ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Kryptus
ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 7
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 9
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 9
2.4 Modes of Operation.........................................................................................................10
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................14
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................20
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................20
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................21
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................22
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................22
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification.........................................................................................23
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................25
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................25
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................31
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................32
4.4 Non-Approved Services.................................................................................................103
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded..............................................................................104
5 Software/Firmware Security .................................................................................................105
5.1 Integrity Techniques ......................................................................................................105
5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................105
6 Operational Environment......................................................................................................106
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ........................................................106
7 Physical Security..................................................................................................................107
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required................................................................................107
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals............................................................................................108
7.3 Filler Panels...................................................................................................................108
7.4 Fault Induction Mitigation...............................................................................................108
7.5 EFP/EFT Information.....................................................................................................108
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7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ........................................................................109
8 Non-Invasive Security ..........................................................................................................110
8.1 Mitigation Techniques....................................................................................................110
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management........................................................................111
9.1 Storage Areas ...............................................................................................................111
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods............................................................................................111
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..............................................................................................114
9.4 SSPs .............................................................................................................................115
10 Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................144
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ..........................................................................................144
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................144
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information......................................................................................151
10.4 Error States .................................................................................................................158
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .........................................................................................................160
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures........................................................160
11.2 Administrator Guidance ...............................................................................................162
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................166
11.4 Design and Rules ........................................................................................................167
11.5 Maintenance Requirements.........................................................................................167
11.6 End of Life ...................................................................................................................167
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................168
12.1 Attack List....................................................................................................................168
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 9
Table 3: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................12
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................13
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................13
Table 7: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................19
Table 8: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................20
Table 9: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................20
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................22
Table 11: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................30
Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................32
Table 13: Approved Services ..................................................................................................103
Table 14: Non-Approved Services...........................................................................................104
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required .........................................................................107
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information...............................................................................................109
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures .............................................................................109
Table 18: Storage Areas .........................................................................................................111
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods......................................................................................114
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods........................................................................................115
Table 21: SSP Table 1............................................................................................................127
Table 22: SSP Table 2............................................................................................................142
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests......................................................................................144
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................151
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.......................................................................151
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information..............................................................................158
Table 27: Error States.............................................................................................................159
List of Figures
Figure 1: Cryptographic module’s Physical Perimeter – top view ............................................... 7
Figure 2: Cryptographic module’s Physical Perimeter – bottom view ......................................... 8
Figure 3: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 9
Figure 4: Cryptographic Module Interfaces................................................................................23
Figure 5: Top view of the cryptographic module......................................................................107
Figure 6: Bottom view of the cryptographic module.................................................................108
Figure 7: Installation on the rack .............................................................................................160
Figure 8: Tamper-evident seals...............................................................................................161
Figure 9: Tamper-evident seals – zoom in ..............................................................................161
Figure 10: Label affixed to the back of the device ...................................................................162
Figure 11: HSM Frontal board after self-tests and not configured............................................163
Figure 12: HSM Frontal board displaying the Temporary PIN .................................................163
Figure 13: HSM Frontal Board Default Screen ........................................................................164
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1 General
1.1 Overview
The ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET Cryptographic Module is a Hardware Security Module that provides
cryptographic services with native implementation of the Key Management Interoperability
Protocol to ap-plications. The hardware is optimized for cryptographic operations along with
proprietary firmware and software developed exclusively for the module. Its operators
communicate with it via a standard Ethernet interface using IP protocols. The module is usually
sold embedded within a stand-alone net-work appliance, which is typically used in large-scale
cloud infrastructures, where ease of remote configuration and operation is required.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
The module has an overall security level of 3.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET Cryptographic Module is a multi-user, multi-chip embedded
hardware security module. The ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET Cryptographic Module is referred to in the
remainder of this document as ‘the module’, ‘kNET HSM’ and ‘kNET’.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The Physical Perimeter of the module is delimited by two aluminum frames, one at the top and
other at the bottom of the ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET main board, as depicted in Figure 1 and Figure
2. All the hardware components that execute security functions are contained in the
Cryptographic Boundary, which is completely covered by the epoxy resin potting.
Figure 1: Cryptographic module’s Physical Perimeter – top view
Cryptographic Boundary
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Figure 2: Cryptographic module’s Physical Perimeter – bottom view
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The module is sold embedded within a stand-alone network appliance, which is a 19-inch
rackmount case. The appliance is typically used in large-scale cloud infrastructures, where ease
of remote configuration and operation is required.
Besides the ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET main board where the module is located, the TOEPP also
includes an ATX power supply unit, fans, and the Frontal Board. The latter device contains the
external connectors, the graphical display, the interface buttons, and the power button of the
appliance.
Cryptographic Boundary
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Figure 3: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part Number Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
ASI-HSM AHX5 kNET
Cryptographic Module
1.1.0 1.1.0 C293 Crypto
Coprocessor
Unique
version
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no excluded components within the cryptographic boundary.
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2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
FIPS 140-3 The FIPS 140-3 approved mode of
operation
Approved Frontal Board
Display
Legacy FIPS
140-2
Non-approved mode for legacy FIPS
140-2 restrictions
Non-
Approved
System Log
Common
Criteria
Non-approved mode for Common
Criteria restrictions
Non-
Approved
System Log
Unrestricted Non-approved mode for unrestricted
usage
Non-
Approved
System Log
Table 3: Modes List and Description
When the module is initialized with the Initialize HSM function, the operator can choose the
mode of operation to be used.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
A mode of operations is explicitly selected by an operator during the initialization process. The
module enters the approved mode after configuring it as per instructions in Section 11.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A6066 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A6066 Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A6066 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6066 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A6066 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External, Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A6066 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
Conditioning
Component AES-
CBC-MAC SP800-
90B
A6066 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-90B
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - extra bits
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224,
SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-256
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224,
SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-256
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen A6066 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen A6066 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer A6066 Curve - ED-25519, ED-448
PreHash - Yes
Pure - Yes
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A6066 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA-1 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/224
A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256
A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512 A6066 Key Length - Key Length: 8-65536 Increment
8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A6066 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KDF TLS (CVL) A6066 TLS Version - v1.2
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
ML-DSA KeyGen A6066 Parameter Sets - ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65,
ML-DSA-87
FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigGen A6066 Deterministic - No FIPS 204
ML-DSA SigVer A6066 - FIPS 204
ML-KEM
EncapDecap
A6066 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-
512, ML-KEM-768
Functions - Decapsulation, Encapsulation
FIPS 203
ML-KEM KeyGen A6066 Parameter Sets - ML-KEM-1024, ML-KEM-
512, ML-KEM-768
FIPS 203
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A6066 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-224 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/224 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/256 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-256 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-384 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHA3-512 A6066 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 202
SHAKE-256 A6066 Output Length - Output Length: 512 FIPS 202
TDES-CBC A6066 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67
Rev. 2
TDES-ECB A6066 Direction - Decrypt SP 800-67
Rev. 2
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
In Approved Mode of operation, the supported Approved algorithms are those listed above.
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Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A SP 800-133r2 Section 4 Example #1,
Section 5.1, Section 5.2 and Section
6.1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
All vendor-affirmed algorithms are those listed above.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
Triple DES Data Encryption
RSA Data encryption using PKCS#1; Signature Generation using keys less
than 2048 bits
MD5 Message Digest
DSA Key Pair Generation and Signature Generation
Brainpool P-160
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-192
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-224
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-256
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-320
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-384
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Brainpool P-512
(r1/t1)
Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Ed521 Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
SEC P-256 (k1) Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature Generation, Digital Signature
Verification
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
When configured in Non-Approved Mode the algorithms in Table 7 are supported as well.
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Data Encryption BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
- AES-CBC:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
AES-ECB:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
AES-CTR:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
Data Decryption BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
- AES-CBC:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
AES-ECB:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
AES-CTR:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
Legacy Data
Decryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
- TDES-CBC:
(A6066)
TDES-ECB:
(A6066)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
Deterministic
Random
Number
Generator
DRBG - Hash DRBG:
(A6066)
Digital Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen - SHA2-224:
(A6066)
SHA2-256:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
(A6066)
SHA2-512:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6066)
SHA3-224:
(A6066)
SHA3-256:
(A6066)
SHA3-384:
(A6066)
SHA3-512:
(A6066)
SHAKE-256:
(A6066)
ML-DSA
SigGen:
(A6066)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
EDDSA SigGen:
(A6066)
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
Digital Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer - SHA2-224:
(A6066)
SHA2-256:
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
(A6066)
SHA2-512:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6066)
SHA3-224:
(A6066)
SHA3-256:
(A6066)
SHA3-384:
(A6066)
SHA3-512:
(A6066)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHAKE-256:
(A6066)
ML-DSA SigVer:
(A6066)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
EDDSA SigVer:
(A6066)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
Key Agreement CKG
KAS-135KDF
- Reference:SP800-
56Ar3, SP800-
135r1
Caveat:Provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A6066)
KDF TLS:
(A6066)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Key Generation AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
- RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A6066)
EDDSA
KeyGen:
(A6066)
ML-DSA
KeyGen:
(A6066)
ML-KEM
KeyGen:
(A6066)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Symmetric Key
Generation
CKG - CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Secure Hash
(Message
Digest)
SHA - SHA2-224:
(A6066)
SHA2-256:
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6066)
SHA2-512:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6066)
SHA3-224:
(A6066)
SHA3-256:
(A6066)
SHA3-384:
(A6066)
SHA3-512:
(A6066)
Message
Authentication
MAC - AES-GCM:
(A6066)
AES-CMAC:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/224:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA3-
224: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA3-
256: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA3-
384: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA3-
512: (A6066)
SHA2-224:
(A6066)
SHA2-256:
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
(A6066)
SHA2-512:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6066)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6066)
SHA3-224:
(A6066)
SHA3-256:
(A6066)
SHA3-384:
(A6066)
SHA3-512:
(A6066)
Message
Verification
MAC - AES-GCM:
(A6066)
AES-CMAC:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/224:
(A6066)
HMAC-SHA2-
512/256:
(A6066)
SHA2-224:
(A6066)
SHA2-256:
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
(A6066)
SHA2-512:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/224:
(A6066)
SHA2-512/256:
(A6066)
SHA3-224:
(A6066)
SHA3-256:
(A6066)
SHA3-384:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A6066)
SHA3-512:
(A6066)
Key
Encapsulation
KEM-Full - ML-KEM
EncapDecap:
(A6066)
Key Wrapping KTS-Wrap - AES-KW:
(A6066)
Key length: 256
Key Unwrapping KTS-Unwrap - AES-KW:
(A6066)
Key Length: 256
Legacy Key
Wrapping
KTS-Unwrap - TDES-CBC:
(A6066)
TDES-ECB:
(A6066)
Input-Output BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
SHA
- AES-CBC:
(A6066)
Key Length: 128
AES-GCM:
(A6066)
Key Length:
128, 256
SHA2-256:
(A6066)
SHA2-384:
(A6066)
Get Entropy ENT-ESV - Conditioning
Component
AES-CBC-MAC
SP800-90B:
(A6066)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
KAS [SP 800-56Ar3] is employed in Ephemeral Unified Mode, using P-256, P-384, P-521 key
sizes and strength. [SP 800-56Ar3] KAS-SSC (Cert. #A6066) with [SP 800-135r1] TLS 1.2 KDF
CVL (Cert. #A6066). Compliant to IG D.F Scenario 2 Option 2, testing the shared secret and
separately testing the key derivation function.
AES-GCM using key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 are employed. The Module supports internal IV
generation using the Approved DRBG. The IV is at least 96 bits in length per SP 800-38D
Section 8.2.2, and the Approved DRBG generates outputs such that the (key, IV) pair collision
probability is less than 2^-32 per SP 800-38D Section 8. AES-GCM IVs shall be used in
compliance with IG C.H scenario 1a (TLS/DTLS 1.2, per RFC 5288), The Module is compatible
with TLS/DTLS 1.2 protocol and pro-vides the primitives to support the AES GCM cipher suites
from SP 800-52 Rev. 1 Section 3.3.1. The Module’s implementation of AES-GCM is used
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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together with one or more applications outside the Module’s cryptographic boundary that
implement the specified protocols; these protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
TDES shall only be used for legacy purposes i.e., for decryption and key unwrapping, in
conformance with IG C.M.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E11 STMicroelectronics
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
STM32U5x
TRNG
Physical STM32U5x advanced
Arm®-based 32-bit MCU
128 bits Full
entropy
AES-CMAC
(A1729)
Table 9: Entropy Sources
The entropy source is provided by a microcontroller of the family STM32U5x, from
STMicroelectronics, which embeds a validated TRNG entropy source with the certification
number #E11. According to STM32U5x TRNG’s SP 800-90B Non-Proprietary Public Use
Document, its entropy source provides 128 bits of min-entropy per 128 bits output sample, or
full entropy.
2.9 Key Generation
The module employs several forms of Key Generation Techniques:
• RSA – Key Pair Generation for 2048, 3072, 4096 bits.
• ECDSA – Key Pair Generation for curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521.
• DRBG (HASH_DRBG) – Key Generation.
• EdDSA – Key Pair Generation for curves ED-25519, ED-448.
• ML-DSA [FIPS 204] – Key Generation for ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87.
• ML-KEM [FIPS 203] – Key Generation for ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module employs the following Key Agreement Scheme:
• KAS [SP 800-56Ar3] (Ephemeral Unified) – [SP 800-56Ar3] KAS-SSC (Cert. #A6066)
with [SP 800-135r1] TLS 1.2 KDF CVL (Cert. #A6066). Compliant to IG D.F Scenario 2
Option 2 for curves P-256, P-384, P-521.
