© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches
Cisco Systems, Inc.
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation
Version 1.1
March 27, 2023
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 MODULES VALIDATION LEVEL.................................................................................................... 4
1.3 REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION...................................................................................................... 5
2 CISCO SYSTEMS CATALYST 9400 SERIES SWITCHES........................................................... 5
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES INTERFACES AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ......................................... 6
2.2 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION ..................................................................................... 8
2.2.1 User Role..................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.2 Crypto-Officer Role ..................................................................................................... 9
2.2.3 Unauthorized Role .................................................................................................... 12
2.2.4 Services Available in Non-FIPS Mode of Operation.................................................. 12
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ................................................................................................ 13
2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 16
2.5 SELF-TESTS.......................................................................................................................... 22
2.5.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs) .................................................................................... 22
2.5.2 Conditional Tests....................................................................................................... 23
2.6 PHYSICAL SECURITY ............................................................................................................... 24
3 SECURE OPERATION...................................................................................................... 24
3.1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION AND CONFIGURATION ............................................................................ 24
3.2 VERIFY FIPS MODE OF OPERATION.......................................................................................... 25
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series
Switches running Cisco IOS-XE Firmware Version 16.12 or 17.3. This security policy describes how the modules
listed below meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 1, and how to operate the switches with on-board
crypto enabled in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. The Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches has primary SKUs that are
covered in this validation effort as listed below:
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series
Chassis C9404R
C9407R
C9410R
Supervisor Card C9400-SUP-1
C9400-SUP-1XL
C9400-SUP-1XL-Y
Line Card C9400-LC-48U
C9400-LC-48T
C9400-LC-48P
C9400-LC-24XS
C9400-LC-48UX
C9400-LC-24S
C9400-LC-48S
C9400-LC-48H
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program.
1.2 Modules Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
Table 1: Modules Validation Level
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 1
1.3 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the modules in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the switches from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco products. Please refer to the following
websites for:
Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches – https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/switches/catalyst-9400-series-
switches/index.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions, please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems
website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html) contains contact
information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the modules.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches are referred to as C9400 switches, the switches, the
devices, the cryptographic modules, or the modules.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the
Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches and explains the secure
configuration and operation of the modules. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the
general features and functionality of the switches. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for
the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation
is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these
documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
2 Cisco Systems Catalyst 9400 Series Switches
The Cisco Catalyst® 9400 Series switches are Cisco’s leading modular enterprise switching access, distribution
and core platform built for security, IoT and cloud. Advanced Persistent Security Threats, exponential growth of
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, mobility everywhere and cloud adoption require a network fabric that integrates
advanced hardware and software innovations to automate, secure, and simplify customer networks. The goal of
this network fabric is to enable customer revenue growth by accelerating business service rollout.
Figure 1: (a) Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches
The switches include cryptographic algorithms implemented in IOS-XE firmware as well as hardware ASICs. The
modules support RADsec (RADIUS over TLS), IKE/IPSec, TLS, SNMPv3, SSHv2, and MACsec.
The cryptographic modules have two mode of operations: FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode. The non-FIPS mode
is default for the switches. It is the Crypto-Officer’s responsibility to install and configure the modules in FIPS
mode of operation. Detailed instructions to setup FIPS mode of operation can be found in Secure Operation
section of this document.
2.1 Cryptographic Modules Interfaces and Physical Characteristics
The modules are multiple-chip standalone cryptographic modules. The cryptographic boundary is defined as
encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” “rear,” and “bottom” surfaces of the chassis for the switches and
the casing for the switches. Included in the physical boundary is the ACT2Lite Cryptographic Module (CMVP
Certificate #3637). Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches provide support for the following features:
Table 2 - Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series Switches Model Components and Descriptions
Cisco Catalyst 9400
Series Component
Description
C9404R Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series 4 slot chassis
C9407R Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series 7 slot chassis
C9410R Cisco Catalyst 9400 Series 10 slot chassis
C9400-SUP-1 The supervisor module has eight 1-GE or 10-GE ports. These ports require
either small form-factor pluggable (SFP) or SFP+ transceivers.
C9400-SUP-1XL The supervisor card has eight 1-GE or 10-GE ports. These ports require either
small form-factor pluggable (SFP) or SFP+ transceivers.
