VMware's VPN Crypto
Module
Software Version: 2.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 1
Document Version: 0.1
VMware, Inc.
3401 Hillview Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
Tel: 877-486-9273
Email: info@vmware.com
http://www.vmware.com
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 2 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 Reference .....................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 Document Organization...............................................................................................................................4
2 VMware’s VPN Crypto Module................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................5
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................7
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary..............................................................................................................8
2.2.3 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................9
2.3 Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................................................10
2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication ............................................................................................................10
2.4.1 Roles ......................................................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 Services..................................................................................................................................................11
2.4.3 Authentication.......................................................................................................................................11
2.5 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................11
2.6 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................11
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................13
2.7.1 Key Generation ......................................................................................................................................14
2.7.2 Key Entry/Output...................................................................................................................................14
2.7.3 Zeroization.............................................................................................................................................14
2.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) ................................................14
2.9 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................14
2.9.1 Power-On Self-Tests ..............................................................................................................................14
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................15
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................15
3 Secure Operation......................................................................................................................................16
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance .............................................................................................................................16
3.1.1 VMware’s VPN Crypto Module Secure Operation.................................................................................16
3.2 User Guidance............................................................................................................................................16
4 Acronyms .................................................................................................................................................17
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 3 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram.............................................................................................................7
Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary..................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section ........................................................................................5
Table 2 – Tested Configurations...................................................................................................................6
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (librte_crypto_post.so.20.0 )..............................................................9
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (librte_cryptodev.so.20.0)..................................................................9
Table 5 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping........................................................................................10
Table 6 – Crypto Officer and Users Services..............................................................................................11
Table 7 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Key Components, and CSPs..........................................................13
Table 8 – Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................17
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 4 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the VMware's VPN Crypto Module from
VMware, Inc. This Security Policy describes how the VMware's VPN Crypto Module meets the security
requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S.
and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-
2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This
policy was prepared as part of the Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The VMware's VPN Crypto
Module is also referred to in this document as “the module”.
1.2 Reference
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following
sources:
• The VMware website (http://www.vmware.com) contains information on the full line of products
from VMware.
• The CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/Validated-Modules/Search) contains options to get contact information for individuals to
answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Model document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package is
proprietary to VMware and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to
these documents, please contact VMware, Inc.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 5 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2 VMWARE’S VPN CRYPTO MODULE
2.1 Introduction
VMware, Inc., a global leader in virtualization, cloud infrastructure, and business mobility, delivers
customer-proven solutions that accelerate Information Technology (IT) by reducing complexity and
enabling more flexible, agile service delivery. With VMware solutions, organizations are creating
exceptional experiences by mobilizing everything, responding faster to opportunities with modern data and
apps hosted across hybrid clouds, and safeguarding customer trust with a defense-in-depth approach to
cybersecurity. VMware enables enterprises to adopt an IT model that addresses their unique business
challenges. VMware’s approach accelerates the transition to solutional-computing while preserving existing
investments and improving security and control.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Specification
VMware's VPN Crypto Module is a software cryptographic module whose purpose is to provide FIPS 140-
2 validated cryptographic functions to various VMware applications utilizing VPN capabilities.
The module is defined as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module and has been validated at the FIPS
140-2 overall Security Level 1. Table 1 below describes the level achieved by the module in each of the
eleven sections of the FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A1
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC2
1
9 Self-tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
1
N/A – Not Applicable
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 6 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
The FIPS 140-2 operational testing was performed on the configurations presented in Table 2.
Table 2 – Tested Configurations
Operating System Processor
Processor
Optimization
Hardware Platform
Ubuntu 18.04 on VMware
ESXi 7.0
Intel Xeon Gold
6230R
AES-NI3
Dell PowerEdge R740
Ubuntu 18.04 on VMware
ESXi 7.0
Intel Xeon Gold
6230R
None Dell PowerEdge R740
In addition to its full AES software implementations, the VMware's VPN Crypto Module is capable of
leveraging the AES-NI instruction set of the supported Intel processors in order to accelerate AES
calculations.
Because the VMware's VPN Crypto Module is defined as a software cryptographic module, it possesses
both a physical cryptographic boundary and a logical cryptographic boundary.
3
AES-NI – Advanced Encryption Standard-New Instructions
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 7 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.2.1 Physical Cryptographic Boundary
As a software module, the module must rely on the physical characteristics of the host system. The physical
boundary of the cryptographic module is defined by the hard enclosure around the host system on which it
runs. The host system consists of integrated circuits of the system board, processor, RAM, hard disk, device
case, power supply, and fans. See Figure 1 below for a block diagram of the host system.
