© 2023 Nuvoton Technology Corporation / atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 2.0
Hardware Version 2.1.3
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.4
Last update: 2023-07-01
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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2 of 26
1 Table of Contents
1 General............................................................................................................................................................ 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Mode of Operation .................................................................................................................................. 4
2.2 Security Functions................................................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Module Overview .................................................................................................................................... 6
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................... 7
4 Roles, services, and authentication ............................................................................................................ 8
5 Software/Firmware Security ....................................................................................................................... 12
5.1 Software/Firmware Integrity Technique ................................................................................................ 12
6 Operational Environment............................................................................................................................ 13
7 Physical Security ......................................................................................................................................... 14
8 Non-invasive Security ................................................................................................................................. 15
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management.............................................................................................. 16
9.1 Random Number Generation................................................................................................................ 18
9.2 Key/SSP Generation............................................................................................................................. 18
9.3 Key/SSP Establishment ........................................................................................................................ 18
9.4 Key/SSP Entry and Output ................................................................................................................... 19
9.5 Key/SSP Storage .................................................................................................................................. 19
9.6 Key/SSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................. 19
10 Self-tests....................................................................................................................................................... 20
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ................................................................................................................... 20
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests........................................................................................................................... 20
10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests .......................................................................... 20
10.2.2 Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Test...................................................................................... 21
10.2.3 Periodic Self-Test......................................................................................................................... 21
10.3 Self-Test Error Handling ....................................................................................................................... 21
11 Life-cycle assurance ................................................................................................................................... 22
11.1 Delivery and Operation ......................................................................................................................... 22
11.2 Crypto Officer Guidance ....................................................................................................................... 22
11.3 Operator Guidance................................................................................................................................ 22
11.3.1 End of Life .................................................................................................................................... 22
11.3.2 RSA Key Wrapping ...................................................................................................................... 22
12 Mitigation of other attacks.......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 General
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Hardware version 2.1.3 of the Nuvoton
Cryptographic Library 2.0. It has a one-to-one mapping to the [SP 800-140B] starting with section B.2.1 named
“General” that maps to section 1 in this document and ending with section B.2.12 named “Mitigation of other
attacks” that maps to section 12 in this document. This document also contains the security rules under which
the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-
3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for a Security Level 1 module. Table 1
describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas:
ISO/IEC 24759
Section 6.
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 1
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware Security Not Applicable
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Physical Security 1
8 Non-invasive Security Not Applicable
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle Assurance 1
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Not Applicable
Table 1 - Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 2.0 cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a
Hardware Single Chip cryptographic module. More specifically, the module is considered a sub-chip
cryptographic subsystem as defined in IG 2.3.B.
The module has been tested by atsec CST lab on the following platforms:
Model Hardware
[Part Number and Version]
Firmware Version Tested Platform
Notebook Embedded
Controller (EC)
2.1.3 N/A Nuvoton NPCX998H
Desktop Super I/O (SIO) 2.1.3 N/A Nuvoton NPCD321H
Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
2.1 Mode of Operation
The module supports approved services in a FIPS approved mode of operation. There are no allowed algorithms
used in approved mode. There are no non-approved algorithms used in the approved mode with no security
claimed. There are no non-approved algorithms used in a non-approved mode.
2.2 Security Functions
The Table 3 below lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for
approved services, and implemented modes of operation.
