FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2
Document Version 1.1.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
2
Table Of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Purpose.............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Document Organization..................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Notices ............................................................................................................................... 4
2. AUTOSOL CryptoMod .............................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................. 6
2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary............................................................................................. 7
2.1.2 Modes Of Operation................................................................................................... 8
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................... 9
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ................................................................................ 14
2.3.1 Authorized Roles....................................................................................................... 14
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms..................................................................................... 14
2.3.3 Services ..................................................................................................................... 16
2.4 Physical Security .............................................................................................................. 19
2.5 Operational Environment ................................................................................................ 21
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management..................................................................................... 22
2.6.1 Key Generation ......................................................................................................... 26
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output...................................................................................................... 26
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures............................................................................................. 26
2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)................... 27
2.8 Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................... 28
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests ................................................................................................. 28
2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................... 29
2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling .......................................................................................... 29
2.9 Mitigation Of Other Attacks............................................................................................. 30
3. Secure Operation................................................................................................................... 31
3.2 Setup and Initialization .................................................................................................... 31
Appendix A: Acronyms.................................................................................................................. 33
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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List of Tables
1. Security Level For Each FIPS 140-2 Section.............................................................................. 5
2. Supported Approved Algorithms............................................................................................. 8
3. Non-Approved Algorithms....................................................................................................... 9
4. Module Interface Mapping...................................................................................................... 9
5. Front Panel LED Description .................................................................................................. 11
6. Top Side ................................................................................................................................. 12
7. Bottom Side ........................................................................................................................... 13
8. Authentication Mechanism Details ....................................................................................... 15
9. Services .................................................................................................................................. 16
10. Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs ................................................................................ 21
11. Power-On Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 28
12. Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................ 29
13. Acronyms ............................................................................................................................... 33
List of Figures
1. The CryptoMod........................................................................................................................ 6
2. CryptoMod Block Diagram....................................................................................................... 7
3. Front Panel LED...................................................................................................................... 10
4. Top Side.................................................................................................................................. 12
5. Bottom Side ........................................................................................................................... 13
6. Tamper Evident Labels - A and B ........................................................................................... 19
7. Front - Tamper Evident Label - A........................................................................................... 20
8. Top - Tamper Evident Label - B.............................................................................................. 20
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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1. Introduction
This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the AUTOSOL CryptoMod, which for the
duration of this document will be referred to as CryptoMod only. Below are the details of the
product certified:
Hardware Version #: CM5705-D9
Firmware Version #: 1.0.51.FIPS
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2
1.1 Purpose
This document was prepared as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2
validation process. The document describes how the CryptoMod meets the security
requirements of FIPS 140-2. It also provides instructions to individuals and organizations on
how to deploy the product in a secure FIPS-approved mode of operation. Target audience of
this document is anyone who wishes to use or integrate this product into a solution that is
meant to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements.
1.2 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition
to this document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Machine
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
1.3 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2. AUTOSOL CryptoMod
The CryptoMod (the module) is a multi-chip standalone module validated at FIPS 140-2 Security
Level 2. Specifically, the module meets that following security levels for individual sections in
FIPS 140-2 standard:
Table 1 - Security Level For Each FIPS 140-2 Section
# Section Title Security Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurances 2
11 Mitigation Of Other Attacks N/A
12 Overall Level 2
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
AUTOSOL’s CryptoMod is an end-point security device designed to protect data exchanged
between remote industrial field devices and a centralized SCADA host. Installed directly in front
of the remote assets you want to protect, the CryptoMod encrypts network traffic for the entire
length of an industrial network. The CryptoMod is device and protocol neutral, acting as an
invisible secure pass through for network traffic. The CryptoMod provides authentication for
controlling network access, integrity for data when it’s in motion, and confidentiality for network
traffic. The CryptoMod also offers physical intrusion detection to its enclosure. The CryptoMod
carries a CSA Class 1 Div. 2 Hazardous Area Classification and functions as a terminal server,
allowing it to fit any existing industrial network configuration without the need to re-configure
the network. Since reliability is the foundation of safety, the CryptoMod has a hardware
watchdog timer as well as the capability to be remotely configured, managed, and updated.
