RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM FIPS 140-3
Security Policy
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Shenzhen IBestChain Technology Co., Ltd.
RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Version: 1.6
Date: October 17, 2024
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Table of Contents
1 General .........................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification...............................................................................6
2.1 Operational Environment.............................................................................................................6
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary ..............................................................................................................6
2.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................9
2.3.1 Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation.......................................................................9
2.3.2 Configuration of the Non-Approved Modes of Operation .............................................................9
2.4 Security Functions......................................................................................................................11
2.5 Entropy Sources .........................................................................................................................13
2.6 Overall Security Design...............................................................................................................14
2.7 Rules of Operation .....................................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces................................................................................. 15
4 Roles, Services and Authentication .............................................................................. 16
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services ................................................................................16
4.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................18
4.3 Services.......................................................................................................................................19
5 Software/Firmware Security ........................................................................................ 29
6 Operational Environment ............................................................................................ 30
7 Physical Security.......................................................................................................... 31
7.1 Tamper-Evident Seals.................................................................................................................31
7.2 Tamper Detection ......................................................................................................................34
7.3 Environmental Failure Protection (EFP).....................................................................................34
8 Non-Invasive Security .................................................................................................. 35
9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management ......................................................... 36
9.1 Critical Security Parameters (CSP)..............................................................................................37
9.2 Public Security Parameters (PSP) ...............................................................................................39
10 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................... 40
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .................................................................................................... 43
11.1 Secure Installation, Initialization, Startup and Operation of the Module..................................43
11.2 Cryptographic Officer Guidance.................................................................................................43
11.3 User Guidance............................................................................................................................46
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ......................................................................................... 46
13 References and Definitions .......................................................................................... 47
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................5
Table 2 – Tested Operational Environment..................................................................................................6
Table 3 – Modes of Operation ......................................................................................................................9
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms ..................................................................................................................11
Table 5 – Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms ......................................................................................12
Table 6 – Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation ..........................12
Table 7 – Security Function Implementations ............................................................................................13
Table 8– Split Knowledge Procedures.........................................................................................................13
Table 9 – Entropy Sources...........................................................................................................................13
Table 10 – Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................................15
Table 11 – Trusted Channel ........................................................................................................................15
Table 12 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output ...........................................................................16
Table 13 – Authentication Description .......................................................................................................18
Table 14 – Approved Services.....................................................................................................................19
Table 15 – Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................................25
Table 16 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................31
Table 17 – Tamper-Evident Seal Locations Guidance.................................................................................33
Table 18 – Environmental Failure Protection .............................................................................................34
Table 19 – SSP Management Methods.......................................................................................................36
Table 20 – CSPs Management.....................................................................................................................37
Table 21 – PSPs ...........................................................................................................................................39
Table 22 – Self-Test Error States and Indicators.........................................................................................40
Table 23 – Pre-Operational Self-Test..........................................................................................................40
Table 24 – Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................42
Table 25 – References.................................................................................................................................47
Table 26 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................48
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Front of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM ........................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Back of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM .........................................................................................6
Figure 3 – Right Side of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM.................................................................................7
Figure 4 – Left Side of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM...................................................................................7
Figure 5 – Manufacturer Label Sticker of the Module..................................................................................7
Figure 6 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram ......................................................................................8
Figure 7 – Management Console - Unknown Mode during Initialization...................................................10
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Figure 8 – Management Console - Approved Mode...................................................................................10
Figure 9 – Management Console - Non- Approved Mode..........................................................................11
Figure 10 – Module Seal Locations (Top)....................................................................................................32
Figure 11 – Module Seal Locations (Bottom)..............................................................................................32
Figure 12 – Module Seal Location (Left side)..............................................................................................33
Figure 13 – Module Seal Location (Right side)............................................................................................33
Figure 14 – Choose COM Port.....................................................................................................................44
Figure 15 – Add MNG..................................................................................................................................44
Figure 16 – Create DMK..............................................................................................................................45
Figure 17 – Set Mode of Operation ............................................................................................................45
Figure 18 – Restore DMK ............................................................................................................................46
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1 General
This document defines the Security Policy for the RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM, hereafter denoted the
Module. The Module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. It is a security module that
supports the encryption algorithm approved by FIPS 140-3 and with physical security protection
measures, key management mechanisms, and security features to provide secured and applicable
cryptographic services for customer systems. Specifically, the security features include key wrapping,
message authentication code (MAC), message digest, data encryption and decryption, digital signature
generation and verification, etc.
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements
ISO/IEC 24759 section Security Requirement Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3
4 Roles, Services and, Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 3
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 3
10 Self-Tests 3
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 3
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The Module is a hardware cryptographic module. The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies
or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated Data Encryption Cryptographic implementation. The
Module is intended to be used in customer systems requiring security features include key wrapping,
message authentication code (MAC), message digest, data encryption and decryption, digital signature
generation and verification, etc.
2.1 Operational Environment
IBestChain Data Encryption cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Table 2 – Tested Operational Environment
# Model
Hardware Part
Number and version
Firmware
version
Distinguishing Features
1 RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM 3.4.0 1.4.0 hard metal 1U chassis
NOTE: No Components were excluded from the cryptographic boundary
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a multiple-chip standalone
embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is defined as an entire hardware module, and its physical
boundary is defined by the hard metal chassis that surrounds all hardware and firmware of the module.
The physical dimensions of the module are 482mm*45.5mm*360mm (W*H*L).