C9400-SUP-1XL-Y The supervisor card has eight small form-factor pluggable (SFP) or SFP+
transceivers which support 1-GE or 10-GE modules. These ports are numbered
1 to 8. Ports 1 and 5 use SFP28 transceivers in 25G mode.
C9400-LC-48U 48-Port UPOE 10/100/1000 Module
C9400-LC-48T 48-Port 10/100/1000 Module
C9400-LC-48P 48-Port Gigabit Ethernet POE/POE+ Module
C9400-LC-24XS 24-Port SFP/SFP+ Module
C9400-LC-48UX 48-Port UPOE Multigigabit Module
C9400-LC-24S 24-Port SFP Module
C9400-LC-48S 48-Port SFP Module
C9400-LC-48H 48-Port UPOE+ 10/100/1000 Module
The modules provide a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided
by the modules are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control
input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables.
Table 3: Catalyst 9400 Physical Interface/Logical Interface Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Physical Interfaces and Cabling
Data Input Interface, Data Output Interface 1000BASE-T ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E UTP cabling
Multigigabit-T ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E, Cat 6, Cat 6A UTP
cabling
1000BASE-T SFP-based ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E UTP
cabling
100BASE-FX, 1000BASE-SX, -LX/LH, -ZX, -BX10, Dense Wavelength-
Division Multiplexing (DWDM) and Coarse Wavelength-Division
Multiplexing (CWDM) SFP transceivers: LC fiber connectors (single-
mode or multimode fiber)
10GBASE-SR, LR, LRM, ER, ZR, DWDM SFP+ transceivers: LC fiber
connectors (single-mode or multimode fiber)
QSFP
SFP+ connector
Control Input Interface, Status Output Interface 1000BASE-T ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E UTP cabling
Multigigabit-T ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E, Cat 6, Cat 6A
UTP cabling
1000BASE-T SFP-based ports: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5E UTP
cabling
Ethernet management port: RJ-45 connectors, 4-pair Cat 5 UTP cabling
Management console port: RJ-45-to-DB9 cable for PC connections
Universal Serial Bus (USB) type A
Mini-USB type B
Status Output Interface Light Emitting Diode (LED)
• Fan Tray LED
• Power supply LED
• Status LED
• Locate LED
• Port link LEDs
• Active LED
• SFP or SFP+ uplink LED
• QSFP uplink LED
• Port set enabled LED
Power Interface AC power connector
The following physical interfaces are prohibited from usage in FIPS mode of operation:
• Universal Serial Bus (USB)
• Wireless Console Access with Bluetooth
2.2 Roles, Services and Authentication
The modules support identity-based authentication. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the modules.
There are two roles in the switches that may be assumed: the Crypto-Officer (CO) role and the User role. The
administrator of the switches assumes the CO role in order to configure and maintain the switches, while the
Users are processes that exercise security services over the network.
2.2.1 User Role
The role is assumed by users obtaining secured data services. From a logical view, user activity exists in the data-
plane via defined Data Input/Output Interfaces. Users are authenticated using EAP methods and 802.1X-REV,
and their data is protected with 802.1AE protocols. EAP and 802.1X-REV can use password-based credentials for
User role authentication – in such a case the user passwords must be at least eight (8) characters long. The
password must contain at least one special character and at least one number character along with six additional
characters taken from the 26-upper case, 26-lower case, 10-numbers and 32-special characters (procedurally
enforced). This requirement gives (26 + 26 + 10 + 32 =) 94 options of character to choose from. Without repetition
of characters, the number of probable combinations is the combined probability from 6 characters
(94x93x92x91x90x89) times one special character (32) times 1 number (10), which turns out to be
(94x93x92x91x90x89x32x10 =) 187,595,543,116,800. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random
attempt is approximately 1 in 187,595,543,116,800, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In
order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280
guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the switches.
EAP and 802.1X-REV can also authenticate the User role via certificate credentials by using 2048-bit RSA keys –
in such a case the security strength is 112 bits, so the associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1
in 2112
, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a
successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules.
