VMware, Inc.
PCoIP®
Cryptographic Module for VMware View™
Software Version: 3.5.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 5
Prepared for: Prepared by:
VMware, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
3401 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94304
U.S.A.
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
U.S.A
Phone: +1 (877) 486-9273 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
http://www.vmware.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Policy, Version 5.0 November 10, 2011
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© 2011 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
VMware is a registered trademark and VMware View is a trademark of VMware, Inc. in the United States and/or other jurisdiction.
PCoIP, PC-over-IP and Teradici are registered trademarks of Teradici Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. All
other marks and names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................................4
1.2 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................4
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION...........................................................................................................4
2 PCOIP CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR VMWARE VIEW....................................................5
2.1 OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................................................5
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY.........................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary....................................................................................7
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary .....................................................................................8
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................9
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES ..................................................................................................................10
2.4.1 Authentication Mechanism..............................................................................................12
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................13
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................................................13
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT .........................................................................................13
2.7.1 Key Generation...............................................................................................................17
2.7.2 Key Entry and Output .....................................................................................................17
2.7.3 CSP Storage and Zeroization..........................................................................................17
2.8 EMI/EMC....................................................................................................................................17
2.9 SELF-TESTS..................................................................................................................................17
2.10 DESIGN ASSURANCE ....................................................................................................................18
2.11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ................................................................................................18
3 SECURE OPERATION......................................................................................................................19
3.1 MODES OF OPERATION.................................................................................................................19
3.2 STATUS MONITORING ..................................................................................................................19
3.3 CRYPTO-OFFICER GUIDANCE.......................................................................................................19
3.3.1 Installation......................................................................................................................19
3.3.2 Configuration..................................................................................................................19
3.3.3 Management....................................................................................................................20
3.4 USER GUIDANCE ..........................................................................................................................20
4 ACRONYMS AND TERMS...............................................................................................................21
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT OF PCOIP SYSTEM................................................................................... 6
FIGURE 2 – STANDARD GPC BLOCK DIAGRAM............................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 3 – LOGICAL BLOCK DIAGRAM AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY.................................................... 9
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – FIPS 140-2 SECURITY LEVELS....................................................................................................... 6
TABLE 2 – FIPS INTERFACE MAPPINGS..........................................................................................................10
TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO-OFFICER AND USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO TYPE OF ACCESS.......................10
TABLE 4 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM EMPLOYED BY THE MODULE ......................................................13
TABLE 5 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS........................................................................14
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© 2011 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
VMware is a registered trademark and VMware View is a trademark of VMware, Inc. in the United States and/or other jurisdiction.
PCoIP, PC-over-IP and Teradici are registered trademarks of Teradici Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. All
other marks and names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their respective companies.
TABLE 6 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS ......................15
TABLE 7 – ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................................21
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the PCoIP Cryptographic Module for
VMware View from VMware, Inc. This Security Policy describes how the PCoIP Cryptographic Module
for VMware View (software version: 3.5.0) meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run
the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2
validation of the module.
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic
modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp),
which is maintained by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Communication
Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC).
The PCoIP Cryptographic Module for VMware View is referred to in this document as the cryptographic
module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the
following sources:
 The VMware corporate website (http://www.vmware.com) contains information on the full line of
products from VMware.
 The CMVP Validation List (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Submission Summary
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model
 Other supporting documentation and additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to VMware. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-
2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to VMware and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact VMware.
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2 PCoIP Cryptographic Module for VMware View
2.1 Overview
VMware, Inc. is a global leader in virtualization and cloud infrastructure, delivering customer-proven
solutions that reduce IT1
complexity and accelerate the transition to a cloud computing approach, all while
preserving existing investments and improving security and control.
VMware View is a desktop virtualization platform, and the only purpose-built solution for delivering
desktops as a secure managed service. VMware View virtualizes desktop operating systems, applications,
and user data, decoupling these components from their underlying hardware. IT administrators can then
centrally manage and provision these desktop components from the datacenter, creating a rapidly-
deployable private “desktop cloud” infrastructure.
VMware View employs the PC2
-over-IP3®
(PCoIP) protocol, designed by Teradici Corporation specifically
to deliver a user's desktop from a centralized host PC over standard IP networks. The PCoIP protocol
compresses, encrypts, and encodes the entire computing experience at the datacenter and transmits all
required information across a standard IP network to PCoIP client devices. The PCoIP protocol facilitates
the central provisioning, management, maintenance, and securing of enterprise desktops.
