CIGENT SECURE SSD ADVANCED FIPS M.2
2280
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary
SECURITY POLICY
Document Revision: V1.00
REVISION HISTORY
Author(s) Version Updates
Tom Ricoy V1.00 Initial Release
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................3
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY .........................................................................5
3 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................5
4 SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION ............................................................................6
5 PHYSICAL PORTS AND LOGICAL INTERFACES ............................................7
6 SECURITY RULES ................................................................................................7
6.1 NON-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION......................................................7
6.2 SECURITY INITIALIZATION ..............................................................................9
6.3 FIPS-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ....................................................11
6.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE .......................................................12
6.5 USER GUIDANCE ..............................................................................................12
6.6 SELF TESTS ........................................................................................................12
6.6.1 POWER UP SELF TESTS ............................................................................13
6.6.2 CONDITIONAL SELF TESTS ......................................................................15
7 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS, PUBLIC KEYS, AND PRIVATE KEYS.................16
8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ...................................19
9 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY .............................................................................22
9.1 AUTHENTICATED SERVICES ..........................................................................22
9.2 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICE .......................................................................24
10 APPROVED ALGORITHMS ..............................................................................26
11 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY .........................................................................29
12 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY ................................................29
1 INTRODUCTION
The Cigent Secure SSD Advanced FIPS M.2 2280 from Cigent Technology
Inc., hereafter referred to as “Cigent SSDs” or the “cryptographic
modules” are multi-chip embedded cryptographic modules designed to
fulfill FIPS 140-2 level 2 requirements and offer on-the-fly AES encryption
and decryption of user data stored on the NAND Flash. Cigent SSDs offer
NVMe PCIe interface and are fully compliant with industry standard TCG
OPAL SSC protocol.
MODULE CAPACITY HW P/N AND VERSION FW
VERSION
CIGENT
SECURE SSD
ADVANCED
FIPS M.2 2280
512GB CGN-110050IF ECPM13.1
1024GB CGN-110100IF ECPM13.1
2048GB CGN-110200IF ECPM13.1
Exhibit 1 - Cryptographic Module Configurations
Exhibit 2 - Specification of the Cigent Secure SSD Advanced FIPS M.2
2280 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom: top side, bottom
side).
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY
The cryptographic boundary of the modules is the physical perimeter of
the PCB including the physical connector (NVMe). The following diagram
defines the cryptographic boundary as Exhibit 3.
PS5012-E12
DDR Memory
Flash
Flash
.
.
.
Cryptographic
Boundary
NVMe Interface
Exhibit 3 - Specification of Cryptographic Boundary
3 ACRONYMS
TERM DESCRIPTION
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic
Compatibility
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
TERM DESCRIPTION
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
MEK Media Encryption Key
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Exhibit 4 - Specification of Acronyms and their Descriptions
4 SECURITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION
This document was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation
of the module. The following table lists the module’s FIPS 140-2 security
level for each section as Exhibit 5.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AREA LEVEL
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Exhibit 5 - Security Level Table.
5 PHYSICAL PORTS AND LOGICAL INTERFACES
The ports and interfaces of the cryptographic module are as follows:
 NVMe Connector
The following ports are disabled during the manufacturing process and
physically protected by the module’s physical security mechanisms.
Therefore, they are considered latent-functionality and not available
when operating in FIPS mode or non-FIPS mode:
 JTAG
 UART
Exhibit 6 shows how the module’s physical interfaces map to the logical
interfaces defined in FIPS 140-2.
