2 Public Keys ............................................................................................................................................ 14
3 Roles, Authentication and Services..................................................................................................... 15
3.1 Assumption of Roles ............................................................................................................................. 15
3.2 Services................................................................................................................................................. 15
4 Self-tests ........................................................................................................................................... 18
5 Physical Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 19
6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................... 19
6.1 Use of External RNG.............................................................................................................................. 19
7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy...................................................................................................... 20
8 Security Rules and Guidance .............................................................................................................. 21
8.1 Basic Enforcement ................................................................................................................................ 21
8.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager.......................................................................... 21
8.3 Basic Guidance...................................................................................................................................... 21
8.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs............................................................................................... 21
8.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF ................................................................ 22
8.6 Rules for setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE................................................................................ 22
8.7 Guidance for the use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source ......................................... 22
9 References and Definitions ................................................................................................................ 24
List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Tested Environments ......................................................................................... 4
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements................................................................................................ 5
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces.................................................................................................................. 8
Table 4 – Available Java Permissions ..................................................................................................................... 8
Table 5 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions........................................................................ 9
Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation ................................................... 10
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions.......................................................................... 11
Table 8 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for Use in Non-FIPS Mode Only............................................ 11
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)....................................................................................................... 13
Table 10 – Public Keys ......................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 11 – Roles Description ............................................................................................................................... 15
Table 12 – Services.............................................................................................................................................. 15
Table 13 – CSP Access Rights within Services ...................................................................................................... 17
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests............................................................................................................................ 18
Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests ......................................................................................................................... 19
Table 16 – References ......................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 17 – Acronyms and Definitions.................................................................................................................. 24
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – Block Diagram of the Software for the Module .................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of the Physical Components of a Typical GPC ............................................................... 7
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1 Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the Keysight Technologies Cryptographic Module for Network
Visibility, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a cryptographic library. The Module meets FIPS 140-2
overall Level 1 requirements. The SW versions covered by this Security Policy are 1.0.2.1, 1.0.2.2, and 1.0.2.3.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environments on the general-purpose
computer (GPC) platforms detailed in Table 1.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Tested Environments
# GPC Platform CPU Family OS Java SE Runtime Environment
1 Dell PowerEdge R830 Intel Xeon Processor E5
without PAA
Photon OS 2.0 on
VMware ESXi 6.7
Java SE Runtime Environment v7 (1.7.0),
single-user mode
2 Dell PowerEdge R830 Intel Xeon Processor E5
without PAA
Photon OS 2.0 on
VMware ESXi 6.7
Java SE Runtime Environment v8 (1.8.0),
single-user mode
3 Dell PowerEdge R830 Intel Xeon Processor E5
without PAA
Photon OS 2.0 on
VMware ESXi 6.7
Java SE Runtime Environment v11 (1.11.0),
single-user mode
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, the cryptographic module will remain compliant with the FIPS
140-2 validation when operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that:
1) No source code has been modified.
2) The GPC uses the specified single-user platform, or another compatible single-user platform such as one of
the Java SE Runtime Environments listed on any of the following:
• Keysight Vision Network Visibility OS 5.10.1 and later releases running on a Vision Network Packet
Broker
o Vision Network Packet Broker models include Vision X, Vision ONE, Vision 7300/7303, Vision
E100/E40/E10S, Vision 7816/5812/7712, and TradeVision.
o Supported processor architectures include Intel Broadwell, Broadwell-DE, Ivy Bridge,
Silvernote/Rangely, and Kaby Lake.
For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby stated that the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of
the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational
environment is not listed on the validation certificate.
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require a FIPS 140-2 validated
Cryptographic Library. The Module is a software-only embodiment; the cryptographic boundary is the Java
Archive (JAR) file, bc-fips-1.0.2.3.jar in the case of Module v1.0.2.3, bc-fips-1.0.2.2.jar in the case of Module
v1.0.2.2, bc-fips-1.0.2.1.jar in the case of Module v1.0.2.1.
Note: Module v1.0.2.2 offers identical functionality and API to Module v1.0.2.1, however an internal
modification means that it is not susceptible to JVM class loader issues that started showing up following
updates to Java 11 in October 2020. Users experiencing class loader issues on startup with Module v1.0.2.1 are
advised to use Module v1.0.2.2.
