Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Version 0.3
July 28, 2017
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 2
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO ADAPTIVE SECURITY APPLIANCE CM.......................................................... 4
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ................................................................................................. 5
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS .................................................. 5
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
2.4 ASA 5500 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ........................................................................... 7
2.5 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 13
2.6 USER SERVICES ................................................................................................................ 14
2.7 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................. 15
2.8 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES .............................................................................................. 16
2.9 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 17
2.10 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 17
2.11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 21
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 22
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 22
Non-Approved/Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms ......................................................................................................... 23
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module ........................................................................................ 23
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded Module.......................................................... 24
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module ................................................................................ 24
2.12 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 24
2.13 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 26
2.13.1 Opacity Shield Security ........................................................................................................................................ 26
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield................................................................................................. 26
ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield ............................................................................................................ 27
2.13.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) ............................................................................................................................ 28
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels................................................................................................................................. 44
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 44
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION .................................................. 44
3.2 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM CONFIGURATION................................................. 45
3.3 IDENTIFYING MODULE OPERATION IN AN APPROVED MODE............................................ 47
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Adaptive Security
Appliances Cryptographic Module running Firmware 9.6. This security policy describes how the
module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run the module in a
FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module will operate, including the
rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2IG and additional rules imposed
by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available on the modules from the following
sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following websites:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
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The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module is referred to
as Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module, Adaptive Security Appliance CM,
ASA, Module, Appliances or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic
Module on the 5500 Security Appliances models identified below and explains the secure
configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2,
which details the general features and functionality of the appliances. Section 3 specifically
addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
2 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance CM
Cisco® Adaptive Security Appliances, ASA 5500-X Series Next-Generation Firewalls, provide
balanced security effectiveness with productivity. This solution offers the combination of the
industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation
network security services: intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security, secure unified
communications, TLSv1, SSHv2, IKEv2, Remote Access VPN [With TLSv1/ DTLSv1 and
IKEv2/ ESPv3] and Suite B.
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) firmware is the core operating system for the Cisco
ASA Family. It delivers enterprise-class firewall capabilities for the ASA devices in an array of
form factors - standalone appliances tailor-made for small and midsize businesses, midsize
appliances for businesses improving security at the Internet edge, high performance and
throughput appliances for demanding enterprise data centers, high-performance blades that
integrate with the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches, virtual instances to provide enterprise-
class security for private and public clouds and Firepower services.
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2.1 Cryptographic Module
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances Cryptographic Module is defined as a multiple-chip
standalone cryptographic module running on the following Adaptive Security Appliances:
Small Scale Models:
 ASA 5506-X
 ASA 5506H-X
 ASA 5506W-X
 ASA 5508-X
 ASA 5512-X
 ASA 5515-X
 ASA 5516-X
Medium Scale Models:
 ASA 5525-X
 ASA 5545-X
 ASA 5555-X
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance, when deployed as next-generation firewall (NGFW)
appliances, use Adaptive Security Appliance CM and the embedded Cisco®
Firepower CM,
Certificate# 2960 with these appliances. The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance CM is the core
operating system for the Cisco ASA Family. It delivers enterprise-class firewall capabilities for
the ASA series appliances. Please refer to FIPS Cert. #2960 for more information about the
FIPS relevant security services provided by Cisco Firepower CM. The sections below detail the
Adaptive Security Appliance CM FIPS compliance.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics
The Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Security Appliances deliver enterprise-class security for business-
to-enterprise networks in a modular, purpose-built appliance, including ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X,
5506W-X, 5508-X, 5512-X, 5515-X, 5516-X, 5525-X, 5545-X, and 5555-X appliances.
