© Copyright 2023 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Cisco ASR 1000 Series Routers with MACsec
Firmware version:
Cisco IOS-XE 16.12
Hardware versions:
ASR1001-HX, ASR1002-HX, ASR1006-X, and ASR1009-X
Embedded Services Processor (ESP) Hardware versions:
ASR1000-ESP40, ASR1000-ESP100 and ASR1000-ESP200;
Route Processor (RP) Hardware versions:
ASR-1000-RP2, and ASR-1000-RP3
Modular Interface Processor Hardware versions:
ASR1000-MIP100
Line Card Hardware versions:
EPA-10X10GE, and EPA-1X40GE QSFP+
FIPS-140 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - Security Level
1
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Version 1.3
© Copyright 2023 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 References ............................................................................................................ 1
1.2 FIPS 140-2 Submission Package.......................................................................... 1
2 Module Description .................................................................................................... 2
2.1 Cisco ASR (1001-HX, 1002-HX, 1006-X, and 1009-X)..................................... 2
2.2 Embedded Services Processor (40, 100 and 200 Gbps)....................................... 6
2.3 Router Processor (RP2, RP3)............................................................................... 7
2.4 ASR 1000 Series Modular Interface Processor (ASR1000-MIP100).................. 8
2.5 Validated and Vendor Affirmed Hardware.......................................................... 9
2.6 FIPS and non-FIPS modes of operation............................................................. 10
2.7 Module Validation Level ................................................................................... 10
3 Cryptographic Boundary........................................................................................... 11
4 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ............................................................. 11
5 Roles, Services, and Authentication ......................................................................... 16
5.1 User Services...................................................................................................... 16
5.2 Cryptographic Officer Services.......................................................................... 17
5.3 Unauthenticated User Services........................................................................... 18
6 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management...................................................................... 19
6.1 User Services and CSP Access........................................................................... 26
6.2 Crypto Officer Services and CSP Access .......................................................... 27
7 Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................ 29
7.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................ 29
7.2 Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-mode ............................... 31
7.3 Non-Approved Algorithms ................................................................................ 31
7.4 Self-Tests............................................................................................................ 32
8 Physical Security....................................................................................................... 34
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9 Secure Operation....................................................................................................... 35
9.1 System Initialization and Configuration ............................................................ 35
9.2 IPsec Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................... 36
9.3 Protocols............................................................................................................. 37
9.4 Remote Access ................................................................................................... 37
9.5 Key Strength....................................................................................................... 37
10 Related Documentation............................................................................................. 37
11 Definitions List ......................................................................................................... 38
Page 1 of 39
© Copyright 2023 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco ASR 1K
network router modules. This security policy describes how modules meet the security
requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of
operation.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation
program is available on the NIST website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.1 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical
terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is
available on the module from the following sources:
• The Cisco Systems website (http://www.cisco.com) contains information on the
full line of products from Cisco Systems.
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.2 FIPS 140-2 Submission Package
The security policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In
addition to this document, the submission package includes:
• Vendor Evidence
• Finite State Machine
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this non-proprietary security policy, the FIPS 140-2 validation
documentation is proprietary to Cisco Systems, Inc. and is releasable only under
appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact
Cisco Systems, Inc. See “Obtaining Technical Assistance” section for more information.
Page 2 of 39
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2 Module Description
2.1 Cisco ASR (1001-HX, 1002-HX, 1006-X, and 1009-X)
The Cisco ASR 1000 Series Routers (1001-HX, 1002-HX, 1006-X, and 1009-X) are
highly scalable WAN and Internet Edge router platforms that deliver embedded hardware
acceleration for multiple Cisco IOS Software services without the need for separate
service blades. In addition, the Cisco ASR 1000 Series Router is designed for business-
class resiliency, featuring redundant Route and Embedded Services Processors, as well as
software-based redundancy.
With routing performance and IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) acceleration around
ten-fold that of previous midrange aggregation routers with services enabled, the Cisco
ASR 1000 Series Routers provides a cost-effective approach to meet the latest services
aggregation requirement. This is accomplished while still leveraging existing network
designs and operational best practices.
Figure 1: ASR 1001-HX
Figure 2: ASR 1002-HX
The EPA-18X1GE was not part of the tested configuration.
Page 3 of 39
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Figure 3: ASR 1002-HX Overall Chassis View
Page 4 of 39
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Figure 4: ASR 1006-X
Figure 5: ASR 1006-X Overall Chassis View
Page 5 of 39
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Figure 6: ASR 1009-X
Figure 7: ASR 1009-X Overall Chassis View
Page 6 of 39
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2.2 Embedded Services Processor (40, 100 and 200 Gbps)
The Cisco ASR 1000 Series Embedded Service Processors (ESPs) are based on the
innovative, industry-leading Cisco QuantumFlow Processor for next-generation
forwarding and queuing in silicon. These components use the first generation of the
hardware and software architecture known as Cisco QuantumFlow Processor.