The module employs following Key Transport Schemes:
• AES [SP 800-38F] (KW) – Key Wrapping/Unwrapping for 128, 192, 256 bits.
• ML-KEM [FIPS 203] – Key Encapsulation and Key Decapsulation for ML-KEM-512, ML-
KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024.
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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2.11 Industry Protocols
The module supports TLS v1.2. No parts of this protocol, other than the approved cryptographic
algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Ethernet
Interfaces
Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
Two sets of ports for Ethernet connection are available. These
interfaces are the main communication channel for the
cryptographic module. Also, encrypted channel with ASI-HSM
AHX5 kNET client when using the Trusted Channel (sensitive
data is always encrypted when transmitted through these
channels)
RS232
Interface
Control
Input
Status
Output
Serial interface used for module configuration (e.g. configure
network interface). No sensitive information is transmitted
through this channel. Also used to output module status
I2C
Interface
Control
Input
Status
Output
Interface with the Frontal Board, which is responsible for power
control (e.g. turn off the module) and user interface control
(buttons, LCD). Information about the module status is send
through this interface, such as temperature and battery voltage.
No sensitive information is transmitted through this channel
FLAGx Status
Output
Two output signals (FLAG0 and FLAG1) that inform to the frontal
board the current condition of the CM board (normal condition,
occurrence of some internal error or environmental failure) and
the temperature used at the fans speed control subroutine
Tamper
Pin
Control
Input
Receives a control signal that can be connected to a tamper-
evidence device (e.g. tamper switch)
USB
Interface
Data Input
Data Output
Currently optionally used for Import/Export Backup Operations.
Since backups are encrypted, no sensitive information is
transmitted through this channel
ATX Power
input
Power Power input from the ATX power supply unit
Battery
Power
input
Power Power input from the battery unit
Status
LEDs
Status
Output
Indicate the status of the module initialization sequence
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
Table 11 lists the module’s external connection interfaces. The module does not support Control
Output interface.
The figure below identifies the physical interfaces of the cryptographic module:
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Figure 4: Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification
The cryptographic module has two Ethernet Interfaces that are used as trusted channel, as
identified in Section 3.1 - Ports and Interfaces. The physical path from these interfaces inside
the cryptographic boundary is protected by all mechanisms described in Section 7 - Physical
Security. The segment outside the cryptographic boundary to the external connector remains
inside the equipment external enclosure, which features tamper-evident seals and a lid-open
sensor that is monitored by the crypto-graphic module (as described in Section 7.1). The
operator can use an ethernet cable directly attached to the connector interface to access the
trusted channel.
All communication over the trusted channel is always encrypted and authenticated via the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS implementation is configured to exclusively
use cipher suites constructed from the following approved algorithms:
• Confidentiality: AES-CBC or AES-GCM
• Key Establishment: KAS-ECC-SSC
• Authenticity: RSA SigVer
• Key Derivation: KDF TLS
• Integrity and Hashing: SHA-256 or SHA-384
All services require identity-based authentication from the operator (Section 4) after the secure
TLS channel is established.
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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The module indicates that the trusted channel is in use by the TLS channel establishment and
generating a system log for every request, which records the operator's identity, their source
address, and the service accessed.
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Password
with KAS-
ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
User ID and
password. The
authentication
data is
encrypted using
the TLS
protocol. The
password is
composed of 6
or more
alphanumeric
characters,
which may
include both
upper and lower
case letters,
punctuation
marks, and
symbols (such
as @, &, and *).
Each operator
follows a
Password
Policy for its
category that
can be
configured by
the
Administrators
(PCOs and
VCOs)
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6066)
The worst-case
scenario is a 6-
character password,
containing
uppercase and
lowercase
characters, symbols
or digits totaling 96
possibilities (10
digits, 52 letters and
34 symbols); thus,
the probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/96^6 =
1/782,757,789,696,
much smaller than
the required
1/1,000,000
The password
authentication uses
an exponential
backoff delay on
failed attempts for a
given operator. After
the first failure, a
new attempt can be
made after 1 s; 2 s
after the second
failure; 4 s after the
third; 8 s after the
fourth; and 16 s
after the fifth.
Therefore, the
number of
maximum possible
attempts during a
one-minute period is
7, given a
probability of
7/782,757,789,696
=
1/111,822,541,385
which is smaller
than the required
1/100,000
Password
with KDF TLS
User ID and
password. The
authentication
data is
encrypted using
the TLS
protocol. The
password is
composed of 6
or more
KDF TLS
(A6066)
The worst-case
scenario is a 6-
character password,
containing
uppercase and
lowercase
characters, symbols
or digits totaling 96
possibilities (10
digits, 52 letters and
The password
authentication uses
an exponential
backoff delay on
failed attempts for a
given operator. After
the first failure, a
new attempt can be
made after 1 s; 2 s
after the second
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
alphanumeric
characters,
which may
include both
upper and lower
case letters,
punctuation
marks, and
symbols (such
as @, &, and *).
Each operator
follows a
Password
Policy for its
category that
can be
configured by
the
Administrators
(PCOs and
VCOs)
34 symbols); thus,
the probability that a
random attempt will
succeed is 1/96^6 =
1/782,757,789,696,
much smaller than
the required
1/1,000,000
failure; 4 s after the
third; 8 s after the
fourth; and 16 s
after the fifth.
Therefore, the
number of
maximum possible
attempts during a
one-minute period is
7, given a
probability of
7/782,757,789,696
=
1/111,822,541,385
which is smaller
than the required
1/100,000
mTLS
Certificate
with KAS-
ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
Private key and
certificate for
mTLS
authentication.
Both are used
to enable client
authentication
according to the
TLS protocol, in
which a
handshake
message is
digitally signed
using the
private key and
the signature is
sent to the
module
KAS-ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6066)
The strength of the
mechanism relies on
the strength of the
digital signature
employed. The
module will restrict
the algorithm to
2048-bit RSA or
larger; or 224-bit
ECDSA or larger.
These provide a
112-bit security
level, therefore, the
chance that a
random attempt will
succeed is roughly
1/2^112, much
smaller than the
required 1/1,000,000
The module is able
to execute at most
30,000 verifications
per second (less
than that in practice,
due to software
overhead). Being
optimistic and
assuming 30,000,
the chance that
random attempts
during a one-minute
window will succeed
is 30,000/2^112,
which is roughly
equal to 6/10^30
and much smaller
than the required
1/100,000
mTLS
Certificate
with KDF TLS
Private key and
certificate for
mTLS
authentication.
Both are used
to enable client
authentication
according to the
TLS protocol, in
KDF TLS
(A6066)
The strength of the
mechanism relies on
the strength of the
digital signature
employed. The
module will restrict
the algorithm to
2048-bit RSA or
larger; or 224-bit
The module is able
to execute at most
30,000 verifications
per second (less
than that in practice,
due to software
overhead). Being
optimistic and
assuming 30,000,
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
which a
handshake
message is
digitally signed
using the
private key and
the signature is
sent to the
module
ECDSA or larger.
These provide a
112-bit security
level, therefore, the
chance that a
random attempt will
succeed is roughly
1/2^112, much
smaller than the
required 1/1,000,000
the chance that
random attempts
during a one-minute
window will succeed
is 30,000/2^112,
which is roughly
equal to 6/10^30
and much smaller
than the required
1/100,000
Authentication
Certificate
The operator
must register a
certificate in the
module and use
the
corresponding
private key to
sign a token
value provided
by the module.
The module
checks the
signature to
allow the
authentication
Key
Generation
The operator must
register a certificate
in the module and
use the
corresponding
private key to sign a
token value provided
by the module. The
module checks the
signature to allow
the authentication.
The strength of the
mechanism is
exactly the same as
mTLS Certificate
method
The strength of the
mechanism is
exactly the same as
mTLS Certificate
method
Session
Token
The operator
can request a
session token to
the module
using another
authentication
method. Once
generated, the
token can be
used to
authenticate the
user that
requested it.
The session
token has an
expiration time,
configurable by
the
administrator,
that is renewed
every time the
session token is
used
Hash DRBG
(A6066)
The chance that a
random attempt will
succeed is roughly
1/2^130, much
smaller than the
required 1/1,000,000
The timeframe to
break the Session
Token is similar to
the timeframe to
break a 128-bit AES
Key
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Fastlane
Token
The operator
can request a
fastlane token
to the module
using another
authentication
method.
Different from
session token,
the fastlane
token is
associated with
a specific user
object and can
be used to
authenticate the
user to use the
specific object
only
Hash DRBG
(A6066)
The chance that a
random attempt will
succeed is roughly
1/2^128, much
smaller than the
required 1/1,000,000
The timeframe to
break the Session
Token is similar to
the timeframe to
break a 128-bit AES
Key
Time-Based
OTP
Multi-factor
authentication
mechanism.
The operator
must provide a
6-digit time-
based OTP
value when
authenticating.
The module
checks if the
OTP matches
the expected
value, which is
calculated
based in the
current interval
of time
HMAC-
SHA-1
(A6066)
The operator must
provide a 6-digit
time-based OTP
value when
authenticating. The
module checks if the
OTP matches the
expected value,
which is calculated
based in the current
interval of time. The
strength of the
mechanism relies on
the strength of
HMAC-SHA1 with
160-bit key and of
the OTP value itself
(which changes
every 30 seconds).
The algorithm
provides a 80-bit
security level,
therefore, the
chance that a
random attempt of
guessing the key will
succeed is roughly
1/2^80, much
smaller than the
required
Since the time-
based OTP is
subject to the same
exponential backoff
delay mentioned
above, the number
of maximum
possible attempts
during a one-minute
period is 7, given a
probability of
7/1,000,000 =
1/142,857 which is
smaller than the
required 1/100,000.
In practice, since
the code changes
every 30 seconds,
the odds are even
lower
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
1/1,000,000. If the
attacker tries to
guess the OTP value
itself, probability that
a random attempt
will succeed is the
required 1/1,000,000
HMAC-Based
OTP
Multi-factor
authentication
mechanism.
The operator
must provide a
hash-based
OTP value
when
authenticating.
The module
checks if the
OTP matches
the expected
value, which is
calculated
based in the
number of
successful
requests done
so far using the
mechanism
HMAC-
SHA-1
(A6066)
The operator must
provide a hash-
based OTP value
when authenticating.
The module checks
if the OTP matches
the expected value,
which is calculated
based in the number
of successful
requests done so far
using the
mechanism. The
strength of the
mechanism relies on
the strength of
HMACSHA1 with
160-bit key and of
the OTP value itself
(which changes after
every successful
login). The algorithm
provides a 80-bit
security level,
therefore, the
chance that a
random attempt of
guessing the key will
succeed is roughly
1/2^80, much
smaller than the
required
1/1,000,000. If the
attacker tries to
guess the OTP value
itself, probability that
a random attempt
will succeed is the
required 1/1,000,000
Since the hash-
based OTP is
subject to the same
exponential backoff
delay mentioned
above the number
of maximum
possible attempts
during a one-minute
period is 7, given a
probability of
7/1,000,000 =
1/142,857 which is
smaller than the
required 1/100,000
Quorum Multi-factor
authentication
mechanism.
Hash DRBG
(A6066)
The strength of the
mechanism relies on
the strength of the
The strength of the
mechanism relies
on the strength of
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
The PHSM and
the VHSMs can
be configured to
activate quorum
authentication.
The quorum
authentication
activation can
be requested by
any crypto
officer, who
defines a
number M of
crypto officers
for the quorum.
Then, M out of
a total N crypto
officers must
authenticate
themselves
(with one of the
above
schemes) and
agree to
activate the
quorum
authentication
for the PHSM or
VHSM. Once
the quorum
authentication is
activated,
critical
operations can
only be
executed if M
out of N crypto
officers allow it.
To do that, the
crypto officers
must
authenticate
themselves
using one of the
methods above
and allow the
execution of the
operation
above mechanisms
and on the number
M of operators in the
quorum. M must
always be equal or
greater than half of
the operators (N),
rounded up
the above
mechanisms and on
the number M of
operators in the
quorum. M must
always be equal or
greater than half of
the operators (N),
rounded up
Table 11: Authentication Methods
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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The module enforces identity-based authentication, and each identity is mapped to a single role,
where the user ID is used as the identification for identity-based authentication. The module
also supports multi-factor authentication mechanisms. These mechanisms can’t be used alone
and must be combined with one more of the authentication methods listed above to authenticate
the user. Similar to the authentication methods, it’s the Crypto Officers that define which multi-
factor mechanisms are mandatory. The module supports the following authentication methods.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Physical HSM Crypto
Officer
Identity Crypto Officer Password with KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-56Ar3
Password with KDF TLS
mTLS Certificate with
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
mTLS Certificate with
KDF TLS
Authentication Certificate
Session Token
Time-Based OTP
HMAC-Based OTP
Quorum
Virtual HSM Crypto
Officer
Identity Crypto Officer Password with KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-56Ar3
Password with KDF TLS
mTLS Certificate with
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
mTLS Certificate with
KDF TLS
Authentication Certificate
Session Token
Time-Based OTP
HMAC-Based OTP
Quorum
User Identity User Password with KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-56Ar3
Password with KDF TLS
mTLS Certificate with
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
mTLS Certificate with
KDF TLS
Authentication Certificate
Session Token
Fastlane Token
Time-Based OTP
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
HMAC-Based OTP
Quorum
Table 12: Roles
The module supports three different roles: the Physical HSM Crypto Officer (PCO), the Virtual
HSM Crypto Officer (VCO), and the User. A Virtual HSM (VHSM) is a logical security module
implemented in the physical module. The physical module is referred as the Physical HSM
(PHSM). Multiple VHSMs can be created in the PHSM and each VHSM has its own users and
data, which cannot be accessed by other VHSMs.