Note: Module v1.0.2.3 offers identical functionality and API to Module v1.0.2.2, however an internal
modification removes 2 performance bottlenecks and adds support for configuring the Module’s system
properties using entries in java.security.
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The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are given in Table 2 as follows:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
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1.1 Logical and Physical Cryptographic Boundaries
1.1.1 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The executable for the Module is: bc-fips-1.0.2.1.jar or bc-fips-1.0.2.2.jar or bcfips-1.0.2.3.jar. This module is
the only software component within the Logical Cryptographic Boundary and the only software component
that carries out cryptographic functions covered by FIPS 140-2. Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the
cryptographic module to the other software and hardware components of the computer. The BC classes are
executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) using the classes of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE). The JVM
is the interface to the computer’s Operating System (OS) that is the interface to the various physical
components of the computer.
The physical components of the computer are discussed further in Section 7. Abbreviations introduced in
Figure 1 that describe physical components are: Central Processing Unit (CPU), Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) and Input Output (I/O).
Figure 1 – Block Diagram of the Software for the Module
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1.1.2 Physical Boundary
The Module runs on a general-purpose computer (GPC). The Physical Cryptographic Boundary for the module
is the case of that computer. Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the physical components of a typical GPC and
the ports or interfaces across the Physical Cryptographic Boundary. All the physical components are standard
electronic components; there are not any custom integrated circuits or components dedicated to FIPS 140-2
related functions.
Abbreviations introduced in Figure 2 are: Basic I/O System (BIOS), Integrated Device Electronics (IDE), Institute
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), Peripheral Component
Interconnect (PCI), Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) and Universal Serial Bus (USB). Input
or output ports are designated by arrows with single heads, while I/O ports are indicated by bidirectional
arrows.
Figure 2 – Block Diagram of the Physical Components of a Typical GPC
For FIPS 140-2 purposes, the Module is defined as a “multi-chip standalone module”, therefore, the module’s
physical ports or interfaces are defined as those for the hardware of the GPC. These physical ports are
separated into the logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as shown in Table 3.
The Module is a software module only, and, therefore, control of the physical ports is outside of the module’s
scope. The module provides a set of logical interfaces which are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. When the module performs
self-tests, is in an error state, is generating keys, or performing zeroization, the module prevents all output on
the logical data output interface as only the thread performing the operation has access to the data. The
module is single-threaded, and in an error state, the module does not return any output data, only an error
value.
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The mapping of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces to the module is described in Table 3.
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Interface Module Equivalent
Data Input API input parameters – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Data Output API output parameters and return values – plaintext and/or ciphertext data.
Control Input API method calls – method calls, or input parameters, that specify commands and/or control data
used to control the operation of the module.
Status Output API output parameters and return/error codes that provide status information used to indicate the
state of the module.
Power Start up/Shutdown of a process containing the module.
1.2 Modes of Operation
There will be two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-approved
mode when the appropriate transition method is called. To verify that a module is in the Approved Mode of
operation, the user can call a FIPS-approved mode status method
(CryptoServicesRegisrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()). If the module is configured to allow approved and non-
approved mode operation, a call to CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true) will switch the current
thread of user control into approved mode.
In FIPS-approved mode, the module will not provide non-approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will be
called if the user tries to access non-approved algorithms in the Approved Mode.
1.3 Module Configuration
In default operation the module will start with both approved and non-approved mode enabled.
If the module detects that the system property org.bouncycastle.fips.approved_only is set to true the module
will start in approved mode and non-approved mode functionality will not be available. This property can also
be set in the java.security file for the module if bc-fips-1.0.2.3 is in use.
If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed the module will be running in approved
mode with secret and private key export disabled.
Use of the module with a Java Security manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow the
module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to examine
secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly with a Java Security
manager are indicated by a Y in the Req column of Table 4.
Table 4 – Available Java Permissions
Permission Settings Req Usage
RuntimePermission “getProtectionDomain” Y Allows checksum to be carried out on jar.
RuntimePermission “accessDeclaredMembers” Y Allows use of reflection API within the provider.
PropertyPermission “java.runtime.name”, “read” N Only if configuration properties are used.
SecurityPermission "putProviderProperty.BCFIPS" N Only if provider installed during execution.
CryptoServicesPermission “unapprovedModeEnabled” N Only if unapproved mode algorithms required.
