



Red Hat

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module

version rhel8.20210628

FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy

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Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com

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1. Cryptographic Module Specification

This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module version rhel8.20210628, and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1 Software Module.

1.1. Description of the Module

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 GnuTLS Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as the “module”) is a set of libraries implementing general purpose cryptographic algorithms and network protocols. The module supports the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol defined in [RFC5246] and the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol defined in [RFC4347]. The module provides a C language Application Program Interface (API) for use by other calling applications that require cryptographic functionality or TLS/DTLS network protocols.

The components of the cryptographic module are specified in the following table:

Component	Description
libgnutls	This library provides the main interface which allows the calling applications to request cryptographic services. The Approved cryptographic algorithm implementations provided by this library include the TLS protocol, DRBG, RSA Key Generation, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman.
libnettle	This library provides the cryptographic algorithm implementations, including AES, Triple-DES, SHA, HMAC, RSA Digital Signature, DSA and ECDSA.
libhogweed	This library includes the primitives used by libgnutls and libnettle to support the asymmetric cryptographic operations.
libgmp	This library provides the big number arithmetic operations to support the asymmetric cryptographic operations.
*.hmac	The .hmac files contain the HMAC-SHA-256 values of its associated library for integrity check during the power-up.

Table 1: Cryptographic Module Components

The module has been tested on the following multi-chip standalone platforms:

Manufacturer	Model	Test Configurations	Processor
Dell	PowerEdge R440	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 with/without AES-NI	Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4216

Table 2: Tested Platform

NOTE: This validation is only for the tested platform listed in Table 2 of this document. It does not cover other derivatives of the Operating Systems (I.e, Centos or Fedora).

The following platform have not been tested as part of the FIPS 140-2 level 1 certification however Red Hat “vendor affirms” that this platform is equivalent to the tested and validated platform. Additionally, Red Hat affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the systems listed below.

Hardware Platform	Processor	Operating System
Dell PowerEdge R430	Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8

Table 2A: Vendor Affirmed Platforms

Note: Per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

The following table shows the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation:

Security Component	FIPS 140-2 Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall level	1

Table 3: Security Level of the Module

1.2. Description of the Approved Modes

The module supports two modes of operation:

- In "FIPS mode" (the FIPS Approved mode of operation) only approved or allowed security functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
- In "non-FIPS mode" (the non-Approved mode of operation) only non-approved security functions can be used.

When the module is powered up, the module executes the power-up tests and obtains the HMAC value of the module for integrity check from the .hmac file for each software libraries within the module's logical boundary. The module enters FIPS mode automatically after power-up tests succeed. If the module fails any power-up tests, the module will return an error code and enter the

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error state to prohibit any further cryptographic operations. The operator should follow the guidance in section 10.2 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.

Once the module completes power-up tests successfully and enters FIPS mode by default, the module is available to provide cryptographic services. The mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and the security strength of the cryptographic keys.

Critical security parameters used or stored in FIPS mode are not used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa.

The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms in FIPS mode:

Algorithm	CAVP Certificates	Standards	Keys/CSPs
AES	Cert. #A1830 (CBC, CMAC, GCM, GMAC)	FIPS 197 AES SP 800-38A SP 800-38D GCM	AES keys 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits (ECB, CBC, CFB8) AES keys 128 bits and 256 bits (CCM, CMAC, GCM, GMAC, XTS)
	Cert. #A1824 (CBC, CCM, CMAC, GCM)		
	Cert. #A1825 (CBC, CMAC, GCM)		
	Certs. #A1827, #A1828 and #A1833 (CFB8)	SP 800-38A	
	Cert. #A1831 (XTS)	SP 800-38E	
3-key Triple-DES with the following mode: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CBC 	Cert. #A1830	SP 800-67 SP 800-38A	Triple-DES keys 192 bits
DRBG using AES-256 CTR_DRBG where AES encryption is provided by the nettle library Note: CTR_DRBG without Derivation Function, without Prediction Resistance and Reseeding implementation	Cert. #A1830 Dependent AES Cert. #A1804 (AES-ECB from Nettle)	SP 800-90A	Entropy input string, seed, V and Key
ENT(NP)	N/A	SP 800-90B	N/A
SHA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 	Certs. #A1825 and #A1830	FIPS 180-4	N/A
SHA3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> SHA3-224 SHA3-256 SHA3-384 SHA3-512 	Certs. #A1826 and #A1832	FIPS 202	N/A

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Algorithm	CAVP Certificates	Standards	Keys/CSPs
HMAC: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SHA-1 • SHA-224 • SHA-256 • SHA-384 • SHA-512 	Certs. #A1825 and #A1830	FIPS 198-1	At least 112 bits HMAC Key
DSA Domain Parameters Generation and Verification DSA Key Generation DSA Signature Generation DSA Signature Verification	Cert. #A1830	FIPS 186-4	L=2048, N=224 (with SHA-384) L=2048, N=256 (with SHA-384) L=3072, N=256 (with SHA-384) L=2048, N=224 (with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) L=2048, N=256 (with SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) L=3072, N=256 (with SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) L=2048, N=224 (with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) L=2048, N=256 (with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) L=3072, N=256 (with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
RSA Key Generation (B.3.2) RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5) Signature Generation (with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) RSA PSS Signature Generation (with SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)	Cert. #A1830	FIPS 186-4	RSA keys (2048, 3072, 4096 ¹ bits)

