Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and
Dell OME-M v2.6
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
Security Policy
Document Revision 1.0
July 28, 2022
© 2022 Dell, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Dell, the Dell logo, and other Dell names and marks are
trademarks of Dell, Inc. in the US and worldwide. Dell, Inc. disclaims proprietary interest in the marks
and names of others.
Revision History
Revision Date Authors Summary
1.0 July 28, 2022 Colby Harper Module v2.6 FIPS validation for IDRAC and
OME
Table of Contents
Revision History ...........................................................................................................................................2
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................4
Dell Cryptographic Library...........................................................................................................................4
Module Specification ................................................................................................................................4
Security Level........................................................................................................................................5
FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.......................................................................................................6
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms....................................................................................................8
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms..........................................................................................10
Module Interfaces....................................................................................................................................11
Roles, Services and Authentication.........................................................................................................11
Finite State Model ...................................................................................................................................13
Physical Security.....................................................................................................................................13
Operational Environment ........................................................................................................................13
Vendor Affirmed Operating Environments.............................................................................................13
Key Management ....................................................................................................................................13
Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility.....................................................................................15
Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................................16
Guidance and Secure Operation..............................................................................................................17
Crypto-officer Guidance......................................................................................................................17
User Guidance .....................................................................................................................................17
Mitigation of Other Attacks ....................................................................................................................17
Introduction
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 security policy details the secure operation of the Dell Crypto Library
for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M as required in the Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 140-2 (FIPS 140-2) as published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) of the United State Department of Commerce. This document, the Cryptographic Module Security
Policy, also referred to as the Security Policy, specifies the security rules under which the Dell Crypto
Library must operate.
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M provides cryptography to Dell iDRAC and
Dell OME-M lifecycle controllers providing them with the protection afforded by industry-standard,
government-approved algorithms to ensure secure, remote management. Dell iDRAC, Dell CMC, and
Dell OME-M leverage the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M to ensure use of FIPS
140-2 validated cryptography.
Dell Cryptographic Library
The following sections describe the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M.
Module Specification
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M (hereinafter referred to as the “Library,”
“cryptographic module,” or the “module”) is a software-only cryptographic module executing on a
general-purpose computing system.
The physical perimeter of the general-purpose computing system comprises the module’s physical
cryptographic boundary, while the Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M constitutes the
module’s logical cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 - Logical Diagram
Security Level
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M meets the overall requirements applicable to
Level 1 security overall of FIPS 140-2 and the following specified section security levels.
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
# FIPS 140-2 Section Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Physical Cryptographic Boundary (General Purpose Computing System)
Operating System
Linking
Application
Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Dell Crypto Library
for Dell iDRAC and
Dell OME-M
FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M provides both FIPS-Approved and non-FIPS-
Approved services, and thus provides both a FIPS-Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. To
use the Library in a FIPS-compliant mode of operation, the operator must follow these rules:
1. As allowed by FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 security, the module does not provide any indicator
of its FIPS mode of operation. Thus, an operator (calling process) must ensure to follow each
of the rules in this section (during the development of a calling application) to ensure that the
module operates in its FIPS mode.
2. The module affords no persistent or permanent configuration to ensure use of its Approved
mode or operation, rather the module, when in its operational state, alternates service by service
between its Approved and non-Approved mode of operation (depending on what services the
operator calls).
3. The list of services enumerated in the Roles, Service and Authentication section includes all
security functions, roles, and services provided by the cryptographic module in both its
Approved and non-Approved modes of operation.
4. An operator does not configure the module during power-up initialization to operate only in one
mode or another mode. The module provides no such configuration, but instead requires the
operator to only solicit Approved services and to not solicit non-Approved services. The
following services are non-Approved services:
a. Random Number Generation using ANSI X9.31 RNG (all non-compliant)
b. Triple-DES (non-compliant)
5. An operator must avoid violating Approved-mode key generation and usage requirements by:
a. Not generating keys in a non-Approved mode of operation and then switch to an
Approved-mode of operation (for example, using the ANSI X9.31 RNG to directly
generate an AES encryption key for use in the Approved mode of Operation)
b. Not electronically importing keys in plaintext in a non-Approved mode of operation
and then switch to an Approved-mode of operation and use those keys for Approved
services
c. Not generating keys in an Approved-mode of operation and then switching to a non-
Approved mode of operation and using the generated keys for non-Approved services
d. Not changing the default RNG to non-approved ANSI X9.31 RNG algorithm via calls
like ENGINE_set_RAND() and ENGINE_set_default_RAND(). When the module is
in the Approved mode of operation, the default RNG is the validated AES-256
CTR_DRBG.
