Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt
Cryptographic Module v4.0
Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt
Cryptographic Module v5.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.2
Last update: 2017-07-03
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ...................................................................................... 4
2.1Module Overview........................................................................................................... 4
2.2FIPS 140-2 validation..................................................................................................... 6
2.3Modes of Operations...................................................................................................... 7
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ...........................................................................9
4 Roles, Services and Authentication ..................................................................................... 10
4.1Roles............................................................................................................................ 10
4.2Services....................................................................................................................... 10
4.3Authentication............................................................................................................. 14
5 Physical Security ................................................................................................................. 15
6 Operational Environment .................................................................................................... 16
6.1Applicability................................................................................................................. 16
6.2Policy........................................................................................................................... 16
7 Cryptographic Key Management ......................................................................................... 17
7.1Random Number Generation....................................................................................... 17
7.2Key / Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access............................................................ 18
7.3Key / CSP Storage........................................................................................................ 18
7.4Key / CSP Zeroization................................................................................................... 18
8 Self Tests ............................................................................................................................. 19
8.1Power-Up Tests............................................................................................................. 19
8.1.1Integrity Tests..................................................................................................... 19
8.1.2Cryptographic algorithm tests............................................................................ 19
8.2On-Demand self-tests.................................................................................................. 20
8.3Conditional Tests.......................................................................................................... 20
9 Guidance ............................................................................................................................. 21
9.1Crypto Officer Guidance...............................................................................................21
9.2User Guidance............................................................................................................. 22
9.2.1Three-key Triple-DES.......................................................................................... 22
10 Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................23
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations ................................................................................. 25
Appendix B References .......................................................................................................... 27
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138-30 / 138-31 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1 Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux
libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic
Module v5.0. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and
describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Overview
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 and Red Hat Enterprise
Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0 (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a
software library implementing general purpose cryptographic algorithms. The module
provides cryptographic services to applications running in the user space of the underlying
operating system through an application program interface (API).
The module is implemented as a set of shared libraries / binary files; as shown in the diagram
below, the shared library files and the integrity check file used to verify the module's integrity
constitute the logical cryptographic boundary:
Figure 1: Software Block Diagram
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libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
Boundary
Kernel
User
System Physical Boundary
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The module is aimed to run in a general purpose computer. The physical boundary is the
surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below:
All components of the module will be in the libgcrypt RPM. The following RPMs files constitute
the module:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0: libgcrypt-1.5.3-
12.el7_1.1.rpm
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0: libgcrypt-1.5.3-
14.el7.rpm
When installed on the system, the module comprises the following files:
• /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2
• /usr/lib64/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac
• /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2
• /usr/lib/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac
Note: the files /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11 and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11 are symlinks respectively
to /usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2 and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.11.8.2; the files
/usr/lib64/libgcrypt.so.hmac and /usr/lib/libgcrypt.so.hmac are symlinks respectively to
/usr/lib64/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac and /usr/lib/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac. These four symlinks files
are not part of the module
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Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram
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2.2 FIPS 140-2 validation
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module validated at security level 1. The table below shows the
security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:
FIPS 140-2 Section Security
Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Table 1: Security Levels
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The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v4.0 module has been tested on
the following platform(s):
Construct
or
Hardware Processor Operating
System
Tested
With
AES-NI
Without
AES-NI
With
CPACF
HP Proliant DL380p Gen8 Intel®
Xeon® E5-
2600 v3
product
family
Red Hat
Enterprise
Linux 7.1
yes yes n/a
IBM POWER8 Little Endian 8286-
41A
POWER8E Red Hat
Enterprise
Linux 7.1
n/a n/a n/a
IBM z13 IBM/S390 Red Hat
Enterprise
Linux 7.1
n/a n/a yes
Table 2: Tested Platform(s) for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
v4.0
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module v5.0 module has been tested on
the following platform(s):
Construct
or
Hardware Processor Operating
System
Tested
With
AES-NI
Without
AES-NI
With
CPACF
Dell PowerEdge R630 Intel Xeon
E5-2640 v3
Red Hat
Enterprise
Linux 7.4
no yes n/a
Table 3: Tested Platform(s) for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
v5.0
The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary
is depicted in the software block diagram.
