Copyright Taua Biomatica, S/A 2006. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Zyt Cryptographic Module
Security Policy
Document Version 1.1
Taua Biomatica
December 20, 2006
Zyt Cryptographic Module Security Policy Version 1.1 December 20, 2006
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. MODULE OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................................................3
2. SECURITY LEVEL................................................................................................................................................3
3. MODES OF OPERATION.....................................................................................................................................4
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES .................................................................................................................................5
5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY................................................................................5
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY..............................................................................................................................6
ROLES AND SERVICES................................................................................................................................................6
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)........................................................................................8
DEFINITION OF CSPS MODES OF ACCESS ..................................................................................................................8
7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................................................................................10
8. SECURITY RULES .............................................................................................................................................10
9. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY ......................................................................................................................11
PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS.........................................................................................................................11
OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS ..............................................................................................................................12
10. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY...........................................................................................12
11. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................13
12. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS...................................................................................................................13
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1. Module Overview
The Zyt Cryptographic Module device is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module
(Hardware Version: HW P/N PM400002-9, Version 3; Firmware Version 2.0) encased in a hard,
opaque, tamper evident epoxy. The Zyt is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) designed to
encrypt and digitally sign documents/transactions. This security policy specifies the security
rules that must be followed by the persons involved in its operations, the service provided by the
module and the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs). The physically contiguous boundary is
defined as the outer perimeter of the potted PCB containing all of the security relevant hardware
required for secure cryptographic processing. The image below defines the physically
contiguous cryptographic boundary.
Figure 1 – Image of the Cryptographic Module
2. Security Level
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security of FIPS
140-2.
Table 1 - Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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3. Modes of Operation
The Zyt Cryptographic Module has two modes of operation as follows:
1. the FIPS Approved mode;
2. the non-FIPS mode.
It enters the FIPS Approved mode upon each power cycle. Then it may enter the non-FIPS mode
when an operator authenticates to the module using cryptographically protected identity strings
that are input to the module from a smart card external to the cryptographic boundary that is used
only in non-FIPS mode. After that, the module returns to the FIPS Approved mode upon the
removal of this card. Any operator that had previously been authenticated to the module in the
FIPS Approved mode must re-authenticate after the module returns to the FIPS Approved mode.
The module performs power up self-tests whenever it transitions from the non-FIPS Approved
mode to the FIPS Approved mode.
The Zyt Cryptographic Module provides the current state of the module via the “Status” service.
FIPS Approved mode of operation
The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms:
• RSA with 1024, 1536 or 2048 bit keys for digital signature generation and verification
• Triple-DES (two keys) for encryption
• SHA-1 for hashing
The Zyt Cryptographic Module relies on the implemented deterministic random number
generator (DRNG) that is compliant with ANSI X9.31; a hardware NDRNG is used for seeding
the Approved DRNG.
RSA with 1024, 1536 or 2048 bit keys is supported for key wrapping as a commercially
available key establishment technique that meets the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D
(key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 112 bits of encryption
strength) (encryption of bulk data via RSA is only supported in the non-FIPS mode).
Non-FIPS mode of operation
In the non-FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports all the algorithms implemented in the
FIPS Approved mode and the following non-approved algorithms:
• RSA with 1024, 1536 or 2048 bit keys for encryption of bulk data (key wrapping; key
establishment methodology provides between 80 and 112 bits of encryption strength)
• MD5 for hashing
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4. Ports and Interfaces
The Zyt Cryptographic Module provides a single multi-pin connector that
supports the following physical and logical interfaces:
- Main Power: receives main power via physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector.
- USB: shared pins on the multi-pin connector for data input, data output, status, control.
- Interface to external liquid crystal display: shared pins on the multi-pin connector for status &
data.
- Interface to external smart card: physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector for
dedicated data input, data output, status, control.
- Interface to external fingerprint sensor: shared pins on the multi-pin connector for data input,
data output.
- Interface to external keypad: physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector for control
input.
- Interface to external battery: physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector for backup
power.
- Reset: physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector for control.
- Wait: physically isolated pins on the multi-pin connector for control.
5. Identification and Authentication Policy
Assumption of roles
The Zyt Cryptographic Module shall support two distinct operator roles (User and
Cryptographic-Officer). The Cryptographic Officer and the User are authenticated using an
identity based authentication method. The operator is uniquely identified via an identity string
(fingerprint template). The module authenticates the identity of the operator by verifying that
the operator has possession of a unique valid TDES key. The role is explicitly selected with the
first command issued after authentication of the operator.