Figure 1 – Front of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM
Figure 2 – Back of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM
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Figure 3 – Right Side of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM
Figure 4 – Left Side of RIGFORT Pro Blockchain HSM
Figure 5 – Manufacturer Label Sticker of the Module
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Figure 6 – Cryptographic Boundary Block Diagram
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2.3 Modes of Operation
The Module supports both an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. To verify that the Module
is in the Approved mode of operation, the operation mode indicator can be seen on the left side of the
management software or check the operation mode status via the menu: Tools → Display Module Status.
Table 3 – Modes of Operation
Name Description
FIPS
[Non-FIPS/FIPS]
Status Indicator
Approved Mode Normal Operation with only
approved services and security
functions available
FIPS See HSM mode in Figure 8
Non-Approved Mode Non-approved security
functions are available
Non-FIPS See HSM mode in Figure 9
2.3.1 Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation
The Approved mode of operation is configured at reception of the Module by the CO role who implements
the instructions in Section 11.2 Cryptographic Officer Guidance. The operation mode can be selected at
initialization through the management software and cannot be changed once selected unless restored to
factory settings.
2.3.2 Configuration of the Non-Approved Modes of Operation
The non-Approved mode of operation is configured at reception of the Module by the CO role who
implements the instructions in Section 11.2 Cryptographic Officer Guidance. The operation mode can be
selected at initialization through the management software and cannot be changed once selected unless
restored to factory settings.
In order to switch modes, the CO must perform a reset of the module by selecting from Management
Console menu: Tools → Reset HSM, which zeroizes all the SSPs.
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Figure 7 – Management Console - Unknown Mode during Initialization
Figure 8 – Management Console - Approved Mode
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Figure 9 – Management Console - Non- Approved Mode
2.4 Security Functions
The Module implements the Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in
the table(s) below.
Table 4 – Approved Algorithms
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method
Description / Key
Size(s) / Strength(s)
Use / Function
A2750 AES [197]
ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
CBC [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
A2750 DRBG [90A] Hash SHA-256
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
Security Strength = 256 bits
A2750 ECDSA [186]
Mode: SHA-256
Curves: P-256
Keys Length: 128
KeyGen
SigGen
SigVer
A2750 HMAC [198] SHA-256 Key Length: 256
Key Derivation for the Session
and Session HMAC Keys
A2750 KBKDF [108] Counter HMAC-SHA2-256 Key Derivation
A2750 KTS-IFC [56Br2]
Method: KTS-OAEP-
Basic; OAEP-Party_V-
confirmation
Modulus Length: 2048
Hash: SHA2-256
Keys Length: 112
Key Transport: encapsulation
and un-encapsulation
A2750 RSA [186] n = 2048 SHA-256 KeyGen
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method
Description / Key
Size(s) / Strength(s)
Use / Function
PKCS1_v1.5 n = 2048 SHA-256 SigGen
PKCS1_v1.5 n = 2048 SHA-256
SigVer
Integrity check
A2750 SHS [180] SHA2-256
ECDSA, HMAC, RSA, Message
Digest
ECDSA, RSA Key Generation
A2749 SHS [180] SHA2-256 Integrity check, Message Digest
Table 5 – Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms
Algorithm
Algorithm
Properties
OE Reference
VA CKG [IG D.H] [133] Sections 4 and 5.1 Asymmetric signature key generation
using unmodified DRBG output
Key
Generation
[133] Sections 4 and 6.1 Direct symmetric key generation using
unmodified DRBG output
[133] Section 6.2.2 Derivation of symmetric keys from a pre-
shared key
Note: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode
of Operation.
Note: The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode
of Operation with No Security Claimed
Table 6 – Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
Algorithm Description
ECDSA_secp256k1 Signature Algorithms of Blockchain
ed25519 Signature Algorithms of Blockchain
ripmd160 Message Digest algorithm of Blockchain
sha3-256 (FIPS 202) Message Digest algorithm of Blockchain
SM2 Chinese Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (asymmetric
encryption/decryption, key agreement, signature generation/verification)
SM3 Chinese Message Digest Algorithm (message digest)
SM4 Chinese Block Cipher Symmetric Algorithm (symmetric encryption/decryption)
sr25519 Signature Algorithms of Blockchain
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Table 7 – Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description SF Properties Algorithms Algorithm Properties
KTS1 KTS
SP 800-56Brev2. KTS-IFC
[56Br2] (Key
encapsulation and un-
encapsulation) per IG
D.G
2048-bit
modulus
providing 112
bits of
encryption
strength
KTS-IFC (Cert. #A2750)
Hash: SHA2-256
Modulus Length:
2048
Keys Length: 112
KTS2 KTS
SP 800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
256- bit keys
providing 256
bits of
encryption
strength
AES-256 (CBC) and
HMAC-SHA-256 (Cert.
#2750)
Keys Length: 256
Below in Table 8 are the procedures for the Shamir Secret Share for Split Knowledge.
Table 8– Split Knowledge Procedures
Algorithm Caveat Description
Shamir
Secrets
Share
Split Knowledge Procedures: Polynomial method used
only for secret-sharing.
Note: As per NISTIR 8214, Section 6.2, implementation
of Shamir Secret Sharing is used to satisfy section 7.9.5
of the FIPS 140-3 standard which defines security
requirements for split-knowledge procedures.
The secret sharing algorithm
divides the secret and shares
the secret among n participants
more than specific t participants
can calculate or recover the
secret, and less than t
participants cannot get it.
2.5 Entropy Sources
The Module uses the following entropy sources:
Vendor Name Cert. Number
Shenzhen IBestChain Technology Co Ltd ESV Cert. #E17
Table 9 – Entropy Sources
Entropy Source/
Name
Type
Operating
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy per
Sample
Conditioning
Components
AS578 Entropy Source Physical ARM Cortex-M 1 bit .83 bits SHA2-256 (Cert. #A2750)
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2.6 Overall Security Design
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User (User Application external entity) and
Cryptographic Officer (Manager).