e. When initializing Approved 800-90B DBRGs, users must consider the supported
strength of the DRBG methods and the entropy source(s). The module supports
DRBGs with varying length of required entropy input per NIST SP 800-90A. The
length of the input string will depend on DRBG selected and desired security strength.
Module users shall provide, at a minimum, the “Minimum entropy input length” and
entropy input that meets the security strength required for the random number
generation mechanism as shown in SP 800-90A Table 2 (Hash_DRBG,
HMAC_DRBG), and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). The entropy input length may be equal to
or greater than the target security strength of the DRBG based on the associated
minimum entropy estimate (i.e. bits per byte) for the entropy input value. Per FIPS
140-2 I.G. 7.14, in all cases the minimum entropy input must contain at least 112 bits
of entropy. The entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. The callback
functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met.
6. An operator may use the following methods for construction of the AES GCM IV for
encryption per FIPS PUB 140-2 Implementation Guidance, Section A.5. The selection of the IV
construction method is the responsibility of the user of this module. The operator of the module
must not use an externally generated IV.
a. Construct the IV with the calling application within the module boundary for exclusive
use with peer-to-peer industry standard protocols per FIPS PUB 140-2 Implementation
Guidance, Section A.5 Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D,
Scenario #1.
The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and supports acceptable GCM ciphersuites
from Section 3.3.1 of SP 800-52 Rev 1 or SP 800-52 Rev 2. TLSv1.2 protocol with
AES GCM IV construction per RFC 5246 is supported with the counter set within the
module boundary. When the IV is constructed according to TLS protocol, the IV must
only be used within the context TLS protocol with AES GCM mode encryption. When
the maximum number of possible values for a given session key is reached, a client
hello or server hello should be sent to renegotiate security parameters per RFC 5246 or
fail. In the event of power loss, a new AES GCM key must be established for the
encryption function. Note: The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the
CAVP or CMVP.
b. For deterministic construction of AES GCM IV the IV must be constructed with the
first 32 bits as a unique identifier (e.g. name of module) and use at least 32 bits as a
deterministic non-repetitive counter for a combined IV length between 64 bits and 128
bits. The encryption of blocks must be aborted if the counter part of the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given encryption key. In the event of power
loss, a new AES GCM key must be established for the encryption function.
7. An operator must limit the use of the XTS-AES mode of encryption/decryption per NIST SP
800-38E to data storage applications. The length of the data unit for any instance of an
implementation of XTS-AES shall not exceed 220
AES blocks. Key_1 and Key_2 must be
established within the physical boundary as distinct values, the calling application shall ensure
that Key_1 does not equal Key_2.
8. When using Key agreement primitives (KAS-SSC), the operator shall ensure domain
parameters are compliant to NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3. NIST SP 800-56A rev.3 approved FFC
groups for KAS_SSC FFC (Diffie Hellman) provide between 112 and 200-bits of algorithm
strength. NIST SP 800-56A rev.3 approved ECC curves for KAS_SSC ECC (Elliptic Curve
Cryptography Diffie Hellman) provide between 112 and 256 bits of algorithm strength.
9. When using the supported RSA Key transport primitives, the module supports the allowed use
of RSA key wrapping per FIPS 140-2 IG D.9. The RSA modulus must be at least 2048 bits.
Only RSA PKCS#1-v1.5 padding consistent with RFC 2313, section 8.1 is allowed for use. Per
FIPS 140-2 IG D.9 the use RSA key transport is disallowed for security relevant functions in
the Approved Mode of Operation after December 31, 2023.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module uses cryptographic algorithm implementations that have received the following certificate
numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program.
Table 2 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms Certificates
Algorithms
CAVP
Certificate
AES
FIPS 197
SP800-38A
• CBC (128, 192, 256)
• CFB1 (128, 192, 256)
• CFB128 (128, 192, 256)
• CTR (128, 192, 256)
• ECB (128, 192, 256)
• OFB (128, 192, 256)
SP800-38B
• CMAC (128, 192, 256)
SP800-38C
• CCM (128, 192, 256)
SP800-38D
• GCM (128, 192, 256)
SP900-38E
• XTS (128, 256)
A2213
DRBG SP 800-90A
• COUNTER DRBG-AES 256
• HASH DRBG
o SHA-1 or SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
• HMAC DRBG
o SHA-1 or SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
A2213
Algorithms
CAVP
Certificate
DSA FIPS 186-4
• Key Pair Generation
o L/N: 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256
• PQG Gen.
o L/N: 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256
• PQG Ver.
o L/N: 1024/160, 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256)
• Sign
o L/N: 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256
o SHA-2
• Verify
o L/N: 1024/160, 2048/224, 2048/256, 3072/256)
o SHA-1 or SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
A2213
ECDSA FIPS 186-4
• Key Pair Generation
o B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
• Key Verification
o B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384,
P-521
• Sign
o B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
o SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
• Verify
o B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
o SHA-1 or SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
A2213
HMAC FIPS 198
SHA-1
SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
A2213
KAS-ECC-SSC
(ECDH)
SP 800-56Ar3
Ephemeral Unified (B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-
283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521)
A2213
KAS-FFC-SSC
(DH)
SP 800-56Ar3
dhEphem (2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192) A2213
Algorithms
CAVP
Certificate
RSA FIPS 186-4
• Key Pair Generation
o 2048, 3072
• Sign
o 2048, 3072
o SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
• Verify
o 2048, 3072
o SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)
A2213
SHS FIPS 180-4
o SHA-1 or SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) A2213
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module uses the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved, but allowed algorithms.
• RSA with 2048-bit to 16384-bit key sizes provides between 112 and 270 bits of encryption
strength – allowed for use as part of a key-establishment scheme.
The module also provides the following non-Approved and not allowed algorithms:
• ANSI X9.31 RNG (non-compliant)
• Triple-DES (non-compliant)
As described above, in order to utilize the Library in FIPS-compliant mode, a calling process cannot
solicit non-Approved algorithms.
Module Interfaces
The module is classified as a multiple-chip standalone module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. As such, the
module’s physical cryptographic boundary encompasses the general-purpose computing system and
Linux based OS interfacing with the peripherals (through its console port, network (Ethernet and QSFP)
ports, USB ports, and power adapter).
However, the module provides only a logical interface via an application programming interface (API)
and does not interface with or communicate across any of the physical ports of the computing system.
This logical interface exposes services that operators (calling applications) may use directly.
The module’s C-language API interface provided by the module is mapped onto the four FIPS 140-2
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. It is through this logical API
that the module logically separates them into distinct and separate interfaces. The mapping of the
module’s API to the four FIPS 140-2 interfaces is as follows:
• Data input – API entry point data input stack parameters
• Data output – API entry point data output stack parameters
• Control input – API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
• Status output – API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports both of the FIPS 140-2 required roles, the Crypto-officer and the User role, and
supports no additional roles. An operator implicitly selects the Crypto-officer role when loading (or
causing loading of) the library and selects the User role when soliciting services from the module through
its API. The module requires no operator authentication. The following table enumerates the module’s
services.
Table 3 - Service Descriptions for Crypto-officer and User Roles
Service Description, Critical Security Parameter (CSP) and Key
Access
Crypto-Officer services
Library Loading The process of loading the assembly
Self-test Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest)
User services
Show Status Functions that provide module status information
• Version (an unsigned long or const char *)
• FIPS Mode (Boolean)
• FIPS POST Status (returns 1 if they failed)
Does not access CSPs.
Zeroize Functions that destroy CSPs:
• fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for the DRBG context,
overwrites DRBG CSPs
Service Description, Critical Security Parameter (CSP) and Key
Access
All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in
allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the
calling application.
Random number generation Used for random number generation.
• Seed or reseed the DRBG instance
• Determine security strength of the DRBG instance
• Obtain random data
Uses and updates the DRBG CSPs.
Asymmetric key generation Used to generate RSA, DH, DSA, and EC keys:
RSA Signature Generation Key (SGK), RSA Signature
Verification Key (SVK), DH Private, DH Public, DSA SGK,
DSA SVK, EC DH Private, EC DH Public, ECDSA SGK,
ECDSA SVK. The random value (seed) needed to generate an
asymmetric key pair is the direct output of the Approved
DRBG.
Symmetric encrypt/decrypt Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
For symmetric encryption or decryption, the module supports:
• Approved AES: CBC, CCM, CFB1, CFB128, CMAC,
CTR, ECB, GCM, OFB, or XTS modes
Message digest Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.
Does not access CSPs.
Keyed Hash Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC.
Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).
Key transport1
primitives Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling
process (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA Key Decryption Key (KDK), RSA Key
Encryption Key (KEK) (passed in by the calling process).
Key agreement primitives Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the
calling process (does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using EC DH Private, DH Private, EC DH Public,
DH Public (passed in by the calling process).
Digital Signature Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA and ECDSA digital
signatures. Executes using RSA Signature Generation Key
(SGK), RSA Signature Verification Key (SVK); DSA SGK,
DSA SVK, ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK (passed in by the
calling process).
1
"Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter
definition is the one that applies to the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module
Finite State Model
The module has a finite state model (FSM) that describes the module’s behavior and transitions based on
its current state and the command received. The module’s FSM was reviewed as part of the overall FIPS
140-2 validation.
Physical Security
The physical security requirements do not apply to the module. The module is a software-only module
that executes on a general-purpose computing system.
Operational Environment
The Library executes on a general-purpose operating system running in single-user mode that segregates
processes into separate process spaces. Thus, the operating system separates each process space from all
others, implicitly satisfying the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single-user mode of operation.
Table 4 - Tested Operational Environments
Tested OS and Processor
1 OME-M: Linux 4.9.241 on a PowerEdge MX7000 Modular Chassis w/ Dell OME-M with Intel Atom
E3950
2 IDRAC: Linux 4.19.112 on a PowerEdge R750 Rack Server w/ Dell iDRAC9 with ARMv7
NPCMX50
Vendor Affirmed Operating Environments
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) allows for porting of unmodified software
cryptographic modules to compatible operating environments as described in Implementation Guidance
for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program G.5, “Maintaining Validation
Compliance of Software or Firmware Cryptographic Modules”. The CMVP makes no statement as to the
correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys.
All module versions in this security policy are considered validated, per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, running on a
general-purpose computing platform and compatible operating system.
Key Management
The module possesses its HMAC-SHA-1 self-integrity test key and power-up self-test known answer test
(KAT) keys. Beyond those keys, the module does not store any other keys persistently. It is the calling
applications responsibility to appropriately manage keys. The module can generate keys (DSA, EC, and
RSA asymmetric key pairs), can accept keys entered by an operator, and affords an operator the ability to
zeroize keys held in RAM.
The following table describes the module’s security-relevant data items (SRDI’s) including asymmetric
and symmetric keys:
Table 5 - Module Security-Relevant Data Items
Key Type Bit size Description Origin Stored Zeroized
RSA SGK RSA 2048 or
3072
RSA PKCS#1, ANSI
X9.31, or PSS signature
generation key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
RSA KDK RSA 2048-
16384
RSA key decryption
(private key transport) key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DSA SGK DSA 224 or
256
DSA signature generation
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
ECDSA SGK ECDS
A
224-521 ECDSA signature
generation key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DH Private DH 112-200* DH private key agreement
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DH Z value DH
KAS
112-200* DH KAS Shared secret Z
Value
Agreement RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
EC DH Private EC
DH
112-256* EC DH private key
agreement key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
EC DH Z value EC
DH
KAS
112-256* EC DH Shared secret Z
Value
Agreement RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
AES EDK AES 128-256 AES encrypt / decrypt key Entered RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
HMAC Key HMA
C
112+ Keyed hash key intended
for data integrity
Entered RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
CTR_DRBG
Key
AES 256 AES-256 CTR_DRBG
internal state Key
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
CTR_DRBG V
(seed)
N/A 128 AES-256 CTR_DRBG
internal state V (seed)
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
HASH_DRBG C N/A 440 or
888
HASH_DRBG internal
state C
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
HASH_DRBG V
(seed)
N/A 440 or
888
HASH_DRBG internal
state V (seed)
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
HMAC_DRBG
Key
N/A 160-512 HMAC_DRBG internal
state key
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
HMAC_DRBG
V (seed)
N/A 160-512 HMAC_DRBG internal
state V (seed)
From
environment
RAM
/plaintext
Clear
method
* Key agreement: target security strength in bits per SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (rounded to nearest multiple of eight bits).