CryptoServicesPermission “changeToApprovedModeEnabled” N Only if threads allowed to change modes.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportSecretKey” N To allow export of secret keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportPrivateKey” N To allow export of private keys only.
CryptoServicesPermission “exportKeys” Y Required to be applied for the module itself.
Optional for any other codebase.
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Permission Settings Req Usage
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsNullDigestEnabled” N Only required for TLS digest calculations.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled” N Only required if TLS is used with RSA encryption.
CryptoServicesPermission “tlsAlgorithmsEnabled” N Enables both NullDigest and PKCS15KeyWrap.
CryptoServicesPermission “defaultRandomConfig” N Allows setting of default SecureRandom.
CryptoServicesPermission “threadLocalConfig” N Required to set a thread local property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar.
CryptoServicesPermission “globalConfig” N Required to set a global property in the
CryptoServicesRegistrar.
2 Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in
Table 5 to Table 7, below.
Table 5 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description Cert. #
AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB8, CFB128, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2113
A1641
C2204
CCM [SP 800-38C]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2113
A1641
C2204
CMAC [SP 800-38B]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: AES with 128, 192, 256 bits and Triple-DES with 2-key1,2
, 3-key
A2113
A1641
C2204
GCM/GMAC3
[SP 800-38D]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
A2113
A1641
C2204
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: Hash DRBG, HMAC DRBG, AES-CTR DRBG, Triple-DES-CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits
A2113
A1641
C2204
DSA4
[FIPS 186-4]
Functions: PQG Generation, PQG Verification, Key Pair Generation, Signature Generation,
Signature Verification
Key sizes: 1024, 2048, 3072 bits (1024 only for SigVer)
A2113
A1641
C2204
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Signature Generation Component, Public Key Generation, Signature Generation,
Signature Verification, Public Key Validation
Curves/Key sizes: P-192*, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163*, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,
B-163*, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
* Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
A2113
A1641
C2204
1 2^20 block limit is enforced by module.
2 In approved mode of operation, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than verification purposes is non-
compliant.
3 GCM encryption with an internally generated IV, see section 8.4 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5.
4 DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols.
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Algorithm Description Cert. #
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation, Authentication
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256,
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
A2113
A1641
C2204
KDF, Existing
Application-
Specific5
[SP 800-135]
Functions: TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH KDF, X9.63 KDF, IKEv2 KDF, SRTP KDF
A2113
A1641
C2204
(CVL)
KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions6
[SP 800-108]
Modes: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode
Functions: CMAC-based KBKDF with AES, 3-key Triple-DES or HMAC-based KBKDF with
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
A2113
A1641
C2204
Key Wrapping
Using Block
Ciphers7
[SP 800-38F]
Modes: AES KW, KWP
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits (provides between 128 and 256 bits of strength)
A2113
A1641
C2204
[SP 800-38F]
Mode: Triple-DES TKW
Key size: 3-key (provides 112 bits of strength)
A2113
A1641
C2204
RSA [FIPS 186-4, FIPS 186-2, ANSI X9.31-1998 and PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS and PKCS1.5)]
Functions: Key Pair Generation (2048 and 3072 bits), Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits (1024, 1536, 4096 only for SigVer)
A2113
A1641
C2204
[PKCS #1 v2.1 (PSS and PKCS1.5)] RSA Signature Primitive
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.1.2] RSA Decryption Primitive
A2113
A1641
C2204
(CVL)
SHS [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature
Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256
A2113
A1641
C2204
SHA-3, SHAKE [FIPS 202]
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256
A2113
A1641
C2204
Triple-DES [SP 800-67]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: TECB, TCBC, TCFB64, TCFB8, TOFB, CTR
Key sizes: 2-key (Decryption only)8
, 3-key9
A2113
A1641
C2204
Table 6 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description IG Ref.
AES-CBC
Ciphertext
Stealing (CS)
[Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct 2010]
Functions: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.12
5 These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
6 Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not be used in approved mode.
7 Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
8 2^20 block limit is enforced by the module, 2-key encryption is disabled.
9 3-key Triple-DES encryption must not be used for more than 2^20 blocks for any given key.
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Algorithm Description IG Ref.