1 The modulus size of 4096 is CAVP validated but it is blocked from use in the validated module.

Algorithm	CAVP Certificates	Standards	Keys/CSPs
RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5) Signature Verification (with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)			
RSA PSS Signature Verification (with SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)			
ECDSA Key Pair Generation and Public Key Verification ECDSA Signature Generation (with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) ECDSA Signature Verification (with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)	Cert. #A1830	FIPS 186-4	ECDSA keys based on P-256, P-384, or P-521 curve
KAS-ECC-SSC	Cert. #A1830 ²	SP 800-56Arev3	EC Diffie-Hellman private key (P-256, P-384, P-521) shared secret
KAS-FFC-SSC with safe prime groups	Cert. #A1830	SP 800-56Arev3	Diffie-Hellman private key (ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192) shared secret
Diffie-Hellman Safe Primes Key Generation	Cert. #A1830	SP 800-56Arev3	Safe Prime Groups: (ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 ³)

² KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC components which are not SP 800-56Arev3, although tested by CAVP, are not used by the module and only the SP 800-56Arev3 compliant are used.

³ Only ffdhe groups are used by GnuTLS since MODP groups are used for IKE only, and GnuTLS does not implement IKE.

Algorithm	CAVP Certificates	Standards	Keys/CSPs
KDA HKDF	Cert. #A1829	SP800-56Crev1 Key Derivation in TLS 1.3	Shared secret, derived key
Key Derivation Function in TLS v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2 (with MD5/SHA1 for v1.0 and SHA-256 and SHA-384 for v1.1/1.2)	CVL Cert. #A1830	SP800-135 rev1 Section 4.2	Shared secret, derived key
PBKDF - Key Derivation (with HMAC-SHA1/224/256/384/512)	Cert. #A1830	SP 800-132	Password, derived key
KTS	Certs. #A1824, #A1825 and #A1830	SP800-38F AES-GCM AES-CCM	AES keys 128 and 256 bits
	AES Certs. #A1824, #A1825 and #A1830 HMAC Certs. #A1825 and #A1830	SP800-38F AES CBC with HMAC	AES keys 128 and 256 bits
	Triple-DES Certs. #A1830 HMAC Certs. #A1825 and #A1830	SP800-38F Triple-DES CBC with HMAC	Triple-DES keys 168 bits

Table 4: Validated Cryptographic Algorithms

Note: The TLS and DTLS network protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

Note: There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVP tested but not used by the module in FIPS approved mode. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in Table 4 and Table 5 are used by the module in FIPS approved mode.

The module supports different AES and SHA implementations based on the underlying platform's capability. The module supports the use of AES-NI and SSSE3 when it is operated in an Intel® x86-64 architecture environment. When the AES-NI is enabled in the operating environment, the module performs the AES operations using the support from the AES-NI instructions; when the AES-NI is disabled in the operating environment, the module performs the AES operations using the supports from the Supplemental Streaming SIMD Extensions 3 (SSSE3). The module also

performs SHA operations using the supports from the SSSE3. The SSSE3 cannot be disabled on the test platform that runs in the Intel® x86 architecture environment. The AES and SHA implementations that uses the AES-NI and SSSE3 supports and their related algorithms have been CAVP tested and functionally tested. Although the module implements different implementations for AES and SHA, only one implementation for one algorithm will ever be available for AES SHA and HMAC cryptographic services at run-time.

The module implements the following non-Approved algorithms which are allowed in FIPS mode:

Algorithm	Usage	Key/CSP sizes
RSA	PKCS#1 v1.5 key wrapping	Key size between 2048 bits and 16384 bits or more
MD5	Used in TLS PRF only	N/A

Table 5: Non-Approved but allowed algorithms

The module implements the following non-Approved algorithms only available in non-FIPS mode:

- AES GCM usage outside of TLSv1.2 context
- AES with counter mode (CTR)
- AES-SIV
- Blowfish
- Camellia
- ChaCha20
- CAST 128
- DES
- Diffie-Hellman KAS with smaller than 2048 bits domain parameters size
- Diffie-Hellman with keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes
- FIPS 186-2 RSA Key Generation
- FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation with modulus size smaller than 2048 bits and larger than 3072 bits
- RSA Key wrapping using modulus size smaller than 2048
- FIPS 186-4 RSA, DSA, ECDSA Signature Generation/Verification with non-Approved Message Digest algorithms not listed in Table 4
- FIPS 186-4 DSA key generation, signature generation, signature verification with smaller than 2048 bits public key size or larger than 3072 bits
- GOST (symmetric key encrypt/decrypt, message digest)
- MD2
- MD4
- MD5
- RC2
- RC4
- RIPEMD-160
- Salsa20
- Serpent
- Twofish
- UMAC
- Streebog 256 and 512
- Poly1305
- Ed25519 curve.

- EdDSA.

Regarding the available services in FIPS mode of operation and non-FIPS mode of operation, please refer to Table 7: Services Available in FIPS mode and Table 8. Services Available in non-FIPS mode in section 3.2 Services.