The 40-, 100-, and 200-Gbps Cisco ASR 1000 Series ESPs provide centralized
forwarding-engine options for the Cisco ASR 1000 Series Aggregation Services Routers.
The Cisco ASR 1000 Series ESPs are responsible for the data-plane processing tasks, and
all network traffic flows through them. The modules perform all baseline packet routing
operations, including MAC classification, Layer 2 and Layer 3 forwarding, quality-of-
service (QoS) classification, policing and shaping, security access control lists (ACLs),
VPN, load balancing, and NetFlow.
ESP40
ESP100
ESP200
Figure 8: ESPs
Page 7 of 39
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*It should be noted that the ASR1001-HX and ASR1002-HX uses an integrated ESP.
They do not have a distinct part number but is referred to as the, ESP2.5.
2.3 Router Processor (RP2, RP3)
The Cisco ASR 1000 Series Route Processors running Cisco IOS-XE 16.12 address the
route-processing requirements of carrier-grade IP and Multiprotocol Label Switching
(MPLS) packet infrastructures. Not only do they provide advanced routing capabilities,
but they also monitor and manage the other components in the Cisco ASR 1000 Series
Aggregation Services Router.
*It should be noted that ASR1001-HX and ASR1002-HX employs an integrated RP.
Figure 9: (a) RP2 and (b) RP3
Figure 10: RP LEDs and USBs
Figure 11: RP Connections
Page 8 of 39
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2.4 ASR 1000 Series Modular Interface Processor (ASR1000-
MIP100)
The Cisco ASR 1000 Series Modular Interface Processor (ASR1000-MIP100) (Figure 7)
is a full-duplex 100-Gbps modular Ethernet line card that is capable of hosting up to two
Cisco ASR 1000 Series Ethernet Port Adapters (EPAs) (Figures 8 and 9). The EPAs are
new interface cards that introduce 40 Gigabit Ethernet and 100 Gigabit Ethernet
connectivity to the Cisco ASR 1000 Series.
Figure 12: ASR1000-MIP100
Figure 13: EPA-10X10GE
Figure 14: EPA-1X40GE QSFP+
Page 9 of 39
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2.5 Validated and Vendor Affirmed Hardware
The validated configurations are comprised of the following components:
Chassis:
1. ASR1001-HX
2. ASR1002-HX
3. ASR1006-X
4. ASR1009-X
Route Processors (RP):
1. ASR-1000-RP2
2. ASR-1000-RP3
Embedded Service Processors (ESP):
1. ASR1000-ESP40
2. ASR1000-ESP100
3. ASR1000-ESP200
Line Cards (LC):
1. EPA-10X10GE
2. EPA-1X40GE QSFP+
Chassis
Hardware Configurations
Route
Processor
Embedded
Service Provider Line Card
ASR 1001-HX Fixed configuration Not Applicable
ASR 1002-HX Fixed configuration Not Applicable
ASR 1006-X
Dual RP2
Dual ESP40
EPA-10X10GE, EPA-1X40GE QSFP+
Dual ESP100
Dual RP3
Dual ESP40
Dual ESP100
ASR 1009-X
Dual RP2
Dual ESP40
EPA-10X10GE, EPA-1X40GE QSFP+
Dual ESP100
Dual ESP200
Dual RP3
Dual ESP40
Dual ESP100
Dual ESP200
Table 1: Module Hardware Configurations running Cisco IOS-XE 16.12
Chassis
Vendor Affirmed Hardware Configurations
Route
Processor
Embedded
Service Provider Line Card
ASR 1001-X Fixed configuration Not Applicable
ASR 1013
Dual RP2
Dual ESP40
EPA-18X1GE, EPA-1X100GE,
EPA-CPAK-2X40GE,
EPA-1X100GE QSFP+,
EPA-2X40GE QSFP+
Dual ESP100
Dual ESP200
Dual RP3
Dual ESP40
Dual ESP100
Dual ESP200
Table 2: Vendor Affirmed Models1
1
Vendor affirmed devices use the same firmware image (Cisco IOS-XE 16.12) as the modules tested. No
claim to conformance can be made as these models were not tested by a CSTL or reviewed by CMVP.
Page 10 of 39
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2.6 FIPS and non-FIPS modes of operation
The ASR 1000 Series Routers supports a FIPS and non-FIPS mode of operation. The
non-FIPS mode of operation is not a recommended operational mode but because the
module allows for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes, a non-approved
mode of operation exists. The following services are available in a FIPS Approved mode
of operation:
• SSH
• IPSec
• SNMPv3
• MACsec
The following services are available in a non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation:
• SSH
• TLS
• IPSec
• SNMPv3
• MACsec
When the services are used in non-FIPS mode they are considered to be non-compliant.