Table 2 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Data
User Identity-based operator
authentication
TDES Key
Cryptographic-Officer Identity-based operator
authentication
TDES Key
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Table 3 – Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Proof of possession of TDES key. The probability that a random attempt will
succeed or a false acceptance will occur is at
most 1 in 2^80 which is stronger than the
required minimum of 1 in 10^6.
The probability of successfully authenticating
to the module within one minute is less than
2^63 which is stronger than the required
minimum of 1 in 10^5.
6. Access Control Policy
Roles and Services
Table 4 – Services Authorized for Roles
Role Authorized Services
User: This role shall
provide all of the services
necessary for encryption
and digital authentication
of User data.
User Authentication: authenticates the authorized User role via
proof of possession of a TDES key.
Sign Data with RSA: digitally authenticate data entered into the
USB port with RSA.
Verify Data Signed with RSA: verify digitally authenticated data
entered into the USB port with RSA.
Zyt Card Management: creates and manages authentication
parameters for Zyt smart cards.
TDES Data Encryption: Encrypt data entered into the USB port
with TDES.
TDES Data Decryption: Decrypt data entered into the USB port
with TDES.
Hash Data: hash data received via the USB with SHA-1.
Cryptographic-Officer:
This role shall provide all
of the services necessary
for secure management of
C.O. Authentication: authenticates the authorized C.O. role via
proof of possession of a TDES key.
Module initialization: initializes the cryptographic module.
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the cryptographic module. C.O. Get Status: returns status to the authenticated CO
Zyt Card Management: creates and manages authentication
parameters for Zyt smart cards
Sign Data with RSA: digitally authenticates data entered into the
USB port.
Zyt Module Management: creates and manages the Zyt Module’s
keys.
Hash Data: hash data received via the USB with SHA-1.
Firmware Upgrade: loads new firmware onto the Zyt Module via
RSA signature verification.
C.O. Logoff: logs the C.O. off the system.
Invalidate Zyt Module: brings the module back to a factory default
state.
Unauthenticated Services:
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services that do not
provide key management functionality and do not use any Approved security functions:
• Initiate power-up self-tests: induced via power cycle.
• Zeroize: destroys all CSPs contained within the cryptographic boundary
• Unauthenticated Get Status: provides status of the device.
• Module Reset: resets the module; equivalent to power-cycle.
• Wait: slows down the communication speed of the cryptographic module to support
interaction with slower peripheral equipment.
• Get Smart Card Reader State: retrieve status information from the peripheral smart card
reader.
• Power smart card on/off: sends a command to the smart card reader to apply or remove
power to/from the smart card’s processor.
• Smart Card Reset: sends a command to reset the peripheral smart card’s processor.
• Receive/transmit: receives and transmits plaintext data to and from the smart card reader.
• Get Date and Time: returns the date and time.
• Capture Fingerprint: retrieve a fingerprint image from the fingerprint port and send both
the obtained image and quality information about this image out via USB.
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Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following are CSPs contained in the module:
• TDES Keys (TKs): used for TDES encryption/decryption
• RSA Signing Keys (RSKs): used for digital signature generation
• RSA Unwrapping Keys (RUKs): used for key unwrapping
• RNG Internal State (RIS): used for key generation, and random number generation
Definition of Public Keys:
The following are the public keys contained in the module:
• Manufacturer Public Key (MPK): Used to authenticate the firmware upgrade service via
RSA digital signature verification.
• RSA Signature Verification Public Keys (RSVPKs): Used to verify RSA signatures.
• RSA Key Wrapping Public Keys (RKWPKs): used for RSA key wrapping.
Definition of CSPs Modes of Access
Table 6 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The
modes of access shown in the table are defined as follows:
• Use (U): the parameter is used within its corresponding cryptographic algorithm.
• Destroy (D): the parameter is zeroized.
Table 6 – CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
Role CSPs Access Operations Public Key Access
Operations
User C.O.
Service
TKs
RSKs
PVKs
RIS
MPK
RSVPKs
RKWPKs
X User
Authentication
U U
X Sign Data with
RSA
U U U U
X Verify Data
Signed with RSA
U U
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Role CSPs Access Operations Public Key Access
Operations
User C.O.
Service
TKs
RSKs
PVKs
RIS
MPK
RSVPKs
RKWPKs
X Zyt Card
Management
U, D U, D U, D U, D U, D U, D
X TDES Data
Encryption
U U U U
X TDES Data
Decryption
U U U U
X Hash Data
X C.O.