CKG using
output from
DRBG10
[SP 800-133]
Section 6.1 (Asymmetric from DRBG)
Section 7.1 (Symmetric from DRBG)
Using A2113 or A1641 or C2204 (DRBG)
Vendor
Affirmed IG
D.12
cSHAKE128,
cSHAKE256
[SP 800-185]
Section 3, cSHAKE
Using A2113 or A1641 or C2204 (SHA3, SHAKE)
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.15
KAS-SSC11
[SP 800-56A-rev3]
Section 5.6.2.3.1 (Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) Full Public Key Validation Routine)
Section 5.6.2.3.2 (Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Full Public Key Validation Routine)
Section 5.7 (DLC Primitive)
Section 5.8 (Key Derivation Functions for Key Agreement Schemes)
Section 5.9 (Key Confirmation)
Section 6 (Key Agreement)
Parameter sets/Key sizes:
ECC: Approved P, B, K Curves per Appendix D
FFC: Safe primes per Appendix D
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.1
rev 3
KDF, Password-
Based
[SP 800-132]
Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Using A2113 or A1641 or C2204 (HMAC)
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.6
Key Wrapping11
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.3]
RSA-KEMS-KWS with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
Key Transport11
Using RSA
[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.2]
RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
Vendor
Affirmed IG D.4
RSA [SP 800-131 rev2, Section 3]
Key sizes: 4096 up to 16384 bits
Using mechanism tested in A2113 or A1641 or C2204
Vendor
Affirmed IG
A.14
Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Description
NDRNG [IG 7.15] Non-deterministic random number generator.
Non‐SP 800‐56B compliant
RSA Key Transport
[IG D.9] RSA may be used by a calling application as part of a key encapsulation scheme.
Key sizes: 4096 up to 16384 bits.
MD5 within TLS [IG D.2]
Table 8 – Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for Use in Non-FIPS Mode Only
Function Name
AES (non-compliant12
)
ARC4 (RC4)
Blowfish
Camellia
CAST5
DES
Diffie-Hellman KAS (non-compliant13
)
HMAC-RIPEMD128
HMAC-RIPEMD160
HMAC-RIPEMD256
HMAC-RIPEMD320
HMAC-TIGER
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL
IDEA
RC2
RIPEMD128
RIPEMD160
RIPEMD256
RIPEMD320
RSA (non-compliant17
)
RSA KTS (non-compliant18
)
10 The resulting key or a generated seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.
11 Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
12 Support for additional modes of operation.
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Function Name
DSA (non-compliant14
)
DSTU4145
ECDSA (non-compliant15
)
EdDSA
ElGamal
GOST28147
GOST3410-1994
GOST3410-2001
GOST3411
HMAC-GOST3411
HMAC-MD5
KAS16
using SHA-512/224 or SHA-
512/256
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or SHA-
512/256 (non-compliant)
MD5
OpenSSL PBKDF (non-compliant)
PKCS#12 PBKDF (non-compliant)
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF (non-
compliant)
PRNG X9.31
SCrypt
SEED
Serpent
SipHash
SHACAL-2
TIGER
Triple-DES (non-compliant19
)
Twofish
WHIRLPOOL
XDH
13 Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
17 Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional key sizes.
18 Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.
14 Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
15 Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.
16 Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.
19 Support for additional modes of operation.
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section in Table 9. All usage of these CSPs by the Module
(including all CSP lifecycle states) is described in the services detailed in Section 3.2.
Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
CSP Description / Usage
AES Encryption Key [FIPS-197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]
AES (128/192/256) encrypt key20
AES Decryption Key [FIPS-197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]
AES (128/192/256) decrypt key
AES Authentication Key [FIPS-197] AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key
AES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key
DH Agreement key [SP 800-56A-rev3] Diffie-Hellman (160 - 512 bits) private key agreement key
DRBG(CTR AES) V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
DRBG(CTR Triple-DES) V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(Hash) V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
DRBG(HMAC) V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length
dependent on security strength)
DSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
EC Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev3] EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) private key agreement key
EC Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) signature generation key.
HMAC Authentication Key [FIPS 198-1] Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2). Key size determined by security strength
required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2 PRF.
PBKDF Secret Value [SP 800-132] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified PRF.
RSA Signing Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (2048 up to 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (2048 up to 16384 bits) key transport (decryption) key
SP 800-56C Concatenation
Derivation Function Secret
Value
[SP 800-56C] Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF.
SP 800-108 KDF Secret
Value
[SP 800-108] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF.
SRTP Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP PRF.
SSH Derivation Function
Secret Value
[SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH PRF.