The module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor Algorithm Acceleration
(PAA) functions provided by the different processors supported, as shown in the following
table:
Processor Processor Algorithm Acceleration
(PAA) function
Cryptographic Module
implementation
Intel x86 AES-NI AES
Table 4: PAA function implementations
2.3 Modes of Operations
The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS approved and non-approved modes.
The mode of operation in which the module is operating can be determined by:
• If the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled exists and contains a numeric value other than
0, libgcrypt is put into FIPS mode at initialization time
• If the file /etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled exists, libgcrypt is put into FIPS mode at
initialization time. Note that this filename is hardwired and does not depend on any
configuration options.
The module turns to the FIPS approved mode after the initialization and the power-on self-
tests have completed successfully.
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When libgcrypt is in the FIPS mode of operation, the request of services involving non-FIPS
approved algorithms will be denied. However, the module does not check for approved key
sizes or approved mode of algorithms.
The services available in FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 6.
The non-Approved but allowed services can be found in section 4.2, Table 7.
The services available in non-FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 8.
Note: Using a non-Approved key sizes, algorithms or block chaining mode specified in Table 8
will result in the module implicitly entering the non-FIPS mode of operation.
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3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the
FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the
hardware platform on which it runs.
The logical interfaces are the application program interface (API) through which applications
request services. The following table summarizes the four logical interfaces:
Logical interface Description
Data input API input parameters for data
Data output API output parameters for data
Control input API function calls, API input parameters,
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled control file,
/etc/gcrypt/fips_enabled configuration file
Status output API return codes, API output parameters
Table 5: Logical Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data
Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input
interface consists of the API function calls and the input parameters used to control the
behavior of the module. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API
functions and status sent through output parameters.
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The module supports the following roles:
⚫ User role: performs all services, except module installation and configuration.
⚫ Crypto Officer role: performs module installation and configuration and some basic
functions: get status function and performing self-tests.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module
services.
4.2 Services
The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are
described in detail in the user documentation.
The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed (“CO” stands for Crypto
Officer role and “U” stands for User role), the Critical Security Parameters involved and how
they are accessed in the FIPS mode:
Service Algorithm Key
Length
Note / Mode CAVS
Cert.
Role CSPs Access
Symmetric
encryption/
decryption
Triple-DES 168 bits Modes: ECB,
CBC, CFB64,
OFB, CTR
3-key Triple-
DES
encryption/
decryption
2-key Triple-
DES
decryption
only
Certs.
#2030,
#2031,
#2032,
#2033
and
#2034
Certs.
#2433
and
#2434
U 168 bits
Triple-DES Key
R, W, EX
AES 128, 192
and 256
bits
Modes: ECB,
CBC, CFB128,
OFB, CTR
Certs.
#3643,
#3644,
#3645,
#3646,
#3647,
#3648
and
#3649
Certs.
#4580
and
#4581
U 128/192/256
bits AES Key
R, W, EX
Get Key
Length
N/A N/A cipher_get_k
eylen()
function
N/A U N/A R
Get Block
Length
N/A N/A cipher_get_bl
ocksize()
function
N/A U N/A R
Check N/A N/A cipher_get_bl N/A U N/A R
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Service Algorithm Key
Length
Note / Mode CAVS
Cert.
Role CSPs Access
availability
of
Algorithm
ocksize()
function
Secure
Hash
Algorithm
(SHS)
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
N/A N/A Certs.
#3062,
#3063,
#3064,
#3065
and
#3066
Certs.
#3756
and
#3757
U N/A R, W, EX
HMAC HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-
SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-
384, HMAC-
SHA-512
At least
112 bits
KS<BS,
KS=BS,
KS>BS
N/A Certs.
#2395,
#2396,
#2397,
#2398
and
#2399
Certs.
#3030
and
#3031
U MAC-key R, W, EX
RSA Key pair
generation,
signature
generation
and
verification
2048 and
3072 bits
modulus
1024 bits
signature
verification
for legacy-
use
FIPS 186-4,
RSASSA-PKCS
#1.5
RSASSA-PSS
Certs.
#1879,
#1880,
#1881,
#1882
and
#1883
Certs.