The module also supports the following public/non-sensitive keys:
Table 6 - Module Public Keys
Key Type Bit size Description Origin Stored Zeroized
RSA SVK RSA 2048 or
3072
RSA PKCS#1, ANSI X9.31,
or PSS signature verification
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
RSA KEK RSA 2048-
16384
RSA key encryption (public
key transport) key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DSA SVK DSA 2048 or
3072
DSA signature verification
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
ECDSA
SVK
ECDSA 224-521 ECDSA signature verification
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
DH Public DH
112-200*
DH public key agreement key Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
EC DH
Public
EC DH
112-256*
EC DH public key agreement
key
Entered or
Generated
RAM /
plaintext
Clear
method
Self-tests
KAT
Keys
All All Keys used for module Power-
Up Known Answer Self-Test
Compiled
into the
module
Module
image
N/A
(see 140-2
IG 7.4)
Self-tests
Integrity
Keys
HMAC 256 bits HMAC-SHA-1 key used by
the module for its power up
integrity test
Compiled
into the
module
Module
image /
plaintext &
obfuscated
N/A
(see 140-2
IG 7.4)
* Key agreement: target security strength in bits per SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (rounded to nearest multiple of eight bits).
Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility
The module meets Level 1 security for FIPS 140-2 EMI/EMC requirements as the Dell Crypto Library
for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M passed validation executing on a general-purpose computing system
that confirms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15,
Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (for example, for home use).
Self-Tests
The module provides the self-tests listed in Table 7.
Table 7 - Self-tests
FIPS Cryptographic Module Self-Tests
Power-Up Self-Tests
Integrity test (HMAC-SHA-1)
DRBG KAT (CTR_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG - all applicable SP 800-90 Section 11
assurance tests)
SHA KATs (SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512)
HMAC-SHA KATs (SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512)
CMAC KATs
AES encrypt KAT and AES decrypt KAT
AES CCM KATs
AES GCM authenticated encryption KAT and AES GCM authenticated decryption KAT
AES XTS KATs
RSA sign KAT and RSA verify KAT
DSA sign KAT and DSA verify KAT
ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
KAS-FFC-SSC KAT
KAS-ECC-SSC KAT
Conditional Self-tests:
DSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test
RSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test
ECDSA Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test
DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator Test
Seeding of DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator Test
The module automatically performs the complete set of power-up self-tests during library load to ensure
proper operation, thus an operator has no access to cryptographic functionality unless the power-up self-
tests passes and the library load succeeds. The power-up self-tests include an integrity check of the
module’s software using an HMAC-SHA-1 value calculated over the object module’s in-memory image.
Should the module fail a self-test, the module enters an Error state where it prohibits cryptographic
services.
Additionally, the module performs both power-up and conditional self-tests for its cryptographic
algorithms. An operator may invoke the power-up self-tests at any time by calling the FIPS Mode
function.
Guidance and Secure Operation
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M meets overall Level 1 requirements for FIPS
PUB 140-2. The following sections describe the Crypto-officer and User guidance.
Crypto-officer Guidance
The Crypto-officer or operator responsible for configuring the operational environment on which the
module runs must ensure FIPS-compliant operation (as described in the section, FIPS Approved Mode of
Operation, of the Security Policy).
Additionally, the Crypto-officer is defined to be the operator responsible for loading the library, thus
when invoked by a calling application (either at library load or dynamically), the operating system loader
loads the module, causing it to automatically perform its power-up self-tests. If the module fails its
power-up self-tests, the module transitions into an Error state.
User Guidance
After the operating system has been properly configured by the Crypto-officer (if needed), the Dell
Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M requires the user to follow the rules of section FIPS
Approved Mode of Operation in order to operate in a FIPS-compliant manner. Furthermore, the User
must assume responsibility for managing all keys, as the module does not provide any persistent key
storage.
Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Dell Crypto Library for Dell iDRAC and Dell OME-M does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond
the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for validation.