

# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

# Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module

Software Version 3.0.2.1

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# **Overview**

This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module.

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# **1** Introduction

## **1.1 About FIPS 140**

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. *Validated* is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at <u>https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program</u>.

## **1.2 About this Document**

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module from Tellabs Enterprise, Inc. ("Tellabs") provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.

Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module may also be referred to as the "module" in this document.

### **1.3 External Resources**

The Tellabs website (<u>www.tellabs.com</u>) contains information on Tellabs services and products. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and Tellabs contact information.

### **1.4 Notices**

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# 2 Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module

# 2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification

Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module is a standards-based cryptographic engine for the PanoramaPON management application. The module delivers core cryptographic functions for securing communication to Tellabs Optical LAN networking equipment.

Tellabs Panorama PON Manager Cryptographic Module is used by supported Tellabs products, including Panorama PON Manager.

The module's software version is 3.0.2.1. The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the Java Archive (JAR) file (ccj-3.0.2.1.jar).

The module is a software module that relies on the physical characteristics of the host platform. The module's physical cryptographic boundary is defined by the enclosure of the host platform, which is the General Purpose Device that the module is installed on. For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 validation, the module's embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.

All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.

#### 2.1.1 Validation Level Detail

The following table lists the module's level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:

FIPS 140-2 Section Title	Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1

#### Table 1 - Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section

#### 2.1.2 Modes of Operation

The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode. The module will be in FIPS Approved mode when the appropriate transition method is called. To verify that a module is in the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the user can call a FIPS Approved mode status method (*CryptoServicesRegistrar.isInApprovedOnlyMode()*). If the module is configured to allow FIPS Approved mode operations, a call to

*CryptoServicesRegistrar.setApprovedMode(true)* will switch the current thread of user control into FIPS Approved mode.

In FIPS Approved mode, the module will not provide non-Approved algorithms, therefore, exceptions will be called if the user tries to access non-Approved algorithms in the FIPS Approved mode.

#### 2.1.3 Module Configuration

In default operation, the module will start with both FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode enabled.

If the module detects that the system property *com.safelogic.cryptocomply.fips.approved\_only* is set to *true* the module will start in FIPS Approved mode and non-Approved mode functionality will not be available.

If the underlying JVM is running with a Java Security Manager installed, the module will be running in FIPS Approved mode with secret and private key export disabled.

Use of the module with a Java Security Manager requires the setting of some basic permissions to allow the module HMAC-SHA-256 software integrity test to take place as well as to allow the module itself to examine secret and private keys. The basic permissions required for the module to operate correctly with a Java Security Manager are indicated by a Y in the **Req** column of Table 2 - Available Java Permissions.

Permission	Settings	Req	Usage
RuntimePermission	"getProtectionDomain"	Y	Allows checksum to be
			carried out on jar
RuntimePermission	"accessDeclaredMembers"	Y	Allows use of reflection API
			within the provider
PropertyPermission	"java.runtime.name", "read"	Ν	Only if configuration
			properties are used
SecurityPermission	"putProviderProperty.BCFIPS"	Ν	Only if provider installed
			during execution
CryptoServicesPermission	"unapprovedModeEnabled"	Ν	Only if non-Approved mode
			algorithms required
CryptoServicesPermission	"changeToApprovedModeEnabled"	Ν	Only if threads allowed to
			change modes

#### Table 2 - Available Java Permissions

Permission	Settings	Req	Usage
CryptoServicesPermission	"exportSecretKey"	N	To allow export of secret keys only
CryptoServicesPermission	"exportPrivateKey"	Ν	To allow export of private keys only
CryptoServicesPermission	"exportKeys"	Y	Required to be applied for the module itself. Optional for any other codebase.
CryptoServicesPermission	"tlsNullDigestEnabled"	N	Only required for TLS digest calculations
CryptoServicesPermission	"tlsPKCS15KeyWrapEnabled"	N	Only required if TLS is used with RSA encryption
CryptoServicesPermission	"tlsAlgorithmsEnabled"	Ν	Enables both NullDigest and PKCS15KeyWrap
CryptoServicesPermission	"defaultRandomConfig"	N	Allows setting of default SecureRandom
CryptoServicesPermission	"threadLocalConfig"	N	Required to set a thread local property in the CryptoServicesRegistrar
CryptoServicesPermission	"globalConfig"	Ν	Required to set a global property in the CryptoServicesRegistrar

# 2.1.4 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

#### 2.1.4.1 CAVP Tested Approved Algorithms

The module's cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP).

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
A2720	AES	FIPS 197	CBC, ECB, CFB8, CFB128,	128, 192, 256	Encryption, Decryption
		SP 800-38A	CTR, OFB		
A2720	AES CCM	SP 800-38C	ССМ	128, 192, 256	Generation, Authentication
A2720	AES CMAC	SP 800-38B	CMAC	128, 192, 256	Generation, Authentication
A2720	AES GCM/GMAC <sup>1</sup>	SP 800-38D	GCM/GMAC	128, 192, 256	Generation, Authentication
A2720	CVL: KDF, Existing	SP 800-135	TLS v1.0/1.1 KDF,	Various (See #A2720 for details)	KDF Services
	Application-		TLS 1.2 KDF,		
	Specific <sup>2</sup>		SSH KDF,		
			X9.63 KDF,		
			IKEv2 KDF,		
			SRTP KDF		
A2720	DRBG	SP 800-90A	Hash DRBG	112, 128, 192, 256	Random Bit Generation
			HMAC DRBG	(SHA-1, SHA-2,	
			CTR DRBG	3-Key Triple DES, AES)	

#### Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithm Certificates

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> GCM encryption with an internally generated IV, see Security Policy section 3.4 concerning external IVs. IV generation is compliant with IG A.5. <sup>2</sup> These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
A2720	DSA <sup>3</sup>	FIPS 186-4	Key Pair Generation,	(1024, 160) <sup>4</sup>	Digital Signature Services
			PQG Generation,	(2048, 224)	
			PQG Verification,	(2048, 256)	
			Signature Generation,	(3072, 256)	
			Signature Verification		
A2720	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	Key Generation,	P-192 <sup>5</sup> , P-224, P-256, P-384, P- 521,	Digital Signature Services
			Signature Generation,	K-163 <sup>6</sup> , K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571,	
			Signature Verification,	B-163 <sup>7</sup> , B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571	
			Public Key Validation,		
			Signature Generation		
			Component (CVL)		
A2720	HMAC	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA-1,	Various (KS <bs, ks="">BS)</bs,>	HMAC Generation,
			HMAC-SHA-224,		HMAC Authentication
			HMAC-SHA-256,		
			HMAC-SHA-384,		
			HMAC-SHA-512,		
			HMAC-SHA-512/224,		
			HMAC-SHA-512/256,		
			HMAC-SHA3-224,		
			HMAC-SHA3-256,		
			HMAC-SHA3-384,		
			HMAC-SHA3-512		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> DSA signature generation with SHA-1 is only for use with protocols
<sup>4</sup> Key size only used for Signature Verification
<sup>5</sup> Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
<sup>6</sup> Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation
<sup>7</sup> Curves only used for Signature Verification and Public Key Validation

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
A2720	KBKDF, using Pseudorandom Functions	SP 800-108	Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode	CMAC-based KDF: AES (128, 192, 256), 3-key Triple-DES HMAC-based KDF: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 <sup>8</sup>	KDF Services
A2720 (AES)	KTS: Key Wrapping Using AES <sup>9</sup>	SP 800-38F	AES KW, AES KWP	128, 192, 256	Key Transport For AES, the key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength
A2720 (TDES)	KTS: Key Wrapping Using TDES <sup>10</sup>	SP 800-38F	ТКШ	3-key Triple-DES	Key Transport For Triple-DES, key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength
A2720	RSA	FIPS 186-4 SP 800-56B Section 7.1.2	2048, 3072 Signature Verification (AN 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096 RSA Signature Primitive C 2048	ISI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS): NSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS): Component (CVL): Component (CVL) per SP 800-56B:	Digital Signature Services, Key Transport (per SP 800-56B)
		FIPS 186-2	Signature Verification (AN 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4	NSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5, and PKCSPSS): 4096 bits	

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Note: CAVP testing is not provided for use of the PRFs SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. These must not be used in FIPS Approved mode.
 <sup>9</sup> Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.
 <sup>10</sup> Keys are not established directly into the module using key unwrapping.

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
A2720	SHA-3, SHAKE	FIPS 202	SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256,	N/A	Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications
A2720	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256	N/A	Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature Verification, non-Digital Signature Applications
A2720	Triple-DES	SP 800-67	TCBC, TCFB8, TCFB64, TECB, TOFB, CTR	2-key <sup>11</sup> , 3-key <sup>12</sup>	Encryption, Decryption
A2720	Triple-DES CMAC	SP 800-38B	Triple-DES	Triple-DES with 2-key <sup>13</sup> , 3-key	Generation, Authentication

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 2<sup>20</sup> block limit is enforced by the module, 2-key encryption is disabled.
<sup>12</sup> 3-key Triple-DES encryption must not be used for more than 2<sup>20</sup> blocks for any given key.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> 2<sup>20</sup> block limit is enforced by the module. In FIPS Approved mode, the use of 2-key Triple-DES to generate MACs for anything other than verification purposes is non-compliant.

### 2.1.4.2 Vendor Affirmed Approved Algorithms

The following Approved cryptographic algorithms were implemented with vendor affirmation.

Algorithm	IG Reference	Use
AES-CBC Ciphertext Stealing (CS) CKG using output	Vendor Affirmed per IG A.12 Vendor Affirmed	[Addendum to SP 800-38A, Oct 2010] Functions: Encryption, Decryption Modes: CBC-CS1, CBC-CS2, CBC-CS3 Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 [SP 800-133]
from DRBG <sup>14</sup>	per IG D.12	Section 6.1 (Asymmetric from DRBG) Section 7.1 (Symmetric from DRBG) Using DRBG #A2720
cSHAKE128, cSHAKE256	Vendor Affirmed per IG A.15	[SP 800-185] Section 3, cSHAKE Using SHA3 #A2720, SHAKE #A2720
KAS-SSC <sup>15</sup>	Vendor Affirmed per IG D.1-rev3	<ul> <li>[SP 800-56Ar3]</li> <li>Section 5.6.2.3.1 (Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) Full Public Key Validation Routine)</li> <li>Section 5.6.2.3.2 (Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Full Public Key Validation Routine)</li> <li>Section 5.7 (DLC Primitive)</li> <li>Section 5.8 (Key Derivation Functions for Key Agreement Schemes)</li> <li>Section 5.9 (Key Confirmation)</li> <li>Section 6 (Key Agreement)</li> <li>Parameter sets/Key sizes <ul> <li>ECC: Approved P, B, K Curves per Appendix D</li> <li>FFC: Safe primes per Appendix D (safe primes key generation tested under #A2720)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
KTS: Key Transport <sup>16</sup> Using RSA	Vendor Affirmed per IG D.4	[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.3] RSA-KEM-KWS with, and without, key confirmation Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits
KTS: Key Transport <sup>17</sup> Using RSA	Vendor Affirmed per IG D.4	[SP 800-56B, Section 7.2.2] RSA-OAEP with, and without, key confirmation Key sizes: 2048, 3072 bits

