© 2022 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar®
DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Document Version: 1.7
2022-06-28
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 2 of 22
Contents
1. Cryptographic Module Overview.............................................................................................................4
1.1 Models.......................................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Security Level............................................................................................................................................................................5
2. Modes of Operation...................................................................................................................................5
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.....................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Approved Algorithms..............................................................................................................................................................6
3. Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................7
4. Identification and Authentication Policy.................................................................................................7
4.1 Crypto-Officer..........................................................................................................................................................................7
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority ...............................................................................................................................................7
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority ......................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User).................................................................................................................................................7
4.3 Anybody....................................................................................................................................................................................8
4.4 Maker.........................................................................................................................................................................................8
5. Access Control Policy ................................................................................................................................9
5.1 Roles and Services....................................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Unauthenticated Services..................................................................................................................................................... 11
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)............................................................................................................ 12
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters .......................................................................................................................... 12
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations.......................................................................................................... 13
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access .................................................................................................................................. 13
6. Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................15
7. Security Rules ............................................................................................................................................15
7.1 Invariant Rules....................................................................................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Initialization Rules ................................................................................................................................................................ 16
7.3 Zeroization Rules.................................................................................................................................................................. 17
8. Physical Security Policy............................................................................................................................17
8.1 Mechanisms ........................................................................................................................................................................... 17
8.2 Operator Responsibility ....................................................................................................................................................... 17
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ........................................................................................................17
10. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................17
11. Acronyms...................................................................................................................................................19
12. References..................................................................................................................................................20
12.1 NIST Specifications.............................................................................................................................................................. 20
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications ........................................................................................................................ 21
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards................. 21
12.4 Corporate Documents.......................................................................................................................................................... 21
12.5 SCSI Commands................................................................................................................................................................... 21
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 3 of 22
Tables
Table 1 Ultrastar DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD Models........................................................................4
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification..............................................................................................5
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms ............................................................................................................6
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation...................................7
Table 5 - Ultrastar DC SS530 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces ................................................7
Table 6 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...............................................................8
Table 7 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths............................................................................................9
Table 8 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved Mode) ............................................................................9
Table 9 - Authenticated CM Services (Non-Approved Mode).................................................................10
Table 10 - Unauthenticated Services.............................................................................................................11
Table 11 - CSPs and Private Keys.................................................................................................................12
Table 12 - Public Security Parameters ..........................................................................................................13
Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services.............................................................................14
Table 14 - SCSI Commands...........................................................................................................................21
Figures
Figure 1: Ultrastar DC SS530 Cryptographic Boundary..............................................................................4
Figure 2: Tamper-Evident Seals ....................................................................................................................17
Figure 3: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seals .............................................................................................17
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 4 of 22
1. Cryptographic Module Overview
The self-encrypting Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD, hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar DC SS530”, or
“the Cryptographic Module”, is a multiple chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security.
The Cryptographic Module complies with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive
enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. See Figure 1: Ultrastar DC SS530 Cryptographic Boundary. All
components within this boundary satisfy FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Figure 1: Ultrastar DC SS530 Cryptographic Boundary
Top View SAS Connector View Bottom View
1.1 Models
The Cryptographic Module is available in several models that vary in write endurance and storage capacity. Data
storage within the Cryptographic Module incorporates both NOR flash and NAND flash. All user data is stored in
NAND flash. NOR flash stores all CSP data within the SECD FID and FSEC FID. The address range of all NOR
flash is outside the address range of the NAND flash media. Therefore, NAND flash capacity and write endurance
are not security relevant and excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements.
The validated models listed below in Table 1 lists the models, characteristics, hardware version and firmware version
associated with each model.