The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w), execute (e)
and zeroized/delete (d) are listed below:
Table 4 - User Services
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Secured Dataplane MACsec Network Functions: authentication,
access control, confidentiality and data
integrity services provided by the MACsec
protocol
Diffie- Hellman (DH) private key, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) public key, Diffie- Hellman (DH)
Shared Secret, MACsec Security Association
Key (SAK), MACsec Connectivity Association
Key (CAK), MACsec Key Encryption Key
(KEK), MACsec Integrity Check Key (ICK) (w,
e, d)
Bypass Services Traffic without cryptographic processing
except authentication. The rule must have
been previously configured by the Crypto
Officer.
Diffie- Hellman (DH) private key, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) public key, Diffie- Hellman (DH)
Shared Secret (w, e, d)
2.2.2 Crypto-Officer Role
This role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the switches via CLI through the console port and
performing management functions and modules configuration. Additionally, the stack master is considered CO for
stack members. From a logical view, CO activity exists only in the control plane. IOS-XE prompts the CO for their
username and password, and, if the password is validated against the CO’s password in IOS-XE memory, the CO
is allowed entry to the IOS-XE executive program. A CO can assign permission to access the CO role to additional
accounts, thereby creating additional COs. The cryptographic modules support RADsec for authentication of COs.
CO passwords must be at a minimum eight (8) characters long. The Secure Operation sections procedurally
enforces the password must contain at least one special character and at least one number character along with
six additional characters taken from the 26-upper case, 26-lower case, 10-numbers and 32-special characters
(procedurally enforced). This requirement gives (26 + 26 + 10 + 32 =) 94 options of character to choose from.
Without repetition of characters, the number of probable combinations is the combined probability from 6
characters (94x93x92x91x90x89) times one special character (32) times 1 number (10), which turns out to be
(94x93x92x91x90x89x32x10 =) 187,595,543,116,800. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random
attempt is approximately 1 in 187,595,543,116,800, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. In
order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280
guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules.
The Crypto-Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the switches. The services available to the Crypto
Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w), execute (e) and zeroized/delete (d) are
listed below:
Table 5 - Crypto-Officer Services
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Define Rules and Filters Define network interfaces and settings, create
command aliases, set the protocols the switch will
support, enable interfaces and network services, set
system date and time, and load authentication
information.
Log off users, shutdown or reload the switch, manually
back up switch configurations, view complete
configurations, manage user rights, and restore switch
configurations.
Create packet Filters that are applied to User data
streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set
of Rules, which define a set of packets to permit or
deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Enable password (r, w, e, d)
View Status Functions View the switch configuration, routing tables, active
sessions, health, temperature, memory status, voltage,
packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view
physical interface status.
Enable password (r, w, e, d)
Configure Encryption/Bypass Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set
pre-shared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP
range or allow plaintext packets to be set from
specified IP address.
[IKE session encryption key, IKE
session authentication key,
ISAKMP pre-shared, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, skeyid,
skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IPsec
session encryption key, IPsec
session authentication key] (w,
d) and Enable password (r)
Configure Remote
Authentication
Set up authentication account for users and devices
using RADSec (RADIUS over TLS)
RADIUS secret, RADIUS Key
wrap key, TLS Server private key,
TLS Server public key, TLS pre-
master secret, TLS encryption
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
keys, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
V, DRBG Key (w, d)
HTTPs HTTP server over TLS (1.2) TLS Server private key, TLS
Server public key, TLS pre-
master secret, TLS encryption
keys, TLS integrity keys, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG V, DRBG
Key (w, e, d)
SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output
of CSPs.
DH private DH public key, DH
Shared Secret, SSH RSA private
key, SSH RSA public key, SSH
integrity key, SSH session key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG V,
DRBG Key (w, e, d)
SNMPv3 Configure SNMPv3 MIB and monitor status [SNMPv3 Password,
snmpEngineID] (r, w, d), SNMP
session key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG V, DRBG Key (w, e, d)
IPsec VPN Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE
session encryption key, IKE
session authentication key,
ISAKMP pre-shared, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec
session encryption key, IPsec
session authentication key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG V,
DRBG Key (w, e, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. User Password (r, w, e, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the
zeroization methods classified in table 7, Zeroization
column.
All CSPs (d)
2.2.3 Unauthorized Role
The services for someone without an authorized role are: passing traffic through the devices, view the status
output from the modules’ LED pins, and cycle power.