1.3. Cryptographic Boundary

The module's physical boundary is the physical boundary of the test platform. The embodiment type of the module is defined as multi-chip standalone.

The module's logical boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files, which are delivered through Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) listed in section 9.1. The binary files and the HMAC files within the module's logical boundary are listed below:

- libgnutls library:
 - /usr/lib64/libgnutls.so.30.28.0
 - /usr/lib64/.libgnutls.so.30.28.0.hmac
- libnettle library:
 - /usr/lib64/libnettle.so.6.5
 - /usr/lib64/.libnettle.so.6.5.hmac
- libhogweed library:
 - /usr/lib64/libhogweed.so.4.5
 - /usr/lib64/.libhogweed.so.4.5.hmac
- libgmp library:
 - /usr/lib64/libgmp.so.10.3.2
 - /usr/lib64/fipscheck/libgmp.so.10.3.2.hmac

1.3.1. Hardware Block Diagram

The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the test platform which is a General Purpose Computer (GPC). The following block diagram shows the hardware components of a GPC:




Figure 1. Hardware Block Diagram

1.3.2. Software Block Diagram

The block diagrams below shows the module's logical boundary, its interface with the operational environment and the delimitation of its logical boundary which are included in **BLUE** box:




Figure 2. Software Block Diagram

2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

The physical ports of the module are the same as the computer system on which it executes. The logical interface is a C-language Application Program Interface (API) through libgnutls library.

The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table.

FIPS Interface	Physical Port	Module Interface
Data Input	Ethernet ports	API input parameters, kernel I/O - network or files on file system, TLS protocol
Data Output	Ethernet ports	API output parameters, kernel I/O - network or files on file system, TLS protocol
Control Input	Keyboard, Serial port, Ethernet port, Network	API function calls, TLS protocol
Status Output	Serial port, Ethernet port, Network	API return codes, TLS protocol
Power Input	PC Power Supply Port	N/A

Table 6: Ports and Interfaces

Note: The module is an implementation to support the TLS protocol defined in [RFC5246] and TLS is a port networking interface to provide secure channel between entities. When the calling application sends the data to the module, the module packages the data according to the TLS standard and sends it to other entity confidentially and integrity. The module is considered a user interface to use the TLS protocol to communicate with other remote entities securely through the network.

3. Roles, Services and Authentication

This section defines the roles, services, and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.

3.1. Roles

The module supports the following roles:

- **User role:** performs all services (in both FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode of operation), except module installation, configuration and initialization.
- **Crypto Officer role:** performs module installation, configuration and initialization.

The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the module.

3.2. Services

The module provides services to users that assume one of the available roles. All services are described in detail in the user documentation.

The following table lists the Approved services and the non-Approved but allowed services in FIPS mode of operation, the roles that can request the service, the Critical Security Parameters (CSP) involved and how they are accessed:

Service	Role	Keys/CSPs	Access
Cryptographic Library Services			
Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	User	AES 128, 192 or 256 bit key	Read
		3-key Triple-DES 192 bit key	
Asymmetric Key Generation in X509 Certificate	User	RSA public-private keys with 2048 and 3072 bits of modulus size	Create
		DSA public-private keys with 2048 and 3072 bits of public key size	
		ECDSA public-private keys with P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve	
Digital Signature Generation in X509 Certificate	User	RSA public-private keys with 2048 and 3072 bits of modulus size	Read
		DSA public-private keys with 2048 and 3072 bits of public key size	
		ECDSA public-private keys with P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve	
Digital Signature Verification in X509 Certificate	User	RSA public-private keys with 2048 and 3072 bits of modulus size	Read
		DSA public-private keys with 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits public key size	

Service	Role	Keys/CSPs	Access
		ECDSA public-private keys with P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve	
Public Key Verification	User	ECDSA public-private keys with P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve	Read
DSA domain parameter generation/verification	User	None	None
Shared secret computation	User	Shared secret, (EC) Diffie-Hellman private key	Create, Read, Write
Diffie-Hellman Parameters Generation using safe primes	User	Diffie-Hellman domain parameters	Create, Read, Write
Import and Export Public Key	User	RSA, DSA or ECDSA public key	Read, Write
Import and Export Private Key	User	RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key	Read, Write
Keyed Hash (HMAC)	User	At least 112 bits HMAC Key	Read
Message Digest (SHA)	User	None	None
Random Number Generation (SP800-90A DRBG)	User	Entropy input string, seed, internal state (V and key)	Read, Write
Symmetric key generation	User	AES or Triple-DES or HMAC key	Create
Key Wrapping according to SP 800-38F ⁴	User	AES, Triple-DES and HMAC keys	Read
SP 800-132 Password-based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF)	User	PBKDF Password, PBKDF derived key	Read, Create
SP800-56Crev1 Key Derivation Function (HKDF)	User	HKDF derived key shared secret	Read, Create
Network Protocols Services (Note: The underlying algorithms are the same as the algorithm implementations provided in the Cryptographic Library Services.)			
TLS or DTLS Handshaking Initialization	User	None	None
TLS Alert Protocol	User	None	None
TLS Record Protocol	User	AES or Triple-DES key, HMAC key	Read
TLS Handshaking using X509 Certificates Authentication method with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diffie-Hellman KAS EC Diffie-Hellman KAS RSA-based PKCSv1.5 Key Wrapping 	User	AES or Triple-DES key, RSA, DSA or ECDSA public-private key, HMAC Key, pre-master secret, TLS Master secret, Diffie-Hellman public-private keys and EC Diffie-Hellman EC public-private keys	Create, Read

⁴ The module claims SP 800-38F compliant key wrapping see section 6.3 for details.