VMware’s software implementation of the PCoIP protocol consists of a PCoIP Client and PCoIP Server.
PCoIP Client installs on existing PCs or thin clients across the network, while PCoIP Server installs on the
server or VMware virtual machine with no special hardware required. The communication between the
PCoIP Client and PCoIP Server is secured via the PCoIP Cryptographic Module. Using the PCoIP Crypto
Module, the session management traffic is protected via the TLS4
protocol with FIPS-Approved algorithms,
while the bulk data traffic is protected via the PCoIP protocol which encrypts and authenticates all the data
sent over the network using AES-GCM5
authenticated encryption algorithm.
In a typical deployment, software-based clients and servers are used to remotely access PC desktops.
Figure 1 shows a typical deployment scenario in which software-based PCoIP clients are used to access
virtual machine desktops.
1
IT – Information Technology
2
PC – Personal Computer
3
IP – Internet Protocol
4
TLS – Transport Layer Security
5
GCM – Galois Counter Mode
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VMware ESX
Virtual Desktop
VMware View Client
ESX Server Hosting
Virtual Machines
. . .
PCoIP
Crypto
PCoIP
Client
Enterprise
IP Network
PCoIP
Crypto
PCoIP
Server
View
Agent
Virtual Desktop
PCoIP
Crypto
PCoIP
Server
View
Agent
VMware View Client
PCoIP
Crypto
PCoIP
Client
Figure 1 – Typical Deployment of PCoIP System
All of the cryptographic functionality performed by the VMware View software within a PCoIP session is
provided by the PCoIP Cryptographic Module for VMware View. The PCoIP Cryptographic module is a
single shared library which is used by both the PCoIP server and the PCoIP client applications. The
module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module evaluated for use on a standard General Purpose
Computer (GPC) platform running one of the following operating systems:
 Windows XP
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5.1
The PCoIP®
Cryptographic Module for VMware View is validated as a multi-chip standalone module at the
following FIPS 140-2 Section levels:
Table 1 – FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 2
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Section Section Title Level
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC6
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Cryptographic boundary
The following sections will define the physical and logical boundary of the PCoIP Cryptographic Module.
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software cryptographic module there are no physical security mechanisms implemented per se, the
module must rely on the physical characteristics of the GPC. Thus, the physical cryptographic boundary of
the PCoIP Cryptographic Module for VMware View is defined by the hard metal enclosure around the
computer on which it runs. Figure 2 below depicts the standard hardware platform with accompanying
physical ports, the dotted blue line surrounding the module components represents the module’s physical
cryptographic boundary, while the ports and interfaces exist at the boundary and interface with the various
controllers.
6
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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Cryptographic Boundary
Motherboard
Power
Supply
Standard GPC Block Diagram
UART / Data IO
(Serial Ports)
Super I/O
BIOS
Keyboard /
Mouse
Controller
Keyboard
Mouse
Networking
Clock Driver /
Generator
Microprocessor
System
Controller
Memory
Cache
Graphics /
Video
PCI bus
ISA bus
SDRAM
Plaintext data
Encrypted data
Control data
Status data
Crypto boundary
KEY:
GPC – General Purpose Computer
BIOS – Basic Input/Output System
I/O – Input/Output
ISA – Industry Standard Architecture
PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect
SDRAM – Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
UART – Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
USB – Universal Serial Bus
HDD – Hard Disk Drive
DVD/CD – Digital Video Disc/Compact Disc
FireWire – 1394 Port
FireWire
USB
Audio
HDD
DVD/CD
Figure 2 – Standard GPC Block Diagram
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 3 below shows a logical block diagram of the module, where “Client Application” can represent
either the PCoIP Client or PCoIP Server application described in Section 2.1 above. The module runs on
Windows XP or RHEL 5.1 Operating System. The module’s logical cryptographic boundary encompasses
all functionality contained within a single shared library named pcoip_crypto.dll (on Windows XP) or
libpcoip_crypto.so (on RHEL 5.1).