2.2.4 Services Available in Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
The cryptographic modules in addition to FIPS mode of operation can operate in a non-FIPS mode of operation.
This is not a recommended operational mode but because the associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow
for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. The modules
are considered to be in a non-FIPS mode of operation when it is not configured per section 3 (Secure Operation
of the Switches). The FIPS approved services listed in table 8 become non-approved services when using any
non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve sizes.
Table 6 - Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
IPsec
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4, Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SNMP v1/v2 Hashing: MD5
Symmetric: DES
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any of non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve
sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms
The modules implement a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The switches support the following FIPS-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 7 – Algorithm Certificates
Algorithms CAVP #A1462: IOS
Common Cryptographic
Module (IC2M)
Rel5a
CAVP #C431: CiscoSSL
FIPS Object Module
6.22
CAVP #4769: UADP
MSC 1.0
CAVP #C220:
Firmware Image
Signing
AES CBC (128, 192, 256),
CFB128 (128, 192, 256),
CMAC (128, 256),
CTR (128, 192, 256),
ECB (128, 192, 256),
GCM (128, 192, 256)
CBC(128, 192, 256),
CCM(128, 192, 256),
CFB1/8/128(128, 192,
256),
CMAC(128, 192, 256),
CTR(128, 192, 256),
ECB(128, 192, 256),
GCM(128, 192, 256),
KW(128, 192, 256),
OFB (128, 192, 256)
XTS(128, 256)
ECB (128, 256)
GCM (128, 256)
N/A
KAS-FFC-SSC (SP
800-56Arev3)
KAS-FFC-SSC:
modp-2048
modp-3072
modp-4096
N/A N/A N/A
KAS ECC CDH
Component
N/A KAS-ECC CDH
Component (Curve: B-
233, B-283, B409, B-571,
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521)
N/A N/A
DRBG CTR-AES (256) CTR-AES (128, 192, 256), N/A N/A
HMAC HMAC SHA-1, HMAC
SHA2-256, HMAC SHA2-
384, HMAC SHA2-512
HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA2-
224, HMAC SHA2-384,
HMAC SHA2-512
N/A N/A
ECDSA KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen,
SigVer (Curve: P-256, P-
384)
KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen,
SigVer (Curve: B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283,
N/A N/A
2
AES-XTS was tested as part of CAVP algorithm testing (C:431), but is not utilized for any services implemented/supported by
the module in Approved mode of operation.
K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521)
CVL (SP800-135)3
IKEv2
SNMP
SRTP
SSH
IKEv2
SNMP
SRTP
SSH
TLS
N/A N/A
KBKDF (SP800-108) Counter: HMAC-SHA-1 Counter: HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-
SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-
384, HMAC-SHA2-512
N/A N/A
RSA KeyGen (186-4) 2048-,
3072-bits modulus
SigGen (186-4 PKCS 1.5)
2048-, 3072-bits modulus,
SigVer (186-2 PKCS 1.5)
1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-,
4096-bits modulus
SigVer (186-4 PKCS 1.5)
1024-, 2048-, 3072-bits
modulus
KeyGen (186-4) 2048-,
3072-bits modulus
SigGen (186-2 ANSI X9.31,
PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS) 4096-
bits modulus,
SigGen (186-4 ANSI X9.31,
PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS) 2048-,
3072-bits modulus,
SigVer (186-4 ANSI X9.31,
PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS) 2048-,
3072-bits modulus
N/A RSA 2048 with
SHA-512 SIgVer
SHS SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
N/A SHA-512
DSA N/A Keygen (2048, 3072),
PQGGen (2048, 3072),
PQGVer (2048, 3072),
Siggen (2048, 3072),
Sigver (2048, 3072)
N/A N/A
CKG Vendor affirmed Vendor affirmed N/A N/A
KTS (AES Cert. #C431; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
KTS (AES Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength)
KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A1462, CVL Cert. #A1462; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 192
bits of encryption strength).
The KAS FFC and KAS ECC strengths are as follows:
KAS-ECC-SSC: 128 and 192 bits of encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC: 112 and 152 bits of encryption strength
3
SRTP was tested as part of CAVP algorithm testing (C431 and A1462) but is not utilized for any services
implemented/supported by the module in Approved mode of operation.