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the Module.
6. Pre-Operational self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are restrictions on which SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. Factory reset will zeroize
all SSPs of the module, tamper detection or EFP failure will zeroize all unprotected SSPs of the module.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
14. The Module enters or outputs plaintext CSPs using trusted channel and split knowledge.
15. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
16. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
17. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
2.7 Rules of Operation
The Module shall be installed as described in Section 11 secure installation, initialization, startup and
operation of the Module, and Section 7 Physical Security.
The Module shall be operated such that only the approved mode is enabled.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated logical interface categories are listed in Table 10.
Table 10 – Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface
Power Ports (2) Power Connect the module to the power outlet via the redundant
power supply
Power button Control In Electrical signal passes through
LEDs Status out Display the working status of the module through different
combinations
Serial Port (RS-232) Control in | Data in |
Data out | Status out
Connected to the management computer to provide
management services
Type-c Port Control in | Data in |
Data out | Status out
Connected to the communication computer to provide
cryptographic services for user applications
* Control Output is not available in this module
Table 11 – Trusted Channel
Trusted Channel Description
Directly connected
cable through a Serial
Port (RS-232) from the
Management Console
to the module
The Trusted Channel must be setup per section 11.1 Secure Installation,
Initialization, Startup and Operation of the Module.
The Management Console connects directly to module via a serial port (RS-232).
To protect the plaintext CSPs, the physical ports used for the trusted channel are
physically separated from all other ports and will be under the direct supervision
of the CO.
A status indicator through the management console is provided when the
trusted channel is in use or not. See the Channel section of Figure 8
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services
The Module supports two distinct operator roles, User (User Application external entity) and
Cryptographic Officer (CO) (Manager). The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using
identity-based authentication. Re-authentication is enforced when changing roles. If the CO logs in while
the user is logged in, the user will be automatically logged out.
Table 12 lists all operator roles supported by the Module and their related services. In addition, the
Module supports services which does not require to be authenticated, listed UA in Table 12.
The Module does not support a maintenance role and bypass capability. The Module does not support
concurrent operators. Previous authentications will be cleared on power cycle. The physical security
mechanisms employed by the module protect the SSPs from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and
substitution via physical intrusions.
Table 12 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role
Service Input Output
CO User UA
✓ Create DMK Command In Generated DMK.
✓ Restore DMK Command In DMK restored.
✓ Add MNG Command In The MNG account is created. Success/failure
status.
✓ MNG Login Password Login CO role.
✓ MNG Logout Command In Logout CO role.
✓ Add User Application Command In The User Application user account is created.
Success/failure status.
✓ Delete User
Application
Command In The User Application user account is deleted.
Success/failure status.
✓ Reset User Application
password
Command In The User Application default password.
Success/failure status.
✓ List User Application Command In User list
✓ Create User Key Command In Creates AES/HMAC/HASH/RSA2048/ECDSA-P256
keys for the user
✓ Remove User Key Command In Deletes User Keys
✓ List User Key Command In User key list
✓ Key Derivation
Function
DMK PK
✓ View Log Command In Log
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Role
Service Input Output
CO User UA
✓ User Application Login Command In Login User role
✓ User Application
Logout
Command In Logout User role
✓ Modify User
Application password
User Application
password
Updated the User Application password.
Success/failure status.
✓ AES CBC Encryption Plaintext Ciphertext. Success/failure status
✓ AES CBC Decryption Cyphertext Plaintext. Success/failure status
✓ AES ECB Encryption Plaintext Ciphertext. Success/failure status
✓ AES ECB Decryption Cyphertext Plaintext. Success/failure status
✓ RSA2048 Signature
generation
Command In Generated signature. Success/failure status
✓ RSA2048 Signature
verification
Signature data Success/failure status
✓ ✓ Random Bit
Generation
Entropy data,
DRBG state values
DRBG Seed
✓ ECDSA Signature
generation
Command In Generated signature. Success/failure status
✓ ECDSA Signature
verification
Signature data Success/failure status
✓ ✓ Display Module
Version
Command In Module HW version, FW version information
✓ ✓ Display Module Status Command In FIPS status.
✓ ✓ Zeroize Factory reset
Command In
All keys zeroized
Tamper switch
triggered, EFP
failed
All unprotected SSPs zeroized
✓ ✓ Self-Tests Command In
(Reset, automatic
periodic self-
tests)
Success/Reset.
✓ Set Mode of operation Command In Success/failure status
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4.2 Authentication Methods
The module uses identity-based authentication to identify and verify users of the module. For roles as the
manager are identified by UKEY_ID and verified using a challenge-response mechanism based on a 2048-
bit RSA key pair, and user are identified by username and verified using a challenge-response mechanism
based on sha2-256. The public key is stored in the module in plaintext, and the private key is stored in the
user’s USB token.
The module ensures that there is no visible display of the authentication data.
Table 13 – Authentication Description
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
CO Identity-based - The CO is authenticated by
UKEY_ID and verified using challenge-
response mechanism based on a 2048-bit
RSA key pair.
The public key is stored in the module in
plaintext, and the private key is stored in the
user’s USB token.
112 bits strength of the authentication method,
the probability of a successful random attempt is
1 in 2112
Each RSA Signature Verification authentication
attempt takes at least 60ms. So, the number of
attempts for one minute cannot exceed 1000.
The USB token corresponding to CO allows six (6)
consecutive failed attempts before locking. After
a successful attempt, the number of failures will
be reset to zero. After six (6) consecutive failed
attempts, the USB token cannot be used.
User Identity-based – The User role sends assigned
username to HSM, and HSM utilizes a
challenge-response mechanism for user role
authentication. The user's password is
protected with a cryptographic hash (SHA-
256 message digest).