• Physical HSM Crypto Officer (PCO): The most privileged role on the physical HSM;
created when the physical HSM is initialized or by another PCO. It is responsible for the
physical module management, which includes creation and deletion of virtual HSMs and
firmware updates.
• Virtual HSM Crypto Officer (VCO): The most privileged role on the virtual HSM; created
when the virtual HSM is initialized or by another VCO. It is responsible for the virtual
HSM management, which includes the creation of users and altering the virtual module
configurations.
• User: Created by a VCO, it is responsible for all cryptographic operations and
management of cryptographic objects that it has ownership.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Initialize
HSM
Initialize the
HSM;
create first
PCO with
provisory
password
(PIN)
IND-1 Temporary
PIN and
arguments
Initialization
status
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key: G
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
W,E,Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- PHSM
Server CA
Key: G
- Master
Key: E
- PHSM
Server
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: G
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
G
- PHSM
Client CA
Key: G
- PHSM
Client CA
Certificate:
G
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key: G
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
G
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: G
Configure
Network
Configure
network
settings (IP,
netmask,
gateway
(optional),
DNS
(optional))
IND-1 Network
arguments
Configured
network
settings
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Get Network
Configuratio
n
Get network
setting
IND-1 - Network
Configuratio
n
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Reset HSM Reset HSM
to factory
state
IND-1 - HSM in
Factory
State
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key: Z
- PHSM
Server CA
Key: Z
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
Z
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- PCO's
OTP Key:
Z
- PCO's
OTP: Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- VHSM
Server
Keys: Z
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: Z
- VHSM
Client CA
Keys: Z
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: Z
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
Z
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): Z
- Users’
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
- User’s
OTP: Z
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
AES Key:
Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
HMAC
Key: Z
- Users'
Certificate:
Z
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
Key: Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key: Z
- DRBG C
and V
values: Z
- Disk
Encryption
Key: Z
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: Z
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
TLS
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Server
Private
Key: Z
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
TLS Client
Private
Key: Z
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
Secret: Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
Z
- Session
Token: Z
- Fastlane
ID: Z
- Fastlane
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 39 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- PHSM
Server
Key: Z
- PHSM
Server
Certificate:
Z
- PHSM
Client CA
Key: Z
- PHSM
Client CA
Certificate:
Z
Set Date
Time
Set the
current date
and time
IND-1 Date, time
and
arguments
Set Date
Time
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get Date
Time
Get the
current date
and time
IND-1 Get Date
Time
arguments
Current
Date Time
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get HSM
Usage
Get CPU,
RAM and
disk usage
IND-1 Get HSM
Usage
arguments
Current
HSM Usage
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Create User Create a
PCO, VCO
or User
IND-1 New user
information
and
arguments
New User
Temporary
Password
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
G
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): G
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
G
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): G
Delete User Destroy a
PCO, VCO
or User
IND-1 User Unique
Identifier
and
arguments
Deleted
User
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- PCO's
OTP: Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 41 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 42 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
AES Key:
Z
- Users'
HMAC
Key: Z
- Users'
Certificate:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
List Users List PCOs,
VCOs or
Users
IND-1 List User
Arguments
List of
PCOs,
VCOs or
Users
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Change
Password
Change a
PCO, VCO
or User's
password.
It's used to
activate the
user in its
first time
performing
this
operation
IND-1 Temporary
Password
and
arguments
Status
return
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
W,E,Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 43 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,E,Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,E,Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: E,Z
User
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,E,Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 44 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Reset
Password
Reset a
PCO, VCO
or User's
password.
When a
User's
password is
reset, it
deactivates
the user,
until their
password is
set again
IND-1 Reset
arguments
Temporary
Password
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
G,R
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): G,R
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,Z
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- PCO's
OTP Key:
Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 45 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
G,R
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): G,R
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,Z
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 46 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
AES Key:
Z
- Users'
HMAC
Key: Z
- Users'
Certificate:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
User
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): G,R
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: G,Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
OTP Key:
Z
Register
Certificate
Sign a CSR
and register
the
certificate
for PCO,
VCO or
User
authenticati
on
IND-1 Certificate
and
arguments
Registered
Certificate
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W,Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W,Z
- PHSM
Client CA
Key: E
- PHSM
Client CA
Certificate:
E
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W,Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W,Z
User
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W,Z
Activate
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Activates
quorum
authenticati
on for the
PHSM,
VHSM or a
Object
IND-1 Activate
Quorum
Authenticati
on
arguments
Activated
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: G
- Quorum
Secret
Share: G
Virtual
HSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 48 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: G
- Quorum
Secret
Share: G
User
- Quorum
Secret: G
- Quorum
Secret
Share: G
Deactivate
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Deactivates
quorum
authenticati
on for the
PHSM
IND-1 Deactivate
Quorum
Authenticati
on
arguments
Deactivated
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Data
Decryption
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
User
- Quorum
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
Get Quorum
Authenticati
on State
Check the
quorum
authenticati
on state of
the PHSM
(i.e.
activated or
not, the
minimum
quorum)
IND-1 Get Quorum
Authenticati
on State
arguments
Quorum
Authenticati
on State
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 49 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Get Quorum
Authenticati
on Status
Check the
quorum
authenticati
on status of
the PHSM
(i.e. number
of
operations
or time left)
IND-1 Get Quorum
Authenticati
on Status
arguments
Quorum
Authenticati
on Status
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Vote
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Inform the
operator’s
verdict for
quorum
authenticati
on
operations
(allow or
deny)
IND-1 Vote
Quorum
Authenticati
on
arguments
Voted
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Data
Encryption
Data
Decryption
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Quorum
Secret: W
- Quorum
Secret
Share:
G,E
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Quorum
Secret: W
- Quorum
Secret
Share:
G,E
User
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Quorum
Secret: W
- Quorum
Secret
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 50 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Share:
G,E
Start
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Request
that
operators
vote to start
quorum
authenticati
on votes to
allow critical
operations
IND-1 Start
Quorum
Authenticati
on
arguments
Started
Quorum
Authenticati
on
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Stop
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Stop
quorum
authenticati
on, blocking
critical
operations
when
quorum
authenticati
on is
activated (a
new start is
required)
IND-1 Stop
Quorum
Authenticati
on
Stopped
Quorum
Authenticati
on
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Quorum
Secret: Z
User
- Quorum
Secret: Z
Create
Virtual HSM
Create a
Virtual HSM
along with
its first VCO
with
provisory
password
(PIN)
IND-1 Virtual HSM
information
and
arguments
Created
Virtual HSM
information
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
G,R,Z
List Virtual
HSMs
List all
Virtual
HSMs
IND-1 List Virtual
HSMs
arguments
List of
Virtual
HSMs
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Activate
Virtual HSM
Activate a
Virtual HSM
IND-1 Activate
Virtual HSM
arguments
Activated
Virtual HSM
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Deactivate
Virtual HSM
Deactivate
a Virtual
HSM
IND-1 Deactivate
Virtual HSM
arguments
Deactivated
Virtual HSM
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 51 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): Z
- Users’
Passwords
: Z
- User’s
OTP: Z
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
Key: Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 52 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
Z
- Session
Token: Z
- Fastlane
ID: Z
- Fastlane
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret: Z
Delete
Virtual HSM
Delete a
Virtual HSM
and all of its
objects
IND-1 Delete
Virtual HSM
arguments
Deleted
Virtual HSM
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
Z
- VHSM
Server
Keys: Z
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: Z
- VHSM
Client CA
Keys: Z
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: Z
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 53 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: Z
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 54 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
AES Key:
Z
- Users'
HMAC
Key: Z
- Users'
Certificate:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
Edit Virtual
HSM
Edit a
VHSM
configuratio
n
IND-1 Edit Virtual
HSM
arguments
Edited
Virtual HSM
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Export
VHSM
Export an
entire
Virtual
HSM; its
users and
objects
IND-1 Export
VHSM
arguments
Exported
VHSM
encrypted
package
Data
Encryption
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: R
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
R
- VHSM
Server
Keys: R
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: R
- VHSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 55 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Client CA
Keys: R
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: R
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: R
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: R
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
R
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: R
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: R
- User’s
OTP Key:
R
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 56 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
EDDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: R
- Users'
AES Key:
R
- Users'
HMAC
Key: R
- Users'
Certificate:
R
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
R
- Quorum
Secret
Share: R
- Disk
Encryption
Key: E
- Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate:
E
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
- PHSM
Module
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 57 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Certificate:
E
Import
VHSM
Import an
entire
Virtual HSM
IND-1 Import
VHSM
encrypted
package
and
arguments
Status
return
Data
Decryption
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: W
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
W
- VHSM
Server
Keys: W
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: W
- VHSM
Client CA
Keys: W
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: W
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: W
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
W
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: W
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W
- User’s
OTP Key:
W
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 58 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: W
- Users'
AES Key:
W
- Users'
HMAC
Key: W
- Users'
Certificate:
W
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 59 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
- Quorum
Secret
Share: W
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
- PHSM
Module
Certificate:
E
- Disk
Encryption
Key: E
- Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate:
E
Export
PHSM
Export an
entire
Physical
HSM, its
users and
VHMs
IND-1 Export
PHSM
arguments
Exported
PHSM
encrypted
package
Data
Encryption
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Module
Key: R,E
- PHSM
Module
Certificate:
E
- Quorum
Secret
Share: R
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 60 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
R
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
Secret: R
- VHSM
Client CA
Keys: R
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: R
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
R
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
R
- PHSM
Server CA
Key: R
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: R
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: R
- PCO's
OTP Key:
R
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: R
- VHSM
Server
Keys: R
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: R
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 61 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
s: R
- User’s
OTP Key:
R
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: R
- Users'
AES Key:
R
- Users'
HMAC
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 62 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: R
- Users'
Certificate:
R
- Disk
Encryption
Key: R
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: R
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Private
Key: R
- Cluster
TLS Client
Private
Key: R
Import
PHSM
Import an
entire
Physical
HSM
IND-1 Import
PHSM
encrypted
package
and
arguments
Status
return
Data
Decryption
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate:
E
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
- PHSM
Module
Certificate:
W,E
- PHSM
Server CA
Key: W
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
W
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: W
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 63 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
s: W
- PCO's
OTP Key:
W
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: W
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
W
- VHSM
Server
Keys: W
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: W
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: W
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
W
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Private
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
TLS Client
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 64 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Private
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
Secret: W
- Disk
Encryption
Key: W
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
- Quorum
Secret
Share: W
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: W
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: W
- User’s
OTP Key:
W
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 65 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: W
- Users'
AES Key:
W
- Users'
HMAC
Key: W
- Users'
Certificate:
W
- Master
Key: E
Get
Requester
Type
Get the role
of the
requester
IND-1 Get
Requester
Type
arguments
Requester
Type
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Update
Firmware
Update the
module
firmware.