Table 4 - Approved Cryptographic Functions Implemented with Vendor Affirmation
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The resulting key or a generated seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.

Algorithm	IG Reference	Use
PBKDF, password-	Vendor Affirmed	[SP 800-132]
based key derivation	per IG D.6	Options: PBKDF with Option 1a
		Functions: HMAC-based KDF using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
		256, SHA-384, SHA-512
	Using HMAC #A2720	
		Refer also to Security Policy section 3.5 - Enforcement
		and Guidance for Use of the Approved PBKDF
RSA	Vendor Affirmed	[SP 800-131Ar2] Section 3
	per IG A.14	Key sizes: 4096 - 16384 bits
		Using mechanism tested in #A2720

#### 2.1.5 Non-Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 non-Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

Algorithm	Use
MD5 within TLS	[IG D.2, IG 1.23 example 2a]
NDRNG	[IG 7.15, IG 7.14 example 1b]
	Non-deterministic random number generator.
	The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are
	modified by available entropy
RSA Key Wrapping, Non-SP 800-	[IG D.9]
56B compliant	RSA may be used by a calling application as part of a key
	encapsulation scheme.
	Key sizes: 4096 - 16384 bits (key wrapping; key establishment
	methodology provides between 150 and 256 bits of encryption
	strength)

#### 2.1.6 Non-Approved Mode of Operation

The module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

Table 6 - Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions for Use in non-Approved mode Only

Algorithm	Use
AES (non-compliant <sup>18</sup> )	Encryption, Decryption
ARC4 (RC4)	Encryption, Decryption
Blowfish	Encryption, Decryption

<sup>18</sup> Support for additional modes of operation.

Algorithm	Use
Camellia	Encryption, Decryption
CAST5	Encryption, Decryption
DES	Encryption, Decryption
DSA (non-compliant <sup>19</sup> )	Public Key Cryptography
DSTU4145	Public Key Cryptography
ECDSA (non-compliant <sup>20</sup> )	Public Key Cryptography
EdDSA	Public Key Cryptography
ElGamal	Public Key Cryptography
GOST28147	Encryption, Decryption
GOST3410-1994	Hashing
GOST3410-2001	Hashing
GOST3411	Hashing
HMAC-GOST3411	Hashing
HMAC-MD5	Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD128	Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD160	Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD256	Hashing
HMAC-RIPEMD320	Hashing
HMAC-TIGER	Hashing
HMAC-WHIRLPOOL	Hashing
IDEA	Encryption, Decryption
KAS <sup>21</sup> , Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant <sup>22</sup> )	Key Agreement
KAS <sup>23</sup> using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256	Key Agreement
KBKDF using SHA-512/224 or SHA-512/256 (non-compliant)	KDF
MD5	Hashing
OpenSSL PBKDF (non-compliant)	KDF
PKCS#12 PBKDF (non-compliant)	KDF
PKCS#5 Scheme 1 PBKDF (non-compliant)	KDF
PRNG X9.31	Random Number Generation
RC2	Encryption, Decryption
RIPEMD128	Hashing
RIPEMD160	Hashing
RIPEMD256	Hashing
RIPEMD320	Hashing
RSA (non-compliant <sup>24</sup> )	Public Key Cryptography
RSA KTS (non-compliant <sup>25</sup> )	Public Key Cryptography
SCrypt	KDF

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Deterministic signature calculation, support for additional digests, and key sizes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Keys are not directly established into the module using key agreement or transport techniques.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Support for additional digests and signature formats, PKCS#1 1.5 key wrapping, support for additional key sizes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Support for additional key sizes and the establishment of keys of less than 112 bits of security strength.

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Algorithm	Use
SEED	Encryption, Decryption
Serpent	Encryption, Decryption
SipHash	Hashing
SHACAL-2	Encryption, Decryption
TIGER	Hashing
Triple DES (non-compliant <sup>26</sup> )	Encryption, Decryption
Twofish	Encryption, Decryption
WHIRLPOOL	Hashing
XDH	Key Agreement

# 2.2 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys

#### 2.2.1 Critical Security Parameters

The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:

CSP	Description / Usage	
AES Encryption Key	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]	
	AES (128/192/256) encrypt key <sup>27</sup>	
AES Decryption Key	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C, SP 800-38D, Addendum to SP 800-38A]	
	AES (128/192/256) decrypt key	
<b>AES</b> Authentication	[FIPS 197]	
Кеу	AES (128/192/256) CMAC/GMAC key	
AES Wrapping Key	[SP 800-38F]	
	AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key	
DH Agroomont Koy	[SP 800-56Ar3]	
DH Agreement Key	Diffie-Hellman (160 - 512 bits) private key agreement key	
DRBG (CTR AES) V (128 bits) and AES key (128/192/256), entropy input (length of		
DRDG (CTR AES)	security strength)	
DRBG (CTR Triple-	V (64 bits) and Triple-DES key (192), entropy input (length dependent on	
DES)	security strength)	
DRBG (Hash)	V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on	
	security strength)	
DRBG (HMAC)	V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy	
	input (length dependent on security strength)	
DCA Signing Koy	[FIPS 186-4]	
DSA Signing Key	DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key	

#### **Table 7 - Critical Security Parameters**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Support for additional modes of operation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> The AES GCM key and IV are generated randomly per IG A.5, and the Initialization Vector (IV) is a minimum of 96 bits. In the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed. Refer also to Security Policy section 3.4.

CSP	Description / Usage
	[SP 800-56Ar3]
EC Agreement Key	EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-
	409 and B-571) private key agreement key
	[FIPS 186-4]
EC Signing Key	ECDSA (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,
2001811181009	B-409 and B-571) signature generation key
	[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC	Keyed-Hash key (SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3). Key size determined by security
Authentication Key	strength required (>= 112 bits)
IKEv2 Derivation	
Function Secret	[SP 800-135]
Value	Secret value used in construction of key for the specified IKEv2 PRF
	[SP 800-132]
PBKDF Secret Value	Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified PRF
DCA Signing Koy	[FIPS 186-4]
RSA Signing Key	RSA (2048 - 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA Key Transport	[SP 800-56B]
Кеу	RSA (2048 - 16384 bits) key transport (decryption) key
SP 800-56C	
Concatenation	[SP 800-56C]
Derivation Function	Secret value used in construction of key for underlying PRF
Secret Value	
SP 800-108 KDF	[SP 800-108]
Secret Value	Secret value used in construction of key for the specified PRF
SRTP Derivation	[SP 800-135]
Function Secret	Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SRTP PRF
Value	
SSH Derivation	[SP 800-135]
Function Secret	Secret value used in construction of key for the specified SSH PRF
Value	
TLS KDF Secret Value	[SP 800-135]
	Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified TLS PRF
Triple-DES	[SP 800-67]
Encryption Key	Triple-DES (192 bits) encryption key
Triple-DES Decryption Key	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) decryption key
Triple-DES	
Authentication Key	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES (128/192 bits) CMAC key
Triple-DES Wrapping	[SP 800-38F]
Key	Triple-DES key wrapping (192 bits)/unwrapping key (128/192 bits)
	[SP 800-135]
X9.63 KDF Secret	Secret value used in construction of Keyed-Hash key for the specified X9.63
Value	PRF


## 2.2.2 Public Keys

The table below provides a complete list of the public keys used within the module:

#### Table 8 - Public Keys

Public Key	Description / Usage	
DH Agreement Key	[SP 800-56Ar3]	
Dif Agreement Key	Diffie-Hellman (2048 and 3072) public key agreement key	
DSA Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4]	
	DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key	
EC Agreement Key	[SP 800-56Ar3]	
	EC (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283,	
	B-409 and B-571) public key agreement key	
EC Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4]	
	ECDSA (P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-	
	571, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409 and B-571) signature verification key	
RSA Key Transport Key	[SP 800-56B]	
	RSA (2048 - 16384) key transport (encryption) key	
RSA Verification Key	[FIPS 186-4]	
	RSA (1024 - 16384) signature verification key	

## 2.3 Module Interfaces



The figure below shows the module's physical and logical block diagram:

#### Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram

The module's physical boundary is the boundary of the General Purpose Computer (GPC) that the module is installed on, which includes a processor and memory. The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary include the computer's network port, keyboard port, mouse port, power plug, and display. When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module's interfaces are purely logical.

Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware components of the GPC. The module classes are executed on the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) using the classes of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE). The JVM is the interface to the computer's Operating System (OS), which is the interface to the various physical components of the computer. The logical

interface is provided through an Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The API itself defines the module's logical boundary, i.e. all access to the module is through this API. The API provides functions that may be called by an application (see Section 2.4 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.

The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces, which relate to the module's callable interface as follows:

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input	API input parameters – plaintext and/or	Network Interface
	ciphertext data	
Data Output	API output parameters and return values –	Network Interface
	plaintext and/or ciphertext data	
Control Input	API method calls – method calls, or input	Network Interface, Keyboard
	parameters, that specify commands and/or	Interface, Mouse Interface
	control data used to control the operation of	
	the module	
Status Output	API output parameters and return/error	Display Controller, Network
	codes that provide status information used to	Interface
	indicate the state of the module	
Power	None	Power Supply

Table 9 - Logical Interface	/ Physical	Interface Mapping
Tuble 5 Logical Internate	, i nysicai	internace mapping

When the module performs self-tests, is in an error state, is generating keys, or performing zeroization, the module prevents all output on the logical data output interface as only the thread performing the operation has access to the data. The module is single-threaded, and in an error state, the module does not return any output data, only an error value.

# 2.4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

### 2.4.1 Assumption of Roles

The module supports two distinct operator roles, which are the User and Crypto Officer (CO), as indicated in Table 10 - Description of Roles. The cryptographic module implicitly maps the two roles to the services. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.

The module does not support a Maintenance role or bypass capability. The module does not support authentication.

#### Table 10 - Description of Roles

Role	Role Description	Authentication Type
CO	Crypto Officer – Powers the module on and off	N/A – Authentication is not a
		requirement for FIPS 140 Level 1
User	User – The user of the complete API	N/A – Authentication is not a
		requirement for FIPS 140 Level 1

#### 2.4.2 Services

All services implemented by the module are listed in Table 11 - Module Services, Descriptions. The second column provides a description of each service, and availability to the Crypto Officer and User is indicated in columns three and four, respectively. Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services describes all CSP usage by services.

#### Table 11 - Module Services, Descriptions, and Roles

Service	Description	СО	User
Initialize Module and	The JRE will call the static constructor for self-tests on module	Х	
Run Self-Tests on	initialization.		
Demand			
Show Status	A user can call FipsStatus.IsReady() at any time to determine if		Х
	the module is ready.		
	CryptoServicesRegistrar. <i>IsInApprovedOnlyMode()</i> can be called		
	to determine the FIPS mode of operation.		
Zeroize / Power-off	The module uses the JVM garbage collector on thread		Х
	termination.		
Data Encryption	Used to encrypt data.		Х
Data Decryption	Used to decrypt data.		Х
MAC Calculation	Used to calculate data integrity codes with CMAC.		Х
Signature Generation	Used to generate digital signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA).		Х
Signature Verification	Used to verify digital signatures (DSA, ECDSA, RSA).		Х
DRBG (SP 800-90A)	Used for random number, IV and key generation.		Х
output			
Message Hashing	Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3 message digest,		Х
	SHAKE output.		
Keyed Message Hashing	Used to calculate data integrity codes with HMAC.		Х
TLS Key Derivation	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
Function	suitable to be used for a master secret in TLS from a pre-		
	master secret and additional input.		
SP 800-108 KBKDF	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
	additional input.		
SSH Derivation Function	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
	additional input.		

Service	Description	СО	User
X9.63 Derivation	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
Function	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
	additional input.		
SP 800-56C	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
Concatenation	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
Derivation Function	additional input.		
IKEv2 Derivation	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
Function	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
	additional input.		
SRTP Derivation	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to calculate a value		Х
Function	suitable to be used for a secret key from an input secret and		
	additional input.		
PBKDF	(secret input) (outputs secret) Used to generate a key using an		Х
	encoding of a password and an additional function such as a		
	message hash.		
Key Agreement	Used to calculate key agreement values (SP 800-56Ar3, key		Х
Schemes	agreement in non-Approved mode)		
Кеу	Used to encrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)		Х
Wrapping/Transport			
Key Unwrapping	Used to decrypt a key value. (RSA, AES, Triple-DES)		Х
NDRNG Callback	Gathers entropy in a passive manner from a user-provided		Х
	function.		
Utility	Miscellaneous utility functions, does not access CSPs.		Х

Note: The module services are the same in the FIPS Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. The only difference is the function(s) used (Approved/allowed or non-Approved/non-allowed).

Services in the module are accessed via the public APIs of the Jar file. The ability of a thread to invoke non-Approved services depends on whether it has been registered with the module as FIPS Approved mode only. In FIPS Approved only mode, no non-Approved services are accessible. In the presence of a Java SecurityManager FIPS Approved mode services specific to a context (such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS) require specific permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Crypto Officer or User.

In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available, however must only be used in relation to those protocols.

Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

- **G** = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
- **R** = Read: The module reads the CSP. The read access is typically performed before the module uses the CSP.
- **E** = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.

- **W** = Write: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is imported into the module, when the module generates a CSP, or when the module overwrites an existing CSP.
- **Z** = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.

#### Table 12 - CSP Access Rights within Services

													(	CSPs	;												
Services	AES Encryption Key	AES Decryption Key	AES Authentication Key	AES Wrapping Key	DH Agreement Key	DRBG (CTR AES)	DRBG (CTR Triple-DES)	DRBG (Hash)	DRBG (HMAC)	DSA Signing Key	EC Agreement Key	EC Signing Key	HMAC Authentication Key	IKEv2 DF Secret	PBKDF Secret	RSA Signing Key	RSA Key Transport Key	SP 800-56C Concat. DF Secret	SP 800-108 KDF Secret	SRTP DF Secret	SSH DF Secret Value	TLS KDF Secret	<b>Triple-DES Encryption Key</b>	Triple-DES Decryption Key	<b>Friple-DES Authentication Key</b>	Triple-DES Wrapping Key	X9.63 KDF Secret Value
Initialize Module and Run Self-Tests on Demand																											
Show Status																											
Zeroize / Power-off	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ	Ζ
Data Encryption	R																						R				
Data Decryption		R																						R			
MAC Calculation			R																						R		
Signature Generation										R		R				R											
Signature Verification										R		R				R											
DRBG (SP 800-90A) output	G	G	G	G	G	G R	G R	G R	G R	G	G	G	G			G	G						G	G	G	G	
Message Hashing																											
Keyed Message Hashing													R														
TLS Key Derivation Function																						R					
SP 800-108 KBKDF																			R								

													(	CSPs													
Services	AES Encryption Key	AES Decryption Key	AES Authentication Key	AES Wrapping Key	DH Agreement Key	DRBG (CTR AES)	DRBG (CTR Triple-DES)	DRBG (Hash)	DRBG (HMAC)	DSA Signing Key	EC Agreement Key	EC Signing Key	HMAC Authentication Key	IKEv2 DF Secret	PBKDF Secret	RSA Signing Key	RSA Key Transport Key	SP 800-56C Concat. DF Secret	SP 800-108 KDF Secret	SRTP DF Secret	SSH DF Secret Value	TLS KDF Secret	Triple-DES Encryption Key	<b>Triple-DES Decryption Key</b>	<b>Friple-DES Authentication Key</b>	Triple-DES Wrapping Key	X9.63 KDF Secret Value
SSH Derivation Function																					R						
X9.63 Derivation Function					G						G					G											R
SP 800-56C Concatenation Derivation Function					G						G					G		R									
IKEv2 Derivation Function														R													
SRTP Derivation Function																				R							
PBKDF													G R		R												
Key Agreement Schemes	G	G	G	G	R						R		G				R						G	G	G	G	
Key Wrapping/ Transport				R									R				R									R	
Key Unwrapping NDRNG Callback				R		G	G	G	G				R				R									R	
Utility						9	0	0	0																		

# 2.5 Physical Security

The module is a software-only module and does not have physical security mechanisms.

### 2.6 Operational Environment

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.

The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating systems specified in the approved operational environment list in this section. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a logically separated manner. The module's user is considered the owner of the calling application that instantiates the module within the process space of the Java Virtual Machine.

The module optionally uses the Java Security Manager and starts in FIPS Approved mode by default when used with the Java Security Manager. When the module is not used within the context of the Java Security Manager, it will start by default in the non-Approved mode.

The module was tested on the following platforms:

#### Table 13 - Tested Environments

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processor (CPU)
VMware Photon OS 2.0 with JDK 11 on VMware ESXi 6.7	Dell PowerEdge R830	Intel Xeon E5

FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained for other compatible operating systems (in single user mode) where the module source code is unmodified, and the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.

The module, when compiled from the same unmodified source code, is vendor-affirmed to be FIPS 140-2 compliant when running one of the Java SE Runtime environments on any of the following on the following supported single-user operating systems for which operational testing and algorithm testing were not performed:

- Windows Server 2022
- Windows 11

#### 2.6.1 Use of External RNG

The module makes use of the JVM's configured SecureRandom entropy source to provide entropy when required. The module will request entropy as appropriate to the security strength and seeding configuration for the DRBG that is using it and for the default DRBG will request a minimum of 256 bits

of entropy. In approved mode the minimum amount of entropy that can be requested by a DRBG is 112 bits. The module will wait until the SecureRandom.generateSeed() returns the requested amount of entropy, blocking if necessary.

### 2.7 Self-Tests

Each time the module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data has not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.

On power-up or reset, the module performs the self-tests that are described in Table 14 - Power-Up Self-Tests. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Self-Test Failure error state. The module will output a detailed error message when *FipsStatus.isReady()* is called. The error state can only be cleared by reloading the module and calling *FipsStatus.isReady()* again to confirm successful completion of the KATs.

#### 2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests

Test Target	Description
Software Integrity Check	HMAC-SHA-256 (HMAC Cert. #A2720)
AES	KATs: Encryption, Decryption
	Modes: ECB
	Key sizes: 128 bits
AES CCM	KATs: Generation, Verification
	Key sizes: 128 bits
AES CMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification
	Key sizes: 128 bits
AES GCM/GMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification
	Key sizes: 128 bits
DRBG	KATs: HASH_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG
	Security Strengths: 256 bits
DSA	KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
	Key sizes: 2048 bits
ECDSA	KAT: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
	Curves/Key sizes: P-256
НМАС	KATs: Generation, Verification
	SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256
KAS: FFC <sup>28</sup>	KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive "Z" Computation
	Parameter Sets/Key sizes: FB

#### Table 14 - Power-Up Self-Tests

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.

KAS: ECC <sup>29</sup>	KATs: Per IG 9.6 – Primitive "Z" Computation
	Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EC
KBKDF (SP 800-108)	KATs: Per IG 9.4 – Output Verification
	Modes: Counter, Feedback, Double Pipeline
	PRFs: AES-CMAC, Triple-DES-CMAC, SHA-1, SHA-
	224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224,
	SHA-512/256
RSA	KATs: Signature Generation, Signature Verification
	Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA, Key Transport	KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
	Key sizes: 2048 bits
RSA, Key Wrapping	KATs: SP 800-56B specific KATs per IG D.4
	Key sizes: 2048 bits
SHS	KATs: Output Verification
	SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
Triple-DES	KATs: Encryption, Decryption
	Modes: TECB
	Key sizes: 3-Key
Triple-DES CMAC	KATs: Generation, Verification
	Key sizes: 3-Key
XOF (Extendable-Output	KATs: Output Verification
functions)	XOFs: SHAKE256

### 2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number generation (respectively):

Test Target	Description
DRBG	DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
	requested from the DRBG.
DRBG Health Checks	Performed conditionally on DRBG, per SP 800-90A Section
	11.3.
DSA	DSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DSA key
	pair generation.
ECDSA	ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every EC key
	pair generation.
KAS: DH	DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every DH key
	pair generation.
KAS: ECDH/ECCDH	EC DH Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every
	ECDH/ECCDH key pair generation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.

Test Target	Description
KAS: SP 800-56A	Performed conditionally per SP 800-56A Sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2,
Assurances <sup>30</sup>	and/or 5.6.3
NDRNG	NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
	requested from the NDRNG.
RSA	RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key
	pair generation.

# 2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module implements basic protections to mitigate against timing-based attacks against its internal implementations. There are two countermeasures used.

The first countermeasure is Constant Time Comparisons, which protect the digest and integrity algorithms by strictly avoiding "fast fail" comparison of MACs, signatures, and digests so the time taken to compare a MAC, signature, or digest is constant regardless of whether the comparison passes or fails.

The second countermeasure is made up of Numeric Blinding and decryption/signing verification which both protect the RSA algorithm.

Numeric Blinding prevents timing attacks against RSA decryption and signing by providing a random input into the operation which is subsequently eliminated when the result is produced. The random input makes it impossible for a third party observing the private key operation to attempt a timing attack on the operation as they do not have knowledge of the random input and consequently the time taken for the operation tells them nothing about the private value of the RSA key.

Decryption/signing verification is carried out by calculating a primitive encryption or signature verification operation after a corresponding decryption or signing operation before the result of the decryption or signing operation is returned. The purpose of this is to protect against Lenstra's CRT attack by verifying the correctness of the private key calculations involved. Lenstra's CRT attack takes advantage of undetected errors in the use of RSA private keys with CRT values and, if exploitable, can be used to discover the private value of the RSA key.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Implemented by the module, though not required per IG D.1-rev3. The KAS is vendor affirmed to SP 800-56Ar3.

# 3 Security Rules and Guidance

### 3.1 Basic Enforcement

The module design corresponds to the module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 1 module.

- 1. The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Crypto Officer.
- 2. The module does not provide authentication.
- 3. The operator may command the module to perform the power up self-tests by cycling power or resetting the module.
- 4. Power-up self-tests do not require any operator action.
- 5. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Output related to keys and their use is inhibited until the key concerned has been fully generated.
- 6. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
- 7. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
- 8. The module does not support concurrent operators.
- 9. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
- 10. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs from the module's physical boundary.
- 11. The module does not output intermediate key values.

### 3.2 Additional Enforcement with a Java SecurityManager

In the presence of a Java SecurityManager FIPS Approved mode services specific to a context (such as DSA and ECDSA for use in TLS) require specific policy permissions to be configured in the JVM configuration by the Crypto Officer or User. The Java SecurityManager can also be used to restrict the ability of particular code bases to examine CSPs. See Section 2.1.3 –Module Configuration for further advice on this.

In the absence of a Java SecurityManager specific services related to protocols such as TLS are available, however must only be used in relation to those protocols.

#### 3.3 Basic Guidance

The jar file representing the module needs to be installed in a JVM's class path in a manner appropriate to its use in applications running on the JVM.

Functionality in the module is provided in two ways. At the lowest level there are distinct classes that provide access to the FIPS Approved and non-Approved services provided by the module. A more

abstract level of access can also be gained using strings providing operation names passed into the module's Java cryptography provider through the APIs described in the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).

When the module is being used in FIPS Approved-only mode, classes providing implementations of algorithms which are not FIPS Approved, or allowed, are explicitly disabled.

# 3.4 Enforcement and Guidance for AES GCM IVs

IVs for GCM can be generated randomly or via a FipsNonceGenerator. Where an IV is not generated within the module, the module supports the importing of GCM IVs.

In FIPS Approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated randomly, the module enforces the use of an approved DRBG in line with Section 8.2.2 of SP 800-38D.

In FIPS approved mode, when a GCM IV is generated using the FipsNonceGenerator, a counter is used as the basis for the nonce. Rollover of the counter in the FipsNonceGenerator will result in an IllegalStateException indicating the FipsNonceGenerator is exhausted. Per IG A.5, where the AES GCM IV is used for TLS, rollover will terminate any TLS session in process using the current key. The exception can only be recovered from by using a new handshake and creating a new FipsNonceGenerator.

In FIPS Approved mode, importing a GCM IV for encryption that originates from outside the module is non-conformant unless the source of the IV is also FIPS approved for GCM IV generation.

Per IG A.5, Section 2.2.1 of this Security Policy also states that in the event module power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that any of its AES GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

# 3.5 Enforcement and Guidance for Use of the Approved PBKDF

In line with the requirements for SP 800-132, keys generated using the approved PBKDF must only be used for storage applications. Any other use of the approved PBKDF is non-conformant.

In FIPS Approved mode the module enforces that any password used must encode to at least 14 bytes (112 bits) and that the salt is at least 16 bytes (128 bits) long. The iteration count associated with the PBKDF should be as large as practical.

As the module is a general purpose software module, it is not possible to anticipate all the levels of use for the PBKDF, however a user of the module should also note that a password should at least contain enough entropy to be unguessable and also contain enough entropy to reflect the security strength required for the key being generated. In the event a password encoding is simply based on ASCII, a 14byte password is unlikely to contain sufficient entropy for most purposes. Users are referred to Appendix A, "Security Considerations" in SP 800-132 for further information on password, salt, and iteration count selection.

For users interested in introducing memory hardness as a layer on top of the PBKDF, the scrypt augmentation to PBDKF based on HMAC-SHA-256 (as described in RFC 7914) is also available.

# 3.6 Rules for Setting the N and the S String in cSHAKE

To customize the output of the cSHAKE function, the cSHAKE algorithm permits the operator to input strings for the Function-Name input (N) and the Customization String (S).

The Function-Name input (N) is reserved for values specified by NIST and should only be set to the appropriate NIST specified value. Any other use of N is non-conformant.

The Customization String (S) is available to allow users to customize the cSHAKE function as they wish. The length of S is limited to the available size of a byte array in the JVM running the module.

# 3.7 Guidance for the Use of DRBGs and Configuring the JVM's Entropy Source

A user can instantiate the default Approved DRBG for the module explicitly by using SecureRandom.getInstance ("DEFAULT", "CCJ"), or by using a CryptoComplyFipsProvider object instead of the provider name as appropriate. This will seed the Approved DRBG from the live entropy source of the JVM, for example /dev/random on the tested Linux operational environments, with an appropriate number of bits of entropy for the security level of the default Approved DRBG configured for the module.

An additional option is available using the Approved Hash\_DRBG and the process outlined in SP 800-90A, Section 8.6.5. The provider can be configured to use an DRBG chain based on a SHA-512 SP 800-90A DRBG as the internal (source) DRBG providing a seed generation for the external (target) DRBG. To configure this use: "C:HYBRID;ENABLE{AII};"

The two DRBGs are instantiated in a chain as a "Source DRBG" to seed the "Target DRBG" in accordance with Section 7 of Draft NIST SP 800-90C, where the Target DRBG is the default Approved DRBG used by the module.

The initial seed and the subsequent reseeds for the DRBG chain come from the live entropy source configured for the JVM. The DRBG chain will reseed automatically by pausing for 20 requests (which will usually equate to 5120 bits). An entropy gathering thread reseeds the DRBG chain when it has gathered sufficient entropy (currently 256 bits) from the live entropy source. Once reseeded, the request counter is reset and the reseed process begins again.

The "Source DRBG" in the chain is internal to the module and inaccessible to the user to ensure it is only used for generating seeds for the default Approved DRBG of the module.

The user shall ensure that the Approved entropy source is configured per Section 6.1 of this Security Policy and will block, or fail, if it is unable to provide the amount of entropy requested.

# 3.8 Software Installation

The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the general public. Only the compiled module is provided to solution developers. The module and its host application are to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.6 or on an operating system where portability is maintained.

# 4 References and Acronyms

### 4.1 References

#### Table 16 – References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
ANSI X9.31	X9.31-1998, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
	Financial Services Industry (rDSA), September 9, 1998
FIPS 140-2	Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
FIPS 180-4	Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-2	Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 186-4	Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197	Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1	The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS 202	SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
IG	Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
DKCC#1 - 2 1	Validation Program
PKCS#1 v2.1	RSA Cryptography Standard
PKCS#5	Password-Based Cryptography Standard
PKCS#12	Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
SP 800-38A	Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38B	Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
	Authentication
SP 800-38C	Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
	Authentication and Confidentiality
SP 800-38D	Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F	Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
SP 800-56Ar3	Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-56B	Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer
	Factorization Cryptography
SP 800-56C	Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then- Expansion
SP 800-67	Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
SP 800-89	Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
SP 800-90A	Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
SP 800-108	Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions

SP 800-131Ar2	Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
SP 800-132	Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation
SP 800-133	Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
SP 800-135	Recommendation for Existing Application–Specific Key Derivation Functions
SP 800-185	SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash

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### 4.2 Acronyms

The following table defines acronyms found in this document:

#### Table 17 - Acronyms and Terms

Acronym	Term
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with CBC-MAC
CCCS	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CDH	Computational Diffie-Hellman
CFB	Cipher Feedback Mode
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
СО	Crypto Officer
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CS	Ciphertext Stealing
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
CVL	Component Validation List
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DSTU4145	Ukrainian DSTU-4145-2002 Elliptic Curve Scheme
EC	Elliptic Curve
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EdDSA	Edwards Curve DSA using Ed25519, Ed448
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Message Authentication Code
GOST	Gosudarstvennyi Standard Soyuza SSR/Government Standard of the Union of Soviet
	Socialist Republics
GPC	General Purpose Computer
HMAC	(Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IG	Implementation Guidance
IV	Initialization Vector
JAR	Java ARchive
JCA	Java Cryptography Architecture

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JCE	Java Cryptography Extension
JDK	Java Development Kit
JRE	Java Runtime Environment
JVM	Java Virtual Machine
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
КАТ	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KW	Key Wrap
KWP	Key Wrap with Padding
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A	Not Applicable
NDRNG	Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OCB	Offset Codebook Mode
OFB	Output Feedback
OS	Operating System
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PQG	Diffie-Hellman Parameters P, Q and G
RC	Rivest Cipher, Ron's Code
RIPEMD	RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
ТСВС	TDEA Cipher-Block Chaining
TCFB	TDEA Cipher Feedback Mode
TDEA	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
TECB	TDEA Electronic Codebook
TOFB	TDEA Output Feedback
TLS	Transport Layer Security
USB	Universal Serial Bus
XDH	Edwards Curve Diffie-Hellman using X25519, X448
XOF	Extendable-Output Function
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