Since the password length is eight (8) ASCII
printable characters and there are 95 ASCII
printable characters, the probability of a
successful random attempt is 1 in
{(10)*(26^2)*(95^5)} (at least one number, one
uppercase, one lowercase).
1. HSM waits for the user to log in.
2. When the user enters the wrong PIN code for
the first time, HSM sets the number of
consecutive PIN code errors to 1 and starts the
consecutive PIN code error cycle timing.
3. Within the consecutive PIN code error cycle
(24 hours), if the user enters the wrong PIN code
6 times, the HSM will be locked for 60 minutes.
4. After 60 minutes, HSM will clear the number
of consecutive PIN code errors, and the
consecutive PIN code error cycle will end and be
cleared.
5. Loop back to step 1 and provide login service
to the user again.
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4.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 14 and Table 15 below.
The SSPs modes of access shown in Table 14 are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module.
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Table 14 – Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
Create DMK
Create a DMK, use the
Shamir Secrets Share
algorithm to divide the DMK
into 3 component keys, and
back up these three keys to
three external USB tokens
respectively. Then derive PK
through DMK
HASH_DRBG,
KBKDF [108]
(Cert. #A2750)
Device
Master Key
(DMK),
Protection
Key (PK)
CO G, R, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Restore DMK
Import 2 component keys
stored in the USB token into
the cryptographic module,
synthesize the DMK through
the Shamir Secrets Share
algorithm, and then derive
the PK through the DMK.
KBKDF
(Cert. #A2750)
Device
Master Key
(DMK),
Protection
Key (PK)
CO W, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Add MNG
Write ID and RSA public key
from management console to
the module.
AES-256,
SHA2-256, RSA-2048
SigVer.
(Cert. #A2750)
CO RSA-pub
Key
CO G
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
MNG Login
The cryptographic module
authenticates the manager's
identity
RSA-2048 SigVer,
HASH_DRBG
(Cert. #A2750)
CO RSA-pub
Key
CO R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
MNG Logout Manager logout
RSA-2048 SigVer.
(Cert. #A2750)
N/A CO N/A
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
Add User
Application
Create a user, write the user
name and default password
to module, and store it with
PK protection.
AES-256,
SHA2-256, RSA-2048
SigVer.
(Cert. #A2750)
User
Password,
Protection
Key (PK)
CO G
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Delete User
Application
Delete user’s information
AES-256,
SHA2-256, RSA-2048
SigVer.
(Cert. #A2750)
User
password,
Protection
Key (PK)
CO Z
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Reset User
Application
password
modify user password, write
the new default password to
the module, and store it with
PK protection.
AES-256,
SHA2-256, RSA-2048
SigVer.
(Cert. #A2750)
Protection
Key (PK)
CO W
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
List User
Application
List all currently existing User
Application users
N/A N/A CO R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Create User
Key
Create user key, and store it
with PK protection.
AES-256, SHA2-256,
RSA-2048,
ECDSA-P256
(Cert. #2750)
User AES key,
User ECDSA-
pub Key,
User ECDSA-
priv Key,
User RSA-pub
Key,
User RSA-priv
Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
CO G
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Remove User
Key
Remove user key
AES-256, SHA2-256,
RSA-2048,
ECDSA-P256
(Cert. #2750)
User AES key,
User ECDSA-
pub Key,
User ECDSA-
priv Key,
User RSA-pub
Key,
User RSA-priv
Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
CO Z
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
List User Key List user key types
AES-256, SHA2-256,
RSA-2048,
ECDSA-P256
(Cert. #2750)
N/A CO R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
ERROR_OK;
Key
Derivation
Function
Perform Key
Derivation using NIST
SP800-108 KDF in
CTR mode
KBKDF with HMAC-
SHA-256
(Cert. #2750)
Device
Master KEY
(DMK),
Protection
Key (PK)
CO R, W, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
ERROR_OK;
View Log View HSM log N/A N/A CO R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
ERROR_OK;
User
Application
Login
Verify Username and
PASSWORD
AES-256, HMAC-
SHA-256,
HASH_DRBG, SHA2-
256, KTS-RSA-2048
(Cert. #A2750)
User
Password,
RSA Key
Decryption
Key (KDK),
RSA Key
Encryption
Key (KEK),
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
User
Application
Logout
User Application Logout N/A
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key
User R
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
Modify User
Application
password
modify user password, write
the new password to
module, and store it with PK
protection.
AES-256, HMAC-
SHA-256, KTS-RSA-
2048
(Cert. #A2750)
User
password,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User W
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
AES CBC
Encryption
User uses AES CBC
encryption service
AES-256 CBC
(Cert. #A2750)
User AES Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
AES CBC
Decryption
User uses AES CBC
decryption service
AES-256 CBC
(Cert. #A2750)
User AES Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
AES ECB
Encryption
User uses AES ECB encryption
service
AES-256 ECB
(Cert. #A2750)
User AES Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
AES ECB
Decryption
User uses AES ECB decryption
service
AES-256 ECB
(Cert. #A2750)
User AES Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
RSA2048
Signature
generation
User uses RSA 2048 signature
generation service
RSA-2048 SigGen
(Cert. #A2750)
User RSA-priv
Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
RSA2048
Signature
verification
User uses RSA 2048 Signature
verification service
RSA-2048 SigVer
(Cert. #A2750)
User RSA-pub
Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
ECDSA
Signature
generation
User uses ECDSA signature
generation service
ECDSA SigGen (Cert.
#A2750)
User ECDSA-
priv Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
ECDSA
Signature
verification
User uses ECDSA Signature
verification service
ECDSA SigVer (Cert.