Authentication
U U
X Module
initialization
U U U U U U U
X C.O. Get Status U U U U U U U
X Sign Data with
RSA
U U U U
X Zyt Module
Management
U,D U,D U,D U,D U,D U,D
X Hash Data
X Firmware
Upgrade
U
X C.O. Logoff
X Invalidate Zyt
Module
D D D D
Zeroize D D D D
Unauthenticated
Get Status
Module Reset
Wait
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Role CSPs Access Operations Public Key Access
Operations
User C.O.
Service
TKs
RSKs
PVKs
RIS
MPK
RSVPKs
RKWPKs
Get Smart Card
Reader State
Power smart card
on/off
Smart Card Reset
Receive/transmit
Capture
Fingerprint
7. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
cryptographic module does not contain a limited operational environment, and does not support
the loading or execution of untrusted code. Firmware upgrade integrity and authenticity is
verified via RSA digital signature verification.
8. Security Rules
The Zyt Cryptographic Module’s design corresponds to the Zyt Cryptographic Module’s security
rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to
implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide two distinct operator roles. These are the User
role, and the Cryptographic-Officer role.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication for all services that
provide key management functionality and use Approved security functions. The
cryptographic module also provides unauthenticated services that do not provide key
management functionality and do not use Approved security functions.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to
any cryptographic services.
4. While in FIPS mode, the cryptographic module shall encrypt using the TDES algorithm,
RSA for key wrapping only, RSA for digital signature generation/verification, SHA-1 for
hashing, ANSI X9.31 for key generation.
5. The cryptographic module shall perform the following tests:
A. Power up Self-Tests:
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1. Cryptographic algorithm tests:
i. TDES Known Answer Test
ii. DRNG Known Answer Test
iii. SHA-1 Known Answer Test
iv. RSA Known Answer Test (sign/verify & wrap/unwrap)
2. Firmware Integrity Test (SHA-1 hash verification)
3. Critical Functions Tests
i. CPU ID check
ii. Presence of Flash0 test (includes 32 bit CRC verification)
iii. Presence of Flash1 test (includes 32 bit CRC verification)
iv. Presence of Smart Card test
v. Presence of USB test
vi. CMOS Read/Write memory test (includes 32 bit CRC verification)
B. Conditional Self-Tests:
1. RSA sign/verify pairwise consistency test
2. RSA wrap/unwrap pairwise consistency test
3. Firmware load test via RSA signature verification
4. Continuous RNG test (on all implemented RNGs)
6. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power-up self-
test via power cycling the device.
7. Prior to each use, the internal RNG shall be tested using the conditional test specified in
FIPS 140-2 §4.9.2.
8. Data output shall be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error
states.
9. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
10. The module shall not support concurrent operators.
9. Physical Security Policy
Physical Security Mechanisms
The Zyt Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that includes the
following physical security mechanisms:
• Production-grade components
• Hard, opaque, tamper evident potting material encapsulation of multiple chip circuitry
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enclosure. With very high probability, removal/penetration attempts will cause serious
damage to the device, and render it non-functional.
Operator Required Actions
The operator is required to periodically inspect the device for tamper evidence as described
below:
Table 7 – Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Hard, opaque, tamper evident
potting material encapsulation.
The cryptographic module is
embedded within it’s host
device in a secure location
during the manufacturing
process under full control of
Taua Biomatica. The
cryptographic module is
visually inspected by trusted
Taua Biomatica employees
before being sealed inside it’s
host unit.
Further inspection for
evidence of physical
tampering on the
cryptographic boundary is to
be dictated by the
cryptographic module owner’s
security policy.
Inspect the potting for
evidence of a breach in
physical security. If potting
shows any signs of attempted
physical access to underlying
circuitry the device shall be
destroyed.
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2.
Table 8 – Mitigation of Other Attacks
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
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11. References
• FIPS PUB 140-2
• FIPS PUB 186-2
• FIPS PUB 180-1
• FIPS PUB 46-3
• ANSI X9.31
12. Definitions and Acronyms
• ANSI: American National Standards Institution
• C.O.: Cryptographic Officer
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter
• DRNG: Deterministic RNG
• FIPS PUB: Federal Information Processing Standard
• HSM: Hardware Security Module
• MD5: Message Digest 5
• MPK: Manufacturer Public Key
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic RNG
• RIS: RNG Internal State
• RNG: Random Number Generator
• RSA: Rivest-Shamir-Adelman algorithm
• RSKs: RSA Signing Keys
• RSVPKs: RSA Signature Verification Public Keys
• RUKs: RSA Unwrapping Keys
• SHA-1: Secure Hashing Algorithm – 1
• TDES: Triple Data Encryption Standard
• TKs: TDES Keys
• USB: Universal Serial Bus