Notes:
There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the modules. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the modules are shown in this table.
The modules’ AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS, RFC
7296 for IPSec/IKEv2 and IEEE 802.1AE and its amendments for MACsec.
The modules are compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites
from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The 64-bit counter portion of the 96-bit IV is set by the modules
within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values (0
to 264 - 1) for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will
trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the modules’ power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
The modules use RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the
AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key. In case the modules’ power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
The AES GCM IV is generated internally in the cryptographic module in accordance with IEEE 802.1AE
and its amendments. The IV length used is 96 bits (per SP 800-38D and FIPS 140-2 IG A.5). If the
module loses power, then new AES GCM keys should be established. The module should only be
used with CMVP FIPS 140-2 validation modules when supporting the MACsec protocol for providing
Peer, Authenticator functionality. The link between the Peer and the Authenticator should be secured
to prevent the possibility for an attacker to introduce foreign equipment into the local area network.
No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic modules perform Cryptographic Key Generation
as per scenario 1 of section 4 in SP800-133rev1. The resulting generated symmetric key and the seed
used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength;
non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength) when used with modulus size of 2048 bits
or greater
NDRNG4
to seed FIPS approved DRBG (256 bits)
4
ACT2Lite Cryptographic Module (CMVP Certificate #3637)
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms
The cryptographic module implements the following non-Approved algorithms that are not used in FIPS mode of
operation:
MD5 (MD5 does not provide security strength to TLS protocol)
HMAC-MD5
RC4
Triple-DES
DES
2.4 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The modules securely administer both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on the CO role login, and can be zeroized by
the CO. Keys are exchanged and entered electronically. Persistent keys are entered by the CO via the console
port CLI, transient keys are generated or established and stored in DRAM.
Note that the command ‘fips zeroize’ will zeroize a large majority of the listed CSPs. This command essentially
results in a device reboot and therefore forces a power cycle, zeroizing all the keys listed below with “Power cycle”
in the Zeroization Method column.
Table 8 lists the secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs used by the modules.
Table 8 – Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
ID Algorithm Size Description Storage Zeroization Method
General Keys/CSPs
DRBG V SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits Generated by entropy source via the
CTR_DRBG derivation function. It is
stored in DRAM with plaintext form
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG key SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits This is the 256-bit DRBG key used
for SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG
entropy
input
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits HW based entropy source output
used to construct seed
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
DRBG seed SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG derivation
function that includes the entropy
input from the entropy source
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
User
password
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
Enable
secret
Password Variable (8+
characters)
Used to authenticate local users at
a higher privilege level
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
password
RADIUS
secret
Shared
Secret
Variable (8+
characters)
The RADIUS Shared Secret NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no radius-server
key’
RADIUS key
wrap key
AES 128 bits Used to protect SAK for RADsec
(RADIUS over TLS)
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
overwriting with new
key
Diffie-
Hellman
public key
DH 2048-4096
bits
The public exponent used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
Diffie-
Hellman
private key
DH 224-379 bits The private exponent used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically after
shared secret
generated.
Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
DH 2048-4096
bits
This is the shared secret agreed
upon as part of DH exchange
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
ECDH P-256, P-384 Public key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange. This key is
derived per the EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
ECDH P-256, P-384 Private key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange. Generated by
calling the SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared
secret
ECDH P-256, P-384 Shared secret used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SSH
SSHv2 RSA
public key
RSA 2048-3072
bits modulus
SSH public key used in SSH session
establishment
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
SSHv2 RSA
private key
RSA 2048-3072
bits modulus
SSH private key used in SSH
session establishment
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# crypto key zeroize
rsa’
SSHv2
integrity key
HMAC 160-512 bits Used for SSH integrity protection. DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
SSH session
terminated
SSHv2
session key
AES 256-bits This is the SSH session symmetric
key.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
SSH session
terminated
TLS
TLS server
public key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA: 2048-
3072 bits
modulus
ECDSA: P-
256, P-384
Public key used in TLS
negotiations.
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘#crypto key zeroize {
rsa | ecdsa }’
TLS server
private key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA: 2048-
3072 bits
modulus
ECDSA: P-
256, P-384
Identity certificates for module
itself and also used in TLS
negotiations.