#A2750)
User ECDSA-
pub Key,
Session AES
Key,
Session
HMAC Key,
Protection
Key (PK)
User E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Random Bit
Generation
Provide random bits
from the DRBG
DRBG [90A]
(CERT. #A2750)
DRBG-EI,
DRBG-State,
DRBG Seed
CO,
User
R, W, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Display
Module
Version
Display version number of
modules in HSM/hardware/
firmware
N/A N/A
CO,
UA
R, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
SSPs Roles
Access
rights
Indicator
Display
Module
Status
View Module status N/A N/A
CO,
UA
R, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
Zeroize
Zeroization through Factory
reset of the module, tamper
switch or EFP failure.
N/A
Device
Master Key
(DMK),
Protection
Key (PK),
User AES Key,
User ECDSA-
priv Key,
User ECDSA-
pub Key,
User RSA-priv
key,
User RSA-pub
keys,
User
Password,
CO RSA-pub
Key
CO,
UA
Z
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
Self-Tests
Perform the self-tests
automatically when the
module is powered on or
restarted
AES-256,
HASH_DRBG [90A],
ESV [90B]
HMAC-SHA-256
KBKDF [108]
KTS-RSA-2048
SHA2-256,
RSA-2048,
ECDSA-P256
(Cert. #2750)
N/A
CO,
UA
R, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
Set Mode of
operation
Set the mode of operation
RSA-2048 SigVer
HASH_DRBG
(Cert. #A2750)
CO RSA-pub
Key
CO W, E
Approved
mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM
_STATE;
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Table 15 – Non-Approved Services
Service Description Algorithm Accessed Roles Indicator
Create User Key Create user key
ECDSA_secp256k1, ed25519, SM2,
SM4, SR25519
CO
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
Remove User Key Remove user key
ECDSA_secp256k1,
ed25519,
SM2,
SM4,
SR25519
CO
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
List User Key List user key types
ECDSA_secp256k1,
ed25519,
SM2,
SM4,
SR25519
CO
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
SM4 Decryption
User uses sm4 decryption
service
SM4 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
SM4 Encryption
User uses sm4 encryption
service
SM4 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
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Service Description Algorithm Accessed Roles Indicator
SM2 Signature
generation
User uses sm2 signature
generation service
SM2 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
SM2 Signature
verification
User uses sm2 Signature
verification service
SM2 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
ECDSA_secp256k
1 Signature
generation
User uses ECDSA_secp256k1
signature generation service
ECDSA_secp256k1 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
ECDSA_secp256k
1 Signature
verification
User uses ECDSA_secp256k1
Signature verification service
ECDSA_secp256k1 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
sr25519 Signature
generation
User uses sr25519 signature
generation service
sr25519 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
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Service Description Algorithm Accessed Roles Indicator
sr25519 Signature
verification
User uses sr25519 Signature
verification service
sr25519 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
ed25519
Signature
generation
User uses ed25519 signature
generation service
ed25519 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
ed25519
Signature
verification
User uses ed25519 Signature
verification service
ed25519 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
ripmd160 digest
User uses ripmd160 message
digest service
ripmd160 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
SHA3-256 digest
User uses sha3-256 message
digest service
SHA3-256 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
SM3 digest
User uses SM3 message digest
service
SM3 User
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
ERROR_HSM_S
TATE;
ERROR_HSM_
MODE;
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Service Description Algorithm Accessed Roles Indicator
Zeroize
Zeroization through Factory
reset of the module, tamper
switch or EFP failure.
ECDSA_secp256k1, ed25519, SM2,
ripmd160, SHA3-256, SM3, SM4,
SR25519
CO
Non-Approved
Mode;
ERROR_OK;
NOTE: All non-approved services are only available in Non-Approved mode. If invoke any non-approved
service in approved mode, the module will return error code ERROR_HSM_MODE.
NOTE: All services in Table 14 and Approved SSPs in Table 20 and Table 21 are available in Non-Approved
mode. These services are considered non-approved services.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
The Module is a Level 3 multi-chip standalone hardware module.
Firmware integrity verification uses an approved digital signature cryptographic mechanism, if the
calculated result is not successfully verified, the test fails, and the module enters the error state.
In the production process, the public key of the firmware integrity key pair is written into the flash of the
AS578 in plaintext. Use the sha256 algorithm to calculate the message digest of the bootloader, kernel,
and application of the IMX6 and the message digest of the executable code of the AS578, sign these
message digests with the private key of the firmware integrity key pair, and write these signatures into
the flash of the AS578. The firmware integrity check of IMX6 and AS578 is performed as follows:
AS578:
• Read the digital signature of executable code message digest stored in the flash of AS578, verify the
signature with the public key of the firmware integrity key pair, and get the message digest.
• Read executable code and use sha256 algorithm to calculate message digest.
• Compare the two message digests, if the digests are consistent, the firmware integrity check will
pass, otherwise module enters the error state.
imx6:
• Read the images of bootloader, kernel and application on EMMC respectively, use sha256 algorithm
to calculate the message digest, and transfer the message digest to AS578.
• Read the digital signature of bootloader, kernel, and application stored in the flash of AS578, verify
the signature with the public key of the firmware integrity key pair, and obtain the message digest.
• Compare the two message digests, if the digests are consistent, the firmware integrity check will
pass, otherwise module enters the error state.
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by rebooting the module.
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6 Operational Environment
The Module has a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The tested
operational environment is listed in Table 2.
The Module does not include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. Any firmware not
identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the Module defined by this Security Policy or covered
by this validation.
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7 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module. Physical security is designed according
to Level 3 standards.