TLS KDF Secret Value [SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified TLS PRF.
Triple-DES Authentication
Key
[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) CMAC key
20 The AES-GCM key and IV is generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum of 96 bits. In the event
module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or
decryption are re-distributed.
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CSP Description / Usage
Triple-DES Encryption Key [SP 800-67] Triple-DES (192) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption Key [SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192) decryption key
Triple-DES Wrapping Key [SP 800-38F] Triple-DES (192 bits) key wrapping/unwrapping key, (128 unwrapping only).
X9.63 KDF Secret Value [SP 800-135] Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified X9.63 PRF.
2.2 Public Keys
Table 10 – Public Keys
Key Description / Usage
DH Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev3] Diffie-Hellman (2048 and 3072) public key agreement key
DSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
EC Agreement Key [SP 800-56A-rev3] EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) public key agreement key
EC Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
B-409 and B-571) signature verification key
RSA Key Transport Key [SP 800-56B] RSA (2048 - 16384) key transport (encryption) key
RSA Verification Key [FIPS 186-4] RSA (1024 - 16384) signature verification key
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The cryptographic
module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that
instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
Table 11 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The module does not support a maintenance role
and/or bypass capability. The module does not support authentication.
Table 11 – Roles Description
Role ID Role Description Authentication Type
CO Cryptographic Officer – Powers on and off the module. N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1
User User – The user of the complete API. N/A – Authentication not required for Level 1
3.2 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 12 below and Table 13 describes all usage of CSPs by
the service.
Table 12 lists the services. The second column provides a description of each service and availability to the
Cryptographic Officer and User, in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Table 12 – Services
Service Description CO U
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module initialization. X
Show Status A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if the module is
ready.
CryptoServicesRegistrar.IsInApprovedOnlyMode() can be called to determine the
FIPS mode of operation.
X
Zeroize / Power-off The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread termination. X
Data Encryption Used to encrypt data. X
Data Decryption Used to decrypt data. X
MAC Calculation Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC. X
Signature Authentication Used to generate signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA). X
Signature Verification Used to verify digital signatures. X
DRBG (SP800-90A) output Used for random number, IV and key generation. X
Message Hashing Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest, SHAKE output. X
Keyed Message Hashing Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC. X
TLS Key Derivation
Function
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
master secret in TLS from a pre-master secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-108 KDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SSH Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
X9.63 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SP 800-56C Concatenation
Derivation Function (KDM)
(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
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Service Description CO U
IKEv2 Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
SRTP Derivation Function (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value suitable to be used for a
secret key from an input secret and additional input.
X
PBKDF (secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an encoding of a
password and an additional function such as a message hash.
X
Key Agreement Schemes Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56Arev3, Diffie-Hellman). X
Key Wrapping Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
Key Unwrapping Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES) X
NDRNG Callback Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided function X
Utility Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs X
Note: The module services are the same in the approved and non-approved modes of operation. The only
difference is the function(s) used (approved/allowed or non-approved/non-allowed).
Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke non-
approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as approved mode only. In
approved only mode no non-approved services are accessible. In the presence of a Java SecurityManager
approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific
permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Cryptographic Officer or User.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
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Table 13 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of
access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
• R = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module uses the
CSP.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into
the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
Table 13 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
AES
Encryption
Key
AES
Decryption
Key
AES
Authentication
Key
AES
Wrapping
Key
DH
Agreement
Key
DRBG
(CTR
AES)
DRBG
(CTR
Triple-DES)
DRBG
(Hash)
DRBG
(HMAC)
DSA
Signing
Key
EC
Agreement
Key
EC
Signing
Key
HMAC
Authentication
Key
IKEv2
DF
Secret
Value
PBKDF
Secret
Value
RSA
Signing
Key
RSA
Key
Transport
Key
SP
800-56C
Concat.
DF
Secret
Value
SP
800-108
KDF
Secret
Value
SRTP
DF
Secret
Value
SSH
DF
Secret
Value
TLS
KDF
Secret
Value
Triple-DES
Authentication
Key
Triple-DES
Encryption
Key
Triple-DES
Decryption
Key
Triple-DES
Wrapping
Key
X9.63
KDF
Secret
Value
Initialize Module and Run
Self-Tests on Demand
Show Status
Zeroize / Power-off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Data Encryption R R
Data Decryption R R
MAC Calculation R R R
Signature Generation R R R
Signature Verification R R R
DRBG (SP800-90A) output G G G G G G
R
G
R
G
R
G
R
G G G G G G G G G G
Message Hashing
Keyed Message Hashing R
TLS Key Derivation Function R
SP 800-108 KBKDF R
SSH Derivation Function R
X9.63 Derivation Function G G G R
SP 800-56C Concatenation
Derivation Function (KDM)
G G G R
IKEv2 Derivation Function R
SRTP Derivation Function R
PBKDF G
R
R
Key Agreement Schemes G G G G R R G R G G G G
Key Wrapping/Transport
(RSA, AES, Triple-DES)
R R R R
Key Unwrapping
(RSA, AES, Triple-DES)
R R R R
NDRNG Callback G G G G
Utility
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that
sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the
module.
On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 14 below. All KATs must
be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the
module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed error message when
FipsStatus.isReady() is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and calling
FipsStatus.isReady() again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.
Table 14 – Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Software Integrity HMAC-SHA256
AES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 128 bits
CCM KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
AES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: AES with 128 bits
FFC KAS21
KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB
DRBG KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-256
GCM/GMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 128 bits
HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256
ECC KAS21
KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive “Z” Computation
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EC
SP 800-108 KBKDF KATs: Per IG 9.4 – Output Verification
Modes: Counter, Feedback, Double Pipeline
PRFs: AES-CMAC, Triple-DES-CMAC, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-512/256
RSA KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS KATs: Output Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
Triple-DES KATs: Encryption, Decryption
Mode: TECB
Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES-CMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
Key sizes: 3-Key
21
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1rev3 due to vendor affirmation to SP 800-56Arev3.
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Test Target Description
Extendable-Output
functions (XOF)
KATs: Output Verification
XOFs: SHAKE256
Key Wrapping Using RSA KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Key Transport Using RSA KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
Key sizes: 2048 bits
Table 15 – Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DH DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key pair generation.
DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is requested from the DRBG.
DSA DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key pair generation.
ECDH/ECCDH EC DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key pair generation.
ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key pair generation.
RSA RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
DRBG Health Checks Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section 11.3.
SP 800-56A Assurances22
Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and/or 5.6.3.
5 Physical Security Policy
The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.
6 Operational Environment
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational
environment list. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated
manner. The Module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that instantiates the Module
within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.
The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager, and starts in FIPS-approved mode by default when used
with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java Security Manager,
it will start by default in the non-FIPS-approved mode.
6.1 Use of External RNG
The module makes use of the JVM's configured SecureRandom entropy source to provide entropy when
required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding configuration for
the DRBG that is using it and for the default DRBG will request a minimum of 256 bits of entropy. In approved
mode the minimum amount of entropy that can be requested by a DRBG is 112 bits. The module will wait until
the SecureRandom.generateSeed() returns the requested amount of entropy, blocking if necessary.
22
Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1rev3 due to vendor affirmation to SP 800-56Arev3.
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7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against its internal
implementations. There are two counter-measures used.
The first is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by strictly avoiding
“fast fail” comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a MAC, signature, or
digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.
The second is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both protect the RSA
algorithm.
Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input into
the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input makes it
impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the operation as
they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the operation tells them
nothing about the private value of the RSA key.
Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification
operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or signing
operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the correctness
the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected errors in the use of
RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the private value of the RSA key.
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8 Security Rules and Guidance
8.1 Basic Enforcement
The module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1
module.
1. The module shall provide two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The module does not provide authentication.
3. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling
power or resetting the module.
4. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
5. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Output related to keys and
their use is inhibited until the key concerned has been fully generated.
6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of
the module.
7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module’s physical boundary.
11. The module does not output intermediate key values.
8.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager
In the presence of a Java SecurityManager approved mode services specific to a context, such as DSA and
ECDSA for use in TLS, require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the
Cryptographic Officer or User. The SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the ability of particular code
bases to examine CSPs. See section 8 for further advice on this.
In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available,
however must only be used in relation to those protocols.
8.3 Basic Guidance
The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate to its
use in applications running on the JVM.
Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that provide
access to the FIPS approved and non-FIPS approved services provided by the module. A more abstract level of
access can also be gained through the use of strings providing operation names passed into the module's Java
cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and the Java
Cryptography Extension (JCE).