Service	Role	Keys/CSPs	Access
TLS Handshaking using Anonymous Authentication method with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diffie-Hellman KAS EC Diffie-Hellman KAS 	User	AES or Triple-DES key, DSA or ECDSA public-private key, HMAC Key, pre-master secret, TLS Master secret, Diffie-Hellman public-private keys and EC Diffie-Hellman EC public-private keys	Create, Read
TLS Handshaking using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication method with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diffie-Hellman KAS EC Diffie-Hellman KAS RSA-based PKCSv1.5 Key Wrapping 	User	AES or Triple-DES key, RSA, DSA or ECDSA public-private key, HMAC Key, pre-master secret, TLS Master secret, Diffie-Hellman public-private keys and EC Diffie-Hellman EC public-private keys	Create, Read
TLS X.509 Certificate Handling, including digital signature, key/certificate import and export, and support the following format: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PKCS#7 PKCS#12 Binary (DER) encoding ASCII (PEM) encoding 	User	RSA, DSA or ECDSA public-private key	Read, Write
TLS Extensions	User	RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key	Read
Other FIPS-related Services			
Show status	User	None	None
Self-test	User	None	None
Zeroize	User	All aforementioned CSPs	Zeroize
Module Installation	Crypto Officer	None	None
Module Initialization	Crypto Officer	None	None
Module configuration	Crypto Officer	None	None

Table 7: Services Available in FIPS mode

The following table lists the services only available in non-FIPS mode of operation.

Service	Role	Keys	Access
FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation/Verification with modulus size smaller than 2048 bits or greater than 3072 bits	User	RSA private key	Create, Read
FIPS 186-2 RSA Key Generation	User	RSA private key	Create

Service	Role	Keys	Access
FIPS 186-4 RSA, DSA, ECDSA Signature Generation/Verification with non-Approved Message Digest algorithms	User	RSA private key DSA private key ECDSA private key	Read
RSA Key Wrapping as part of the TLS key exchange with modulus size smaller than 2048 bits	User	RSA private key	Read
DSA key generation, signature generation, signature verification with public key size smaller than 2048 bits and larger than 3072 bits	User	DSA private key	Create, Read
Diffie-Hellman KAS with key sizes smaller than 2048 bits	User	Diffie-Hellman public-private keys	Read
Diffie-Hellman with keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes	User	Diffie-Hellman public-private keys	Read
Symmetric encryption and decryption using AES GCM usage outside of TLSv1.2 context, AES CTR, AES-SIV, Blowfish, Camellia, ChaCha20, CAST 128, DES, Gost, RC2, RC4, Salsa20, Serpent, or Twofish	User	8 to 2048 bits key	Read
Message digest using GOST, MD2, MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160 or Streebog 256 and 512	User	None	None
MAC generation using UMAC, Poly1305	User	MAC key	Read
Asymmetric signature generation/verification using Ed25519 curve, EdDSA	User	EC private key	Read
Support to use DANE Certificate	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private keys	Read
Support to use OpenPGP Certificate	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private keys	Read
Support to use PKCS#11 Certificate	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private keys	Read
Support to use the Secure RTP (SRTP) defined in RFC5764	User	AES and HMAC keys	Read
Support to use Trusted Platform Module (TPM)	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private keys	Create, Read

Table 8. Services Available in non-FIPS mode

Note: The module does not share CSPs between FIPS mode of operation and a non-FIPS mode of operation. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS mode of operation must be generated in the FIPS mode or imported while running in the FIPS mode. The DRBG shall not be used for key generation for non-Approved services in non-FIPS mode.

More information about the services listed in Table 7: Services Available in FIPS mode can be found

in the manpages from the module.

3.3. Operator Authentication

The module does not implement authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.

4. Physical Security

The module comprises of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.

5. Operational Environment

This module operates in a modifiable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 definition.

5.1. Applicability

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.2.

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to:

- Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS
- Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
- Red Hat OpenStack Platform
- OpenShift Container Platform
- Red Hat Gluster Storage
- Red Hat Ceph Storage
- Red Hat CloudForms
- Red Hat Satellite.

Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 1.1.

5.2. Policy

The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.

In FIPS Approved mode, the `ptrace(2)` system call, the debugger (`gdb(1)`), and `strace(1)` shall be not used.