Extensive logs with forwarding capabilities provide auditable files for detailed network
monitoring. The CryptoMod provides network security as close to an industrial network’s edges
as possible in order to maintain data availability and, ultimately, process safety.
Figure 1 - The CryptoMod
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.1.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary is defined as being the physical enclosure of the CryptoMod. All of
the functionality described in this publication is provided by components within this
cryptographic boundary.
Figure 2 - CryptoMod Block Diagram
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.1.2 Modes Of Operation
After the Crypto-Officer has performed the initial configuration and setup described in Section
3 of this document, the module will be in its Approved mode of operation.
Table 2 - Supported Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert. # Cryptographic
Algorithm
Usage
1255 DRBG (NIST
SP 800-
90Arev1)
Functions: Hash DRBG Random Number Generation; Key
generation. Size: 1, 256 and 384 bit.
2257 RSA (FIPS 186-
4
Functions: Digital Signature Generation/Verification and
Asymmetric Key Generation. Size: 2048 and 3072 bit
4140 AES (NIST SP
800-38A)
Functions: Encryption/Decryption, Key Generation. Mode: CBC
mode. Size: 128 and 256 bit
3410 SHA (FIPS 180-
4)
Functions: Hashing. SHA Sizes: 1, 256 and 384 bit
2713 HMAC (FIPS
198-1)
Functions: Message Authentication. SHA Sizes: 1, 256 and 384 bit
946 CVL (NIST SP
800-135)
Functions: Key Derivation Function. TLS 1.2
Vendor
Affirmed
PBKDF2 (NIST
SP 800-132)
Functions: Password Based Key Derivation Function. The vendor
affirms compliance with SP 800-132, using option 1(a) in Section
5.4
The Cryptographic Module also provides the following non FIPS-approved but allowed
algorithms:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of
encryption strength.)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of
encryption strength.)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength.)
 NDRNG (for seeding the Approved DRBG)
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved function:
Table 3 – Non-Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Usage
PBKDF2 (non-compliant) No claims are made to the security of non-compliant PBKDF2.
Any keys derived from this function and used for protecting
other keys are considered the equivalent to obfuscation or
plaintext.
If the service associated with the non-Approved PBKDF2 is invoked, it is implicitly assumed the
module will transition to a non-Approved mode of operation.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The CryptoMod provides two Ethernet and two serial interfaces. The only interface available to
users is the Web Config which is accessed through the Ethernet ports. The Serial Connector
(COM 1) is used only for device to device connections.
The following table indicates the mapping of the module’s physical ports and logical interfaces
to the FIPS 140-2 interfaces.
Table 4 - Module Interface Mapping
FIPS Interface Physical Interface
Data Input Ethernet interfaces (LAN 1, LAN 2), Serial connector
(COM 1), Digital I/O
Data Output Ethernet interfaces (LAN 1, LAN 2), Serial connector
(COM 1), Digital I/O
Control Input Ethernet interfaces (LAN 1, LAN 2), Reset Button,
Switch 1 and 2
Status Output Ethernet interfaces (LAN 1, LAN 2), Front LED Panel
(Figure 3), Ethernet port lights
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Figures 3, 4 and 5 as well as Tables 5, 6 and 7, show the mapping of the physical interfaces of
the CryptoMod and their descriptions.
Figure 3 - Front Panel LED
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Table 5 - Front Panel LED Description
Item LED Name Color State Description
1 POWER Green On The system is powered and booting the operating system.
Red On 1. Initial power on state
2. Filesystem corrupted, OR Modified
3. Restore Client Settings - If Reset Button is pressed and
held one second then released after LED changes to On
solid.
Red Flashing Reset Button is pressed.