Figure 1 – Hardware Block Diagram
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 8 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.2.2 Logical Cryptographic Boundary
The logical cryptographic boundary for the VMware's VPN Crypto Module is depicted in Figure 2. The
VMware's VPN Crypto Module boundary consists of the following five object files:
• librte_crypto_post.so.20.0
• librte_cryptodev.so.20.0
• librte_pmd_aesni_gcm.so.20.0
• librte_pmd_aesni_mb.so.20.0
• libIPSec_MB.so.0.53.0
The librte_crypto_post.so.20.0 is responsible for performing the integrity testing and loading of all
components. The librte_cryptodev.so.20.0 provides cryptographic services to the application components
once the integrity tests and power-on self-tests have passed successfully. The
librte_crypto_aesni_gcm.so.20.0 provides poll mode crypto driver support for utilizing the Intel multi-buffer
library and provides API access to utilize the AES_GCM and AES_GMAC algorithms. The
librte_crypto_aesni_mb provides poll mode crypto driver support for utilizing Intel multi buffer library and
provides API access to all other algorithms supported by the module. The libIPSec_MB.so.0.53.0 is
highly-optimized software implementations of the core cryptographic processing for the module.
The colored arrows, in Figure 2, indicate the logical information flows into and out of the module.
Hardware (GPC)
Ubuntu OS
Kernel Space
User Space
Calling Application
librte_crypto_post.so.20.0
librte_pmd_aesni_mb.so.20.0
librte_pmd_aesni_gcm.so.20.0
libIPSec_MB.so.0.53.0
API Invocation
System Calls
Logical Boundary
VMware ESXi
librte_cryptodev.so.20.0
Figure 2 – Module’s Logical Cryptographic Boundary
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 9 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.2.3 Modes of Operation
The VMware's VPN Crypto Module only supports a FIPS-Approved mode of operation, when operated and
configured as described in section 3.
Table 3 includes the FIPS-Approved algorithms implemented in librte_crypto_post.so.20.0 and Table 4
includes the FIPS-Approved algorithms implemented in libIPSec_MB.so.0.53.0.
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (librte_crypto_post.so.20.0)
Algorithm Implementation/Mode Certificate Number
SHS SHA-256
A1918
HMAC SHA-256
Table 4 – FIPS-Approved Algorithms (libIPSec_MB.so.0.53.0)
Algorithm Modes Certificate Number
AES (128, 192, and 256-bit keys) CBC, GCM/GMAC
A1917
AES (128-bit key) CCM/CMAC
Triple-DES (3-Key)4
CBC
SHS SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512
HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512
4
After December 31st
, 2023, non-compliant NIST SP 800-67 three-key TDEA is disallowed for encryption unless
specifically allowed by other NIST guidance. Decryption using three-key TDEA is allowed for legacy use.
Data encryption using the same three-key Triple-DES key shall not exceed 2^16 64-bit Triple-DES blocks, in accordance
with IG A.13. In any other scenario, the module cannot perform more than 2^16 64-bit data block encryptions. The user
is responsible for ensuring the module’s compliance with this requirement.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 10 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s logical interfaces exist at a low level in the software as an API. Both the API and physical
interfaces can be categorized into the following interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
• Data input
• Data output
• Control input
• Status output
• Power input
As a software module, the module’s manual controls, physical indicators, and physical and electrical
characteristics are those of the host platform. A mapping of the FIPS 140-2 defined interfaces and the
logical interfaces of the module can be found in Table 5 below.
Table 5 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping
FIPS Interface Logical Interface Physical Interface
Data Input The function calls that accept input data
for processing through their arguments.
Network port, serial port, USB port
Data Output The function calls that return by means of
their return codes or arguments
generated or processed data back to the
caller.
Network port, serial port, USB port
Control Input The function calls that are used to
initialize and control the operation of the
module.
Network port, serial port, USB port ,
Power button
Status Output Return values for function calls; module
generated error messages.
Network port, serial port, USB port ,
Graphics controller
Power Input Initialization function. AC power socket
2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication
2.4.1 Roles
There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2) that operators may assume: A Crypto-Officer
(CO) role and a User role. Each role and their corresponding services are detailed in the sections below.
The User and CO roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module services. Please note
that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in Table 6 below indicate the types of access
required using the following notation:
• R – Read: The CSP is read.
• W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
• X – Execute: The CSP is used within an FIPS-Approved or Allowed security function or
authentication mechanism.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 11 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.4.2 Services
Table 6 below describes the CO and User services.