Table 1 Ultrastar DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD Models
Part Number Firmware
Capacity
(GB)
Description
WUSTM3240ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R960,
R962, R963
400 2.5"-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 10DW/D
WUSTM3280ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R960,
R962, R963
800 2.5"-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 10DW/D
WUSTM3216ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R960,
R962, R963
1600 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 10DW/D
WUSTM3232ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R960, R962, R963
3200 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 10DW/D
WUSTR6440ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R95A,
R960, R962, R963
400 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 3DW/D
WUSTR6480ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R95A,
R960, R962, R963
800 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 3DW/D
WUSTR6416ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R95A,
R960, R962, R963
1600 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 3DW/D
WUSTR6432ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R95A, R960, R962, R963
3200 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 3DW/D
WUSTR6464ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R960, R962, R963
6400 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 3DW/D
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Part Number Firmware
Capacity
(GB)
Description
WUSTR1548ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R960, R962, R963
480 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
WUSTR1596ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R960,
R962, R963
960 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
WUSTR1519ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R960, R962, R963
1920 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
WUSTR1538ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R95A,
R960, R962, R963
3840 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
WUSTR1576ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R957, R95A,
R960, R962, R963
7680 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
WUSTR1515ASS205
R900, R901, R920, R925, R92C, R957,
R95A, R95D, R960, R962, R963
15360 2.5”-SFF, 12 Gb/s SAS, 3D TLC NAND, 1DW/D
1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
FIPS 140-2
Security Requirements Section
FIPS 140-2
Security Level Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation. Configuration and policy determine the
Cryptographic Module’s FIPS mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved Mode after
successful completion of the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions. See Section 7.2 for information on the
Cryptographic Module’s initialization rules. The operator can determine if the Cryptographic Module is operating in a
FIPS approved mode by invoking the Get FIPS mode service1. The Crypto-Officer shall not enable the Maker
Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode. The cryptographic module is in FIPS non-
Approved mode whenever a successful authentication to the Maker Authority occurs. If the Crypto-Officer enables
the Maker Authority after the module enters FIPS Approved mode, the Crypto-Officer must also execute the TCG
Revert Method to zeroize the cryptographic module. If the Crypto-Officer, subsequently, executes the Initialize
Cryptographic service instructions provided in Section 7.2 with the intent of placing the cryptographic module in
1 A return value of 1 indicates that the cryptographic module is operating in FIPS Approved mode.
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 6 of 22
FIPS Approved mode, the Crypto-Officer must first execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the cryptographic
module.
The chapter titled FIPS 140 Crypto-Officer Instructions within the Ultrastar DC SS530 Product Manual provides
information on how to execute the Initialize Cryptographic service as well as the TCG Revert Method.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with NIST SP 800-131A.
Table 3 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES Firmware
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP 800 38F]
Functions: Encryption, decryption, and key wrapping to protect
an associated MEK in data storage applications
Modes: ECB, KW, CTR
Key Size: 256
4281
AES ECB Hardware2
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A]
Functions: Encryption and decryption
Mode: ECB
Key Sizes:128, 256
4309
AES XTS Hardware3
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP800 38E]
Functions: Encryption and decryption in storage applications
Mode: XTS
• XTS-AES Key1 does not equal XTS-AES Key2
• The length of the XTS-AES data unit does not exceed 220
blocks.
Key Sizes: 128, 256
4309
DRBG Firmware
[SP800 90A]
Function: Deterministic random number generator
Mode: CTR
Security Strength: 256 bits
1341
HMAC Firmware
[FIPS 198-1]
Function: Key encrypting key (KEK) derivation used within the
PBKDF
SHA size: SHA-256
2817
RSA Firmware
[FIPS 186-4, PSS]
Function: Digital signature verification with SHA-2564
Key size: 2048
2302
SHA
Hardware/Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature verification and KEK generation
SHA size: SHA-256
3517
SHA Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature verification and KEK generation
SHA size: SHA-256
3519
2
Tested AES ECB-128. However, the cryptographic module does not use this algorithm.
3
Tested AES XTS-128. However, the cryptographic module does not use this algorithm.
4 SHA-256 Cert. #3519
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 7 of 22
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description Rationale
CKG
[SP800 133] Cryptographic Key Generation
Function: Generated from the DRBG without
further modification or post processing
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.12.
See Section 5.3.
PBKDF [SP 800-132] PBKDF Vendor Affirmed
The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithm:
• A hardware NDRNG seeds the Approved [SP800-90A] DRBG. The NDRNG provides a minimum of 256
bits of entropy for key generation.
3. Ports and Interfaces
The drive uses the standard 29-pin Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) connector that conforms to the mechanical
requirements of SFF 8680. Table 5 identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The Serial connector
is a two-wire port that consists of signal and ground. Western Digital disables the serial connector at its
manufacturing facility before delivering the Cryptographic Module to customers. The Cryptographic Module does
not provide a maintenance access interface.