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Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provides
no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Physical Interface
Data Input Interface Data ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Data Output Interface Data ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Control Input Interface Data ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Reset Pin/Switch/Button (only on 5506-X, 5506H-X, 5506W-X, 5508-X,
5512-X 5515-X, 5516-X, 5525-X)
Status Output Interface Data ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
LED
Power Interface Power Plug
Unused Interface USB Port
Table 2 Module Interfaces
Mgmt Port Console Data Ports
ASA 55xx chassis
FP CM
ASA CM
Internal
Communication
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2.4 ASA 5500 Physical Characteristics
Figure 1 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Font Panel
1 Power LED:
Green -> power applied OK
6 Console Ports:
RJ-45 and mini-USB Connector if mini-USB
is connected, RJ-45 becomes disconnected
2 Status LED:
Green blinking -> system is booting up
Green solid -> successful boot
Orange -> error during boot-up
7 GE Management Port
3 Active LED:
Green -> unit is Active in failover pair
Orange -> unit is Standby in failover pair
Off -> not part of a failover pair
8 USB port for external storage – shows up as
disk1
4 WLAN Module
Only lit for 5506W-X Controlled by AP
module, same color/blink behavior as
existing AP702i Access Point
9 Reset Pin
5 GE ports:
Left-side LED Green -> link
Right-side LED blinking -> network activity
10 Power Supply
5 9
6
8
10
Figure 2 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Rear Panel
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Figure 3 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Rear Panel
1 Power cord socket. The chassis power-supply socket. See Power Supply for more information
about the chassis power supply.
Note The ASA is powered on when you plug in the AC power supply.
2 Status LEDs The locations and meanings of the status LEDs are described in Status Lights.
3 Network data ports Four Gigabit Ethernet RJ-45 (8P8C) network I/O interfaces. The ports are
numbered (from top to bottom) 1, 2, 3, 4,. Each port includes a pair of LEDs,
one each for connection status and link status. The ports are named and
numbered Gigabit Ethernet 1/1 through Gigabit Ethernet 1/4. See Network
Ports for additional information.
4 Management port A Gigabit Ethernet interface restricted to network management access only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
5 Console ports Two serial ports, a standard RJ-45 (8P8C), and a mini USB Type B, are
provided for management access via an external system. See Console Ports for
additional information.
6 USB port A standard USB Type A port is provided that allows the attachment of an
external device, such as mass storage. See Internal and External Flash Storage
for additional information.
7 Reset button A small recessed button that if pressed for longer than three seconds resets the
ASA to its default “as-shipped” state following the next reboot. Configuration
variables are reset to factory default. However, the flash is not erased and no
files are removed.
Note
You can use the service sw-reset-button to disable the reset button.
The default is enabled.
Figure 4 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Front Panel
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Figure 5 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Rear Panel
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Figure 6 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Front Panel
Figure 7 ASA 5512-X, ASA 5515-X and ASA 5525-X Appliances Front Panel
LED Description
1 Power Button A hard switch that turns the system on and off. Once depressed, the button stays in the "on"
position:
 On–The power symbol on the button illuminates.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
For information about the power state, see the “Power Supply Considerations” section.
2 Hard disk release
button
Releases the hard disk from the device.
3 Alarm Indicates system operating status:
 Off–Normal operating system function.
 Flashing amber–Critical Alarm indicting one or more of the following:
- a major failure of a hardware or software component.
- an over-temperature condition.
- power voltage is outside of the tolerance range.
4 VPN Indicates VPN tunnel status:
 Solid green–VPN tunnel is established.
 Off–No VPN tunnel is established.
5 HD Indicates Hard Disk Drive status:
 Flashing green–Proportioned to read/write activity.
 Solid amber–Hard disk drive failure.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
6 PS Indicates the power supply status.
7 Active Indicates the status of the failover pair:
 Solid green–Failover pair is operating normally.
 Off– Failover is not operational.
8 Boot Indicates power-up diagnostics:
 Flashing green–Power-up diagnostics are running, or system is booting.
 Solid amber–System has passed power-up diagnostics.
 Off– Power-up diagnostics are not operational.
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Figure 8 ASA 5512-X, ASA 5515-X and ASA 5525-X Appliances Rear Panel
1 Management 0/0
interface
Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet Interface that is restricted to management use only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
(See the “Management 0/0 Interface on the ASA 5500-S Series” section.)
2 Power supply Indicates the chassis power supply.
3 RJ-45 Ethernet
ports
Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet customer data interfaces.
The top row port numbers are (from left to right) 5, 3, 1.
The bottom row port numbers are (from left to right) 4, 2, 0.
4 USB ports Indicates the two USP standard ports.
(See the “External USP Support” section.)