Table 6 – Crypto Officer and User Services
Role Service Description
CSP and Type of
Access
CO, User Encryption Encrypt plaintext using supplied key and
algorithm specification
AES Key – RX
AES GCM IV – RX
TDES Key – RX
CO, User Decryption Decrypt ciphertext using supplied key and
algorithm specification
AES Key – RX
AES GCM IV – RX
TDES Key – RX
CO, User Hashing Compute and return a message digest using
SHA algorithm
None
CO, User Message Authentication
Code generation
Compute and return a hashed message
authentication code
HMAC Key – RX
CO, User Show Status Show current operational mode of the
module
None
CO, User Run On-Demand Self-Tests Execute required self-tests AES Key – RX
AES GCM IV – RX
TDES Key – RX
HMAC Key – RX
CO, User Key Zeroization Zeroize all Keys and CSP AES Key – W
AES GCM IV – W
TDES Key – W
HMAC Key – W
2.4.3 Authentication
The module is a Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement authentication.
Roles are assumed implicitly through the execution of either a CO or a User service.
2.5 Physical Security
The VMware's VPN Crypto Module is a software module, which FIPS 140-2 defines as a multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module. As such, it does not include physical security mechanisms. Thus, the
FIPS 140-2 requirements for physical security are not applicable.
2.6 Operational Environment
The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-2 requirements on:
• A Dell PowerEdge R740 Server with an Intel Xeon Gold 6230R processor running Ubuntu 18.04
on VMware ESXi 7.0.
The module only allows access to CSPs through its well-defined API.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 12 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Per IG G.5, VMware affirms that the module remains compliant with the FIPS 140-2 validation when
operating on any general-purpose computer (GPC) provided that the GPC uses the specified single user
operating system/mode specified on the validation certificate, or another compatible single user operating
system. The CMVP allows vendor porting and re-compilation of a validated cryptographic module from the
operational environment specified on the validation certificate to an operational environment which was not
included as part of the validation testing as long as the porting rules are followed.
VMware, Inc. affirms that the VMware's VPN Crypto Module runs in its configured, Approved mode of
operation on the following binary compatible platforms executing VMware ESXi 6.7, ESXi 7.0 or higher, or
without ESXi with any of the compatible single user operating system:
• Dell PowerEdge R530, R730, R740, R830, R840, R930, R940, FC640, T320, T430 with Intel Xeon
Processor and R740 with Intel Xeon Gold 61xx or 62xx series Processor
• HPE ProLiant Gen 10: DL 180, DL 360, DL 385, DL560 with Intel Xeon Processor and DL38P Gen8
with AMD Opteron Processor
• Cisco UCS Servers with Intel Xeon Processors, B200, B480, M5 B-Series Blade Serves; C125,
C220, C480 M5 C-Series Blade Servers; B22 M-Series Blade Servers and, C24 M3-Series
Rackmount Servers
• A general-purpose computer platform with Intel Xeon or AMD Opteron Processor executing VMware
ESXi (or without hypervisor) and any OS (including any Linux distribution such as Ubuntu 20.04;
Photon OS 3.0 or higher; RHEL 7.x, 8.x; CentOS 6.x, 7.x, 8.x; SLES 11, 12, 15; and Fedora) with
single user mode.
• A cloud computing environment composed of a general-purpose computing platform executing
VMware ESXi or a VMware cloud solution that is executing VMware ESXi.
• A public, private or hybrid cloud computing environment or offering composed of a general-purpose
computing platform using one of the single user operating systems specified in this document or a
compatible single-user operating system.
No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module and the security strength of keys when the
module is ported to an operational environment that is not listed on the CMVP validation certificate.
In addition to its full AES software implementations, the VMware's VPN Crypto Module is capable of
leveraging the AES-NI instruction set of supported Intel and AMD processors in order to accelerate AES
calculations.
All cryptographic keys and CSPs are under the control of the OS, which protects its CSPs against
unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution. The module only allows access to CSPs through
its well-defined API.
The tested OS segregates user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically
separated from all other processes by the operating system and hardware. The module functions entirely
within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a
single user mode of operation.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022 Page 13 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module supports the CSPs listed below in Table 7.
Table 7 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Key Components, and CSPs
Key/CSP
Key/CSP
Description
Generation/Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
AES Key 128, 192,
256-bit key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Encryption,
Decryption;
Authentication
AES GCM Key 128, 192,
256-bit key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Encryption,
Decryption
AES GCM IV 96-bit Input via API in
plaintext
None In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Encryption,
Decryption
AES CCM Key 128-bit key Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Encryption,
Decryption
TDES Key5
168-bit key Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Encryption,
Decryption
HMAC Key 112-bit key Input via API in
plaintext
Output in plaintext via
Tested Platform’s INT
Path
In RAM Reboot OS;
Cycle host
power
Message
Authentication
5
Note that the security strength of the Triple-DES Key is 112 bits.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 14 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.7.1 Key Generation
The module does not implement any random number generator for the generation of random bits or keys.
The cryptographic module is passed keys and CSPs as API parameters, associated by memory location.
The application calling the cryptographic module passes keys and CSPs in plaintext within the physical
boundary.
2.7.2 Key Entry/Output
Symmetric keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by
the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.
2.7.3 Zeroization
Keys and CSPs can be zeroized by rebooting the host hardware platform.
2.8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
The Dell PowerEdge R740 has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device,
pursuant to Part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against
harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. This equipment
generates, uses, and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with
the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this
equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful interference, in which case the user will be required
to correct the interference at his own expense.
2.9 Self-Tests
Cryptographic self-tests are performed by the module after initialization of the module, and on demand by
power cycling the module. The module does not implement any algorithms that require conditional self-
tests. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and
any error resolutions.
Self-tests are health checks that ensure the cryptographic algorithms implemented within the module are
operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-2 broadly fall within two categories:
1. Power-On Self-Tests
2. Conditional Self-Tests
2.9.1 Power-On Self-Tests
The module performs the required set of power-on self-tests. These self-tests are performed automatically
by the module when the module is powered-up. The list of power-on self-tests that follows may also be run
on-demand when the CO reboots the OS. The module will perform the listed power-on self-tests to
successful completion. During the execution of self-tests, data output from the module is inhibited.
If any of the self-tests fail, the module will return an error code to the application that tried to load and
initialize the module. The module will enter an error state and none of the module’s services are available
in the error state. In order to resolve a cryptographic self-test error, the module must be restarted by
rebooting the OS. If the error persists, the module must be reinstalled.
The VMware's VPN Crypto Module performs the following power-on self-tests:
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 15 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
• Software integrity check
o HMAC SHA-256
• Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o AES CBC Encryption KAT (128, 192, and 256-bit)
o AES CBC Decryption KAT (128, 192, and 256-bit)
o AES GCM Encryption KAT (128, 192, and 256-bit)
o AES GCM Decryption KAT (128, 192, and 256-bit)
o AES CCM Encryption KAT (128-bit)
o AES CCM Decryption KAT (128-bit)
o Triple-DES CBC Encryption KAT
o Triple-DES CBC Decryption KAT
o CMAC-AES Encryption KAT (128-bit)
o CMAC-AES Decryption KAT (128-bit)
o HMAC SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512
KAT (also tests SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module does not implement any algorithm that requires the module to perform any conditional self-
tests.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module was not designed to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS
140-2 Level 1 requirements for this validation.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 16 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3 SECURE OPERATION
The VMware's VPN Crypto Module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below
describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
3.1.1 VMware’s VPN Crypto Module Secure Operation
There are no additional steps beyond installing the VMware NSX-T 3.2 or later versions that must be
performed to use the module correctly. The module is installed automatically when the NSX-T Edge is
installed. The module cannot be obtained separately and is part of the NSX-T Edge installation media. The
CO does not need to perform any action for the module to install or initialize. See " Installing NSX Edge"
and “NSX Edge Installation Methods” in "VMware NSX-T Data Center" documentation.
3.2 User Guidance
The User or API functions calls should be designed to deal with the identified error cases of the VMware's
VPN Crypto Module.
The user is responsible for ensuring the module’s compliance with IG A.13 regarding the maximum number
of encryptions permitted with the same Triple-DES key. After December 31st, 2023, non-compliant NIST
SP 800-67 three-key TDEA is disallowed for encryption unless specifically allowed by other NIST guidance.
Decryption using three-key TDEA is allowed for legacy use. Please see A.13 SP 800-67rev1 Transition for
more information.
Per IG A.5 Scenario 1.b implementation ii), the AES GCM IV is constructed in compliance with the IPsec-
v3 protocol per RFC 4106 and is to be used in the context of the AES GCM mode within the IPsec-v3
protocol alone. The module uses RFC 7296-compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED
from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. Per requirements of IPSec-v3, the IV is constituted
of 32-bits of salt followed by 64-bits of the deterministic nonce. The last 64 bits of the IV are deterministically
constructed using an incremental counter. When the nonce portion of the IV exhausts the maximum number
of possible values for a given security association, either party to the security association that encounters
this condition triggers a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key for the security association
per RFC 7296. In the event that the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption is established.
There are no additional user guidance instructions for correct operation of the module.
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 17 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 ACRONYMS
Table 8 provides definitions for the acronyms used in this document.
Table 8 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard – New Instructions
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CCM CBC Counter Mode
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FCC Federal Communications Commission
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC GCM Message Authentication Code
HMAC (Keyed) Hash Message Authenticating Code
INT
A validated Cryptographic Module which lies internal or
inside of the boundary in regard to the reference diagram
CM software physical boundary
IT Information Technology
KAT Known Answer Test
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SP Special Publication
TDES Triple Digital Encryption Standard
VPN Virtual Private Network
Security Policy, Version 0.1 VMware's VPN Crypto Module
May 15, 2022, Page 18 of 18
© 2022 VMware, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.