FIPS Applet on RookySE
FIPS Applet v1.6.1.4 on RookySE ‘097153’
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary
Cryptographic Module Security Policy
Version: 1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly digital
world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay, connect,
travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By standing
for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect this asset,
whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as guarantee
secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from Financial,
Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT (Oberthur
Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company counts 14,000
employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180 countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................. 7
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION............................................................. 7
2.1 Module Specifications............................................................................................ 7
2.1.1 Module Type and Boundary ............................................................................. 7
2.1.2 Module Components and Configuration ............................................................ 9
2.2 Modes of Operations............................................................................................. 9
2.2.1 Approved Mode of Operation........................................................................... 9
2.3 Security Functions ............................................................................................... 10
2.3.1 Approved Security Functions .......................................................................... 10
2.3.2 Non-approved but Allowed Security Functions ................................................. 14
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES................................................................14
3.1 Physical and Logical Interface............................................................................... 14
3.1.1 ISO7816 T0 Contact Protocol.......................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Protocol.......................................................... 14
4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION.............................................................15
4.1 Roles.................................................................................................................. 15
4.2 Authentication.................................................................................................... 16
4.2.1 Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’ (GP SCP ‘03’) Authentication ......... 16
4.2.2 FIPS Applet Authentication Methods............................................................... 16
4.2.3 Authentication Strength in Each Role .............................................................. 17
4.3 Services.............................................................................................................. 18
4.3.1 Roles, Service Commands, Input and Ouput ..................................................... 19
4.3.2 Approved Services......................................................................................... 24
4.3.3 Firmware Loading ......................................................................................... 34
5 SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE SECURITY .................................................................35
5.1 Form of Executable Code ..................................................................................... 35
5.2 Initiate on Demand.............................................................................................. 35
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.............................................................................35
7 PHYSICAL SECURITY.............................................................................................36
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8 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY.....................................................................................37
9 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER MANAGEMENT .................................................38
9.1 SSP Management ................................................................................................ 38
9.2 SSPs Access......................................................................................................... 61
9.3 Random Bit Generator (RBG)................................................................................ 61
9.4 SSP Zeroization ................................................................................................... 61
10 SELF-TESTS..........................................................................................................62
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests.................................................................................... 62
10.1.1 Pre-Operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test............................................ 62
10.1.2 Pre-Operational Critical Functions Test............................................................ 62
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................... 62
10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Test........................................................ 62
10.2.2 Conditional Software/Firmware Load Test ....................................................... 66
10.2.3 Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Test ........................................................... 66
10.2.4 Conditional Manual Entry Test........................................................................ 66
10.3 Periodic Self-Test................................................................................................. 66
10.4 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests............................................................................ 66
10.5 Error States......................................................................................................... 66
11 LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE .......................................................................................67
11.1 Installation, Initialization and Startup Procedure ................................................... 67
11.1.1 Components Version Number Retrieval Procedures.......................................... 68
11.2 Secure Sanitization and Destruction Procedure...................................................... 69
12 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS .........................................................................69
13 DOCUMENT REVISIONS........................................................................................73
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TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 Module Boundary................................................................................................................................ 8
Figure 2 FIPS Applet on RookySE Chip............................................................................................................... 9
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TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1 Security Level........................................................................................................................................ 7
Table 2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration....................................................................................... 9
Table 3 Approved Algorithms.......................................................................................................................... 13
Table 4 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed14
Table 5 Ports and Interfaces in ISO7816 T0 Contact Protocol......................................................................... 14
Table 6 Ports and Interfaces in Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Protocol ...................................................... 15
Table 7 Role Description.................................................................................................................................. 16
Table 8 Role and Authentication..................................................................................................................... 18
Table 9 Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output..................................................................................... 23
Table 10 Approved Security Services .............................................................................................................. 33
Table 11 Approved Services - ISO19790:2012 7.4.3 Services, Non Security-Relevant Services, or Services Using
Non-Approved Algorithm but Claiming No security........................................................................................ 34
Table 12 Form of Executable Code.................................................................................................................. 35
Table 13 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines............................................................................................ 36
Table 14 EFP/EFT ............................................................................................................................................. 37
Table 15 Hardness Testing Temperature Range.............................................................................................. 37
Table 16 SSPs................................................................................................................................................... 60
Table 17 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification....................................................... 61
Table 18 Integrity Self-Test Target .................................................................................................................. 62
Table 19 Critical Function Self-test.................................................................................................................. 62
Table 20 CM Conditional CAST ........................................................................................................................ 66
Table 21 Error States ....................................................................................................................................... 67
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1 GENERAL
This document defines the Security Policy for FIPS Applet on RookySE with firmware FIPS Applet v1.6.1.4 on
RookySE ‘097153’ cryptographic module. FIPS Applet on RookySE is a Hardware Security Module made by
Idemia, hereafter denoted the module.
The module, validated to [NIST.FIPS.140-3] overall Level 3, meets security levels of following individual areas.
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Table 1 Security Level
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
FIPS Applet on RookySE is a cryptographic module intended to be used as hardware security module. It is
designated for creating, storing, and operating keys with some cryptographic operations capabilities, and it
relies on a secure element hardware with a tamper-protection.
2.1 Module Specifications
2.1.1 Module Type and Boundary
This cryptographic module, is a hardware module, and is a single chip. It is operated by embedded Global
Platform OS with card manager capability for firmware (applet) loading, installation, or deletion. FIPS Applet
is loaded at manufacturing and is part of the module. The module boundary is shown in red in the following
picture:
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Figure 1 Module Boundary
The below picture shows the FIPS Applet on RookySE Cryptographic Module in a single chip (Module count
is 1) in VQFN32 form factor with dual interface (ISO 7816 T0 Contact Protocol and SPI Protocol):
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Figure 2 FIPS Applet on RookySE Chip
2.1.2 Module Components and Configuration
Below components are part of the module:
Model/Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors
SLC37ESA2M0 Version: ‘29’
Global Platform OS: RookySE ‘097153’
Javacard Application: FIPS Applet v1.6.1.4
32-bit ARM®
SecurCore® SC300™
Table 2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
The module can be in one of the two configurations below. The configuration is set in the manufacturing stage.
FIPS Certified Product (FCP)
This product configuration is intended to meet FIPS requirements and be validated by validation
authority. This Security Policy describes this configuration.
Non-FIPS Certified Product (NFCP)
This product configuration is not intended to meet FIPS requirements and is out of scope of the FIPS
evaluation.
The module does not implement any Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments.
2.2 Modes of Operations
The module supports an applet instance that is running only in one mode of operation that is an approved
mode. All services provided by the module when set in configuration FCP are approved services as specified
in the section 4.3.2. A global indicator via FIPS Applet GET INFO service (unauthenticated service) is provided
to show the status mode of operation.
2.2.1 Approved Mode of Operation
This mode means that the module is applying strictly rules of the FIPS requirements and the security policy is
enforced. Access to some services is restricted and only approved services as specified in section 4.3.2 are
available for users.
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In this mode, customer is still allowed to load additional firmware but this is restricted to firmware (applet) that
is already validated under [NIST.FIPS.140-3]. Any firmware (applet) that is not validated [NIST.FIPS.140-3]
will cancel the FIPS status of the module. A procedure for firmware loading is described in [FQR 401 9097 Ed
4] section 3.4.2.
2.3 Security Functions
The module implements the ‘approved security functions’ and ‘non-approved but allowed security functions’
listed in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
2.3.1 Approved Security Functions
Note that the full cryptographic algorithm implementation capabilities were tested for the Approved
cryptographic functions but only algorithms / mode / key sizes / functionalities identified in the Table 3 are
implemented by the module.
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CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/
Method
Description /
Key Size(s) /
Key
Strength(s)
Use
/ Function
A2912
AES
[NIST.FIPS.197]
[NIST.SP.800-38A]
ECB, CBC 128/192/256 Data encryption/decryption
A2912
AES
[NIST.SP.800-38B]
CMAC 128/192/256
MAC Generation/Verification,
SP800-108 KDF
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG
[NIST.SP.800-
133.Rev2]
5.1 Key Pairs for Digital
Signature Schemes
5.2 Key Pairs for Key
Establishment
6.1 The “Direct
Generation” of
Symmetric Keys
6.2.1 Symmetric Keys
Generated Using Key-
Agreement Schemes
6.2.2 Symmetric Keys
Derived from a Pre-
existing Key
RSA 2048,
RSA 3072,
RSA 4096,
ECC P-224,
ECC P-256,
ECC P-384,
ECC P-521,
TDES-64,
TDES-128,
TDES-192,
HMAC 64,
HMAC 128,
HMAC 160,
HMAC 224,
HMAC 256,
HMAC 320,
HMAC 384,
HMAC 512,
AES 128,
AES 192,
AES 256
Key generation
Symmetric and Asymmetric
A2912
DRBG
[NIST.SP.800-
90A.Rev1]
CTR 256
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
A2912
ECDSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
CKG using method in
section 4 and 5.1
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
ECDSA Key Generation,
A2912
ECDSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
P-192,
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
ECDSA Key Verification
A2912
ECDSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
ECDSA Signature
Generation
A2912
ECDSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
P-192,
P-224,
P-256,
P-384,
P-521
ECDSA Signature
Verification
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ENT (P) Entropy Source
[NIST.SP.800-90B]
Physical
Hardware True RNG used to
seed the DRBG. The
minimum number of bits of
entropy is specified in the
Table 17 Non-Deterministic
Random Number Generation
Specification
A2912
HMAC
[NIST.FIPS.198-1]
SHA2-256
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Key strength : 112
(minimum)
Message Authentication;
SP800-108 KDF
MAC Generation
A2912
HMAC
[NIST.FIPS.198-1]
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Key strength : 64
(minimum)
Message Authentication;
MAC Verification
A2912
KAS-ECC
[NIST.SP.800-
56A.Rev3]
with bilateral key
confirmation
P-521 curve
providing 256
bits of encryption
strength
KAS-ECC SP800-56Ar3
A2912
KDF
[NIST.SP.800-108]
AES CMAC, HMAC
HMAC-64,
HMAC-128,
HMAC-160,
HMAC-224,
HMAC-256,
HMAC-320,
HMAC-384,
HMAC-512
AES-128,
AES-192,
AES-256
Key Derivation
Symmetric Keys Derived
from a Pre-existing Key
using KDF
A2912
KTS (Secure
Channel GP)
[NIST.SP.800-38F]
SP 800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
256 bits keys
providing 256 bits
of encryption
strength
AES-CBC, AES-CMAC
A2912
KTS (Secure
Session)
[NIST.SP.800-38F]
SP 800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
256 bits keys
providing 256 bits
of encryption
strength
AES-CBC, AES-CMAC
A2912
KTS (Token
transport )
[NIST.SP.800-38F]
SP 800-38F. KTS (key
wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
128,192, 256 bits
keys providing
128,192, 256 bits
of encryption
strength
AES-CBC, AES-CMAC
A2912 RSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
N/A
2048/3072/4096 RSA Key Generation
A2912 RSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
2048/3072/4096
RSA Signature Generation
using PCKS1 v1.5 and PSS
Scheme
A2912 RSA
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
1024/2048/3072/4
096
RSA Signature Verification
using PCKS1 v1.5 and PSS
Scheme
(SHA-1 and module 1024
allowed for legacy use)
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Table 3 Approved Algorithms
A2912
RSA (CVL)
[NIST.FIPS.186-4]
2048 RSA Signature Generation
Primitive
The RSA SigGen (CVL) shall
only be used within the
context of a FIPS 186-4
signature generation
A2912
SHA-3
[NIST.FIPS.202]
SHA3-224,
SHA3-256,
SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
N/A Message Digest
A2912
SHS
[NIST.FIPS.180-4]
SHA-1,
SHA2-224,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
N/A Message Digest
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2.3.2 Non-approved but Allowed Security Functions
These algorithms do not claim any security and are not used to meet [NIST.FIPS.140-3] requirements.