5 Console port Indicates the console port that directly connects a computer to the ASA.
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Figure 9 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Front Panel
4
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Figure 10 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Rear Panel
In addition, for details of the embedded Firepower cryptographic module, please refer to
certificate number 2960’s Security Policy for more information.
2.5 Roles and Services
The security appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
• Console Port
• Telnet over IPsec
• SSH v2
• HTTPS/TLS
Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to
the module. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the security appliances that
operators may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the security
appliances assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using
Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. The module also
supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another means of authentication, allowing the storage of
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 14
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usernames and passwords on an external server as opposed to using the module’s internal
database for storage.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number
character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper
case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by
performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in
one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048
bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would
have a 1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a
million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful
random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately
1.8x1021
attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to
support.
2.6 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or via IPsec
protected telnet or SSH session to an Ethernet port or ASDM via HTTPS/TLS. The module
prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed
entry to the module management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via
an IPsec session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital
signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs,
the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroize/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs
are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of IOS currently running. Operator password (r)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust flow control). Operator password (r)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
IPsec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec VPN. Operator password, skeyid, skeyid_d,
SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key,
IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication
private Key, IKE authentication public
key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec
authentication key, DRBG entropy
input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V and
DRBG C (r, w, d)
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Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
SSH Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH. Operator password, SSHv2 Private Key,
SSHv2 Public Key and SSHv2 session
key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions (TLS) Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS. Operator password, ECDSA private
key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS traffic keys,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
2.7 Crypto Officer Services
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the security
appliances and authenticates from the enable command (for local authentication) or the login
command (for AAA authentication) from the user services. The Crypto Officer services consist
of the following:
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available
to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and
zeroize/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Configure the Security
Blade
Define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases, set the
protocols the module will support, enable interfaces and network
services, set system date and time, and load authentication information.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable
password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key, IKE authentication private Key,
IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key (r. w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each
interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set of
packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions health,
temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review
accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Manage the Security
Blade
Log off users, shutdown or reload the module, erase the flash memory,
manually back up module configurations, view complete configurations,
manager user rights, and restore module configurations.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Configure
Encryption/Bypass
Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set preshared keys and
algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow plaintext packets to be
set from specified IP address.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable
password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key, IKE authentication private Key,
IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption
key, IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
TLS VPN (TLSv1.0) Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs. ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master
secret, TLS traffic keys, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
SSH v2 Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs. SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key and SSHv2
session key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
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IPsec VPN Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs. ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED,
IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication
key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption key,
IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input,
DRBG Seed, DRBG V and DRBG C (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Local Certificate
Authority
Allows the ASA to be configured as a Root Certificate Authority and
issue user certificates for SSL VPN use (AnyConnect and Clientless).
The ASA can then be configured to require client certificates for
authentication.
N/A
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization methods
classified in table 6, Zeroization column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.8 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.8, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
IPsec
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SSH
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
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All services available can be found at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/security/asa-5500-
series-next-generation-firewalls/products-installation-and-configuration-guides-list.html. This
site lists all configuration guides for the ASA systems.
2.9 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins and cycle power.
In addition, for details regarding the Roles, Services and Authentication provided by the
embedded cryptographic module, please refer to certificate number 2960’s Security Policy.
2.10 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the
Crypto Officer role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of
overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both
manually and electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual
distribution are used for pre-shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used
for electronic distribution.
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer
can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly
associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are entered into
the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public
key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with
the user/role that entered them.
The on-board processor provides the source of raw entropy. The DRBG is seeded with 384-bits.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG (using
SHA-512)
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-
90A HASH_DRBG.
HW (onboard Cavium
cryptographic processor) based
entropy source used to construct
seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG (using
SHA-512)
384-bits Input to the DRBG that
determines the internal state of the
DRBG. Generated using DRBG
derivation function that includes
the entropy input from hardware-
based entropy source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG V SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG (using
SHA-512)
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon
which the security of this DRBG
mechanism depends. Generated
first during DRBG instantiation
and then subsequently updated
using the DRBG update function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG C SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG (using
SHA-512)
256-bits Internal critical value used as part
of SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG.
Established per SP 800-90A
HASH_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 – 4096 bits The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange.
