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SEALSQ
VaultIC408 1.2.4
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.0
Date: 27 July 2026
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Table of Contents
1 – General................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 9
2.5 Algorithms .......................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................19
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................19
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................19
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................20
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................20
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................20
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................20
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................21
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................21
Secure Channel Protocol 03 ..............................................................................................21
Secure Password Key........................................................................................................21
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................22
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................22
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................40
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................42
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................42
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................42
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................42
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................43
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................43
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................43
Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation .............................................................43
Configuration of the non-Approved modes of operation .....................................................43
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................43
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................43
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7.5 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................43
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................44
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................44
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................44
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................44
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................44
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................45
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................46
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................52
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................54
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................54
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................54
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................57
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................60
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................60
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................60
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................61
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................61
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................61
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................62
The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role. .............................................62
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................62
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................62
References and Definitions .......................................................................................................62
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 8
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................12
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................12
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................13
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.......................................................................13
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................18
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................19
Table 10: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................19
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................21
Table 12: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................22
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................22
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................40
Table 15: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................42
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................43
Table 17: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................43
Table 18: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................44
Table 19: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................44
Table 20: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................45
Table 21: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................45
Table 22: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................48
Table 23: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................52
Table 24: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................54
Table 25: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................57
Table 26: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................57
Table 27: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................59
Table 28: Error States...............................................................................................................60
Table 29 References.................................................................................................................62
Table 30 Acronyms and Definitions...........................................................................................63
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram .............................................................................................. 7
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1 – General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 1.2.4.1 of the
VaultIC408 1.2.4 Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module
must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB
140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security
Level 3 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as shown in Table 1:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification
The WISeKey VaultIC408 1.2.4, hereafter denoted as “the module” or “VaultIC™”, is a security
module designed to secure various applications such as anticloning, physical access control,
personal access control for multimedia and web applications, hardware authentication, user
strong authentication, SSL support, PKCS#11 or Microsoft® CSP based applications, PKI
applications, DRM, trusted computing, and IP protection. It is a turnkey solution that combines
powerful cryptographic capabilities and secure data storage.
The VaultIC™ supports both an Approved and a non-Approved mode of operation,
automatically selected according to device state and authenticated operator. The selected mode
of operation remains activated while the operator is authenticated. The mode of operation is
discarded when the operator logs out or the secure channel is terminated.
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
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The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-
3 validated Security Modules.
The proven technology used in the security module is already widespread and used in national
ID/health cards, e-passports, bank cards (storing user Personal Identification Number, account
numbers and authentication keys among others), pay-TV access control and cell phone SIM
cards (allowing the storage of subscribers’ unique ID, PIN code, and authentication to the
network), where cloning must definitely be prevented.
The chips can detect tampering attempts and destroy sensitive data on such events, thus
avoiding data confidentiality being compromised. Strong Authentication capability, secure
storage, and flexibility thanks to its various interfaces (SPI, I2C), low pin count and low power
consumption are main features of the VaultIC™. Its embedded firmware provided advanced
functions such as Identity-based authentication, large Cryptographic command set,
Cryptographic protocols, Secure Channel Protocols, Robust communication protocol.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The block diagram of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is a Hardware single-chip
embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is denoted with the dashed blue line in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram
The module is delivered in two packages:
- QFN20 with and without reset pin
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- SOIC8 with and without reset pin
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
VaultIC408 1.2.4 cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
VaultlC408 1.2.4 -
Level 3: SOIC8
with Reset
AT90SO28RS
rev A
1.2.4.1
AVR Secure
Processor
Communication interface
SPI or I2C Package
SOIC8 with reset pin
VaultlC408 1.2.4 -
Level 3: SOIC8
without Reset
AT90SO28RS
rev A
1.2.4.1
AVR Secure
Processor
Communication interface
SPI or I2C Package
SOIC8 without reset pin
VaultlC408 1.2.4 -
Level 3: QFN20
with Reset
AT90SO28RS
rev A
1.2.4.1
AVR Secure
Processor
Communication interface
SPI or I2C Package
QFN20 with reset pin
VaultlC408 1.2.4 -
Level 3: QFN20
without Reset
AT90SO28RS
rev A
1.2.4.1
AVR Secure
Processor
Communication interface
SPI or I2C Package
QFN20 without reset pin
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2
3
1
4
5
15
14
13
12
11
6
7
9
8
10
20
19
18
17
16
VAULTIC408
QFN20 SPI_SEL / I2C_SDA
GND
SPI_MISO
SPI_MOSI
SPI_SCK
VCC
IndexCorner
SPI_SS / I2C_SCL
RST
Other pins are Not Internally Connected
2
3
1
4
5
15
14
13
12
11
6
7
9
8
10
20
19
18
17
16
VAULTIC408
QFN20L SPI_SS
GND
SPI_MISO
SPI_MOSI
SPI_SCK
VCC
IndexCorner
Other pins are Not Internally Connected
VaultIC408
SOIC8 / SPI / I²C
INDEX CORNER
SPI_MOSI
GND
1
2
3
4
8
7
6
5
SPI_MISO
VCC
SPI_SCK
I2C_SCL / SPI_SS
I2C_SDA / SPI_SEL
RST
VaultIC408
SOIC8 / SPI / I²C
INDEX CORNER
SPI_MOSI
GND
1
2
3
4
8
7
6
5
SPI_MISO
VCC
SPI_SCK
I2C_SCL / SPI_SS
I2C_SDA / SPI_SEL
NC(*)
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Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
when the device is in
ACTIVATED state and an
approved user or an approved
administrator is successfully
authenticated
Approved
Show Version (Get Info)
command returns bMode =
Approved_Mode
Non-
Approved
mode
when the device is in
ACTIVATED state and a non-
approved user or a non-
approved administrator is
authenticated
Non-
Approved
Show Version (Get Info)
command returns bMode =
Non_Approved_Mode
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The VaultIC™ operates in different modes of operation, given different conditions of use of keys
and cryptographic services. The mode of operation is automatically selected according to the
device state and the authenticated operator. The mode of operation is completely separated
from the point of authentication. There are Approved operators and non-Approved operators.
The Approved operator cannot access any non-Approved services and vice-versa. In order to
transition between modes, the operator must log out and re-authenticate with the mode-specific
operator’s credentials for the mode desired. The selected mode of operation remains activated
while the operator is authenticated. The mode of operation is discarded when the authentication
is cancelled, or the secure channel is terminated.
Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation
This mode is automatically selected when the device is in ACTIVATED state and an approved
user or an approved administrator is successfully authenticated. While in an approved mode of
operation, only Approved and Allowed Algorithms are supported. Additional security restrictions
may apply.
The module will indicate that it is running in the Approved mode of operation by indicating Mode
of Operation: Approved in the response of a Show Version (Get Info) command, as described
below:
-> 80 01 01 00 37
<- 56 61 75 6C 74 49 43 34 30 38 20 31 2E 32 2E 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 01 01 00 00 3D 80 03 00 10 00 00 08 03 90 00
In this response:
• The 41st
byte (0x07) indicates that the device is in ACTIVATED state.
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• The 43rd
byte (0x01) indicates that the current authenticated user is an approved user.
• The 44th
byte (0x01) indicates that the current mode of operation is approved.
Configuration of the non-Approved Modes of Operation
This mode is automatically selected when the device is in ACTIVATED state and a non-
approved user or a non-approved administrator is authenticated. While in a non-approved mode
of operation, the VaultIC™ usage is not restricted and Approved, Allowed, and Non-Approved
Algorithms are supported.
The module will indicate that it is running in the non-Approved mode of operation by indicating
Mode of Operation: non-approved mode in the response of a Show Version (Get Info)
command, as described below:
-> 80 01 01 00 37
56 61 75 6C 74 49 43 34 30 38 20 31 2E 32 2E 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 00 02 02 00 00 3D 80 03 00 10 00 00 08 03 90 00
In this response:
• The 41st
byte (0x07) indicates that the device is in ACTIVATED state.
• The 43rd
byte (0x02) indicates that the current authenticated user is a non-approved user.
• The 44th
byte (0x02) indicates that the current mode of operation is non-approved.
CSPs are not shared between the non-Approved and Approved modes of operation and the
internal state of the DRBG is zeroized each time the DRBG is instantiated.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
When the module is in ACTIVATED state, the mode is selected automatically when a user or
admin is authenticated. Session SSPs are zeroised upon session initialization and termination.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below.
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4856
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A4856
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A5349
Direction - Generation, Verification
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-CTR A4856
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A4856
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-GCM A5349
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.2
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A5349
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A5349
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-KWP A5349
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A4856
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG A5349
Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-
283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Extra Bits
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-
163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224,
P-256, P-384, P-521
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Component - No
Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-
283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Component - No
Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-
163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-192, P-224,
P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A5349 Key Length - Key Length: 80-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
224
A5349 Key Length - Key Length: 112-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5349 Key Length - Key Length: 128-512 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A5349 Key Length - Key Length: 192-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
512
A5349 Key Length - Key Length: 256-1024 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3
A5349
Domain Parameter Generation Methods - B-
233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation,
Partial Validation
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Scheme -
onePassDh -
KAS Role - Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Key Length - 512
staticUnified -
KAS Role - Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Key Length - 512
KDF SP800-108 A5349
KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Key Generation Mode - B.3.3
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - Table C.2
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A5349
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048
FIPS 186-4
SHA-1 A5349
Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A5349
Message Length - Message Length: 224, 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5349
Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A5349
Message Length - Message Length: 384, 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A5349
Message Length - Message Length: 512, 0-
65528 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The Module implements the Vendor-Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG
Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A
NIST SP 800-133r2, Section 4
example 1, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
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The module does not implement any Non-Approved, but Allowed Algorithms in the Approved
Mode of Operation.
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The Module implements the Non-Approved, Allowed cryptographic Algorithms with No Security
Claimed.
Name Caveat Use and Function
RAM
Scrambling
No security claimed –
IG 2.4.A, Example
Scenario #1.
Volatile memory is scrambled/obfuscated using a
proprietary algorithm; all contents of RAM are treated
as unprotected plaintext.
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The Module implements the Non-Approved, Not Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed.
Name Use and Function
CIP_RSAES (non-compliant)
PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, or x509
raw cipher
KAS (non-compliant)
Key Agreement Scheme, compound of: - Static Unified Model,
One-Pass Diffie-Hellman Model, defined by ANS X9.63 and
NIST SP 800-56A (GFp, GF2m)
KPG_RSAES (non-
compliant)
RSA key pair generation for cipher engines
KTS_RSA_OAEP_BASIC
(non-compliant)
NIST SP 800-56B Key Transport Scheme based on RSAES
OAEP algorithm without key confirmation
RSA (non-compliant)
1024-bit RSA Signature Generation used to sign the logs
output from the Module. RSA X.509 signature
generation/verification algorithm only applies the RSA
primitive without any message encoding or padding
None None
Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The table below shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AKP-DP
AsymKeyPair-
DomPar
Asymmetric
Key-Pair
Generation
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5349)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Domain
Parameters
AKP-KG
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric
Key-Pair
Generation
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1, SP
800-133r2, IG
D.H
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
AKP-KV
AsymKeyPair-
KeyVer
Asymmetric
Key-Pair
Verification
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
BC-A-DEC BC-Auth
Block Cipher -
Authenticated
Decrypt
Publications:NIST
SP 80038F, SP
800-38D
AES-GCM:
(A5349)
BC-A-ENC BC-Auth
Block Cipher -
Authenticated
Encrypt
Publications:NIST
SP 80038F, SP
800-38D
AES-GCM:
(A5349)
BC-U-DEC BC-UnAuth
Block Cipher -
Unauthenticated
Decrypt
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38A
AES-CBC:
(A4856)
AES-CFB128:
(A4856)
AES-CTR:
(A4856)
AES-ECB:
(A4856)
AES-OFB:
(A4856)
BC-U-ENC BC-UnAuth
Block Cipher -
Unauthenticated
Encrypt
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38A