Table 5 - Ultrastar DC SS530 Pins and FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Port Connector Pins
Power Power connector
Control Input SAS connector, Serial connector
Status Output SAS connector, Serial connector
Data Input SAS connector, Serial connector
Data Output SAS connector, Serial connector
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN). The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator
roles.
4.1 Crypto-Officer
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority
This TCG authority initializes the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.3.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem
Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role.
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority
This TCG authority can selectively zeroize bands within the cryptographic module. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG
Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role. It may also disable User roles and erase
LBA bands (user data regions).
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User)
User roles correspond to Bandmaster Authorities. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class:
Enterprise Specification provides a definition. Bandmaster authorities can lock/unlock and configure LBA bands
(user data regions) and issue read/write commands to the SE Cryptographic Module. The TCG EraseMaster
authority can disable a Bandmaster.
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4.3 Anybody
The Anybody role corresponds to services that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not
disclose, modify, or substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the
security of the Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output
from an instance of the SP800-90A DRBG.
4.4 Maker
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can enable the serial port to perform diagnostics and gather data on the
failure. A power cycle automatically locks the serial port. The vendor must authenticate to the SID and the Maker
authorities to open the serial port. The cryptographic module is in FIPS non-Approved mode whenever the vendor
authenticates to the Maker Authority. The vendor performs failure analysis within the vendor’s facility. Maker
authentication data shall not leave the vendor’s facilities. During normal operation, the Crypto-Officer disables the
Maker Authority when invoking the Initialize Cryptographic Module service.
The following table maps TCG authorities to FIPS140-2 roles.
Table 6 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
TCG
Authority
Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID Authority
The SID Authority is a Crypto-
Officer role that initializes the
Cryptographic Module and
authorizes Firmware download.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (TCG
SID Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
Authority
The EraseMaster Authority is a
Crypto-Officer role that zeroizes
Media Encryption keys and disables
Users.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG
EraseMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG EraseMaster PIN)
BandMaster N
(N = 0 to 15)
The BandMaster Authority is a User
role that controls read/write access
to LBA Bands.
Role-based
User Identity (TCG
BandMaster Authority) and
PIN (TCG BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
Anybody is a role that does not
require authentication. Unauthenticated N/A
Maker
(Disabled)
Completion of the Initialize
Cryptographic Module service
disables the Maker Authority
Role-based
User Identity (TCG Maker
Authority) and
PIN (Maker PIN)
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Table 7 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths
Authentication
Mechanism
Mechanism Strength
TCG Credential (PIN)
TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides 2256 possible values. The
probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in 2256 (approximately
(8.64 x 10-78) which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one
at a time) and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not
exceed the associated TryLimit value. Each authentication attempt consumes
approximately 700 microseconds. Hence, at most, approximately 86,000
authentication attempts are possible in one minute. Thus, the probability that
a false acceptance occurs within a one-minute interval is approximately 7.4 x
10-73, which is significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Maintenance Role
The maintenance role credential embedded within the VUC that enables the
maintenance role is a 32-bit EDC, which provides 232 possible values. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will
occur is at least 1 chance in 232 (2.33 x10-10), which is significantly less than
1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Authentication attempts consume 74.5 milliseconds. Therefore, at most, 805
authentication attempts are possible within a one-minute interval. Thus, the
probability that a false acceptance occurs within a one-minute interval is 1.88
x 10-7, which is less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Table 8 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved Mode)
Service Description Role(s)
Initialize Cryptographic
Module5
Crypto-Officer provisions the Cryptographic Module
from the organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
Authenticate Input a TCG Credential for authentication
CO, Users (SID
Authority, EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download service
CO
(SID Authority)
Firmware Download
Unlocking the Firmware Download Control enables
firmware downloads. RSA2048 PSS and SHA-256
verify the entire firmware image. If, after a successful
download and the self-tests complete successfully the
SED executes the new code.
CO
(SID Authority)
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
The TCG Revert method zeroizes a drive and returns
the Cryptographic Module to its original
manufactured state.
CO, Users
Set
Write data structures; access control enforcement
occurs per data structure field. This service can
change PINs.
CO, Users (SID
Authority, EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
5
See the Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning section within the Ultrastar DC SS530 Product Manual.
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 10 of 22
Service Description Role(s)
Set LBA Band
Set the starting location, size, and attributes of a set
of contiguous Logical Blocks.