7.1 Tamper-Evident Seals
The cryptographic module is contained within a strong enclosure with four (4) tamper-evident seals on
the top, left side and bottom and right side and bottom as described in Table 17. Each tamper evident seal
is individually identifiable. The cryptographic module will perform EFP. If the voltage falls outside the
normal operating range of the module, the module will shut down immediately. The Voltage range is 68V-
280V. If the temperature falls outside the normal operating range of the module, the module will
immediately zeroizes all unprotected SSPS. The temperature range is -2℃---46℃.
Table 16 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper-Evident Seals Inspect tamper-evident seals
monthly.
Look for signs of tampering. If tampering is
suspected, then the module must be
removed from service.
The Module will be shipped from the manufacturer with tamper-evident seals pre-installed. To operate
the Module in an Approved mode of operation, the CO role shall inspect the tamper-evident seals
IB6127370XXX as shown in Figure 10 to Figure 13 on the reception of the Module. Detailed information
is provided in Table 17.
If the CO determines that the seals were tampered with, the module is to be removed from service and
no longer allowed to be used and is not to be returned to the vendor. The CO will perform the factory
reset to zeroize all SSPs.
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Figure 10 – Module Seal Locations (Top)
Figure 11 – Module Seal Locations (Bottom)
Seal ID 3 Seal ID 4
Seal ID 1 and 2
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Figure 12 – Module Seal Location (Left side)
Figure 13 – Module Seal Location (Right side)
Table 17 – Tamper-Evident Seal Locations Guidance
Seal ID Placement
1 Top side
2 Top side
3 Left side and bottom
4 Right side and bottom
Seal ID 4
Seal ID 3
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7.2 Tamper Detection
The cryptographic module includes a tamper detection feature that will immediately zeroize all SSPs when
the module's cover is removed. This forces a factory reset and will put the module into the Invasive Error
State. This will also close all external interfaces and stop providing all services.
The tamper detection remains active at all times including when the module is powered off, which at that
point, will operate with an internal battery.
As the tamper-evident seals will need to be broken to remove the cover, there is no recovery from the
error state as the module will no longer be in service.
7.3 Environmental Failure Protection (EFP)
The cryptographic module includes Environmental Failure Protection (EFP). If the voltage falls outside the
normal operating range of the module, the module will shut down immediately.
If the temperature falls outside the normal operating range of the module, the module will immediately
zeroizes all unprotected SSPS.
See Table 18 for the temperature and voltage measurements
Table 18 – Environmental Failure Protection
Temperature or voltage
measurement
EFP
description
Results
Low Temperature -2.6℃
A tamper flag is raised, zeroization
will proceed.
Zeroization
High Temperature 46℃
A tamper flag is raised, zeroization
will proceed.
Zeroization
Low Voltage 68V
A tamper flag is raised, triggering
the product to shut down
immediately
Shut down
High Voltage 280V
A tamper flag is raised, triggering
the product to shut down
immediately
Shut down
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management
The SSPs access methods are described in Table 19 below:
Table 19 – SSP Management Methods
Method Description
G1 Generated internally by using the internal CAVP validated DRBG during module
initialization
G2 Derived by DMK using SP800-108 CTR KDF (HMAC-SHA256 PRF)
G3 FIPS 186-4 compliant RSA key generation, using the internal CAVP validated DRBG
G4 Symmetric key generated by internal CAVP validated DRBG
G5 FPS 186-4 compliant ECDSA key generation, using the internal CAVP validated DRBG.
G7 Generated external to the Module and installed during manufacturing
G8 Generated internally by using the internal entropy source
E1 Input in plaintext from 2 of the 3 components stored in the token during module
initialization using trusted channel and split knowledge
E2 Split into 3 components and Output to 3 tokens in plaintext using trusted channel and
split knowledge.
E3 Public key output in plaintext
E4 Generated by SDK using AES algorithm and transmitted into the module through KTS-
RSA
E5 Encrypted by session key and Input by User application
E6 Generate by USB_TOKEN and imported as identify Key
E7 Input at manufacturer
E8 Generated by SDK using HMAC-SHA256 algorithm and transmitted into the module
through KTS-RSA
S1 Only stored in volatile memory (RAM).
S2 Stored in flash encapsulated by PK
S3 Stored in flash in plaintext
Z1 Zeroized by Module power cycle
Z2 Zeroized by the “zeroize” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern of 0s.
Z3 Dereferenced by session termination and zeroized by OS memory cleanup.
Z4 Zeroized when the tamper switch is triggered or EFP failed.
Z5 Zeroized by Factory reset
NOTE: Zeroization is implicit and is considered complete either after boot sequence is complete or when
User/CO initiates zeroization via Zeroize service and the module provides success/fail status.
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9.1 Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs by the Module is
described in the services detailed in 0.
Table 20 – CSPs Management
CSP
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert.
Gene-
ration
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
Device
Master Key
(DMK)
256 DRBG
(Cert.
#A2750)
G1 I, E E1, E2 S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
Used to derive the
Protection Key (PK)
Protection
Key (PK)
256 KBKDF
SP800-108
CTR (Cert.
#A2750)
G2 N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
Encrypt SSPs with
AES algorithm and
store (S2) in flash
inside the module.
RSA Key
Decryption
Key (KDK)
112 KTS-RSA
2048 (Cert.
#A2750)
G3 N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
RSA (2048) key
transport key used to
decrypt the RSA Key
Encryption Key (KEK)
Session AES
Key
256 AES CBC,
(Cert.
#A2750)
N/A I E4 S1 Z1, Z3,
Z4, Z5
Encryption key
(along with the
Session HMAC key)
to protect links in the
data transmission
between user
application/manager
computer and HSM
Session
HMAC Key
256 HMAC-
SHA256
(Cert.