PHYSICAL PORT LOGICAL INTERFACE
NVMe Connector Data Input
NVMe Connector Control Input
NVMe Connector Data Output
NVMe Connector Status Output
NVMe Connector Power
Exhibit 6 - Specification of Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and
Logical Interfaces
6 SECURITY RULES
6.1 NON-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
The moment the module is shipped from the factory, in this fresh out-of-
box state the module is in a non-approved mode of operation. The
Cryptographic Officer shall follow the requirements defined in the
Security Policy including following the initialization procedures in section
6.2 to initialize the module into a FIPS Approved mode of operation
In the non-approved mode of operation, the module supports the
following services and algorithms:
ROLE SERVICE ALGORITHMS
Unauthenticated Role Power Cycle N/A
Unauthenticated Role Generate Random Number DRBG (non-compliant)
Unauthenticated Role Show Status N/A
Anybody TCG Get MBR N/A
Unauthenticated Role Reset N/A
Unauthenticated Role Return to uninitialized
state(PSID)
DRBG (non-compliant)
AES-XTS (non-compliant)
AES-KW (non-compliant)
Unauthenticated Role Show FIPS approve mode state N/A
Anybody TCG Get MSID N/A
Anybody TCG Session Control HMAC (non-compliant)
SHA (non-compliant)
PBKDF (non-compliant)
Unauthenticated Role NVMe Standard N/A
Unauthenticated Role User Data Read/Write AES-XTS (non-compliant)
Unauthenticated Role TCG Session Control N/A
Unauthenticated Role Non User Data Output N/A
Unauthenticated Role Non User Data Input N/A
Unauthenticated Role Configuration N/A
Unauthenticated Role Self-Test N/A
Unauthenticated Role Show Status(DAS) N/A
Cryptographic Officer
(Drive Owner)
TCG Activate AES-KW (non-compliant)
Cryptographic Officer,
User
TCG Set PIN SHA (non-compliant)
Cryptographic Officer,
User
TCG Gen Key DRBG (non-compliant)
Cryptographic Officer TCG Enable/Disable Authority N/A
Cryptographic Officer TCG Set/Get LBA Range N/A
Cryptographic Officer,
User
TCG Lock / Unlock LBA Range AES-XTS (non-compliant)
AES-KW (non-compliant)
ROLE SERVICE ALGORITHMS
Cryptographic Officer Return to uninitialized state DRBG (non-compliant)
AES-XTS (non-compliant)
AES-KW (non-compliant)
Cryptographic Officer TCG Set MBR N/A
Cryptographic Officer TCG SET/GET DataStore N/A
Cryptographic Officer TCG SET ACE N/A
Cryptographic Officer TCG Enable/Disable MBR Mode N/A
Exhibit 7 - Non-Approved Mode Services
NOTE:
Unauthenticated Role is a role who is eligible for making use of non-TCG
OPAL commands.
Anybody is a role who is able to use the TCG OPAL command based
services (as listed in Exhibit 7) without password.
6.2 SECURITY INITIALIZATION
Cryptographic Officer (Drive Owner) needs to follow these steps to
initialize the cryptographic module into FIPS approved mode after having
received the Cigent SSD drive.
1. Examine the tamper evidence and check the module has not been
tampered.
2. StartSession SID of AdminSP with MSID password, and then set new
password for SID password. The new password shall be at least 20
bytes.
3. Disable AdminSP “Makers” Authority.
4. Execute TCG activate command to have the module enter TCG
active mode.
5. StartSession Admin1 of LockingSP with new password of SID in
Step2, and then set new password for Admin1-4 passwords and
User1-9 passwords of LockingSP. The new passwords shall be at
least 20 bytes.
6. Configure all LockingRanges of LockinSP by setting ReadLockEnabled
and WriteLockEnabled columns to TRUE.
7. Power cycle the module.
8. Check if the module is in the FIPS approved mode by using the
Identify controller command response data byte 4093 bit1 (NVMe).
The bit1 shall be set to 1.
9. Check the module’s firmware version using the Identify controller
command response data byte 64-71 (NVME). The firmware version
shall be an approved version as per Exhibit 1 above.
NOTE: New firmware versions within the scope of this validation
must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other
firmware loaded into this module that is not reflected in Exhibit 1
above is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate
FIPS 140-2 validation.
After following these steps the drive is in the FIPS approved mode of
operation.
6.3 FIPS-APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
Once the Cryptographic Officer has followed the initialization procedures
in section 6.2, the module is in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. Any
violation of section 6.2 or other requirements specified in the Security
Policy will place this module in a non-approved mode of operation.
In the FIPS-approved mode of operation the module shall adhere to the
following rules:
1. Operators shall not use passwords less than 20 bytes.
2. The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for
use in key generation.
3. The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS
140-2 IG A.9 (ex:. key_1 ≠ key_2).
4. The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form.
5. The cryptographic module enters the FIPS Error State upon
failure of self-tests and the module ceases to provide
cryptographic services and inhibits all data outputs.