Therefore, SSPs do not map to these algorithms.
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
CSPs obfuscation (no security claimed)
CSPs obfuscation with a non-
Approved algorithm
Table 4 Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
with security claimed.
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES
3.1 Physical and Logical Interface
The module provides a dual interface for communications that is available to all users: ISO7816 T0 Contact
Protocol and Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Protocol. These two interfaces cannot be used simultaneously.
Data output is inhibited during error states in any interface. The module acts as a slave device and does not
have control output.
3.1.1 ISO7816 T0 Contact Protocol
In the ISO7816 T0 protocol, data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, and zeroisation except
for procedure byte NULL ‘60’ transmission in order to keep the communication between module and the
interface device still alive.
Physical port Logical interface
Data that passes over
port/interface
VCC, GND Power ISO 7816: Supply voltage
RST Control input ISO 7816: Reset
CLK Control input ISO 7816: Clock
I/O Control input, Status output
Data input, Data output
ISO 7816: Input / Output of Data
ISO 7816: Status Word
ISO 7816: Procedure Byte
Table 5 Ports and Interfaces in ISO7816 T0 Contact Protocol
3.1.2 Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Protocol
In the SPI protocol, data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, and zeroisation with exception for
Check Alive SPI command. This command is used to check if the module is still alive or not. This command
can temporarily interrupt the current execution of key generation, self-tests, or zeroisation.
Physical port Logical interface
Data that passes over
port/interface
VCC, GND Power Supply voltage
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RST Control input Chip Reset
SPI_CLK Control input Clock
SPI_MISO Control input, Data input Master IN, Slave OUT
SPI_MOSI Data output, Status output Master OUT, Slave IN
SPI_CS Control input Chip Select
SPI_IRQ Status output
A status signal to inform command
completion
Table 6 Ports and Interfaces in Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Protocol
4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION
4.1 Roles
The FIPS Applet on RookySE Cryptographic module supports following user roles:
Role Name ID Role Description
Application
Administrator
AA
GP Administrator - This role is responsible for upgrading and loading the
main firmware version of the system and additional customer applet
(delete/load/install Applet). This role is authenticated using Global Platform
Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’
Super User SU
Crypto Officer Role 1 - Performing module Initialization for ADMIN
Creation process, Unblock Administrator, System Reset using DUAL
Control with Administrator
Administrator CO
Crypto Officer Role 2 - Performing module initialization with the help
SuperUser for its creation, global configuration, user management, and
profile management for user and key
Auditor AU Crypto Officer Role 3 - Performing Audit Management
Key Custodians KC
Performing Splitting Knowledge Procedure in the Key Ceremony and hold
secrets of Crypto Card Master Key (CCMK)
This role is split into 3 different roles:
KC1 – manage secret 1 of CCMK in the Splitting Knowledge Procedure
KC2 – manage secret 2 of CCMK in the Splitting Knowledge Procedure
KC3 – manage secret 3 of CCMK in the Splitting Knowledge Procedure
Standard User UR
User Role – Performing general security services including Key
Management and Cryptographic services
The standard user’s role is configurable based on access control list in a
profile that is set by ADMIN for a user. E.g a user can be a standard user A
that have role to do Crypto functions but no role for key management
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Role Name ID Role Description
Unauthenticated
User
UU
A role that does not require an authentication of an operator for the role to
perform some services where CSPs and PSPs are not modified, disclosed
[for CSPs only], or substituted
Table 7 Role Description
The module does not support a maintenance role.
Additionally, any user is allowed to perform non-sensitive services such as requesting status information,
without prior authentication.
4.2 Authentication
There are three types of authentication methods employed by the Module:
1. Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’ (GP SCP ‘03’) Authentication
2. FIPS Applet Password-based Authentication
3. FIPS Applet Smartcard-based Authentication
In the FIPS applet implementation, the module does support authentication level up to two levels where the
last authenticated user will override the access control of the first authenticated user. The active access control
in the second level is based on second authenticated user’s profile. When this user logoff, the active access
control is set back to the first authenticated user’s profile. This authentication level is only applicable for
authentication number 2 and number 3 above that is designed for specific procedure such as Key Ceremony,
System Reset, or System Unblock services.
4.2.1 Global Platform Secure Channel Protocol ‘03’ (GP SCP ‘03’) Authentication
The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the Secure Channel service. The SD-
KENC and SD-KMAC keys are used to derive the SD-SENC and SD-SMAC keys, respectively. The off-card
entity participating in the mutual authentication sends a 64-bit challenge to the Cryptographic Module. The
Cryptographic Module generates its own challenge and computes a 64-bit cryptogram with SD-SMAC key and
both challenges. The Cryptographic Module cryptogram and challenge are sent to the off-card entity which
checks the Cryptographic Module’s cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram with both challenges. A
64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command containing the off-card entity
cryptogram with AES-CMAC and SD-SMAC key, the MAC is concatenated to the command, and the command
is sent to Cryptographic Module. The Cryptographic Module checks the message authentication code and
compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If all of this succeeds, the two participants
are mutually authenticated (the external entity is authenticated to the Module in the AA role).
GP Secure Channel Protocol establishment provides mutual authentication service as well as establishment
of a secure channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data.
4.2.2 FIPS Applet Authentication Methods
The FIPS Applet uses identity-based operator authentication to enforce the separation of roles and allow
corresponding services within each role.
FIPS Applet Password-based Authentication
The operator must enter its user name and its password for authentication process. The username is
an alphanumeric string. The password is a binary string of a minimum of eight (8) characters. Key
Agreement technique ((Cofactor) Full Unified Model, C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) with bilateral key
confirmation is used for mutual authentication and to derive session keys (H-SKAuthEnc, H-
SKAuthMac, H-SKAuthKC). H-SKAuthKC is used to calculate MAC of user credential (user token) for
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authentication. If this mutual authentication process is success, the user can be verified via Key
Confirmation using USER AUTH service employing user token. Other session keys, H-SKAuthEnc and
H-SKAuthMac are used for protecting the message in Secure Channel. This scheme protects from
eavesdropping and provides perfect forward secrecy.
FIPS Applet Smartcard-based Authentication
The operator must use smartcard that owns unique user EC-key pair used for Key Agreement
((Cofactor) Full Unified Model, C(2e, 2s, ECC CDH) with bilateral key confirmation). The static user
key is different per user and stored inside the smartcard which is considered as secure enclave. The
user must enter his pin for verification by the smartcard in order to use his static key and to perform
key agreement. The rest of user authentication process is similar with the password-based method,
except there is no password involved in the user token.
Upon correct authentication, the role is selected based on current logged user’s profile. During authentication
session keys are negotiated which are used to secure subsequent services request from operator. Since the
session keys (and session ID) are stored in volatile memory all information about the authentication and
session is lost if the module is powered down.
4.2.3 Authentication Strength in Each Role
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Application
Administrator
Identity-based
authentication using
Global Platform Secure
Channel Protocol ‘03’
Authentication
• Single Attempt Probability
The probability that a random attempt will succeed
using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2^128) = 2.9E-39 (MAC||cryptogram,
using a 128-bit block for authentication)
Multiple Attempts Probability
The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that
increases the response time between two
authentications attempts following a failed
authentication, such that no more than nine (9)
attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a
one-minute interval is:
• 9/(2^128) = 2.6E-38 (MAC||cryptogram,
using a 128-bit block for authentication)
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Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Administrator
Key Custodians
Super User
Auditor
Standard User
Identity-based
authentication using
Smartcard
Single Attempt Probability
The probability that a random attempt will succeed
using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2^128) = 2.9E-39 (128-bit long
cryptogram computed with 256-bit long key)
Multiple Attempts Probability
The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that
increases the response time between two
authentications attempts following a failed
authentication, such that no more than nine (9)
attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a
one-minute interval is:
• 9/(2^128) = 2.6E-38 (128-bit long
cryptogram computed with 256-bit long key)
Administrator
Key Custodians
Super User
Auditor
Standard User
Identity-based
authentication using
Password
Single Attempt Probability
The probability that a random attempt will succeed
using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2^128) = 2.9E-39 (128-bit long
cryptogram computed with 256-bit long key)
Multiple Attempts Probability
The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that
increases the response time between two
authentications attempts following a failed
authentication, such that no more than nine (9)
attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The
probability that a random attempt will succeed over a
one-minute interval is:
• 9/(2^128) = 2.6E-38 (128-bit long
cryptogram computed with 256-bit long key)
Table 8 Role and Authentication
4.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the section 4.3.1 for each service description and its
access for each Role. The module only provides approved services listed in the section 4.3.2 Approved
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Services. The module does not provide bypass or self-initiated output capabilities. Each service of the module
returns completion status to indicate successful execution or specific error code.