#A2750)
N/A I E8 S1 Z1, Z3,
Z4, Z5
HMAC generation
and verification with
the Session AES Key
DRBG-EI 256 ESV Cert.
#E17
G8 N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
The noise source
inputs 512 bits of
entropy to the
Conditioning
Component, and the
Conditioning
Component uses the
Sha2-256 algorithm
to output 256 bits of
entropy.
0.86323 per entropy
source output bit.
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CSP
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert.
Gene-
ration
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
Output of the
Entropy Source
entered into the
DRBG
DRBG-State
(V and C
value (Per IG
D.L entropy
meets the
requirement
based on
SP800-90A
and SP800-
90B)
256 Hash DRBG
(Cert.
#A2750)
G1 N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
Internal state
information and
temporary variables
for approved DRBG
function.
DRBG Seed
(Per IG D.L
entropy
meets the
requirement
based on
SP800-90A
and SP800-
90B)
256 Hash DRBG
(Cert.
#A2750)
G1 N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2,
Z4, Z5
Output of the DRBG
and used in the
generation of SSPs
User AES Key
128/192/
256
AES CBC,
ECB (Cert.
#A2750)
G4 N/A N/A S2 Z2, Z5 User encryption and
decryption service
use and protected by
the Protection Key
(PK)
User ECDSA-
priv Key
128 ECDSA P-
256 (Cert.
#A2750)
G5 N/A N/A S2 Z2, Z5 User Signature
service use and
protected by the
Protection Key (PK)
User RSA-
priv Key
112 RSA 2048
(Cert.
#A2750)
G3 N/A N/A S2 Z2, Z5 User Signature
service use and
protected by the
Protection Key (PK)
User
Password
8 charac-
ters
N/A N/A I E5 S2 Z2, Z5 User identity
authentication and
protected by the
Protection Key (PK)
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9.2 Public Security Parameters (PSP)
All PSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these PSPs by the Module is
described in the services detailed in Table 150.
Table 21 – PSPs
PSP
Strength
(in bits)
Security
Function /
Cert.
Gener-
ation
Import
/Export
Establish-
ment
Storage
Zeroiza-
tion
Use / Related SSPs
CO RSA-pub
Key
112 RSA 2048
(Cert.
#A2750)
N/A N/A E6 S2 Z2, Z4,
Z5
[FIPS 186-4]
CO Authentication
Key
RSA Key
Encryption
Key (KEK)
112 KTS-RSA
2048
(Cert.
#A2750)
G3 E3 N/A S1 Z1, Z3,
Z4, Z5
RSA (2048) key
transport
(Encryption) key
User
ECDSA-pub
128 ECDSA
P256
(Cert.
#A2750)
G5 N/A N/A S2 Z2, Z5 [FIPS 186-4]
ECDSA signature
verification key and
protected by the
Protection Key (PK)
User RSA-
pub
112 RSA 2048
(Cert.
#A2750)
G3 N/A N/A S2 Z2, Z5 [FIPS 186-4]
RSA signature
verification key and
protected by the
Protection Key (PK)
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10 Self-Tests
The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are
categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational self–tests are periodically performed by the Module every 720 hours automatically after
the module is powered on, without external input or control. The Module will not accept any commands
when a periodic self-test is required; the commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by The Module
and the periodic self-test executed when the I/O buffer is emptied. The Module logs self-test errors in the
system log, the CO can consult the error log by View system logs on management software.
When HSM powers on, the operator can perform the on-demand self-test through power cycling.
The self-tests error states and status indicator are described in table below:
Table 22 – Self-Test Error States and Indicators
Error State Description Indicator
ES1 The Module fails a KAT, PCT or firmware integrity pre-
operational self-test.
When HSM enters ES1, the input and output are all closed,
and the only operation to recovery from error state is to
switch power button to restart HSM. After restart, the
HSM performs self-test, that will determine which state
HSM will enter. If HSM enters error state again, the CO
must send the HSM to vendor.
The Module enters the critical error
state and outputs status of the red
LED stays on, the blue LED flashes
quickly, otherwise it indicates
successful completion by Red LED
flashes quickly, blue LED flashes
normally.
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests:
Table 23 – Pre-Operational Self-Test
Security Function Method Description Error State
Firmware
integrity
RSA Digital
Signature FIPS
186-4
The public key of the firmware integrity key pair is written
into the flash of the AS578 in plaintext. Use the sha256
algorithm to calculate the message digest of the
bootloader, kernel, and application of the IMX6 and the
message digest of the executable code of the AS578, sign
these message digests with the private key of the
firmware integrity key pair, and write these signatures
into the flash of the AS578.
When HSM powers on, after self-test of the entropy
source and algorithm, HSM calculates the digests of
bootloader, kernel and IM6 application, and executable
code of the AS578, then use the public key and the
signatures which have been written in AS578, to verify the
firmware integrity.
ES1
Entropy
Critical Function
APT and RCT When HSM powers on, SP800-90B health tests are
performed before the first use of the entropy source.
When the entropy source fails health test, the entropy
source cannot generate the sufficient amount of entropy.
ES1
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Security Function Method Description Error State
At this time, the module must be restarted via the power
button to return for service.
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The Module performs the following conditional self-tests:
Table 24 – Conditional Self-Tests
Security Function Method Description Error State
AES – ECB KAT AES(ECB) with 256-bit key, encryption
AES(ECB) with 256-bit key, decryption
ES1
AES – CBC KAT AES(CBC) with 256-bit key, encryption
AES(CBC) with 256-bit key, decryption
ES1
DRBG KAT Hash_DRBG using SHA-256, with PR ES1
ECDSA KAT ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256, signature generation
ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256, signature verification
ES1
ECDSA Key Generation PCT ECDSA P-256 Key Generation Pairwise Consistency Test ES1
ESV SP 800-
90B
Health-
Test
An RCT and APT as specified in [90B] section 4.4 are
executed before generation of the DRBG entropy input.