AES-CBC:
(A4856)
AES-CFB128:
(A4856)
AES-CTR:
(A4856)
AES-ECB:
(A4856)
AES-OFB:
(A4856)
EC-SigGen DigSig-SigGen
Digital Signature
Generation
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1, FIPS
180-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
SHA2-224:
(A5349)
SHA2-256:
(A5349)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-384:
(A5349)
SHA2-512:
(A5349)
EC-SigVer DigSig-SigVer
Digital Signature
Verification
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1, FIPS
180-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
SHA-1: (A5349)
SHA2-224:
(A5349)
SHA2-256:
(A5349)
SHA2-384:
(A5349)
SHA2-512:
(A5349)
Entropy ENT-ESV Entropy Source
Publications:NIST
SP 800-90B, IG
9.3.A, D.J
Counter DRBG:
(A5349)
Hash SHA Secure Hash
Publications:NIST
FIPS 180-4
SHA-1: (A5349)
SHA2-224:
(A5349)
SHA2-384:
(A5349)
SHA2-512:
(A5349)
KAS-ECC KAS-Full Key Agreement
Publications:NIST
SP 800-56Ar3,
SP 800-90Ar1,
FIPS 180-4
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2, path
(2), end-to-end
Key
Confirmation:yes
Key
Derivation:KDA
(tested as part of
KAS certificate)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
112 and 256 bits
of security
strength
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5349)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-KG KAS-KeyGen
Key Agreement
Key-Pair
Generation
Publications:NIST
SP 800-56Ar3,
SP 800-90Ar1,
FIPS 186-5
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5349)
KBKDF KBKDF
Key-Based Key
Derivation
Publications:NIST
SP 800-108-r1-
upd1
AES-CMAC:
(A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A5349)
KDF SP800-
108: (A5349)
KDA KAS-56CKDF
Key Derivation
Function
Publications:NIST
SP 800-56Ar3,
SP 800-56Cr2
SHA2-256:
(A5349)
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A5349)
KTS
KTS-Wrap
KTS-Unwrap
Key Transport -
Wrapping
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG
D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits
of security
strength
AES-KW:
(A5349)
AES-KWP:
(A5349)
KTS-SCP03
KTS-Wrap
KTS-Unwrap
Key Transport -
Wrapping using
Secure Channel
Protocol 03
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG
D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128-256
AES-CBC:
(A4856)
AES-CMAC:
(A5349)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
bits of security
strength
MAC-CMAC MAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation -
CMAC
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38B
AES-CMAC:
(A5349)
MAC-GMAC MAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation -
GMAC
Publications:NIST
FIPS 197, SP
800-38D
AES-GMAC:
(A5349)
MAC-HMAC MAC
Message
Authentication
Code
Generation -
HMAC
Publications:FIPS
198-1, FIPS 180-
4
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
224: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A5349)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A5349)
RBG DRBG
Random
Number
Generation
Publications:NIST
SP 800-90Ar1
Counter DRBG:
(A5349)
RSA-SigGen DigSig-SigGen
Digital Signature
Generation
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1, FIPS
180-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
SHA2-224:
(A5349)
SHA2-256:
(A5349)
SHA2-384:
(A5349)
SHA2-512:
(A5349)
RSA-SigVer DigSig-SigVer
Digital Signature
Verification
Publications:NIST
FIPS 186-5, SP
800-90Ar1, FIPS
180-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A5349)
SHA-1: (A5349)
SHA2-224:
(A5349)
SHA2-256:
(A5349)
SHA2-384:
(A5349)
SHA2-512:
(A5349)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SymGen CKG
Symmetric Key
Generation
Publications:NIST
SP 800-90Ar1,
SP 800-133r2, IG
D.H
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Counter DRBG:
(A5349)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES GCM IV Uniqueness
FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2
The IV is uniform-randomly generated internally in its entirety.
The generation uses an Approved DRBG (Cert. #A5349) that is internal to the module’s
boundary.
The IV length shall be at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D).
KAS Implementation
FIPS140-3 IG D.F, Scenario 2, Path 2
The module’s implementation of KAS-ECC has been tested end-to-end under CAVP Cert.
#A5349, which is inclusive of shared secret calculation, key derivation, and key confirmation.
SHA-1 Transition
The module supports the limited use of SHA-1 for non-digital signature applications, as well as
digital signature verifications for legacy purposes. The module does not support digital signature
generation with the use of SHA-1. Per CMVP Programmatic Transitions and NIST SP 800-
131Ar2, usage of SHA-1 for non-digital-signature applications is deprecated through Dec 31,
2030.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E2 WISeKey
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
The Module uses the following entropy sources:
Name Type
Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
VaultIC408 Entropy
Source
Physical
AVR Secure
Processor
1 bit 0.52427 NA
Table 10: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
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The module implements the Key Generation Functions described in Section 9.4. The module
supports a CTR_DRBG (CAVP #A5349) and an internal entropy source (ESV #E2) for the
purposes of key generation.
The length of the DRBG-EI and Seed used to instantiate the CTR_DRBG is 736 bits. At a
min_entropy rate of 0.52427 bits per bit sampled, the 736 bits of output can be construed as
containing at least 384 bits of entropy (i.e., 736 * 0.52427 = 385.86272), which is sufficient to
claim the full security strength of 256 bits for the CTR_DRBG.
2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
The module implements the Key Agreement Functions described in Section 9.4. The module
supports KAS-ECC for the purposes of key agreement.
Key Transport Information
The module implements the Key Transport Functions described in Section 9.4. The module
supports key transport using NIST SP 800-38F compliant methods, which include:
- AES-KW, AES-KWP
- AES-CBC with AES-CMAC
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not implement any Industry Protocols.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below.
The module does not support a Control Output interface.
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
SPI_SCK Control Input SPI Clock
SPI_MISO
Data Output
Status Output
SPI Master In, Slave Out
SPI_MOSI
Data Input
Control Input
SPI Master Out, Slave In
SPI_SS Control Input SPI Slave Select
I2C_SCL Control Input I2C Clock
SPI_SEL Control Input SPI or I2C Selection
I2C_SDA
Data Input
Data Output
I2C Data Line
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Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Control Input
Status Output
VCC Power Power Supply
GND Power Ground
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The Module’s authentication methods are listed in Table 12.
Secure Channel Protocol 03
Knowledge of 128, 192 or 256-bit AES Keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) provides at least 128 bits of
security. The probability of a random attempt or a false acceptance occurring is then at most 1
in 2128
which is less than 1 in 1,000,000. For multiple attempts in a one-minute period, the
device will lock out after a maximum of 127 failed authentication attempts. Therefore, the
probability of a random attempt succeeding within a one-minute period is at most 127 in 2128
which is less than 1 in 100,000.
Secure Password Key
Knowledge of a 128, 192 or 256-bit AES-CBC Key (Secure Password AES Key) provides 128
bits of security. The probability of a random attempt or a false acceptance occurring is then at
most 1 in 2128
, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000. For multiple attempts in a one-minute period,
the device will lock out after a maximum of 127 failed authentication attempts. Therefore, the
probability of a random attempt succeeding within a one-minute period is at most 127 in 2128
,
which is less than 1 in 100,000.
Remark: When operator is deleted (through the Manage Authentication Data service),
authentication data, files and keys owned by the operator are zeroized.