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key /
Curve / Modulus
Size(s)
Use / Function
A1347 AES
[SP 800-38 A]
[SP 800-38 C]
CBC ECB
CCM OFB
CFB128
128, 192, 256 bits AES Encryption and AES Decryption
AES
[SP 800-38 A]
CTR 128, 192, 256 bits
AES
[SP 800-38 D]
GCM 1
[1] 128, 192, 256 bits
AES
[SP 800-38 B]
CMAC 128, 192, 256 bits CMAC Message Authentication Code
Generation and CMAC Message
Authentication Code Verification
1
The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG C.H scenario 2. The module uses the approved Hash_DRBG to generate the IV
with a length of 96-bits. The entropy source producing the DRBG seed is located inside the module’s cryptographic boundary
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key /
Curve / Modulus
Size(s)
Use / Function
AES
[SP 800-38 D]
GMAC 128, 192, 256 bits GMAC Message Authentication Code
Generation and GMAC Message
Authentication Code Verification
HMAC
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
256, 384, 512 bits HMAC Message Authentication Code
Generation
RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
RSA-PSS using SHA2-
256, SHA2-384 or SHA2-
512
RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 using
SHA2-256, SHA2-384 or
SHA2-512
2048 or 3072 modulus RSA Signature Generation,
RSA Signature Verification
KTS-IFC
[SP800-56Brev2]
KTS-OAEP-basic 2048 or 3072 modulus RSA Key Transport (key wrapping and
un-wrapping)
ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
B.4.2 Testing Candidates P-256, P-384, P-521
curves
ECDSA Key Generation
NA P-256, P-384, P-521
curves
ECDSA Key Verification
SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
P-256, P-384, P-521
curves
ECDSA Signature Generation,
ECDSA Signature Verification
N/A P-256, P-384, P-521
curves
ECDSA Signature Generation
Component
SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
N/A Message Digest Generation
KAS-ECC-SSC
[SP800-56Arev3]
ephemeralUnified P-256, P-384, P-521
curves
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
Computation
Hash_DRBG
[SP800-90A]
SHA2-512 512 Random Number Generation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG (Cryptographic Key
Generation)
[SP800-133rev2]
SP800-133rev2 Section 4:
direct output U from
approved DRBG; no XOR,
no post-processing
N/A ECDSA Key Generation
N/A ENT(P)
[SP800-90B]
N/A Used to seed the SP800-
90A DRBG
Random Number Generation
Table 3 - Approved Algorithms
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2.3 Module Overview
Figure 1 depicts the module’s block diagram with a red outline indicating the Tested Operational Environment’s
Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) of the NPCX998H and the NPCD321H and the blue dotted outline depicting the
cryptographic boundary of the sub-chip embedded within the physical perimeter.
Figure 1 - [Block Diagram]
Figure 2 and 3 shows a picture of the NPCX998H (e.g., EC) and the NPCD321H (e.g., SIO) in which the sub-
chip module is embedded.
Figure 2: Nuvoton NPCX998HA0BX Figure 3: Nuvoton NPCD321HA0DX
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3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the module’s C language Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs). All data input and data output, status ports and control ports are directed through the interface of the
module’s logical component, which are the APIs while the physical interface is considered the I/O ports of the
sub-chip module through which the data input and data output, status output and control input traverse.
Physical Interface Logical Interface2
Data that passes over port/interface
I/O Ports Data Input Data inputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable
service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
I/O Ports Data Output Data outputs are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable
service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers
I/O Ports Control Input Control inputs which control the operation of the module are provided
through dedicated parameters.
I/O Ports Status Output Status output is provided in return codes and through messages.
Documentation for each API lists possible return codes. A complete list of
all return codes returned by the C language APIs within the module is
provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are
documented also in the API documentation.
Power Port Power Interface Power interface is provided internally by TEOPP in which the cryptographic
module is embedded.
Table 4 - Ports and Interfaces
2
The module does not implement a Control Output interface.
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4 Roles, services, and authentication
The module supports two authorized roles: A Crypto Officer Role and a User Role. No support is provided for a
Maintenance operator. The module does not implement a bypass mode nor concurrent operators.
When a device is delivered, the Crypto Officer is responsible for initializing the module i.e., configure the device
by properly setting up key registers for storage of keys/CSPs. The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed. The User
can perform services from Table 5 and 5a only after the Crypto Officer takes possession by initializing it, thus
creating data to be protected is generated. The Users of the module are software applications that implicitly
assume the User Role when requesting any cryptographic services provided by the module.
FIPS 140-3 does not require authentication mechanism for level 1 modules. Therefore, the module does not
implement an authentication mechanism.
The module only implements Approved security functions in an Approved mode. The Table 5 below lists services
available. The module provides an approved service indicator by receiving a return code of “NCL_STATUS_OK
to indicate that the service executed an approved security function.