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Memory
Cryptographic
Module
Operating System
Client Application
CPU
OS schedules
CPU time for
host application
execution
Module loaded
at run-time
Primary Storage
CPU loads OS, client
application, library into
memory when needed
OS translates
intermediate
language into
machine code
CPU runs
machine code
Plaintext data
Encrypted data
Control input
Status output
Crypto boundary
Figure 3 – Logical Block Diagram and Cryptographic Boundary
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s logical interfaces exist at a low level in the software as an Application Programming
Interface (API). The API interface is mapped to the following five logical interfaces:
 Data input
 Data output
 Control input
 Status output
 Power
The module features the physical ports of the GPC, as depicted in Figure 2. The following is a list of
physical interfaces implemented on a GPC:
 Keyboard port
 Network port
 Mouse port
 Audio port
 Graphics/Video port
 DVD/CD7
drive
 LED8
indicators
7
DVD/CD – Digital Video Disc/Compact Disc
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 Power plug/adapter
 Serial port
 Power switch
 USB ports
 FireWire Port
As a software module, the module has no physical characteristics. Thus, the module’s manual controls,
physical indicators, and physical and electrical characteristics are those of the GPC. The FIPS-defined
interfaces map to their physical and logical counterparts as described in Table 2 below.
Table 2 – FIPS Interface Mappings
FIPS-Defined
Logical Interface
Physical Interface Mapping
(GPC)
Logical Interface Mapping
(Module)
Data Input Interface Keyboard, mouse, DVD/CD, and
serial/network/USB/FireWire port
The API calls that accept input data for
processing through their arguments.
Data Output Interface Graphics/Video, audio and serial/
/network/USB/FireWire port
The API calls that return by means of their
return codes or arguments generated or
processed data back to the caller.
Control Input Interface Keyboard, mouse, DVD/CD, and
serial/network/USB/FireWire port,
power switch
The API calls that are used to initialize and
control the operation of the module.
Status Output Interface Graphics/Video, audio, LED indicators
and serial/network/USB/ FireWire
port
Return values for API calls.
Power Interface Power input Not Applicable
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports the following authorized roles: the Crypto-Officer (CO) role and the User role. Once
authenticated, the operator is authorized to assume both the Crypto-Officer and User role.
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer and User role are listed in Table 3 below. The
following definitions are used in the “CSP9
and Type of Access” column in Table 3:
 R – The CSP is read or referenced by the service.
 W – The CSP is written or updated by the service.
 X – The CSP is used in the execution of a cryptographic function.
Table 3 – Mapping of Crypto-Officer and User Role’s Services to Type of Access
Service
Role
Description CSP and Type of Access
CO User
tera_crypto_aes_256_encrypt   Performs AES-256 ECB
encryption
AES ECB Key – R, W, X
tera_crypto_aes_256_decrypt   Performs AES-256 ECB
decryption
AES EBC Key – R, W, X
8
LED – Light-Emitting Diode
9
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
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Service
Role
Description CSP and Type of Access
CO User
tera_crypto_cipher_create()   Creates a cipher object AES Key – R, W, X
IV – R, W, X
Legacy10 AES Key – R, W, X
tera_crypto_cipher_csps_get()   Gets the key, salt, and
SPI for the specified
cipher object
AES Key – R
IV – R
tera_crypto_cipher_csps_set()   Sets the key, salt, and
SPI for the specified
cipher object
AES Key – R, W
IV – R, W
tera_crypto_cipher_csps_use_legacy()   Specifies whether to use
the legacy salt, key, and
SPI or encrypted key,
salt, and SPI when
encrypting or decrypting
with the cipher object
AES Key – R, W
IV – R, W
Legacy AES Key – R, W
tera_crypto_cipher_delete()   Zeroizes all key, salt,
and SPI values and
returns cipher objects
to the memory pool
AES Key – R, W
Legacy AES Key – R, W
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_key_get()   Gets the key for the
specified cipher object
Legacy AES Key – R
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_key_set()   Sets the key for the
specified cipher object
Legacy AES Key – R, W