6. The approved DRBG shall be used for generating
cryptographic keys.
7. The cryptographic module shall enforce role-based
authentication for security relevant services.
8. The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational
environment by the secure firmware load test using RSA-2048
with SHA-256.
9. An operator can invoke on demand power-on self tests by
power cycling the module.
10. Data output interface is inhibited when module is performing
self-test and when the module is in an Error State.
11. Data output interface is logically disconnected when module
is performing key generation or zeroization processes.
12. Caveat: The module generates cryptographic keys whose
strengths are modified by available entropy
6.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OFFICER GUIDANCE
1. Periodically examine tamper evidence, if evidence of tamper has
been detected then the device must be put out of service and the
Cryptographic Officer (Drive Owner) shall be notified.
2. When first executing StartSession with the password provided by
Cryptographic Officer (Drive Owner), the Cryptographic Officer (CO)
needs to change to a new password for the CO himself and the
password must contain at least 20 bytes.
6.5 USER GUIDANCE
1. When first executing StartSession with the password which was
provided by CO, user needs to change to a new user password and
the password must contain at least 20 bytes.
6.6 SELF TESTS
When self tests fail, module either enters the Boot Code Fail Loop State
or the FIPS error state in which it ceases to provide any services to the
host and where the error can only be cleared by power-cycling of the
module.
FIPS Error State: When module enters FIPS Error State, the module can’t
service any host commands and the DAS signal pin will toggle at a 1Hz
frequency. (The DAS signal default is high.)
Boot Code Fail Loop State: When module enters Boot Code Fail Loop
State, the module is not accessible by the host. This is an implicit status
as no service nor command input will be processed and the data output
and status output interfaces are inhibited.
Note: For different form factor, the assigned DAS PIN number is:
PS5012-E12 M.2 2280 NVMe NAND Flash SSD (PIN#10)
6.6.1 POWER UP SELF TESTS
Function Description Failure Handle
Rom Code SHA 256 bit
KAT
Mode : SHA-256
Boot Code Fail Loop
State
Rom Code RSA 2048 bit
KAT
Mode : RSA 2048 SHA-
256 PSS Signature
Verification
Boot Code Fail Loop
State
Boot Loader Integrity Firmware Integrity Test
Mode : RSA 2048 SHA-
256 PSS Signature
Verification
Boot Code Fail Loop
State
Firmware Integrity Firmware Integrity Test
Mode : RSA 2048 SHA-
256 PSS Signature
Verification
FIPS Error State
Firmware AES XTS 256 bit
Encrypt
KAT
Mode : AES-XTS-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware AES XTS 256 bit
Decrypt
KAT
Mode : AES-XTS-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware SHA 256 bit
KAT
Mode : SHA-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware SHA 512 bit
KAT
Mode : SHA-512
FIPS Error State
Firmware HMAC SHA 256
bit
KAT
Mode : HMAC SHA-256
FIPS Error State
Function Description Failure Handle
Firmware AES Key Wrap KAT
Mode : AES-KW-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware AES Key Unwrap KAT
Mode : AES-KW-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware DRBG
KAT
Mode : HMAC-SHA-256-
DRBG
FIPS Error State
Firmware DRBG Health
Tests
SP 800-90A Section 11.3
Health Tests
Mode : HMAC-SHA-256-
DRBG
FIPS Error State
Firmware AES CBC 256 bit
Encrypt
KAT
Mode : AES-CBC-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware AES CBC 256 bit
Decrypt
KAT
Mode : AES-CBC-256
FIPS Error State
Firmware SP 800-132
PBKDF
KAT
Mode : HMAC-SHA-256
FIPS Error State
Exhibit 8 - Power Up Self Tests
6.6.2 CONDITIONAL SELF TESTS
Function Description Failure Handle
DRBG Conditional: Continuous
RNG test for DRBG
FIPS Error State
NDRNG Conditional: Continuous
RNG test for NDRNG
FIPS Error State
Firmware Download Check Conditional: RSA 2048
SHA-256 PSS Signature
Verification
Abort the
Microcode
Download
command and
discard the new
image. FW will
perform an
additional RSA 2048
SHA-256 PSS KAT to
attempt error
recovery. If the KAT
fails, module
immediately enters
the FIPS error state.