Established per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224-379 bits The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is generated by calling SP800-
90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 – 4096 bits The public key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is derived per the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was established via
key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF and it will be
used for deriving other keys in
IKE protocol implementation.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it
will be used for deriving IKE
session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
SKEYSEED Shared Secret 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it
will be used for deriving IKE
session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
encrypt key. This key is derived
via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC SHA-1 160 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
authentication key. This key is
derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared secret Variable 8 plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE
skeyid when using preshared
secret authentication. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
no crypto
isakmp key’
command
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA/ ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves: P-
256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in
IKE authentication. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running
‘#crypto key
zeroize’
command
IKE
authentication
public key
RSA/ ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves: P-
256/P-384)
RSA/ECDSA public key used in
IKE authentication. Internally
generated by the module
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running
‘#crypto key
zeroize’
command
IPsec encryption
key
Triple-DES, AES and
AES-GCM
192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
The IPsec (IKE phase II)
encryption key. This key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC SHA-1 160 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II)
authentication key. This key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus characters The password of the User role.
This CSP is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable password Password 8 plus characters The password of the CO role.
This CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
RADIUS secret Shared Secret 16 characters The RADIUS shared secret. Used
for RADIUS Client/Server
authentication. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
no radius-server
key’ command
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The TACACS+ shared secret.
Used for TACACS+
Client/Server authentication. This
CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
no tacacs-server
key’ command
SSHv2 Private
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 private key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
crypto key
zeroize rsa’
command
SSHv2 Public
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 public key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
internally generated by the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
By running ‘#
crypto key
zeroize rsa’
command
SSHv2 Session
Key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
This is the SSHv2 session key. It
is used to encrypt all SSHv2 data
traffics traversing between the
SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
ECDSA private
key
ECDSA Curves: P-
256,384,521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. This key
is generated by calling SP 800-
90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized upon
API call
“#crypto key
zeroize ecdsa”
ECDSA public
key
ECDSA Curves: P-
256,384,521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. This key
is generated by calling SP 800-
90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized upon
API call
“#crypto key
zeroize ecdsa”
Enable secret Shared Secret At least eight
characters
The obfuscated password of the
CO role. However, the algorithm
used to obfuscate this password is
not FIPS approved. Therefore,
this password is considered
plaintext for FIPS purposes. This
password is zeroized by
overwriting it with a new
password. The Crypto Officer
configures the module to
obfuscate the Enable password.
This CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS RSA private
keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself and also
used in TLS negotiations. This
key was generated by calling
FIPS approved DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
“#crypto key
zeroize rsa”,
write to startup
config, followed
by a module
reboot
TLS RSA public
keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself and also
used in TLS negotiations. This
key was generated by calling
FIPS approved DRBG.
NVRAM
(plain text)
Zeroized by
“#crypto key
zeroize rsa”,
write to startup
config, followed
by a module
reboot
TLS pre-master
secret
Shared Secret At least eight
characters
Shared secret created/derived
using asymmetric cryptography
from which new HTTPS session
keys can be created. This key
entered into the module in cipher
text form, encrypted by RSA
public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated.
TLS traffic keys Triple-DES/AES
128/192/256
HMAC-
SHA1/256/384/512
192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
Used in HTTPS connections.
Generated using TLS protocol.
This key was derived in the
module.
DRAM
(plain text)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Integrity test key RSA-2048 Public key 2048 bits A hard coded key used for
firmware power-up/load integrity
verification.
Hard coded
for firmware
integrity
testing
Zeroized by
“#erase flash:”
command (or
replacing), write
to startup
config, followed
by a module
reboot
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
In addition, for details regarding the cryptographic keys and CSPs used in the embedded
cryptographic module, please refer to certificate number 2960’s Security Policy.
2.11 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
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Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Note:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
 Per SP800-67 rev1, the user is responsible for ensuring the module’s limit to 2^32
encryptions with the same Triple-DES key while being used in SSH, TLS or IPSec/IKE
protocol.
 The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
6071 for IPsec and RFC 5288 for TLS. The module uses basically a 96-bit IV, which is
comprised of a 4 byte salt unique to the crypto session and 8 byte monotonically
increasing counter. The module rekeys prior to the IV hitting its maximum number of 2^64
-1. The module generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.