#2498
and
#2499
U RSA private
key
R, W, EX
DSA Key pair
generation,
signature
generation
and
verification
L=2048,
N=224;
L=2048,
N=256;
L=3072,
N=256;
FIPS 186-4 Certs.
#1017,
#1018,
#1019,
#1020
and
#1021
Certs.
#1214
and
#1215
U DSA private
keys
R, W, EX
Signature
verification
L=1024,
N=160
Generate
random
numbers
SP 800-90A
DRBG:
HMAC_DRBG
with SHA-
1/256/384/512
HASH_DRBG
with SHA-
N/A Fill buffer
with length
random
bytes,
function to
allocate a
memory
Certs.
#976,
#977,
#978,
#979
and
#980
U Seed W, EX
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Service Algorithm Key
Length
Note / Mode CAVS
Cert.
Role CSPs Access
1/256/384/512
(with and
without
prediction
resistance)
block
consisting of
nbytes of
random
bytes,
function to
allocate a
memory
block
consisting of
nbytes fresh
random
bytes using a
random
quality as
defined by
level. This
function
differs from
gcry_randomi
ze() in that
the returned
buffer is
allocated in a
“secure" area
of the
memory
Certs.
#1527
and
#1528
SP 800-90A
DRBG:
CTR_DRBG
with
derivation
function
AES
128/192/256
(with and
without
prediction
resistance)
Certs.
#972,
#973,
#974,
#975,
#976,
#977
and
#978
Certs.
#1527
and
#1528
Initialize
Module
N/A N/A Powering-up
the module
N/A U N/A EX
Selftests N/A N/A Performs
Known
Answer Test
(KAT) and
integrity
check
N/A U CO N/A EX
Zeroize
secure
memory
N/A N/A gcry_free() or
gcry_xfree()
functions
N/A U All CSPs
stored in that
secure
memory
W, EX
Release all
resources
of context
created by
gcry_cipher
_open()
N/A N/A Zeroises all
sensitive
information
associated
with this
cipher handle
N/A U Cipher secret
keys
W, EX
Release all
resources
of hash
context
created by
gcry_md_o
pen()
N/A N/A Zeroises all
sensitive
information
associated
with this
cipher handle
N/A U N/A W, EX
Release the
S-
expression
objects
SEXP
N/A N/A N/A N/A U RSA/DSA
asymmetric
key pair
R, W, EX
Show N/A N/A N/A N/A U CO N/A R, EX
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138-30 / 138-31 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Service Algorithm Key
Length
Note / Mode CAVS
Cert.
Role CSPs Access
Status
Installation
and
configurati
on of the
module
N/A N/A N/A N/A CO N/A R, EX
Table 6: Cryptographic Module's Approved Services
Service
(involving
algorithm)
Note / Mode Role Acces
s
RSA Encryption/decryption: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits U R, W,
EX
Signature generation, key generation: 4096 bits
RSA signature verification: 4096 bits
Table 7: Cryptographic Module's non-Approved but allowed in FIPS mode Services
The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed, the Critical Security
Parameters involved and how they are accessed in the non-FIPS mode:
Service
(involving
algorithm)
Note / Mode Role Access
ARC4 Encryption and decryption (stream cipher) U
Blowfish Encryption and decryption U
Camellia Encryption and decryption U
Cast5 Encryption and decryption U
CRC32 Cyclic redundancy code U
CSPRNG Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator U
DES Encryption and decryption (key size of 56 bits) U
El Gamal Key pair generation, encryption and decryption, signature
generation, signature verification
U
Gost 28147 encryption U
R 34.11-94 hash U
R 34.11-2012 (Stribog) hash
HMAC
(SHA1, SHA224,
SHA256, SHA384
and SHA512)
Key size < 112 bits U
IDEA Encryption and decryption U
MD4 Hashing
Digest size 128 bit
U
MD5 Hashing
Digest size 128 bit
U
OpenPGP S2K
Salted and
Password based key derivation compliant with OpenPGP
(RFC4880)
U
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Service
(involving
algorithm)
Note / Mode Role Access
Iterated/salted
RC2 Encryption and decryption based on RFC 2268 U
RIPEMD 160 Hashing U
RSA Encryption/decryption: 1024 bits
Signature generation, key generation: 1024 bits U
SEED Encryption and decryption U
Serpent Encryption and decryption U
Tiger Hashing U
Twofish Encryption and decryption U
2-key Triple-DES Encryption U
Whirlpool Hashing U
Services
available in FIPS
mode
The services available in FIPS mode can be used in non-FIPS mode
CSPs/keys separation is enforced between both modes
U
Table 8: Cryptographic Module's non-Approved Services and Algorithms
Note:
1. RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology between 112 and 150 bits of
encryption strength)
4.3 Authentication
The module is a Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement
authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.