Any
firmware
loaded into
this module
that is not
IND-1 Update
Firmware
encrypted
package
and
arguments
Status
return;
Updated
Firmware
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
- PHSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 66 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
shown on
the module
certificate,
is out of the
scope of
this
validation
and
requires a
separate
FIPS 140- 3
validation
Module
Certificate:
E
Get Log
Level
Get the
current log
level
IND-1 Get Log
Level
arguments
Log Level None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Set Log
Level
Set the
current log
level
IND-1 Set Log
Level
arguments
Log Level
set
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get System
Log
Retrieve the
PHSM log
IND-1 Get System
Log
arguments
System Log
file
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
Show Status Get the
status of the
HSM
IND-1 Show Status
arguments
Status None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Shutdown Shutdown
the HSM
IND-1 Shutdown
arguments
- None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 67 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- PCO's
OTP: Z
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): Z
- Users’
Passwords
: Z
- User’s
OTP: Z
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
Key: Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 68 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key: Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
Z
- Session
Token: Z
- Fastlane
ID: Z
- Fastlane
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret: Z
Restart Restart the
HSM and
Perform
self-tests on
demand
IND-1 Restart
arguments
- Data
Decryption
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Key
Generatio
n
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key: G
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
G
- DRBG C
and V
values: G
- Super
Root Key
Hash: E
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 69 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
: Z
- PCO's
OTP: Z
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): Z
- Users’
Passwords
: Z
- User’s
OTP: Z
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 70 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key: Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
Z
- Session
Token: Z
- Fastlane
ID: E
- Fastlane
Secret: E
- Quorum
Secret: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: G
- DRBG
Seed: G
Boot Boot
process
before main
services are
available
IND-1 - - Data
Decryption
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Key
Generatio
n
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key: G
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
G
- DRBG C
and V
values: G
- Super
Root Key
Hash: E
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 71 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: G
- DRBG
Seed: G
- Master
Key: E
Get Device
Information
Get device
version,
status,
serial
number and
other
information
IND-1 Get Device
Information
arguments
Device
Information
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get TLS
Certificate
Get the TLS
certificate of
the PHSM
server and
the
correspondi
ng CA
IND-1 Get TLS
Certificate
arguments
TLS
Certificate
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Server CA
Key: R
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
R
- PHSM
Server
Certificate:
R
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: R
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
R
Renew
Server
Certificate
Renew the
PHSM
server TLS
certificate
IND-1 Renew
Server
Certificate
arguments
Renewed
Server
Certificate
Key
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
G,R
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 72 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- PHSM
Server
Certificate:
G
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: G,R,Z
Activate
OTP
Activate
OTP for the
PCO, VCO
or User
IND-1 Activate
OTP
arguments
Activated
OTP
Key
Generatio
n
Message
Authentica
tion
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCO's
OTP Key:
G,R
- PCO's
OTP: G,W
- User’s
OTP Key:
G,R
- User’s
OTP: G,W
- DRBG C
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
G,R
- VCO's
OTP: G,W
- User’s
OTP Key:
G,R
- User’s
OTP: G,W
- DRBG C
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 73 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
User
- User’s
OTP Key:
G,R
- User’s
OTP: G,W
- DRBG C
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
Manual
Activate
OTP
Manually
activate
OTP for the
PCO, VCO
or User
informing
the OTP
key
IND-1 Manual
Activate
OTP
arguments
Manually
Activated
OTP
Message
Authentica
tion
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCO's
OTP Key:
W
- PCO's
OTP: G,W
- User’s
OTP Key:
W
- User’s
OTP: G,W
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
W
- VCO's
OTP: G,W
- User’s
OTP Key:
W
- User’s
OTP: G,W
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 74 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
User
- User’s
OTP Key:
W
- User’s
OTP: G,W
Deactivate
OTP
Deactivates
OTP for the
PCO, VCO
or User
IND-1 Deactivate
OTP
arguments
Deactivated
OTP
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCO's
OTP Key:
Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
Z
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
User
- User’s
OTP Key:
Z
Register
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Register a
certificate to
be used
during PCO,
VCO or
User
authenticati
on
IND-1 Register
Authenticati
on
Certificate
arguments
Registered
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
User
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 75 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
W
Remove
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Delete a
certificate
used for
authenticati
on
IND-1 Remove
Authenticati
on
Certificate
arguments
Removed
Authenticati
on
Certificate
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
User
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
List
Authenticati
on
Certificates
List the
registered
certificates
for the
PCO, VCO
or User
IND-1 List
Authenticati
on
Certificates
arguments
List of
Authenticati
on
Certificates
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
R
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
R
User
-
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 76 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
R
Get Session
Credential
Retrieves a
session
token used
for further
authenticati
ons
IND-1 Get Session
Credential
arguments
Session
Credential
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Session
Token: R
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Session
Token: R
User
- Session
Token: R
Upload
Logo Image
Uploads a
logo image
for the
kNET
frontal
board
IND-1 Upload
Logo Image
arguments
Uploaded
Logo Image
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get SNMP
Data
Retrieves
SNMP Data
IND-1 Get SNMP
Data
arguments
SNMP Data None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Set SNMP
Data
Sets up the
kNET
SNMP
Agent as
well as
some
information
it provides
IND-1 Set SNMP
Data
arguments
Set SNMP
Data
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Delete
Session
Credential
Deletes the
user
session
credential
cached on
server
IND-1 Delete
Session
Credential
arguments
Deleted
Session
Credential
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Session
Token: Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Session
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 77 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Token: Z
User
- Session
Token: Z
Start Token
Authenticati
on
Starts a
token
authenticati
on
IND-1 Start Token
Authenticati
on
arguments
Started
Token
Authenticati
on
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
R
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
R
User
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
R
Set
Password
Policy
Changes
authenticati
on
restrictions
IND-1 Set
Password
Policy
arguments
Password
Policy set
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get
Password
Policy
Retrieves
the current
password
policy for a
specific
user
IND-1 Get
Password
Policy
arguments
Password
Policy
information
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 78 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Activate
NTP Service
Activates
the NTP
service
IND-1 Activate
NTP Service
arguments
Activated
NTP Service
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Deactivate
NTP Service
Deactivates
the NTP
service
IND-1 Deactivate
NTP Service
arguments
Deactivated
NTP Service
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get NTP
Service Info
Retrieves
the current
status of the
NTP
Service in
the HSM
IND-1 Get NTP
Service Info
arguments
NTP Service
Info
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Activate
Remote
Syslog
Activates
the Remote
System Log
IND-1 Activate
Remote
Syslog
arguments
Activated
Remote
Syslog
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Deactivate
Remote
Syslog
Deactivates
the Remote
System Log
IND-1 Deactivate
Remote
Syslog
arguments
Deactivated
Remote
Syslog
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get Remote
Syslog
Retrieves
the current
status of the
Remote
System Log
in the HSM
IND-1 Get Remote
Syslog
arguments
Remote
Syslog
status
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Set
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
Updates the
permission
for
unauthentic
ated
execution of
the Get
System Log
operation
IND-1 Set
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
arguments
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
set
Data
Encryption
None
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
Retrieves
the current
status of the
permission
for
unauthentic
ated
execution of
IND-1 Get
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
arguments
Unauthentic
ated Get
System Log
Permission
status
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 79 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
the Get
System Log
operation
Officer
User
Optimize
Database
Drops and
recreates all
tables to
reclaim disk
space
remnant
from delete
operations
IND-1 Optimize
Database
arguments
Optimized
Database
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Query
Operation
Retrieves
information
about the
HSM
IND-1 Query
Operation
arguments
Queried
Operation
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PHSM
Module
Certificate:
R
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Get
Firmware
Update
Status
Retrieves
the current
status of an
ongoing
firmware
update
operation
IND-1 Get
Firmware
Update
Status
arguments
Firmware
Update
Status
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get
Requester
Info
Retrieves
information
about the
requester
from the
system
IND-1 Get
Requester
Info
arguments
Requester
Info
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Set
Authenticati
on Policy
Sets the
authenticati
on policy for
Users,
VCOs and
PCOs
IND-1 Set
Authenticati
on Policy
arguments
Authenticati
on Policy
set
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 80 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Get
Authenticati
on Policy
Retrieves
the
authenticati
on policy for
Users,
VCOs and
PCOs
IND-1 Get
Authenticati
on Policy
arguments
Authenticati
on Policy
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Create
Cluster
Initializes a
database
synchroniza
tion cluster
IND-1 Create
Cluster
arguments
Created
Cluster
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Key
Generatio
n
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: G
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
G
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Private
Key: G
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
G
- Cluster
TLS Client
Private
Key: G
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
G
- Cluster
Secret: G
Prepare
Join Cluster
Prepares a
node to join
in the
cluster
IND-1 Prepare
Join Cluster
arguments
Join Cluster
encrypted
package
Data
Encryption
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: R
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 81 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Private
Key: R
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
TLS Client
Private
Key: R
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
R
- Cluster
Secret: R
Join Cluster Allows a
HSM to join
an existing
cluster
IND-1 Join
encrypted
package
and
arguments
Joined
Cluster
Data
Decryption
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Cluster
TLS CA
Private
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Private
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
TLS Client
Private
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 82 of 168
Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: W
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
W
- Cluster
Secret: W
Get Session
Timeout
Retrieves
the current
session
timeout
IND-1 Get Session
Timeout
arguments
Session
Timeout
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Set Session
Timeout
Sets the
session
timeout with
minutes
precision
IND-1 Set Session
Timeout
arguments
Session
Timeout set
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Leave
Cluster
Leaves the
existing
cluster
IND-1 Leave
Cluster
arguments
The HSM is
no longer
part of the
cluster
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate:
Z
- PHSM
Module
Key: Z
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
Z
- VHSM
Server
Certificate
s: Z
- VHSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Client CA
Certificate
s: Z
- Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
TLS
Server
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate:
Z
- Cluster
Secret: Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
Z
- Quorum
Secret
Share: Z
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- PCO's
OTP: Z
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
Z
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- VCOs’
Passwords
: Z
- VCO's
OTP: Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin): Z
- Users’
Passwords
: Z
- User’s
OTP: Z
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l): Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
Key: Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key: Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
Z
-
Authentica
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
tion
Certificate
Response:
Z
- Session
Token: Z
- Fastlane
ID: Z
- Fastlane
Secret: Z
- Quorum
Secret: Z
Get Cluster
Status
Retrieves
the cluster
status
IND-1 Get Cluster
Status
arguments
Cluster
Status
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Configure
Cluster
Updates the
cluster
configuratio
n
IND-1 Configure
Cluster
arguments
Configured
Cluster
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Cancel
Backup
Stops the
execution of
any ongoing
Import
Physical
HSM
IND-1 Cancel
Backup
arguments
- None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Change
kNET State
Updates the
state of the
HSM
IND-1 Change
kNET State
arguments
Changed
kNET State
None Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Get Virtual
HSM Usage
Get VHSM
CPU, RAM
and disk
usage
IND-1 Get Virtual
HSM Usage
arguments
Virtual HSM
Usage
information
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Activate
User
Activate a
User (This
is
embedded
in Change
Password
Operation)
IND-1 Activate
User
arguments
Activated
User
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Deactivate
User
Deactivate
a User (This
is
embedded
in Reset
Password
Operation)
IND-1 Deactivate
User
arguments
Deactivated
User
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Change
Operator
Permission
This
operation
changes the
permissions
of a user
IND-1 Change
Operator
Permission
arguments
Changed
Operator
Permission
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Approve
Backup
Import
This
operation
approves an
imported
Virtual HSM
to enter the
Operational
State
IND-1 Approve
Backup
Import
arguments
Backup
Import
approved
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
Discover
Versions
Determine a
list of
supported
protocol
versions by
the server
IND-1 Discover
Versions
arguments
Discovered
Versions
None Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
User
Create Create a
symmetric
key within
the VHSM
IND-1 Create
arguments
Key UID Symmetric
Key
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
AES Key:
G
- Users'
HMAC
Key: G
Create Key
Pair
Create
asymmetric
key pair in
the VHSM
IND-1 Create Key
Pair
arguments
Key Pair
UIDs
Key
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: G
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: G
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: G
- Users'
ECDSA
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public
Key: G
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: G
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: G
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: G
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: G
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: G
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: G
Add
Attribute
Add a single
attribute to
an object
IND-1 Add
Attribute
arguments
Attribute
added
None User
Get
Attributes
Retrieve
attribute
values of an
object
IND-1 Get
Attributes
arguments
List of
Attributes
values
None User
Get
Attributes
List
Retrieve
attributes of
an object
IND-1 Get
Attributes
List
arguments
List of
Attributes
names
None User
Modify
Attribute
Modify an
attribute
value
IND-1 Modify
Attribute
arguments
Modified
Attribute
None User
Delete
Attribute
Delete an
attribute
value of an
object
IND-1 Delete
Attribute
arguments
Deleted
attribute
None User
Revoke Revoke
object
IND-1 Revoke
arguments
Revoked
object UID
None User
Activate Activate
object
IND-1 Activate
arguments
Activated
object UID
None User
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Destroy Destroy
object
IND-1 Destroy
arguments
Destroyed
object UID
None User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: Z
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
Key: Z
- Users'
AES Key:
Z
- Users'
HMAC
Key: Z
- Users'
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Certificate:
Z
Locate Locate an
object given
its attributes
IND-1 Locate
arguments
Located
object(s)
UIDs
None User
Check Check
usage quota
of an object
IND-1 Check
arguments
Checked
object
None User
Register Register an
object
IND-1 Register
arguments
Object’s UID Key
Unwrappin
g
Legacy
Key
Wrapping
Input-
Output
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: W
- Users'
ML-KEM
Public
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: W
- Users'
AES Key:
W
- Users'
HMAC
Key: W
- Users'
Certificate:
W
Get Get an
object
IND-1 Get
arguments
Wrapped
object
Key
Wrapping
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: R
- Users'
ML-KEM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public
Key: R
- Users'
AES Key:
R,E
- Users'
HMAC
Key: R
- Users'
Certificate:
R
Encrypt Encrypt
data
IND-1 Encrypt
arguments
Encrypted
data
Data
Encryption
User
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
AES Key:
E
Decrypt Decrypt
data
IND-1 Decrypt
arguments
Decrypted
data
Data
Decryption
Legacy
Data
Decryption
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
AES Key:
E
Sign Sign data IND-1 Sign
arguments
Signed data Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: E
Signature
verify
Verify
signature
IND-1 Signature
verify
arguments
Signature
verification
result
Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
User
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: E
- Users'
ML-DSA
Public
Key: E
RNG
Retrieve
Retrieve
randomness
IND-1 RNG
Retrieve
arguments
RNG
Retrieved
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
User
- DRBG C
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
RNG Seed Seed RNG IND-1 RNG Seed
arguments
RNG
Seeded
Get
Entropy
User
Hash Compute
hash
IND-1 Hash
arguments
Computed
hash
None User
MAC Generate
MAC of
data
IND-1 MAC
arguments
Generated
MAC
Message
Authentica
tion
User
- DRBG C
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
MAC Verify Verify a
MAC
IND-1 MAC Verify
arguments
Verified
MAC
Message
Verificatio
n
User
- DRBG C
and V
values: E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: E
- DRBG
Seed: E
Set User
Object
Permission
Set object
permissions
for a
specific
user
IND-1 Set User
Object
Permission
arguments
User Object
Permission
set
None User
Get User
Object
Permission
Get object
permissions
for a
specific
user
IND-1 Get User
Object
Permission
arguments
User Object
Permission
None User
Load Key Load key in
cache
IND-1 Load Key
arguments
Loaded Key
UID
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
Input-
Output
User
- Fastlane
ID: G,R
- Fastlane
Secret: W
Validate Validate a
digital
certificate or
certificate
chain
IND-1 Validate
arguments
Validity
Indicator
Data
Decryption
User
- Users'
Certificate:
E
Sign XML Sign data
according to
XMLDSig
standard
IND-1 Sign XML
arguments
Signed XML Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
Generate
CSR
Generate a
Signing
Certificate
Request
IND-1 Generate
CSR
arguments
Generated
CSR
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Users'
RSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Public
Key: R
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Public
Key: R
Generate
Timestamp
Generate a
time stamp
for the given
hash, and
signs it
IND-1 Generate
Timestamp
arguments
Generated
Timestamp
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
Derive Key Derive a
new key
from a pre-
existing key
IND-1 Derive Key
arguments
Derived Key
UID; and/or
Derivation
Data
Key
Generatio
n
Symmetric
Key
Generatio
n
Key
Encapsula
tion
Key
Wrapping
User
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ML-DSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
AES Key:
G,E
- Users'
HMAC
Key: G
- Users'
ML-KEM
Private
Key: E
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Get Secret
Share
Request the
user
respective
encrypt-ed
share for
quor-um
activation
for given
Object
IND-1 Get Secret
Share
arguments
Secret
Share
(encrypted)
Data
Encryption
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
Input-
Output
User
- Quorum
Secret
Share: R
Reformat
Clear PIN
Take a PIN
Block and
reformats it
to the
desired
format
IND-1 Reformat
Clear Pin
arguments
Reformatted
Clear Pin
None User
Create Split
Key
Create a
key in
different
parts and
save each
part as one
key in the
HSM
IND-1 Create Split
Key
arguments
Split Key
UIDs
Symmetric
Key
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
AES Key:
G,E
- Users'
HMAC
Key: G,E
Join Split
Key
Join
different
parts of a
split key into
only one
key in the
HSM
IND-1 Join Split
Key
arguments
Joined Split
Key UID
Symmetric
Key
Generatio
n
User
- Users'
AES Key:
G,E
- Users'
HMAC
Key: G,E
Prepare
Fast Red
Blob Sign
Prepare the
HSM to
perform
Fast Red
Blob Sign
operation
IND-1 Prepare
Fast Red
Blob Sign
arguments
Red Blob
UID
Determinis
tic
Random
Number
Generator
User
- Fastlane
ID: G,R
- Fastlane
Secret: W
Sign
Authenticati
on Package
Sign a
Token
Authenticati
on Pack-
age
generated
by the Start
Token
Authenticati
on
Operation
IND-1 Sign
Authenticati
on Package
arguments
Signed
Authenticati
on Package
Digital
Signature
Generatio
n
User
- PHSM
Module
Key: E
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Decrypt
Secret
Share
Decrypt a
Packaged
Secret
Share
retrieved
from the
Get Secret
Share
Operation
IND-1 Decrypt
Secret
Share
arguments
Decrypted
Secret
Share
Data
Decryption
User
- Users'
RSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
ECDSA
Private
Key: E
- Users'
EDDSA
Private
Key: E
Generate
EMV
Cryptogram
Generate
an EMV
(Europay,
MasterCard
and Visa)
Cryptogram
IND-1 Generate
EMV
Cryptogram
arguments
Generated
EMV
Cryptogram
Data
Encryption
User
- Users'
AES Key:
E
Authenticati
on
The
operator
authenticati
on process,
using one or
more of the
authenticati
on methods
IND-1 Authenticati
on
- Digital
Signature
Verificatio
n
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Message
Authentica
tion
Input-
Output
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- PCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
W,E,Z
- PCOs'
Temporary
Password:
W,E,Z
- PCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: E
- PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: E
- PCO's
OTP: E
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: E
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: E
- User’s
OTP Key:
E
- User’s
OTP:
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
E
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
W,E,Z
- Fastlane
ID: W,E
- Fastlane
Secret:
W,E,Z
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- VCO
Initializatio
n
Password:
W,E,Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- VCOs'
Temporary
Password:
W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
: E
- VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: E
- VCO’s
OTP Key:
E
- VCO's
OTP:
W,E,Z
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: E
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: E
- User’s
OTP Key:
E
- User’s
OTP:
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
E
-
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
W,E
- Fastlane
ID: W,E
- Fastlane
Secret:
W,E,Z
User
- Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin):
W,E,Z
- Users’
Passwords
: W,E,Z
- Users’
Hashed
Passwords
: E
- Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s: E
- User’s
OTP Key:
E
- User’s
OTP:
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate:
E
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Challenge:
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W,E,Z
-
Authentica
tion
Certificate
Response:
W,E,Z
- Fastlane
ID: W,E
- Fastlane
Secret:
W,E,Z
TLS
Establishme
nt
The process
to establish
the TLS
connection
between the
module and
the external
entity
(operator,
process,
etc.)
IND-1 TLS
Establishme
nt
arguments
TLS
Established
Key
Agreement
Key
Generatio
n
Physical
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Session
Key: G,E,Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,E,Z
- PHSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Server CA
Key: E
- PHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
E
- PHSM
Server
Key: E
- PHSM
Server
Certificate:
E
- PHSM
Client CA
Key: E
- PHSM
Client CA
Certificate:
E
Virtual
HSM
Crypto
Officer
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- TLS
Session
Key: G,E,Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,E,Z
- VHSM
Server CA
Key: E
- VHSM
Server CA
Certificate:
E
- VHSM
Client CA
Keys: E
- VHSM
Client CA
Certificate
s: E
User
- ECDH
Private
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- ECDH
Public
Componen
t
(ephemera
l):
G,R,W,E,Z
- TLS Peer
Public
Key: W,E
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Session
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key: G,E,Z
- TLS
Authentica
tion Key:
G,E,Z
Table 13: Approved Services
All services listed in this section can be accessed in approved mode. Services that give access
to cryptographic algorithms provide only FIPS 140-3 approved algorithms.
Notes
- Indicator
How to identify if the requested service is approved.
IND-1: The HSM is in Approved Mode (See 11.2 Administrator Guidance). KMIP
operations will return “Illegal Operation” if not approved.
- Access Rights to Keys and/or SSPs
The following definition will be used when listing access rights for each SSP (Sensitive Security
Parameter):
• G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
- KMIP Operations
All services that are identified as KMIP Operations use a TLS connection to send requests and
receive responses from the module. They also require the authentication of the requester via
one or more of the authentication methods. Because of that, all KMIP Operations are executed
together with “TLS Establishment” and “Authentication” services.
- HSM Reset
After the HSM Reset service execution, to zeroise the SSPs stored in the non-volatile memory,
the Restart service is executed automatically, doing the zeroization of all SSPs stored in the
volatile memory.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
Register
SEApp
The kNET HSM enables the user to execute Python
applications with access to cryptographic objects stored on
that device. These applications may be uploaded,
controlled and monitored on the device via custom KMIP
requests. These requests, although use the KMIP protocol,
are not commands from the KMIP specification, but were
added by Kryptus to its own KMIP server to offer extended
Triple DES
RSA
MD5
DSA
Brainpool P-
160 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
User
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Name Description Algorithms Role
functionalities. This document provides a brief explanation
on how the kNET HSM Secure Execution feature works.
For instructions on commands to manage Secure
Execution Applications, please refer to the Command Line
Interface manual. Important: The user of the SE App is
responsible for its security and enforcing the desired
security rules upon its connections
192 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
224 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
256 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
320 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
384 (r1/t1)
Brainpool P-
512 (r1/t1)
Ed521
SEC P-256
(k1)
Table 14: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The operational environment is limited and, therefore, is designed to accept only controlled
firmware changes that successfully pass the software/firmware load test. The software/firmware
is generated and validated by Kryptus Segurança da Informação S.A, no data is output until the
software/firmware is loaded during the update process and all of the required tests are executed
prior first use, including the integrity test.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The firmware of the kNET HSM is stored in an encrypted format inside the device using AES
256 CBC. During the boot process, the device decrypts the firmware image and check the
integrity with digital signature verification (RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256). If the decryption fails
or the decrypted image is invalid, the device will not boot, ensuring that only trusted and
unmodified firmware is executed.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
If the Operator needs to perform the kNET HSM tests, they can restart the HSM and then, all
the self-tests will be performed.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
Epoxy resin N/A N/A
EFP N/A N/A
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module is a multi-chip embedded hardware and meets the physical security level 3. The
crypto-graphic boundary is completely coated by epoxy resin, so that any attempt to physically
gain access to the module’s circuitry is highly likely to cause its destruction. Two aluminum
frames are used to delimit the resin area that is applied over the PCB, which can be seen in
Figure 5 and Figure 6. The resin is opaque inhibiting visual inspection and, moreover, providing
tamper-evidence. Besides the epoxy resin, the module implements environmental failure
protection (EFP), forcing the equipment to shut down in case any voltage or temperature
monitored do not meet the module’s operating range.
Figure 5: Top view of the cryptographic module
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Figure 6: Bottom view of the cryptographic module
Furthermore, the module was designed with an input interface for the monitoring of an external
event. In the scope of the TOEPP, this interface is connected to the kNET cover opening
sensor. The response to this event is the same as that applied to the EFP.
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
The module is completely covered by epoxy resin, hence, there is no cover or opening that
allows internal access. As a result, no tamper evident seal is used over the module.
7.3 Filler Panels
The module is completely covered by epoxy resin, hence, there is no cover or opening that
allows internal access. As a result, no filler is used over the module.
7.4 Fault Induction Mitigation
Not Applicable.
7.5 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or Voltage EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -25°C (storage); -2°C (installed) EFP Shutdown
HighTemperature +85°C (storage); +70°C (installed) EFP Shutdown
LowVoltage 10.20 V (+12V ATX); 2.80 V (+3.3V ATX); 1.96 V
(Battery)
EFP Shutdown
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Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or Voltage EFP
or
EFT
Result
HighVoltage 13.80 V (+12V ATX); 3.80 V (+3.3V ATX); 5.75 V (+5V
Standby ATX); 4.08 V (Battery)
EFP Shutdown
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information
The module uses ultra-low-power microcontroller and sensors to constantly monitor the
environmental parameters, even when the appliance is not plugged to the mains electricity. A
non-removable battery, along with voltage conditioning and a supercapacitor, are used to
ensure that the sensors have non-interruptible power.
The module monitors the voltage of the power inputs and the temperature, triggering an EFP
response in case any parameter is outside the operating range. After the module recovers from
an EFP event, it switches to Intrusion State.
Regarding the voltage inputs, +12V ATX, +3.3V ATX, +5V Standby ATX and Battery are
monitored and trigger the environmental failure response.
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -25°C
HighTemperature +85°C
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures
The hardness tested temperature considers the temperature range for an appliance at storage.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
Non-invasive security is non-applicable since there are currently no requirement in [SP 800-
140F].
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
The Database Encryption Key encrypts all other private SSP (CSPs) stored in the disk. The
Database Encryption Key itself is stored in the disk encrypted by the Master Key. The Master
Key is stored in-side the main CPU enclosure and never leaves it. The usage of the Master Key
and Database Key Encryption Key is controlled by the KMIP server and are never used to
encrypt arbitrary data (i.e.: they can’t be used directly by any user).
The integrity of all public SSPs (PSPs) stored in the disk are protected by the KMIP server. The
KMIP server integrity is verified by the Bootloader. The Bootloader integrity is verified by the
Super Root Key. The Super Root Key integrity is verified by the main CPU, using the Super
Root Key Hash stored in a read-only memory inside the CPU enclosure.
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
One-time Programmable
Memory
Read-only, non-volatile memory, internal to the
CPU encapsulation
Static
Non-volatile Memory Non-volatile memory, external to the CPU, but
internal to the cryptographic boundary
Dynamic
Encrypted Non-volatile
Memory
Non-volatile Memory where encrypted data is
stored
Dynamic
Volatile Memory Volatile memory, external to the CPU, but internal
to the cryptographic boundary
Dynamic
Encrypted Volatile
Memory
Volatile Memory where encrypted data is stored Dynamic
CPU Registers CPU registers, internal to the CPU encapsulation Dynamic
Table 18: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
ACTIVATE OTP 1 Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
ACTIVATE OTP 2 External Encrypte
d Volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
AUTHENTICATIO
N
External Volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
CHANGE
PASSWORD
External Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
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Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
CREATE USER Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
CREATE VHSM Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
ESTABLISH TLS
SESSION 1
Volatile
Memory
External Plaintext Manual Electroni
c
Key
Agreemen
t
ESTABLISH TLS
SESSION 2
External Volatile
Memory
Plaintext Manual Electroni
c
Key
Agreemen
t
EXPORT PHSM 1 Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
EXPORT PHSM 2 Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
EXPORT VHSM 1 Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
EXPORT VHSM 2 Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
FACTORY INPUT
1
External Non-
volatile
Memory
Plaintext Manual Direct
FACTORY INPUT
2
External Non-
volatile
Memory
Plaintext Manual Direct
GET Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
GET SECRET
SHARE
Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
GET SESSION
CREDENTIAL
Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
GET
TEMPORARY PIN
Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
GET TLS
CERTIFICATE
Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
IMPORT PHSM 1 External Encrypte
d Non-
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
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Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
volatile
Memory
IMPORT PHSM 2 External Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
IMPORT VHSM 1 External Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
IMPORT VHSM 2 External Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
INITIALIZE HSM External Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
JOIN CLUSTER External Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
LCD DISPLAY Volatile
Memory
External Plaintext Manual Direct
LOAD KEY Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
PREPARE JOIN
CLUSTER
Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
QUERY Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
REGISTER External Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
REGISTER
AUTHENTICATIO
N CERTIFICATE
External Encrypte
d Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
RENEW SERVER
CERTIFICATE
External Non-
volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
RESET
PASSWORD
Non-
volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
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Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
START TOKEN
AUTHENTICATIO
N
Volatile
Memory
External Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
VOTE QUORUM
AUTHENTICATIO
N
External Volatile
Memory
Encrypte
d
Manual Electroni
c
Input-
Output
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
AFTER USE
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
processes executed
when a unprotected
SSP is the volatile
memory is not
required anymore
The zeroisation is applied in order to
make the SSP irretrievable and not
reusable
No
PHSM
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
of all PHSM SSPs
Since the PHSM represents all the
information of the module, the
zeroisation is applied in order to make
the PHSM SSPs irretrievable and not
reusable when the process is initiated by
the Operator
Yes
VHSM
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
of all SSPs of a
VHSM
Since the VHSM represents part of the
information of the module, the
zeroisation is applied in order to make
the VHSM SSPs irretrievable and not
reusable when the process is initiated by
the Operator. When the PHSM
ZEROISATION is applied, the VHSM
ZEROISATION is applied as a
consequence
Yes
USER
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
of all SSPs of a
USER
Since the USER’s SSPs reside in the
module, the zeroisation is applied in
order to make the USER SSPs
irretrievable and not reusable when the
process is initiated by the Operator.
When the PHSM ZEROISATION or
VHSM ZEROISATION is applied, the
USER ZEROISATION is applied as a
consequence
Yes
OBJECT
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
of all SSPs of an
OBJECT
Since the OBJECT is a USER’s SSPs,
the zeroisation is applied in order to
make the OBJECT SSPs irretrievable
and not reusable when the process is
Yes
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
initiated by the Operator. When the
PHSM ZEROISATION, VHSM
ZEROISATION or USER
ZEROISATION is applied, the OBJECT
ZEROISATION is applied as a
consequence
SHUTDOWN
ZEROISATION
It is the zeroisation
of all SSPs stored in
the Volatile Memory
and Encrypted
Volatile Memory
Since the SSPs stored in the volatile
memory are not stored in the disk, the
SHUTDOWN ZEROISATION
guarantees that the SSPs are
irretrievable and not reusable. The
SHUTDOWN ZEROISATION process
can be initiated either by the Operator or
Automatically: if the module enters in
Intrusion State, the shutdown is applied
Yes
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods
All SSPs and key components within the module are physically and logically protected. Most of
the SSPs within the module are encrypted. All temporarily stored SSPs within the module are
kept in the volatile memory and zeroised when they are no longer needed. A zeroised SSP are
not retrievable or reusable.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Super Root
Key Hash
Hash of the
Public Key used
to verify the
Bootloader
image (secure
boot)
256-bit -
128-bit
Messag
e Digest
- Neither
Master Key Device's master
key, used to
encrypt the Disk
Encryption Key.
The access to
this key is
hardware
restricted to the
CPU (no other
hardware or
process have
access to it)
256-bit -
256-bit
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Key
Wrapping
Key
Unwrappin
g
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key
Key used to
keep keys
protected by the
Master Key
encrypted in
memory while
they are being
used
256-bit -
256-bit
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Key
Wrapping
Key
Unwrappin
g
Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate
X.509
Certificate used
to verify
firmware update
packages
4096-bit
- 140-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
PHSM
Module
Key
Private Key that
identifies the
module. It is
used to decrypt
firmware update
packages, sign
backup
packages and
decrypt backup
packages
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Data
Decryption
Digital
Signature
Generation
PHSM
Module
Certificate
X.509
Certificate that
identifies a
module. It is
used to verify
backup
packages
signatures and
to encrypt
backup
packages
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
PHSM
Server CA
Key
Private Key
used during the
PHSM TLS
Server
authentication
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
PHSM
Server CA
Certificate
Certificate of the
PHSM TLS
Server CA,
used to sign
TLS Server
certificates.
Matches PSHM
Server CA Key
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
PHSM
Server Key
Private Key
used during the
PHSM TLS
Server
authentication
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
PHSM
Server
Certificate
X.509
Certificate used
during the
PHSM TLS
Server
authentication.
Matches the
PHSM Server
Key
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Digital
Signature
Verification
PHSM
Client CA
Key
Private Key of
the PHSM TLS
Client CA, used
to sign TLS
Client
certificates
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
PHSM
Client CA
Certificate
Certificate of the
PHSM TLS
Client CA, used
to sign TLS
Server
certificates.
Matches PSHM
Client CA Key
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Digital
Signature
Verification
PCO
Initialization
Password
Password used
to initialize the
PHSM when it
is in factory
state
6
characte
rs - 6
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
PCOs'
Temporary
Password
Temporary
password
generated when
the PCO is
created. It can
be used only in
the CHANGE
PASSWORD
operation
12
characte
rs - 12
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
PCOs’
Passwords
PCO's
password, used
for
authentication
6
characte
rs - 6
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
PCO's hashed
passwords,
used for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Hashed
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
PCO's mTLS
certificate
fingerprint, used
for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Messag
e Digest
- PSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
PCO's OTP
Key
PCO's OTP
secret, used to
generate the
OTP
160-bit -
80-bit
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Message
Authenticati
on
PCO's OTP PCO's one-time
password, used
for
authentication
6
characte
rs - 6
characte
rs
One-
time
Passwor
d - CSP
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
VHSM
Server CA
Key
Private Key of
the VHSM TLS
Server CA,
used to sign
TLS Server
certificates
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
VHSM
Server CA
Certificate
Certificate of the
VHSM TLS
Server CA,
used to sign
TLS Server
certifi-cates.
Matches VHSM
Server CA Key
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
VHSM
Server
Keys
Private Key
used during the
VHSM TLS
Server
authentication
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
VHSM
Server
Certificates
X.509
Certificate used
during the
VHSM TLS
Server
authentication.
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Matches the
VHSM Server
Key
VHSM
Client CA
Keys
Internally when
re-quested:
INITIALIZE
HSM
3072-bit
- 128-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
VHSM
Client CA
Certificates
Certificate of the
VHSM TLS
Client CA, used
to sign TLS
Server certifi-
cates. Matches
VHSM Client
CA Key
3072-bit
- 128-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
VCO
Initialization
Password
Password used
to initialize the
VHSM after its
creation
12
characte
rs - 12
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
VCOs'
Temporary
Password
Temporary
password
generated when
the VCO is
created. It can
be used only in
the CHANGE
PASSWORD
operation
12
characte
rs - 12
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
VCOs’
Passwords
VCO's
password, used
for
authentication
12
characte
rs - 79-
bit
Passwor
d - CSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
VCO's hashed
passwords,
used for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Hashed
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
VCO's mTLS
certificate
fingerprint, used
for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Messag
e Digest
- PSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
VCO’s OTP
Key
VCO's OTP
secret, used to
generate the
OTP
160-bit -
80-bit
HMAC
OTP
Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Message
Authenticati
on
VCO's OTP VCO's one-time
password, used
for
authentication
6
characte
rs - 6
characte
rs
One-
Time
Passwor
d - CSP
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin)
Temporary
password
generated when
the User is
created. It can
be used only in
the CHANGE
PASSWORD
operation
12
characte
rs - 12
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Users’
Passwords
User's
password, used
for
authentication
8
characte
rs - 8
characte
rs
Passwor
d - CSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Users’
Hashed
Passwords
User's hashed
passwords,
used for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Hashed
Passwor
d - CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
User's mTLS
certifi-cate
fingerprint, use
for
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Messag
e Digest
- PSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
User’s OTP
Key
User's OTP
secret, used to
generate the
OTP
160-bit -
80-bit
HMAC
OTP
Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Message
Authenticati
on
User’s OTP User's one-time
password, used
for
authentication
6
characte
rs - 6
characte
rs
One-
Time
Passwor
d - CSP
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 121 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Users' RSA
Private Key
User's RSA
private keys
2048-
bit,
3072-
bit,
4096-bit
- 112-
bit, 128-
bit, 140-
bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Data
Decryption
Digital
Signature
Generation
Users' RSA
Public Key
User’s RSA
public keys
2048-
bit,
3072-
bit,
4096-bit
- 112-
bit, 128-
bit, 140-
bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Data
Encryption
Digital
Signature
Verification
Users'
ECDSA
Private Key
User’s ECDSA
private keys
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Key
Agreement
Users'
ECDSA
Public Key
User’s ECDSA
public keys
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Key
Agreement
Users'
EDDSA
Private Key
User’s EDDSA
private keys
ED-
25519,
ED-448
- 128-
bit, 224-
bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Users'
EDDSA
Public Key
User’s EDDSA
public keys
ED-
25519,
ED-448
- 128-
bit, 224-
bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 122 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Users' ML-
DSA
Private Key
User’s ML-DSA
private keys
ML-
DSA-44,
ML-
DSA-65,
ML-
DSA-87
- 128-
bit, 192-
bit, 256-
bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Users' ML-
DSA Public
Key
User’s ML-DSA
public keys
ML-
DSA-44,
ML-
DSA-65,
ML-
DSA-87
- 128-
bit, 192-
bit, 256-
bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Users' ML-
KEM
Private Key
User’s ML-KEM
private keys
ML-
KEM-
512,
ML-
KEM-
768,
ML-
KEM-
1024 -
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Key
Encapsulati
on
Users' ML-
KEM Public
Key
User’s ML-KEM
public keys
ML-
KEM-
512,
ML-
KEM-
768,
ML-
KEM-
1024 -
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Key
Encapsulati
on
Users' AES
Key
User’s AES
symmetric keys
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit -
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Data
Encryption
Data
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 123 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Decryption
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
Key
Wrapping
Key
Unwrappin
g
Users'
HMAC Key
User’s HMAC
symmetric keys
224-bit,
256-bit,
384-bit,
512-bit -
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
Users'
Certificate
User’s public
key certificates
RSA:
2048-
bit,
3072-
bit,
4096-
bit;
ECDSA:
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
RSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
140-bit,
ECDSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
ECDH
Private
Component
(ephemeral
)
Ephemeral
ECDH private
component
used during the
TLS session
key
Establishment
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Key
Agreement
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 124 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
ECDH
Public
Component
(ephemeral
)
Ephemeral
ECDH public
component
used during the
TLS session
key
Establishment
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Key
Generation
Key
Agreement
TLS Peer
Public Key
Certificate-
based
authentication
during TLS
session key
Establishment
2048-bit
- 112-bit
Public
Key -
PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
Derivation of the
TLS Master
Secret
256-bit,
384-bit,
521-bit -
256-bit,
384-bit,
521 bit
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Key
Agreemen
t
Key
Agreement
TLS Master
Secret
Derivation of the
TLS Session
Key and TLS
Authentication
Key
384-bit -
384-bit
Shared
Secret -
CSP
Key
Agreemen
t
Key
Agreement
TLS
Session
Key
Encryption and
decryption of
TLS session
packets
128-bit,
256-bit -
128-bit,
256-bit
AES
Session
Key -
CSP
Key
Agreemen
t
Data
Encryption
Data
Decryption
TLS
Authenticati
on Key
Authentication
of TLS session
packets
256-bit -
128-bit
HMAC-
Key -
CSP
Key
Agreemen
t
Message
Authenticati
on
Message
Verification
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Generation of
random number
384-bit -
256-bit
Entropy
Input -
CSP
Get
Entropy
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
DRBG
Seed
Generation of
random number
384-bit -
256-bit
DRBG
Seed -
CSP
Get
Entropy
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
DRBG C
and V
values
Generation of
random number
256-bit -
256-bit
DRBG
Internal
State -
CSP
Get
Entropy
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 125 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Disk
Encryption
Key
Encryption and
de-cryption of
SSPs stored in
the non-volatile
memory
256-bit -
256-bit
Symmet
ric Key -
CSP
Symmetric
Key
Generation
Data
Encryption
Data
Decryption
Key
Wrapping
Key
Unwrappin
g
Cluster
TLS CA
Private Key
TLS key used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate
TLS certificate
used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Cluster
TLS Server
Private Key
TLS key used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Generation
Cluster
TLS Server
Certificate
TLS certificate
used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Cluster
TLS Client
Private Key
TLS key used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
Private
Key -
CSP
Digital
Signature
Generation
Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate
TLS certificate
used to
establish the
TLS session
between kNETs
in the cluster
2048-bit
- 112-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Key
Generation
Digital
Signature
Verification
Cluster
Secret
Use to
authenticate
kNETs in the
cluster
16
characte
rs - 16
characte
rs
Secret -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 126 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Authenticati
on
Certificate
X.509
Certificate used
in non-TLS
authentication
schemes
RSA:
2048-
bit,
3072-
bit,
4096-
bit;
ECDSA:
224-bit,
256-bit,
384-bit,
521-bit -
RSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
140-bit;
ECDSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
X.509
Certifica
te - PSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Challenge
The challenge
of the
challenge-
response
protocol used to
authenticate the
user based on
its
AUTHENTICATI
ON
CERTIFICATE
800-bit -
128-bit
Other -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Authenticati
on
Certificate
Response
The response of
the challenge-
response
protocol used to
authenticate the
user based on
its
AUTHENTICATI
ON
CERTIFICATE
RSA:
2048-
bit,
3072-
bit,
4096-
bit;
ECDSA:
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
RSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
140-bit;
Other -
CSP
Digital
Signature
Verification
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 127 of 168
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generated
By
Establish
ed By
Used By
ECDSA:
112-bit,
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit
Session
Token
Session token,
used for
authentication
20
characte
rs - 20
characte
rs
Other -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Fastlane ID Fastlane ID,
used for
authentication
128-bit -
128-bit
Other -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Fastlane
Secret
Fastlane Secret,
used for
authentication
128-bit -
128-bit
Other -
CSP
Secure
Hash
(Message
Digest)
Quorum
Secret
Quorum secret
used to encrypt
a User Object
protected by
quorum
authentication
256-bit -
128-bit
Other -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Key
Wrapping
Key
Unwrappin
g
Quorum
Secret
Share
Quorum secret
share used to
reconstitute the
quorum secret
256-bit -
128-bit
Other -
CSP
Determinist
ic Random
Number
Generator
Table 21: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Super Root
Key Hash
FACTORY
INPUT 2
One-time
Programmable
Memory:Encry
pted
Perman
ent
N/A Master
Key:Derived
From
Master Key FACTORY
INPUT 2
One-time
Programmable
Memory:Encry
pted
Perman
ent
N/A
Job
Descriptor
Key
Encryption
Key
CPU
Registers:Plain
text
Until
Reboot
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 128 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
ZEROISATI
ON
Kryptus
kNET CA
Certificate
FACTORY
INPUT 1
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Perman
ent
N/A PHSM Module
Certificate:Signs
PHSM
Module
Key
FACTORY
INPUT 1
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Perman
ent
N/A PHSM Module
Key:Paired With
PHSM
Module
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
FACTORY
INPUT 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT PHSM
2
QUERY
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Perman
ent
N/A PHSM Module
Key:Paired With
Kryptus kNET
CA
Certificate:Signe
d by
PHSM
Server CA
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Server
CA
Certificate:Paired
With
PHSM
Server CA
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Server
CA Key:Paired
With
PHSM
Server Key
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Server
Certificate:Paired
With
PHSM
Server
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Server
Key:Paired With
PHSM
Client CA
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Client CA
Certificate:Paired
With
PHSM
Client CA
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Client CA
Key:Paired With
PCO
Initializatio
n
Password
AUTHENTICAT
ION
GET
TEMPORARY
PIN
INITIALIZE
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 129 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
HSM
LCD DISPLAY
ZEROISATI
ON
PCOs'
Temporary
Password
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
CREATE USER
RESET
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
PCOs’
Passwords
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
PCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
PCOs’
Passwords:Deriv
ed From
PCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
PCO's OTP
Key
ACTIVATE
OTP 1
ACTIVATE
OTP 2
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 130 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
PCO's OTP ACTIVATE
OTP 2
AUTHENTICAT
ION
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
PCO's OTP
Key:Derived
From
VHSM
Server CA
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Server
CA
Certificate:Paired
With
VHSM
Server CA
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Server
CA Key:Paired
With
VHSM
Server
Keys
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Server
Certificates:Paire
d With
VHSM
Server
Certificates
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET TLS
CERTIFICATE
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
RENEW
SERVER
CERTIFICATE
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Server
Keys:Paired With
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 131 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
VHSM
Client CA
Keys
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Client CA
Certificates:Paire
d With
VHSM
Client CA
Certificates
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM Client CA
Keys:Paired With
VCO
Initializatio
n
Password
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CREATE
VHSM
INITIALIZE
HSM
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
VCOs'
Temporary
Password
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
CREATE USER
RESET
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
VCOs’
Passwords
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
VCOs’
Hashed
Passwords
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
VCOs’
Passwords:Deriv
ed From
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 132 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
IMPORT VHSM
1
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
VCOs’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
VCO’s
OTP Key
ACTIVATE
OTP 2
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
VCO's OTP ACTIVATE
OTP 2
AUTHENTICAT
ION
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
VCO’s OTP
Key:Derived
From
Users'
Temporary
Password
(Pin)
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
CREATE USER
RESET
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 133 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Users’
Passwords
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CHANGE
PASSWORD
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Users’
Hashed
Passwords
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users’
Passwords:Deriv
ed From
Users’
Certificate
Fingerprint
s
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
User’s OTP
Key
ACTIVATE
OTP 1
ACTIVATE
OTP 2
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
Encrypted
Volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
User’s OTP ACTIVATE
OTP 2
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
User’s OTP
Key:Derived
From
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 134 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
AUTHENTICAT
ION
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' RSA
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' RSA
Public Key
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
ECDSA
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
ECDSA
Public Key
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
IMPORT PHSM
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 135 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
EDDSA
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
EDDSA
Public Key
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' ML-
DSA
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' ML-
DSA Public
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 136 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' ML-
KEM
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' ML-
KEM Public
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users' AES
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
HMAC Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
EXPORT
VHSM 1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 137 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
GET
IMPORT PHSM
1
IMPORT VHSM
1
REGISTER
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Users'
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
ECDH
Private
Component
(ephemeral
)
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
ECDH Public
Component
(ephemeral):Pair
ed With
ECDH
Public
Component
(ephemeral
)
ESTABLISH
TLS SESSION
1
ESTABLISH
TLS SESSION
2
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
ECDH Private
Component
(ephemeral):Pair
ed With
TLS Peer
Public Key
ESTABLISH
TLS SESSION
1
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Encrypts
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 138 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
TLS Master
Secret
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS
Session
Key
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS
Authenticat
ion Key
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
DRBG
Entropy
Input
CPU
Registers:Plain
text
Until
zeroizati
on
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
DRBG
Seed:Used With
DRBG C and V
values:Used
With
DRBG
Seed
CPU
Registers:Plain
text
Until
zeroizati
on
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG C and V
values:Used
With
DRBG C
and V
values
CPU
Registers:Plain
text
Until
zeroizati
on
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG
Seed:Used With
Disk
Encryption
Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
PHSM Server
CA Key:Encrypts
PCOs’ Hashed
Passwords:Encry
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 139 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
pts
PCOs’ Certificate
Fingerprints:Encr
ypts
PCO's OTP
Key:Encrypts
VHSM Server
CA Key:Encrypts
VHSM Server
Keys:Encrypts
VHSM Client CA
Keys:Encrypts
VCOs’ Hashed
Passwords:Encry
pts
VCOs’ Certificate
Fingerprints:Encr
ypts
VCO’s OTP
Key:Encrypts
Users’ Hashed
Passwords:Encry
pts
Users’ Certificate
Fingerprints:Encr
ypts
User’s OTP
Key:Encrypts
Users' RSA
Private
Key:Encrypts
Users' ECDSA
Private
Key:Encrypts
Users' EDDSA
Private
Key:Encrypts
Users' ML-DSA
Private
Key:Encrypts
Users' ML-KEM
Private
Key:Encrypts
Users' AES
Key:Encrypts
Users' HMAC
Key:Encrypts
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 140 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
PHSM Client CA
Key:Encrypts
Cluster
TLS CA
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS CA
Certificate:Paired
With
Cluster TLS
Server
Certificate:Signs
Cluster
TLS CA
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS CA
Private
Key:Paired With
Cluster
TLS Server
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS
Server
Certificate:Paired
With
Cluster
TLS Server
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS
Server Private
Key:Paired With
Cluster TLS CA
Private
Key:Signed by
Cluster
TLS Client
Private Key
EXPORT
PHSM 1
IMPORT PHSM
1
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Encrypted
Non-volatile
Memory:Encry
pted
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS
Client
Certificate:Paired
With
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 141 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Cluster
TLS Client
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Cluster TLS
Client Private
Key:Paired With
Cluster
Secret
EXPORT
PHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
JOIN
CLUSTER
PREPARE
JOIN
CLUSTER
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
Authenticat
ion
Certificate
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
IMPORT PHSM
2
IMPORT VHSM
2
REGISTER
AUTHENTICAT
ION
CERTIFICATE
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Authenticat
ion
Certificate
Challenge
START TOKEN
AUTHENTICAT
ION
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Authenticat
ion
Certificate
Response
AUTHENTICAT
ION
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 142 of 168
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Session
Token
AUTHENTICAT
ION
GET SESSION
CREDENTIAL
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Fastlane ID AUTHENTICAT
ION
LOAD KEY
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Fastlane
Secret
AUTHENTICAT
ION
LOAD KEY
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Fastlane
ID:Encrypts
Quorum
Secret
Volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
AFTER
USE
ZEROISATI
ON
SHUTDOW
N
ZEROISATI
ON
Quorum
Secret
Share
EXPORT
PHSM 2
EXPORT
VHSM 2
GET SECRET
SHARE
IMPORT VHSM
2
VOTE
QUORUM
AUTHENTICAT
ION
Non-volatile
Memory:Plaint
ext
Until
zeroizati
on
PHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
VHSM
ZEROISATI
ON
USER
ZEROISATI
ON
OBJECT
ZEROISATI
ON
Table 22: SSP Table 2
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 143 of 168
Note: For Reset HSM Service and Leave Cluster services, all SSPs have Z permissions,
except:
Super Root Key Hash, Master Key, Kryptus kNET CA, Certificate, PHSM Module Key, PHSM
Module.
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 144 of 168
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
Digital Signature
Verification with
RSA 2048 bits
and SHA-256
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Frozen in “Initializing”
screen on the frontal
board in case of failure,
otherwise, the device
will enter the Conditional
Self-Tests stage
Digital
Signature
Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Pre-Operational Self-Tests are run during the power-on process and after a reboot. The system
image is decrypted, and its integrity is checked. If this test fails, the device does not boot and
cannot receive requests through the Ethernet interface.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Hash DRBG
(A6066)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Hash-based
Deterministic
Random
Number
Generation:
Instantiate,
Reseed,
Generate
and
Uninstantiate
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-ECB
Encrypt
(A6066)
Encryption
ECB mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Encryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-ECB
Decrypt
(A6066)
Decryption
ECB mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 145 of 168
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
Encrypt
(A6066)
Encryption in
CBC mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Encryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-CBC
Decrypt
(A6066)
Decryption in
CBC mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-CTR
Encrypt
(A6066)
Encryption in
CTR mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Encryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-CTR
Decrypt
(A6066)
Decryption in
CTR mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-GCM
Encrypt
(A6066)
Encryption in
GCM mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Encryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
AES-GCM
Decrypt
(A6066)
Decryption in
GCM mode.
Key size: 128,
256
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-224
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-256
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 146 of 168
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-384
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-512
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-
512/224
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA2-
512/256
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA3-224
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA3-256
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA3-384
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
SHA3-512
(A6066)
N/A KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
Message
Digest
Prior to the
first
operational
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 147 of 168
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
the frontal
board
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-SHA-
1 (A6066)
SHA-1 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA2-224
(A6066)
SHA2-224 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A6066)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A6066)
SHA2-384 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA2-512
(A6066)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA3-224
(A6066)
SHA3-224 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA3-256
(A6066)
SHA3-256 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
Page 148 of 168
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-
SHA3-384
(A6066)
SHA3-384 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
HMAC-
SHA3-512
(A6066)
SHA3-512 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
MAC
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Generation.
SHA-256.
Key size:
2048 bit
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Key size:
2048 bit
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Generation.
Curve: NIST
P-521
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Curve: NIST
P-521
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
EDDSA
SigGen
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Generation.
Curve
Ed25519
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
EDDSA
SigVer
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Curve
Ed25519
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
cryptographi
c algorithm
ML-KEM
Encapsulatio
n (A6066)
Encapsulation
. Parameters
Set: ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Key
Encapsulatio
n
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ML-KEM
Decapsulatio
n (A6066)
Decapsulatio
n. Parameters
Set: ML-KEM-
512, ML-
KEM-768,
ML-KEM-
1024
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Key
Decapsulatio
n
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ML-DSA
SigGen
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Generation.
Parameters
Set: ML-DSA-
44, ML-DSA-
65, ML-DSA-
87
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Generation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
ML-DSA
SigVer
(A6066)
Digital
Signature
Verification.
Parameters
Set: ML-DSA-
44, ML-DSA-
65, ML-DSA-
87
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Digital
Signature
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
(A6066)
Key
Agreement
Scheme
(Primitive “Z”
computation
using ECDH).
Curve: P-256,
P-384, P-512
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Shared
Secret
Computation
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
KDF TLS
(A6066)
[SP800-135
Rev 1] TLS
1.2 KDF.
SHA-256,
SHA-384
KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Key
Derivation
Function
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
TDES-CBC
(A6066)
Key Option: 1 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
TDES-ECB
(A6066)
Key Option: 1 KAT CAST “PASS” or
“FAIL” on
the frontal
board
Decryption Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
Firmware
Load Test
Digital
Signature
Verification
and AES
Decryption:
RSA 2048
bits and SHA-
256
KAT SW/F
W
Load
Frontal
board
frozen in
“Initializing
” screen
Decryption,
Digital
Signature
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
Entropy 90
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
N/A RCT CAST System
Log
Continuous
Health Test
Continuous
during the
entropy
source
operation
Entropy 90
Adaptive
Proportion
Test (APT)
N/A APT CAST System
Log
Continuous
Health Test
Continuous
during the
entropy
source
operation
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
N/A PCT PCT System
Log
Key Pair
Generation
and
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
and on-
demand
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
N/A PCT PCT System
Log
Key Pair
Generation
and
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
and on-
demand
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
EDDSA
KeyGen
(A6066)
N/A PCT PCT System
Log
Key Pair
Generation
and
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
and on-
demand
ML-DSA
KeyGen
(A6066)
N/A PCT PCT System
Log
Key Pair
Generation
and
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
and on-
demand
ML-KEM
KeyGen
(A6066)
N/A PCT PCT System
Log
Key Pair
Generation
and
Verification
Prior to the
first
operational
use of any
cryptographi
c algorithm
and on-
demand
Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs conditional self-tests prior to the first operational use of the cryptographic
algorithm.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
KAT SW/FW Integrity On-demand On-demand
(power-on
process and
after a reboot)
Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Hash DRBG
(A6066)
KAT CAST On-demand On-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
power-on or
reboot)
AES-ECB
Encrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-ECB
Decrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-CBC
Encrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-CBC
Decrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-CTR
Encrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-CTR
Decrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-GCM
Encrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
AES-GCM
Decrypt (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-224
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-256
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-384
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-512
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-512/224
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA2-512/256
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA3-224
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA3-256
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA3-384
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
SHA3-512
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA-1
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA2-
224 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA2-
384 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA3-
224 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA3-
256 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA3-
384 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
HMAC-SHA3-
512 (A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
EDDSA SigGen
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
EDDSA SigVer
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
ML-KEM
Encapsulation
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
power-on or
reboot)
ML-KEM
Decapsulation
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
ML-DSA SigGen
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
ML-DSA SigVer
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
KDF TLS
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
TDES-CBC
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
TDES-ECB
(A6066)
KAT CAST Every 24h Automatically or
on-demand
(after boot
process,
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
triggered by
power-on or
reboot)
Firmware Load
Test
KAT SW/FW Load On-demand On-demand (on
SW/FW load or
after boot
process)
Entropy 90
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
RCT CAST On-demand On-demand
(continuous
during the
entropy source
operation)
Entropy 90
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
APT CAST On-demand On-demand
(continuous
during the
entropy source
operation)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
PCT PCT On-demand On-demand (for
Key Pair
Generation)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A6066)
PCT PCT On-demand On-demand (for
Key Pair
Generation)
EDDSA KeyGen
(A6066)
PCT PCT On-demand On-demand (for
Key Pair
Generation)
ML-DSA
KeyGen (A6066)
PCT PCT On-demand On-demand (for
Key Pair
Generation)
ML-KEM
KeyGen (A6066)
PCT PCT On-demand On-demand (for
Key Pair
Generation)
Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information
The module performs Periodic Self-Tests every 24 hours.
The execution of the Periodic Self-Tests is not affected by or affects other uses of the HSM,
then there is no current operation listed above that could interrupt or delay the HSM
performance and vice-versa.
Note: The execution and the results from the periodic routine are not displayed in the frontal
panel. It can be checked getting the module’s log.
10.4 Error States
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Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Error
State
Failure of
any Self-
Test
Failure of any
Pre-Operational
Self-tests.
Failure of any
Conditional
Self-tests.
Failure of any
Periodic Self-
Test Information
Click on MENU to
restart the module or
click on OK to
proceed. If the latter
option is chosen, the
only services
available will be:
“Get System Log”,
“Restart” and
“Shutdown”. Power
cycle or re-start the
module to recover it
from this state
Right after test execution,
the test will be tagged as
“FAIL” on the frontal
display. After the
completion of the FIPS
tests, the device switches
to Error State. This
condition is indicated on
the frontal display by the
message “Auto Test has
failed”. Also, it can be
checked by getting the
log file
Start
Failures
Failures at
the
hardware
Failures at the
hardware of the
module
detected during
the boot,
preventing its
operation
Click on MENU to
restart the module or
click on OK to
proceed. If the latter
option is chosen, the
only services
available will be:
“Get System Log”,
“Restart” and
“Shutdown”. Power
cycle or restart the
module to recover it
from this state
The frontal display shows
the message “Failure”
and one of the following
conditions: ·
“Cryptographic Module
Start Failure” · “CPU start
Failure” After the
message has been
displayed for 10 seconds,
the module is restarted,
and if the failure persists,
the kNET switches to
Power Off State
Table 27: Error States
Errors are indicated on the frontal display.
Besides the screen that informs the occurrence of an EFP event, in case of hardware
malfunction preventing the module operation, the screen “Failure” will be shown before the
module is power cycled in an attempt to recover it from this state. If this error persists after the
power cycle, the kNET switches to Power Off State.
In case the same behavior is seen after the operator power cycles the kNET, contact Kryptus’
support.
On completion of the auto-tests, if any test has failed, the display will show the following
message:
“WARNING: Auto Test has failed.”
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
11.1.1 Installation
11.1.1.1 Secure Location
The module shall operate in a protected environment that limits physical access to the appliance
to authorized PCOs. The equipment must be installed and maintained by PCOs in a secure
state that mitigates against the following risks:
• Protection against loss or theft of the module.
• Inspection to deter and detect tampering (Ref. 11.1.2.2 Detecting Modifications and
Tampering).
• Protection against changes on the hardware appliance.
11.1.1.2 Installation on the rack
Figure 7: Installation on the rack
11.1.2 Initialization
11.1.2.1 Secure Initialization
During device initialization, a test suite is executed to ensure the integrity of the module. This
suite verifies that no algorithm tampering has occurred. If any of the power-on self-tests fail, the
module will be considered insecure and will not initialize, entering an error state. The Frontal
Board Interface visually indicates the success or failure of the self-tests, providing assurance to
the operator and preventing any potential malicious hardware intervention.
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11.1.2.2 Detecting Modifications and Tampering
Following setup, it is highly advisable to extract logs from the acquired devices prior to initiating
any cryptographic operations. In the event of tampering attempts occurring between shipment
and receipt, these logs will provide comprehensive details regarding any such incidents and the
nature of tampering detected. It is imperative to verify the absence of any such log entries
before proceeding with routine operations using the module, ensuring the utmost safety and
security. In addition, as a physical security measure, it is strongly recommended that the
tamper-evident seal of the TOEPP be verified.
Figure 8: Tamper-evident seals
Figure 9: Tamper-evident seals – zoom in
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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11.1.2.3 Serial Number Validation
After extracting the log in the previous step, the header of the log file should include information
about the device’s serial. Please check that the serial number therein informed is equal to the
serial number printed on the label affixed to the back of the device.
Figure 10: Label affixed to the back of the device
11.1.2.4 Software Validation
Software validation occurs automatically upon boot-up by the module during the decryption of
the system image. If the decryption process fails, the device will reject the boot-up sequence.
11.1.3 Startup Procedure
The startup process is fully described in sections 11.2.1 HSM Initial Configuration and 11.2.2
Get Device Status.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
11.2.1 HSM Initial Configuration
Before proceeding, it is crucial to configure the device network, initialize the HSM, set and
confirm the mode of operation, verify the hardware and software versions, and ensure that the
module has passed all tests and is fully operational. These steps are listed below:
1. HSM Network Configuration:
a. When a factory state kNET HSM is turned on, the frontal panel informs that the
HSM is not configured yet. Tap the CONFIRM button to proceed with the
initialization according with [Kryptus FIPS 140-3 Mode Manual].
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Figure 11: HSM Frontal board after self-tests and not configured
2. HSM Initialization in Approved Mode:
a. T The Temporary PIN should be displayed in the frontal panel after configuring
the network interface:
Figure 12: HSM Frontal board displaying the Temporary PIN
b. Initialize PHSM operation through the CLI (Command Line Client) is used to
complete the HSM initialization process using the command below:
⮚ ./command_line_client man initialize-phsm
--username DEFAULT_PCO
--password <TEMP_PIN>
--host <kNET-IP-ADDRESS>
--port 60000
--old-password <TEMP_PIN>
--new-password <NEW_PASSWORD>
--hostname <HOSTNAME>
--country <COUNTRY>
--state-or-province <STATE_OR_PROVINCE>
--locality <LOCALITY>
--organization <ORGANIZATION>
--organizational-unit <OU>
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--hsm-name <HSM_NAME>
--use-system-date-time
--out-cert <OUTPUT_CERT_PATH>
--hsm-policy fips140_3
--insecure
The Approved mode of operation is strictly enforced by specifying the --hsm-
policy fips140_3 flag.
IMPORTANT: Once this policy is committed during initialization, the module
cannot revert to a non-Approved policy without a full factory reset (zeroization)
of the module.
Note: The flag –insecure indicates that the SSL verification is disabled. In other
words, the client trusts the CA certificate provided by the server when the
communication is established instead of verifying it, which could be exploited by
man-in-the-middle attacks, hence the “insecure” name. However, the exchange
of information between client and server still happens in an encrypted channel
secured by the TLS key exchange. Besides testing purposes, we strongly
recommend using the CA Certificate instead.
For additional information regarding the CLI usage, consult the instructions
stated in [Kryptus FIPS 140-3 Mode Manual]
3. Check the Frontal Panel:
a. If the initialization process is completed successfully, the CLI operation will return
with no errors and the HSM’s frontal panel will display the screen:
Figure 13: HSM Frontal Board Default Screen
11.2.2 Get Device Status
Getting the device status can be achieved by using the following command:
➢ ./command_line_client man get-device-information --username DEFAULT_PCO --
interactive-password --host <kNET-IP-ADDRESS> --port 60000 –insecure
Specifying the username and password as well as the host and port.
Note: The flag –insecure indicates that the SSL verification is disabled. In other words, the client
trusts the CA certificate provided by the server when the communication is established instead
of verifying it, which could be exploited by man-in-the-middle attacks, hence the “insecure”
ASI-HSM AHX5 KNET Cryptographic Module
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name. However, the exchange of information between client and server still happens in an
encrypted channel secured by the TLS key exchange. Besides testing purposes, we strongly
recommend using the CA Certificate instead.
The command returns status information about the device temperature, battery voltage, monitor
state, intrusion state, device state, Approved Mode, firmware version, serial number and SNMP
Configurations.
Below is an example of the output of the command
kNET Status:
Temperature (Millidegree Celsius ): 38250
Battery Voltage (millivolts): 3651
Monitor State: Nominal
Intrusion State: Nominal
KNET State: Operational
Approved Mode: On
kNET Version: 1.1.0
kNET Serial Number: 000000000000XXXX
SNMP Configuration:
SNMP v1 is enabled
SNMP v2c is enabled
SNMP v3 is disabled
SNMP traps are disabled
SNMP System Description: Network HSM - kNET
SNMP System Contact: contact@knet.com
SNMP System Name: kNET production 1
SNMP System Location: Department 3
The kNET Version in the output of this command is the firmware version, which should be in
version 1.1.0.
The Approved Mode should be ON, indicating the correct mode.
11.2.3 Get Software Version
Getting the device’s software version can be achieved by using the following command:
➢ ./command_line_client man get-knet-server-version --username DEFAULT_PCO --
interactive-password --insecure --host <kNET-IP-ADDRESS> --port 60000
This command will return only the version of the software in a single line, which should be in
version 1.50.0.
The same information can be double checked in the next command.
Note: The flag –insecure indicates that the SSL verification is disabled. In other words, the client
trusts the CA certificate provided by the server when the communication is established instead
of verifying it, which could be exploited by man-in-the-middle attacks, hence the “insecure”
name. However, the exchange of information between client and server still happens in an
encrypted channel secured by the TLS key exchange. Besides testing purposes, we strongly
recommend using the CA Certificate instead.
11.2.4 Get Approved Mode
Checking if the HSM is correctly set in the Approved Mode, using the following command:
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➢ ./command_line_client man get-log --username DEFAULT_PCO --interactive-password -
-insecure --host <kNET-IP-ADDRESS> --port 60000 --startdate <DATE> --outfile
/tmp/outfile.txt
This command will generate an output file, in the header of this output file will be the information
about the software version, device serial number and policy, which is supposed to be set as
FIPS 140-3.
The startdate parameter should be just one hour before the command is executed, this will get
just some logs instead of every log entry, since we are interested only on the header and not in
the log entries.
Note: The flag –insecure indicates that the SSL verification is disabled. In other words, the client
trusts the CA certificate provided by the server when the communication is established instead
of verifying it, which could be exploited by man-in-the-middle attacks, hence the “insecure”
name. However, the exchange of information between client and server still happens in an
encrypted channel secured by the TLS key exchange. Besides testing purposes, we strongly
recommend using the CA Certificate instead.
Below is an example of the output file of the command:
--------------------------------------
kNET Version: 1.50.0
Device serial number: 0000000000000000
Policy name: FIPS 140-3
--------------------------------------
2024-08-16T17:00:53.508864+00:00 ahx5 PHSM[17796]: [Info] [IPC-JSON]
[17886:0:0] [] REQUEST [] [] [GetSNMPData] [] []
2024-08-16T17:00:53.629664+00:00 ahx5 PHSM[17796]: [Info] [IPC-JSON]
[17886:0:0] [] RESPONSE [] [] [GetSNMPData] [] [] [Success] []
11.2.5 Checking the Hardware Version
Getting the device's hardware version can be achieved by using the following SNMP command:
➢ snmpwalk -v 2c -t 5 -c public 172.30.203.54 iso.3.6.1.4.1.44588.1.1.1.3
This command will return only the kNET's hardware version in a single line, which should be in
version 1.1.0.
Note: The OID 3.6.1.4.1.44588.1.1.1.3 is equivalent of the device’s hardware.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module makes a clear separation between Administrators and Users. Access to
management operations in the module is exclusive to administrator operators: the PCO and the
VCO. The former has rights to manage the whole device, while the latter can only manage its
respective VHSM. Meanwhile the User type does not have the same management capabilities
as the previous two but is the only one that can execute cryptographic operations and own
cryptographic objects.
All possible operations are detailed in the kNET Operations Document, which outlines the full
range of HSM functions for both Administrators (PHSM and VSHM) and Users. The CLI Manual
provides guidance on executing these operations, including all necessary parameters.
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11.4 Design and Rules
Not applicable for this module.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The module does not require any periodic maintenance besides the physical inspection of the
TOEPP for signs of tamper, as described in Section 11.1.2.2 Detecting Modifications and
Tampering.
11.6 End of Life
The recommended processes for the secure sanitization and secure destruction of the module
are reported in a proprietary document. For further information, request the above-mentioned
document.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
N/A. No mitigation of other attacks is implemented on the module.