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_salt_get()   Gets the salt for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_salt_set()   Sets the salt for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_spi_get()   Gets the SPI for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_cipher_legacy_spi_set()   Sets the SPI for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_cipher_spi_get()   Gets the SPI for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_cipher_spi_set()   Sets the SPI for the
specified cipher object
None
tera_crypto_esp_packet_authenticate()   Authenticates a received
IPsec ESP packet
None
tera_crypto_esp_packet_decrypt()   Decrypts the ESP11
packet using the
specified cipher object
AES Key – R, W, X,
IV – R, W, X
Legacy AES Key – R, W, X
AES ECB12 Key – R, W, X
10
Legacy – Unencrypted AES GCM Parameters
11
ESP – Encapsulating Security Payload
12
ECB – Electronic Codebook
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Service
Role
Description CSP and Type of Access
CO User
tera_crypto_esp_packet_encrypt()   Encrypts the ESP packet
using the specified
cipher object
AES Key – R, W, X,
IV – R, W, X
Legacy AES Key – R, W, X
AES ECB Key – R, W, X
tera_crypto_esp_packet_handle_get()   Retrieves the cipher
object handle
None
tera_crypto_exit()   Shuts down the
cryptographic module
(zeroizing keys) before
program exit
AES Key – R, W
IV – R, W, X
Legacy AES Key – R, W
tera_crypto_fips_mode_get()   Returns the current
FIPS mode of operation
None
tera_crypto_fips_mode_set()   Enables or disables the
FIPS mode of operation
None
tera_crypto_get_build_id()   Retrieves the build ID
(version) of the crypto
module
None
tera_crypto_get_build_date()   Retrieves the date that
the crypto module was
build
None
tera_crypto_init()   Initializes the
cryptographic module at
the start of the
application
None
tera_crypto_rand_bytes()   Calls ANSI X9.31 RNG
to create a
cryptographically strong
pseudo-random number
Seed key – R, W, X
Seed – R, W, X
IV – R, W, X
tera_crypto_self_test()   Performs the FIPS
power-up self test
HMAC SHA-256 Key – R, W, X
Send and receive session initiation data   OpenSSL used for TLS
connection for
management traffic
AES CBC Key – R, W, X
Seed – R, W, X
Seed key – R, W, X
2.4.1 Authentication Mechanism
The module employs the following authentication method to authenticate the Crypto-Officer and the User.
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Table 4 – Authentication Mechanism Employed by the Module
Role
Authentication
Type
Authentication
Strength
Crypto-Officer or
User
Password The authentication mechanism is provided by the host
Operating System. Proper operation of the module requires
that the host operating system be configured to enforce a
password length of at least 8 (eight) characters long.
Alphabetic (uppercase and lowercase) and numeric characters
can be used, which gives a total of 62 characters to choose
from. With the possibility of repeating characters, the chance
of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1 in 628
, or 1 in 2 X
1014
.
Assuming that no password lockout settings were configured,
that no delay is configured between password attempts, and
that an attacker could attempt 100 password entries per
minute, then the probability that a random attempt will
succeed is still less than one in 2 X 1012
(100 in 2 X 1014
).
Therefore, the module is sufficiently protected against the
random attempt attack for each of the Operating Systems on
which it was tested.
2.5 Physical Security
The PCoIP®
Cryptographic Module for VMware View is purely a software module. As such, it depends on
the physical characteristics of the GPC and its protection mechanisms. Thus, physical security
requirements do not apply.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested for FIPS 140-2 validation running on Windows XP and Red Hat Enterprise Linux
(RHEL) 5.1 operating systems. All cryptographic keys and CSPs are either hardcoded or under the control
of the OS. The OS protects the CSPs against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. The
OS uses its native memory management mechanisms to ensure that outside processes cannot access the
process space used by the module. The module only allows access to CSPs through its well-defined APIs.
The required operating systems on which the module is supported are Windows XP and RHEL 5.1, which
were evaluated to the CC13
requirements at evaluation assurance level 4+. Windows XP was validated on
01 April 2007 (Validation Report Number: CCEVS-07-0023, http://www.niap-ccevs.org/st/st_vid9506-
vr.pdf) and RHEL 5.1 was validated on 21 April 2008 (Validation Report Number: CCEVS-VR-
VID10286-2008, http://www.niap-ccevs.org/st/st_vid10286-vr.pdf).
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module employs the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 5 below.