Users (BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band
Users
(BandMasters)
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data into ciphertext and
write in a LBA band.
Users
(BandMasters)
Read Data
Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output user
plaintext data.
Users
(BandMasters)
Set Data Store Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage.
Users
(BandMasters)
Erase LBA Band
Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA band
encryption keys to new values. Erasing an LBA band
with EraseMaster sets the TCG Credential to the
default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
Diagnostics
(non-compliant)
Vendor Unique Commands (VUC) support
diagnostic functions for testing the memory of the
drive and the SCSI bus integrity. The VUCs do not
alter the medium of the drive.
Maintenance
Table 9 - Authenticated CM Services (Non-Approved Mode)
Service Description Role(s)
Initialize Cryptographic
Module6 (non-
compliant)
Crypto-Officer provisions the Cryptographic Module
from the organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
Authenticate (non-
compliant)
Input a TCG Credential for authentication
CO, Users, Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Lock/Unlock
Firmware Download
Control (non-
compliant)
Deny/Permit access to Firmware Download service
CO
(SID Authority)
Firmware Download
(non-compliant)
Unlocking the Firmware Download Control enables
firmware downloads. RSA2048 PSS and SHA-256 verify
the entire firmware image. If, after a successful download,
and all self-tests complete successfully, the SED executes
the new code.
CO
(SID Authority)
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
(non-compliant)
The TCG Revert method zeroizes a drive and returns the
Cryptographic Module to its original manufactured state. CO, Users
Set
(non-compliant)
Write data structures; access control enforcement occurs
per data structure field. This service can change PINs.
CO, Users, Maker
(SID Authority,
EraseMaster,
BandMasters)
Set LBA Band (non-
compliant)
Set the starting location, size, and attributes of a set of
contiguous Logical Blocks.
Users (BandMasters)
6 See the Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning section within the Ultrastar DC SS530 Product Manual
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FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 11 of 22
Service Description Role(s)
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
(non-compliant)
Deny/Permit access to a LBA Band
Users
(BandMasters)
Write Data
(non-compliant)
Transform plaintext user data into ciphertext and write in
a LBA band.
Users
(BandMasters)
Read Data
(non-compliant)
Read ciphertext from a LBA band and output user
plaintext data.
Users
(BandMasters)
Set Data Store
(non-compliant)
Write a stream of bytes to unstructured storage.
Users
(BandMasters)
Erase LBA Band
(non-compliant)
Band cryptographic-erasure by changing LBA band
encryption keys to new values. Erasing an LBA band with
EraseMaster sets the TCG Credential to the default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
Set Vendor Data
(non-compliant)
A Non-Approved service that is unavailable after the
Initialize Cryptographic Module service completes.
Maker
Diagnostics
(non-compliant)
Vendor Unique Commands (VUC) support diagnostic
functions for testing the memory of the drive and the
SCSI bus integrity. The VUCs do not alter the medium of
the drive.
Maintenance
5.2 Unauthenticated Services
Table 10 - Unauthenticated Services lists the unauthenticated services the Cryptographic Module provides.
Table 10 - Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Get FIPS Mode TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic Module
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the SP800-90A DRBG
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
Zeroize
TCG Revert method to return the Cryptographic Module to its original manufactured state;
authentication data (PSID) is printed on the external label
SCSI
[SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage device. See
Table 14 - SCSI Commands
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor7
This service reports the FIPS 140 revision as well as the cryptographic module’s overall
security level, hardware revision, firmware revision and module name.
7 See the FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor section within the Ultrastar DC SS530 Product Manual
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5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the CSPs listed in
Table 11 - CSPs and Private Keys. Zeroization of CSPs complies with the purge requirements for SCSI solid state
drives within [SP800-88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization.
Table 11 - CSPs and Private Keys
Key Name Type Description
Crypto-Officer PIN - TCG
Credential (2 total)
256-bit authentication
data
The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate the Crypto-
Officer’s credentials.
User PIN –TCG Credential
(16 total)
256-bit authentication
data
The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate the User’s
credentials
MEK - Media Encryption
Key8 (16 total - 1 per LBA
band)
XTS-AES-256 (512
bits)
Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. Each key is only
associated with one LBA band. The Cryptographic
Module’s DRBG generates MEKs without
modification.