6. Cryptographic Key Management

The following table summarizes the Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module in FIPS mode:

Keys/CSPs	Generation	Entry and Output	Zeroization
128, 192 or 256 bits AES key (used by symmetric encryption/decryption service)	N/A	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters. No output mechanism provided.	Call <code>gnutls_cipher_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
128, 192 or 256 bits AES key (used by symmetric key generation service)	The key can be generated by the SP 800-90A DRBG.	Key is output to caller in the form of API output parameter.	Call <code>gnutls_cipher_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
192 bits Triple-DES key (used by symmetric encryption/decryption service)	N/A	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters. No output mechanism provided.	Call <code>gnutls_cipher_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
192 bits Triple-DES key (used by symmetric key generation service)	The key can be generated by the SP 800-90A DRBG.	Key is output to caller in the form of API output parameter.	Call <code>gnutls_cipher_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
At least 112 bits HMAC key (used by symmetric encryption/decryption service)	N/A.	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters. No output mechanism provided.	Call <code>gnutls_hmac_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
At least 112 bits HMAC key (used by symmetric key generation service)	The key can be generated by the SP 800-90A DRBG.	Key is output to caller in the form of API output parameter.	Call <code>gnutls_hmac_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.

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RSA public-private key	The RSA public-private keys with the modulus size of 2048 and 3072 bits are generated using FIPS 186-4 RSA Key Generation method and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP 800-90A DRBG.	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters, or imported via service calls. The public-private keys can be exported via service calls, and the public key can exit the module via TLS protocol.	Call <code>gnutls_rsa_params_deinit()</code> , <code>gnutls_privkey_deinit()</code> or <code>gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
DSA public-private key	The DSA public-private keys with the public key size of 2048 and 3072 bits are generated using FIPS 186-4 DSA Key Generation method and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP 800-90A DRBG.	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters, or imported via service calls. The public-private keys can be exported via service calls and the public key can exit the module via TLS protocol.	Call <code>gnutls_privkey_deinit()</code> or <code>gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
ECDSA public-private key where the key associated with P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve	The ECDSA public-private keys are generated using FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Key Generation method and the random value used in key generation is generated using SP 800-90A DRBG.	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters, or imported via service calls. The public-private keys can be exported via service calls and the public key can exit the module via TLS protocol.	Call <code>gnutls_privkey_deinit()</code> or <code>gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit()</code> to zeroize the key.
Diffie-Hellman public and private keys	The domain parameters used in Diffie-Hellman is generated using SP 800-90A DRBG, SP800-56Arev3.	The domain parameters are passed into the module via API input parameters, or imported via service calls. The domain parameters can be exported via service calls, and the generated public key can exit the module via TLS protocol.	Call or <code>gnutls_deinit()</code> or <code>gnutls_dh_params_deinit()</code> to zeroize the Diffie-Hellman domain parameters.
EC Diffie-Hellman public and private keys	The components to generate the public-private keys used in EC Diffie-Hellman is generated using SP 800-90A DRBG, SP800-56Arev3 and FIPS186-4.	The key is passed into the module via API input parameters. The public key can exist the module via TLS protocol.	Call <code>gnutls_deinit()</code> to zeroize the EC public-private keys.

Shared Secret	The shared secret is generated by the module in the Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation.	The module does not import or export this CSP.	Call <code>gnutls_deinit()</code> to zeroize the shared secret.
Entropy Input String	Obtained from CPU Jitter source outside of the module's logical boundary within the module's physical boundary	The module does not import or export the key or CSP.	Call <code>gnutls_global_deinit()</code> to zeroize the internal state of the DRBG.
DRBG seed, internal state (V and Key)	Generated internally in the DRBG	The module does not import or export the key or CSP.	Call <code>gnutls_global_deinit()</code> to zeroize the internal state of the DRBG.
TLS Pre-Master Secret	Generated during the key agreement when using Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Generated by TLS client as output from DRBG when using RSA key exchange.	Entry: if received by module as TLS server, wrapped with server's public RSA key; otherwise no entry. Output: if generated by module as TLS client, wrapped with server's public RSA key; otherwise, no output.	Call <code>gnutls_deinit()</code> to zeroize the pre-master secret
TLS Master Secret	Derived from pre-master secret using SP 800-135 KDF	Generated by the module. No output.	Call <code>gnutls_deinit()</code> to zeroize the master secret
TLS-KDF derived key	Derived AES/Triple-DES/HMAC key from SP800-135 TLS KDF mechanisms	No output mechanism provided.	Internal state is zeroized automatically when function returns
PBKDF password	N/A	The password is passed into the module via API input parameters.	Internal PBKDF state is zeroized automatically when function returns
PBKDF derived key	Derived by SP800-132 PBKDF	The resulting key is output through output parameters.	Internal PBKDF state is zeroized automatically when function returns
HKDF-KDF Derived key	Derived SP800-56Crev1 HKDF KDF mechanisms	No output mechanism provided.	Internal state is zeroized automatically when function returns

Table 9: Keys/CSPs

6.1. Random Number Generation

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the creation of key components of asymmetric keys, symmetric keys, and random number generation.

The module implements the CTR_DRBG with AES-256 without derivation function and without prediction resistance. The CTR_DRBG is implemented in the libgnutls library and provides at least 128 bits of output data per each request.

The module uses CPU jitter as a noise source provided by the operational environment which is within the module's physical boundary but outside of the module's logical boundary. The source is compliant with [SP 800-90B] and marked as ENT (NP) on the certificate.

The module collects 384 bits of entropy from the kernel CPU Jitter source, which is provided to an HMAC_DRBG in the kernel, which preserves the 384-bits of entropy upon output. This 384-bits of entropy is the initial seed during initialization of the CTR_DRBG, and reseeding internally which occurs less than 2^{48} times of DRBG services request. The module obtains at least 384 bits of entropy from the CPU Jitter source per each call. The caveat, "The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy" applies.

