Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 1 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs HFS960GECTX098N HFS1T9GECTX098N HFS3T8GECTX098N HFS7T6GECTX098N HFS800GECTX098N HFS1T6GECTX098N HFS3T2GECTX098N HFS6T4GECTX098N FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security Policy Document Version: 1.3 Date: 1/23/2023 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 2 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). CHANGE RECORD Revision Date Author Description of Change 1.0 10/25/2021 Chandra Chebrolu Dharma Nagarajan First release 1.1 5/18/2022 Chandra Chebrolu Dharma Nagarajan EMI/EMC updated to Security Level 3; AES-XTS footnote added for below Table 4; correction to MEKj listing in Table 7 1.2 7/28/2022 Chandra Chebrolu Dharma Nagarajan NDRNG replaced by ENT (P) in Tables 4, 15 and 19; added description of ENT (P) self-tests in Table 14 1.3 1/23/2023 Chandra Chebrolu Dharma Nagarajan Added Section 8.4 Firmware Update SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 3 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................... 6 1.2 Firmware and Module Block Diagram ......................................................................................... 7 1.3 Mode of Operation ...................................................................................................................... 8 Cryptographic Functionality........................................................................................................... 9 2.1 Critical Security Parameters....................................................................................................... 10 2.2 Public Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 11 Roles, Authentication and Services .............................................................................................. 12 3.1 Assumption of Roles .................................................................................................................. 12 3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................ 13 3.3 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 14 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................... 21 Physical Security Policy................................................................................................................ 23 Operational Environment ............................................................................................................ 29 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ............................................................................................... 30 Security Rules and Guidance........................................................................................................ 31 8.1 Invariant Rules ........................................................................................................................... 31 8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization............................................................................................ 31 8.3 Un-Initialize the Module ............................................................................................................ 32 8.4 Firmware Update ....................................................................................................................... 32 References and Definitions .......................................................................................................... 34 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 4 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). List of Tables Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements.........................................................................................5 Table 2: Module Configurations ................................................................................................................... 5 Table 3: Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................ 6 Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................................9 Table 5: Critical Security Parameters..........................................................................................................10 Table 6: Public Security Parameters ...........................................................................................................11 Table 7: Authenticated Roles...................................................................................................................... 12 Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles..................................................................................................................13 Table 9: Authentication Description...........................................................................................................13 Table 10: Unauthenticated Services ...........................................................................................................14 Table 11: Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................15 Table 12: CSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................17 Table 13: PSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................19 Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests.................................................................................................................... 21 Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................22 Table 16: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines......................................................................................23 Table 17: Figures of all Modules with Production Label and Tamper-Evident Seals.................................24 Table 18: References................................................................................................................................... 34 Table 19: Acronyms and Definitions ...........................................................................................................36 List of Figures Figure 1: PE8010/PE8030 U.2/U.3 Form Factor............................................................................................6 Figure 2: Module Block Diagram................