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5 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2
level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-
purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.2.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which
include
but are not limited to:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host
• Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
• Red Hat OpenStack Platform
• OpenShift Container Platform
• Red Hat Gluster Storage
• Red Hat Ceph Storage
• Red Hat CloudForms
• Red Hat Satellite.
Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found
unchanged.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the
module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In FIPS Approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall
be not used.
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7 Cryptographic Key Management
The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization
of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and destruction, which
overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with “zeros” before it is
deallocated.
7.1 Random Number Generation
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for
the creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.
The DRBG is initialized during module initialization. The module loads by default the DRBG
using HMAC_DRBG with SHA-256 and derivation function tests without prediction resistance.
The DRBG is seeded during initialization with a seed obtained from /dev/random of the
appropriate length depending on the instantiated type (see section 10 of [SP800-90A]).
The module performs continuous tests on the output of the DRBG to ensure that consecutive
random numbers do not repeat. The noise source of /dev/random also implements continuous
tests.
Here are listed the CSPs/keys details concerning storage, input, output, generation and
zeroization:
Keys/CSPs Key Generation Key Storage Key Entry/Output Key Zeroization
AES Keys Use of the module's
SP 800-90A DRBG
Application's
memory
API input/output
parameters and return
values within the
physical boundaries of
the module
Automaticly zeroized
when freeing the
cipher handler by
calling gcry_free()
Triple-DES
Keys
Use of the module's
SP 800-90A DRBG
Application's
memory
API input/output
parameters and return
values within the
physical boundaries of
the module
Automaticly zeroized
when freeing the
cipher handler by
calling gcry_free()
DSA private
keys
Use of the module's
SP 800-90A DRBG
and the modules DSA
key generation
mechanism
Application's
memory
API input/output
parameters and return
values within the
physical boundaries of
the module
Automaticly zeroized
when freeing the
cipher handler by
calling gcry_free()
RSA private
keys
Use of the module's
SP 800-90A DRBG
and the modules RSA
key generation
mechanism
Application's
memory
API input/output
parameters and return
values within the
physical boundaries of
the module
Automaticly zeroized
when freeing the
cipher handler by
calling gcry_free()
SP 800-90A
DRBG
Entropy
string
The seed data
obtained from
hardware random
number generator
/dev/random
Application's
memory
N/A Automaticly zeroized
when freeing DRBG
handler by calling
gcry_free()
SP 800-90A
DRBG Seed
and internal
state values
(C and V
values)
Based on entropy
string as defined in
SP 800-90A
Application's
memory
N/A Automaticly zeroized
when freeing DRBG
handler by calling
gcry_free()
HMAC Keys Use of the module's
SP 800-90A DRBG
Application's
memory
API input/output
parameters and return
values within the
Automaticly zeroized
when freeing the
cipher handler by
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138-30 / 138-31 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
physical boundaries of
the module
calling gcry_free()
Table 9: Keys/CSPs
7.2 Key / Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Access
An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during
the operation of the module. Moreover, the module does not support the output of
intermediate key generation values during the key generation process.
7.3 Key / CSP Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed
when released by the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent
storage of keys.
7.4 Key / CSP Zeroization
The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system
calls. The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions provided
in the module's API by using the API function gcry_free(). The destruction functions overwrite
the memory occupied by keys with “zeros” and deallocates the memory with the regular
memory deallocation operating system call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out
of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the
Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
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8 Self Tests
8.1 Power-Up Tests
The module performs power-up tests at module initialization to ensure that the module is not
corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The selftests are
performed without any user intervention.