The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in section 11.3 of [SP800-90A].

6.2. Key Generation

The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for Approved services in FIPS mode is compliant with [SP800-133].

For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.

The public and private key pairs used in the Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman KAS are generated internally by the module using key generation compliant with [SP800-56Arev3].

The module supports the generation of symmetric keys. Either `gnutls_key_generate()` or `gnutls_rnd()` can be used to generate symmetric keys. Each will call the DRBG compliant to [SP800-90A] to generate the key for symmetric keys or HMAC keys. Therefore, CKG (vendor affirmed) is mentioned on the draft certificate.

6.3. Key Establishment/Key Derivation

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario X1 (1) of IG D.8. Diffie-Hellman shall use at least-2048 bits key size and EC Diffie-Hellman shall use curves P-256, P-384 or P-521 curve in FIPS mode. The Diffie-Hellman with less than 2048 bits key size is only available in non-FIPS mode.

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes compliant with SP800-56rev3 and used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange in accordance with scenario X1 (2) of IG D.8; that is, the shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) followed by the derivation of the keying material using SP800-135 KDF.

For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of safe primes from RFC7919 for domain parameters and key generation, which are used in the TLS key agreement implemented by the module.

- TLS (RFC7919)

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- ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)
- ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)
- ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)
- ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)
- ffdhe8192 (ID = 260).

The module also supports RSA key wrapping using encryption and decryption primitives with the modulus size of at least 2048 bits in FIPS mode. The modulus size of 1024 bits is only available in non-FIPS mode.

According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in NIST SP 800-57 Part1Rev5 (dated on May, 2020), the key sizes of RSA, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provides the following security strength for the corresponding key establishment method shown below:

- RSA key wrapping provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength;
- Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength;
- Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength;
- EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength;
- EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

The module provides approved key transport methods compliant to SP 800-38F according to IG D.9. The key transport method is provided by:

- AES-GCM and AES-CCM
- AES-CBC with HMAC used within the TLS protocol
- Triple-DES-CBC with HMAC used within the TLS protocol.

Therefore, the following caveats apply:

- KTS (AES Certs. #A1824, #A1825 and #A1830; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)
- KTS (AES Certs. #A1824, #A1825 and #A1830 and HMAC Certs. #A1825 and #A1830; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)
- KTS (Triple-DES Cert. #A1830 and HMAC Certs. #A1825 and #A1830; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)

Note: As the module supports the RSA key pair with 16384 bits or more modulus size, the encryption strength 256 bits is claimed for RSA key wrapping.

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-135]:

- KDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.0/1.1 and TLSv1.2.

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-56C1]:

- HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3.

The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP-800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications.

6.4. Key Entry and Output

The module does not support manual key entry or intermediate key generation key output.

For symmetric algorithms or for HMAC, the keys are provided to the module via API input parameters for the cryptographic operations. For asymmetric algorithms, the keys are also provided to the module via API input parameters. The module also provides the services to import and export public and private keys within the physical boundary of the module.

6.5. Key/CSP Storage

The module does not support persistent key storage. The keys and CSPs are stored as plaintext in the RAM.

The symmetric keys and HMAC keys are provided to the module via API input parameters, and are destroyed by the module using appropriate API function calls before they are released in the memory.

Asymmetric public and private keys are provided to the module via API input parameters, and are destroyed by the module using appropriate API function calls before they are released in the memory.

The HMAC pre-computed value used for the integrity test is stored in the .hmac file and relies on the operating system for protection. The HMAC key used to the integrity test is stored in the module's binary.

6.6. Key/CSP Zeroization

The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular libc malloc/calloc() calls. The application that uses the module is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the GnuTLS API to zeroize the keys or keying material. The destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.

7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

MARKETING NAME..... PowerEdge R440
REGULATORY MODEL..... E45S
REGULATORY TYPE..... E45S001
EFFECTIVE DATE..... March 01, 2020
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS..... Class A

7.1. Statement of compliance

This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations, and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. Generally, Information Technology Equipment (ITE) product compliance is based on IEC and CISPR standards and their national equivalent such as Product Safety, IEC 60950-1 and European Norm EN 60950-1 or EMC, CISPR 22/CISPR 24 and EN 55022/55024. Dell products have been verified to comply with the EU RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU. Dell products do not contain any of the restricted substances in concentrations and applications not permitted by the RoHS Directive.

8. Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform power-up tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions require continuous testing of the cryptographic functionality, such as the asymmetric key generation. If any self-test fails, the module returns an error code and enters the error state. No data output or cryptographic operations are allowed in error state.

See section 10.2 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.

8.1. Power-Up Tests

The module performs power-up self-tests automatically when the module is loaded into memory; power-up tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the module is in a self-test state because the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are completed. If any power-up self-test fails, the module returns the error code listed in section 10.2 and displays “Error in GnuTLS initialization” with the specific error message associated with the returned error code, and then enters the error state. The subsequent calls to the module will also fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible. If the power-up self-tests complete successfully, the module will return 0 and accepts cryptographic operation services request.

8.1.1. Integrity Tests

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each component of the module. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters the error state.