Method
Name
Description
Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
SCP03
The CO/User is
authenticated to the
module through a
Secure Channel Protocol
03 Authentication
method
BC-U-ENC
Minimum
2^128
The probability of a
random attempt
succeeding within a one-
minute period is at most
127 in 2^128, which is
less than 1 in 100,000.
Secure
Password
Key
The CO/User is
authenticated to the
module through a
BC-U-ENC
Minimum
2^128
The probability of a
random attempt
succeeding within a one-
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Method
Name
Description
Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Secure Password Key
Authentication method
minute period is at most
127 in 2^128, which is
less than 1 in 100,000.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The Module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO). The
module also supports an Everyone role, which does not require any authentication. The
cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using operator IDs and authentication
methods. The module does not support changing roles. Re-authentication is enforced when
logging in under a new roles/user. The module does not support concurrent operators.
The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
The Module does not support an operator changing roles.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Cryptographic Officer Identity CO
SCP03
Secure Password Key
User Identity User
SCP03
Secure Password Key
Everyone Role Unauthenticated None
Table 13: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:
Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Cancel
Authenticati
on
Returns module
to un-
authenticated
state
Status
Word
None
Status
Word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: Z
- SCP03
R-MAC: Z
- SCP03
C-ENC: Z
User
- SCP03
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
C-MAC: Z
- SCP03
R-MAC: Z
- SCP03
C-ENC: Z
Compute
Message
Digest
Computes a
digest of
provided
message
Status
Word
Message
Message
digest +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Hash
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Delete Key Zeroizes keys
Status
Word
Key ID None
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Transport
Key: Z
- AES
Keys: Z
- MAC
Keys: Z
- RSA
Signing
Key: Z
- ECC
Signing
Key: Z
- RSA
Verifying
Key: Z
- ECC
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Verifying
Key: Z
- KAS
Private
Key: Z
- KAS
Public
Key: Z
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Transport
Key: Z
- AES
Keys: Z
- MAC
Keys: Z
- RSA
Signing
Key: Z
- ECC
Signing
Key: Z
- RSA
Verifying
Key: Z
- ECC
Verifying
Key: Z
- KAS
Private
Key: Z
- KAS
Public
Key: Z
Derive
Secret Key
Derives a secret
key suitable for
later
cryptographic
use from a
Status
Word
Key ID +
KDF ID +
Digest ID +
Key
confirmatio
Key
derivation
response +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
RBG
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
shared secret
value
n policy +
Key ID
storage +
Access
control
Entropy
KDA
KAS-KG
MAC-
CMAC
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- KAS
Private
Key: G
- KAS
Public
Key: G
- KAS
Shared
Secret: E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- KAS
Private
Key: G
- KAS
Public
Key: G
- KAS
Shared
Secret: E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Encrypt/Dec
rypt
Message
Performs data
encryption/decry
ption of provided
message
Status
Word
Message
Response
message +
Status
word
BC-A-
ENC
BC-A-
DEC
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
C-ENC: E
- AES
Keys: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Keys: E
Establish
Key Material
Computes a
shared secret
value utilizing
internal
approved DRBG
Status
Word
ECC
private key
ID + KAS
ID +
Shared
secret ID
+ Access
control +
Status
word
Status
Word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
RBG
Entropy
KAS-
ECC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- KAS
Private
Key: E
- KAS
Public
Key: E
- KAS
Shared
Secret: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- KAS
Private
Key: E
- KAS
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Public
Key: E
- KAS
Shared
Secret: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
External
Authenticate
Allows
transmission of
authentication
data
Status
Word
SCP03
security
level +
External
Authenticat
e SCP03
data
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
MAC-
GMAC
MAC-
HMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
File System
Command
set
Read/Delete/Mo
dify files, folder,
and access
permissions of
internal
filesystem (no
CSP access)
Status
Word
Command
Command
response
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Generate
Key Pair
Generates and
stores an
asymmetric key
pair utilizing
Status
Word
Key pair
identifier +
Key ID +
Access
condition +
Status
Word
AKP-DP
AKP-KG
AKP-KV
BC-U-
ENC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
internal
approved DRBG
Algorithm
parameters
BC-U-
DEC
RBG
Entropy
KAS-KG
MAC-
CMAC
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: G
- ECC
Signing
Key: G
- RSA
Verifying
Key: G
- ECC
Verifying
Key: G
- KAS
Private
Key: G
- KAS
Public
Key: G
- DRBG-
State: E,G
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: G
- ECC
Signing
Key: G
- RSA
Verifying
Key: G
- ECC
Verifying
Key: G
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- KAS
Private
Key: G
- KAS
Public
Key: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Generate
Random
Generates
random data
utilizing internal
DRBG
Status
Word
Length of
random
Random
value +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
RBG
Entropy
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Generate
Symmetric
Key
Generates and
stores a
symmetric key
utilizing internal
approved DRBG
Status
Word
Key ID +
access
condition +
AES Key
Identifier
Status
Word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
SymGe
n
RBG
Entropy
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
MAC-
CMAC
Keys: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Keys: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Generate/Ve
rify
Signature
Generates
signature on
incoming
messages or
verifies incoming
message and
signature
Status
Word
Message
Signature
or None +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
EC-
SigGen
RSA-
SigGen
EC-
SigVer
RSA-
SigVer
MAC-
CMAC
MAC-
GMAC
MAC-
HMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- MAC
Keys: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: E
- ECC
Signing
Key: E
- RSA
Verifying
Key: E
- ECC
Verifying
Key: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- MAC
Keys: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: E
- ECC
Signing
Key: E
- RSA
Verifying
Key: E
- ECC
Verifying
Key: E
Get
Authenticati
on Info
Returns
information
pertinent to
operator
Status
Word
User ID
Authenticat
ion
methods,
roles
access,
security
level,
number of
authenticat
ion
attempts
remaining,
sequence
counter +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Get Config
Provides
configuration
data that is not
available in the
Show Version
(Get Info)
command
Status
Word
Length of
config to
read
Value
requested
+ Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Get Data
(Show
Status)
Provides
periodic self-
tests information
Status
Word
ID of the
value to
read
Value
requested
+ Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Get Error
Log
Provides error
log information
Status
Word
None
Log data +
Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Initialize
Algorithm
Initializes
cryptographic
algorithm with
key and
algorithm
specific
parameters
Status
Word
Key ID +
Algorithm
mode +
Algorithm
ID +
Algorithm
parameter
None or IV
for
GCM/GMA
C + Status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
EC-
SigGen
RSA-
SigGen
EC-
SigVer
RSA-
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
SigVer
Entropy
MAC-
CMAC
MAC-
HMAC
MAC-
GMAC
- AES
Keys: E
- MAC
Keys: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: E
- ECC
Signing
Key: E
- RSA
Verifying
Key: E
- ECC
Verifying
Key: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
- AES
Keys: E
- MAC
Keys: E
- RSA
Signing
Key: E
- ECC
Signing
Key: E
- RSA
Verifying
Key: E
- ECC
Verifying
Key: E
Initialize
Update
Used for
generation of
session keys to
Status
Word
User ID =+
Role ID +
SCP03
response
data +
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
setup secure
channel and
authenticate its
message
contents
Host
challenge
Status
word
DEC
RBG
Entropy
KBKDF
MAC-
CMAC
MAC-
GMAC
MAC-
HMAC
S-MAC: E
- SCP03
S-ENC: E
- SCP03
C-MAC:
G,Z
- SCP03
R-MAC:
G,Z
- SCP03
C-ENC: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- SCP03
S-MAC: E
- SCP03
S-ENC: E
- SCP03
C-MAC:
G,Z
- SCP03
R-MAC:
G,Z
- SCP03
C-ENC: G
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Key
Confirmation
Verifies the
MacTagU given
by the host and
on success,
unlocks the
access to the
Derived Secret
key computed
during Derive
Secret Key
Status
Word
Key ID +
MacTag
value
Status
Word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- MAC
Keys: E
User
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- MAC
Keys: E
Manage
Authenticati
on Data
Authenticated
administrator
can add, delete
or modify
authentication
data of any
approved
operators.