2 SYSTEM Green On The system is powered and booting the operating system.
Red On 1. Initial power on state
2. FILESYSTEM CORRUPT, MODIFIED, OR HACKED
3. Mounted peer on 5 (failover partition)
3 COMM Green On The system is powered and booting the operating system.
Red On 1. Initial power on state
2. FILESYSTEM CORRUPT, MODIFIED, OR HACKED
4 CRYPTO Green On Secured Mode
Red On 1. Initial power on state
2. Failed Startup Test
None Off Unsecured Mode - Cryptographic Keys Zeroed
5 LAN LINK 1 Green On Active Ethernet Link
6 LAN LINK 2 Green On Active Ethernet Link
7 TX Red On Active Transmit Serial Data Serial Port 1 (COM 1)
8 RX Red On Active Receive Serial Data
9 RS485 Green On RS485 Mode
Green Off RS232 Mode
10 RS485 Green On RS485 Mode Serial Port 2 (COM 2-
Disabled)
Green Off RS232 Mode
11 TX Red On Active Transmit Serial Data
12 RX Red On Active Receive Serial Data
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Figure 4 – Top Side
Table 6 - Top Side
Item Name Description
13 Power Plug +10 -26 VDC
14  GND 220mA
15 COM 2 Serial Communication Port 2
(disabled)
16 COM 1 Serial Communication Port 1
17 RESET BUTTON Restore Client Settings
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Figure 5 – Bottom Side
Table 7 - Bottom Side
Item Name Number State Description
18 D I/O 1 1 or 0 Digital I/O #1 - type: Dry Contact, 1mA source,
3.3Vdc
19 2 1 or 0 Digital I/O #1 - type: Dry Contact, 1mA source,
3.3Vdc
20 3 1 or 0 Digital I/O #1 - type: Dry Contact, 1mA source,
3.3Vdc
21 4 0 Earth Ground Connection Point
22 SWITCH 1 On Disable Hardware Watchdog
Off Enable Hardware Watchdog - Default
23 2 On Enable On-board Lithium battery - Default
(Required for FIPS)
Off Disable On-board Lithium battery
24 LAN 1 LED Yellow On Ethernet Speed 100Mb
Off Ethernet Speed 10Mb
LED Green On Active Ethernet Link
25 LAN 2 LED Yellow On Ethernet Speed 100Mb
Off Ethernet Speed 10Mb
LED Green On Active Ethernet Link
26 DIN RAIL MOUNT DIN Rail Mount, Spring Loaded Locking Tab
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these roles
are authenticated and the services the roles are authorized to access.
2.3.1 Authorized Roles
The CryptoMod supports role-based authentication. There are two security roles in the
CryptoMod that operators may use: Crypto Officer and Crypto User.
 Crypto Officer (CO) - The Crypto Officer role performs administrative services on the
module, such as initialization, configuration, and monitoring of the module. The module
offers the Web Config as a management interface.
 Crypto User (CU) - The Crypto User role has the ability to perform basic configuration and
monitoring operations using the Web Config provided by the CryptoMod.
The CryptoMod supports concurrent operators. Each user session requires an RSA certificate
which is used to authenticate.
2.3.2 Authentication Mechanisms
The CryptoMod requires certificate based authentication for all users connecting via TLS or
VPN. A username and password is also required for users to authenticate to the device via the
Web Config.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Table 8 describes the authentication methods used.
Table 8 - Authentication Mechanism Details
Role Type Of
Authentication
Authentication Strength
Crypto
Officer and
Crypto User
Username and
Password
Passwords are a minimum of 8 characters, including at
least one uppercase, one lowercase, one special character
and at least one number. The password requirements are
enforced by the Security Policy as well as Software.