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘#crypto key zeroize {
rsa | ecdsa }’
TLS pre-
master
secret
Keying
material
384-bits Shared secret created using
asymmetric cryptography from
which new HTTPS session keys can
be created.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session terminated.
TLS Master
Secret
Keying
material
48-bits Keying material used to derive other
HTTPS/TLS keys. This key was
derived from the TLS pre-master
secret during the TLS session
establishment
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session terminated.
TLS
encryption
key
AES 256-bits This is the TLS session key DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session terminated.
TLS
Integrity Key
HMAC-SHA
256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS integrity to assure the
traffic integrity. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session terminated.
SNMPv3
snmpEngine
ID
Shared
secret
32-bits Unique string to identify the SNMP
engine
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no snmp-server
engineID local
engineid-string’,
overwritten with new
engine ID
SNMPv3
password
shared
secret
256 bits This secret is used to derive HMAC-
SHA1 key for SNMPv3
Authentication
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SNMPv3
session key
AES 128-bit Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IPSec
skeyid Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE. This
key was derived in the module
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
skeyid_d Shared
Secret
160 bits Used for key agreement in IKE DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
SKEYSEED Keying
material
160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will
be used for deriving IKE session
authentication key.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
IPSec/IKE session is
terminated
IKE session
encryption
key
AES 256-bit AES Derived in the module used for
IKEv2 payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IKE session
authenticati
on key
HMAC-
SHA1
160 bits HMAC-SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IKE
authenticati
on private
Key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA (2048
bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in
IKEv2 authentication. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA keypair
deletion command
IKE
authenticati
on public
key
RSA/ECDS
A
RSA (2048
bits) or
ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA public key used in
IKEv2 authentication. The key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA/ECDSA key pair
generation method in the module.
NVRAM (plaintext) Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA keypair
deletion command
ISAKMP
preshared
pre-shared
key
Variable (8+
characters)
This key was configured by CO and
used for User role authentication
using IKE Pre-shared key based
authentication mechanism
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no crypto isakmp
key..’
IPSec
session
encryption
key
AES 256-bit AES Derived in the module used for
IKEv2 payload integrity verification
DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
IPSec
session
authenticati
on key
HMAC-
SHA1
160 bits HMAC-SHA1 key DRAM (plaintext) Power cycle
MACsec
MACsec
Security
Association
Key (SAK)
AES-GCM 128-, 256-bits Used for creating Security
Associations (SA) for
encrypting/decrypting the MACsec
data plane traffic. Derived from the
CAK using the SP800-108 KDF.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
MACsec
Connectivity
Association
Key (CAK)
AES-GCM 128-, 256-bits A CO configured pre-shared secret
key possessed by members of a
MACsec connectivity association
(via MKA) to secure control plane
traffic
NVRAM (plaintext) ‘# no key-string..’
MACsec Key
Encryption
Key (KEK)
AES-CMAC 128/256 bits Used to transmit SAKs to other
members of a MACsec connectivity
association. Derived from the CAK
using the SP800-108 KDF.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
MACsec
Integrity
Check Key
(ICK)
AES-GCM 128/256 bits Used to prove an authorized peer
sent the message. Derived from
the CAK using the SP800-108 KDF.
DRAM (plaintext) Automatically when
session expires
2.5 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent
any secure data from being released and to insure all components are functioning correctly.