Authenticated
operator can
update their own
authentication
data (change
password or
static keyset)
Status
Word
User ID +
Operation
identifier +
Authenticat
ion data
update
operations
Status
word
KTS-
SCP03
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
S-ENC:
W,Z
- SCP03
S-MAC:
W,Z
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- Secure
Password:
W,Z
- Secure
Password
AES Key:
W,Z
User
- SCP03
S-ENC:
W,Z
- SCP03
S-MAC:
W,Z
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- Secure
Password:
W,Z
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- Secure
Password
AES Key:
W,Z
Put Key
Electronically
enters keys
encrypted in
Approved mode
with AES-KWP /
AES-KW as per
NIST SP 800-
38F and/or
SCP03
Status
Word
Key ID +
Access
condition +
Key object
data
Status
Word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
KTS
KTS-
SCP03
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Transport
Key: W,E
- AES
Keys: W
- MAC
Keys: W
- RSA
Signing
Key: W
- ECC
Signing
Key: W
- RSA
Verifying
Key: W
- ECC
Verifying
Key: W
- KAS
Private
Key: W
- KAS
Public
Key: W
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Transport
Key: W,E
- AES
Keys: W
- MAC
Keys: W
- RSA
Signing
Key: W
- ECC
Signing
Key: W
- RSA
Verifying
Key: W
- ECC
Verifying
Key: W
- KAS
Private
Key: W
- KAS
Public
Key: W
Read Key
Electronically
output keys
encrypted in
Approved mode
with AES-KWP /
AES-KW as per
NIST SP 800-
38F and/or
SCP03
Status
Word
Key ID
Key object
+ status
word
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
KTS
KTS-
SCP03
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Transport
Key: R,E
- AES
Keys: R
- MAC
Keys: R
- RSA
Signing
Key: R
- ECC
Signing
Key: R
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
- RSA
Verifying
Key: R
- ECC
Verifying
Key: R
- KAS
Private
Key: R
- KAS
Public
Key: R
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
- AES
Transport
Key: R,E
- AES
Keys: R
- MAC
Keys: R
- RSA
Signing
Key: R
- ECC
Signing
Key: R
- RSA
Verifying
Key: R
- ECC
Verifying
Key: R
- KAS
Private
Key: R
- KAS
Public
Key: R
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
Self-Tests
Executes the
suite of self-test
Status
Word
None
Status
Word
Cryptograp
hic Officer
User
Self-Tests
(Power
Cycle)
Executes the
suite of self-tests
as a result of a
power cycle.
Status
Word
None
Status
Word
Entropy
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
User
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Everyone
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E
Show
Version (Get
Info)
Provides current
status of the
module, and
returns
Approved mode
indicator
Status
Word
None
Approved
mode
indicator
and
module
versioning
information
.
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
MAC-
CMAC
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
User
- SCP03
C-MAC: E
- SCP03
R-MAC: E
- SCP03
C-ENC: E
Everyone
Submit
Secure
Password
Used to
generate the
challenge and
transmission of
authentication
data
Status
Word
User ID +
Role ID +
None or
challenge
response
Challenge
or none +
Status
word
BC-U-
DEC
RBG
Entropy
Cryptograp
hic Officer
- Secure
Password:
E
- Secure
Password
AES Key:
E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
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Name Description
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs
Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Access
G,E,Z
User
- Secure
Password:
E
- Secure
Password
AES Key:
E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- DRBG-EI
and Seed:
G,E,Z
Table 14: Approved Services
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Note: The Indicator of the services is the Status Word (SW) return by the command. 9000h
means that the service completed successfully, else the service returns an error code.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
All non-approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below, CO and
User in this table are non-approved one:
Name Description Algorithms Role
Initialize Update
Used for generation of session
keys to setup secure channel
and authenticate its message
contents
None
CO, User,
Everyone
External
Authenticate
Allows transmission of
authentication data
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Submit Secure
Password
Used to generate the challenge
and transmission of
authentication data
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Manage
Authentication
Data
Authenticated administrator can
add, delete or modify
authentication data of any
None CO, User
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Name Description Algorithms Role
approved operators.