The probability of a random correct password guess is less
than 1/948 (one (1) in 6,095,689,385,410,816). After a
failed authentication attempt, the CryptoMod would allow
another attempt within a second, thus the possibility of a
random correct guess during a one-minute period is less
than 60 * (1/6,095,689,385,410,816) which is less than
1/1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute
would require the ability to make over
101,594,823,040,180 guesses per second, which far
exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Certificate based
authentication
CryptoMod supports public key authentication by using
2048 bit RSA keys. A 2048-bit RSA key has 112 bits, so the
associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1
in 2112, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 as required by FIPS
140-2. Assuming the module can support 60
authentications attempts in one minute, the probability of
a success with multiple consecutive attempts in one-
minute period is 60/2112 which is less than 1/100,000
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.3.3 Services
The CryptoMod provides a wide range of services and functions that allow the users to monitor
and provide security for SCADA end devices. The table below displays the services provided by
the CryptoMod and the access level required to perform them. All services are accessible
through the Web Config.
The access types are abbreviated as follows
R = Read: The module reads the CSP(s).
W = Write: The module writes the CSP(s). This write access is performed after a CSP is either
imported into the module, generated by the module, or if the module overwrites an existing
CSP.
Z = Zeroize. The module zeroizes the CSP(s).
Table 9 - Services
Service Description Role Key/CSP and Type of
Access (Mapped from
Table 10)
Access
CO CU
Change CO
Password
Apply a different
password to the Crypto
Officer
•
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17,18,19
RW
Change CU
Password
Apply a different
password to the Crypto
User
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17,18,19
RW
Change Date
and Time
Apply a new date and
time based on the current
user's client side date and
time.
•
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
View/Modify
Network
Settings
Apply different settings to
IP addresses for Ethernet
ports, gateways, DNS and
subnets.
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
View/Modify
Serial Port
Settings
Enable and disable serial
port as well as the
different configuration
settings for it.
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
View/Modify
SSL Tunnels
Settings
Create a new stunnel with
a source and destination
IP address, as well as
source and destination
port.
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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View/Modify
VPN Servers
Settings
Apply different settings to
the listening port,
protocol, routed
networks/IP's, routed
subnets as well as
compression levels.
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
Create and
Install
Backups*
Generation and
Installation of a backup
created from the
CryptoMod's current
settings.
•
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18,19
RW
Create and
Install PKI
Generation and
Installation of CA, Server
and Client keyset, as well
as a certificate revocation
list.
•
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18,19
RWZ
Enable/Disable
Services
Enable and disable
services (Failover and
ModBus).
•
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
View and
Export Log files
Access log files from the
CryptoMod. Download
and view most recent log
files as well as stored log
archives.
• •
1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
Access the
CryptoMod
through
OpenVPN
Obtain access to the Web
Config through OpenVPN
on a configuration
computer and the VPN
running on the
CryptoMod
• •
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17
RWZ
Access the
CryptoMod
through
Stunnel
Obtain access to the Web
Config through Stunnel on
a configuration computer
and Stunnel running on
the CryptoMod
• •
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17
RWZ
Apply Update Apply an update through
the Web Config on the
Package Manager page.
• 1,2,3,10,11,12,13,14,15,
16,17
RW
Import/Export
Backup
Import/Export backup
created within the
CryptoMod or imported
from other CryptoMods.
• 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18,19,
20,21
RW
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Deleting
Backup
Deleting backup stored on
the CryptoMod
• 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17
RWZ
Restoring
Backup
Restoring latest
imported/created Backup
stored on the CryptoMod
• 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17
RW
On-Demand
Self-Tests
Reboot the module in
order to perform self-
tests
• • N/A
Display Status
Information
View module status
through the Web Config.
• • 1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RW
Zeroization Invoke the zeroization
command in order to
zeroize persistent keys
stored in the CryptoMod
• 1,2,3,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17
RWZ
* This service utilizes a non-Approved PBKDF2. As stated in Section 2.1.2 of this document, a
non-Approved mode of operation is implicitly assumed if this service is invoked. Keys derived
and used by this non-Approved service are not associated or used by any other functions.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.4 Physical Security
The CryptoMod's chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the module
has been designed to satisfy Level 2 physical security requirements. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the
FIPS 140-2 level-2 tamper evident labels A and B (AUTOSOL P/N 729) applied to a CryptoMod.
The two tamper evident labels are applied to the CryptoMod at the factory prior shipping.
Figure 6 – Tamper Evident Labels (A and B)
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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Figure 7 – Front -Tamper Evident Labels (A)
Figure 8 – Top -Tamper Evident Labels (B)
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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2.5 Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
CryptoMod does not contain a modifiable operational environment.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The CryptoMod uses public/private RSA keypairs for SSL and VPN operation as well as any HTTPS communication. The keypairs are
shared between the applications that use them, there is not a separate keyset for each.
Table 10 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
ID Key/CSP Type Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Usage
1 SSL/VPN
Server
Private
Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated on a
CryptoMod, Installed
through Web Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
2 SSL/VPN
Server
Public Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated on a
CryptoMod, Installed
through Web Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
3 Certificate
Authority
Public Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated on a
CryptoMod, Installed
through Web Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
4 Generated
Server
Private
Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated on a
CryptoMod, Installed
through Web Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
encrypted
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
5 Generated
Server
Public Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated Internally,
or Input using Web
Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
6 Generated
Client
Private
Key
Private RSA
2048-bits
Generated Internally,
or Input using Web
Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
Encrypted
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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ID Key/CSP Type Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Usage
7 Generated
Client
Public Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated Internally,
or Input using Web
Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
8 Generated
CA Private
Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated Internally,
or Input using Web
Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
Encrypted
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN Server
9 Generated
CA Public
Key
RSA 2048-bits Generated Internally,
or Input using Web
Config
Exported
encrypted via
Web Config
NVRAM
Encrypted
zeroize
command
Used for SSL
and VPN
ServeStored
internally
10 Update
Validation
Public Key
RSA 2048-bits Installed with build
image unchangeable.
Does not exit
the module
NVRAM
plaintext
Fixed Public Key for
RSA SHA-256
validation of
update
packages
11 TLS Key
Establish
ment
Private
Key
EC Diffie
Hellman (256-
bits), Diffie-
Hellman (224-bit
private
exponent)
Generated internally Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Used to
negotiate TLS
handshake and
authentication
12 TLS Key
Establish
ment
Public Key
EC Diffie
Hellman (256-
bits), Diffie-
Hellman (2048-
bit public
exponent)
Generated internally Exits
electronically
in plaintext
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Used to
negotiate TLS
handshake and
authentication
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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ID Key/CSP Type Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Usage
13 Web
Config
Passwords
Secret CO/User provided Does not exit
the module
NVRAM
plaintext
zeroize
command
User
Authentication
14 TLS pre-
master
secret
Shared Secret Generated internally
or enters
electronically
encrypted
Exits
electronically
encrypted
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
New TLS
session keys
can be created
from this.
15 TLS
master
secret
48-byte value Generated internally Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
New TLS
session keys
can be created
from this.
16 TLS
session
encryption
key
AES (256-bits) Generated internally Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Key used to
encrypt TLS
session data
17 TLS
session
integrity
key
HMAC
(SHA1/256/384)
Generated internally Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot. Or
automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Used for TLS
data integrity
protection
18 V Value
for NIST
SP 800-
90A Hash
DRBG
Internal state
value
Internally generated Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot, or
upon DRBG
uninstantpaiati
on
Internal value
used by the
Approved DRBG
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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ID Key/CSP Type Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Usage
19 C Value
for NIST
SP 800-
90A Hash
DRBG
Internal state
value
Internally generated Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot, or
upon DRBG
uninstantiation
Internal value
used by the
Approved DRBG
20 Data
Protection
Key
AES (256-bits) Derived internally via
PBKDF2 function
Does not exit
the module
RAM plaintext Reboot, Upon
completion of
PBKDF2
function
Key used for
storage
applications
21 Certificate
Chain
Protection
Password
Secret CO/User provided Does not exit
the module
N/A Reboot, Upon
completion of
PBKDF2
function
Password input
to PBKDF2
function
2.6.1 Key Generation
Keys in the CryptoMod are generated using the Approved NIST SP 800-90A DRBG which is
seeded by an internal entropy source. The minimum number of bytes of entropy generated
directly by the CryptoMod for use in key generation is 32 bytes (256 bits).
The module performs PBKDF2 as defined in IETF25 RFC26 #2898. The vendor affirms
compliance with SP 800-132, using option 1(a) in Section 5.4 to derive the Data Protection Key
(DPK). The PBKDF2 is used for storage applications only.
 Passwords used in key derivation are minimum 8 characters, including at least one
uppercase, one lowercase, one special character and at least one number. The password
requirements are enforced by the Security Policy as well as Software.
 The probability of a random correct password guess is less than 1/948 (one (1) in
6,095,689,385,410,816).
 In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to
make over 101,594,823,040,180 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational
capabilities of the module.
2.6.2 Key Entry/Output
To operate the CryptoMod a keyset will need to be installed by the Crypto Officer. In order to
install the keyset, the Crypto Officer shall first authenticate to the Web Config and then
navigate to the PKI page. The keyset consists of three files: Certificate Authority (Table 10
#8,#9), Server Certificate (Table 10 #4,#5) and Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The files can be
downloaded from the CryptoMod that generated them.
The installation of keys into the CryptoMod requires entry of the Certificate Chain Protection
Password (Table 10 #21) used when the keyset was originally created.
All keys, authentication and sessions in the CryptoMod are encrypted over TLS 1.2.
2.6.3 Zeroization Procedures
Key zeroization is achieved by overwriting the key storage partition with binary zeros. As
described in Table 10 - Details of Cryptographic Keys and CSPs, zeroization for persistent keys
takes place by triggering the zeroize command. The zeroize command can be found in the PKI
page in the Web Config, under Install PKI. This function will also force a reboot of the
CryptoMod, which would terminate any ongoing sessions.
In other cases, ephemeral keys are zeroized upon terminating the established session or a
reboot of the device.
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2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The module is declared to conform with EMI/EMC requirements for a Class B (business use)
device as specified by Part 15, Subpart B, of the FCC rules.
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2.8 Self-Tests
Self-tests are health checks performed automatically by CryptoMod which ensure that the
cryptographic algorithms within the module are operating correctly.
The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-2 broadly fall within two categories
1. Power-On Self-Tests
2. Conditional Self-Tests
2.8.1 Power-On Self-Tests
All Power-On Self-Tests automatically run upon boot up of the CryptoMod. Upon success of the
Power-On Self-Tests, the SYSTEM light in the front LED panel (Figure 3) will become green. An
operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand by shutting down and restarting the
CryptoMod with the Reboot CryptoMod function in the Web Config page under Administration
> System Settings.
Table 11 shows the Power-On Self-Tests the CryptoMod runs on startup.
Table 11 - Power-On Self-Tests
Algorithm Type Description
Firmware
Integrity
Integrity
test
SHA-256 integrity test performed at start-up on the operational
firmware
Cryptographic
Library
Integrity Test
Integrity
test
HMAC-SHA1 integrity test performed on the cryptographic
library
AES KAT Encrypt/Decrypt CBC mode: 256 key length
RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key and SHA-256
DRBG KAT HASH_DRBG
HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384
SHA KAT SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384 on known data. Resulting hash
compared to a known good value
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2.8.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Table 12 - Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm Test
DRBG Health Checks required by Section 11 of NIST SP 800-90Arev1
RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
CRNGT Continuous RNG test run on outputs of DRBG and the NDRNG used to
seed the Approved DRBG. The continuous test is performed every time
a random seed is generated. It is tested against the previous generated
seed to assure it is unique.
Firmware Load Test Firmware load test using an RSA 2048-bit Signature Verification
operation
2.8.3 Self-Tests Error Handling
Upon failure of a self-test, the SYSTEM light in the front LED panel (Figure 3) will become red
and the CryptoMod will attempt at fixing itself by rebooting. This could continue indefinitely if
the attempts fail. The Web Config and any cryptographic operation will be inhibited until the
self-tests successfully pass.
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2.9 Mitigation Of Other Attacks
The CryptoMod does not claim to mitigate any attacks in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy v1.1.5
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3. Secure Operation
When in FIPS-approved mode the CryptoMod has only one image installed at any given time
and utilizes only supported algorithms (Table 2 in section Modes of Operation) to operate.
3.1 Setup and Initialization
In order to operate in a FIPS-approved mode of operation the Crypto Officer (CO) must initialize
and operate the CryptoMod using the steps below.
1. Boot the CryptoMod.
 For better security, it is recommended that the CryptoMod’s Ethernet Interface
(LAN 1 or LAN 2 port be connected directly to the Crypto Officer’s configuration
computer’s ethernet port).
 For more information, visit the “Establishing a Connection to the CryptoMod”
section of the User Manual shipped with the CryptoMod.
2. As the CO, access the CryptoMod’s Web Config page through https:// IP of the
CryptoMod
 If connected to LAN 2 port of the CryptoMod go to: https://172.16.63.3
 Default IP of the CryptoMod’s LAN 1 port is 172.16.63.2
3. The CO shall change the default CO and CU passwords via the Web Config.
 Visit the Passwords page under the Administration menu.
 After each password change the Web Config will terminate the session and force
the CO to reauthenticate using the new password.
 Reauthentication will occur three times: after changing the default CO password,
after changing the default CU password, and reauthenticate the third time to
continue with these steps.
4. As the CO, create a Keyset (consisting of the Generated Certificate Authority (CA)
Key Pair (Table 10 #8,9), Generated Server Key Pair (Table 10 #4,#5) and Certificate
Revocation List file) via the Web Config.
 Select create PKI in the PKI page under the Administration menu.
 For more information, please consult Creating a PKI in the User Manual.
5. The CO must then export the created Keyset to the CO’s configuration computer
using the PKI page.
 The keyset will be available for download in the PKI page after creation in step 4.
 Export the CA (ca.crt) and CRL(currentlist.crl.pem)
 Export the Server Certificate (file name contains ‘SVR’)
 Export the Client Certificates (file name ends in BROWSER.key.crt.pfx and other
file ends in stunnel.ovpn.crt)
6. The CO shall now install the downloaded Keyset via the Web Config.
 Select Install PKI in the PKI page under the Administration menu.
 Upload the CA file(ca.crt), the Server Certificate file (file name contains ‘SVR’),
and the CRL file(currentlist.crl.pem).
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 For more information, please consult How to use a PKI in the User Manual.
7. Click Start Change PKI Process in the PKI page.
8. Click Reboot CryptoMod in the PKI page.
9. While the reboot is taking place, install the client certificate (Table 10 #6,#7 file
name ends in BROWSER.key.crt.pfx) and the CA (ca.crt) that were downloaded in
step 6 in the browser of the configuration comptuer.
 For more information, please consult Installing certificates in browser in the User
Manual.
10. Enter the Web Config of the CryptoMod after installing the browser certificates and
ensure it displays “Mode of Operation: FIPS-Approved” mode in the side Unit
Statistics table.
11. Ensure the crypto LED goes green on the Front Panel of the CryptoMod.
 Figure 3 specifies the LED, which when green indicates the module is in the
approved mode of operation.
 After the approved mode of operation is verified, the CO can generate a keyset
for the CU.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used throughout the document.
Table 13 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CA Certificate Authority
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CU Crypto User
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic random bit generator
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory
PBKDF2 Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RAM Random Access Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SVR Server
TLS Transport Layer Security
VPN Virtual Private Network