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 3: Module Physical Enclosure – Bottom View .................................................................................23 Figure 4 : PE8000 Series NVMe OPAL SEDs Tamper Evidence....................................................................28 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 5 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Introduction This document defines the Security Policy for the SK Hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs cryptographic module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a multiple chip embedded self- encrypting drive (SED) compliant with TCG Core, TCG Opal, TCG Single User Mode (SUM), PCIe, NVMe and NVMe-MI specifications. The cryptographic module’s controller has a built-in AES-XTS HW engine which encrypts and decrypts the user data without any performance loss. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Security Level 2. The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows: Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements Security Requirement Security Level Cryptographic Module Specification 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 Finite State Model 2 Physical Security 2 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 2 EMI/EMC 3 Self-Tests 2 Design Assurance 2 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Level 2 The Module has the following configurations: Table 2: Module Configurations HW P/N and Version FW Version Description PE8010 Family 1 HFS960GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 960GB 2 HFS1T9GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 1.9TB 3 HFS3T8GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 3.8TB 4 HFS7T6GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 7.6TB PE8030 Family 5 HFS800GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 800GB 6 HFS1T6GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 1.6TB 7 HFS3T2GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 3.2TB 8 HFS6T4GECTX098N 11080A10 U.2/U.3, 2.5”, 6.4TB SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 6 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 1.1 Module Description and Cryptographic Boundary The Module is designed to be embedded in a general-purpose computer (host) and is connected through the PCIe connecter. The Module is protected by a tamper-evident enclosure and two (2) opaque tamper- evident seals. To ensure evidence of tampering, the seals are affixed as indicated in Figure 1 (numbered). The only component exposed is the PCIe connector (NVMe, SMBus and Power) port. The physical boundary is defined as the entire enclosure and it is protected by opaque, tamper evident seals as indicated in Figure 1. The module does not support maintenance access interface. The Module PE8010 and PE8030 is provided in a U.2/U.3 physical form factor as depicted in Figure 1. The red outline depicts the cryptographic boundary as well as the physical boundary. Figure 1: PE8010/PE8030 U.2/U.3 Form Factor Table 3: Ports and Interfaces Port Interfaces Description Logical Interface Type PCIe Connector Power Power Connector Power NVMe NVMe interface Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out SMBus Management Interface Control in, Status out 1.1.1 NVMe Interface The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the Module. Most services provided by the Module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user data, retrieving FIPS capability support, and retrieving FIPS status reporting. 1.1.2 SMBus Interface The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data). 1 2 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 7 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 1.2 Firmware and Module Block Diagram The Module uses a single chip controller (Aquarius) with a PCIe/NVMe and SMBus interface on the systems side and SK Hynix NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational environment. The red outline in the figure depicts the cryptographic boundary which is the physical boundary outside the enclosure of the device. All firmware runs on the controller inside the cryptographic boundary. Aquarius Controller Nand Nand SK HYNIX NAND Memory PCIe/NVMe SK HYNIX DRAM NAND Interface ROM CPU PMC SRAM ECC DRAM Interface PCIe/ NVMe Interface SMBus Interface AES 256 TRNG CTR DRBG SHA/HMAC SMBus Power Figure 2: Module Block Diagram The Module is composed of the following components: • Aquarius Controller – The controller SoC (System on Chip). This component is responsible for terminating PCIe/NVMe commands; reading or writing data to the Host platform; encrypting or decrypting data from the Host platform; and storing or retrieving data to SK Hynix NAND nonvolatile memory. • PMC – Power Management Controller – Manages power control of the Module • PCIe/NVMe Interface – Provides PCI/NVMe Interface access to the controller • SMBus Interface – Provides SMBus Interface access to the controller • CPU – Central Processing Unit of the controller • ROM – Read only memory – Non-volatile memory which has first bootable code for controller • ECC – Error Correction Code memory provides error correction and detection access to the controller • SRAM – Static Random Access memory • DRAM Interface – Provides access to SK hynix DRAM • NAND Interface – Provide access to SK hynix NAND Memory • SK hynix DRAM – Dynamic Random Access Memory. DRAM provides variable storage, instruction memory, data mapping tables, and a buffer for user data going into and out of the device. • SK hynix NAND memory – NAND flash is the storage medium where encrypted user data, firmware for the Aquarius controller, and other non-volatile configuration data that is needed by the Aquarius controller during execution. The Module relies on the PCIe/NVMe interface as input/output devices. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 8 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 1.3 Mode of Operation The Module is always in the FIPS Approved Mode of operation. The module has two distinct operational modes in the approved mode of operation as described below. • Uninitialized Mode – In this operational mode, the ownership of the drive is not taken. Once the ownership is taken, the module transitions to initialized mode. • Initialized Mode - In this operational mode, the ownership of the drive is taken. To initialize the drive, the module owner must take ownership of the device and activate Locking SP by following steps in the Crypto Officer Initialization section from the uninitialized mode. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 9 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Cryptographic Functionality The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. The term FIPS Approved cryptographic function is defined by FIPS 140-2 specifications. Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats A913 AES [197] ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256 Boundary: Hardware Encrypt, Decrypt Underlying for XTS, KW and CTR-DRBG. XTS [38E]0F 1 Key Sizes: 256 Per IG A.9, the module assures Key1 and Key2 are not equal. Boundary: Hardware Encrypt, Decrypt A913 AES [197] KW [38F] Forward Key Sizes: 256 Boundary: Hardware Authenticated Encrypt, Authenticated Decrypt VA CKG [IG D.12] [133 Rev2] Section 6.11F 2 Direct Symmetric Key generation using unmodified DRBG output [133 Rev2] Section 6.2.32F 3 Derivation of symmetric keys from a Password A912 DRBG [90A] CTR Prediction Resistance: Yes, No Supports Reseed Mode: AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled: Yes Additional Input: 0-2048 Increment 128 Entropy Input: 256-2048 Increment 128 Nonce: 128-1024 Increment 128 Personalization String Length: 0- 2048 Increment 128 Returned Bits: 512 Additional Input used: 256 Bit Entropy Input used: 896 Bit Nonce used: 512 Bit Personalization String used: 256 Deterministic Random Bit Generation 1 The module uses AES XTS only for storage purposes per SP 800-38E. 2 CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140- 2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.1. The generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from the Approved SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG. 3 CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140- 2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.2.3. The symmetric key is derived from a password using the Approved SP 800-132 PBKDF. The key can only be used for storage applications. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 10 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats Boundary: Firmware A913 HMAC [198- 1] SHA-256 Key Sizes: 256 bits λ = 32 bytes Boundary: Hardware Integrity Check PSP and PBKDF ENT(P) ENT (P) [90B] [Annex C] – Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG; minimum of 512 bits per access Boundary: Hardware The ENT (P) output is used to seed the Approved DRBG. Synopsys A912 PBKDF [132] Option 1a sLen = 32 bytes salt C = 1,000 iterations HMAC SHA-256 Cert. #A913 Boundary: Firmware Password Based Key Derivation. The keys derived from passwords are used only in storage application. The probability of guessing the key is 1/(2^256) = 1.16e+77. A912 RSA [186-4] PSS n = 2048 SHA 256 Boundary: Firmware SigVer used for Digital Signature verification (Firmware Download, Maker Authentication) Firmware A914 RSA [186-4] PSS n = 2048 SHA 256 Boundary: Hardware SigVer used for Digital Signature verification (ROM Secure Boot) Hardware A913 SHS [180-4] SHA-256 Boundary: Hardware Firmware Integrity Self- Test and HMAC-SHA-256 2.1 Critical Security Parameters All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs is described in the services detailed in Section 4. Table 5: Critical Security Parameters CSP Description / Usage DRBG-EI Deterministic Random Bit Generator – Entropy Input Size: 896 bits of entropy data with 268 bits of security strength. (268.8 bits of min-entropy input without a nonce.) DRBG V The secret value V (128 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state DRBG Key The secret Key (256 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state DRBG seed_material The DRBG-internal seed_material value (1664 bits) used within the CTR_DRBG algorithm CO Password Crypto Officer password Type: Password Purpose: Used for authenticating the CO role SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 11 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). CSP Description / Usage User Password User Password Type: Password Purpose: Used for authenticating User roles HRK Hidden Root Key Type: AES wrapping key Purpose: Used to wrap following keys: PSP_HMAC_KEY, MEK_KEK, TPER_SALT_KEK, and KS_HMAC_KEY. PSP_HMAC_KEY Public Security Parameter HMAC Key Type: 256-bit Purpose: Key is used for PSP Integrity Check MEK_KEK Type: AES 256 Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs. TPER_SALT_KEK Type: AES 256 Purpose: Key wraps the SALT PSP. KS_HMAC_KEY Type: HMAC Purpose: Key is used to RSA public key integrity check TPER_KEK Type: AES 256 Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs. SUM_KEKi Where i is 0-8 keys. Type: AES 256 Purpose: It is the key wrapping key used for MEKs. MEKj Where j is 0-8 keys. Type: AES 256 Purpose: MEK0 is the Global Range Key. MEK1-8 are User Range MEKs. MEKs are used for User data encryption. AUTH_KEYm Where m is 0-18 keys. Type: key derived from PBKDF2 using password provided by the host. This includes the CO and User passwords. Purpose: Key is used for KEK wrapping. 2.2 Public Security Parameters Table 6: Public Security Parameters Key Description / Usage SALT This is the 256-bit salt used as input to the PBKDF2. A unique salt is associated with the derivation of each AUTH_KEY. PSID PIN This 32-byte PIN is used to access the TCG Revert service. The PSID PIN is visibly printed on a production label on the Module. MSID PIN This 32-byte default PIN is used to authenticate the CO role (Admin SP SID) during the Initialize service. It can be displayed via the Show Status/Read Security Configuration service. FW Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key Purpose: Key is used for RSA signature verification of the firmware image. Maker Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key Purpose: Key is used to authenticate Maker role to access Zeroize service. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 12 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Roles, Authentication and Services 3.1 Assumption of Roles The module supports Cryptographic Officer (CO), User, Maker and PSID roles. The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles by enforcing re-authentication with the appropriate password (or PIN) when changing roles. Note that although each TCG role includes a unique identifier (UID) as part of the authentication process, authentication is still considered role-based because the UID corresponds to the TCG role itself, not an individual operator. Table 7 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Authentication data is stored encrypted and never output from the module. Authentication is cleared during each power cycle. Table 7: Authenticated Roles Role Name Description / Corresponding Roles Authentication Data Authentication Type CO Crypto Officer – - Admin SP SID - This Role is responsible for transitioning from uninitialized mode to initialized mode. - Admin SP Admin 1, 2, 3, and 4 – This Role is disabled by default but can be enabled by SID authority. When enabled, it can transition the Module back to uninitialized mode from initialized mode. - Locking SP Admin 1, 2, 3, and 4 –This role is used to enable and disable Users, create and delete user ranges, lock or unlock the ranges and cryptographically erase the user ranges Password - After five (5) failure attempts, requires power cycle to authenticate again Role-based User User – - Locking SP User 1 – 9 - This role can unlock and lock the drive to allow the operator to read and write data to the drive. This user can also call the Cryptographic Erase service. Password - After five (5) failure attempts, requires power cycle to authenticate again Role-based Maker Maker – This is an assumed role which enables the operate to execute Zeroize Service command. RSA Signature - After five (5) failure attempts, requires power cycle to authenticate again Role-based SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 13 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). PSID TCG PSID Authority – This authority is used with the PSID PIN (32 bytes) that is visibly printed on a label on the Module. The PSID PIN is intended to only be available to an operator that is physically present with the Module. This role is used to access PSID Revert service. Password -After five (5) failure attempts, it requires a power cycle to authenticate again Role-based Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles Role Name Description Anybody TCG Anybody Authority – This authority is considered unauthenticated because no password is needed for this authority. This authority can read the MSID PIN, and other security configuration data through TCG Get method. The authority has a 64-bit UID. 3.2 Authentication Methods The module enforces PIN authentication and RSA Signature verification methods. The strength of authentication is described in Table 9. Minimum PIN lengths are enforced by the module. Table 9: Authentication Description Authentication Method Description Password (or PIN) PINs are a minimum of 80 bits, providing 2^80 possible values. The probability that a random attempt succeeds is 1/(2^80) = 1/1.2e+24 which is less than 1/1,000,000. Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially. Any authentication attempt consumes at least 1 millisecond. After five (5) consecutive unsuccessful password validation attempts have occurred, the Module requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The reset time required in performing a reset to the Module is eight (8) seconds. Therefore, a maximum of (60/8)*5 = 37 authentication attempts are possible in one minute and the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one-minute interval is 37/(2^80) = 3.06e-23, which is smaller than 1/100,000. RSA Signature Key Length is 2048-bit, Key strength is equal to 112 bits. RSA 2048 has a key strength of 112 bits, which is the minimum approved by CMVP. The probability of guessing the key of 112 bit strength is 1/(2^112) = 1/(5.19e+33) = 1.9e-34, which is less than 1/1,000,000. This effectively eliminates the possibility of determining the private key through exhaustive methods. Each verification takes 86 milliseconds. Limiting it to less than eleven (11) attempts per second. After five (5) consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have occurred, the Module requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The reset time required in performing a reset to the Module is eight (8) seconds. Therefore, a maximum of (60/(11 + 8))*5 = 15 attempts are possible in one minute and the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one minute interval is 15/(2^112) = 2.89e-33, which is smaller than 1/100,000. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 14 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 3.3 Services All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. CSP usage for each service described is specified in Table 10 below. The services highlighted in bold in Table 10 and Table 11 can be called in uninitialized mode. The unauthenticated Anybody role can do unauthenticated services. Table 10: Unauthenticated Services Service Description Power Cycle (Self-Test) Powers the module off and on again. This triggers the following: 1. Power-On Self-Tests of the Module. 2. Unblock locked-out authorities that have exhausted their Try Limit. 3. Enable CO authority (Admins SP SID) if it is previously blocked by the Block SID Authentication service. Hot reset Resets one of the ports of the Module by performing a PCIe Hot Reset. Warm reset Resets the Module by performing an NVMe Subsystem Reset or PCIe Warm reset. Show Status This is a set of commands from the TCG and NVMe protocols to read Security Configuration. Specifically, this includes NVMe Security Send/Receive, Identify Controller commands, which can be used for reading FIPS mode (Initialized/Uninitialized), error messages and other status information. The FIPS Mode indicator is a subset of the NVMe Security Receive command (TCG Level 0 Discovery) and the returned word of the NVMe Identify Controller command (word at offset 4092, bit 0). Read FIPS Compliance The Module’s FIPS 140 Compliance descriptor (hardware and firmware versions) can be retrieved in the format specified by SFSC specification using TCG IF-RECV command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2. Block SID Authentication Disables CO (Admin SP SID) authentication when ownership of the drive is not taken. TCG Authentication Authenticates an operator using TCG PIN through Start session or TCG Authentication method. Enable Zeroization Service Authenticates an operator using RSA 2048 signature verification using Zeroization Public Key (the Maker Public Key). Get Random Number TCG Random method used to generate and output a random number from the DRBG. Firmware update Loads a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated with RSA signature verification over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate in order to remain in an Approved Mode. Telemetry logs The Module allows the collection of debugging information through NVMe log pages. The purpose of the telemetry log data is to provide information required to debug firmware issues remotely. NVMe MI Specific commands MI specific commands provide MI physical port information, NVM Subsystem and NVMe controller information and statuses, SMART warnings, access to VPD data. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 15 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Service Description Read/Write User Data Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if the module is in uninitialized mode. Note: • CO= Cryptographic Officer Role • U = User Role • M = Maker Role • ASP = Admin SP (Security Provider) • LSP = Locking SP (Security Provider) • P = PSID Role Table 11: Authenticated Services Service Description CO U M P ASP SID ASP Admin 1 - 4 LSP Admin 1 - 4 LSP User 1 - 9 Maker PSID Take ownership Changes default password of SID to a value other than MSID X - - - - - Activate OPAL Enables Locking SP via TCG Activate method. Activate method can enable SUM. X - - - - - Deactivate OPAL Reverts the drive back to the Original Factory State through TCG Revert or Revert SP methods. Note: For Revert SP, 1. Global Range data is preserved if KeepGlobal parameter is TRUE. 2. TPER_SALT_KEK and PSP_HMAC_KEY are also preserved. X X X - - - Admin Set PIN Updates Admin authority PIN. X X X - - - User Set PIN Updates User authority PIN. Locking SP Admins can set PINs for any Non-SUM Users. - - X X - - Enable/Disable User Set PIN Disables a non-SUM User’s ability to change its own PIN - - X - - - Enable/Disable Admin SP authorities Enables or disables an Admin SP authority X - - - - - Enable/Disable Locking SP authorities Enables or disables a Locking SP Admins and non-SUM Users - - X - - - Enable/Disable SUM Configures users and ranges in SUM through TCG Reactivate method. - - X - - - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 16 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Service Description CO U M P ASP SID ASP Admin 1 - 4 LSP Admin 1 - 4 LSP User 1 - 9 Maker PSID Locking Range Configuration For non-SUM ranges: Used to modify a Range starting address, capacity, and attributes of non-SUM ranges - - X - - - For SUM Policy 1: Used to modify a SUM Range starting address, capacity, and attributes by Admins if allowed. - - X - - - For SUM Policy 0: Used to modify a SUM Range starting address, capacity, and attributes by SUM Users if allowed. - - - X - - Lock/Unlock range Controls read and write access to a Range by either locking or unlocking the LBA range. In Non-SUM, Admins and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access. In SUM, only Users have access. - - X X - - Format NVM / Namespace Management Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating new MEK. This service is only successful if the range is unlocked for read/write access via Lock/Unlock range service. X X X X - - Sanitize Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating new MEK. This service is accessible only in Uninitialized mode. X X - - - - Set common name Customizes the name of a TCG Authority. Admins and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access. - - X X - - Data store table Set Writes a stream of bytes to unstructured storage. Admins and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access. - - X X - - Crypto Erase of a range For Non-SUM ranges: Erases a range by destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one. This service is performed via TCG GenKey method. By default, Admins have access. If Admins allows, Users also have access. - - X X - - For SUM ranges via TCG Erase method: Erases a range by destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one. The range’s LBA range is unlocked, and the User PIN is reset to the NULL password. This service is performed via the TCG Erase method. - - X X - - For SUM ranges via TCG GenKey method: Erases a range by destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one. This service is performed via the TCG GenKey method. - - - X - - Read/Write User Data Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if the range is unlocked for read/write access via Lock/Unlock range service. - - X X - - Zeroization Destruction of plaintext keys and CSPs. This service decommissions the drive. - - - - X - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 17 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Service Description CO U M P ASP SID ASP Admin 1 - 4 LSP Admin 1 - 4 LSP User 1 - 9 Maker PSID PSID Revert TCG Revert method using PSID. This service returns the Module to its original factory state. The authentication data (PSID) is printed on the label of the Module. - - - - - X • G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the CSP. • I = Input: The CSP is input into the Module. • X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the CSP. • W = Write: The Module writes the CSP to storage. • Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP. • - = Not accessed by the service. Table 12: CSP Access within Services Service CSPs CO Password User Password DRBG-EI DRBG V DRBG Key DRBG seed_material HRK PSP_HMAC_KEY MEK_KEK TPER_SALT_KEK KS_HMAC_KEY TPER_KEK SUM_KEK i MEK j AUTH_KEY m Authenticated Services Take ownership I, X, Z - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - G, X - - G, X, Z Activate OPAL I, X, Z X G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - - G, X - G, X, Z Deactivate OPAL X - G, X, Z X, G, Z X, G, Z X, G, Z X Z, G, X Z, G, X Z, G, X - X, Z X, Z X, Z, G G, X, Z Admin Set PIN I, X, Z - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - X -- - G, X, Z User Set PIN - I, X, Z G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - X X - G, X, Z Enable/Disable User Set PIN - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 18 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Service CSPs CO Password User Password DRBG-EI DRBG V DRBG Key DRBG seed_material HRK PSP_HMAC_KEY MEK_KEK TPER_SALT_KEK KS_HMAC_KEY TPER_KEK SUM_KEK i MEK j AUTH_KEY m Enable/Disable Admin SP authorities X - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - - - - G, X, Z Enable/Disable Locking SP authorities X X G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - X - - G, X, Z Enable/Disable SUM I, X, Z X G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - Z, G, X Z, G, X - G, X, Z Locking Range Configuration - - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X X - - X X G, X, Z - Lock/Unlock range - - - - - - - X - - - X X X, Z - Format / Namespace Management - - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X X - - X X Z, G, X - Sanitize - - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X X - - - - Z, G, X - Set common name - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - Data store table Set - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - Crypto Erase of a range - X G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X X X - X X Z, G, X G, X, Z Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - Zeroization - - - Z Z Z Z Z, Z Z Z Z Z Z - PSID Revert X - G, X, Z X, G, Z X, G, Z X, G, Z X Z, G, X Z, G, X Z, G, X - Z Z Z, G G, X, Z Unauthenticated Services Power Cycle (Self-Test) - - - X, G, Z X, G, Z X, G, Z X X X X X - - X - Hot reset - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Warm reset - - - - - - - X - - - - - - - Show Status - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 19 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Service CSPs CO Password User Password DRBG-EI DRBG V DRBG Key DRBG seed_material HRK PSP_HMAC_KEY MEK_KEK TPER_SALT_KEK KS_HMAC_KEY TPER_KEK SUM_KEK i MEK j AUTH_KEY m Read FIPS Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Block SID Authentication - - - - - - - - - X - - - - G, X, Z TCG Authentication I, X, Z I, X, Z G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - X - X - G, X X - G, X, Z Enable Zeroization Service - - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - - - - - - - - - Get Random Number - - G, X, Z X, G X, G X, G - - - - - - - - - Firmware update - - - - - - X - - - X - - - - Telemetry logs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NVMe MI Specific commands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X - • G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the PSP. • I = Input: The PSP is input into the Module. • X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the PSP. • - = Not accessed by the service. Table 13: PSP Access within Services PSPs SALT PSID PIN MSID PIN FW Public Key Maker Public Key Authenticated Services Take ownership G, X - - - - Activate OPAL G, X - - - - Deactivate OPAL G, X - X - - Admin Set PIN G, X - - - - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 20 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). PSPs SALT PSID PIN MSID PIN FW Public Key Maker Public Key User Set PIN G, X - - - - Enable/Disable User Set PIN - - - - - Enable/Disable Admin SP authorities G, X - - - - Enable/Disable Locking SP authorities G, X - - - - Enable/Disable SUM G, X - - - - Locking Range Configuration - - - - - Lock/Unlock range - - - - - Format / Namespace Management - - - - - Sanitize - - - - - Set common name - - - - - Data store table Set - - - - - Crypto Erase of a range G, X - - - - Read/Write User Data - - - - - Zeroization - - - - - PSID Revert G, X - X - - Unauthenticated Services Power Cycle (Self-Test) - - - X - Hot reset - - - - - Warm reset - - - - - Show Status - - - - - Read FIPS Compliance - - - - - Block SID Authentication - - X - - TCG Authentication G, X I, X - - - Enable Zeroization Service - - - - X Get Random Number - - - - - Firmware update - - - X - Telemetry logs - - - - - NVMe MI Specific commands - - - - - Read/Write User Data - - - - - SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 21 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Self-Tests Each Time the Module is powered up, tests are run to guarantee the proper functioning of the crypto algorithms. Power on self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module. On power-on or reset, the Module performs self-tests as described in Table 14 below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails during the ROM boot stage of the device, then the Module enters an internal error state. If the Module has exited ROM boot stage, the Module enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state which can be retrieved by NVMe Identify Controller command word at offset 4092, bit 0 will be 1. Power cycle is required to recover the Module from self-test failure. Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests Test Target Description Failure Behavior Firmware Integrity RSA PSS 2048-bit and SHA-256 signature verification is performed over all firmware located in NAND storage on the Aquarius controller. The calculation of the Approved digital signature is when the firmware is installed. The self-test fails upon failure of the signature verification. Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state. The SSD will not enumerate, PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100 RSA (Cert. #A914) RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is implemented in hardware and is used for the firmware integrity test. Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state. The SSD will not enumerate, PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100. (This error would be found during the firmware integrity test.) SHA RSA is used to verify the signature of the firmware and a KAT of the underlying SHA-256 hashing function is not required. SHA-256 is tested in the Firmware Integrity test. Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state. The SSD will not enumerate, PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100. (This error would be found during the firmware integrity test.) RSA (Cert. #A912) RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is implemented in firmware and is used for the firmware integrity test. Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR state. The SSD will not enumerate, PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be 0x0100 AES-XTS Performs encrypt and decrypt KATs using a 256-bit key. Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. AES-ECB Encryption and Decryption KATs Key size: 256 bits Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. AES-KW KATs: Both forward and inverse ciphers are tested via encryption and decryption. See IG 9.4 Modes: KW Key size: 256 bits Note: This test covers AES-ECB as per IG 9.4, #4 (c). Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 22 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Test Target Description Failure Behavior HMAC Performs HMAC generate and verify KATs using a 256-bit key. Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. PBKDF Performs KAT using a known password and 256-bit key. Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. DRBG Performs a fixed input KAT inclusive of the SP 800-90A Rev 1 instantiate, generate, and reseed health tests. Mode: AES CTR DRBG Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. ENT (P) Performs ENT (P) startup tests including seven (7) statistical tests on each block of consecutive 1024 raw samples. Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests Test Target Description Failure Behavior ENT (P) The Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator Test (RCT and APT) for each call to the ENT (P). Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. AES XTS Key generation An IG A.9 key comparison test is performed on Key1 and Key2 for each generation. Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state. Firmware load Test The Module performs a SHA-256 and RSA 2048 (Cert. #A912) signature verification on all firmware loaded into the Module. The Module returns invalid image for download commit command and the image is discarded. The module transitions back to the Unauthenticated Service Processor state without entering an error state. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 23 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Physical Security Policy The Module implemented the following physical security mechanisms: • An aluminum alloy enclosure that protects the production-grade components of the Module. The enclosure is opaque within the visible spectrum. • Two (2) opaque tamper-evident seals that are affixed on the sides of the Module as shown in the following image. These two (2) seals are required to ensure the detection of tamper attempt. These seals cannot be removed or reapplied without tamper evidence. Figure 3: Module Physical Enclosure – Bottom View The following table summarizes the actions required by the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained: Table 16: Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Physical Security Mechanism Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test Inspection/Test Guidance Details Physical Enclosure On initial receipt of the Module and when feasible afterwards. Inspect the entire enclosure for cracks, bending and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found. Tamper-Evident Seals On initial receipt of the Module and when feasible afterwards. Inspect the seals for evidence of a removal attempt. If any peeling, scratching, discoloration, and/or disfiguration is observed, then remove the Module from service. 1 2 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 24 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). The following table depicts the pictures of all hardware modules with tamper-evident seals: Table 17: Figures of all Modules with Production Label and Tamper-Evident Seals Part Number Top View Bottom View HFS960GECTX098N HFS1T9GECTX098N SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 25 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Part Number Top View Bottom View HFS3T8GECTX098N HFS7T6GECTX098N SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 26 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Part Number Top View Bottom View HFS800GECTX098N HFS1T6GECTX098N SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 27 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Part Number Top View Bottom View HFS3T2GECTX098N HFS6T4GECTX098N SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 28 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Examples of tamper evidence are depicted in the following figure: Figure 4: PE8000 Series NVMe OPAL SEDs Tamper Evidence SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 29 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Operational Environment The Module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The Module will not load or execute firmware which is not signed with SK hynix 2048-bit RSA Private Key. The mechanism available to perform a firmware load is through NVMe Firmware Download and Commit command. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the CMVP under FIPS 140-2. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 30 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy The Module does not support the mitigation of other attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 31 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Security Rules and Guidance The Module design corresponds to the Module Security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the Module and the Cryptographic Officer instructions that are necessary to implement in order to maintain compliance with FIPS 140-2 security requirements. 8.1 Invariant Rules The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules: 1. No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to CSPs. 2. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, Key generation, Zeroization and in error states. 3. Data output is logically disconnected while the Module is performing key generation and zeroization. 4. All CSPs are zeroized by zeroization service. Zeroization service is accessible only by the Maker role. 5. The module does not support manual key entry. 6. The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values. 7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. 8. The Module does not support a bypass capability. 9. The Module shall provide four (4) distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, User, Maker, and PSID. 10. The Module shall provide role-based authentication. 11. The Module shall clear previous authentication on power cycle. 12. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any cryptographic services. 13. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by power cycling or resetting the Module. 14. Power on self –tests do not require any operator action. 15. The Module does not support the update of the serial number and vendor ID. 16. The Module does not support concurrent operators. 8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization The Module is shipped from the factory in an approved mode of operation (uninitialized mode). The keys generated during manufacturing are used to encrypt/decrypt the user data. The shipping container protecting the Module or set of Modules in transit should be verified for evidence of tampering. On receipt of the module, the CO should examine the product to ensure it has not been tampered with during shipping according to the procedures outline in the module Physical Security Policy, Section 5. Upon verification that the module has not been tampered, the CO should initialize the Module by taking the following steps: SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 32 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 8.2.1 Verifying the Module is in an approved mode of operation To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation the operator will perform the Read FIPS Compliance by issuing TCG IF-RECV command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2. Refer [SFSC] spec. For example, the sample of data below is returned from the module: ----------------FIPS 140 compliance descriptor------------------------ COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR INFORMATION LENGTH -> 528 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR TYPE -> 1 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR LENGTH -> 520 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR RELATED STANDARD -> FIPS 140-2 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL -> Level-2 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR HARDWARE VERSION -> HFS1T6GECTX098N COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR VERSION ->11080A10 COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR MODULE NAME -> SK Hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.2.2 Initialize the Module 1. Take Ownership - Set Admin SP SID password to a value other than MSID 2. Activate Opal with Single User Mode 3. Set WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges 4. Set PINs for all authorities (Admins and Users) that are enabled 5. PIN length at least 10 bytes or more but 32-byte length is recommended 6. Power cycle the Module 7. Verify the module is in initialized mode by checking the: • LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1 • WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges in the Locking Table are set to True 8.3 Un-Initialize the Module The TCG Revert or Revert SP Methods may be invoked either by authenticated role or PSID role to affect a transition into the uninitialized mode of operation. This is analogous to restoring the module to factory default state. 8.4 Firmware Update A firmware update loads a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated with RSA signature verification over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate to remain in an Approved Mode. The firmware update process could be performed with and without the reset, for the first one the host: 1. Issues NVM Firmware Image Download command [NVMe, 5.12]. 2. Issues NVM Firmware Commit command [NVMe, 5.11]. 3. Performs a Reset. Reset causes the loaded firmware to be activated. For the firmware update without the reset, the host: 1. Issues NVM Firmware Image Download command. 2. Issues NVM Firmware Commit command with Commit Action set to 3. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 33 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Following the Commit Action, the NVMe controller completes the firmware commit by activating the loaded firmware. SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 34 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy Table 18: References Acronym Full Specification Name [FIPS 140-2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001 [Annex C] NIST, Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, June 10, 2019 [180-4] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015 [186-4] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July 2013 [197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001 [198-1] NIST, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS Publication 198-1, July 2008 [IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, last update: May 4, 2021 [NVMe] Standard spec available online https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express- 1_3c-2018.05.24-Ratified.pdf Revision 1.3C May 24, 2018 [NVMe-MI] Standard spec available online https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-Management-Interface-1.1- Ratified.pdf Revision 1.1, April 29, 2019 [PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002 [SFSC] Information technology – Security Features for SCSI Commands (SFSC), Revision 2.0, 15 September 2015 [38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, December 2001 [38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010 [38F] NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012 [90A Rev1] NIST Special Publication 800-90A Rev 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015 [90B] NIST Special Publication 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, January 2018 [108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009 [132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, December 2010 [133 Rev2] NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, June 2020 [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, version 2.01 Revision 1.0, 5 August 2015 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 35 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Acronym Full Specification Name [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00, 5 August 2015 [TCG SIIS] TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version .08, 14 August 2018 [TCG ADS] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Additional Datastore Tables Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00, 24 February 2012 [TCG SUM] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 2.00, 5 August 2015 [TCG PSID] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: PSID, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00, 5 August 2015 [TCG Block SID] TCG Storage Feature Set: Block SID Authentication, Version 1.00 Final, Revision 1.00, 5 August 2015 [IEEE 1667] IEEE Std 1667-2018 – IEEE Standard for Discovery, Authentication, and Authorization in Host Attachments of Storage Devices, February 2018 SK hynix PE8010 and PE8030 NVMe Opal SEDs FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Copyright SK hynix Inc., 2023 Version 1.3 Page 36 of 36 SK_hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 19: Acronyms and Definitions Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard APT Adaptive Proportion Test CO Cryptographic Officer CSP Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140-2] DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book mode of AES Encryption/Decryption ENT (P) Entropy – Physical validated entropy source KAT Known Answer Test PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function LBA Logical Block Address MSID Manufactured Security Identifier MEK Media Encryption Key NVMe Non-Volatile Memory express PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express PSP Public Security Parameter PIN Personal Identification Number (or Password) PSID Physical Security Identifier RCT Repetitive Count Test RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SED Self-Encrypting Drive SID Security Identifier SSD Solid-state Drive SSC Security Subsystem Class TCG Trusted Computing Group UID Unique Identifier XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Cipher text Stealing