Authenticated operator can
update their own authentication
data (change password or static
keyset)
Get
Authentication
Info
Returns authentication method,
roles access, security level,
number of authentication
attempts remaining, sequence
counter
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Cancel
Authentication
Returns module to un-
authenticated state
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Put Key
Electronically enters keys
encrypted by AES-KWP, NIST
SP 800-56B Key Transport,
and/or SCP03
KTS_RSA_OAEP_BASIC
(non-compliant)
CO, User
Read Key
Electronically outputs keys
encrypted by AES-KWP, NIST
SP 800-56B Key Transport,
and/or SCP03
KTS_RSA_OAEP_BASIC
(non-compliant)
CO, User
Delete Key Zeroizes keys None CO, User
Initialize
Algorithm
Initializes cryptographic
algorithm with key and algorithm
specific parameters
None CO, User
Encrypt/Decrypt
Message
Performs data
encryption/decryption of
provided message
RSA (non-compliant)
CIP_RSAES (non-
compliant)
CO, User
Generate/Verify
Signature
Generates signature on
incoming messages or verifies
incoming message and
signature
RSA (non-compliant) CO, User
Generate
Symmetric Key
Generates and stores a
symmetric key utilizing internal
approved DRBG
None CO, User
Generate Key
Pair
Generates and stores an
asymmetric key pair utilizing
internal approved DRBG
RSA (non-compliant)
KPG_RSAES (non-
compliant)
CO, User
Establish Key
Material
Computes a shared secret value
utilizing internal approved DRBG
KAS (non-compliant) CO, User
Derive Secret
Key
Derives a secret key suitable for
later cryptographic use from a
secret value or a static master
key
None CO, User
Key
Confirmation
Verifies the MacTagU given by
the host and on success,
unlocks the access to the
Derived Secret key computed
during Derive Secret Key
None CO, User
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Name Description Algorithms Role
Compute
Message Digest
Computes a digest of provided
message
None CO, User
Generate
Random
Generates random data utilizing
internal DRBG
None
CO, User,
Everyone
File System
Command set
Read/ Delete/ Modify files,
folder, and access permissions
of internal filesystem (no CSP
access)
None CO, User
Show Version
(Get Info)
Provides current status of the
module, and returns non-
Approved mode indicator
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Get Data (Show
Status)
Provides periodic self-tests
information
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Get Error Log
Provides Error log information
(after password authentication)
None Everyone
Get Config
Provides configuration data that
is not available in the Show
Version (Get Info) command
None
CO, User,
Everyone
Self-Tests Executes the suite of self-tests None
CO, User,
Everyone
Table 15: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
There is no External Software/Firmware Loaded.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module is composed of the following firmware component(s):
• Component 1: VaultIC408 1.2.4 binary – source code
The firmware component is protected with
- the pre-operational self-test performed before authentication
- the authentication technique Secure Channel Protocol 03 or secure password
- verification of the firmware using an error detection code (HW CRC16)
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by sending the Self-Tests command or
power cycling.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by sending the Self-Tests command or
power cycling.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The module supports a non-modifiable operational environment, which does not support
firmware updates.
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The CO role shall configure the Operating System with the following policy:
• Authentication
• User access configuration and credential
Configuration of the Approved Mode of Operation
The Approved mode of operation is configured per the instructions in Section 2.4.
Configuration of the non-Approved modes of operation
The non-Approved mode of operation is configured per the instructions in Section 2.4.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The following physical security mechanism are implemented by hardware in the Module:
- Hard, opaque, non-removable enclosure (IC packaging)
Mechanism
Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper
resistant
packaging
Monthly
The CO is to evaluate the single-chip for evidence of tamper.
GetErrorLog command gives the log of the violation after
authentication. In case tamper evidence is found, contact the
Site Security personnel.
Table 16: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.5 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -60C EFT Shutdown
HighTemperature 160C EFT Shutdown
LowVoltage 1.4V EFT Shutdown
HighVoltage 8V EFT Shutdown
Table 17: EFP/EFT Information
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7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -40C
HighTemperature 105C
Table 18: Hardness Testing Temperatures
Note: The module is hardness tested at the lowest and highest temperatures within the
module's intended temperature range of operation.
8 Non-Invasive Security
At this time, no requirements have been specified for non-invasive attacks in NIST SP 800-
140F. As such, this section is not applicable.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description
Persistence
Type
RAM (S1) Only stored in volatile memory (RAM) scrambled. Dynamic
EEPROM (S2) Stored in EEPROM in scrambled NVM. Static
EEPROM (S3) Stored in EEPROM as a SHA2-256 hash. Static
Table 19: Storage Areas
All the memory (RAM and EEPROM) of the Module are scrambled.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input AES
wrapped
Application
Software
(Outside)
RAM (S1) Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
Output
AES
wrapped
RAM (S1)
Application
Software
(Outside)
Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
Input
SCP03
wrapped
Application
Software
(Outside)
RAM (S1) Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS-
SCP03
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Name From To
Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Output
SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1)
Application
Software
(Outside)
Encrypted Automated Electronic
KTS-
SCP03
Table 20: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Z1 Zeroized after use
The SSP is zeroized
after it is used.
Automatic
Z2
Zeroized by the
zeroization service by
overwriting with a fixed
pattern of zeros.
The SSP is zeroized
upon deletion of the
operator account.
Manage Authentication
Data command.
Z3
Zeroized the module
when it enters the
Terminated state.
All SSPs stored in
the module are
zeroized.
Automatic upon failure of
the DRBG KAT or
EEPROM CSP integrity
self-tests.
Table 21: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3.
Name Description Size - Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
AES Keys
Encryption/decryption
operations
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric -
CSP
SymGen
BC-A-
ENC
BC-A-
DEC
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
AES
Transport
Key
Wraps other SSPs for
secure transport
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric -
CSP
SymGen KTS
DRBG-EI
and Seed
CTR_DRBG entropy input 736 - 384 ENT - CSP Entropy RBG
DRBG-
State
AES-based Counter DRBG
internal state (V and Key)
256 - 256 RBG - CSP RBG
AKP-KG
SymGen
RBG
KAS-KG
ECC
Signing Key
Signature generation
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521, K-233, K-283, K-409,
K-571, B-233, B-283, B-
409, B-571 - 112-256
Asymmetric -
CSP
AKP-KG
EC-
SigGen
ECC
Verifying
Key
Signature Verification
P-192 (Legacy), P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521, K-163
(Legacy), K-233, K-283, K-
409, K-571, B-163
(Legacy), B-233, B-283, B-
409, B-571 - 80 (Legacy),
112-256
Asymmetric -
PSP
AKP-KG
EC-
SigVer
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Name Description Size - Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
KAS
Private Key
Establishes KAS Shared
Secret
P-224, P-256, P384, P-521
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, B-233, B-283, B-409,
B-571 - 112-256
Asymmetric -
CSP
KAS-KG
KAS-
ECC
KAS Public
Key
Establishes KAS Shared
Secret
P-224, P-256, P384, P-521
K-233, K-283, K-409, K-
571, B-233, B-283, B-409,
B-571 - 112-256
Asymmetric -
PSP
KAS-KG
KAS-
ECC
KAS
Shared
Secret
Derives key material 112-256 - 112-256
Symmetric -
CSP
KAS-ECC
KAS-
ECC