NOTE: The module does not implement any non-Approved Algorithms in the Approved Mode of Operation
(neither with nor without security claim). The module does not implement any non-approved security functions.
The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Service Description Inputs Outputs Approved Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
AES
Encryption
Data
Encryption
AES key
and plain
text
cipher text AES-CBC
AES-ECB
AES-CCM
AES-OFB
AES-CFB128
AES-CTR
AES-GCM
AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
AES
Decryption
Data
Decryption
AES key
and cipher
text
plain text AES-CBC
AES-ECB
AES-CCM
AES-OFB
AES-CFB128
AES-CTR
AES-GCM
AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
CMAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
Message
Authenticatio
n Code
Generation
AES key
and
message
M
MAC T AES-CMAC AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
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Service Description Inputs Outputs Approved Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
CMAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Verification
Message
Authenticatio
n Code
Verification
MAC and
Message
“VALID” or
“INVALID”
AES-CMAC AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
GMAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
Message
Authenticatio
n Code
Generation
AES key,
AAD
authenticatio
n tag T
AES-GMAC AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
GMAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Verification
Message
Authenticatio
n Code
Verification
AES key,
AAD, IV,
tag T
“PASS” or
“FAIL”
AES-GMAC AES key User W, E NCL STATUS OK
HMAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
Message
Authenticatio
n Code
Generation
HMAC
key and
message
MAC HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
HMAC
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
Message
Digest
Generation
SHS
Message
Digest
Generation
message digest (hash
value)
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
none User N/A NCL STATUS OK
RSA Key
Transport
(encapsulation
)
Key
Wrapping
using KTS-
OAEP-basic
RSA public
key and
key to be
wrapped
encrypted
key
KTS-IFC RSA
public
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
RSA Key
Transport (un-
encapsulation)
Key Un-
wrapping
using KTS-
OAEP-basic
RSA
private key
and key to
be un-
wrapped
plaintext key KTS-IFC RSA
private
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
RSA Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
RSA
private key
and
message
signature RSA-PSS,
RSA-PKCS#1
v1.5 Signature
Generation,
HMAC_DRBG
RSA
private
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
RSA Digital
Signature
Verification
Digital
Signature
Verification
RSA public
key and
signature
True or False RSA-PSS,
RSA-PKCS#1
v1.5 Signature
Verification
RSA
public
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
ECDSA Digital
Signature
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
private key
and
message
signature ECDSA Digital
Signature
Generation,
HMAC_DRBG
ECDSA
private
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
ECDSA Digital
Signature
Generation
Component
Digital
Signature
Generation
Component
ECDSA
private key
and
message
digest
signature ECDSA Digital
Signature
Generation
Component,
HMAC_DRBG
ECDSA
private
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
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Service Description Inputs Outputs Approved Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
ECDSA Digital
Signature
Verification
Digital
Signature
Verification
ECDSA
public key
and
signature
True or False ECDSA Digital
Signature
Verification
ECDSA
public
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
ECDSA Key
Generation
Asymmetric
Key Pair
Generation
Curve
size
generated
private and
public key
pair
ECDSA Key
Generation,
HMAC_DRBG,
CKG
ECDSA
Key pair
User G, R NCL STATUS OK
EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret
Computation
Shared
Secret
Computation
using Elliptic
Curve
Cryptography
received
public key
and
possesse
d private
key
shared secret KAS-ECC-SSC ECDH
public
key
User W, E NCL STATUS OK
ECDH
private
key
E
shared
secret
G, R
Random
Number
Generation
Deterministic
Random
Number
Generation
Seed random
numbers
Hash_DRBG Entropy
input
string,
nonce
User W NCL STATUS OK
seed, V,
and C
G
Module
Version Info
Outputs
Module Name
+ Version
Number
None Module
Name +
Module
Version
Number
N/A None User N/A N/A
SSP
Zeroisation
zeroizes
crypto
function
context and
releases
memory
space
handle of
crypto
function
context
zeroized and
released
memory
space
N/A All Keys
/ SSPs
User Z N/A
Show-Status Outputs
Operational/
Error status
of the module
None Operational/
Error status
N/A None User N/A N/A
Self-test3
Executes on-
demand self-
test and
outputs
Pass/Fail
status
None Pass/Fail
status
HMAC-SHA2-
512
HMAC
Key
User E NCL STATUS OK OK’
SHA2-256 N/A
AES-CCM AES
Key
AES-CBC AES
Key
3
Keys and SSPs used in this service are hard-coded in the module and used exclusively for self-tests.