4.3.1 Roles, Service Commands, Input and Ouput
The following table shows data input and output of each service employed by the module. Some services do
not require an operator to assume an authorized role. In this case the associated role is marked with the role
UU (Unauthenticated User) defined in Table 7
Role Service Input Output
Global Platform Services
AA GP Secure Channel
Key Identifier, Host Challenge, Security
Level Host Cryptogram, MAC
Card Challenge, Card Cryptogram,
diversification data, and key
information, Status Word of the
command
AA GP Manage Content
Loaded package and stored data and key
encrypted through GP SCP ‘03’ Security
Level 3
Status Word of the command
AA GP Get Status Application Type
List of application and its status,
Status Word of the command
AA GP Get Data Data Tag
Corresponding data based on input
tag
AA GP Life Cycle Status type and State Control Status Word of the command
UU GP Select Application (applet) AID Status Word of the command
UU SE Reset Signal Reset in port RST Answer-to-RESET (ATR)
Firmware Upgrades Services - FIPS Applet
AA Initialize Update Key Identifier and host challenge
Card Challenge, Card Cryptogram,
diversification data, and key
information, Status Word of the
command
AA External Authenticate
Security Level 3, Host Cryptogram and
MAC
Status Word of the command
AA Store Data
Sensitive Data and Key encrypted through
GP SCP ‘03’ Security Level 3
Status Word of the command
FIPS Applet Services
UU Get Info Information type
System information as requested
such as: Applet version, applet build
type, single/multi SE configuration,
life cycle status, storage size
configuration, TC and sync status,
current active user, and/or last
executed frame id
Return Status1
UU Manage Session Session type Return Status
1
Completion Status that indicates execution status result (success or error with specific reason code)
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Role Service Input Output
UU Mutual Authenticate
username, user/host public ephemeral
key, selected authentication method, and
host ID
System's public ephemeral key and
receipt for key confirmation
Return Status
UU User Authenticate
user token generated from MAC of user's
credential using generated session key
from Key Agreement process in Mutual
Authenticate
Authentication result
Return Status
SU,
CO,
KC1,
KC2,
KC3,
AU,
UR
User Logout Username information Return Status
SU,
CO,
KC1,
KC2,
KC3,
AU,
UR
Secure Channel Encrypted data and its signature
Encrypted response data
Return Status
AU Check Log Number of logs to be returned Activity logs and Return Status
AU Read Log Number of logs to be read and deleted Activity logs and Return Status
AU Delete Log Number of logs to be deleted Return Status
AU Export Log (mode 01) Mode to export the logs (mode: deleted) All activity logs and Return Status
CO,
AU
Export Log (mode 02) Mode to export the logs (mode: kept) All activity logs and Return Status
CO Profile Create Profile name and the access control Return Status
CO Profile Delete Profile name and deletion option Return Status
CO Profile View
Only input frame with no additional input
data
information of all profiles
Return Status
CO User Create User information and credential data Return Status
SU User Create ADMIN Admin's information and credential data Return Status
CO User Delete Username information Return Status
SU, CO
User Change
Credential
Username and new user’s password or
new user’s public key
Return Status
CO User View (full) User Type (All Users)
Information of all users
Return Status
SU, CO
User View (Admin
only)
User Type (Admin only)
information about admin user
Return Status
CO,
KC1
CCMK Import 1
Secret data and its key check value to
import CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Return Status
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Role Service Input Output
CO,
KC2
CCMK Import 2
Secret data and its key check value to
import CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Return Status
CO,
KC3
CCMK Import 3
Secret data and its key check value to
import CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Key check value of CCMK
Return Status
CO,
KC1
CCMK Export 1
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Secret data and its key check value
of CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Return Status
CO,
KC2
CCMK Export 2
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Secret data and its key check value
of CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Return Status
CO,
KC3
CCMK Export 3
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Secret data and its key check value
of CCMK using split knowledge
procedure
Return Status
CO System Set Config
00 to keep FIPS Certified Product
01 to change to Non FIPS Certified
Product
Return Status
CO,
UR
Import Key
Imported key in key token form
protected by protection key whose label
specified in key token's properties
Imported key in key token form
protected by CCMK of the module as
protection key
Return Status
CO,
UR
Export Key
Exported key label and protection key
label where those key tokens shall be
loaded to the module prior to this service
via Load Key service
Exported key in key token form with
protection key as configured in input
frame
Return Status
CO,
UR
Load Key
Loaded key in key token form protected
by protection key whose label specified
in key token's properties
Return Status
CO,
UR
Diversify Key
Key token properties and diversification
method
Diversified key in key token form
protected by CCMK of the module as
its protection key
Return Status
CO,
UR
Generate Key Key token properties
Generated key in key token form
protected by CCMK of the module as
its protection key
Return Status
CO,
UR
Generate Key Pair Key token properties
Generated key in key token form
protected by CCMK of the module as
protection key
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Role Service Input Output
Return Status
CO
Generate Key (For
Split Knowledge)
Customer key properties Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Export 1
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Customer key’s secret data, its KCV
and properties
Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Export 2
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Customer key’s secret data and its
KCV
Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Export 3
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Exported Customer key's properties,
secret data, secret KCV, customer
key KCV
Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Import 1
Customer key's properties, secret data,
and its KCV to import Customer Key using
split knowledge procedure
Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Import 2
Customer key's secret data and its KCV to
import Customer Key using split
knowledge procedure
Return Status
CO,
UR
CK Import 3
Imported Customer key's properties,
secret data, secret KCV, and customer
key KCV to import Customer Key using
split knowledge procedure
Customer Key Token protected by
CCMK of the module as its
protection key
Return Status
CO Set Date Date information Return Status
SU, CO System Reset
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Return Status
SU, CO Get Data
Requested data such as: System, Host or
Super User’s Ephemeral public key
Requested data
Return Status
SU, CO System Store Data
Data to be stored such as: : System, Host
or Super User’s Authentication public
key, System Authentication private key,
System Sync Master Key, logging
configuration
Return Status
SU, CO Sync Request Token Sync properties
Sync token data
Return Status
SU, CO Sync Write Token Sync token data Sync result status
SU, CO Sync Report Sync result data Return Status
CO,
UR
Crypto Encipher
Encipher Key label, plain data and cipher
configuration
Encrypted data
Return Status
CO,
UR
Crypto Decipher
Decipher Key label, encrypted data and
decipher configuration
Decrypted data
Return Status
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Role Service Input Output
CO,
UR
Crypto Sign
Signature Key label, data and signature
configuration
Signature of the data
Return Status
CO,
UR
Crypto Verify
Signature Key label, data, signature of
the data, and verification configuration
Signature verification result
Return Status
CO User Unblock Username information Return Status
SU Admin Unblock Admin username information Return Status
SU, CO System Unblock
Only input frame with no additional input
data
Return Status
Table 9 Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
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4.3.2 Approved Services
Services listed below are approved services: either FIPS-approved security services, [ISO/IEC 19790] 7.4.3 services, non security-relevant services, or
services using non-approved algorithm but claiming no security. Those services are available when the module is running in approved mode of operation.
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Service Description
Approved Security
Function
Keys and/or SSPs Roles
Access rights to
Keys and/or
SSPs
Indicator
GP Secure
Channel
Establish a Global
Platform secure
communications
channel
GP SCP ‘03’ Authentication
and Secure Messaging
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
A2912
OS-DRBG-STATE
SD-KENC
SD-KMAC
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
SD-RMAC
AA
G, E
E
E
G, E
G, E
G, E
Completion
Status2
GP Manage
Content
Load and install
application
packages and its
associated keys
and data
GP SCP ‘03’ Secure
Messaging
AES Encryption/Decryption
A2912
SD-KENC
SD-KMAC
SD-KDEK
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
SD-RMAC
DAP-AES
AA
W
W
W
E
E
E
W, E
Completion Status
GP Life Cycle Set GP life cycle - OS-MKEK AA Z Completion Status
SE Reset Reset Warm/Cold -
H-eAUTH_sk
H-Zs
H-Ze
H-SKAuthEnc
H-SKAuthMac
H-SKAuthKC
H-SKSyncEnc
H-SKSyncMac
H-eAUTH_pk
H-eHOST_pk
H-HostID
UU
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Completion Status
Initialize
Update
Performs initiation
of a GP SCP ‘03’
Secure Channel
Session
GP SCP ‘03’ Authentication
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
A2912
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
SD-RMAC
AA
G, E
G, E
G
Completion Status
External
Authenticate
Authenticate the
host and to
determine the level
of security required
for all subsequent
commands
GP SCP ‘03’ Authentication
A2912
SD-SENC
SD-SMAC
SD-RMAC
AA
E
E
E
Completion Status
2
Completion Status that indicates execution status result (success or error with specific reason code)
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Store Data
Transfer data to an
Application in the
GP secure channel
GP SCP ‘03’ Secure
Messaging
AES Encryption/Decryption
A2912
H-sAUTH_sk
H-Ksync
H-sAUTH_pk
H-sHOST_pk
H-sUSER_pk
AA
W
W
W
W
W
Completion Status
Manage
Session
FIPS Applet open
session and close
session
N/A
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_ECDSA_pk H-
KT_RSA_pk
UU
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Completion Status
Mutual
Authenticate
Public key
exchange leads to
key agreement
between HOST’s
operator and the
module
C(2s,2e, ECDH) Key
Agreement using Curve
P521
One Step Key Derivation
Counter Mode using
HMAC-SHA2-256
A2912
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
H-sAUTH_sk
H-eAUTH_sk
H-eD
H-Zs
H-Ze
H-SKAuthEnc
H-SKAuthMac
H-SKAuthKC
H-sAUTH_pk
H-sHOST_pk
H-sUSER_pk
H-eAUTH_pk
H-eHOST_pk
H-HsmID
H-HostID
UU
E
G, E, Z
E
G, E, Z
G, E, Z
G
G
G, E
E
E
E
G, E, Z
G, E, Z
E
W, E
Completion Status
User
Authenticate
Login on current
open session
Key Confirmation using
AES-CMAC-256
A2912
H-SKAuthEnc
H-SKAuthMac
H-SKAuthKC
H-User_pwd
UU
Z
Z
E, Z
E
Completion Status
Secure
Channel
Secure Messaging
for sensitive data
AES-256-CBC for Message
Encryption & Decryption
AES-256-CMAC for
Message Authenticity
A2912
H-SKAuthEnc
H-SKAuthMac
H-SKAuthKC
SU, CO,
KC1, KC2,
KC3, AU,
UR
E, Z
E, Z
E, Z
Completion Status
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CCMK Import
1
Import secret based
on user’s
(KeyCustodian1)
input
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
A2912
N/A CO, KC1 N/A Completion Status
CCMK Import
2
Import secret based
on user’s
(KeyCustodian2)
input
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
A2912
N/A CO, KC2 N/A Completion Status
CCMK Import
3
Import secret based
on user’s
(KeyCustodian3)
input. CCMK will be
set in this sequence
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
A2912
One Step Key Derivation
Counter Mode: AES-
CMAC-256
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
A2912
H-CCMK
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
CO, KC3
W, Z
G, Z
G, Z
Completion Status
CCMK Export
1
Export secret of
KeyCustodian1
Secret is calculated
by FIPS applet in
this case
vendor affirmed CKG
(SP800-133 Rev2)
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
A2912
H-CCMK CO, KC1 G Completion Status
CCMK Export
2
Export secret of
KeyCustodian2.
Secret is calculated
by FIPS applet in
this case
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
A2912
H-CCMK CO, KC2 E Completion Status
CCMK Export
3
Export secret of
KeyCustodian3.
Secret is calculated
by FIPS applet in
this case. CCMK
will be set in this
sequence
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 Bits for KCV
One Step Key Derivation
Counter Mode: AES-
CMAC-256
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
A2912
H-CCMK
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
CO, KC3
E
G
G
Completion Status
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Import Key
Create new key with
parameters totally
based on user’s
input.
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
CO, UR
E
E
W, E
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
Completion Status
Export Key
Export existing key
into key file with
CCMK or other
existing key
protection
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
CO, UR
E
E
R, E
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
Completion Status
Load Key
Load PERMANENT
key from LKD or
VOLATILE FOR
STORAGE key from
LKD_DP into FIPS
applet
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
CO, UR
E
E
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
Completion Status
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Diversify Key
Diversify an existing
key with user’s
choice of method
Using approved Key
Derivation Function
SP800-108
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
CO, UR
E
E
G, E
G
G, E
Completion Status
Generate Key
Create a new key
with user’s input
algorithm
Key value
randomized by
FIPS applet
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
CO, UR
E
E
G
G
G
Completion Status
Generate Key
Pair
Create a new
asymmetric key
User can freely
choose the
algorithm and curve
Key value
randomized by
FIPS applet
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
CO, UR
E
E
G
G
G
Completion Status
Generate Key
(for Split
Knowledge)
Customer key
generation
This service will
determine the
specification of key
token output from
the whole Customer
Key Ceremony
procedure
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
CO
G
G
G
Completion Status
CK Export 1
Export a secret for
customer key
creation for KCP1
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
A2912
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
CO, UR
E
E
E
Completion Status
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CK Export 2
Export a secret for
customer key
creation for KCP2
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
A2912
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
CO, UR
E
E
E
Completion Status
CK Export 3
Export a secret for
customer key
creation for KCP3
This sequence will
return KCV of
Secret and Key
Token for CK Import
procedure later on
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
AES-CMAC-256 for Key
Authenticity
A2912
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
H-CCMKMac
CO, UR
E
E
E
E
Completion Status
CK Import 1
Import secret based
on user’s (KCP1)
input
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
N/A CO, UR N/A Completion Status
CK Import 2
Import secret based
on user’s (KCP2)
input
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
N/A CO, UR N/A Completion Status
CK Import 3
Import secret and
key token based on
user’s (KCP3) input.
This sequence will
return a completed
key token to be
stored in LKD or
LKD_DP
Split knowledge procedure
and 32 bits KCV
Key Protection using
combination of approved
encryption method and
approved authentication
method in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
CO, UR
E
E
Completion Status
FIPS Applet
Store Data
This service
normally used to
store
SUPER_USER
public key within
FIPS Applet
Initialization
procedure after
SUPER_USER
change its
smartcard’s PIN
ECC CDH Key Agreement
for Key Validation
Message Digest SHA2-256
A2912
H-sHOST_pk
H-sUSER_pk
SU, CO
W
W
Completion Status
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Sync Request
Token
This service is
targeted to
SE_MASTER to
retrieve a sync
token which will be
referred on Sync
Write Token service
Key Derivation One Step
Counter Mode : AES-
CMAC-256
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
Automated SSPs
Establishment using
approved method SP800-
38F
SYNC Message Encryption:
AES-256-CBC-M2
SYNC Message
Authenticity: AES-256-
CMAC
A2912
H-KSync
H-SKSyncEnc
H-SKSyncMac
SU, CO
E
G, E, Z
G, E, Z
Completion Status
Sync Write
Token
This service will
write sync token on
SE_SLAVE. Sync
token that is written
in this service can
be retrieved from
Sync Request
Token service
Key Derivation One Step
Counter Mode: AES-
CMAC-256-M2
vendor affirmed CKG
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2]
Automated SSPs
Establishment using
approved method SP800-
38F
SYNC Message Decryption
& Encryption : AES-256-
CBC
SYNC Message
Authenticity: AES-256-
CMAC
A2912
H-KSync
H-SKSyncEnc
H-SKSyncMac
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
SU, CO
E
G, E, Z
G, E, Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Completion Status
Sync Report
This service
purpose is to
confirm that Sync
Write Token had
performed
successfully. The
target of this service
is SE_MASTER
SYNC Message
Decryption: AES-256-CBC-
M2
SYNC Message
Authenticity: AES-256-
CMAC
A2912
H-SKSyncEnc
H-SKSyncMac
SU, CO
E, Z
E, Z
Completion Status
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Crypto
Encipher
Perform encipher
on the user’s input
data
When used with an
approved encryption
algorithm in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-KT_AES
CO, UR
E
Completion Status
Crypto
Decipher
Perform decipher
on the user’s input
data
When used with an
approved decryption
algorithm in section 2.3.1
A2912
H-KT_AES
CO, UR
E
Completion Status
Crypto Sign
Create signature
based on the user’s
input data
When used with an
approved signature and
MAC algorithm in section
2.3.1
A2912
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
CO, UR
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
Completion Status
Crypto Verify
Confirm the verified
status of the user’s
signature data
When used with an
approved verification and
MAC algorithm in section
2.3.1
A2912
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
CO, UR
E
E
E
E
E
E
Completion Status
FIPS Applet
Set Config
Set FIPS applet
configuration
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
N/A CO N/A Completion Status
Profile Create Create new profile
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
N/A CO N/A Completion Status
Profile Delete
Delete non-default
profile based on
profile name input
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
N/A CO N/A Completion Status
User Create Create new user
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
H-User_pwd
H-sUSER_pk
CO
W
W
Completion Status
User Create
ADMIN
Admin creation.
This is a step during
FIPS Applet
Initialization
procedure
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
H-User_pwd
H-sUSER_pk
SU
W
W
Completion Status
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User Delete
Delete user based
on user name input
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
H-User_pwd
H-sUSER_pk
CO
Z
Z
Completion Status
User Change
Credential
Change user’s
password or user’s
public key
Service that uses
processes in approved
manner
H-User_pwd
H-sUSER_pk
SU, CO
W
W
Completion Status
User Logout Logout the user N/A
H-SKAuthEnc
H-SKAuthMac
H-SKAuthKC
SU, CO,
KC1, KC2,
KC3, AU,
UR
Z
Z
Z
Completion Status
System Reset
Reset admin user,
applet life cycle,
LKD, and LKD_DP
N/A
H-CCMK
H-CCMKEnc
H-CCMKMac
H-User_pwd
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
H-KT_AES
H-KT_3DES
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
H-KT_HMAC
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
H-KT_RSA_pk
H-sUSER_pk
SU, CO
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Completion Status
Table 10 Approved Security Services
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
- = Not accessed by the service
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Service Approved Service’s Rationale
Global Platform Services
GP Get Status Show status service as specified in the [ISO/IEC 19790] section 7.4.3
GP Get Data
Show module’s versioning information service as specified in the ISO19790:2012
section 7.4.3
GP Select There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
FIPS Applet Services
Get Info
Show module’s versioning information and Show status service as specified in the
[ISO/IEC 19790] section 7.4.3
Check Log There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Read Log There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Delete Log There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Export Log (mode 01) There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Export Log (mode 02) There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SS.
Profile View There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
User View (full) There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
User View (Admin only) There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Set Date There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
Get Data There is no intervention to the security process nor access to defined SSP
User Unblock Crypto Officer management function service
Admin Unblock Crypto Officer management function service
System Unblock Crypto Officer management function service
Table 11 Approved Services - ISO19790:2012 7.4.3 Services, Non Security-Relevant Services, or Services Using Non-
Approved Algorithm but Claiming No security
The module does not support any non-approved services.
4.3.3 Firmware Loading
The module employs GP APDU Commands i. e Load command and Install command as specified in
[GPC_Specification_v2.3] as part of GP Manage Content Services for firmware loading. Due to I/O buffer size
of the module, the firmware loading process utilizes several Load commands and Install command. Data output
is inhibited in each APDU command execution and during Load Test.
The module performs Load Test specified in the section 10.2.2 during firmware loading process. If the load
test is failed, specific Status Word of the command is returned to indicate failure on firmware loading and the
firmware cannot be used.
New firmware version within the scope of this validation must be validated through the [NIST.FIPS.140-3]
CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate
[NIST.FIPS.140-3] validation. A procedure for firmware loading is described in [FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] section
3.4.2.
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5 SOFTWARE AND FIRMWARE SECURITY
Initial firmware is loaded through a chip loader (referenced as Initial Flash Loader) and provided by Hardware
Manufacturer. The loader is used to decrypt a RookySE firmware delivered in an encrypted firmware. Once
full firmware is received and deciphered, a final checksum is sent to the Flash Loader to compare against the
internal computed checksum.
From the RookySE firmware, OS checksum can be verified through a GP GET DATA command on DGI DF6E.
During this command, the checksum is recalculated on the OS memory range. In case of memory corruption,
the card might trigger a security event. OS checksum is checked using a 16-bit EDC and compared against a
stored value in NVM.
Beside OS Firmware verification, the module also ensures the Applet Packages integrity by computing a
CRC16 on each package, and comparing against stored values. The laters are computed during application
loading and stored as references. Upon a failed checksum verification, the OS Firmware will trigger a security
event.
The operator can perform a warm or cold reset to check OS integrity and NVM (applet packages) integrity is
valid or not as specified in section 10.1.1 integrity self test.
5.1 Form of Executable Code
The module consists of several components that have different forms of executable code. The following table
shows the form of each component:
Component Sub Components Form
OS
Native Application
A binary code written in c and assembly language
running on Hardware’s CPU
Built-in Card Manager A binary code written in Java running on JCVM
FIPS Applet
FIPS Applet A binary code written in Java running on JCVM
Rooky Common Package A binary code written in Java running on JCVM
Table 12 Form of Executable Code
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational self-tests on demand by power cycling the module.
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Not Applicable
(Remarks. The module is designated as a limited operational environment under the [NIST.FIPS.140-3]
definitions. The module includes a firmware load process (GP Manage Content service) to support necessary
updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
[NIST.FIPS.140-3] CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and
requires a separate [NIST.FIPS.140-3] validation.)
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7 PHYSICAL SECURITY
The module is a single-chip implementation that meets commercial-grade specifications for power,
temperature, reliability, and shock/vibrations.
The following table shows the physical security mechanisms that are implemented in the module and the
actions required by the operator(s) to ensure that the physical security is maintained:
Physical Security Mechanism
Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test
Guidance Details
Tamper-evident coating on chip
The module implements a secure wiring: all
security critical wires are protected by special
routing measures against probing.
Additionally, the wires are embedded into
shield lines and used as normal lines for
operation to prevent successful probing
Whenever a physical manipulation or physical
probing attack is detected, the processing of
the module is stopped, and the module enters
a secure state (reset)
Permanently active, the
detection is automatic
N/A
Memory Protection
All memories present on the module (Flash,
ROM, RAM) are encrypted, memory
addresses are scrambled and data
transferred over bus are masked.
Furthermore, RAM, Flash and Cache
integrity are protected with error detection
mechanisms
In case of security critical error, the module
enters a secure state (reset)
Permanently active, the
detection is automatic
N/A
Sensors
The module is equipped with a temperature
sensor, a voltage sensor, a frequency sensor
and backside light detection. The module
enters a secure state in case of range
violation (reset)
Permanently active, the
detection is automatic
N/A
Table 13 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
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The following table shows temperature and voltage measurement for EFP that is required for modules with
physical Security Level 3:
Temperature or
voltage
measurement
Specify EFP
11
or EFT
Specify if this
condition results in
a shutdown or
zeroisation
Low Temperature -25°C
EFT Shutdown
High Temperature +85°C EFT Shutdown
Low Voltage 1.40V < Vcc < 1.62V EFT Shutdown
High Voltage 5.5V < Vcc < 7.9V EFT Shutdown
Table 14 EFP/EFT
The following table shows hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the module's
intended temperature range of operation:
Hardness tested temperature measurement
Low Temperature -25°C
High Temperature +85°C
Table 15 Hardness Testing Temperature Range
8 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY
Not Applicable
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9 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETER MANAGEMENT
9.1 SSP Management
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS – OS
OS-DRBG-SEED
Entropy input and
nonce provided by the
ENT (P)
N/A ENT (P)
Generated by a call
to ENT when the
DRBG is instantiated
or when a reseed is
required
N/A N/A
Plaintext/
dynamic in
RAM (Stack)
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on power cycle
or when no
longer used
Used to seed the
Approved DRBG
OS-DRBG-STATE
The current AES‐
256 CTR_DRBG state
N/A N/A
Generated every
time DRBG is
generated
N/A N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic in RAM
(Global)
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on power cycle
or when no
longer used
Store the state of
CTR_DRBG
SD-KENC
Master Encryption
Security Domain key
AES Key
Mode: N/A (only
derivation)
AES-256
AES
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command STORE
DATA or PUT KEY
through GP SCP ‘03’
at Manufacturing, and
also later, IN USE
phase
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static in
persistent
memory of the
Module at
manufacturing
stage
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
APDU
Command GP
Delete Key
Master key used to
generate SD‐SENC
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
SD-KMAC
Master MAC Security
Domain key
AES Key
Mode: N/A (only
derivation)
AES-256
AES
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command STORE
DATA or PUT KEY
through GP SCP ‘03’
at Manufacturing
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static in
persistent
memory of the
Module at
manufacturing
stage
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
APDU
Command GP
Delete Key
Master key used to
generate SD‐SMAC
SD-KDEK
Master DEK Security
Domain key
AES Key
Mode: N/A (only
derivation)
AES-256
AES
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command STORE
DATA or PUT KEY
through GP SCP ‘03’
at Manufacturing
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static in
persistent
memory of the
Module at
manufacturing
stage
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
APDU
Command GP
Delete Key
Sensitive data decry
ption key used to de
crypt CSPs (SD-
KENC, SD-KMAC,
SD-KDEK, DAP-
AES)
SD-SENC
GP Secure Channel
Session Encryption Key
AES Key
Mode: CBC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated
during Secure
Channel
opening (in
InitUpdate
command) using
approved key
generation
function (CKG)
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile Native
Key Object
(RAM) inside
the Module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Power_ON or
applet selection
Session encryption k
ey used to encrypt /
decrypt secure chan
nel data
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
SD-SMAC
GP Secure Channel
Session Command
MAC Key
AES Key,
Mode: CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated
during Secure
Channel
opening (in
InitUpdate
command) using
approved key
generation
function (CKG)
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile Native
Key Object
(RAM) inside
the Module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Power_ON or
applet selection
Session MAC key us
ed to verify inbound
secure channel data
integrity
SD-RMAC
GP Secure Channel
Session Response
MAC Key
AES Key
Mode: CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated
during Secure
Channel
opening (in
InitUpdate
command) using
approved key
generation
function (CKG)
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile Native
Key Object
(RAM) inside
the Module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Power_ON or
applet selection
Session MAC key us
ed to generate respo
nse secure channel
data MAC
DAP-AES
Data Authentication
Pattern AES Key
AES Key
Mode: CMAC
AES-128
AES
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command PUT KEY
through GP SCP ‘03’
at Manufacturing
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/static
as persistent
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the ISD
inside the
Module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
APDU
Command GP
Delete Key
Used to calculate
signature (MAC) of
loaded package for
firmware loading
CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS – FIPS APPLET on RookySE
H-sAUTH_sk Curve
P-521
KAS-
ECC
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command ‘Store
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
Overwrite with
all zeros value
Used in the Key
Agreement together
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
System Authentication
Static Private Key
EC Private Key
A2912 Data’ that is
authenticated and
protected using GP
SCP ‘03’ level 3
(Encrypted and MAC)
on:
Personalization at
Manufacturing
Firmware Loading
process to upgrade
version of new
validated FIPS Applet
I/O type: electronic
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
with HOST
Authentication Static
Public Key (H-
sHOST_pk) or User
Authentication Static
Public Key (H-
sUSER_pk) to
generate shared
secret H-Zs
H-eAUTH_sk
System Authentication
Ephemeral Private Key
EC Private Key
Curve
P-521
CKG
KAS-
ECC
A2912
Generated using
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation function
(CKG) on
Mutual Authenticate
service
N/A N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as JCVM
Key Object
owned by the
FIPS Applet
inside the
Module as
volatile data
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Destroy on
shared secret H-
Ze generation.
Any failure
during mutual
authentication
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with HOST
Authentication
Ephemeral Public
Key (H-eHOST_pk)
to generate shared
secret H-Ze
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
H-Zs
Shared secret Zs
66 bytes of secret data
N/A
KAS-
ECC
A2912
N/A N/A
Established in
the Key
Agreement
(A2912)
between H-
sAUTH_sk and
H-sUSER_pk if
authentication
method is
smartcard-
based or H-
sHOST_pk if
authentication
method is
password-based
on Mutual
Authenticate
service
Plaintext/Dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
After Key
Derivation
Any failure
during
authentication
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Combined with H-Ze
to construct secret Z
used in Key
Derivation to
generate session
keys H-SKAuthEnc,
H-SKAuthMac, H-
SKAuthKC on
successful user
authentication
H-Ze
Shared secrets Ze
66 bytes of secret data
N/A
KAS-
ECC
A2912
N/A N/A
Established in
the Key
Agreement
(A2912)
between H-
eAUTH_sk and
H-eHOST_pk
on
Mutual
Authenticate
service
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
After Key
Derivation
Any failure
during
authentication
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Combined with H-Zs
to construct secret Z
used in Key
Derivation to
generate session
keys H-SKAuthEnc,
H-SKAuthMac, H-
SKAuthKC on
successful user
authentication
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
H-SKAuthEnc
Encryption Secure
Channel Session Key
AES Key
Mode: CBC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated using
approved key
generation
(CKG) using
derivation from
Key Agreement
Scheme
followed by One
Step KDF in
counter mode
with (H-Zs ||H-
Ze) as message
in the process
on Mutual
Authenticate
service
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Any failure
during User
authentication
Error secure
messaging in
secure channel
User logging out
Close Session
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used to encrypt and
decrypt the
message for secure
messaging in the
Secure Channel
H-SKAuthMac
MAC Secure Channel
Session Key
AES Key
Mode: CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated using
approved key
generation
(CKG) using
derivation from
Key Agreement
Scheme
followed by One
Step KDF
counter mode
with (H-Zs ||H-
Ze) as message
in the process
on Mutual
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Any failure
during User
authentication
Error secure
messaging in
secure channel
User logging out
Close Session
Used to calculate
MAC of the
message for secure
messaging in the
Secure Channel
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
Authenticate
service On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
H-SKAuthKC
Key Confirmation
Secure Channel
Session Key
AES Key
Mode: CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Generated using
approved key
generation
(CKG) using
derivation from
Key Agreement
Scheme
followed by One
Step KDF
counter mode
with (H-Zs ||H-
Ze) as message
in the process
on Mutual
Authenticate
service
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Any failure
during User
authentication
Error secure
messaging in
secure channel
User logging out
Close Session
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used for bilateral
key confirmation
including for
generating
UserToken from
username, {H-
User_pwd}, H-
HsmID, H-HostID,
H-eAUTH_pk , and
H-eHOST_pk in the
authentication
process
Used to generate
IVs for Message
Encryption /
Decryption for
secure messaging in
Secure Channel
H-CCMK
Crypto Card Master
Key
AES Key
Mode: N/A (only
derivation)
AES-256
CKG
AES
DRBG
KDF
A2912
Generated internally
using approved CKG
(Direct Generation of
Symmetric Key) and
split into 3 secrets on
Export CCMK
services
Exported and
encrypted through
secure channel using
split knowledge
procedure on Export
CCMK services
Imported through
secure channel using
Established from
three different
secrets from
three different
key custodians
through secure
channel on
Import CCMK
services
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
System Reset
service
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
Used as master key
to derrive H-
CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
split knowledge
procedure on Import
CCMK services
I/O type: electronic
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
H-CCMKEnc
Encryption Derived
CCMK Key
AES Key
Mode : CBC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Derived from
pre-existing key
H-CCMK using
one step KDF
counter mode
on successful
completion of 3
secrets export or
import
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
System Reset
service
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
Used to
encrypt/decrypt key
token for Key
Protection
H-CCMKMac
MAC Derived CCMK
Key
AES Key
Mode : CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Derived from
pre-existing key
H-CCMK using
one step KDF
counter mode
on successful
completion of 3
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
System Reset
service
Personalization
at Manufacturing
Used to calculate
MAC of key token as
part of token for Key
Protection
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Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
secrets export or
import
non-volatile
data
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
H-KSync
Synchronization Master
Key
AES Key
Mode: N/A (only
derivation)
AES-256
KDF
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command ‘Store
Data’ that is
authenticated and
protected using GP
SCP ‘03’ level 3
(Encrypted and MAC)
on:
Personalization at
Manufacturing
Firmware Loading
process to upgrade
version of new
validated FIPS Applet
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static in
persistent byte
array owned by
FIPS Applet
inside the
module
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
Used as master key
to derive H-
SKSyncEnc and H-
SKSyncMac for
Synchronization
Session Keys
H-SKSyncEnc
Encryption
Synchronization
Session Key
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Derived from
pre-existing key
H-KSync using
one step KDF
counter mode
with incremental
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
Any failure
during
Used to
encrypt/decrypt
SYNC Token using
Automated SSP
Establishment Key
Transport in
47/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
AES Key
Mode: CBC
SYNC session
counter as part
of the message
on every
synchronization
initiation (SYNC
Request Token
service in
System
MASTER and
SYNC Write
Token service in
System SLAVE)
synchronization
session
After
synchronization
session
completed
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
synchronization
process
H-SKSyncMac
MAC Synchronization
Session Key
AES Key
Mode: CMAC
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
N/A N/A
Derived from
pre-existing key
H-KSync using
one step KDF
counter mode
with incremental
SYNC session
counter as part
of the message
on every
synchronization
initiation (SYNC
Request Token
service in
System
MASTER and
SYNC Write
Token service in
System SLAVE)
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by FIPS
Applet inside
the module
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
Any failure
during
synchronization
session
After
synchronization
session
completed
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used to calculate
MAC of SYNC
Token using
Automated SSP
Establishment Key
Transport in
synchronization
process
H-User_pwd Maximum 16
char AES N/A
Imported along with
username via User
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static in
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
Used as part of
credential data to
48/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
User’s password
credential
Maximum 16
characters
KAS-
ECC
A2912
Create service
through secure
channel
Updated the old
password with new
password via User
Change Password
service through
secure channel
I/O type: electronic
persistent byte
array owned by
FIPS Applet
inside the
module
System Reset
User deletion
Synchronization
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
generate User
Token using H-
SKAuthKC
H-KT_ECDSA_PAIR
Key Token ECDSA
PAIR
ECC Key Pair
Curve P-192
Curve P-224
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
CKG
ECDSA
A2912
Generated using
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation function
(CKG) on
Generate Key
service
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
H-
KT_ECDSA_PAIR
can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
Public Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
49/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
Crypto operation via
Crypto Verify service
Private Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Sign service
H-
KT_ECDSA_PAIR
with Curve P-192
can only be used for
signature verification
and not for signature
generation
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
Key Token ECDSA
PRIVATE
ECC Private Key
Curve P-192
Curve P-224
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
ECDSA
A2912
N/A
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
H-KT_ECDSA_sk
can be stored
outside the system
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
All curves (except
curve P-192) of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Sign service
50/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
- Sync write
token
H-KT_AES
Key Token AES
AES Key
Mode: CBC
AES-128
AES-192
AES-256
CKG
AES
A2912
Generated internally
using approved
Generate Key
service (CKG) –
Direct Generation of
Symmetric Key
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
H-KT_AES also
can be
generated from
Diversify Key
service using
KDF Counter
mode with
approved
MasterKey (H-
KT_AES or H-
KT_HMAC)
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
H-KT_AES can be
stored outside the
System module
protected by H-
CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
H-KT_AES can be
used to protect
another key token
for external key
storage (outside of
System Module).
This key token can
be used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Cipher,
Crypto Decipher
service.
H-KT_RSA_CRT_PAIR
Key Token RSA CRT
PAIR
RSA CRT Key Pair
Mode: PSS or PKSC1
RSA-1024
RSA-2048
RSA-3072
RSA-4096
CKG
RSA
A2912
Generated using
RSA Key Pair
Generation function
(CKG) on approved
Generate Key
service
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
H-
KT_RSA_CRT_PAI
R can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
51/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
Public Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Verify
service.
Private Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Sign service.
(Key Token RSA-
1024 can only be
used for signature
verification)
H-
KT_RSA_SFM_PAIR
Key Token RSA SFM
PAIR
RSA SFM Key Pair
Mode: PSS or PKSC1
RSA-1024
RSA-2048
RSA-3072
RSA-4096
CKG
RSA
A2912
Generated using
RSA Key Pair
Generation function
(CKG) on approved
Generate Key
service
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service.
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
H-
KT_RSA_SFM_PAI
R can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
52/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
Public Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Verify
service.
Private Key of this
key token can be
used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Sign service.
(Key Token RSA-
1024 can only be
used for signature
verification)
H-KT_RSA_CRT_sk
Key Token RSA CRT
PRIVATE
RSA CRT Private Key
Mode: PSS or PKSC1
RSA-1024
RSA-2048
RSA-3072
RSA-4096
RSA
A2912
N/A
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
H-
KT_RSA_CRT_sk
can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
Key Token RSA
Private can be used
to perform Crypto
53/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
operation via Crypto
sign service
(For Crypto sign,
key token RSA
Private 1024 is
excluded)
H-KT_RSA_SFM_sk
Key Token RSA SFM
PRIVATE
RSA SFM Private Key
Mode: PSS or PKSC1
RSA-1024
RSA-2048
RSA-3072
RSA-4096
RSA
A2912
N/A
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
H-
KT_RSA_SFM_sk
can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
Key Token RSA
Private can be used
to perform Crypto
operation via Crypto
sign service.
(For Crypto sign,
key token RSA
Private 1024 is
excluded)
H-KT_HMAC HMAC-64
HMAC-128
HMAC-160
HMAC-224
CKG
HMAC
Generated internally
using approved
Generate Key
Imported via Import
Key service and
H-KT_HMAC
also can be
generated from
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
H-KT_HMAC can be
stored outside the
System module
54/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
Key Token HMAC
HMAC Key
HMAC-256
HMAC-320
HMAC-384
HMAC-512
A2912 service (CKG) –
Direct Generation of
Symmetric Key
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
Diversify Key
service using
KDF Counter
mode with
approved
MasterKey (H-
KT_AES or H-
KT_HMAC)
inside the
System module
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
protected by H-
CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES).
This key token can
be used to perform
Crypto operation via
Crypto Sign and
Crypto Verify
service;
HMAC-64 is used
only for verification
(not HMAC
generation)
PUBLIC SECURITY PARAMETER
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
Key Token ECDSA
PUBLIC
ECC Public Key
Curve P-192
Curve P-224
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
ECDSA
A2912
N/A
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
H-KT_ECDSA_pk
can be stored
outside the System
module protected by
H-CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
This key token can
be used to perform
Crypto operation
Crypto Verify service
55/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
- Manage
session
Sync write token
H-KT_RSA_pk
Key Token RSA
PUBLIC
RSA Public Key
Mode: PSS or PKSC1
RSA-1024
RSA-2048
RSA-3072
RSA-4096
RSA
A2912
N/A
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
H-KT_RSA_pk can
be stored outside
the System module
protected by H-
CCMKEnc and H-
CCMKMac, or by
approved symmetric
key token (H-
KT_AES)
Key Token RSA
Public can be used
to perform Crypto
operation via Crypto
Verify service.
Key Token RSA-
1024 Public can only
be used for
signature verification
H-sAUTH_pk
System Authentication
Static Public Key
EC Public Key
Curve
P-521
KAS-
ECC
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command ‘Store
Data’ that is
authenticated and
protected using GP
SCP ‘03’ level 3
(Encrypted and MAC)
on:
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with HOST
Authentication Static
Private Key or User
Authentication Static
Private Key to
generate shared
secret in H-Zs in the
client side
56/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
Personalization at
Manufacturing
Firmware Loading
process to upgrade
version of new
validated FIPS Applet
Exported using
System Get Data
Service through
Secure Channel
I/O type: electronic
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
H-sHOST_pk
HOST Authentication
Static Public Key
EC Public Key
Curve
P-521
KAS-
ECC
A2912
N/A
Imported using APDU
Command ‘Store
Data’ that is
authenticated and
protected using GP
SCP ‘03’ level 3
(Encrypted and MAC)
on:
Personalization at
Manufacturing
Firmware Loading
process to upgrade
version of new
validated FIPS Applet
Exported using
System Get Data
N/A
Plaintext/static
as JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with System
Authentication Static
Private Key (H-
sAUTH_sk) to
generate shared
secret H-Zs
57/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
Service through
Secure Channel
I/O type: electronic
H-sUSER_pk
User Authentication
Static Public Key
EC Public Key
Curve
P-521
KAS-
ECC
A2912
N/A
Imported via User
Create service
through secure
channel (for all users
except Super User)
Personalized at
Manufacturing
through GP SCP ‘03’
level 3 (only
applicable for Super
User’s Public Key)
Updated using
System Store Data
service through
secure channel (only
applicable for Super
User’s Public Key)
Exported using
System Get Data
Service through
Secure Channel (only
applicable for Super
User’s Public Key)
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext(obfus
cated)/static as
JCVM Key
Object owned
by the FIPS
Applet inside
the Module as
non-volatile
data
Overwrite with
all zeros on:
System Reset
User deletion
Synchronization
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with System
Authentication Static
Private Key (H-
sAUTH_sk) to
generate shared
secret H-Zs
58/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
H-eAUTH_pk
System Authentication
Ephemeral Public Key
EC Public Key
Curve
P-521
CKG
ECDSA
A2912
Generated using
ECDSA Key Pair
Generation function
(CKG) on Mutual
Authenticate service
Returned to the user
as part of response
data of Mutual
Authenticate service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as JCVM
Key Object
owned by the
FIPS Applet
inside the
Module as
volatile data
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Any failure
during mutual
authentication
Successful user
authentication
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with HOST
Authentication
Ephemeral Private
Key to generate
shared secret in H-
Ze in the client side
H-eHOST_pk
HOST / SMA
Authentication
Ephemeral Public Key
EC Public Key
Curve
P-521
KAS-
ECC
KDF
A2912
N/A
Imported through
Mutual Authenticate
service
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic as JCVM
Key Object
owned by the
FIPS Applet
inside the
Module as
volatile data
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Any failure
during mutual
authentication
Successful user
authentication
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used in the Key
Agreement together
with System
Authentication
Ephemeral Private
Key (H-eAUTH_sk)
to generate shared
secret H-Ze
H-HsmID
Predefined System
Identification data
N/A
KDF
A2912
N/A Pre-defined value N/A
Plaintext/static
in persistent
byte array
owned by the
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
Used as FixedInfo
data in Key
Confirmation and
UserToken
59/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
FIPS Applet
inside the
Module
Personalization
at Manufacturing
by erasing all
data in NVM
Firmware
Loading Process
using APDU
Command
Delete Package
and Instance
H-HostID
HOST Identification
data
N/A
KDF
A2912
N/A
Imported as part of
mutual authenticate
service’s incoming
data
I/O type: electronic
N/A
Plaintext/dyna
mic in transient
byte array
owned by the
FIPS Applet
inside the
Module
Overwrite with
all zeros value
on:
On RESET
(Warm/Cold)
Used as FixedInfo
data in Key
Confirmation and
UserToken
OTHER PARAMETERS (not considered as SSPs but included here for completeness)
H-KT_3DES
Key Token DES
DES Key
TDES-64
TDES-128
TDES-192
CKG
Generated internally
using approved CKG
(Direct Generation of
Symmetric Key) in
Generate Key
service
Imported via Import
Key service and
Exported via Export
Key service
I/O type: electronic
H-KT_3DES
also can be
generated from
Diversify Key
service using
KDF Counter
mode with
approved
MasterKey (H-
KT_AES or H-
KT_HMAC)
Plaintext/dyna
mic as a
volatile data
inside the
System module
Key token data
will be zeroised
when the user is
blocked, System
is blocked or
terminated, and
device reset
(warm/cold).
Also when the
following
services are
executed:
Needed by some
product outside the
cryptographic
module for
compatibility
purpose.
60/73
FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
Key/SSP Name/ Type Strength
Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Generation Import /Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
- System Reset
- Manage
session
- Sync write
token
OS-MKEK
Key Encryption Key
AES Key
(Not a SSP but list here
for completeness)
AES-128 CKG
Generated using
approved CKG
(Direct Generation of
Symmetric Key)
function as described
in SP800-90
N/A N/A
Plaintext/static
in persistent
memory of the
Module at
manufacturing
stage
Key is erased
upon Card
Manager
lifecycle
switched to
TERMINATED
(Overwrite with
all zeros)
Master Key
used to encrypt (obf
uscate)
storage of CSPs
Table 16 SSPs
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9.2 SSPs Access
SSPs are securely stored in the Cryptographic Module, a secure element hardware that is considered as
secure enclave. The SSPs stored in the module is associated and accessible only via approved services as
you can see in this section. The approved services itself are associated and accessible to some specific roles
as described in the table section 4.3.1.
9.3 Random Bit Generator (RBG)
The RBG source within this module is from entropy source with tittle “ENT (P)” in the Table Approved
Algorithm.
Entropy sources
Minimum number of
bits of entropy
Details
Hardware-TRNG
Minimum entropy of
2.800831 bits per byte
The Entropy Source is a hardware module
inside the CM boundary. The Entropy Source
supplies the DRBG with more than 92 bytes
Since the entropy source provides a min
entropy output of at least 2.800831 bits of min
entropy per byte, this is sufficient to obtain 256
bits of security strength
Table 17 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
The TRNG (or entropy source) output is used to seed DRBG. The use of DRBG output in the module are
described below:
1. Generate random number for initial Nonce for key protection by CCMK during FIPS Applet Installation
2. Generate key for CCMK in “CCMK Export 1” service
3. Generate random numbers for Split procedure in “CCMK export” services and “Generate Key (for Split
Knowledge)” service
4. Generate key for Customer key in “Generate Key (for Split Knowledge)” service
5. Generate key for Symmetric Key in “Generate Key” Service
6. Generate key for Asymmetric Key (RSA and EC Key pair) in “Generate Key Pair” Service
7. Ephemeral EC Key Generation during Key Agreement in the Mutual Authentication service
8. Utilized in Cipher process of RSA PKCS and PSS
9. Utilized in Signature Generation process using ECDSA
10. Utilized to generate card challenge in GP Initialize Update command
11. Utilized in GP Put Key Command
12. Utilized in the creation of OS-MKEK
The approved services that uses DRBG are listed in the section 4.3.2 with link to “DRBG”.
9.4 SSP Zeroization
For all SSP, an implicit indicator that the zeroization is completed is provided. This indicator is the successful
completion of the requested service for SSP zeroized through a dedicated command (the command is
indicated in column “zeroization” of Table 16 SSPs) or Answer-to-RESET (ATR) in case of module reset. For
SSP that are automatically zeroized (e.g H-Zs and H-Ze), the implicit indicator is the completion of the
command mentioned in Table 16 SSPs with a correct status or an error status.
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10SELF-TESTS
The module has several self-tests that are triggered at pre-operational (manufacturing stage, power on, or
prior to its first use), on demand, conditionally, and periodically.
If any self-test fails other than the pairwise consistency, manual entry test, and firmware load test in the
conditional self-test, the module will enter in the Kill Card state and emit an error code that identifies the type
of test that failed. No further communication with the module is possible until the module is reset (Power-On).
If it happens several times and reaches the error limit, the module will be terminated.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
This section describes pre-operational self-test executed at startup (power on).
10.1.1 Pre-Operational Software/Firmware Integrity Test
The software/firmware integrity is verified using a 16-bit EDC, referred to as CRC-16 hereafter.
Test Target Description
NVM Integrity CRC-16 performed over all executable (JavaCard packages) in NVM
ROM Code Integrity CRC-16 performed over all ROM code
Table 18 Integrity Self-Test Target
10.1.2 Pre-Operational Critical Functions Test
This critical function self-test is performed in every power on before executing integrity self-test.
Test Target Description
CRC-16 Computes CRC-16 from a fixed message and checks the result (a critical function
test)
TRNG Performs Hardware True Random Number Generator tests
DRBG Performs a fixed input KAT of CTR_DRBG instantiate and generate functions
Table 19 Critical Function Self-test
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module will automatically trigger specific self-test in some conditions. There are several types of
conditional self-tests that are employed by the module described in the following section.
10.2.1 Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Test
The module employs Known Answer Test (KAT) to perform Cryptographic Algorithm Self-test. For
performance concern, not all algorithm are executed in the startup (power on) but prior to its first use.
Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test method Type Indicator Details
Condition
s
Coverag
e
Coverag
e Notes
Period
Periodic
Method
CRC-16 CRC-16 bit KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
CRC
Power
On
- -
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
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Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test method Type Indicator Details
Condition
s
Coverag
e
Coverag
e Notes
Period
Periodic
Method
KillCar
d State
AES-
CBC
AES, 128-
bit,
Covered by
CAST on KDF-
CMAC
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Encrypt
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
AES-
CBC
AES, 128-
bit,
Covered by
CAST on AES
ECB
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Decrypt
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
AES-
ECB
AES, 128-
bit, ECB
Covered by
CAST on KDF-
CMAC
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Encrypt
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
AES-
ECB
AES, 128-
bit, ECB
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Decrypt
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
DRBG
CTR_DRB
G
AES 256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
DRBG
CTR_DRB
G
AES 256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Instantiate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
DRBG
CTR_DRB
G
AES 256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Reseed
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
HMAC
HMAC SHA-
1, 128-bit
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
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Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test method Type Indicator Details
Condition
s
Coverag
e
Coverag
e Notes
Period
Periodic
Method
SHA2-
224
Covered by
CAST on SHA2-
256 – bit
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
SHA2-
256
SHA2-256
– bit
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
SHA2-
384
Covered by
CAST on SHA2-
512 – bit
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
SHA2-
512
SHA2-512-
bit
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
SHA-3
SHA3-512-
bit
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
KDF
KDF,
AES CMAC
128 -bit
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Generate
Power
On
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
ECDSA P-224 curve KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
signature
generation
,
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
ECDSA P-224 curve KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Signature
verification
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
RSA
PSS
2048-bit
RSA-STD
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
signature
generation
STD
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
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Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test method Type Indicator Details
Condition
s
Coverag
e
Coverag
e Notes
Period
Periodic
Method
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
RSA
PSS
2048-bit
RSA-CRT
PSS with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
signature
generation
CRT
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
RSA
PSS
2048-bit
RSA PSS
with SHA2-
256
KAT CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
Signature
verification
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
RSA
PKCS 1
V1.5
2048-bit
RSA-STD
PSS with
SHA2-256
Covered by
CAST on RSA-
PSS
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
signature
generation
STD
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
RSA
PKCS 1
V1.5
2048-bit
RSA-CRT
PSS with
SHA2-256
Covered by
CAST on RSA-
PSS
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d State
signature
generation
CRT
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
RSA
PKCS 1
V1.5
2048-bit
RSA-PSS
with SHA2-
256
Covered by CAST
on RSA-PSS
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d state
Signature
verification
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
KAS-
ECC
KDF
Covered by
CAST on
ECDSA, KDF
and
AES CMAC 128
-bit
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d state
Generate First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
KTS
AES-CBC
& AES
CMAC 128
-bit
Covered by-
CAST on AES-
CBC and AES-
CMAC.
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
KillCar
d state
- First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
AES
CMAC AES CMAC
128 -bit
Covered by
CAST on KDF
CAST
Pass:
Next
test
Fail:
Module
in
Encryption
(Verify
uses
encryption
)
First Use
Cert
#A2912
IG
10.3.A
2.097.15
1
On
Deman
d &
Auto
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Algorith
m or Test
Test
Properties
Test method Type Indicator Details
Condition
s
Coverag
e
Coverag
e Notes
Period
Periodic
Method
KillCar
d state
Table 20 CM Conditional CAST
10.2.2 Conditional Software/Firmware Load Test
The module relies on DAP Verification specified in [GPC_Specification_v2.3] section 9.2.1. The employed
DAP Verification for Load Test is using AES-CMAC as approved data authentication technique to verify the
validity of the firmware that is loaded. The AES Key with 128 bits key length (DAP-AES) is loaded at
manufacturing stage used as authentication key to calculate the MAC of the loaded firmware.
10.2.3 Conditional Pair-Wise Consistency Test
When the module generating RSA and ECC Key Pair via ‘Generate Key Pair’ service, the module performs
pairwise consistency test using sign and verify of known value technique. If pairwise consistency test is failed
the module returns error code value ‘D6’ indicating error in Generate Key Service with reason pair-wise
consistency self-test is failed. On five consecutive errors, the module will enter blocked state. An exit procedure
from this state is described in [FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] section 7.3.
10.2.4 Conditional Manual Entry Test
The module performs manual entry self-test on some services such as “CCMK Import” services done by each
key custodian to enter each secret of CCMK and “CK Import” services done by each customer key custodian
enter secrets of customer key. Those operators enter KCV along with its secret. The module performs manual
entry self-test by comparing entered KCV and calculated KCV of given secret. If the entered KCV does not
match with calculated KCV, the manual entry test is failed with error code ‘D7’. On five consecutive errors, the
module enters blocked state. An exit procedure from this state is described in [FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] section
7.3.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test
The module provides a periodic self-test that is executed in every certain number of FIPS Applet service
execution. This number is configured on FIPS Applet installation with 2,097,151 as default value. This periodic
self-test executes the self-test described in the section 10.1. Data output is inhibited during self-test execution.
Only power reset, Hard-fault, procedure NULL (‘60’) byte in ISO7816 interface, and check alive command in
SPI can interrupt the process. If it’s interrupted by the Hard-fault, the module enters error state of the hardware
and requires power reset to exit from this state.
10.4 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The module permits operators to initiate the pre-operational self-tests on demand by power cycling the module.
10.5 Error States
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
KillCard State
(Low-level
Error State)
A state that indicates the module
is in security state. Module at this
state can no longer communicate
till a power reset (cold or warm)
is performed
Pre-Operational Self-
Tests Failure
Power
cycle
Muted
Device
Conditional
Cryptographic Algorithm
Test Failure
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Periodic Self-Test
Failure
Table 21 Error States
11LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE
11.1 Installation, Initialization and Startup Procedure
The module is delivered as single chip to the customer where its life cycle state is in SYSTEM
INITIALIAZATION state. The customer shall follow below procedures for secure installation, initialization,
startup and operation of the module:
1. The installation procedure of the module that supports two physical interface ISO7816 T0 protocol and
SPI Protocol are described as follow:
a. Each ISO7816 physical port defined in section 3.1.1 must be installed correctly by connecting
each ISO port (VCC, GND, RST, CLK, IO) of the module to the corresponding ISO Reader’s
port or terminal’s port. Electrical characteristics in each connected port, signal sequence in
activation and deactivation, and transmission protocol shall follow [ISO/IEC 7816-3].
b. Each SPI physical port defined in section 3.1.2 must be installed correctly by connecting each
SPI port (VCC, GND, RST, SPI_CLK, SPI_MISO, SPI_MOSI, SPI_CS) of the module to the
corresponding SPI Reader’s port or SPI master device’s port. Electrical characteristics in each
connected port and its transmission protocol shall follow chip manufacturer datasheet.
2. All module components specified in section 2.1.2 are already installed in the manufacturing. The
configuration is set to FIPS Certified Product (FCP).
3. In the SYSTEM INITIALIZATION state:
a. Super User shall create new credential and replace its default credential in the module.
b. Then, Super User shall create new Administrator role in the module.
When this procedure is successfully done, the module state is automatically changed to KEY
CEREMONY state.
4. In the KEY CEREMONY state:
a. Administrator shall create new roles for Auditor and three Key Custodians role.
b. Then, Administrator shall initiate KEY CEREMONY session together with three Key
Custodians to import or export CCMK of the module using split knowledge procedure.
c. After that Administrator shall confirm either to keep the configuration still in FIPS Certified
Product (FCP) or not. Please note that if Administrator is answering no, then the module will
loose its FIPS Certified status. Customer cannot revert to FIPS Certified status unless the
module is returned at IDEMIA to be erased and personalized with new SSPs. It is
recommended for customer to perform System Reset before returning the module to the
IDEMIA.
When this procedure is successfully done, the module state is automatically changed to System USER
(operational) state.
5. When the module is in operational state and configured as FIPS Certified Product (FCP):
a. Only approved mode of operation is available for users. In this mode of operation, only
approved services in section 4.3.2 is available for users.
b. Only applet that is already validated under [NIST.FIPS.140-3] evaluation shall be loaded and
installed in the module. Otherwise, the module will loose its FIPS certified status. This is not
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automatically enforced by the module but must be obeyed by following procedure defined in
[FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] section 3.4.2.
6. The module does not support maintenance role.
7. The Administrator shall update current date of the module. It is strongly recommended to update the
current date of the module on daily basis.
8. Detailed information about module life cycle state and procedures for initialization and operation of the
module at customer side, and the procedure to keep the module still in FIPS are described in document
[FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] for Crypto Officer Role and [FQR 401 9098 Ed 3] for User Role.
11.1.1 Components Version Number Retrieval Procedures
Hardware version can be retrieved with the following steps:
• The current selected application shall be the CARD MANAGER
APDU command: 00 A4 04 00 08 A0 00 00 01 51 00 00 00
• GP GET DATA command will return the hardware version under two possible DGI TAG.
o DGI ‘DF50’
APDU command: 80 CA DF 50 1B
Hardware version is in the first byte of IC Type information in the returned data
o DGI ‘DF52’
APDU command: 80 CA DF 52
Hardware version is the first byte of the returned data
• The hardware version returned from GET DATA command is act as the hardware identifier and
version at the same time
OS Firmware information can be retrieved with the following steps:
• The current selected application shall be the CARD MANAGER
APDU command: 00 A4 04 00 08 A0 00 00 01 51 00 00 00
• GP GET DATA command will return the OS firmware information under the following information:
o DGI ‘DF66’
o APDU command: 80 CA DF 66 0D
o Returned data is the OS Firmware Information
• OS Firmware Information retrieved by the GET DATA command contains the module identifier and
version number. The detail is as follow:
o Complete OS Firmware Information: ‘097153’
▪ Module Identifier: ‘09715’
▪ Version number: ‘3’
Application Firmware FIPS Applet version number can be retrieved with the following steps:
• The current selected application shall be the FIPS APPLET
APDU command: 00 A4 04 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 A1 12 58
• FRAME HSM GET INFO with tag option ‘FF’ will return the FIPS APPLET version number under tag ‘C0’
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11.2 Secure Sanitization and Destruction Procedure
Sanitization can be done by performing HSM Reset that is authorized by SUPER_USER and HSM
Administrator credentials authenticated in Admin Session. HSM Reset service will perform zeroization that is
created at customer side and set back module to Factory State like when the customer receives the module
for the first time.
For secure destruction procedure, it is recommended for customers to follow below step:
1. Under role ‘’AA” (Application Administrator) to set card manager state to TERMINATED.
2. Once, it is terminated, OS-MKEK that is used to encrypt all keys stored in the module is zeroised.
3. Once OS-MKEK is zeroised, all keys stored in the module cannot be retrieved in plaintext form. Event
encrypted form, it is difficult to those keys which are stored inside the flash on single chip component
which are protected with hard tamper-evident coating on the chip.
12MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The Module implements defenses against:
• Fault attacks: the chip includes several sensors for detecting intrusion or fault attacks. Additionally,
the operating system provides checks of expected conditions in areas of code deemed sensitive. If
an error is detected by this mechanism, a security function is initiated: the detected attack type is
logged in a table; when the number of attacks reaches a pre-set limit, the module initiates card
termination, including overwriting of the CSPs, and the module is no longer operable.
• Side-channel attacks (SPA/DPA, timing analysis): the chip implements hardware countermeasures
such that timing and current consumption are independent from processed data. The operating
system enables the hardware countermeasures and implements independent countermeasures in
code, such as constant time execution or randomized intermediate values.
• Card tearing attacks: the operating system implements methods to assure protective measures are
completed in the next cycle if the module loses power (i.e., if the power line is cut) before completion
of the protective function.
APPENDIX 1. REFERENCES
A.1 NIST References
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Reference Detail Reference
[NIST.FIPS.140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
[NIST.FIPS.180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
[NIST.FIPS.186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
[NIST.FIPS.197] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[NIST.FIPS.198-1] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
[NIST.FIPS.202]
SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions
[NIST.SP.800-38A]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques
[NIST.SP.800-38B]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode
for Authentication
[NIST.SP.800-38F]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
[NIST.SP.800-56A.Rev3]
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
[NIST.SP.800-56B.Rev2]
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
[NIST.SP.800-56C.Rev2]
Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment
Schemes
[NIST.SP.800-63b] Digital Identity Guidelines
[NIST.SP.800-67.Rev2]
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher
[NIST.SP.800-90A.Rev1]
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
[NIST.SP.800-90B] Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
[NIST.SP.800-108]
Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
(Revised)
[NIST.SP.800-131A.Rev2] Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
[NIST.SP.800-133.Rev2] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
[NIST.SP.800-140A]
CMVP Documentation Requirements: CMVP Validation Authority Updates
to ISO/IEC 24759
[NIST.SP.800-140B] CMVP Security Policy Requirements
[NIST.SP.800-140E] CMVP Approved Authentication Mechanisms
A.2 ISO/IEC References
Reference Detail Reference
[ISO/IEC 7816-3]
“Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 3: Cards with contacts -
Electrical signal and transmission protocols”. - 2006-11-01 - Third edition
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Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
REFERENCE NUMBER: ISO/IEC 7816-3:2006(E)
[ISO/IEC 7816-4]
“Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security
and commands for interchange." - 2013-04-15 - Third edition
REFERENCE NUMBER: ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013(E)
[ISO/IEC 19790]
Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for
cryptographic modules
[ISO/IEC 24759]
Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for
cryptographic modules
A.3 Global Platform References
Reference Detail Reference
[GPC_Specification_v2.3]
GlobalPlatform Card Specification
Version 2.3.1 Public Release – March 2018
Document Reference: GPC_SPE_034
[GPC_CIC]
GlobalPlatform Card - Common Implementation Configuration
Version 2.1 Member Release – July 2018
Document Reference: GPC_GUI_080
[GPC_AMD_D]
GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Secure Channel Protocol '03', Card
Specification v2.2 – Amendment D
Version 1.1.1 - Public Release July 2014
Document Reference: GPC_SPE_014
A.4 FIPS Applet on RookySE References
Reference Detail Reference
[FQR 401 9097 Ed 4] FQR 401 9097 Ed 4 - Rooky Crypto Officer Guidance
[FQR 401 9098 Ed 3] FQR 401 9098 Ed 3 - Rooky User Guidance
[FQR 401 9187 Ed 2] FQR 401 9187 Ed 2 - Rooky Delivery, Installation, and Destruction Guidance
[FQR 110 A0A1 Ed 1] FQR 110 A0A1 Ed 1 - SPI Application Note for ROOKY
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FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
APPENDIX 2. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Acronym Definition
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
LKD Local Key Database
LKD_DP Local Key Database Data Preparation
KCV Key Check Value
CCMK Crypto Card Master Key
DGI Data Grouping Identifier
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
SE Secure Element
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
GP Global Platform
RAM Random Access Memory
AdminApp Admin Application
Enc Encipher
Dec Decipher
Sig Signature
Ver Verify
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
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FIPS Applet on RookySE FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy V1.2
Revision Date: 30/09/2024
13DOCUMENT REVISIONS
Date Change
1.2 - Update table 3 for CKG and KDF to update description/key size
- Update table 16 to add CKG in some key and its used
- Update table conditional self-test
- Add new table for error states
- Add new section 11.2 Secure Sanitization and Destruction Procedure
1.1 Renaming some tables according SP800-140B; typographic errors corrections.
Change applet version.
1.0 Initial version