MAC Keys Data integrity key 128-256 - 128-256 MAC - CSP SymGen
MAC-
CMAC
MAC-
GMAC
MAC-
HMAC
RSA
Signing Key
Signature generation 2048 - 112
Asymmetric -
CSP
AKP-KG
RSA-
SigGen
RSA
Verifying
Key
Signature verification
1024 (legacy), 2048 - 80
(legacy), 112
Asymmetric -
PSP
AKP-KG
RSA-
SigVer
SCP03 C-
ENC
SCP03 session encryption
key
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric -
CSP
KBKDF
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
KTS-
SCP03
SCP03 C-
MAC
SCP03 session integrity key 256 - 256 MAC - CSP KBKDF
KTS-
SCP03
MAC-
CMAC
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Name Description Size - Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
SCP03 R-
MAC
SCP03 session integrity key 256 - 256 MAC - CSP KBKDF
KTS-
SCP03
MAC-
CMAC
SCP03 S-
ENC
Used to derive SCP03
session encryption keys
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric -
CSP
KBKDF
SCP03 S-
MAC
Used to derive SCP03
session integrity keys
256 - 256 MAC - CSP KBKDF
Secure
Password
Used in addition to the
Secure Password AES Key
to authenticate the operator
64-256 - 64-256
Authentication
- CSP
Secure
Password
AES Key
AES key used to encrypt
Secure Password during
entry
128-256 - 128-256
Symmetric -
CSP
SymGen
BC-U-
ENC
BC-U-
DEC
Table 22: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES Keys
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
DRBG-State:Generates
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
AES Transport Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
AES Keys:Protected by
MAC Keys:Protected by
RSA Signing Key:Protected by
ECC Signing Key:Protected by
RSA Verifying Key:Protected by
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
ECC Verifying Key:Protected by
KAS Private Key:Protected by
KAS Public Key:Protected by
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
DRBG-EI and Seed RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
DRBG-State:Establishes
DRBG-State RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
DRBG-EI and Seed:Derived
From
Secure Password AES
Key:Generated By
AES Keys:Generated By
MAC Keys:Generated By
AES Transport Key:Generated
By
RSA Signing Key:Generated By
ECC Signing Key:Generated By
RSA Verifying Key:Generated
By
ECC Verifying Key:Generated
By
KAS Private Key:Generated By
KAS Public Key:Generated By
ECC Signing Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
ECC Verifying Key:Paired With
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
ECC Verifying Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
ECC Signing Key:Paired With
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
KAS Private Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
KAS Public Key:Paired With
KAS Shared Secret:Derived
From
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
KAS Public Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
KAS Private Key:Paired With
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
KAS Shared Secret:Derived
From
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
KAS Shared Secret RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
KAS Private Key:Derives
KAS Public Key:Derives
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
MAC Keys
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
DRBG-State:Generates
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
RSA Signing Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
RSA Verifying Key:Paired With
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
RSA Verifying Key
Input AES
wrapped
Output AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
Output SCP03
wrapped
RAM (S1):Obfuscated
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
RSA Signing Key:Paired With
AES Transport Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 C-ENC RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
SCP03 S-Enc:Derives
SCP03 C-MAC RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
SCP03 S-MAC:Derives
SCP03 R-MAC RAM (S1):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z1
Z2
Z3
SCP03 S-MAC:Derives
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Name Input - Output Storage
Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SCP03 S-ENC
Input SCP03
wrapped
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
SCP03 C-ENC:Derived From
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 S-MAC
Input SCP03
wrapped
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
SCP03 C-MAC:Derived From
SCP03 R-MAC:Derived From
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
Secure Password
Input AES
wrapped
Input SCP03
wrapped
EEPROM
(S3):Plaintext
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
Secure Password AES
Key:Encrypts
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
Secure Password
AES Key
Input SCP03
wrapped
EEPROM
(S2):Obfuscated
Until use
completes
Z2
Z3
Secure Password:Encrypted By
SCP03 C-ENC:Encrypts
SCP03 C-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
SCP03 R-MAC:Provides
Integrity For
Table 23: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
The module implements multiple keys with a security strength of 112 bits. In accordance with IG D.B, applying cryptographic
protection (e.g., encryption) with a minimum security strength of 112 bits is acceptable through 2030; thereafter, 128 bits of security
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strength shall be provided. For 2031 and beyond, the legacy use of cryptographic keys with a minimum of 112 bits of security
strength is permitted for the purposes of processing cryptographically protected data (e.g., decryption).
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3,
these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational self–tests are periodically performed by the Module after 65535 (max)
command received. The Module will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is
required; the pending commands in the I/O buffer will be processed by the Module after the
periodic self-tests complete. The Module logs the latest self-test errors, the approved CO and
User can consult the error log after successful authentication.
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Firmware
Integrity
16-bit CRC
Error
Detection
Code
EDC
SW/FW
Integrity
Success or
Failure
code
Executed on the whole
firmware stored in
EEPROM before the
Module transition to the
idle state.
EEPROM
CSP area
integrity
16-bit CRC
Error
Detection
Code
EDC
Critical
Function
Success or
Failure
code
Executed on the whole
CSP stored in
EEPROM before the
Module transition to the
idle state.
Table 24: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-
CMAC
(A5349)
AES-128
CMAC
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
Generation and
Verification
Power-On
AES-ECB
(A4856)
Decrypt
AES-128,
192 and
256-bit –
ECB
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
Decryption Power-On
AES-ECB
(A4856)
Encrypt
AES-128,
192 and
256-bit –
ECB
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
Encryption Power-On
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A5349)
Decrypt
AES-128
and AES-
256 - GCM
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
Decryption Power-On
AES-GCM
(A5349)
Encrypt
AES-128
and AES-
256 - GCM
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
Encryption Power-On
Counter
DRBG
(A5349)
CTR_DRBG KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
AES-256
CTR_DRBG
instantiate,
generate, and
reseed KATs
performed
before the first
random data
generation.
Includes Health
Tests.
Power-On
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
EC key pair
generation.
PCT PCT
No Error
Status
Word
EC Key Pair
Generation.
Signature
generation and
verification.
Upon Key
Generation
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
w/ K-233
Using
ECDSA K-
233 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
ECDSA using K-
233 with SHA2-
256. Signature
generation.
Power-On
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
w/ P-224
Using
ECDSA P-
224 with
SHA2-224
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
ECDSA using P-
224 with SHA2-
224. Signature
generation.
Power-On
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
w/ K-233
Using
ECDSA K-
233 with
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
ECDSA using K-
233 with SHA2-
256. Signature
verification.
Power-On
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
w/ P-224
Using
ECDSA P-
224 with
SHA2-224
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
ECDSA using P-
224 with SHA2-
224. Signature
verification.