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Service Description Inputs Outputs Approved Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
RSA PKCS#1
v1.5 Signature
Generation
RSA
Private
Key
RSA PKCS#1
v1.5 Signature
Verification
RSA
Public
Key
KTS-IFC
(encapsulation)
RSA
Public
Key
ECDSA
Signature
Generation
ECDSA
Private
Key
ECDSA
Signature
Verification
ECDSA
Public
Key
KAS-ECC-SSC ECDH
Key
Pair,
Shared
Secret
Hash_DRBG Seed
Table 5 - Approved Services
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Software/Firmware Integrity Technique
The module’s executable code is programmed in a masked ROM which is a type of Read-Only Memory (ROM)
where content is programmed by the integrated circuit manufacturer during the silicon manufacturing (rather
than by the Operator of the module). The memory technology is non reconfigurable memory as defined in IG
5.A, which will not have any change or degradation of data for a minimum of 10 years after manufactured date.
As such, it is considered a hardware only module with a non-modifiable operational environment. The
requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.
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6 Operational Environment
The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 2.0 operates in a non-modifiable operational environment. The module is
programmed by the manufacturer during the silicon manufacturing (rather than by the user). It maintains its own
memory region which can only be accessed by the module. There is no additional application present within the
operating environment. The module does not spawn any cryptographic processes. The operational environments
in which the module was tested are listed in Table 2.
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14 of 26
7 Physical Security
The Nuvoton Cryptographic Library 2.0 cryptographic module is a Hardware cryptographic module in a single
chip embodiment. More specifically, the module is considered a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem.
The module consists of production-grade components that include standard passivation techniques (e.g., a
conformal coating applied over the module’s circuitry to protect against environmental or other physical
damage). The module does not implement a maintenance role and has no maintenance access interface.
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8 Non-invasive Security
Currently, the non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements of
this area are not applicable to the module.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management
The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module. Modification of PSPs by unauthorized operators is prohibited.
Key/SSP
Name/ Type
Strength Security Function
and Cert. Number
Generation Import
/Export
Establishment Storage Zeroization Use & related
keys
AES key 128,
192, 256
- bits of
security
strength
AES
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
Not
Applicable
. The key
is entered
via API
parameter
Entry: N/A.
The key may
be entered
into the
module
within the
TOEPP4
via
API input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: N/A
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use: AES
Data
Encryption
and
Decryption
Related Keys:
N/A
RSA private
and public
key
112 to
128 bits
of
security
strength
KTS-IFC
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
Not
Applicable
. The key
is entered
via API
parameter
Entry: N/A.
The key may
be entered
into via API
input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: N/A
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use: Key
Encapsulation
and Un-
encapsulation
Related Keys:
N/A
RSA private
and public
key pair
112 to
128 bits
of
security
strength
RSA
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
Not
Applicable
. The key
is entered
via API
parameter
Entry: N/A.
The key may
be entered
into the
module
within the
TOEPP via
API input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: N/A
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use:
Signature
Generation
and
Verification
Related Keys:
N/A
ECDSA
private and
public key
pair
112 to
256 bits
of
security
strength
ECDSA
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
The
private
keys can
be
generated
using
FIPS186-4
Key
Generatio
n method,
and the
random
Entry: N/A.
The key may
be entered
into the
module
within the
TOEPP via
API input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: The
key may be
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use: Key
Generation
and
Verification,
Signature
Generation
and
Verification
Related Keys:
DRBG internal
state
4
TOEPP - Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter
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value
used in
the key
generation
is
generated
using
SP800-
90A
DRBG
output from
the module
within the
TOEPP 5
via
API output
parameters
in plaintext
HMAC key 112 or
greater
bits of
security
strength
HMAC
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
Not
Applicable
. The key
is entered
via API
parameter
Entry: N/A.
The key may
be entered
into the
module
within the
TOEPP via
API input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: N/A
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use: Hashed
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation
Related Keys:
N/A
ECDH key
pair
(including
intermediate
key
generation
values)
112 to
256-bits
of
security
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
CAVP Cert.
#A1347
The
private
keys are
generated
using
FIPS186-4
Key
Generatio
n method,
and the
random
value
used in
the key
generation
is
generated
using
SP800-
90A
DRBG
Entry: N/A.
The public
key may be
entered into
the module
within the
TOEPP via
API input
parameters
in plaintext.
Output: The
key may be
output from
the module
within the
TOEPP via
API output
parameters
in plaintext
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Not
Applicable
. The key
is
ephemeral
and only
held in
memory
during
execution
of service.
automatic
zeroization
when
structure is
deallocate
d or when
the system
is powered
down.
Use: ECDH
Shared Secret
Computation
Related Keys:
DRBG internal
state, EC
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
ECC Shared
Secret
N/A Entry: N/A
Output: The
key may be
output from
the module
within the
TOEPP via
API output
parameters
in plaintext
Not
Applicable
for sub-chip
systems that
only
communicat
e with
subsystems
within the
same OE, as
stated in IG
2.3.B
Use: ECDH
Shared Secret
Computation
Related Keys:
ECDH key pair
Entropy
Input String
+ Nonce
256-bits
of
security
strength
N/A N/A Entry: N/A.
obtained
from the
ENT(P)
found within
N/A Use: Random
Number
Generation
5
TOEPP - Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter
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18 of 26
the
cryptographi
c boundary.
Output: N/A
Related Keys:
ECDSA and
ECDH key
pairs
DRBG
internal
state (i.e.,
Hash_DRB
G V and C
values),
Seed
256-bits
of
security
strength
N/A Derived
from
entropy
input
string as
defined by
SP800-
90A
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
N/A Use: Random
Number
Generation
Related Keys:
ECDSA and
ECDH key
pairs
Table 6 - SSPs
9.1 Random Number Generation
The module employs a Hash_DRBG using a SHA-512 PRF. Per section 10.1.1.1 of [SP800-90A], the internal
state of the Hash_DRBG is the V, C, and reseed counter. The Hash_DRBG is seeded by an ENT(P) which
provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and reseed the DRBG during initialization and reseeding. The estimated
amount of entropy per entropy output bit is ~0.6/bit. The DRBG internal state is not accessible by non-DRBG
functions. All random values used by approved security functions, SSP generation, or SSP establishment
method are provided by the Hash_DRBG.
Table 7 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
9.2 Key/SSP Generation
The module generates Keys and SSPs in accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The cryptographic module
performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133rev2] (vendor affirmed),
compliant with [FIPS186-4] and using DRBG compliant with [SP800-90Arev1]. A seed (i.e., the random value)
used in asymmetric key generation is obtained from [SP800-90Arev1] DRBG as described in Section 4 of
[SP800-133rev2]. The key generation service for ECDSA, as well as the [SP 800-90Arev1] DRBG have been
ACVT tested with algorithm certificates found in Table 3.
9.3 Key/SSP Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services:
1. The module implements KAS-ECC-SSC EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Computation compliant to
[SP800-56Arev3] and IG D.F Scenario (2) path (1).
o The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
2. Within the TOEPP, the module offers RSA key wrapping and unwrapping using KTS-OAEP-basic
scheme. The implementation supports 2048 and 3072 modulus size, with both key encapsulation and
un-encapsulation supported. The module does not implement key confirmation. See section 11.3.2 for
operator guidance details.
o The SSP establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength.
Entropy Source Minimum number of bits of
entropy
Details
SP800-90B compliant
ENT(P)
256 The entropy pool is filled with random bits provided by an SP800-
90B compliant ENT(P) whose noise source is from Ring
Oscillators in hardware TRNG.
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9.4 Key/SSP Entry and Output
Keys/SSPs entered or output the module are electronically entered in plaintext form from the invoking User
firmware running on the same device. No Keys/SSPs are entered or output from the module to outside the
TOEPP. According to IG 2.3.B, Transferring SSPs including the entropy input between a sub-chip cryptographic
subsystem and an intervening functional subsystem for Security Levels 1 and 2 on the same single chip is
considered as not having Sensitive Security Parameter Establishment crossing the HMI of the sub-chip module
per IG 9.5.A.
9.5 Key/SSP Storage
The module does not provide persistent storage for keys/SSPs. Keys/SSPs are stored in memory only and are
received for use by the module only at the request of the User firmware.
9.6 Key/SSP Zeroization
Keys and SSPs are explicitly zeroized automatically when structure associated with the cipher is deallocated or
implicitly when the device is powered down thereby rendering the data irretrievable. Interface with the module is
inhibited while zeroization is being performed. For Keys and SSPs explicitly zeroized automatically the
successful completion of a requested service suffices as the implicit indicator that zeroisation has completed.
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10 Self-tests
Self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. While
the module is executing the self-test, no services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. The
module will boot only after successfully passing the HMAC-SHA2-512 and SHA2-256 CASTs. If an error is
detected in any self-test, the module will enter the Error State.
10.1Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module is solely implemented in hardware (i.e., only contains executable code that is stored in non-
reconfigurable masked ROM6
). As such, the module does not perform any pre-operational software/firmware
integrity test, but instead performs a Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test on the HMAC-SHA2-512 and SHA2-256
algorithms when the module is powered on.
The module does not implement a pre-operational bypass test nor pre-operational critical functions test.
10.2Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs a conditional self-test when the conditions specified for the following tests occur:
Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Test
The module does not implement a Software/Firmware Load Test, Manual Entry Test, Conditional Bypass Test
nor Conditional Critical Functions Test.
10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
The module conducts conditional cryptographic algorithm self-test prior to the first operational use of each
cryptographic algorithm. The table below describe the conditional tests supported by the module.
6
A masked ROM is a type of Read-Only Memory (ROM) where content is programmed by the integrated circuit manufacturer during the
silicon manufacturing.
Algorithm Test
HMAC • HMAC-SHA2-512 MAC Generation KAT
SHA • SHA2-256 Message Digest KAT
AES • AES-CCM Encryption KAT using 128-bit key
• AES-CBC Decryption KAT using 128-bit key
KTS-IFC • KTS-OAEP-basic Encryption KAT with 2048 -bit key and SHA2-256
• KTS-OAEP-basic Decryption KAT with 2048 -bit key and SHA2-256
RSA • PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Generation KAT with 2048 -bit key and SHA2-256
• PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Verification KAT with 2048 -bit key and SHA2-256
ECDSA • ECDSA Signature Generation KAT with P-256 curve and SHA2-256
• ECDSA Signature Verification KAT with P-256 curve and SHA2-256
KAS-ECC-SSC • ECDH shared secret computation KAT with P-256 curve
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Table 8 - Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
10.2.2 Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Test
The module performs a pair-wise consistency test on when a new ECDSA key pair is generated. The pair-wise
consistency test is performed by calculating a digital signature and then verifying it. If the signature cannot be
verified, the pair-wise consistency test shall fail.
10.2.3 Periodic Self-Test
During runtime, operators can initiate the conditional self-tests on demand by calling NCL_MISC_SelfTest and
passing the algorithm as an argument.
The module’s entropy source is powered on only momentarily to seed the module’s SP800-90B DRBG. The
module performs ENT health tests defined in Section 4 of SP800-90A on the generated output prior to seeding
the SP800-90B DRBG. After completing its execution, the entropy source powers down.
10.3Self-Test Error Handling
For any of the conditional self-tests, the module enters an error state upon failing the self-test. A failure in the
conditional CAST or conditional PCT results in “NCL_STATUS_FAIL”. Likewise, a failure of the ENT health tests
will result in an “ENTROPY_SRC_ERROR” status returned to the user. When in the error state, no cryptographic
services are provided, control and data output is prohibited. The only method to clear this error state is to power
cycle the device and then successfully pass the conditional self-tests.
Cause of Error Status Indicator
failure in conditional self-test
(conditional CAST or conditional PCT)
NCL_STATUS_FAIL
failure of the ENT health test ENTROPY_SRC_ERROR
Table 9 - Error States
Algorithm Test
Hash_DRBG • Hash_DRBG random number generation KAT using predefined seed.
ENT • RCT (Repetition Count Test)
• APT (Adaptive Proportion Test)
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11 Life-cycle assurance
11.1Delivery and Operation
As explained in Section 10.1.1, the module is placed in a masked ROM by manufacturer during the silicon
manufacturing. The module is delivered as part of the Nuvoton NPCX998H and Nuvoton NPCD321H platforms
(listed in Table 2). During manufacturing – each chip is tested to make sure the masked ROM was manufactured
correctly; this is done using CRC32 algorithm on the entire masked ROM code on each device before it is
shipped out.
During execution – As part of the device boot process, the code is verified by a dedicated hardware inside the
chip that checks every byte of code compared to a known parity bit. If any byte fails, the parity test then an
internal error is generated; the error is handled by the application (User) firmware.
11.2Crypto Officer Guidance
The module is configured to be operational by default. If the device starts up successfully and has successfully
passed the HMAC-SHA2-512 and SHA2-256 CAST, it is operating correctly and can begin servicing User
requests.
11.3Operator Guidance
11.3.1 End of Life
Once the module reaches its end-of-life stage (End of Life (EOL) date for the Nuvoton device is 10 years from
manufacturing date) or sanitation is initiated by the module’s Operator, it is the Operator’s responsibility to clear
all existing SSPs from the module. This can be achieved by either performing a full device reset, or by explicitly
invoking the following sequence of APIs to clear the data from all modules:
• NCL_SHA_Clear - For each of existing SHA and HMAC contexts
• NCL_DRBG_Clear - For each of existing DRBG contexts
• NCL_AES_Clear - For each of existing AES contexts
• NCL_RSA_Clear - For each of existing RSA contexts
• NCL_ECC_Clear - For each of existing ECDSA and ECDH contexts
11.3.2 RSA Key Wrapping
To comply with SP800-56Brev2 assurances found in its Section 6 (specifically SP800-56Brev2 Section 6.4
Required Assurances) The entity using the IUT must obtain required assurances listed in section 6.4 of SP 800-
56BRev2 by performing the following steps:
1. The entity requesting the RSA key unwrapping (un-encapsulation) service from the module, shall only
use an RSA private key that was generated by an active FIPS validated module that implements FIPS
186-4 compliant RSA key generation service and performs the key pair validity and the pairwise
consistency as stated in section 6.4.1.1 of the SP 800-56BRev2. Additionally, the entity shall renew
these assurances over time by using any method described in section 6.4.1.5 of the SP 800-56BRev2.
2. For use of an RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service in the context of key transport per IG D.G, the
entity using the module, shall verify the validity of the peer's public key using any method specified in
section 6.4.2.1 of the SP 800-56BRev2.
3. The entity using the module, shall confirm the peer's possession of private key by using any method
specified in section 6.4.2.3 of the SP 800-56BRev2.
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12 Mitigation of other attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.
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Appendix A. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ACVP Algorithm Certification Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ENT Entropy Source
EOL End Of Life
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KW AES Key Wrap
KWP AES Key Wrap with Padding
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSC Shared Secret Computation
TOEPP Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing
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Appendix B. References
FIPS140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
March 2019
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3
FIPS140-3_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
May 2021
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/fips 140-3/FIPS 140-3 IG.pdf
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
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SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-56Arev3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP800-56Brev2 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP800-90B NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used
for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP800-133rev2 NIST Special Publication 800-133 - Recommendation for Cryptographic
Key Generation
December 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP800-140B NIST Special Publication 800-140B - CMVP Security Policy Requirements
March 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140B.pdf