KEK – Key Encrypting Key
(16 total)
SP 800-132 PBKDF
(256 bits)
Ephemeral keys derived from BandMaster PINs and
256-bit KDF salts that wrap the MEKs using an [SP
800-38F] AES-256 Key Wrap.
Note: Keys protected by this [SP 800-132] PBKDF
derived key shall not leave the module.
NDRNG 256-byte Entropy
output
Entropy source for DRBG
DRBG Internal CTR_DRBG
state (384 bits)
All properties and state associated with the [SP800-
90A] Deterministic Random Bit Generator
Maintenance Role Credential 32-bit authentication
A 32-bit EDC authenticates the credentials of the VUC
that enables the maintenance role.
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module contains two public keys. The cryptographic module uses the public keys to verify the
digital signature of a firmware download image. If the digital signature verification process fails when utilizing the
primary public key, the cryptographic module attempts to use the secondary public key to verify the digital signature.
The cryptographic module rejects the downloaded firmware image if both attempts to verify the digital signature fail.
8 A concatenation of XTS-AES Key1 (256 bits) and XTS-AES Key2 (256 bits)
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 13 of 22
Table 12 - Public Security Parameters
Key Name Type Description
RSAPublicKey[0] RSA 2048 public key
Primary public key used to verify the digital signature of a
firmware image.
RSAPublicKey[1] RSA 2048 public key
Secondary public key used to verify the digital signature
of a firmware image.
PSID Twenty-character
alpha-numeric string
A unique value generated in the factory and printed on
the Cryptographic Module’s label. The PSID provides
authentication data and proof of physical presence for
the Zeroize service.
PIN salt (16 total) 256-bit key The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates PIN salts
without modification.
KDF Salt - Key Derivation
Function Salt (16 total)
256-bit key The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates KDF salts
without modification.
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
The Cryptographic Module deploys a [SP800-132] Key Derivation Function (KDF).
• The cryptographic module complies with SP800-132 Option 2a.
• The Cryptographic Module tracks TCG Credentials (PINs) by hashing a 256-bit salt and User PIN and
storing the SHA256 digest and associated salt in the Reserved Area.
• Security Policy rules set the minimum User PIN length at 32 bytes. The cryptographic module allows values
from 0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of the User PIN.
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing a User PIN is 2-256. The difficulty of guessing the User PIN
is equivalent to a brute force attack.
• KEKs ([SP800-132] Master Keys) derive from passing a User PIN ([SP800-132] Password) and a 256-bit salt
though an [SP800-132] KDF. The cryptographic module creates a unique KEK for each LBA Band. The
KEK generation process utilizes the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm to generate the KEK. Each KEK has a
security strength of 128-bits against a collision attack.
• Each 256-bit salt is a random number generated using the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
• The sole use of a KEK is to wrap and unwrap a Media Encryption Key (MEK).
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 13 defines the relationship between access to Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and the different
Cryptographic Module services. The definitions shown below define the access modes listed in Table 13.
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the [SP800-90A] DRBG, derives a CSP
with the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
• E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP.
• W = Write: The Cryptographic Module writes a CSP. The write access is performed after the Cryptographic
Module generates a CSP.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP.
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 14 of 22
Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Roles & Services
Service CSPs and Keys Type of CSP Access
Initialize Cryptographic Module
CO PIN
User PIN
DRBG, NDRNG
KEK
MEK
E, W
E, W
E
G
G, W
Authenticate
CO PIN
User PIN
E
E
Lock/Unlock Firmware Download Control CO PIN E
Firmware Download
CO PIN
RSAFW
E
E
Set
CO PIN
User PIN
Maker PIN
E
E
E
Set LBA Band User PIN E
Lock/Unlock LBA Band
User PIN
KEK
MEK
E
G
E
Write Data
User PIN
MEK
E
E
Read Data
User PIN
MEK
E
E
Set Data Store User PIN E
Set Vendor Data None None
Erase LBA Band
CO PIN
KEK
MEK
E
G
Z, G, W
Diagnostics None None
Self-Test
NDRNG
DRBG
E
W
Reset Module None None
Status Output None None
Get FIPS mode None None
Start Session None None
End Session None None
Generate Random DRBG E
Get Data Store None None
Get None None
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 15 of 22
Service CSPs and Keys Type of CSP Access
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
CO PIN
User PIN
DRBG
KEK
MEK
W
W
G
G
Z, G, W
SCSI None None
FIPS 140 Compliance Descriptor None None
6. Operational Environment
The Cryptographic Module operating environment is non-modifiable. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2 operational
environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits
additions, deletions, or modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses
an authenticated download service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. If the download operation is successfully,
authorized and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set. Firmware
loaded into the module that is not on the certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
7. Security Rules
The Cryptographic Module enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents the
security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports two distinct types of operator roles: Crypto-Officer and User. The
module also supports an additional role, the Maker role. Initialization disables the Maker role.