 The SSH, TLS and IPSec/IKE protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP
and CMVP.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and
150 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
Algorithm
ASA OS
(Firmware)
ASA On-board
(Cavium
Octeon III)
(ASA 5506-X,
5506H-X,
5506W-X)
ASA On-board
(Cavium
Octeon III)
(ASA 5508-X,
5516-X)
ASA On-board
(Cavium
Nitrox PX)
(ASA 5512-X,
5515-X, 5525-
X)
ASA On-board
(Cavium
Nitrox PX)
(ASA 5545-X,
5555-X)
ASA OS ASA CN7020
or CN7130
ASA CN7130 ASA CN1610 ASA CN1620
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4249 3301 3301 2472 2050 & 2444
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2304 1881 1881 1513 1321
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3486 2737 2737 2091 1794
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 2787 2095 2095 1514 1247
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer;
2048 bits)
2298
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-
384, P-521)
989
DRBG (SHA-512) 1328 819 819 336 332
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLS and SSH) 1002
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
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 NDRNG
 HMAC MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
 MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
Non-Approved/Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 HMAC MD5
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
Note: The non-approved algorithms HMAC MD5 and MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode when
not used with TLS.
In addition, the embedded cryptographic module (FIPS 140-2 Cert. #2960) also provides the
following FIPS approved algorithm certificates and non-approved algorithms:
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithms Algorithm Implementations
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4266
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2307
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3512
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 2811
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2297
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521) 995
DRBG (AES256 CTR) 1337
CVL Component (TLS and SSH) 1008
Table 8 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Note:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
 Per SP800-67 rev1, the user is responsible for ensuring the module’s limit to 2^32
encryptions with the same Triple-DES key while being used in SSH or TLS protocol.
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
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 The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS. The module uses basically a 96-bit IV, which is comprised of a 4 byte salt
unique to the crypto session and 8 byte monotonically increasing counter. The module
rekeys prior to the IV hitting its maximum number of 2^64
-1The module generates new
AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.
 The SSH and TLS protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded Module
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112
and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman ((key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between
128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength)
 NDRNG
 HMAC MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
 MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
 DES
 HMAC MD5
 MD5
 RC4
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
Note: The non-approved algorithms HMAC MD5 and MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode when
not used with TLS.
2.12 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly.
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Self-tests performed
 ASA Self Tests
o POSTs – Adaptive Security Appliance OS (Firmware)
 AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 AES-GCM KAT
 DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A
Section 11.3 are performed)
 ECDSA (sign/verify)
 Firmware Integrity Test (using SHA-512 and RSA 2048)
 HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 RSA (sign/verify) KATs
 SHA-1 KAT
 SHA-256 KAT
 SHA–384 KAT
 SHA-512 KAT
 Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o POSTs – ASA On-board (Hardware)
 AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 AES-GCM KAT
 DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A
Section 11.3 are performed)
 HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 SHA-1 KAT
 SHA-256 KAT
 SHA-384 KAT
 SHA-512 KAT
 Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o Conditional tests - Adaptive Security Appliance OS (Firmware)
 RSA pairwise consistency test (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify)
 ECDSA pairwise consistency test
 Conditional IPSec Bypass test
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
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o Conditional tests - ASA On-board (Hardware)
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
 Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
The security appliances perform all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.
In addition, for details of the Self-Tests conducted by the embedded cryptographic module,
please refer to certificate number 2960’s Security Policy.
2.13 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the module is met by the use of
opacity shields covering the front panels of appliances to provide the required opacity and
tamper evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence.
2.13.1 Opacity Shield Security
The following table shows the tamper labels and opacity shields that shall be installed on the
appliances to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for using,
securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. Actions to be taken
when there is any evidence of tampering should be addressed within site security programs.
ASA Models Number
Tamper
labels
Tamper Evident Labels Number
Opacity
Shields
Opacity Shields
5506-X 4 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506H-X 4 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506W-X 4 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5508-X 5 ASA5500X-FIPS-KIT= 1 ASA5508-FIPS-KIT=
5512-X 3 ASA5500X-FIPS-KIT= 0 None
5516-X 5 ASA5500X-FIPS-KIT= 1 ASA5516-FIPS-KIT=
5515-X, 5525-X, 5545-X,
5555-X
3 CISCO-FIPS-KIT= 0 None
Table 9 Tamper Labels and Opacity Shield Quantities
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X, follow these steps:
Step 1: Remove the three screws from the bottom of the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and
5506W-X.