8.1.2. Cryptographic Algorithm Test

The module performs self-tests on all FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in the approved mode of operation, using the known answer tests (KAT), shown in the following table:

Algorithm	Power-Up Tests
AES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KAT AES-CBC/GCM/CCM/CMAC encryption • KAT AES-CBC/GCM/CCM/CMAC decryption
Triple-DES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KAT Triple-DES-CBC encryption • KAT Triple-DES-CBC decryption
HMAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KAT HMAC-SHA-1 • KAT HMAC-SHA-224 • KAT HMAC-SHA-256 • KAT HMAC-SHA-384 • KAT HMAC-SHA-512
SHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KATs for SHA2 are covered in the KATs for HMAC as allowed with IG 9.1 • SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512

Algorithm	Power-Up Tests
DSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KAT DSA 2048-bit key with SHA-256 signature generation KAT DSA 2048-bit key with SHA-256 signature verification
RSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KAT RSA 2048-bit key with SHA-256 signature generation KAT RSA 2048-bit key with SHA-256 signature verification
ECDSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> KAT ECDSA (NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521) signature generation KAT ECDSA (NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521) signature verification
Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT
EC Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT with P-256 curve
DRBG	KAT CTR_DRBG with AES-256 bit
DRBG	DRBG health tests as specified in section 11.3 of NIST SP 800-90Ar1
PBKDF	KAT
TLSv1.2 KDF	KAT
HKDF	KAT

Table 10: Power-Up Self-Tests

For the KAT, the module calculates the result and compares it with the known value. If the answer does not match the known answer, the KAT is failed and the module returns the error code and enters the error state.

As described in section 1.2, only one AES or SHA implementation from libnettle library written in C language or using the support from AES-NI or SSSE3 instructions is available at run-time. The KATs cover different implementations dependent on the implementations availability in the operating environment.

8.2. On-Demand Self-Tests

The on-demand self-tests is invoked by powering-off and reloading the module which causes the module to run the power-up tests again. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services are not available and no data output or input is possible.

8.3. Conditional Tests

The module performs conditional tests on the cryptographic algorithms, using the pair-wise consistency test (PCT), shown in the following table:

Algorithm	Conditional Tests
DSA key generation	Pairwise consistency test: signature generation and verification using SHA-256
ECDSA key generation	Pairwise consistency test: signature generation and verification using SHA-256
RSA key generation	Pairwise consistency test: signature

Algorithm	Conditional Tests
	generation and verification using SHA-256. Pairwise consistency test: encryption and decryption

Table 11: Module Conditional Tests

For the PCT, if the signature generation or verification fails, the module returns the error code and enters the error state.

9. Guidance

9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance

The binaries of the module are delivered via Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) packages. The Crypto Officer shall follow this Security Policy to configure the operational environment and install the module to be operated as FIPS 140-2 validated module.

The following version of the RPM packages containing the FIPS validated module and the operating environment settings:

Processor Architecture	RPM packages
x86_64	gnutls-3.6.16-4.el8.x86_64.rpm gmp-6.1.2-10.el8.x86_64.rpm nettle-3.4.1-7.el8.x86_64.rpm

Table 12: RPM packages

The RPM packages of the module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN remote management tool).

FIPS module installation instructions:

10. Recommended method

The system-wide cryptographic policies package (crypto-policies) contains a tool that completes the installation of cryptographic modules and enables self-checks in accordance with the requirements of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. We call this step “FIPS enablement”. The tool named fips-mode-setup installs and enables or disables all the validated FIPS modules and it is the recommended method to install and configure a RHEL-8 system.

1. To switch the system to FIPS enablement in RHEL 8:

```
# fips-mode-setup --enable
Setting system policy to FIPS
FIPS mode will be enabled.
Please reboot the system for the setting to take effect.
```

2. Restart your system:

```
# reboot
```

3. After the restart, you can check the current state:

```
# fips-mode-setup --check
FIPS mode is enabled.
```

Note: As a side effect of the enablement procedure the `fips-mode-enable` tool also changes the system-wide cryptographic policy level to a level named “FIPS”, this level helps applications by changing configuration defaults to approved algorithms.

Manual method

The recommended method automatically performs all the necessary steps.

The following steps can be done manually but are not recommended and are not required if the systems has been installed with the `fips-mode-setup` tool:

- create a file named `/etc/system-fips`, the contents of this file are never checked
- ensure to invoke the command `'fips-finish-install --complete'` on the installed system.
- ensure that the kernel boot line is configured with the `fips=1` parameter set
- Reboot the system.

NOTE: If `/boot` or `/boot/efi` resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter `boot=<boot partition>` must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command `"df | grep boot"`. For example:

```
$ df |grep boot
```

```
/dev/sda1      233191      30454      190296      14%      /boot
```

The partition of the `/boot` file system is located on `/dev/sda1` in this example.

Therefore the parameter `boot=/dev/sda1` needs to be appended to the kernel command line in addition to the parameter `fips=1`.

Once the operating environment has been configured to support FIPS, it is not possible to switch back to standard mode without terminating the module first.

Module Installations:

The Crypto Officer can install the RPM packages contains the module listed in Table 12: RPM packages based on the processor architecture. The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation of the module and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.