2. Cryptographic Module power cycles clear all existing authentications.
3. After the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed all self-tests and initialized according to the
instructions provided in Section 7.2, it is in FIPS Approved mode. The Crypto-Officer shall not enable
the Maker Authority after the cryptographic module enters FIPS Approved mode.
4. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access
to any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
5. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic
Module enters a soft error state. The Cryptographic module reports the error condition by transmitting
an UEC via the [SCSI] protocol. After entering the soft error state, the cryptographic module does not
process functional commands unless a power cycle occurs.
A. Power up Self-Tests
1) Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC
2) Firmware AES Encrypt KAT, Cert #4281
3) Firmware AES Decrypt KAT, Cert #4281
4) RSA 2048 PSS Verify KAT, Cert #2302
5) DRBG KAT9, Cert#1341
6) SHA-256 KAT, Cert#3519
7) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, Cert #2817
9
The DRBG KAT is inclusive of the instantiate, generate and reseed function health tests required in [SP 800-90A]
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 16 of 22
8) Hardware AES Encrypt KAT, Cert #4309
9) Hardware AES Decrypt KAT, Cert #4309
10) HW/FW SHA-256 KAT, Cert #3517
B. Conditional Tests
1) The Cryptographic Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator test on the
DRBG and the hardware NDRNG entropy source.
2) The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on XTS-AES Key1 and XTS-
AES Key2 that satisfies IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements.
3) Firmware Download Test, RSA 2048 PSS (Cert. #2302), SHA-256 (Cert. #3517)
6. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power
cycling the device.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the
Cryptographic Module.
10. The Zeroization service deletes all plaintext keys and CSPs.
11. The Cryptographic Module supports a maintenance role. The operator must execute the TCG Revert
Method to zeroize the cryptographic module before entering and maintenance role. The operator must
also execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the cryptographic module after exiting the maintenance
role.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
17. The End Session service deletes the current operator’s authentication. The Cryptographic Module
requires operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
18. The host shall authenticate to LBA Bands after a power cycle.
19. The Crypto-Officer shall assure that all host issued User PINs are 32-bytes in length.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Crypto-Officer shall follow the instructions provided in the FIPS 140 Crypto-Officer Instructions section of the
Ultrastar DC SS530 Product Manual and the Delivery & Operation (Crypto-Officer’s) Manual for acceptance and end
of life procedures. Acceptance instructions include:
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities by replacing the MSID (default PIN value).
• Erase the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module erases the LBA bands it also erases the Media
Encryption Keys.
• Establish the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module establishes LBA bands it also generates Media
Encryption Keys.
• Disable the Maker Authority.
• Lock the Firmware Download service and set the Firmware Download service to lock automatically after a
power cycle. The cryptographic module automatically locks the Firmware Download service after
downloading new firmware.
At the end of these steps, the cryptographic module will be in a FIPS Approved Mode of operation. While in FIPS
Approved mode, only an authenticated Crypto-Officer can change the state of the firmware download service.
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 17 of 22
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Crypto-Officer shall use the TCG Revert Method to perform the zeroization function. Reverting the
cryptographic module zeroizes all Critical Security Parameters.
8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Western Digital applies two (2) tamper-evident security seals during manufacturing.
• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering. In addition, it is difficult to replicate the of tamper-evident security seal.
Figure 2: Tamper-Evident Seals
8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Crypto-Officer and/or User shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering at least
once a year. If the inspection reveals evidence of tampering, the Crypto-Officer should return the module to Western
Digital.
Figure 3: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seals
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of the requirements within
FIPS 140-2.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy use. [SP800-131A]
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the cryptographic module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
1 2
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 18 of 22
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the
security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds
of a cryptographic module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement approved
security functions contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
• Crypto-Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions. [FIPS140]
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media when the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Drive Writes per Day (DWPD): Drive Writes per Day defines how many times the entire capacity of the
SSD can be overwrite every single day of its usable life without failure during the warranty period.