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Step 2: Slide the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X into the FIPS enclosure.
Step 3: Turn the FIPS enclosure with the chassis securely inside and use the three screws removed
in Step 1 to screw the FIPS enclosure to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X.
Step 4: Apply the tamper evident label over the screw on the bottom. Please see Figure 24 for
placement of the TEL.
Step 5: Apply another tamper evident label so that one half of the tamper evident label attaches
to the enclosure and the other half attaches to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X
chassis. Please see Figure 24 for placement of the TEL.
Figure 11 ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X and ASA 5506W-X Opacity Shield Placement
ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5508-X or ASA 5516-X rear, follow these steps:
Step 1: Power off the ASA.
Step 2: Remove the two screws.
Step 3: Place the shield over the vent areas and insert the screws.
Figure 12 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield Placement
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 28
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2.13.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs)
The tamper evident seals (hereinafter referred to as tamper evident labels (TEL)) shall be
installed on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in FIPS mode. TELs
shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored,
accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason,
the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove
the debris using a damp cloth.
Any deviation of the TELs placement such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change,
replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below
by unauthorized operators shall mean the module is no longer in FIPS mode of operation.
Returning the system back to FIPS mode of operation requires the replacement of the TEL as
depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope
of this Security Policy.
To seal the system, apply tamper-evidence labels as depicted in the figures below.
Figure 13 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Front View
Figure 14 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Right Side View
Figure 15 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Left Side View
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 29
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Figure 16 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 17 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Top View
Figure 18 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Bottom TEL Placement
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 30
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Figure 19 ASA 5506H-X Front View
Figure 20 ASA 5506H-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 21 ASA 5506H-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 22 ASA 5506H-X Left Side TEL Placement
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Figure 23 ASA 5506H-X Top View
Figure 24 ASA 5506H-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 25 ASA 5508-X Front View
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Figure 26 ASA 5508-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 27 ASA 5508-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 28 ASA 5508-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 29 ASA 5508-X Top TEL Placement
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Figure 30 ASA 5508-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 31 ASA 5512-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 32 ASA 5512-X Right Side View
Figure 33 ASA 5512-X Rear TEL Placement
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Figure 34 ASA 5512-X Left Side View
Figure 35 ASA 5512-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 36 ASA 5512-X Bottom TEL Placement
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 35
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Figure 37 ASA 5515-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 38 ASA 5515-X Right Side View
Figure 39 ASA 5515-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 40 ASA 5515-X Left Side View
© Copyright 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. 36
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Figure 41 ASA 5515-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 42 ASA 5515-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 43 ASA 5516-X Front View
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Figure 44 ASA 5516-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 45 ASA 5516-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 46 ASA 5516-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 47 ASA 5516-X Top TEL Placement
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Figure 48 ASA 5516-X Bottom TEL Placement
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Figure 49 ASA 5525-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 50 ASA 5525-X Right Side View
Figure 51 ASA 5525-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 52 ASA 5525-X Left Side View
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Figure 53 ASA 5525-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 54 ASA 5525-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 55 ASA 5545-X Front TEL Placement
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Figure 56 ASA 5545-X Right Side View
Figure 57 ASA 5545-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 58 ASA 5545-X Left Side View
Figure 59 ASA 5545-X Top TEL Placement
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Figure 60 ASA 5545-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 61 ASA 5555-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 62 ASA 5555-X Right Side View
Figure 63 ASA 5555-X Rear TEL Placement
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Figure 64 ASA 5555-X Left Side View
Figure 65 ASA 5555-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 66 ASA 5555-X Bottom TEL Placement
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Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the system before cleaning the chassis and applying labels.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels.
Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the security appliances as shown in figures above.
The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive
backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident labels or the material of
the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial
numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to
verify that the security appliances have not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also
be inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices.
The word “OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the modules are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization
The Cisco ASA 5500-X series security appliances were validated with adaptive security
appliance firmware version 9.6 (File name: asa962-1-lfbff-k8.SPA and asa962-1-smp-k8.bin).
The ASA 5506-X, 5508-X, and 5516-X run the asa962-1-lfbff-k8.SPA firmware image. The
ASA 5512-X, 5515-X, 5525-X, 5545-X and 5555-Xrun the asa962-1-smp-k8.bin. These are the
only allowable images for FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
Step 1: Disable the console output of system crash information, using the following
command:
(config)#crashinfo console disable
Step 2: Install Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the security appliances to use Triple-
DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 3: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the security appliances to internally enforce FIPS-
compliant behavior, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test, using the following
command:
(config)#fips enable
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Step 4: Disable password recovery.
(config)#no service password-recovery
Step 5: Set the configuration register to bypass ROMMON prompt at boot.
(config)#config-register 0x10011
Step 6: If using a Radius/TACACS+ server for authentication, perform the following
steps (see Operator manual for specific TACACS+ commands). Otherwise, skip to step 7.
(config)# aaa-server radius-server protocol radius
(config)#aaa-server radius-server host <IP-address>
Configure an IPsec tunnel to secure traffic between the ASA and the Radius server.
The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long.
Step 7: Enable AAA authentication for the console.
(config)#aaa authentication serial console LOCAL
(config)#username <name> password <password>
Step 8: Enable AAA authentication for SSH.
(config)#aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
Step 9: Enable AAA authentication for Enable mode.
(config)#aaa authentication enable console LOCAL
Step 10: Specify Privilege Level 15 for Crypto Officer and Privilege Level 1 for User
and set up username/password for each role.
(config)#username <name> password <password> privilege 15
(config)#username <name> password <password> privilege 1
Step 11: Ensure passwords are at least 8 characters long.
Step 12: All default passwords, such as enable and telnet, must be replaced with new
passwords.
Step 13: Apply tamper evident labels as described in the “Physical Security” section on
page 26.
Step 14: Reboot the security appliances.
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Configuration
To operate in FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer must perform the following steps:
Step 1: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.
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Step 2: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters
long and secure traffic between the security appliances and the RADIUS/TACACS+
server via IPSec tunnel.
Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise proceed to
step 3.
Step 3: Configure the TLS protocol when using HTTPS to protect administrative
functions. Due to known issues relating to the use of TLS with certain versions of the
Java plugin, upgrade to JRE 1.5.0_05 or later is required. The following configuration
settings are known to work when launching ASDM in a TLS-only environment with JRE
1.5.0_05:
a. Configure the device to allow only TLSv1 packets using the following
command:
(config)# ssl server-version tlsv1-only
(config)# ssl client-version tlsv1-only
b. Uncheck SSL Version 2.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.
c. Check TLS V1.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.
Step 4: Configure the security appliances to use SSHv2. Note that all operators must still
authenticate after remote access is granted.
(config)# ssh version 2
Step 5: Configure the security appliances such that any remote connections via Telnet are
secured through IPSec.
Step 6: Configure the security appliances such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are
used for IPSec tunnels.
Step 7: Configure the security appliances such that error messages can only be viewed by
Crypto Officer.
Step 8: Configure SNMP to always use a secure IPSec tunnel.
Step 9: Disable the TFTP server.
Step 10: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation.
HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.
Step 11: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved
algorithms.
In addition, for the Secure Operations steps required for the embedded cryptographic module,
please refer to certificate number 2960’s Security Policy.
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3.3 Identifying Module Operation in an Approved Mode
The following activities are required to verify that the module is operating in an Approved mode
of operation:
1. Verify that the tamper evidence labels and FIPS opacity shields have been properly placed on
the module based on the instructions specified in the “Physical Security” and “Secure
Operation” sections of this document.
2. Verify that the length of User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets are at least
eight (8) characters long, include at least one letter, and include at least one number
character, as specified in the “Secure Operation” section of this document.
3. Issue the following commands: 'show crypto IPSec sa' and 'show crypto isakmp policy' to
verify that only FIPS approved algorithms are used.
In addition, for the Secure Operations steps required for the embedded cryptographic module,
please refer to certificate number 2960’s Security Policy.