10.1. User Guidance

The applications must be linked dynamically to run the module. Only the services listed in Table 7: Services Available in FIPS mode are allowed to be used in FIPS mode.

The libraries of GMP and Nettle provides the support of cryptographic operations to the GnuTLS library. The operator shall use the API provided by the GnuTLS library for the services. Invoking the APIs provided by the supporting libraries are forbidden.

10.1.1. TLS and Diffie-Hellman

The TLS protocol implementation provides both, the server and the client sides. As required by SP800-131A, For Diffie-Hellman only the safe prime groups listed in RFC7919 are approved to be used in FIPS mode. The TLS protocol cannot enforce the support of FIPS Approved Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To ensure full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the cryptographic module must accept Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by the

TLS server.

The TLS server implementation of the cryptographic Module allows the application to set the Diffie-Hellman key size. The server side must always set the DH parameters with the API call of:

```
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)
```

Alternatively it is possible to use `SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1)`; function call that makes GnuTLS use built-in 2048 bit parameters when the server RSA certificate is at least 2048 bits and 3072 bit DH parameters with RSA certificate of 3072 bits.

To comply with the FIPS 140-2 standard the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits must be met, to do this the Crypto Officer must ensure that:

- in case the Module is used as TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters (dh argument) of the aforementioned API call must be 2048 bits or larger;
- in case the Module is used as TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.

Using DH parameters and keys smaller than 2048 bits will implicitly place the module into non-FIPS mode, as specified in section 1.2 of the Security Policy.

10.1.2. AES-GCM

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established (as defined in IG A.5 scenario 3 option 3 for IV restoration conditions).

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288] and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5. Any use of AES GCM outside of TLSv1.2 context is considered non-approved; thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52Rev2 section 3.3.1]

If the `nonce_explicit` part of the IV exhausts, GnuTLS will mark the TLS session as invalid and the IV will need to be renegotiated.

10.1.3. RSA and DSA Keys

The module allows the use of 1024 bit RSA and DSA keys for legacy purposes, including signature generation.

As per SP800-131A, RSA and DSA must be used at least 2048 bit keys in FIPS mode. To comply with the requirements of [FIPS140-2], the operator must therefore only use keys with at least 2048 bits in FIPS mode.

10.1.4. Triple-DES

According to IG A.13, it's the user's responsibility to make sure that the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^{16} 64-bit blocks of data.

10.1.5. Key derivation using SP800-132 PBKDF

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132. The

module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).

In accordance to [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

- Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more.
- A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits, shall be generated randomly using the SP800-90A DRBG,
- The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000.
- Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.

The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be $1/62^{20} = 10^{-36}$, which is less than 2^{-112} .

The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132].

10.2. Handling Self-Test Errors

When the module fails any self-test, it will return an error code to indicate the error and enters error state that any further cryptographic operations is inhibited. Here is the list of error codes when the module fails any self-test or in error state:

Error Events	Error Codes	Error Messages
When the integrity test, KAT or PCT fails at the power-up	GNUTLS_E_SELF_TEST_ERROR (-400)	"Error while performing self checks."
When the KAT of DRBG fails at the power-up	GNUTLS_E_RANDOM_FAILED (-206)	"Failed to acquire random data."
When the new generated RSA, DSA or ECDSA key pair fails the PCT	GNUTLS_E_PK_GENERATION_ERROR (-403)	"Error in public key generation."
When the module is in error state and caller requests cryptographic operations	GNUTLS_E_LIB_IN_ERROR_STATE (-402)	"An error has been detected in the library and cannot continue operations."

Table 13: Error Events, Error Codes and Error Messages

Self-test errors transition the module into an error state that keeps the module operational but prevents any cryptographic related operations. The module must be restarted and perform power-up self-test to recover from these errors. If failures persist, the module must be re-installed. When downloading the module, the Crypto Officer shall confirm from the RPM tool that the module was downloaded properly.

A completed list of the error codes can be found in Appendix C "Error Codes and Descriptions" in the gnutls.pdf provided with the module's code.

11. Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding is always used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.

The internal API function of `rsa_blind()` and `rsa_unblind()` are called by the module for RSA signature generation and RSA decryption operations. The module generates a random blinding factor and include this random value in the RSA operations to prevent RSA timing attacks.

12. Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Specification
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
API	Application Program Interface
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cypher Block Chaining
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
CVL	Component Validation List
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
GPC	General Purpose Computer
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
IG	Implementation Guidance
KAS	Key Agreement Schema
KAT	Known Answer Test
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
O/S	Operating System
PCT	Pair-wise Consistency Test
RHEL	Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RPM	Red Hat Package Manager
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSSE3	Supplemental Streaming SIMD Extensions 3
TLS	Transport Layer Security

13. References

- FIPS140-2** **FIPS PUB 140-2 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules**
December 2002
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf>
- FIPS140-2_IG** **Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program**
December 2019
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf>
- FIPS180-4** **Secure Hash Standard (SHS)**
August 2015
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>
- FIPS186-4** **Digital Signature Standard (DSS)**
July 2013
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>
- FIPS197** **Advanced Encryption Standard**
November 2001
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf>
- FIPS198-1** **The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)**
July 2008
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf>
- PKCS#1** **Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1**
February 2003
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt>
- RFC4347** **Datagram Transport Layer Security**
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