If the device is in the non-FIPS mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
follow the instructions in section 9.1 of this security policy to transfer into a FIPS
approved mode of operation.
2.7 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Overall module validation level 1
Table 3: Module Validation Level
Page 11 of 39
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3 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary for the Cisco ASR 1001-HX, ASR 1002-HX, ASR 1006-X,
and ASR 1009-X are defined as encompassing the “top,” “bottom,” “front,” “back,”
“left” and “right” surfaces of the case; all portions of the "backplane" of the case.
4 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical
interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables:
Physical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Ethernet Ports (16)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
Backplane (1)
Data Input Interface
Ethernet Ports (16)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
Backplane (1)
Data Output Interface
Ethernet Ports (16)
Console Port (1)
USB Ports (2)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 BITS RJ-48 Port (2)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
Power Switch (1)
Backplane (1)
Control Input Interface
Page 12 of 39
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Physical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Ethernet Ports (16)
LEDs
USB Ports (2)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
Backplane (1)
Status Output Interface
Power Plug(s) Power interface
Table 4: ASR 1001-HX
Page 13 of 39
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Physical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Port Adapter Interface (2)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
GigE port (16)
Backplane (1)
Data Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (2)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
GigE port (16)
Backplane (1)
Data Output Interface
Port Adapter Interface (2)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 BITS Ethernet Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
USB Ports (2)
GigE port (16)
Power Switch (1)
Backplane (1)
Control Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (2)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1)
LEDs (2)
USB Ports (2)
GigE port (16)
Backplane (1)
Status Output Interface
Power Plug(s) Power interface
Table 5: ASR 1002-HX
Page 14 of 39
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Physical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Port Adapter Interface (6)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
GigE port (10)
Backplane (1)
Data Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (6)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
GigE port (10)
Backplane (1)
Data Output Interface
Port Adapter Interface (6)
Console Port (1)
USB Ports (2 per RP)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 BITS Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
Backplane (1)
Power Switch
Control Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (6)
LEDs
USB Ports (2 per RP)
Console Port (1)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
Backplane (1)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
Status Output Interface
Power Plug(s) Power interface
Table 6: ASR 1006-X with dual RP 2 or RP 3 and dual ESP40 or ESP100
Page 15 of 39
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Physical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Port Adapter Interface (7)
Console Port (1 per RP)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
GigE port (10)
QSFP+ (1)
Data Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (7)
Console Port (1 per RP)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
GigE port (10)
QSFP+ (1)
Data Output Interface
Port Adapter Interface (7)
Console Port (1 per RP)
USB Ports (2 per RP)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 BITS Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
Power Switch
Control Input Interface
Port Adapter Interface (7)
LEDs
USB Ports (2 per RP)
Console Port (1 per RP)
Auxiliary Port (1 per RP)
10/100 Management Ethernet Port (1 per RP)
Status Output Interface
Power Plug(s) Power interface
Table 7: ASR 1009-X with dual RP 2 or RP 3 and dual ESP40 or ESP 100 or ESP 200
Page 16 of 39
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5 Roles, Services, and Authentication
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the
module. There are two main roles in the router that operators may assume: the Crypto
Officer role and the User role. The administrator of the router assumes the Crypto Officer
role in order to configure and maintain the router using Crypto Officer services, while the
Users exercise only the basic User services. The module supports RADIUS and
TACACS+ for authentication. A complete description of all the management and
configuration capabilities of the modules can be found in the Cisco ASR 1000 Series
Aggregation Services Routers Software Configuration Guide Manual2
and in the online
help for the modules.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at least eight
(8) characters long, including at least one letter and at least one number character, in
length (enforced procedurally). See the Secure Operation section for more information. If
six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition
for an eight (8) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is
one (1) in 251,596,800 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical
standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic
characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total.
Since it is claimed to be for 8 characters with no repetition, then the calculation should
be, 10x9x8x7x6x5x32x52. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute
would require the ability to make over 4,193,280 guesses per second, which far exceeds
the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA-based authentication, RSA key pair has a modulus size of
either 2048 or 3072 bits, thus providing at least 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low
end of that range (2048 bits), an attacker would have a 1 in 2112
chance of randomly
obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one-in-a-million chance required by
FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in
one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.6 x 1031
(5.2 x 1033
/60 = 8.6 x 1031
) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of
the modules to support.
It should be noted that the same services are available to both Users and Cryptographic
officers, regardless of whether or not they are in a non-FIPS approved mode of operation
or a FIPS approved mode of operation.