13
CC – Common Criteria
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Table 5 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Approved Security Function Certificate Number
Symmetric Key Algorithm
AES GCM – 128-bit 1640
AES CBC14
– 128- and 256-bit 1642
AES ECB – 256-bit 1639
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
SHA-256* 1443
Message Authentication Code (MAC) Function
HMAC* using SHA-256 964
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
ANSI15
X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG* 879
Additionally, the module utilizes the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations:
 Salsa12: 256-bit
 RSA encrypt/decrypt (key transport): 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, 7680-, 15360-bits (key wrapping; key
establishment methodology provides between 80 and 256 bits of encryption strength).*
14
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
15
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
*see SP800-131A for deprecation statements
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The module supports the following critical security parameters:
Table 6 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type CSP
Strength
Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES Key 128-bit AES
GCM key
128-bit Generated internally
using the ANSI X9.31
PRNG or entered
electronically in
encrypted form
Exits the
module in
encrypted form
Stored in
volatile
memory
By power cycle or
Zeroization
Service
Symmetric
encryption/decryption (for
data plane) using 128-bit
AES GCM
Initialization
Vector (IV)
64-bit CSP 64-bit Generated internally
using the ANSI X9.31
PRNG
Never exits the
module
Stored in
volatile
memory
By uninstalling the
module
Symmetric
encryption/decryption (for
data plane) using 128-bit
AES GCM
RSA Public
Key
RSA 1024-
to 15360-
bit key
Between
80- to
256-bits
Hard coded in module
binary
Exits the
module in
plaintext form
Stored in
module binary
By power cycle or
Zeroization
Service
Key Transport
RSA Private
Key
RSA 1024-
to 15360-
bit key
Between
80- to
256-bits
Hard coded in module
binary
None Stored in
module binary
By uninstalling
module and
reformatting the
GPC hard drive
Key Transport
Legacy
AES Key
128-bit AES
GCM key
128-bit Generated internally
using the ANSI X9.31
PRNG or entered
electronically in
plaintext form
Exits the
module in
plaintext form
Stored in
volatile
memory
By power cycle or
Zeroization
Service
Symmetric
encryption/decryption (for
data plane) using 128-bit
AES GCM
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CSP CSP Type CSP
Strength
Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES ECB Key 256-bit AES
ECB key
256-bit Generated during
development and
hard-coded in the
module
Never exits the
module
Hard-coded By uninstalling the
module and
reformatting the
GPC hard drive
Encryption of AES key, salt,
and SPI using 256-bit AES
ECB for key wrapping
AES CBC Key 128-, 256-
bit AES
CBC key
128-, 256-
bit
Generated internally
using the ANSI X9.31
PRNG or entered
electronically in
encrypted form
None Stored in
volatile
memory
By power cycle or
TLS session
termination
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
HMAC SHA-
256 Key
HMAC
SHA-256
112-bit Generated during
development and
hard-coded in the
module
None Hard-coded By uninstalling the
module and
reformatting the
GPC hard drive
Perform software integrity
test
X9.31 PRNG
Seed Key
128, 256-
bit AES key
128, 256-
bit
Generated
internally
None Stored in
volatile
memory
By power cycle or
TLS session
termination
Generate FIPS Approved
random number
X9.31 PRNG
Seed
128-bit of
Seed value
128-bit Generated
internally
None Stored in
volatile
memory
By power cycle or
TLS session
termination
Generate FIPS Approved
random number
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.7.1 Key Generation
The module uses an ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG implementation to generate cryptographic keys.
2.7.2 Key Entry and Output
Keys can be passed to the cryptographic module as parameters from the client application via the APIs.
The client application using the module is responsible for ensuring that the input of secret and private keys
is accomplished in encrypted form. The legacy AES key and the RSA public key are the only keys that can
be output from the module in plaintext. The legacy key never leaves the physical boundary. It is also
possible to input the legacy AES key in plaintext.
2.7.3 CSP Storage and Zeroization
The module persistently stores the following keys and CSPs:
 AES ECB Key
 HMAC SHA-256 Key
 RSA Private Key
All persistently-stored keys can be zeroized by uninstalling the cryptographic module and reformatting the
hard drive. All ephemeral keys and CSPs can be zeroized by calling the tera_crypto_cipher_delete() or
tera_crypto_exit() API described in Table 6, or by power-cycling the host GPC. The AES CBC key, X9.31
seed key, and X9.31 seed are OpenSSL keys and are zeroized by the termination of the TLS connection.
2.8 EMI/EMC
The module is a software module and depends on the GPC for its physical characteristics. However, the
GPC must have been tested for, and meet, applicable Federal Communications Commission (FCC) EMI
and EMC requirements for business use as defined in Subpart B, Class A of FCC 47 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 15. All systems sold in the United States must meet the applicable FCC requirements.
2.9 Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests at power-up:
 Software integrity test using HMAC SHA-256
 Cryptographic Algorithm tests
o AES GCM KAT16
o AES ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
o AES CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
o HMAC SHA-256 KAT
o RSA encrypt/decrypt KAT
o ANSI X9.31 PRNG Appendix A.2.4 KAT
The module performs the following conditional self-tests:
 ANSI X9.31 Continuous Random Number Generator test (CRNGT)
The module enters an error state when a power-up self-test fails. The power-up self-tests run through to
completion without interruption, and provide no mechanism for data output. Upon any power-up self-test
failure, the module enters a critical error state where it sets an internal error flag and returns the control
back to the client application. A power-up self-test error can only be cleared by restarting the module.