When the module is being used in FIPS approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of algorithms
which are not FIPS approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.
8.4 Enforcement and Guidance for GCM IVs
IVs for GCM can be generated randomly, or via a FipsNonceGenerator. Where an IV is not generated within the
module the module supports the importing of GCM IVs.
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In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved DRBG
in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.
In approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated using the FipsNonceGenerator a counter is used as the basis
for the nonce. Rollover of the counter in the FipsNonceGenerator will result in an IllegalStateException
indicating the FipsNonceGenerator is exhausted and, as per IG A.5, where used for TLS, rollover will terminate
any TLS session in process using the current key and the exception can only be recovered from by using a new
handshake and creating a new FipsNonceGenerator.
In approved mode, importing a GCM IV for encryption that originates from outside the module is non-
conformant.
Per IG A.5, Section 2.1 of this Security Policy also states that in the event module power is lost and restored the
consuming application must ensure that any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-
distributed.
8.5 Enforcement and Guidance for use of the Approved PBKDF
In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be used for
storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.
In approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112 bits) and
that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF should be as
large as practical.
As the module is a general-purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use for the
PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain enough entropy
to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for the key being
generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII a 14-byte password is unlikely to contain
sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, “Security Considerations” of SP 800-
132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count selection.
For users interested in introducing memory hardness as a layer on top of the PBKDF the scrypt augmentation to
PBDKF based on HMAC SHA-256 (as described in RFC 7914) is also available.
8.6 Rules for setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE
The cSHAKE algorithm offers to input string for customizing the output of the cSHAKE function, the Function-
Name input (N) and the Customization String (S).
The Function-Name input (N) is reserved for values specified by NIST and should only be set to the appropriate
NIST specified value. Any other use of N is non-conformant.
The Customization String (S) is available to allow users to customize the cSHAKE function as they wish. The
length of S is limited to the available size of a byte array in the JVM running the module.
8.7 Guidance for the use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source
A user can instantiate the default Approved DRBG for the module explicitly by using
SecureRandom.getInstance("DEFAULT", "BCFIPS"), or by using a BouncyCastleFipsProvider object instead of the
provider name as appropriate. This will seed the Approved DRBG from the live entropy source of the JVM, for
example /dev/random on the tested Linux operational environments, with a number of bits of entropy
appropriate to the security level of the default Approved DRBG configured for the module.
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An additional option is available using the Approved Hash_DRBG and the process outlined in SP-800 90A,
Section 8.6.5. This can be turned on by following the instructions in Section 2.3 of the User Guide. The two
DRBGs are instantiated in a chain as a "Source DRBG" to seed the "Target DRBG" in accordance with Section 7
of Draft NIST SP 800-90C, where the Target DRBG is the default Approved DRBG used by the module.
The initial seed and the subsequent reseeds for the DRBG chain come from the live entropy source configured
for the JVM. The DRBG chain will reseed automatically by pausing for 20 requests (which will usually equate to
5120 bytes). An entropy gathering thread reseeds the DRBG chain when it has gathered sufficient entropy
(currently 256 bits) from the live entropy source. Once reseeded, the request counter is reset and the reseed
process begins again.
The “Source DRBG” in the chain is internal to the module and inaccessible to the user to ensure it is only used
for generating seeds for the default Approved DRBG of the module.
The user shall ensure that the Approved entropy source is configured per Section 6.1 of this Security Policy and
will block, or fail, if it is unable to provide the amount of entropy requested.
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9 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 16 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31 X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-3 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5 Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC
Mode
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
SP 800-38C Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
SP 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-56B Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
SP 800-108 Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135 Recommendation for Existing Application – Specific Key Derivation Functions
Table 17 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BC Bouncy Castle
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
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Acronym Definition
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CS Ciphertext Stealing
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Authority
DSTU4145 Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
EdDSA Edwards Curve DSA using Ed25519, Ed448
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG See References
JAR Java ARchive
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
JVM Java Virtual Machine
IV Initialization Vector
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
KWP Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Non Applicable
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB Offset Codebook Mode
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PBKDF Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
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Acronym Definition
PQG Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC Rivest Cipher, Ron’s Code
RIPEMD RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TCBC TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB TDEA Output Feedback
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XDH Edwards Curve Diffie-Hellman using X25519, X448
XOF Extendable-Output Function