5.1 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console/auxiliary port with a terminal program
or SSH v2 session to a LAN port or the 10/100 management Ethernet port. The module
prompts the User for their username/password combination. If the username/password
2
Link located in Section 10.
Page 17 of 39
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combination is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management
functionality. The services available to the User role consist of the following:
• Status Functions - View state of interfaces and protocols, firmware version
• Terminal Functions - Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust
flow control)
• Directory Services - Display directory of files kept in memory
• Perform Self-Tests – Perform the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand
• Perform Cryptography – Use the cryptography provided by the module:
o SSH
o IPSec
o SNMPv3
o MACsec
5.2 Cryptographic Officer Services
A Crypto Officer enters the system by accessing the console/auxiliary port with a
terminal program or SSH v2 session to a LAN port or the 10/100 management Ethernet
port. The Crypto Officer authenticates in the same manner as a User. The Crypto Officer
is identified by accounts that have a privilege level 15 (versus the privilege level 1 for
users). A Crypto Officer may assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to
additional accounts, thereby creating additional Crypto Officers.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the
router. The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:
• Configure the module - Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable interfaces and network
services, set system date and time, and load authentication information.
• Define Rules and Filters - Create packet Filters that are applied to User data
streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set
of packets to permit or deny based characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses,
ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.
• Status Functions - View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions,
use get commands to view SNMP MIB statistics, health, temperature, memory
status, voltage, packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view physical
interface status.
• Manage the module - Log off users, shutdown or reload the router, manually back
up router configurations, view complete configurations, manage user rights,
initiate power-on self-tests on demand and restore router configurations.
• Set Encryption - Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set keys and
algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow plaintext packets to be set from
specified IP address.
Page 18 of 39
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• Perform Self-Tests – Perform the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand.
• Zeroization – Erasing electronically stored data, cryptographic keys, and CSPs by
altering or deleting the contents of the data storage to prevent recovery of the
data.
5.3 Unauthenticated User Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from
the module’s LED pins and cycle power.
Page 19 of 39
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6 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security
parameters such as passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-
protection of the Crypto Officer role login and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer.
Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing the
volatile memory. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically or via Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) or SSH.
The module supports the following critical security parameters (CSPs):
Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
General Keys/CSPs
DRBG entropy
input
CTR (using AES-
256)
256-bit
This is the
entropy for SP
800-90 RNG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
DRBG Seed
(IOS XE)
CTR (using AES-
256)
384-bits
This DRBG seed
is collected from
the onboard
Cavium
cryptographic
processor.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
every 400
bytes or turn
off the router.
DRBG V CTR (using AES-
256)
256-bit
Internal V value
used as part of
SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
DRBG Key CTR (using AES-
256)
256-bit
Internal Key
value used as
part of SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The shared
exponent used in
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange.
Created per the
Diffie-Hellman
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Zeroized
upon deletion.
Page 20 of 39
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224-379 bits The private
exponent used in
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange.
This CSP is
created using the
SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Zeroized
upon deletion.
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 – 4096
bits
The p used in
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange.
This CSP is
created using the
SP
800-90
CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Zeroized
upon deletion.
EC Diffie-
Hellman private
key
ECDH (Curves:
P-256, P-384)
Used for key
agreement
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
EC Diffie-
Hellman public
key
ECDH (Curves:
P-256, P-384)
Used for key
agreement
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
EC Diffie-
Hellman shared
secret
ECDH (Curves:
P-256, P-384)
Used for key
agreement
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
the device
Operator
password
Password, at least
eight characters
The password of
the operator.
This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the User
and/or CO
when logging
in
Never output
from the
module
Overwrite
with new
password
Enable
password
Password, at least
eight characters
The plaintext
password of the
CO role. This
CSP is entered
by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
Overwrite
with new
password
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
Enable secret Password, at least
eight characters
The obfuscated
password of the
CO role.
However, the
algorithm used to
obfuscate this
password is not
FIPS approved.
Therefore, this
password is
considered
plaintext for
FIPS purposes.
This password is
zeroized by
overwriting it
with a new
password. The
Cryptographic
Operator
optionally
configures the
module to
obfuscate the
Enable
password.
This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
Overwrite
with new
password
RADIUS secret Shared Secret, 16
characters
The RADIUS
shared secret.
This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext),
DRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
# no radius-
server key
RADIUSOverIP
SecEncryptionK
ey
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM
AES-128/AES-
256
encryption/decry
ption key, used
in IPSec tunnel
between module
and RADIUS to
encrypt/decrypt
EAP keys.
NVRAM
(plaintext),
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power Cycle
Page 22 of 39
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
RADIUSOverIP
SecIntegrityKey
HMAC Integrity/authenti
cation key, used
in IPSec tunnel
between module
and RADIUS
NVRAM
(plaintext),
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Power Cycle
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret, 16
characters
The TACACS+
shared secret.