• Integrity: A cryptographic property to assure sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an
unauthorized and undetected manner.
• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that provides access to the cryptographic
module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key Management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module. The handling of authentication data is
representative of a key management activity.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique default value assigned to each SED during manufacturing. An
externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive the MSID from other information printed
on the drive. The MSID is readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for all TCG
credentials. [TCG Core]
• Method: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 19 of 22
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Unencrypted data.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a cryptographic module that. A port provides access to the
Cryptographic Module’s physical signals. [FIPS140]
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): A SED unique value printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service.
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information, that if modified can compromise the security of the
cryptographic module (e.g., a public key).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• Security Identifier (SID): A TCG authority used by the Crypto-Officer. [TCG Core]
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services, which automatically
encrypts all user data written to the device and automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Small Form Factor (SFF): Small form factor is a computer form factor designed to minimize the volume
and footprint of a desktop computer
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• Triple Level Cell (TLC): Triple level cells refer to NAND flash devices that store three bits of information
per cell, with eight total voltage states.
• User Data: Data transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• CO: Crypto-Officer [FIPS140]
• CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• DW/D: Drive Writes per Day
• EDC: Error Detection Code
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FSEC: Flash Security Data
• FID: Flash Internal Data
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 20 of 22
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• KDF: Key Derivation Function
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID: Manufactured Security Identifier
• NAND: Negative AND, Flash Memory technology
• NOR: Negative OR, Flash Memory technology
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• PSID: Physical Security Identifier
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• RID: Reserved Area Internal Data
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SECD: Security Data
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SED: Self Encrypting Drive
• SFF: SSD Form Factor
• SID: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• SSD: Solid-state Drive
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• TLC: Triple Level Cell
• UEC: Universal Error Code
• XTS: A mode of AES that utilizes "Tweakable" block ciphers
12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, November 2001
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, July 2013
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, December 2002
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
• [SP800 38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, NIST,
December 2001
• [SP800 38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, SP800-38E, NIST, January 2010
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 21 of 22
• [SP800 38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
December 2012
• [SP800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, January 2016
• [SP800 90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
• [SP800 90B] Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST, January
2018
• [SP800 131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths (Revision 1), NIST, November 2015
• [SP800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
• [SP800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation (Revision 2), NIST, June 2020
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00 (January 10,
2011)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC: Enterprise, Version
1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
• TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.02, (2011)
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee
Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands (SPC-5)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI (SAS-4)
12.4 Corporate Documents
• [Product Manual] Ultrastar DC SS530 2.5-inch Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) Solid-State Drive Product Manual,
Version 1.0 (October 2018), https://www.westerndigital.com/support
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar DC SS530 Datasheet, (July 2018), https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-
center-drives/ultrastar-sas-series-ssd
12.5 SCSI Commands
Table 14 - SCSI Commands
Description Code Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h RESERVE 16h
INQUIRY 12h RESERVE 56h
LOG SELECT 4Ch REZERO UNIT 01h
LOG SENSE 4Dh SANITIZE 48h
MODE SELECT 15h SEEK (6) 0Bh
Ultrastar® DC SS530 TCG Enterprise SSD
FIPS 140- 2 Security Policy Page 22 of 22
Description Code Description Code
MODE SELECT 55h SEEK (10) 2Bh
MODE SENSE 1Ah SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
MODE SENSE 5Ah SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh START STOP UNIT 1Bh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h TEST UNIT READY 00h
READ (6) 08h UNMAP 42h
READ (10) 28h VERIFY (10) 2Fh
READ (12) A8h VERIFY (12) AFh
READ (16) 88h VERIFY (16) 8Fh
READ (32) 7Fh/09h VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
READ BUFFER 3Ch WRITE (6) 0Ah
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h WRITE (10) 2Ah
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h WRITE (12) AAh
READ DEFECT DATA 37h WRITE (16) 8Ah
READ DEFECT DATA B7h WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
READ LONG 3Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS 1Ch WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
RELEASE 17h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
RELEASE 57h WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
REPORT LUNS A0h WRITE SAME (10) 41h
REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION
CODES
A3h/0Ch WRITE SAME (16) 93h
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h