If the KAT succeeds
module is
operational.
Exhibit 9 - Conditional Self Tests
7 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS, PUBLIC KEYS, AND
PRIVATE KEYS
The module supports the following CSPs and Public Keys as defined in
Exhibit 10 below.
CSP or
Public Key
Type Generation Storage Zeroization
Data Encryption
Key (DEK)
AES-XTS-256
SP800-90A
HMAC-SHA-
256-DRBG
Encrypted by Key
Encryption Key and
stored in NAND
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
all storage
locations via
“Return to
uninitialized
state” and
“TCG Gen Key”
services
User Key
Encryption Key
(UKEK)
AES-KW-256
SP800-90A
HMAC-
SHA256-
DRBG
Encrypted by PBKDF
Master Key with AES-KW-
256 and stored in NAND
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
all storage
locations via
“Return to
uninitialized
state” service
PBKDF
Master Key
Keying
Material for
AES-KW-256
SP800-132
PBKDF
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
DRAM and
registers after
each use and
by “Return to
uninitialized
state” service
CSP or
Public Key
Type Generation Storage Zeroization
Operator
Password
(Crypto Officer
password/user
password)
20 - 32 byte
Password
N/A –
Generated
outside of the
module
SHA-512 stored in NAND
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Plaintext
values are
actively
overwritten
when
executing “TCG
Session
Control”
service with
End of Session
command
and “Return to
uninitialized
state” (CO)
PBKDF Internal
State
SP800-132
PBKDF with
HMAC-SHA-
256
SP800-132
PBKDF with
HMAC-SHA-
256
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
DRAM and
registers after
each use and
by “Return to
uninitialized
state” service
Seed Material of
SP800-90A
Entropy Input
and Nonce
for
SP800-90A
HMAC-SHA-
256-DRBG
NDRNG Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
DRAM and
registers after
each use and
by “Return to
uninitialized
state” service
CSP or
Public Key
Type Generation Storage Zeroization
Internal State of
SP800-90A
V and Key for
SP800-90A
HMAC-SHA-
256-DRBG
SP800-90A
HMAC-SHA-
256-DRBG
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
Actively
overwritten in
DRAM and
registers after
each use and
by “Return to
uninitialized
state” service
RSA Code Sign
Public Key
RSA-2048 N/A –
Generated
outside of the
module
Plaintext in DRAM and
registers
SHA-256 message digest
value is stored in OTP-
ROM
N/A
Exhibit 10 - List of CSPs
Note: In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module
performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP 800-133
(Vendor Affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys are the
unmodified output from SP 800-90A DRBG.
8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY
ROLE AUTHENTICATION
TYPE
AUTHENTICATION
DATA
Cryptographic Officer (Drive
Owner)
Role Base Password
Cryptographic Officer Role Base Password
User Role Base Password
Firmware Download Role Identity Base RSA-PSS-2048 with
SHA-256
Unauthenticated Role N/A N/A
Anybody N/A N/A
Exhibit 11 - Identification and Authentication Policy
Note: To assume the “Anybody” role the operator needs to execute “TCG
Session Control” service with a TCG StartSession command, supplying
the Anybody UID and does not need a password. “Anybody” is a TCG
authority who can only perform TCG methods which are
unauthenticated services but still need to use the TCG StartSession
command. Hence, this role is also considered as an unauthenticated role.
For reference here is a mapping between the applicable FIPS 140-2 Roles
and the corresponding TCG Authorities:
ROLE TCG Authority
Cryptographic Officer (Drive Owner) SID
Cryptographic Officer Admin1~Admin4
User User1~User9
Anybody Anybody
Exhibit 12 - TCG Authority and Role Mapping
Minimum password length for Cryptographic Officers and Users shall be
20 bytes with maximum password length supported being 32 bytes.
Using the minimum password length, the probability of a single random
attempt to succeed is 1/(2160
) which is much less than FIPS 140-2
requirement of 1/1,000,000.
Each authentication attempt takes about 2ms to complete, so within one
minute ((60*1000)/2) = 30,000 attempts can be conducted. The
probability of multiple random attempts to succeed is 30,000/(2160
)
which is much less than FIPS 140-2 requirement of 1/100,000. Both
single as well as multiple random attempt probabilities meet FIPS 140-2
requirement.