This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext),
DRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
# no tacacs-
server key
IKE/IPSec
skeyid HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
Value derived
per the IKE
protocol based
on the peer
authentication
SSH
method chosen.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
skeyid_a HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
The IKE key
derivation key
for non ISAKMP
security
associations.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
skeyid_d HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
The IKE key
derivation key
for non ISAKMP
security
associations.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
skeyid_e HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
The IKE key
derivation key
for non ISAKMP
security
associations.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
IKE session
encrypt key
AES -128, 192,
or 256 bits
The IKE session
encrypt key. This
key is created per
the Internet Key
Exchange Key
Establishment
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
The IKE session
authentication
key. This key is
created per the
Internet Key
Exchange Key
Establishment
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
after IKE
session
terminated.
ISAKMP
preshared
Secret
At least eight
characters
The key used to
generate IKE
skeyid during
preshared-key
authentication. #
no crypto
isakmp key
command
zeroizes it. This
key can have two
forms based on
whether the key
is related to the
hostname or the
IP address. This
CSP is entered
by the
Cryptographic
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
# no crypto
isakmp key
IKE RSA
Private Key
RSA (Private
Key)
2048 – 3072 bits
The key used in
IKE
authentication. #
crypto key
zeroize rsa
command
zeroizes it.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
# crypto key
zeroize rsa
IKE RSA Public
Key
RSA (Public
Key)
2048 – 3072 bits
The key used in
IKE
authentication. #
crypto key
zeroize rsa
command
zeroizes it.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
# crypto key
zeroize rsa
Page 24 of 39
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
IPsec encryption
key
AES -128, 192,
or 256 bits
The IPsec
encryption key.
This key is
created per the
Internet Key
Exchange Key
Establishment
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when IPsec
session
terminated.
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
The IPsec
authentication
key. This key is
created per the
Internet Key
Exchange Key
Establishment
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when IPsec
session
terminated.
SSH
SSH Private
Key
RSA (Private
Key)
2048 – 3072 bits
The SSH private
key for the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
SSH private
key is
zeroized by
either deletion
(via # crypto
key zeroize
rsa) or by
overwriting
with a new
value of the
key
EC Diffie-
Hellman
P-256, P-384
AES 128-, 192-,
or 256-bits
SSH Public Key RSA (Public
Key)
2048 – 3072 bits
The SSH public
key for the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Zeroized
upon deletion.
EC Diffie-
Hellman
P-256, P-384
AES 128-, 192-,
or 256- bits
Page 25 of 39
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
SSH Session
Key
AES 128-, 192-,
or 256- bits
The SSH session
key. This key is
created through
SSH key
establishment.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when the SSH
session is
terminated.
SSH Integrity
Key
SHA-1 HMAC
160-bits
Used for SSH
connections
integrity to
assure the traffic
integrity.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Generated
internally via
a call to the
DRBG.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when the SSH
session is
terminated.
AES 128-,192-
,256-bits
Never output
from the
module
HMAC SHA-1
160-bits
Never output
from the
module
SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Password
Secret 256 bits This secret is
used to derive
HMAC-SHA1
key for SNMPv3
Authentication
DRAM Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
Powercycle
snmpEngineID Shared secret 32-
bits
Unique string to
identify the
SNMP engine
NVRAM Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
# no snmp-
server
engineID
local
engineid-
string,
overwritten
with new
engine ID
SNMP session
key
AES 128-bit Encrypts SNMP
traffic
DRAM Internally
generated via
SNMP KDF
Never output
from the
module
Power cycle
MACSec
Page 26 of 39
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Key/CSP
Name
Key Type Description Storage
Generation
/Input
Output Zeroization
MACsec
Security
Association Key
(SAK)
AES-GCM
128/256 bits
Used for creating
Security
Associations
(SA) for
encrypting/decry
pting the
MACSec traffic
in the MACSec
hardware.
MACsec
PHY
(plaintext)
Derived from
the CAK
using the
SP800-108
KDF.
Output from
the module to
other
members of a
MACsec
connectivity
association
when
encrypted by
the KEK
Automatically
when session
expires
MACsec
Connectivity
Association Key
(CAK)
AES-GCM
128/256 bits
A secret key
possessed by
members of a
MACSec
connectivity
association.
MACsec
PHY
(plaintext)
Externally
generated
and entered
by the CO.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when session
expires
MACsec KEK AES-GCM
128/256 bits
Used to transmit
SAKs to other
members of a
MACSec
connectivity
association
MACsec
PHY
(plaintext)
Derived from
the CAK
using the
SP800-108
KDF.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when session
expires
MACsec ICK Secret Used to verify
the integrity and
authenticity.
MACsec
PHY
(plaintext)
Derived from
the CAK
using the
SP800-108
KDF.
Never output
from the
module
Automatically
when session
expires
Table 8: Key and CSP Management
6.1 User Services and CSP Access
The services accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (R), write (W), zeroized/delete
(D) - and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below.
Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs
View Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols,
firmware version. Operator password – r
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the
terminal, adjust flow control).
Operator password – r
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in memory. Operator password – r
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on
demand
N/A
Random Number
Generation
Key generation and seeds for asymmetric
key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG
V, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Page 27 of 39
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Key Exchange Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman and
EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman
private key, Diffie-Hellman shared secret,
EC Diffie-Hellman Public Key, EC Diffie-
Hellman Private Key, EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret – w, d
TACACS+ User & CO authentication to the module
using TACACS+.
TACACS+ secret– r
RADIUS Key Wrap Establishment and subsequent receive
802.11 PMK from the RADIUS server.
RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionKey,
RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey, RADIUS
Server Shared Secret – w, d
SSH Functions
Negotiation and encrypted data transport
via SSH Operator password, SSH private key, SSH
public key, SSH encryption key, SSH
integrity key, SSH Session Key – r
Module Read-only
Configuration
Viewing of configuration settings Operator password – r
Table 9: User Services and CSPs
6.2 Crypto Officer Services and CSP Access
Services &
Access
Description Keys & CSPs3
View Status
Functions
View the switch configuration,
routing tables, active sessions, health,
temperature, memory status, voltage,
packet statistics, review accounting
logs, and view physical interface
status.
Operator password, Enable password – r, w, d
Define Rules
and Filters
Create packet Filters that are applied
to User data streams on each
interface. Each Filter consists of a set
of Rules, which define a set of packets
to permit or deny based on
characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection
establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password – r, w, d
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on
demand
N/A
Random
Number
Generation
Key generation and seeds for
asymmetric key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG
Key – r, w, d
3
r = CSP is read by module, w = CSP is generated, derived and/or used by module =, d = CSP is zeroized
by module.
Page 28 of 39
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Key Exchange Key exchange over Diffie-Hellman
and EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman private key,
Diffie-Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman Public
Key, EC Diffie-Hellman Private Key, EC Diffie-
Hellman shared secret – w, d
TACACS+ User & CO authentication to the
module using TACACS+.
TACACS+ secret – w, d
Zeroization Zeroize CSPs and cryptographic keys
by cycling power to zeroize all
cryptographic keys stored in SDRAM.
The CSPs (password, secret,
engineID) stored in Flash can be
zeroized by overwriting with a new
value.
All Keys and CSPs will be destroyed
Module
Configuration
Selection of non-cryptographic
configuration settings
N/A
SNMPv3 Non-security related monitoring by
the CO using SNMPv3
snmpEngineID, SNMPv3 Password, SNMP session key
– w, d
SSH Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of an SSH session for use
between the module and the CO.
Operator password, SSH private key, SSH public key,
SSH encryption key, SSH integrity key, Session Key –
w, d
IPsec Configure IPsec VPN parameters,
provide entry and output of CSPs.
skeyid, skeyid_a, skeyid_d, skeyid_e, IKE session
encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, ISAKMP
preshared, IKE RSA private Key, IKE RSA public key,
IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG Key – w, d
RADIUS Key
Wrap
Establishment and subsequent receipt
of 802.11 PMK from the RADIUS
server.
RADIUSOverIPSecEncryptionKey,
RADIUSOverIPSecIntegrityKey, RADIUS Server
Shared Secret – w, d
MACSec
Functions
Establishment and subsequent data
transfer of an MACSec session for use
between the module and the CO
MACsec Security Association Key, MACsec
Connectivity Association Key, MACsec KEK, MACsec
ICK – w, d
Table 10: Crypto Officer Services and CSPs
Page 29 of 39
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7 Cryptographic Algorithms
7.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The Cisco ASR 1000 supports many different cryptographic algorithms. However, only
FIPS approved algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation. The
following table identifies the approved algorithms included in the ASR 1000 for use in
the FIPS mode of operation.
Algorithm4
Supported Mode Cert. #
IOS (Route Processor 2 and Route Processor 3)
AES ECB (128 , 192 , 256); CBC (128 ,
192 , 256); CMAC (128 , 192 ,
256); GMAC (128 , 192 , 256);
CFB128 (128 , 192 , 256), GCM
(128 , 192 , 256); KW (128, 256)
A1462
SHS SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512 (Byte
Oriented)
A1462
HMAC SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512 A1462
DRBG CTR (using AES-256) A1462
ECDSA KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen, SigVer
(P-256, P-384)
A1462
RSA Key Generation (2048-3072 bits);
PKCS#1 v.1.5, 1024-4096 bit key
SigGen, SigVer
• 1024-bit keys allowed for
signature verification only.