When the entropy source fails health test, the entropy
source cannot generate enough entropy. At this time, the
module must be restarted via the power button to return
for service.
ES1
HMAC KAT HMAC-SHA2-256 ES1
KBKDF SP800-108 KAT HMAC-SHA2-256 in Counter Mode ES1
RSA KAT RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with 2048-bit key and SHA-256, signature
generation
RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with 2048-bit key and SHA-256, signature
verification
ES1
RSA Key Generation PCT 2048-bit RSA Encryption and Decryption per IG D.G. ES1
2048-bit RSA Sign and Verify per IG D.G
SHS (Cert. #A2749) KAT SHA2-256 ES1
SHS (Cert. #A2750) KAT SHA2-256 ES1
NOTE: Conditional KAT tests are run during the startup of the module as part of the Pre-Operational Self-
Test phase
NOTE: KAT RSA PKCS#1v1.5 with 2048-bit key and SHA-256, signature verification is performed prior to
the Firmware Integrity.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Secure Installation, Initialization, Startup and Operation of the Module
The module will be securely delivered to the operators via UPS with tracking codes to ensure there is no
tampering during delivery. Upon receipt of the module, the CO must check that the module's outer
packaging is intact or that the packaging has been opened during transport.
Upon delivery, the operator must initialize the module as follows:
1. The operator must ensure that the initial security configuration of the module is completed in a
restricted environment using a direct cabled serial connection from the management console
(standalone PC).
2. From the management program on the console, the operator must select the COM port by
selecting “Connect” from the menu bar.
3. Next, the operator must create the Manager role (CO) by selecting from the Management
program menu: Device → Add MNG. The operator then must insert the first of 3 USB tokens. A
new PASSWORD (8 characters) will be required and stored on the USB token.
4. Repeat this process twice more with different USB Tokens. When the three Manager roles have
been created, HSM can be initialized.
5. Next, the operator will create DMK for the HSM, and export DMK components to USB tokens.
Select from the Management program menu: Device → Create DMK. With 3 different USB token,
CO must sign in the HSM three (3) times, and store DMK component to each USB token. One DMK
component, one USB token.
6. With one of 3 USB tokens, the operator selects from menu, choose: Device → Set Mode of
Operation, and choose “FIPS Mode”. Once “OK” is selected, the module will reboot and perform
the Pre-Operational and Conditional KAT Self-Tests.
7. Select from menu Tools → Reset HSM, which zeroizes all the SSPs, will remove the module from
the Approved Mode of Operation
11.2 Cryptographic Officer Guidance
The serial port is used to connect the cryptographic module and the management computer.
The CO implements management functions such as Add MNG, Restore DMK, user application
management, and key management through the management computer. The following is the specific
function description.
Connect HSM
Before use HSM, you have to connect to it first. Choose “Connect” from menu, then the dialog below will
appear:
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Figure 14 – Choose COM Port
From pull-down control, select COM port which connects to HSM. If the port used are not listed, please
input the device full path in the edit control. After selection, please click “OK” button。
Add MNG
The first step to use HSM, is to create HSM manager.
From menu: Device → Add MNG, Follow the instructions shown in the figure below to complete the
process.
Figure 15 – Add MNG
Create DMK
From menu: Device → Create DMK, Follow the instructions shown in the figure below, the manager can
store DMK components to 3 USB Tokens.
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Figure 16 – Create DMK
Set Mode of Operation
The next step sets the HSM operation mode. From menu, choose: Device→ Set Mode of Operation. The
CO will have two choices, to select “FIPS Mode” or “Non-FIPS Mode” Once selected, the CO will follow the
instructions shown in the figure below to complete the process.
Figure 17 – Set Mode of Operation
Restore DMK
After initialization is complete, when the HSM restarts, the first step is to restore DMK. From menu,
choose: Device→ Restore DMK, Follow the instructions below to complete the process.
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Figure 18 – Restore DMK
Other functions can be selected on the menu of the management software and operated according to the
instructions.
COs is responsible for protecting USB tokens and passwords from theft.
COs must periodically check that the tamper evidence seals are intact and located in the correct position
on the chassis. If evidence of tampering is detected, the module shall be considered non-compliant, and
shall be scrapped.
11.3 User Guidance
The Type-C Port is used to connect the cryptographic module and the communication computer. The
communication computer is connected to the application server via Ethernet.
When CO creates a user account, a default password is generated. The default password is emailed to the
appropriate user. The user must change the password when logging in for the first time. Users can access
the services of the cryptographic module only after their identity authentication is passed. The
cryptographic module provides user applications with services such as user login/logout, data encryption
and decryption, data signature and verification.
Users are responsible for protecting their passwords from theft.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
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13 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 25 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December
2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, October 7, 2022
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108 rev1, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), August 17, 2022
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation,
Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-
Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard:
Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special Publication
800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D,
November 2007
[38E] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication
800-38E, January 2010
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes
of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019
[56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67rev2, November 17
2017
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
Table 26 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptative Proportion Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
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Acronym Definition
DMK Device Master Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
ENT Approved SP800-90B Entropy Source
ESV Entropy Source Validation
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
KAT Know Answer Test
KBKDF Key-Based Key Derivation Functions
KDF Key Derivation Function
KTS Key Transport Methods
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PCT Pairwise Consistency Test
PK Protection Key
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PR Prediction Resistance
RAM Random Access Memory
RCT Repetition Count Test
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
PUB Publication
SDK Software Develop Kit
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter