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FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security Policy
For
RFS7000 RF Switch
Document Version 0.6
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Motorola RFS7000 RF Switch 2
Table of Contents
1 Module Description ......................................................................................................... 3
2 Cryptographic Boundary.................................................................................................. 3
3 Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................... 4
4 Roles, Services and Authentication ................................................................................. 4
5 Security Functions ........................................................................................................... 7
6 Key Management............................................................................................................. 7
7 Self Tests.......................................................................................................................... 9
8 Physical Security.............................................................................................................. 9
9 Secure Operation............................................................................................................ 10
9.1 Approved Mode of Operation................................................................................. 10
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Motorola RFS7000 RF Switch 3
1 Module Description
The Motorola RFS7000 RF Switch is a rack-mountable device that manages all inbound
and outbound traffic on the wireless network. It provides security, network services, and
system management applications. The switch uses centralized, policy-based management
to apply sets of rules or actions to all devices on the wireless network. Management
“intelligence” is collected from individual access points, and the collected information is
moved into the centralized wireless switch.
The module is used to control operation of multiple wireless access points and to provide
secure Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) connectivity to a set of wireless client
devices. The module is installed at a wired network location, and is connected to a set of
wireless access point devices over a wired Ethernet network. Wireless access point
devices are hardware radio devices, which do not provide security functionalities and are
used to tunnel wireless network traffic between the module and wireless client devices.
The module protects data exchanged with wireless client devices using IEEE 802.11i
wireless security protocol, which provides data protection using the AES-CCM
cryptographic algorithm.
For the purposes of FIPS 140-2 the RFS7000 RF Switch is classified as multi-chip
standalone module.
FIPS 140-2 conformance testing of the module was performed at Security Level 2, except
for Cryptographic Module Specification and Design Assurance sections of the
FIPS 140-2 standard, which were tested as Security Level 3. The following
configurations were tested:
Module Name and Version Firmware versions
RFS7000 RF Switch 4.1.0.0-040GR
2 Cryptographic Boundary
The complete set of hardware and firmware components of the RFS7000 RF Switch is
physically enclosed in a metal and hard plastic enclosure which serves as the
cryptographic boundary of the module. The enclosure consists of the following parts: top,
front, left, right, rear, and bottom panels of the case. The top panel can be removed by
unscrewing screws. The switch enclosure is opaque within the visible spectrum.
For tamper evidence the module requires tamper-evident labels to allow the detection of
the opening of the top panel.
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An image of the module is provided below:
3 Ports and Interfaces
The module includes the following physical ports and logical interfaces.
Port Name Count Interface(s)
Ethernet Port 91
Data Input, Data Output, Control
Input, Status Output
Serial Console Port 1 Control Input, Status output, Data
Output
USB Ports 2 Not used - covered by a tamper
evident label at the factory
Compact Flash port 1 Not used - covered by a tamper
evident label at the factory
LEDs 4 Status Output
Power Switch N/A N/A
Power Port 1 Power Input
4 Roles, Services and Authentication
The module provides the following roles: a User role, a Crypto Officer role, a System
Administrator role, and a Monitor User role.
The Crypto Officers and System Administrators configure the module and manage its
cryptographic functionality. The Monitor Users monitor the operation of the module.
Users employ the cryptographic services provided by the module.
1
The out-of-band management port is not used and is covered by a tamper evident label at the factory
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Motorola RFS7000 RF Switch 5
The table below provides information on authentication mechanisms employed by each
role.
Role Authentication Mechanism
User Passwords are used for wireless connection with EAP-PEAP
and EAP-TTLS authentication. The module uses passwords of
at least 8 characters, therefore for each random authentication
attempt the probability of success will be significantly less than
one in 1,000,000. When a secure network connection is
established, the possibility of randomly guessing a password in
60 seconds is less than 1 in 100,000 due to the password length
and authentication process performance limitation.
Client Certificates are used for wireless connection with EAP-
TLS authentication. The module uses client certificates with at
least 1024 bit RSA key, which corresponds to 80 bits of
security, therefore for each random authentication attempt the
probability of success will be significantly less than one in
1,000,000. The possibility of randomly guessing a password in
60 seconds is less than 1 in 100,000 due to the authentication
process performance limitation.
Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Monitor User
Passwords are used for connections via Command Line
Interface (CLI), Web User Interface and SNMP management
interface. The module uses passwords of at least 8 characters,
therefore for each random authentication attempt the probability
of success will be significantly less than one in 1,000,000. Upon
a command line interface login attempt failure next username
and password prompt is provided after 1 second interval. This
ensures that a user can only make 60 or less consecutive
attempts in a minute. Therefore the possibility of randomly
guessing a password in 60 seconds is less than 1 in 100,000.
The possibility of randomly guessing a password in 60 seconds
using SNMP or GUI interfaces is less than 1 in 100,000 due to
the password length and authentication process performance
limitation.
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The module provides the following services to the operators:
Service Role Access to Cryptographic Keys
and CSPs
R- read; W – write or
generate; E-execute
Installation of the Module Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Password: W
802.11i pre-shared key: W
SSH RSA key pair: W
TLS server certificate: W
TLS/EAP Certificate: W
SSH keys: E
ANSI X9.31 seed and key: E
Login Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Monitor User
Password: E
SNMP secret: E
SSH Keys: E
TLS Keys: E
ANSI X9.31 seed and key: E
Run self-test Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Monitor User
N/A
Show status Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Monitor User
N/A
Reboot Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Monitor User
N/A
Update firmware Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Firmware load verification RSA
Public Key: E
Zeroize/Restore factory
settings
Crypto Officer
System Administrator
All keys: W
IPSec/VPN configuration Crypto Officer IPSec/IKE pre-shared key: W
SSH Keys: E
ANSI X9.31 seed and key: E
802.11i configuration Crypto Officer 802.11i pre-shared key: W
SSH Keys: E
ANSI X9.31 seed and key: E
Password protection
configuration
Crypto Officer
System Administrator
Password: E
SNMP secret: W
Establishment of secure
network connection
User TLS keys: E
IPSec/IKE keys: E
TLS/EAP Certificate: E
802.11i keys: E
ANSI X9.31 seed and key: E
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5 Security Functions
The table below lists approved cryptographic algorithms employed by the module.
Algorithm Certificate Number
SHS 742, 744, 745
HMAC 390, 392, 393
Triple DES 646, 648, 649
AES2
724, 726, 727, 773
RSA Sign/verify 341
ANSI X9.31 PRNG 423, 424
DSA 274
The table below lists non-Approved cryptographic algorithms employed by the module
Algorithm Usage
MD5 Used by EAP-TLS, EAP-TTL and PEAP protocols
Used during TLS handshake
Used by the SNMP protocol
HMAC-MD5 Used by the SNMP protocol
DES Used by the SNMP protocol
Diffie-Hellman Used for key establishment in TLS, IPSec/IKE, and SSH3
handshake. Provides between 80 and 112 bits of encryption
strength.
RSA encrypt/decrypt Used for key establishment in TLS handshake. Provides 80 bits
of encryption strength.
6 Key Management
The module uses ANSI X9.31 PRNG to generate random data.
The module provides a key zeroization command, which zeroizes all private and secret
cryptographic keys and CSPs stored in flash memory. The command is followed by a
reboot which zeroizes keys and CSPs stored in RAM.
The following cryptographic keys and CSPs are supported by the module.
Name and type Usage Storage
TLS master secret Used to derive TLS data
encryption key and TLS
HMAC key
Plaintext in RAM
2
The maximum effective AES key length is 232 bits.
3
SSH version 2 is used.
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Name and type Usage Storage
TLS Triple-DES or AES
encryption key
Used to encrypt data in TLS
protocol
Plaintext in RAM
TLS HMAC key Used to protect integrity of
data in TLS protocol
Plaintext in RAM
TLS/EAP server RSA
certificate4
(including the
private key)
Used to encrypt the TLS
master secret during the
TLS handshake
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
TLS and IPSec/IKE, and
SSH Diffie-Hellman keys
Used for key establishment
during the handshake
Plaintext in RAM
EAP-TLS Certification
Authority RSA Certificate
Used to verify client
certificate during the EAP-
TLS handshake
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
SSH RSA key pair Used to authenticate the
module to the SSH client
during the SSH handshake
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
SSH master secret Used to derive SSH
encryption key and SSH
HMAC key
Plaintext in RAM
SSH Triple-DES or AES
encryption keys
Used to encrypt SSH data Plaintext in RAM
SSH HMAC keys Used to protect integrity of
SSH data
Plaintext in RAM
IPSec/IKE pre-shared key Used to derive IPSec/IKE
encryption keys and
IPSec/IKE HMAC keys
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
IPSec/IKE Triple-DES or
AES encryption keys
Used to encrypt IPSec/IKE
data
Plaintext in RAM
IPSec/IKE HMAC keys Used to protect integrity of
IPSec/IKE data
Plaintext in RAM
ANSI X9.31 PRNG1 Seed
and Seed Key
Used to initialize the PRNG
to a random state
Plaintext in RAM
ANSI X9.31 PRNG2 Seed
and Seed Key
Used to initialize the PRNG
to a random state
Plaintext in RAM
802.11i AES-CCM
Temporal Key
Used to secure unicast
wireless data
Plaintext in RAM
802.11i AES-CCM Group
Temporal Key
Used to secure multicast
wireless data
Plaintext in RAM
802.11i pre-shared key Used to derive 802.11i
Temporal Key and 802.11i
Group Temporal Key
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
Firmware load verification
RSA Public Key
Used to verify firmware
components
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
4
The same certificate is shared by EAP-TLS, EAP-PEAP and EAP-TTLS protocols.
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Name and type Usage Storage
Passwords Used to authenticate users Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
SNMP Secret Used to authenticate Crypto
Officers accessing SNMP
management interface
Plaintext in RAM
Plaintext in flash
7 Self Tests
The module runs a set of self-tests on power-up. If one of the self-tests fails, the module
transitions into an error state where all data output and cryptographic operations are
disabled.
The module runs power-up self-tests for the following algorithms:
Algorithm Test
AES Known Answer Test
TDES Known Answer Test
SHS Known Answer Test
HMAC Known Answer Test
ANSI X9.31 PRNG Known Answer Test
RSA Pairwise Consistency Check (Sign/Verify)
DSA Pairwise Consistency Check (Sign/Verify)
Firmware integrity SHA-1 of the firmware image
During the module operation the following conditional self-tests are performed:
Condition Test
Random Number Generation Continuous PRNG Test
Firmware Load Firmware Load Test
RSA Key Pair generation Pairwise Consistency Check (Sign/Verify,
Encrypt/Decrypt)
Bypass Bypass Test
8 Physical Security
The module consists of production-grade components enclosed in a metal and hard
plastic enclosure. The enclosure is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of
the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws.
The module is protected by tamper evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 2
Physical Security requirements. The tamper evident labels are applied over the top panel
and sides of the module at the factory to provide evidence of tampering if the top panel is
removed.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for Motorola RFS7000 RF Switch 10
An image of the module with tamper evident labels applied is provided below:
9 Secure Operation
9.1 Approved Mode of Operation
The module always operates in the Approved Mode of Operation and does not support a
non-Approved mode of Operation. Module documentation provides detailed guidance for
the module users and administrators.
The Crypto Officer periodically inspects the module and the tamper evident labels. If an
evidence of tampering is detected, the Crypto Officer shall immediately disable the
module and notify the management.
Module users and administrators shall keep all authentication data confidential and shall
not allow access to the module to unauthorized persons.