The authentication mechanism for Firmware Download Role is RSA-PSS-
2048 with SHA-256 digital signature verification, which means a single
random attempt, can succeed with the probability of 1/2112
.
Each RSA signature verification attempt takes at least 50ms. So within
one minute ((60*1000)/50) = 1200 attempts can be conducted.
Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in
one minute is 1200/2112
, which is much less than the FIPS 140-2
requirement 1/100,000.
AUTHENTICATION
MECHANISM
STRENGTH OF MECHANISM
Password (Min : 20 bytes, Max:
32 Bytes)
The probability of successful single random
attempt is 1/(2160
)
The probability of successful multiple
random attempts is 30,000/(2160
) in one
minute
RSA-PSS-2048 with SHA-256
digital signature verification
The probability of successful single random
attempt is 1/2112
The probability of successful multiple
random attempts is 1200/2112
in one
minute
Exhibit 13 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
9 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
9.1 AUTHENTICATED SERVICES
Type(s) of access
R – read access
W – write access
E – execute access
Z – zeroize
ROLE SERVICE
CSPS AND
PUBLIC KEYS
SECURITY
FUNCTIONS
TYPE(S) OF
ACCESS
Cryptographic
Officer (Drive
Owner)
TCG Activate
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal State
Operator Password
KTS (AES-KW)
SHS (SHA-512)
PBDKF
E
Cryptographic
Officer
User
TCG Set PIN
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal State
Operator Password
KTS (AES-KW)
SHS (SHA-512)
PBKDF
W
Cryptographic
Officer
User
TCG Gen Key
Seed Material of
SP800-90A
Internal State of
SP800-90A
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal State
DEK
KTS (AES-KW)
SHS (SHA-512)
DRBG(HMAC_DRBG)
PBDKF
E
DEK DRBG(HMAC_DRBG) Z
ROLE SERVICE
CSPS AND
PUBLIC KEYS
SECURITY
FUNCTIONS
TYPE(S) OF
ACCESS
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG
Enable/Disable
Authority
N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG Set/Get
LBA Range
N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
User
TCG Lock /
Unlock LBA
Range
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal
DEK
KTS (AES-KW)
PBKDF
E
Cryptographic
Officer
Return to
uninitialized
state
DEK
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal State
Seed Material of
SP800-90A
Internal State of
SP800-90A
Operator Password
KTS (AES-KW)
SHS (SHA-512)
DRBG(HMAC_DRBG)
PBKDF
E Z
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG Set MBR N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG SET/GET
DataStore
N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG SET ACE N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
TCG
Enable/Disable
MBR Mode
N/A N/A N/A
Cryptographic
Officer
User
Authenticated
User Data
Read/Write
DEK AES (XTS) R W E
ROLE SERVICE
CSPS AND
PUBLIC KEYS
SECURITY
FUNCTIONS
TYPE(S) OF
ACCESS
Firmware
Download Role
Update
Firmware
RSA Code Sign Public
Key
RSA(RSA-2048-PSS)
SHS (SHA-256)
E
Exhibit 14 - Authenticated Services Table
9.2 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICE
The following services are available to unauthenticated roles. They are
also available to authenticated roles upon successful authentication.
ROLE SERVICE
CSPS AND
PUBLIC KEYS
TYPE(S) OF ACCESS
Unauthenticated Role Power Cycle N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role
Generate Random
Number
Seed Material of SP800-
90A
Internal State of SP800-
90A
E
Unauthenticated Role Show Status N/A N/A
Anybody TCG Get MBR N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role Reset N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role
Return to
uninitialized
state(PSID)
DEK
UKEK
PBKDF Master Key
PBKDF Internal State
Seed Material of SP800-
90A
Internal State of SP800-
90A
Z
ROLE SERVICE
CSPS AND
PUBLIC KEYS
TYPE(S) OF ACCESS
Unauthenticated Role
Show FIPS approve
mode state
N/A N/A
Anybody TCG Get MSID N/A N/A
Anybody
Unauthenticated Role
TCG Session
Control
Operator Password1
E Z
Unauthenticated Role NVMe Standard N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role
Non User Data
Read/Write
N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role
Non User Data
Output
N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role
Non User Data
Input
N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role Configuration N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role Self-Test N/A N/A
Unauthenticated Role Show Status(DAS) N/A N/A
Exhibit 15 - Unauthenticated Services Table
1
In order to perform TCG Session Control with Start Session command, the Operator Password must
be entered into the module to successfully authenticate into the proper Role. The service is
unauthenticated until such a time that a successful authentication occurs. When, TCG Session Control
with End Session command is issued, the plaintext Operator Password is zeroized.
10 APPROVED ALGORITHMS
CAVP
CERT
ALGORITHM STANDARD MODE/METHOD KEY
LENGTH
USE
C1358
AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
CBC2 256 Prerequisite
C1358
AES FIPS 197
SP800-38E
XTS 256 User Data
Encrypt/
Decrypt
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP800-133 unmodified output
from SP 800-90A
DRBG
Cryptographic
Key Generation
C1358
DRBG SP800-90A HMAC_DRBG
(SHA-256)
Deterministic
Random Bit
Generation
C1358
HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2563 256 Prerequisite
C1358
KTS SP800-38F AES-KW 256 Key Wrapping
A1725
PBKDF SP800-132
(option 2a)
HMAC-SHA256 160 Deriving Keys for
Storage
Application
C1357
C1358
RSA FIPS 186-4 RSA-2048-PSS
With SHA-256
2048 Digital Signature
Verification
C1357
C1358
SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-2564 N/A Prerequisite
2
AES-CBC is only used as a pre-requisite; AES-CBC standalone is not utilized in the FIPS Approved
Mode.
3
HMAC-SHA-256 is only used as a pre-requisite; HMAC-SHA-256 standalone is not utilized in the FIPS
Approved Mode.
4
SHA-256 is only used as a pre-requisite; SHA-256 standalone is not utilized in the FIPS Approved
Mode.
CAVP
CERT
ALGORITHM STANDARD MODE/METHOD KEY
LENGTH
USE
C1358 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-512 N/A Password
Protection
Exhibit 16 - Table of Approved Algorithms for the PS5012-E12 NVMe PCIe
family
The following are Non-Approved but allowed Algorithms:
ALGORITHM USE
NDRNG Seed of DRBG (256 bit)
HMAC-SHA-2565
(non-compliant)
(no security claimed)
No security claimed as per FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23
scenario number 2.
The HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm is approved,
however its usage is not security relevant and
non-compliant as its only purpose is to
support a proprietary handshake between
the module and the host (outside of the
security boundary) to check the correctness
of the command associated with the
"Configuration" service.
The HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm is not used
whatsoever during the “Configuration”
service to meet any FIPS 140-2 requirements
and its usage is strictly considered plaintext.
The HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm does not
access CSPs of the module and is not
intended to be used as a security function,
the algorithm is non-compliant because the
key used is hardcoded (i.e. constant), non-
zeroizable, and said key is not meant to fulfill
a security purpose.
The non-compliant use and purpose of the
HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm is unambiguous
and cannot be easily confused for a security
function since in the FIPS approved mode
there are no HMAC-SHA-256 services
exposed to the operator and HMAC-SHA-256
is only used as an underlying prerequisite for
other algorithms.
Exhibit 17 - Table of Non-Approved but allowed Algorithms for all
modules
5
The use of this non-compliant algorithm is only available in Firmware Version ECPM13.1
11PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY
Following physical security mechanisms are implemented by the module:
1. Production grade components
2. The complete module is covered with an opaque epoxy resin,
leaving only the host interface connector (NVMe data and power
ports) exposed.
When checking the module for tamper evidence the following actions
are mandatory:
PHYSICAL SECURITY
MECHANISMS
RECOMMENDED FREQUENCY
OF INSEPCTION/TEST
INSPECTON/TEST
GUIDANCE DETAILS
Opaque epoxy resin As often as possible Inspection of the
epoxy resin for any
evidence of
scratches, gouges,
cuts and other
deficiencies.
In any case of
evidence of
tampering the
module shall be
removed from
service
Exhibit 18 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
12MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY
The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific
attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.
OTHER ATTACKS MITIGATION MECHANISM SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS
N/A N/A N/A
Exhibit 19 - Table of Mitigation of Other Attacks