While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available and input or
output is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling
application until the self-tests are completed successfully.
8.1.1 Integrity Tests
The integrity of the module is verified comparing the HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run
time with the HMAC value stored in the module that was computed at build time.
8.1.2 Cryptographic algorithm tests
The module performs self-tests on all FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in
the approved mode of operation, using the known answer tests (KAT) shown in the following
table:
Algorithm Tests
Triple-DES KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 128 KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 192 KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
AES 256 KAT, encryption and decryption tested separately
SHA-1 KAT
SHA-224 KAT
SHA-256 KAT
SHA-384 KAT
SHA-512 KAT
HMAC SHA-1 KAT
HMAC SHA-224 KAT
HMAC SHA-256 KAT
HMAC SHA-384 KAT
HMAC SHA-512 KAT
DRBG (Hash, HMAC and
CTR-based)
KAT
RSA KAT of signature generation/verification
DSA PCT of signature generation/verification
Module Integrity test HMAC SHA-256
Table 10: Self-tests
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8.2 On-Demand self-tests
The module provides the Self-Test service to perform self-tests on demand. This service
performs the same cryptographic algorithm tests executed during power-up, plus some
extended self-tests, such as testing additional block chaining modes. During the execution of
the on-demand self-tests, services are not available and no data output or input is possible.
To invoke the on-demand self-tests, the user can invoke the gcry_control(GCRYCTL_SELFTEST)
command.
8.3 Conditional Tests
The module performs conditional tests on the cryptographic algorithms shown in the following
table:
Algorithm Test
DRBG The continuous random number test is only used in FIPS mode. The RNG
generates random numbers per block size depending on the underlying
DRBG type (CTR; HMAC or Hash); the 1st
block generated per context is
saved in the context and another block is generated to be returned to the
caller. Each block is compared against the saved block and then stored in
the context. If a duplicated block is detected, an error is signaled and the
library is put into the “Fatal-Error" state.
(random/drbg.c:cdrbg_fips_continuous_test)
RSA The test creates a random number of the size of p-64 bits and encrypts
this value with the public key. Then the test checks that the encrypted
value does not match the plaintext value. The test decrypts the ciphertext
value and checks that it matches the original plaintext. The test will then
generate another random plaintext, sign it, modify the signature by
incrementing its value by 1, and verify that the signature verification fails.
(cipher/rsa.c:test_keys())
DSA The test uses a random number of the size of the q parameter to create a
signature and then checks that the signature verification is successfull. As
a second signing test, the data is modified by incrementing its value and
then is verified against the signature with the expected result that the
verification fails. (cipher/dsa.c:test_keys())
Table 11: Conditional Tests
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9 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's
validated status while in use.
9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 1 above.
The RPM package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the
installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm,
and the RHN remote management tool).
For proper operation of the in-module integrity verification, the prelink has to be disabled.
This can be done by setting PRELINKING=no in the /etc/sysconfig/prelink configuration file. If
the libraries were already prelinked, the prelink should be undone on all the system files
using the 'prelink -u -a' command.
The ciphers listed in Table 8 are not allowed to be used.
To bring the Module into FIPS Approved mode, perform the following:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the
kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition
of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command
"df /boot"
or
"df /boot/efi"
respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available
Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296
14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string
needs to be appended to the kernel command line:
"boot=/dev/sda1"
Reboot to apply these settings.
Because FIPS 140-2 has certain restrictions on the use of cryptography which are not always
wanted, the Module needs to be put into FIPS Approved mode explicitly: if the file
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled exists and contains a numeric value other than 0, the Module is
put into FIPS Approved mode at initialization time. This is the mechanism recommended for
ordinary use, activated by using the fips=1 option in the boot loader, as described above.
If an application that uses the Module for its cryptography is put into a chroot environment,
the Crypto Officer must ensure one of the above methods is available to the Module from
within the chroot environment to ensure entry into FIPS Approved mode. Failure to do so will
not allow the application to properly enter FIPS Approved mode.
Once the Module has been put into FIPS Approved mode, it is not possible to switch back to
standard mode without terminating the process first.