16
KAT – Known Answer Test
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Failure of a conditional self-test transitions the module to a critical error state. No data output or
cryptographic operations are possible when the module enters this state. After the module provides error
status, the critical error can only be cleared by restarting the module.
2.10Design Assurance
VMware uses Subversion (SVN) version control system as the configuration management system. The
control system provides code version control, code sharing and build management. SVN supports source
code check-in, check-out, and merging. Branches in subversion are used to isolate projects and release
developments. It can also be locked during different phases of control changes.
Additionally, Microsoft Visual SourceSafe (VSS) version 6.0 is used to provide configuration management
for the module’s FIPS documentation. This software provides access control, versioning, and logging.
2.11Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks in an Approved FIPS mode of operation.
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This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3 Secure Operation
The PCoIP®
Cryptographic Module for VMware View meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The
sections below describe how to place and keep the module in its FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Modes of Operation
The cryptographic module will be provided as a part of the client application. The module is a shared
library that is accessed by a client application to provide cryptographic services. The module has two
modes of operation: FIPS-Approved mode and non-FIPS-Approved mode.
Non-FIPS-Approved services are disabled in FIPS-Approved mode of operation. In its non-FIPS-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports Salsa12-256 algorithm. The non-FIPS-Approved mode
of operation is the default configuration.
3.2 Status Monitoring
Operators are able to monitor the status of the module by using the tera_crypto_fips_mode_get() service.
The Crypto-Officer should monitor the module’s status regularly for FIPS mode of operation. The CO can
also check the status of the module by checking the log file of the host operating system. Statuses are
represented as follows:
 “Running in the FIPS approved mode”
 “Running in the non-FIPS mode”
 “FIPS power-up/self-test passed”
 “FIPS power-up/self-test failed”
3.3 Crypto-Officer Guidance
With the delivered client application software, the CO receives detailed documentation on installing,
uninstalling, configuring, managing, and upgrading the client application.
3.3.1 Installation
The Crypto-Officer is an authorized IT administrator responsible for installing and initializing the module.
The module is installed during the process of installing the client application. The CO must ensure that the
client application is installed on one of the CC-evaluated operating systems listed in Section 2.6. The CO
must also ensure that the client application is installed on a machine that meets the minimum hardware and
software requirements.
3.3.2 Configuration
The module’s mode of operation is determined by a configuration setting. Full instructions for the CO to
place the module in FIPS-Approved mode are found in the document Enabling the FIPS-Approved Mode of
Operation in the VMware View Rev 1.0. Once the VMware View is configured to operate in the FIPS-
Approved mode, the PCoIP Cryptographic module starts in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation and only
uses FIPS-Approved ciphers for all cryptographic functionality. If the VMware View is not configured for
the FIPS-Approved mode, then the module starts in non-FIPS-Approved mode and it may use non-FIPS-
Approved ciphers as described in section 3.1.
Once the mode of operation is set, it can only be changed by calling tera_crypto_exit(), followed by a call
to tera_crypto_init().
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3.3.3 Management
No additional management activities are required for the secure operation of the module.
3.4 User Guidance
The User does not have any ability to install the module. Operators in the User role are able to use the
services available to the User role listed in Table 3. However, they should report to the Crypto-Officer if
any irregular activity is noticed.
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© 2011 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms and Terms
This section defines the acronyms and terms used throughout the Security Policy.
Table 7 – Acronyms
Acronym/Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
BIOS Basic Input/output System
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CD Compact Disc
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSEC Communications Security Establishment of Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DVD Digital Video Disc
ECB Electronic Codebook
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FCC Federal Communication Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GPC General Purpose Computer
GPO Group Policy Object
HD High Definition
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
ISA Industry Standard Architecture
IT Information Technology
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Acronym/Term Definition
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
Legacy Unencrypted AES GCM Parameters
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PC Personal Computer
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PCoIP Personal Computer Over Internet Protocol
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
RAM Random Access Memory
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
Salsa Stream Cipher
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SPI Security Parameter Index
SVN Subversion
TLS Transport Layer Security
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
USB Universal Serial Bus
VSS Visual SourceSafe
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
U.S.A.
Phone: +1 703 267 6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com