A1462
CVL IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF, SNMP
KDF, SRTP KDF
Note: The IKEv2, SSH, and SNMP
protocols have not been reviewed
or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
A1462
KAS-ECC-SSC (NIST SP
800-56Arev3)
KAS-ECC-SSC:
- Curves:
o P-256
o P-384
A1462
KAS-FFC-SSC (SP 800-
56Arev3)
KAS-FFC-SSC:
- modp-2048
- modp-3072
- modp-4096
A1462
4
Not all algorithms/modes tested on the CAVP validation certificates are implemented in the module.
Page 30 of 39
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Algorithm4
Supported Mode Cert. #
KBKDF (SP800-108)5
HMAC-SHA1 A1462
CKG Vendor affirmed
Cavium Nitrox CN2460 (Embedded Services Processor 40)
AES CBC (128, 192, 256) 333
SHS (SHA-1) Byte Oriented 408
HMAC SHA-1 Byte Oriented 137
Cavium Octeon II CN6870 (Embedded Services Processor 100)
AES ECB, CBC (128, 192, 256) 2346
SHS (SHA-1) Byte Oriented 2023
HMAC SHA-1 Byte Oriented 1455
Cavium Octeon II CN6880 (Embedded Services Processor 200)
AES ECB, CBC (128, 192, 256) 2346
SHS (SHA-1) Byte Oriented 2023
HMAC SHA-1 Byte Oriented 1455
S12411PRI (AKA X120) Macom / APM (EPA-1X40GE)
AES GCM (128, 256) 3160
Microsemi / Vitesse VSC8490 (EPA-10X10GE)
AES GCM (128, 256) 3505
Table 11: FIPS Approved Algorithms
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following
RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to
establish the shared secret from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived.
When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session
key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established.
• When supporting the MACsec protocol in the FIPS approved modes of operation the
implementation (see CAVP cert # AES A1462) conforms to IG A.5, scenario #3,
when operating in a FIPS approved mode of operation. AES GCM, IVs are generated
both internally and deterministically and are a minimum of 96-bits in length as
specified in SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.1.
• KTS (AES Certs. #A1462; key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides
between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
5
KBKDF tested in counter mode
Page 31 of 39
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• KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1462, CVL Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 192 bits of encryption strength)
• KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1462, CVL Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength)
The KAS FFC and KAS ECC strengths are as follows:
KAS-ECC-SSC: 128 and 192 bits of encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC: 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength
7.2 Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-mode
The ASR 1000 cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved
algorithms that are allowed for use in FIPS-mode:
• NDRNG to seed FIPS approved DRBG (256 bits)
7.3 Non-Approved Algorithms
The ASR 1000 cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms
that are not permitted for use in FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:
Service Non-Approved Algorithm
SSH (non-
compliant)
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS (non-
compliant)
Hashing: MD5, SHA
MACing: HMAC MD5, HMAC SHA
Symmetric: AES, DES, RC4, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: ECDSA, RSA, DH, ECDH
KDF: TLS KDF
IPsec (non-
compliant)
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SNMP (non-
compliant)
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Page 32 of 39
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Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 1024-bit RSA, 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
RSA Key
Wrapping
RSA Key Wrapping (Key establishment providing 112 or 128 bits
of security strength
Table 12: Non-Approved Algorithms
7.4 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically
during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all
components are functioning correctly. The modules implement the following power-on
self-tests:
• Route Processor (Integrated, RP2 and RP3)
o Known Answer Tests:
▪ AES KAT,
▪ AES-GCM KAT,
▪ SHA-1 KAT,
▪ SHA-256 KAT,
▪ SHA-384 KAT,
▪ SHA-512 KAT,
▪ HMAC SHA-1 KAT,
▪ HMAC SHA-256 KAT,
▪ HMAC SHA-384 KAT,
▪ HMAC SHA-512 KAT,
▪ DRBG KAT,
▪ ECDSA KAT,
▪ KAS ECC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3),
▪ KAS FFC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3),
▪ IKEv2 KDF KAT,
▪ SNMP KDF KAT,
▪ SRTP KDF KAT,
▪ SSH KDF KAT,
▪ RSA KAT.
o Firmware Integrity Test (RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256)
• Embedded Services Processor (Integrated, ESP40, ESP100, and ESP200)
o Known Answer Tests:
▪ AES KAT,
Page 33 of 39
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▪ SHS KAT,
▪ HMAC KAT
The modules perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-
tests must be passed before any operator can perform cryptographic services. The power-
on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior any
other operations; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-
test failure. In addition, the modules also provide the following conditional self-tests:
• Route Processor (Integrated, RP2, and RP3)
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for the FIPS-approved DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for the non-approved RNG
o Pair-Wise Consistency Test for RSA signature keys
o Pair-Wise Consistency Test for RSA keys used in key establishment
o Firmware Load Test
Page 34 of 39
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8 Physical Security
The modules are production grade multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules that
meet level 1 physical security requirements.
Page 35 of 39
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9 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped
only to authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes
with Cisco adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting
instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this
module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS
approved mode of operation.
Upon initial boot from the factory, the ASR is in a non-FIPS mode of operation. To
transition from a non-FIPS mode of operation to a FIPS mode of operation, the
Cryptographic Officer must follow all steps detailed in section 9.1 of this security policy
9.1 System Initialization and Configuration
Step1 - The value of the boot field must be 0x2102. This setting disables break from the
console to the ROM monitor and automatically boots. From the “configure terminal”
command line, the Crypto Officer enters the following syntax:
config-register 0x2102
Step 2 - The Crypto Officer must create the “enable” password for the Crypto Officer
role. Procedurally, the password must be at least 8 characters, including at least one letter
and at least one number, and is entered when the Crypto Officer first engages the
“enable” command. The Crypto Officer enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
enable secret [PASSWORD]
Step 3 - The Crypto Officer must set up the operators of the module. The Crypto Officer
enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
Username [USERNAME]
Password [PASSWORD]
Step 4 – For the created operators, the Crypto Officer must always assign passwords (of
at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one number) to users.
Identification and authentication on the console/auxiliary port is required for Users. From
the “configure terminal” command line, the Crypto Officer enters the following syntax:
line con 0
password [PASSWORD]
login local
Step 5 - The Crypto Officer may configure the module to use RADIUS or TACACS+ for
authentication. Configuring the module to use RADIUS or TACACS+ for authentication
is optional. If the module is configured to use RADIUS or TACACS+, the Crypto-Officer
Page 36 of 39
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must define RADIUS or TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 16 characters
long, including at least one letter and at least one number.
Step 6 - Dual IOS mode is not allowed. ROMMON variable IOSXE_DUAL_IOS must
be set to 0.
Step 7 - In service software upgrade (ISSU) is not allowed. The operator should not
perform in service software upgrade of an ASR1000 FIPS validated firmware image
Step 8 - Use of the debug.conf file is not allowed. The operator should not create the
bootflash:/debug.conf file and use it for setting environment variables values.
Step 9 – Execute the “platform ipsec fips-mode” command.
Step 10 – After executing reload/ reboot command. The device will enter the FIPS mode.
NOTE: The keys and CSPs generated in the cryptographic module during FIPS mode of
operation cannot be used when the module transitions to non-FIPS mode and vice versa.
While the module transitions from FIPS to non-FIPS mode or from non-FIPS to FIPS
mode, all the keys and CSPs are to be zeroized by the Crypto Officer.
9.2 IPsec Requirements and Cryptographic Algorithms
Step 1 - The only type of key management that is allowed in FIPS mode is Internet Key
Exchange (IKE).
Step 2 - Although the IOS implementation of IKE allows a number of algorithms, only
the following algorithms are allowed in a FIPS 140-2 configuration:
• ah-sha-hmac
• ah-sha256-hmac
• ah-sha384-hmac
• ah-sha512-hmac
• esp-sha-hmac
• esp-sha256-hmac
• esp-sha384-hmac
• esp-sha512-hmac
• esp-aes
• esp-gcm
Step 3 - The following algorithms shall not be used:
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• MD-5 for signing
• MD-5 HMAC
• DES
9.3 Protocols
Secure DNS and GDOI is not allowed in FIPS mode of operation and shall not be
configured.
9.4 Remote Access
SSH access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation, using SSH v2
and a FIPS approved algorithm.
SNMPv3 communications with the module are allowed in FIPS approved mode.
9.5 Key Strength
Key sizes with security strength of less than 112-bits shall not be used in FIPS mode.
10 Related Documentation
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the security appliances in the
technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic device security policy. More information is
available on the security appliances from the sources listed in this section and from the
following source:
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the security appliances.
• Software Configuration Guide
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/asr1000/configuration/guide/chass
is/asr1000-software-config-guide.html)
• For LED related information please read the following document
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/asr1000/install/guide/modular_lin
ecard/asr1_mlc_hig/mlc_asr1_overview.html)
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© Copyright 2023 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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11 Definitions List
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header
ASR Aggregation Services Router
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment (Canada)
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRAM Dynamic RAM
DRBG Deterministic random bit generator
EDC Error Detection Code
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
Gbps Gigabits per second
GigE Gigabit Ethernet
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
ISSU In service software upgrade
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random Access Memory
PIN Personal Identification Number
QoS Quality of Service
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
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RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RP Route Processor
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access Control System
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network