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If an application that uses the Module for its cryptography is put into a chroot environment,
the Crypto Officer must ensure one of the above methods is available to the Module from
within the chroot environment to ensure entry into FIPS approved mode. Failure to do so will
not allow the application to properly enter FIPS approved mode.
Because FIPS 140-2 has certain restrictions on the use of cryptography which are not always
wanted, libgcrypt needs to be put into FIPS mode explicitly. To switch libgcrypt into this mode,
the file /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled must contain a numeric value other than 0. If the
application requests FIPS mode, use the control command
gcry_control(GCRYCTL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE).
This must be done prior to any initialization (i.e. before the gcry_check_version() function).
Once libgcrypt has been put into FIPS mode, it is not possible to switch back to standard
mode without terminating the process first. If the logging verbosity level of libgcrypt has been
set to at least 2, the state transitions and the self tests are logged.
9.2 User Guidance
Applications using libgcrypt need to call
gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0) after initialization is done: that
ensures that the DRBG is properly seeded, among others.
gcry_control(GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM)needs to be called before the process is terminated.
The function gcry_set_allocation_handler()may not be used.
The user must not call malloc/free to create/release space for keys, let libgcrypt manage
space for keys, which will ensure that the key memory is overwritten before it is released.
See the documentation file doc/gcrypt.texi within the source code tree for complete
instructions for use.
The information pages are included within the developer package. The user can find the
documentation at the following location after having installed the developer package:
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info-1.gz
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info-2.gz
/usr/share/info/gcrypt.info.gz
9.2.1 Three-key Triple-DES
It is the calling application’s responsibility to make sure that the three keys k1, k2 and k3 are
independent. Two-key triple-DES usage will bring the module into the non-Approved mode of
operation implicitly.
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10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
libgcrypt uses a blinding technique for RSA decryption to mitigate real world timing attacks
over a network: Instead of using the RSA decryption directly, a blinded value (y = x·re
mod n)
is decrypted and the unblinded value (x' = y'·r-1
mod n) returned. The blinding value “r” is a
random value with the size of the modulus “n” and generated with `GCRY_WEAK_RANDOM'
random level.
Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:
In DES there are 64 known keys which are weak because they produce only one, two, or four
different subkeys in the subkey scheduling process. The keys in this table have all their parity
bits cleared.
static byte weak_keys[64][8] =
{
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, /*w*/
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e },
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
{ 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe },
{ 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
{ 0x00, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x00 },
{ 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xfe },
{ 0x00, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
{ 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
{ 0x00, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xfe },
{ 0x00, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x00 },
{ 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x0e },
{ 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
{ 0x00, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
{ 0x00, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e },
{ 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00 },
{ 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e },
{ 0x1e, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
{ 0x1e, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe },
{ 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
{ 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x00, 0x00 },
{ 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0x0e }, /*w*/
{ 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
{ 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xfe },
{ 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xfe },
{ 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
{ 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x0e },
{ 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x00 },
{ 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0 },
{ 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
{ 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x00 },
{ 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e },
{ 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0 },
{ 0xe0, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xfe },
{ 0xe0, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
{ 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e },
{ 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xfe },
{ 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
{ 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
{ 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x00 },
{ 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x00 },
{ 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x0e },
{ 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xf0 }, /*w*/
{ 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xfe },
{ 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e },
{ 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00 },
{ 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe }, /*sw*/
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{ 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xf0, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00 }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x00, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xf0, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0xfe, 0x0e }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x1e, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0e, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0, 0xfe },
{ 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0xf0 }, /*sw*/
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x00, 0x00 },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0x0e, 0x0e },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0xf0 },
{ 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xfe } /*w*/ };
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Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMT Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVT Component Verification Testing
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFT Derivation Function Test
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FSM Finite State Model
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PR Prediction Resistance
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
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RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple DES
UI User Interface
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing
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Appendix B References
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips 180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198 1/FIPS-198 1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding
Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality
May 2004
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated
July20_2007.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on
Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
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SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-56A NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation for
Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
May 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800 56Ar2.pdf
SP800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-
Expansion
November 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56C/SP-800-56C.pdf
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
SP800-90B NIST Draft Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the
Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
August 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-90/draft-sp800-90b.pdf
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
October 2009
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A - Transitions: Recommendation
for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths
January 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf
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