2.5.1 Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs)
• Firmware Integrity Test (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-512)
• IC2M Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES-CBC (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES GCM KAT
o AES-CMAC KAT
o SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
o SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify (Curve: P-256)
o HMAC-SHA-1, -256, -384, 512 KATs
o ECC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
o FFC Primitive “Z” KAT (NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
o IKEv2 KDF KAT
o SNMP KDF KAT
o SRTP KDF KAT
o SSH KDF KAT
o FIPS 186-4 RSA (sign/verify) KATs (Size: 2048)
o SHA-1, -256, -384, -512 KATs
o KBKDF (Counter) KAT
• CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES-ECB (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES-CCM (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES-GCM (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o AES-CMAC KAT
o AES-XTS (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
o SP800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
o SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
o FIPS 186-4 DSA Sign/Verify Test (Size: 2048)
o FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Sign/Verify Test (Curve: P-256)
o HMAC-SHA1, -224, -256, -384, -512 KATs
o ECC CDH KAT
o TLS KDF KAT
o FIPS 186-4 RSA (sign/verify) KATs (Size: 2048)
o SHA-1 KAT
o Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA1)
o KBKDF (Counter) KAT
• UADP ASIC Hardware Algorithm Implementation Known Answer Tests:
o AES-ECB (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
2.5.2 Conditional Tests
• Conditional Bypass test
• IC2M Algorithm Implementation Conditional Tests:
o Pairwise consistency test for RSA
o Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA
o Continuous Random Number Generation test for approved DRBG
• CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module Algorithm Implementation Conditional Tests:
o Pairwise consistency tests for RSA, DSA, and ECDSA
o Continuous Random Number Generation test for approved DRBG
• NDRNG Continuous Health Tests:
o Adaptive Proportion Test (APT)
o Repetition Count Test (RCT)
The devices perform all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-tests must be passed before
each role starts to perform services.
2.6 Physical Security
The cryptographic modules entirely contained within production-grade enclosure. The chassis of the modules
have removable covers.
3 Secure Operation
The switches meet all the overall Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. Follow the setup instructions provided
below to place the modules in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this Switches without maintaining the following
settings will remove the modules from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 System Initialization and Configuration
The module does not provide any initial credential from the factory. The CO must follow procedural controls to
control access to the module and initialize the authentication mechanisms.
1. The CO must create the “enable” password for the CO role. Procedurally, the password must be at least 8
characters, including at least one letter and at least one number, and is entered when the CO first engages
the “enable” command. The CO enters the following syntax at the “#” prompt:
Switch(config)# enable secret [PASSWORD]
2. The CO must always assign passwords (of at least 8 characters, including at least one letter and at least one
number) to users. Identification and authentication on the console/auxiliary port is required for users. From
the “configure terminal” command line, the CO enters the following syntax:
Switch(config)# username name [privilege level] {password encryption-type password}
Switch(config)# line con 0
Switch(config-line)# login local
3. Disable manual boot:
Switch(config)#no boot manual
4. Disable Telnet and configuring Secure Shell for remote command line:
Switch(config)# line vty line_number [ending_line_number]
or
Switch(config)# transport input ssh
5. To ensure all FIPS 140-2 logging is received, set the log level:
Switch(config)# logging console error
6. Disable the following interfaces by configuration:
a. USB
Switch(config)# hw-module switch 1 usbflash1 unmount
b. Wireless Console Access with Bluetooth
Switch(config)# hw-module beacon rp active off
7. The CO enables FIPS by configuring the Authorization key:
Switch(config)# fips authorization-key <128 bit, i.e, 16 hex byte key>
8. The CO may configure the modules to use RADsec for authentication. If the modules are configured to use
RADsec, the Crypto Officer must define RADIUS or shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long,
including at least one letter and at least one number. 5
9. The CO shall only assign users to a privilege level 1 (the default).
10. The CO shall not assign a command to any privilege level other than its default.
Note: The keys and CSPs generated in the cryptographic module during FIPS mode of operation cannot be used
when the module transitions to non-FIPS mode and vice versa. While the module transitions from FIPS to non-
FIPS mode or from non-FIPS to FIPS mode, all the keys and CSPs are to be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. For
transition from FIPS to non-FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer has to zeroize the module to delete all plaintext, secret
keys and CSPs as defined in the Table 8 of the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy document and the
Crypto Officer has to issue “no fips authorization key <128-bits (16 octet) key to be used>” command in addition
to those defined in Table 8 of the security policy document.
3.2 Verify FIPS Mode of Operation
Use the command lines to display the FIPS configuration information. The switch CLI output shows running status
for FIPS mode of operation.
1. To ensure FIPS mode of operation is enabled.
Switch#show fips status
Switch is running in fips mode
or
Switch#show fips status
Switch is not running in fips mode
5 RADIUS traffic should be always tunneled over the TLS protocol in the Approved mode of operation and if the RADIUS traffic
is configured alone without the tunneling protocol (i.e. TLS), it is considered as Non-approved service and shall not be used in
Approved mode of operation.