Power-On
EEPROM
CSP Area
Integrity
CRC-16
EDC
KAT
Critical
Function
No Error
Status
Word
16-bit Error
Detection Code.
Executed on the
whole CSP
stored in
Power-On
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
EEPROM before
the Module
transitions to the
idle state.
ENT
NIST SP
800-90B
Health Tests
APT
and
RCT
CAST
No Error
Status
Word
An RCT and
APT as specified
in [90B] section
4.4 are executed
before
generation of the
DRBG entropy
input
Power-On
HMAC-
SHA-1
(A5349)
HMAC SHA-
1
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
HMAC-SHA-1
KAT
Power-On
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5349)
HMAC
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
HMAC SHA2-
256
Power-On
HMAC-
SHA2-512
(A5349)
HMAC
SHA2-512
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
HMAC SHA2-
512
Power-On
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A5349)
P-256 and
B-233 KAS-
ECC
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
P-256 and B-
233 KAS-ECC
with oneStep
KDF per IG D.F.
Power-On
KDF
SP800-108
(A5349)
AES-CMAC
128 and
HMAC
SHA2-256
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
KDF
concatenation
using AES-128
and HMAC
SHA2-256.
Power-On
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
RSA Key
Pair
Generation.
PCT PCT
No Error
Status
Word
Signature
generation and
verification.
Upon Key
Generation
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
2048-bit key
using
PKCS1.5
and PSS.
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
2048-bit
Signature
Generation
using PKCS1.5
and PSS and
SHA2-256
Power-On
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4) (A5349)
2048-bit key
using
PKCS1.5
and PSS.
KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
2048-bit
Signature
Verification
using PKCS1.5
and PSS and
SHA2-256
Power-On
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA-1
(A5349)
SHA-1 KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
SHA-1 Hash Power-On
SHA2-224
(A5349)
SHA2-224 KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
SHA2-224 Hash Power-On
SHA2-256
(A5349)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
SHA2-256 Hash Power-On
SHA2-384
(A5349)
SHA2-384 KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
SHA2-384 Hash Power-On
SHA2-512
(A5349)
SHA2-512 KAT CAST
No Error
Status
Word
SHA2-512 Hash Power-On
Table 25: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
Firmware
Integrity
EDC SW/FW Integrity
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
EEPROM CSP
area integrity
EDC Critical Function
Before any CSP
access and After
65535 command
received (Max)
Automatic
Table 26: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
AES-CMAC
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
AES-ECB
(A4856) Decrypt
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
AES-ECB
(A4856) Encrypt
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
AES-GCM
(A5349) Decrypt
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
AES-GCM
(A5349) Encrypt
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
Counter DRBG
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349)
PCT PCT
Upon Key
Generation
Automatic
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349) w/ K-
233
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349) w/ P-
224
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349) w/ K-
233
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349) w/ P-
224
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
EEPROM CSP
Area Integrity
KAT Critical Function All CSP access Automatic
ENT APT and RCT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
HMAC-SHA-1
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
KDF SP800-108
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349)
PCT PCT
Upon Key
Generation
Automatic
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
SHA-1 (A5349) KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
SHA2-224
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
SHA2-256
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
SHA2-384
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
SHA2-512
(A5349)
KAT CAST
After 65535
command
received (Max)
Automatic
Table 27: Conditional Periodic Information
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10.4 Error States
For a complete listing of all possible error messages, please request the VaultIC408 1.2.X
Technical Datasheet (TPR0693X) from Sales Representative.
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
ES1
The Module fails a
firmware integrity pre-
operational self-test
or a conditional self-
test.
The Module
enters the
Mute error
state
Reboot/Power
cycle the
module
Outputs No status in
error , otherwise it
indicates successful
completion by a Status
word at 9000h
ES2
The Module fails
DRBG KAT or
EEPROM CSP
integrity self-tests.
The Module
enters the
Terminated
state
None
The Module enters the
terminated error state,
otherwise it indicates
successful completion
by a Status word at
9000h
Table 28: Error States
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Module is delivered securely, with tracking and protection against theft, by contracted
logistic partners to the authorized operator. Upon receipt, the Module must be examined for
evidence of tamper.
The VaultIC408 is delivered in the CREATION state, which is an uninitialized state that supports
status commands, self-tests, and personalization. In order to initialize the module for Approved
use, the operator must perform the following:
1. Authenticate using the default password provided by their Sales Representative.
2. Configure an Approved Administrator, along with their authentication credentials.
3. (Optionally) Configure additional Administrators and Users, as desired, for Approved or non-
Approved modes.
4. Set FIPS Level 3.
Set Status to transition the module into the ACTIVATED state. This will zeroize the default role
and password used to initially authenticate; there is no ability to return to the CREATION state
after transitioning to the ACTIVATED state.
Failure to, at minimum, create an Approved Administrator will result in the module only
operating in non-Approved mode. Once in the ACTIVATED state, the operator may invoke the
Approved or non-Approved services by authenticating to the role associated with the desired
mode of operation (i.e., Approved Administrator to invoke the Approved mode, non-Approved
Administrator to invoke the non-Approved mode).
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11.2 Administrator Guidance
VaultIC408 1.2.X technical datasheet (TPR0693X) describes all the mechanisms for
administrator guidance.
Once successfully authenticated, the Administrator user shall perform the personalization data
and initialize other operators. Typical personalization process may be:
1. Create operators with administrator and approved-user roles using Manage
Authentication Data command.
2. Download initial keyset using Put Key command.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
VaultIC408 1.2.X technical datasheet (TPR0693X) describes all the mechanisms for non-
administrator guidance.
Once successfully authenticated, the non-administrator user can use all the approved
command.
11.4 Design and Rules
Design and Rules – Overall security design and the rules of operation.
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an
authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling or resetting
the Module.
6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
11. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output
of data.
12. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
13. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
14. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
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15. The Module does not support a maintenance role or interface.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11.6 End of Life
The Module terminated state is an end of life state; however, that cannot be invoked by the
operator.
The Module must be zeroized by deleting all operator accounts through the Manage
Authentication Data service. The Module may then be physically decommissioned by returning
to corporate IT administrator.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 29 References
Abbreviation* Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15
December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, 20 December 2024 >
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
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WISeKey SEALSQ Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Abbreviation* Full Specification Name
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[202] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B,
May 2005
[38C] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special
Publication 800-38C, May 2004
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December
2012
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018
Table 30 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym* Definition
APT Adaptative Proportion Test
KAT Know Answer Test
RCT Repetition Count Test
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter